SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

168 STC 04 E Rev.1

Original: English

N ATO P a r l i a m e n t a ry A s s e m b l y

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

GENERAL REPORT

PIERRE CLAUDE NOLIN (CANADA)

CHAIRMAN AND ACTING GENERAL RAPPORTEUR
[Enter REFERENCE]STC [YEAR] E 2

International Secretariat November 2004

Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

168 STC 04 E Rev.1 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1

II. THE NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION REGIMES.......2

A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY..........................................................2
B. THE ROLE OF THE IAEA AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.....................................3
C. THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY..............................................4
D. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP............................................................................5
E. THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AND THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY....................
INITIATIVE...................................................................................................................... 5

III. RECENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CASES.....................................................................6

A. NORTH KOREA..............................................................................................................6
1. North Koreas proliferation activities.........................................................................8
B. IRAN................................................................................................................................ 9
C. PAKISTAN...................................................................................................................... 11
D. LIBYA............................................................................................................................. 13
E. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BLACK MARKET..............................................................15

IV. STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.......................................................16

A. PRESIDENT BUSH PROPOSALS................................................................................16
B. SECRETARY STRAW PROPOSALS............................................................................17
C. DR. ELBARADEI PROPOSALS....................................................................................17

V. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 19
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 1

I. INTRODUCTION1

1. Nuclear weapons are by far the most powerful instruments of destruction produced by
mankind. Some have indeed argued that atomic and nuclear armaments are the only true
"weapons of mass destruction" (WMD). For more than 50 years, the international community has
struggled to make the acquisition and development of such weapons more difficult and less
desirable. However, the establishment of a sophisticated international legal non-proliferation
regime, centred on the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and associated diplomatic
efforts have not stopped countries from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
2. About 30 countries have at different stages sought to acquire nuclear weapons, and nine are
known to have succeeded. Of these nine, five: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States, are recognised by the NPT as nuclear-weapon states and enjoy special rights
under international law. Three more countries possess nuclear weapons but remain outside the
NPT: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, a series of
events had seemed to be bringing the so-called "nuclear age" to a close. Russia and the
United States signed agreements to reduce the two major nuclear arsenals in the world. Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine unilaterally eliminated all the nuclear weapons they had inherited from
the Soviet Union. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons thus making Africa a
nuclear-weapons-free continent. In the 1990s, the international community concluded a set of
agreements and negotiations aimed at strengthening the NPT.
3. In 1998, however, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared their
intention to deploy nuclear weapons. Currently, India is thought to possess enough
weapons-grade plutonium to produce 50 to 90 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan may have
produced enough weapons-grade uranium to assemble between 30 and 50 nuclear warheads. At
the end of 2002, after agreeing in the mid-1990s to freeze its nuclear weapons programme, North
Korea acknowledged its clandestine uranium enrichment programme and forced inspectors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) out of the country. Subsequently, Pyongyang restarted
its plutonium production facilities and announced its withdrawal from the NPT. It has since stated
that it reprocessed the spent fuel that had been under safeguards and expanded its deterrent. In
2003, the discovery that Iran had secretly built a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water
production plant sparked concerns about Tehrans compliance with the NPT. Although Iran made
what should have been a comprehensive nuclear declaration in October 2003 and signed the IAEA
additional protocol two months later, in February 2004 it was discovered that the country had
blueprints for an advanced centrifuge design usable for uranium enrichment that it had withheld
from nuclear inspectors. Finally, following Libyas announcement, in December 2003, to renounce
its prohibited weapons programmes, investigations uncovered the role of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan,
the father of Pakistans nuclear bomb, in providing Iran, North Korea and Libya with the designs
and technology to produce fuel for nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear weapons design
information to Libya. Such revelations were followed by the discovery of a worldwide nuclear black
market spanning from Europe to Africa to East Asia and involving private companies and
middlemen as well as states.
4. These recent developments assume an even more worrying connotation in the light of
September 11 and the global struggle against terrorism. An increased availability of nuclear, as
well as chemical and biological weapons to failing states or to countries that support terrorist
groups represents the greatest threat to global security. In particular, the existence of a network
that can deliver technologies for producing material usable in weapons makes it extremely urgent
to strengthen non-proliferation efforts.

1
The Rapporteur would like to thank Meghan Bradley and Filippo Gamba for their assistance in
preparing this Report.
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 2

5. The NPT provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. It has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons
programmes, but it has also suffered major blows. Moreover, the nuclear non-proliferation regime
reflects the climate of the Cold War, during which it was negotiated and established. Many,
including your Rapporteur, believe that it is possible - and necessary - to strengthen this regime
and adapt it to the threats of the 21st century.
6. Proposals to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and combat the spread of
nuclear weapons have recently been put forward by both US President George W. Bush and
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General. Although favouring slightly different approaches
on some aspects, both plans seem to converge on a few significant elements: strengthening the
IAEA in its work against nuclear proliferation (first of all by requiring all states to sign the Additional
Protocol for enhanced nuclear safeguards); tightening controls over the exports of nuclear material
and technology; and controlling sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the production of
new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, and the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive
waste. Proposals for strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime have also been put
forward by UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.
7. This report will briefly describe the current nuclear non-proliferation regime and other
initiatives to curb the illicit acquisition of nuclear material and technology. It will then analyse
recent events in the area of nuclear proliferation, notably in Iran, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan.
Finally, your Rapporteur will outline recent proposals to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation
regime with a view to formulate his own comprehensive set of recommendations for the Committee
to approve during its Autumn session.

II. THE NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION

REGIMES

A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

8. The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is the backbone of the international

non-proliferation regime. With its 188 members, the NPT is the most widely adhered and
successful multilateral arms control agreement in history: only three states, India, Israel, and
Pakistan, remain outside the treaty and only one, North Korea, has announced its withdrawal from
it. NPT members fall into one of two categories: the five nuclear-weapon states (China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom and United States), and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). The two
groups have committed themselves to each other. The NNWS undertook not to acquire nuclear
weapons and put their civil programmes under IAEA safeguards. The five nuclear-weapon states
gave a commitment to pursue negotiations towards general and complete disarmament (under
Article VI) and to facilitate the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology under safeguards. Thus, the
NPT aims to halt the vertical spread of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear powers as well as the
horizontal spread from nuclear aspirants effectively freezing the distribution of nuclear weapons
in 1968.
9. All members, including nuclear-weapon states, are called upon in Article VI to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race at an early date
and dismantle their arsenals. In both the conclusions of the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the
Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the five nuclear weapon states pledged to
reduce their nuclear arsenals in accordance with Article VI. In the document of 2000, NPT parties
also agreed to 13 practical steps to implement Article VI, which included ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); early entry into force of the Strategic Offensive
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and conclusion of START III; preservation of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty; concrete agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. As we will see in
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 3

paragraphs 79 through 85, the five nuclear-weapon states have adopted different approaches to
fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations.
10. Although non-nuclear-weapon states accepted in 1968 that the IAEA carry out inspections to
guarantee that their nuclear programmes were limited to peaceful uses, the NPT does not clearly
draw the red lines of nuclear bomb making for example, it does not ban or limit the production
of enriched uranium or plutonium, both of which are vital for the development of a nuclear
warhead. This factor exposes the treatys greatest drawback as NNWS can acquire equipment in
a piecemeal fashion and eventually build an indigenous nuclear weapon. Recent events in North
Korea, Iran, Libya and Pakistan clearly demonstrate this.
11. Critics maintain that the NPT fails in its efforts to be a disincentive to NNWS to acquire
nuclear weapons. The treaty states that parties have the inalienable rightto develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with the treatys non-proliferation articles. Some claim that this factor made nuclear
programmes easily attainable, providing states that otherwise would not have pursued such
programmes more likely to go nuclear. However, others argue that, had it not been for the NPT,
many more countries could have acquired nuclear weapons. Moreover, without the NPT norm and
incentive, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine probably would not have given their inherited
weapons up; South Africa would not have renounced its nuclear weapons; and Argentina and
Brazil would not have abandoned their nuclear weapons programmes.
12. The treaty was declared in force indefinitely in 1995, yet Article X permits states to withdraw
if they give three months notice and a statement describing the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests. More importantly, there is no mention of the
consequences of violating the treaty and engaging in the transfer, receipt or illegal development of
nuclear weapons. Violations are to be investigated by the IAEA and then reported to the UN
Security Council (SC), which can decide what action eventually to take. The treaty is now
reviewed every five years and amendments may be introduced provided they receive approval by
majority vote. The NPT is inflexible when it comes to addressing nuclear states outside the treaty
i.e., India, Pakistan and Israel. According to the Article IX.3, a nuclear weapons state is defined
as one that has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967. Non-
signatories who possess nuclear weapons must abandon their weapons in order to enter the NPT.
13. All NATO members are strong supporters of the NPT, which they consider a pre-eminent
non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism. In replying to last years NATO PA policy
recommendations, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stressed, Full compliance
with the NPT is a matter of primary concern to the Alliance.

B. THE ROLE OF THE IAEA AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

14. The IAEA is the world's nuclear inspectorate and the verification authority of Article III of the
NPT, with more than four decades of experience. Founded in 1957, the Agency with its safeguards
system has provided an invaluable instrument against nuclear proliferation. Its inspectors work to
verify that nuclear material and activities are not diverted from peaceful use to military or other
unknown purposes. They inspect nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements with
more than 140 states that have committed themselves not to possess nuclear weapons.
Additionally, the IAEA assists the international community in specific cases of verifying the
dismantlement of nuclear capabilities.
15. Until the 1990s, the IAEA system focused mainly on declared nuclear activities and material.
But the discovery, following the 1991 Gulf War, that Iraq had developed a clandestine nuclear
weapons programme despite a comprehensive safeguards agreement between Baghdad and the
Agency, forced the IAEA to focus its system increasingly on possible undeclared material and
activities. Findings following the 2003 Iraq war confirmed that IAEA inspections were extremely
successful at eliminating Iraqs nuclear programme before 1998. In fact, the Agency had destroyed
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most, if not all, of the nuclear infrastructure in Iraq pursuant to UN SC resolution 687. The work in
Iraq helped the IAEA develop the experience and professional skills to reinforce its verification and
inspection capabilities, as the cases of North Korea and Iran have demonstrated.
16. In 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the model Additional Protocol to the
Safeguards Agreement, which conferred upon the Agency the legal authority to perform more
robust verification functions in the countries that agreed to sign it. Under the Additional Protocol,
states must provide the IAEA with an expanded declaration containing information on all aspects of
their nuclear activities. They are also required to grant the Agency broader rights of access to their
facilities and allow it to use the most advanced technologies. As of March 2004, only 81 IAEA
member states have signed the Additional Protocol.
17. The IAEA performs inspections at hundreds of nuclear facilities around the world as its
mandate has dramatically increased in the past decade. Despite these growing inspection
responsibilities, the Agencys budget has not increased in real terms for more than 15 years. In
2003, the Board of Governors approved a plan to increase the budget by $25 million over the
2004-2007 period. Roughly 60% of this increase was in the first year, and over 75% of the total is
for safeguards.

C. THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

18. The CTBT is the most intrusive, and potentially the most effective, tool in nuclear
non-proliferation today, as it prohibits the detonation of a nuclear device and has established an
extensive network of monitoring and verification posts to ensure the immediate detection of such
detonations. The UN General Assembly adopted it in 1996, and as of March 2004, 171 states had
signed, 110 of which had ratified it. The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after it has been
ratified by the 44 states listed in its Annexe 2, all of which formally participated in the 1996 session
of the Conference on Disarmament, and possess either nuclear power or research reactors. Of the
Annexe 2 states, 32 have ratified, including three NWS (France, Russia and the United Kingdom),
and only three (India, North Korea and Pakistan) have not signed. The United States has signed
but not ratified the CTBT, it has however maintained a moratorium on all nuclear testing since 1992
and has continued funding the CTBT monitoring and verification system. According to a note
prepared by the US Department of State, the United States does not intend to become a party to
the CTBT, but it will continue to work, as appropriate, with working groups of the CTBT
Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom) and with its Provisional Technical
Secretariat only on the International Monitoring System (IMS) and IMS-related activities.
19. The treaty established a Provisional Technical Secretariat for the CTBT Organization,
responsible for setting up the verification system and the International Data Centre that collects,
processes and transmits to members the raw information received from the monitoring system.
This system will consist of 321 monitoring stations (about half of which are already in place) and 16
laboratories located in 90 countries, using four verification technologies: seismic, infrasound,
hydroacoustic (employed to monitor the underground, underwater and atmosphere environments,
respectively) and radionuclide (detect radioactive debris from atmospheric explosions or vented by
underground or underwater nuclear explosions). In the event that a suspected nuclear explosion is
detected either by one of the stations of the monitoring system or by national technical means, any
state party can request an on-site inspection.
20. Continuing uncertainty about the timing of the treatys entry into force recently brought some
erosion of international support for the CTBT. This seems to stem from both the concerns of some
states about the rising costs of the monitoring system and the lack of ratification by the United
States together with news that Washington authorised studies on the possible development of new
or modified types of nuclear weapons, and cut the lead-time for conducting nuclear tests from three
years to 18 months.
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 5

D. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

21. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1974 after Indias first nuclear test, which
signalled that nuclear technology meant for peaceful purposes could be misused. A 40-member
voluntary organisation, the NSG adopted a set of export-control guidelines and information
exchange procedures to track developments in nuclear proliferation. Its members, which include
all NATO and EU countries as well as Russia, have to be part of the NPT regime and possess a
legally based domestic export control system coherent with NSG guidelines.
22. A first set of NSG guidelines governs the export of items that are especially designed for
nuclear use, such as nuclear material, nuclear reactors and equipment, plant and equipment for
the reprocessing, enrichment, and conversion of nuclear material. The second set of guidelines
governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies. NSG guidelines are
published and listed by the IAEA for its members. NSG participating states have recently made
efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime by engaging discussions with countries
outside the group, such as China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Mexico, as well as with
India, Israel and Pakistan. Beijing had expressed the intention of joining the NSG by May 2004.

E. THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AND THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY

INITIATIVE

23. After the end of the Cold War, a number of practical disarmament and threat reduction
measures have been launched by NATO countries, including initiatives to provide financial and
technical assistance to eliminate or safeguard weapons and military capabilities located in the
countries of the former Soviet Union. The most extensive of these measures are those carried out
under the US-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, which deals not only
with nuclear, but with chemical and biological weapons in Russia and the Newly Independent
States (NIS). A 2003 report by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) indicated that several
governmental agencies, notably the Departments of Defence and of Energy, had invested from
1991 to 2003 US$ 6.3 billion in measures to eliminate weapons or safeguard the Russian nuclear
complex as well as other WMD programmes and facilities. The same GAO report, however,
underlined a number of areas in which the Russian government could demonstrate a more
transparent and cooperative attitude. Other initiatives have been complementing US programmes,
notably the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (NDCI) co-sponsored by the
European Union, the United States, and Canada, with substantial support from Norway and Japan.
24. All these efforts will now be part of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, launched in 2002 and pledging to provide up to US$20 billion over
the next decade against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. According to
the Global Partnership Annual Report, presented in Sea Island, Georgia (United States), in June
2004, The national pledges of G8 members include commitments of up to: Canada Can$1
billion; France - 750 million; Germany - $1.5 billion; Japan - $200 million; Italy - 1 billion; United
Kingdom - $750 million; United States - $10 billion. The European Union has pledged 1 billion and
Russia $2 billion. The report also indicated that G-8 members have emphasized that additional
progress on implementation of current projects in Russia, with corresponding expenditure of funds,
is necessary before parliaments will approve increased pledges. Some countries have also
emphasized the importance of increased Russian funding. Moreover, six new countries joined the
Global Partnership in 2003 Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland
and have committed about $200 million to specific projects. In 2004, Australia, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, South Korea and New Zealand also joined the Global Partnership.
25. The G-8 countries, as part of their overall Action Plan on Non-proliferation also expressed
strong support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in May 2003 by the United
States to interdict shipments of WMD material and smuggled goods originating from, or destined
for, states of "proliferation concern". Its scope and aims are set out in the Statement of Interdiction
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 6

Principles of September 2003, which makes clear that action under the PSI umbrella will be
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. PSI was
initially taken forward by a core group of 11 states, but now more than 60 countries have
expressed political support for it.
26. In August 2004, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov declared publicly that Russia and
NATO could begin cooperate to improve security at nuclear facilities. It is likely he said that we will
reach a point when we start exchanging technologies for safe storage of nuclear weapons and
dealing with the effects of accidents involving them. In the context of the NATO Russia Council, a
Nuclear Experts Group has already been working for a few months on co-operation between NATO
and Russia in three distinct but associated areas: nuclear terminology, strategy and doctrine, and
nuclear weapon safety and security. The group has developed a joint glossary of nuclear-related
definitions and terminology; it also consults on NATO, Allied and Russian Federation nuclear
strategies and military doctrines; and it exchanges information on safety and security provisions for
nuclear weapons storage and transportation. More recently, it was also agreed that the last topic
could include nuclear-related national and NATO field demonstrations or exercises.

27. Our Committee has for many years sought to raise the attention of governments and
legislators on the security of Russian nuclear weapons and facilities. In 2001, the STC General
Report specifically addressed the issue of "Safeguarding the Nuclear Complex in Russia and the
Newly Independent States". In October 2001, during the Annual Session in Ottawa, Canada, the
entire Assembly endorsed an STC resolution urging member governments and parliaments of the
North Atlantic Alliance, among other things, to assist Russia in sealing all its warheads as part of a
reliable accounting system, as well as upgrading the protection measures of 123 nuclear weapon
storages; to launch additional initiatives and finance existing programmes to help Russia dismantle
out of service nuclear submarines; to encourage European NATO Allies and the European Union to
step up their diplomatic, financial and technical contribution to securing fissile material, combating
illicit traffic, assisting scientists and technical personnel; and to improve international sharing of
intelligence regarding nuclear material smuggling and terrorist groups interested in WMD.

28. In August 2004, during a NATO PA seminar in Spitzbergen, co-organised by the Norwegian
parliament, members were briefed on the extensive assistance being provided to Russia in order to
clean up and secure its nuclear facilities. Among the critical elements in this area, discussions
highlighted a lack of coordination among various initiatives and donors, which results in duplication
of effort and inefficiency. Participants therefore agreed with the proposal put forward by Assembly
Vice-President Pierre Lellouche that the NATO PA should highlight this issue. In his closing
remarks, your Rapporteur, in his capacity as STC Chairman, undertook to develop a proposal on
how the Assembly could address this issue.

III. RECENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CASES

A. NORTH KOREA

29. Of all the recent cases of nuclear proliferation that we will examine, North Koreas, for the
extension and sophistication of its programmes as well as the nature of its regime, is undoubtedly
the more threatening and difficult to address. North Koreas nuclear programme can be divided
into four distinct phases. During the initial phase (1959-1980), Pyongyangs efforts focused on
basic training and research, mainly with Soviet assistance. The second phase (1980-1994)
covered the growth and eventual suspension of North Koreas plutonium production programme.
The country built a series of industrial-scale nuclear facilities but denied their existence until 1992
when it finally concluded an agreement with the IAEA permitting full inspections. North Koreas
subsequent refusal to cooperate with the IAEA led to the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, and to the 1994
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US-North Korea Agreed Framework, which froze the countrys plutonium production facilities and
placed them under IAEA monitoring. The third phase (1994-2002) covered the period of the
nuclear freeze when the countrys known plutonium stocks (some 25-30 kg in spent-fuel rods) were
subject to IAEA monitoring. The final phase (2002 to present) - which was described in detail in
the 2003 General Report of the Science and Technology Committee [155 STC 03 E] - has
witnessed revival of the countrys plutonium production facilities and claims it has extracted all the
plutonium from the spent-fuel rods.
30. During US Assistant Secretary of State James Kellys visit to North Korea in October 2002,
North Korean officials reportedly acknowledged the existence of a secret uranium enrichment
programme. Subsequently, North Korea declared the 1994 Agreed Framework void and ordered
the IAEA to terminate its inspections by the end of the year. Pyongyang restarted its 5 millions of
watts of electrical output (MWe) reactor in Yongbyon in January 2003 and announced that it would
withdraw from the NPT, effective 10 April 2003. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
believe that North Koreas withdrawal from the NPT was invalid, since it has failed to comply with
the requirements for withdrawal set out in Article X of the treaty. North Korea subsequently
declared it had reprocessed all the stored spent fuel, which could yield 25-30 kilograms of
plutonium a year. In contrast to Pyongyangs uranium enrichment capability, which is years from
completion by all accounts, its plutonium production has been a constant source of concern since
the early 1990s.
31. Although US officials have been unable to confirm Pyongyangs declarations, on 8 January
2004, an unofficial US delegation visited the 5MWe reactor in Yongbyon. The visit confirmed that
the reactor was operating normally and could produce roughly 6 kilograms of plutonium a year. It
also confirmed that 8,000 spent-fuel rods removed from the reactor in 1994 were no longer in a
cooling pond, where they had been subject to IAEA safeguards, and that most if not all of the
storage containers has been emptied. The delegation was unable to confirm that samples of
material were, as described, plutonium metal and oxylate, although they appeared consistent with
these claims.
32. As indicated in last years report, the trilateral talks between North Korea, the United States
and China held on 24-25 April 2003 failed to find a solution to the crisis. The US delegation,
headed by Assistant Secretary Kelly, reiterated the US position that North Korea must disarm
completely, irreversibly, and verifiably before receiving any political or economic benefits. China
finally orchestrated a compromise, in which North Korea agreed to accept Six Party Talks (North
Korea, United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia). The first round was held in Beijing on
27-29 August and failed to reach agreement on a draft communiqu. Beijing issued a statement
that all parties agreed to resolve the nuclear dispute and to hold another round of Six Party Talks.
North Korea continued to insist that it would disarm in gradual stages with benefits at every stage
while the US argued that there would be no aid to North Korea until it pledged to move past a
freeze and actually dismantle every part of its nuclear programme in a manner that could be
verified. Moreover, North Korea continued to view the Six Party Talks as a political cover for
intensive bilateral talks with the US, while Washington remained resistant to serious bilateral
negotiations with Pyongyang.
33. The second round of Six Party Talks began in Beijing on 25 February 2004. Before the
meeting, the US administration, supported by Japan, demanded that North Korea agree to
dismantle all its nuclear weapons and development programme as a prerequisite for any
assistance. The United States and Japan were willing to consider the North Korean proposal,
backed by China and partly South Korea, to freeze its nuclear weapons programme in the context
of Pyongyangs agreement to a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear
programme. Despite the offer, North Korea scaled back its freeze proposal, and the meeting
wound down with little progress. The major advance in the talks came with the proposal from
South Korea to provide energy assistance to Pyongyang, so long as the freeze was a major step
forward to a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Koreas nuclear
programme. China and Russia agreed to join South Korea in providing such assistance. All sides
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had pledged to meet in smaller working groups soon and to hold another formal session before the
end of June.
34. During the third round of Six Party Talks, held in Beijing on 23-26 June 2004, the United
States presented a new proposal developed in coordination with South Korea and Japan. Under
such proposal, Pyongyang would, as a first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear
programmes. The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed implementation plan requiring
the supervised dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials; the
removal of all nuclear weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material
and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring programme. Only when North Korea will carry out such
commitments the other parties would, according to the US proposal, take some corresponding
steps. These would include providing North Korea with heavy fuel oil and begin studies to meet
the countrys energy requirements by non-nuclear programmes; offering provisional multilateral
security assurances; and begin discussions on steps necessary to lift economic sanctions on
Pyongyang. The North Korean proposal insisted on its goal of rewards following a freeze of all
nuclear weapons related activities. Despite the more constructive tone set by this third round of
the talks, the parties could not reach an agreement. Speaking in front of the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 15 July 2004, Assistant Secretary Kelly declared that the United States
will continue to seek answers through the Six-Party process. A fourth round of talks was
scheduled by the end of September.
35. During his briefing on 15 July, Assistant Secretary Kelly also declared that North Korea
speaks of an existing nuclear deterrent but has refrained from stating publicly that it has nuclear
weapons. However, Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan, who admitted selling nuclear technology to
Pyongyang, declared in April that during a trip to North Korea five years ago he was shown by
government officials what he described as three nuclear devices. Dr. Khans declarations have not
so far been confirmed by any other sources.
36. On 9 September, a huge explosion in an area in North Korea near the border with China
attracted much attention internationally and sparked suspicions that it might be linked to a nuclear
test. Only three days later, Pyongyangs government said the blast was in fact the deliberate
demolition of a mountain as part of a huge, hydroelectric project. Meanwhile, US Secretary of
State Colin Powell declared on 12 September that the explosion was not any kind of nuclear
event, but confirmed that there is activity going on at a potential nuclear test site, adding that the
United States was monitoring this.

37. To further complicate the difficult situation in the Korean peninsula, in September 2004 South
Korea admitted to the IAEA that several years ago its scientists had covertly produced very small
quantities of highly enriched uranium by using lasers. This immediately brought a reaction from
the North Koreans, who accused the United States of applying double standards by putting
pressure on Pyongyang because of its nuclear programme while ignoring secret nuclear
experiments conducted by South Korea. Pyongyangs state news agency also declared that North
Korea can never dismantle its nuclear deterrent force and that the resumption of the talks can no
longer be discussed unless the US drops its hostile policy.

North Koreas Proliferation Activities

38. North Korea possesses an extremely advanced ballistic missile programme having tested
and deployed missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometres and conducted a single test of a
longer-range missile, which if fully developed, could reach Alaska or even the West Coast of the
United States. Moreover, Pyongyang has supplied missile-related materials and technical
expertise to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria. From 1987 to 1996, Pyongyang exported
about 370 missiles to the Middle East, allegedly earning around $1 billion.
39. The story of the nuclear-for-missile trade between Pakistan and North Korea, going back to
the early 1990s, is particularly disquieting. In the 1980s, Pakistan did not have a diversified
industrial infrastructure, sufficient scientific and engineering manpower, or a large civilian satellite
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 9

launch vehicle programme that could be used as a base to develop ballistic missiles. From 1987
onwards, US-led multinational arms control efforts placed additional obstacles. In 1989 Pakistan
signed a deal with China to purchase 34 solid-fuelled M-11 ballistic missiles. But given Beijings
reluctance to sell longer-range missiles in the early 1990s and M-11s relatively limited range,
Islamabad diversified its suppliers. Pakistani officials visited North Korea to view a No-dong
prototype in 1992, and in May 1993 Pakistani scientists attended the No-dong test-launch. When
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang in 1993, analysts speculated that a
missile deal featured on her agenda. The missile co-operation became public when Pakistan
tested a No-dong (re-named Ghauri) in April 1998. In all, Pakistan has allegedly acquired 15 to 25
liquid-fuelled No-dong missiles from North Korea.
40. In the summer of 2002, US intelligence analysts concluded that Pakistan was the source of
North Koreas uranium enrichment technology given the exchange of scientific personnel and
some highly questionable shipments to North Korea delivered by Pakistani aircraft. Islamabad
refuted the allegations, and on 26 October 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that
President Musharraf had given him four hundred percent assurance that there is no such
interchange taking place now, but they did not, he added later, talk about the past.
Subsequently, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistani nuclear facilities in March 2003
for their role in helping North Korea obtain crucial missile equipment. In January 2004, revelations
by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, confirmed that Pakistan had
provided North Korea with many of the designs for gas centrifuges and much of the scientific
expertise and machinery it needed to produce highly enriched uranium. Predictably, North Korea
dismissed Dr. Khans confession as a whopping lie spun by the United States.

B. IRAN

41. Irans pursuit of nuclear weapons has long been suspected. It was widely known that
construction of the Bushehr reactor had been underway for decades, and that Iran had designed
its extensive, mostly indigenous missile programme to carry nuclear payloads. But until recently, it
was assumed that Bushehr was the principal component of Irans rudimentary programme. Over
the past 18 months, the revelations of a sophisticated clandestine nuclear programme have
brought Iran to the forefront of the international debate on non-proliferation.
42. Iran perceives itself as an isolated nation. Years of ideological and territorial clashes with its
neighbours, a lengthy war with Iraq, economic sanctions, and international discredit due to its
support to certain terrorist organisations have embedded a deep distrust of other nations and a
penchant for self-reliance in Iran. But geopolitical security concerns take a back seat to the
prestige factor. Iran believes that having nuclear weapons would level the political and economic
playing field and guarantee the benefits and respect of being a nuclear power, especially when
dealing with the West. On the domestic front, some experts speculate that the conservative
regime hopes to capitalise on the national pride that would ensue from the development of a bomb.
43. Over the years, Iran has sought the assistance of numerous countries to provide it with the
equipment and knowledge to build a nuclear programme. Germany was the first benefactor in
initiating, before the Islamist revolution of 1979, the construction of the light water reactor at
Bushehr, which Russia took charge of in 1995. Pakistan provided plans for centrifuge production,
and the Pakistani scientist Dr. Khan recently admitted to selling Iran uranium enrichment
equipment. International pressure on Iran has pushed Tehran to admit to purchasing nuclear
components from black market suppliers; a Malaysian police report claims that Iran was the
recipient of centrifuge parts from Dr. Khans network as far back as 1994. Along with anti-ship
missiles and chemical weapons, from 1990-1995 China furnished Iran with three zero-power
research reactors, one 30 kWt (thousands of watts of thermal output) reactor and two cauldrons.
North Korea has been Irans main supplier of conventional arms and missiles. Drawing on its right
to civilian nuclear technology, Tehran has slowly acquired nuclear know-how and dual-use
equipment piece by piece for decades. Though it has been an avid customer of nuclear
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 10

technology and knowledge, there is little evidence that Iran has sold or traded nuclear-weapon
materials.
44. For years, the extent of the Iranian programme and the ambiguity of its civil or military
purpose were under speculation. Suspicions were confirmed in late 2002 when an expatriate
Iranian opposition group, the National Council for Resistance, provided detailed evidence of the
existence of a heavy water production plant and revealed plans to construct a natural uranium
research reactor at Arak and a gas centrifuge plant at Natanz. These sites were subsequently
confirmed by a June 2003 IAEA report. The same opposition group has since exposed several
more facilities including an enrichment R&D facility at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, a
pilot plant for laser enrichment at Lashkar Abad, and a fuel-fabrication facility at Ardekan.
45. Throughout 2003, Tehran and the international community were engaged in a continuous
cat-and-mouse game. A series of IAEA inspections revealed an extensive nuclear programme,
including clandestine efforts in uranium enrichment (centrifuge production, atomic vapour laser
isotope separation and molecular laser isotope separation) and separation of plutonium. They also
exposed foreign suppliers of nuclear equipment, such as Dr. Khans network and other black
market intermediaries. With this evidence in hand, European leaders warned Tehran that its NPT
violations would be reported to the UN SC unless an addendum to the NPT was signed. After
much deliberation, the Additional Protocol, permitting more intrusive inspections, requiring a
reluctant Tehran to declare more of its research and development activities, and suspending Irans
uranium enrichment activities, was signed in December 2003. Though Iran has repeatedly stated it
has no ambitions to build a nuclear weapon, the piecemeal manner in which it has disclosed its
programme has generated international suspicion.
46. As an NPT signatory since 1968, Iran is permitted to have a nuclear programme for civilian
use. But the fact that much of the centrifuge production is taking place on military-industrial
facilities and the sophistication of its uranium enrichment activities are cause for alarm. There are
two main reasons for concern. The first is that Iran insists on developing the entire nuclear fuel
cycle in spite of the fact that it does not need to produce its own fuel as Russia has offered to
supply it, provided that Iran returns spent fuel rods for reprocessing. This would save Iran
enormous costs as well as draw approval from the international community. The second concern
is the extent of uranium enrichment Iran has engaged in. Uranium need only be enriched at or
below 7% for use in a civilian plant, yet there have been traces at much higher levels found at a
number of facilities including levels at weapons grade. Iranian officials claim the particles are
residual contamination from imported centrifuge parts, a claim the IAEA has not been able to
substantiate and for which Iran has failed to provide a plausible explanation.
47. The IAEA has taken a nuanced approach in negotiating with Iran. The United States has
called for the IAEA to formally state that Iran has not complied with its NPT safeguards obligations.
Were the IAEA to find Iran in violation of the treaty, it would be required to refer the issue to the UN
SC. A recent IAEA Board resolution, for instance, called for Libyas NPT violations to be reported to
the Council for information purposes. Should it be discovered that Iran continues to evade full
disclosure of its nuclear programme, Libyas referral could set a precedent for international
response to Irans NPT breaches, and the Council could consider condemnation and eventual
sanctions. Some Board members warn against pressing Iran too hard for fear that Tehran could
simply stop cooperating with the UN, or worse withdraw from the NPT, as it happened with North
Korea. Official statements continue to demonstrate the difficulties of handling this diplomatic
challenge. On 2 March, Dr. ElBaradei praised Iran for its co-operation with inspectors, but
admitted that the revelation of previously undisclosed elements of the Iranian nuclear programme
retarded the development of confidence building between the two sides. Talks hit their lowest point
after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted on 13 March a strong resolution condemning Irans
failure to disclose and explain its possession of P-2 centrifuges (a Pakistani model), certain R&D
initiatives and the traces of enriched uranium. In response to what it called the insulting tone of
the resolution, Tehran delayed scheduled IAEA inspections for over two weeks. Iran then
announced it would readmit inspectors on 27 March. For some, this delay in inspections gives
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 11

weight to concerns that Iran is trying to buy time by dragging its feet to build a bomb quickly. In the
meantime, Iran continued to deny it had a nuclear-weapon programme and stated that it had no
intention of building one.
48. On 18 June the IAEA Board adopted another resolution calling in very explicit terms on Iran
to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency in order to solve the outstanding questions related to
the countrys nuclear programme. Dr. ElBaradei declared during a press conference on the same
day that two issues are essential to our work: the first one being that of contamination and
particularly the issue of 36% enrichment, the second one being that of the P-2 components. UN
inspectors have worked over the summer to compile a report presented by Dr. ElBaradei to the
IAEA Board on 13 September. According to the new report, it appears that the HEU contamination
may not have resulted from enrichment activities by Iran. In fact, according to Janes Defence
Weekly, a sample of 54% enriched uranium found at one Iranian facility has apparently come from
Pakistani equipment; while a separate sample of 36% enriched uranium reportedly derived from
Russian equipment that Moscow had supplied to China, which in turn had passed it on to Pakistan,
and Dr. Khan later sold to Iran. The Agency has also gained better understanding of Irans use of
the P-2 centrifuges. However, this will require additional information on the part of Iran, and
further cooperation by other states, as well as by companies and individuals that were involved in
the illicit procurement network.
49. Following Dr. ElBaradeis report, on 18 September the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a
resolution strongly urging Iran to provide further information and explanations on its nuclear
programme. The Board also considered necessary that Iran immediately suspend all
enrichment-related activities in order to promote confidence. In its next meeting, scheduled on 25
November, the Board, following a new report by Dr. ElBaradei, would decide whether or not further
steps are appropriate. On 19 September, Iran rejected the call to freeze its uranium enrichment
programmes and threatened to stop implementing the Additional Protocol if its case was sent to the
UN Security Council.
50. In mid-November 2004, an agreement between Iran and France, Germany and Britain was
finally signed. As a result of the deal, Iran agreed to suspend all its uranium enrichment activities
in return for negotiations on possible rewards, including economic benefits, political and security
cooperation with Europe and assistance in its nuclear technology. Iran also agreed to suspend its
enrichment activities until the signing of a long-term agreement but clearly expressed its
unwillingness to definitely abandon enrichment programs. Negotiations on a permanent settlement
are scheduled to start by early 2005. The 2004 deal did not include Irans plutonium reprocessing
programme. However, Iran is deemed to be a decade away from the completion of the Arak 40-
megawatt heavy water reactor that will produce plutonium that can also be used as fuel for nuclear
weapons.
51. On November 29, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution 2004/90 on the
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contains a
substantial acknowledgement of Irans recent cooperative efforts culminated in the agreement with
the three European countries. It also underlines the voluntary and non-legally-binding nature of
Irans suspension of enrichment activities. In the document there is no mention of a possible
IAEAs referral to the UN Security Council for Irans past violation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement.

C. PAKISTAN

52. Pakistans nuclear weapons programme was established by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Minister for
Fuel, Power and Natural Resources who later became President and Prime Minister, in 1972,
shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India. Indias 1974 testing of a nuclear
device gave Pakistans nuclear programme new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistans
programme acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise.
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53. In 1975, the arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan
is a European-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies
that he had acquired through his position at a classified uranium enrichment plant in the
Netherlands. He also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from
Europe. Dr. Khan was put in charge of building, equipping, and operating Pakistans Kahuta
Research Laboratory (KRL), established in 1976. Under Khans direction, Pakistan employed an
extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its
developing uranium enrichment capabilities. China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related
materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of
weapons-grade uranium production: it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon by 1986 and acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion by 1987. On
28 May 1998, Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. Pakistan
has not signed the NPT or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, nor does it abide by a no-
first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharrafs statements in May 2002.
54. Pakistan is believed to have produced 580-800 kilograms of highly enriched uranium,
enough to produce 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. Such devices are thought to be stored in
component form, with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives, but they are
ready to be assembled in a matter of hours or days. Pakistan also has missiles with ranges from
280 to 2,000 kilometres that could carry nuclear warheads.
55. Following interrogations ordered by Pakistani authorities, Dr. Khan admitted that during the
last 15 years he had provided Iran, North Korea, and Libya with the designs and technology to
produce fuel for nuclear weapons. He also submitted a plea for clemency, and on
5 February 2004, received a much-publicised pardon by President Musharraf. Dr. Khan said he
shared the technology to divert attention from Pakistans nuclear programme and to aid the Muslim
cause. The revelations and the investigations came after Iranian and Libyan officials had told the
IAEA in November 2003 and January 2004 respectively about Pakistans aid in developing their
nuclear programmes. In October 2003, according to a Pakistani insider, Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia concluded a secret agreement on nuclear co-operation that would provide the Saudis
with nuclear-weapon technology in exchange for cheap oil. Both governments denied the
allegations.
56. It is difficult to establish the level of involvement in nuclear proliferation of successive
Pakistani governments, given the secrecy surrounding the countrys nuclear decision-making
procedures. On the one hand, Pakistans nuclear programme has been closely supervised by the
military since 1977. Some analysts have suggested that civilian governments prior to 1999 may
not have been aware of the activities of the nuclear and military bureaucracies. Moreover, the
suggestion that Dr. Khan and the KRL worked out a deal with North Korea, Iran, and Libya
independent of government seems implausible because of supervision of nuclear scientists by the
national command authority, detailed evaluations by the military preceding the acquisition of
missiles, and the improbability of making such a momentous decision by a small group of civilians.
On the other hand, it has been argued that North Korea could have recruited Pakistani nuclear
scientists without knowledge or approval by the government as they did in the early 1990s with
Russian missile scientists. On balance, it seems plausible that the Pakistani military and KRL
would have been complicit in selling uranium enrichment technology to North Korea.
57. Dr. Khan firstly told investigators that any sharing of nuclear technology with Iran had the
approval of Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the commander of Pakistans army from 1988 to 1991.
Gen. Beg however denied the allegations. Later, in his public confession, Dr. Khan took full
responsibility and insisted there had been no official involvement. Opposition parties, political and
military experts, and relatives of detained officials questioned Pakistans assertion that Dr. Khan
had shared nuclear technology without the knowledge of his superiors. Benazir Bhutto, who
served twice as Prime Minster before being ousted in 1996, said, It is difficult to accept that the
scientists could have violated government policy on their own. Those who violated the policy are
now hiding behind the scientists. Similarly, Chaudhry Nisar, leader of an opposition group, said,
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 13

The government is trying to wash their hands off by sacrificing people who made the bomb for the
country. The two main secular opposition parties, Pakistans People Party and the Pakistan
Muslim League Nawaz, called for a parliamentary inquiry.
58. Official comments revealed that Pakistan had internal information about Dr. Khans activities
far in advance of his admission. But as Gen. Musharraf admitted, It was extremely sensitive. One
couldnt outright start investigating [Dr. Khan] as if hes any common criminal. Moreover, Dr. Khan
was allowed to keep his wealth as a result of a pardon granted by Gen. Musharraf. Feroz Khan,
former director of arms control in the Pakistani military, justified the governments decision by
writing that Dr. Khan, besides being considered a national hero, knows much about Pakistans
security structure and nuclear plans and still has much to tell, therefore his pardon was
conditional on continued co-operation in unravelling the clandestine network he helped build.
59. Gen. Musharraf recently stated that Islamabad would not allow UN weapons inspectors to
monitor the countrys nuclear weapons or civil nuclear facilities following Dr. Khans confession.
He also added that Pakistan would not halt its nuclear weapons programme. On 9 March 2004,
Pakistan test-fired its Saheen II missile with a reported range of 2,000 kilometres and capable of
carrying conventional as well as nuclear warheads.

D. LIBYA

60. Libyas recent decision to halt and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programmes
has put the country at the centre of the current non-proliferation debate. Libyas decision has also
reinvigorated the notion of global non-proliferation whereas the past few years have been fraught
with the feeling that stopping the spread of WMD was hopeless, Libyas coming clean could
significantly change the future of non-proliferation policy. The Libya case also demonstrates that
non-proliferation policy, which has been a mix of treaties, international pressure and sanctions has
ultimately been effective.
61. Libyan aspirations for a nuclear programme came to light in the 1970s when Libyan officials
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from China. After this first attempt, Libya
ratified in 1975 its accession to the NPT while simultaneously developing a relationship with
Pakistani nuclear experts. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Libyan students were sent abroad to
study nuclear science, foreign nuclear experts were imported to advise on uranium prospecting
and enrichment, and numerous nations were approached with requests for equipment and
supplies.
62. The Soviet Union was the most helpful, providing Tripoli with a small, 10 millions of watts of
thermal output (MWt) light-water nuclear research reactor in Tajura and sending Soviet experts to
staff a research centre. The reactor began operating in 1979 and the following year Tripoli
concluded a formal safeguard agreement with IAEA. In the 1990s, a Russian company signed an
$8 million contract to overhaul the Tajura research centre which, apart from the 10 MWt reactor,
consisted of a critical facility which likely included a critical assembly, neutron generator
complex, a Tokamak fusion reactor, a radiochemical facility (to support isotope production
facilities), a nuclear metallurgy laboratory, and a device for measuring material stress.
63. It was known that Libya provided Pakistan with financial assistance and yellowcake
(a powdery mixture of uranium oxides resulting from uranium extraction used in the production of
nuclear fuel) in exchange for Pakistani weaponry. However, recently released information showed
that Pakistani scientists provided large amounts of know-how, centrifuges and other nuclear
components within the past decade. Libya is believed to have financed Pakistani nuclear
programmes in the 1970s in exchange for full access to nuclear technology, but it is unclear how
much the Pakistanis disclosed. Dr. Khan was a central figure in recent Libyan acquisitions, and
some in the Pakistani military were directly involved, to the extent that some shipments were made
on Pakistani military aircraft.
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64. Because requests for direct nuclear assistance had been refused by China and Russia, in
the 1990s Libya relied heavily on the growing and complex nuclear black market to acquire
equipment and plans some of which were blueprints for a nuclear warhead. Most likely the major
role the black market played was in the purchase of gas centrifuge components. Parts and
equipment were ordered from several companies in Malaysia, the most prominent of which was
Scomi Precision Engineering. Companies in Germany and Japan have also been implicated. But
questions remain on other eventual suppliers, and the role of Pakistan and Dr. Khan. Some also
suspect that Libya collaborated with Iraq on its centrifuge programmes.
65. The Libyans had been having secret meetings with American and British officials since
March 2003. In October, negotiations intensified after a shipment of centrifuge parts destined to
Libya was intercepted in the Mediterranean. Talks culminated in December 2003 when Libyan
officials announced their intention to dismantle all their WMD programmes under the supervision
and verification of international observers. By mid-January, Libya further demonstrated its resolve
by accepting implementation of the NPT Additional Protocol (which it signed in March 2004), the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the CTBT.
66. IAEA Inspectors have been examining Libyan facilities since late December 2003. IAEA
Director General Dr. ElBaradei has made several visits since and has repeatedly praised Libya for
its co-operation and willingness to grant access to weapons sites. It is too early to assess the
sophistication of the Libyan programme: thousands of documents still need to be reviewed and
IAEA experts have not yet completed their inspections of Libyan nuclear facilities. So far, officials
have expressed surprise at how extensive the Libyan nuclear programme was. But there is also
evidence that international sanctions hindered acquisition efforts as the programmes were still
lacking in parts and technical expertise. One example given is how key parts of the weapons
design blueprints were too large to be delivered by Libyas ageing Scud-C missiles.
67. Based on the information available, Libya had not reached the point of self-sufficiency in its
nuclear programme though it certainly was in the latter stages of its development. Inspectors are
still working to gauge Libyas enrichment capability. In the 1980s, it is estimated that Libya
acquired more than 450 tonnes of yellowcake uranium from Niger, which could have been used as
the base material for uranium enrichment. Tripoli was also purchasing through black market
intermediaries the components to build a large uranium enrichment plant. In the 1980s, Libya
obtained from the Soviet Union highly enriched uranium fuel for its research reactor in Tajura, and
unirradiated fuel elements containing some 17 kilograms of HEU were returned to Russia in March
2004 with US and IAEA assistance.
68. In presenting the IAEA Annual Report to the Board of Governors on 14 June 2004, Dr.
ElBaradei asserted that Libya has proactively cooperated with the Agency by providing information
and prompt access to all locations requested. He highlighted, however, that for the Agencys
assessment to be complete, Tripoli should provide information on some remaining issues, such as
confirmation of the origin of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) Libya received in 2000 and 2001;
verification of Libyas planned capabilities for UF6 production; and understanding the source of
high enriched and low enriched uranium contamination on gas centrifuge equipment.
69. In his report to the September Board of Governors, Dr ElBaradei noted that the assessment
to date was that Libyas declarations on its uranium conversion programme, enrichment
programme and other past nuclear related activities appear to be consistent with the information
available to and verified by the Agency. However, some questions related to the acquisition of
material and technology including the origin of uranium contamination on some equipment
still needed further investigation in order to verify the completeness and correctness of Libyas
declarations of its nuclear programme.
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E. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BLACK MARKET

70. Since Libyas renunciation of WMD and request for assistance in dismantling its nuclear
weapons programme, bits and pieces of information have uncovered what is likely a decades-long
existence of a sophisticated worldwide nuclear black market. For the past few decades, non-
proliferation policy has been focused on the dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons, especially
those in Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), as well as on small amounts of
radioactive/nuclear material stolen by employees in nuclear facilities and often sold to and by
organised crime gangs. State-to-state proliferation is being increasingly monitored particularly
Pakistan, Iran and North Korea and to avoid international reprimand and sanctions, these nations
have looked to an extensive network of individuals and private companies to obtain nuclear
equipment and know-how.
71. Such networks of intermediaries and brokers thrive on the poor oversight, weak export
controls, and faulty intelligence that have set the stage for a renaissance in global nuclear
proliferation. This recently uncovered black market is mostly peddling pieces, often dual-use, to
build enrichment facilities. Apparently, the most lucrative part of the industry is the sale of
enrichment components as most nuclear weapons aspirants aim to produce their own HEU and
not depend on an illicit source that could disappear at a moments notice. These components are
manufactured by companies that are already manufacturing similar machinery for the industry.
The most publicised example has been that of a Malaysian company that was contracted to make
centrifuge parts. Company officials thought they were producing parts for the oil and gas industry.
Transfers of the materials were made by front companies already involved in other lucrative
businesses, often unrelated to the energy industry.
72. The first glimpses of this black market appeared in late 2003 when names of individual
suppliers were found in Iranian documents providing nuclear weapons plans. Several more central
figures were exposed in early 2004 after Libyas renunciation of nuclear weapons and its handover
of documents to US and British investigators. To date, the most prominent individual involved has
been the Pakistani scientist Dr. Khan. A glance at his past provides an example of the type of
individuals likely to be active in the nuclear trafficking network. Dr. Khan received advanced
degrees in nuclear-related fields from several European universities, and was then hired as a
consultant to a Dutch company that produced weapons-grade uranium. The Netherlands Security
Service did not thoroughly investigate his background, and he was given a familiarisation brief,
which provided him with project design plans and the contact information of supplying firms.
Security precautions within the company were lax: in 1979 Dutch officials became aware of
Dr. Khans theft of sensitive information four years after Dr. Khan had fled the country. It should be
noted that Dr. Khans main motivation for supplying nuclear materials appears to be financial gain;
ideology and defying the West were not primary factors. In the case of Libya, investigators
reported that the Libyan government paid Dr. Khan $50 million for the blueprints, materials and
components to build a uranium enrichment facility.
73. Corporations and front companies also played a large role in Libyan and Iranian acquisition
efforts. Several companies spanning the United States, Europe, Southeast Asia, and a number
of Gulf countries either produced or provided equipment for centrifuges and weapons delivery
vehicles. The companies frequently worked in the electronics or computer industries and provided
dual-use equipment such as high-speed switches, oscilloscopes, magnetometers, telemetry
systems and airplane guidance systems (to be used for missiles). Investigations have revealed
that the majority of these companies were likely unaware of their role in the nuclear proliferation
network, and front companies suspected of aiding in illicit operations have been successful at
covering their tracks by destroying incriminating documents, claiming unawareness or vanishing
entirely.
74. Dr. ElBaradei has likened this underground network to a global Wal-Mart and has outlined its
extensive nature. When you see things being designed in one country, manufactured in two or
three others, shipped to a fourth, redirected to a fifth, that means theres lots of offices all over the
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world. He nonetheless declared that IAEA has now a good understanding of Dr. Khans network
and of how it operated, and that the Agency has discovered many of the networks players and
suppliers. But questions remain. Moreover, there are fears that other, similar smuggling networks
might emerge to fill the void left by Dr. Khans. Given the fact that the technology has become
relatively easy to acquire for ostensibly legitimate purposes because of its dual-use, criminal or
terrorist groups might be able to duplicate a nuclear black market.
75. Yet from all the evidence of a thriving nuclear trafficking network, states remain the greatest
proliferators. There is frequently a link between a nations military and a private individual involved
in underground trafficking. It was clear that Pakistani government officials at best stood aside
while Dr. Khan ordered double the amount of nuclear supplies for the Pakistani military and then
sold off the excess to other nations. Furthermore, governments continue to be the entities capable
of purchasing expensive and extensive systems and equipment. Government compliance is also
evident when cargo ships carrying this material must declare their contents and are granted
permission to unload at the recipient port.

IV. STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

76. The events in North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Libya have made it clear that the
non-proliferation regime is under stress. The current security environment is not only different from
that of the late 1960s, when the NPT was negotiated and signed, but also from the immediate
post-Cold War situation. Firstly, information and expertise on how to build a nuclear weapon is far
more accessible in our globally networked world. Secondly, we are now faced not simply with the
challenge of state proliferation, but with some form of privatisation of such threat, as the
existence of a nuclear black market clearly demonstrates. We might not wait long until that same
black market, which has so far provided states with the material and technologies to build a nuclear
device, also supplies transnational terrorist groups.
77. Three sets of proposals to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation policies have been put
forward in recent months, one by US President George W. Bush, another by UK Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw, and a third by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. All plans seem to
converge on a few significant elements and have provoked a healthy debate among experts and
policymakers. Your Rapporteur believes that they constitute a solid basis for negotiating and
putting in place a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime.

A. PRESIDENT BUSH PROPOSALS

78. Since September 11, non-proliferation has been a top-tier issue for US policymakers, and the
Bush Administration has developed a more muscular policy as can be gleaned from the 2002
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCW). According to this document,
current US policy is based on the three pillars of non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and
consequence management. In a speech at the National Defense University on 11 February 2004,
President Bush outlined a strategy to strengthen international rules governing the spread of
nuclear technology. Such strategy would include seven specific steps:
1. Strengthening the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multilateral scheme to
interdict illicit shipments of WMD material. President Bush called for greater co-operation
not only in the areas of intelligence, military services but also in law enforcement, through
involvement with agencies such as Interpol to intercept illicit weapons shipments;
2. Criminalizing proliferation activities: the UN SC should pass a new resolution requiring
all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive
materials within their borders;
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3. Expanding G-8 assistance to secure weapons and materials: the G-8 Global Partnership
to support co-operative non-proliferation projects in Russia and NIS should be expanded and
include countries such as Iraq and Libya;
4. Refusing to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state
that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.
The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should nonetheless ensure that states have
access to fuel for civilian reactors at reasonable cost;
5. Promoting the Additional Protocol: states should adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol
and by 2005 only states that have signed it should be allowed to import equipment for their
civilian nuclear programmes;
6. Creating a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors which will focus
intensively on safeguards and verification;
7. Excluding countries under investigation for non-proliferation violations from the IAEA
Board: President Bush stressed that allowing potential proliferators to serve on the Board
creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action;
79. All allies welcomed President Bushs set of proposals as a significant step forward in
international non-proliferation efforts. Some experts, however, voiced scepticism that all the points
would be welcomed by IAEA members, particularly because non-nuclear-weapon states have little
to gain from a partial revoke of the NPT nuclear bargain. Also, President Bush did not mention
any steps on the part of the United States or other nuclear-weapons states to fulfil their obligations
under Article VI of the NPT.

B. SECRETARY STRAW PROPOSALS

80. On 25 February 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw set out in a written statement to
the House of Commons his countrys proposals for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. These include:
1. States, which fail to comply with their safeguards obligations, should forfeit the right to
develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly enrichment and reprocessing capabilities civil
nuclear power stations could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their
safeguards obligations. The fuel would be subject to IAEA monitoring while in the receiving
country, and would be returned to the country of supply when spent.
2. Ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol should be regarded as a condition
for the supply of the most sensitive nuclear materials.
3. Enhance the PSI by, among other measures, securing an amendment to the Convention on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea, which will make it an internationally recognised
offence to transport WMD on commercial vessels.

C. DR. ELBARADEI PROPOSALS

81. The IAEA Director General first outlined his proposal to strengthen the nuclear
non-proliferation regime in a speech in front of the UN General Assembly on 2 November 2003.
He stressed the need for the international community to work hard to achieve the universality of
the regime and to be more assertive in resolving the root causes of global insecurity, such as
longstanding conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Dr. ElBaradei
indicated that we must work together to develop and establish a system of collective security that
does not depend on nuclear weapons, and accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament. In
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order to control access to weapon-usable material, he outlined a new approach, which he further
developed in a number of articles and interviews. This approach would include:
1. Tightening controls over the export of nuclear material: in agreeing with President Bush,
Dr. ElBaradei, insisted that it was necessary to universalise the export control system,
criminalize the acts of people who assist in proliferation, remove loopholes, and enact
binding, treaty-based controls, while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear
technology.
2. Empowering IAEA inspectors: the Agency should have the right to conduct broader
inspections such as those performed recently in Libya and Iran in every member country.
3. Suppressing Article X point 1 of the NPT: no country should be allowed to withdraw from
the treaty. Any nation invoking this escape, pointed out Dr. ElBaradei, is almost certainly a
threat to international peace and security. Therefore, withdrawal should prompt an
immediate review by the UN SC.
4. Bringing part of the nuclear fuel cycle under multinational control: sensitive parts of
this cycle, such as the production of new fuel, the processing of weapons-usable material
and the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, would be less vulnerable to
proliferation if brought under international control. Appropriate checks and balances should
be enacted to maintain market competitiveness and ensure a constant, affordable supply to
legitimate recipients.
5. Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: such an agreement, stalled in the
Conference on Disarmament for eight years, but advocated by all NATO members, would
put an end to the production of fissible material for weapons. Strengthening security
measures for material that already exists especially in Russia and the NIS should
continue to be a priority for the international community.
6. Encouraging the five nuclear-weapon states to reduce their arsenals. As Dr. ElBaradei
stressed, the very existence of nuclear weapons gives rise to the pursuit of them.
Nuclear-weapon states have unequivocally committed themselves to move toward
verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. However, following some progress in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, disarmament had nearly ground to a halt by the end of the
century, with nearly 30,000 warheads still in existence. Also the CTBT, a major part in
disarmament commitments, must be brought into force.
82. The last point appears particularly controversial and difficult to implement. Despite
remarkable nuclear weapons reductions in the 1990s, Russia and the United States maintain by far
the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. The 2002 Moscow Treaty requires each country to
reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by
31 December 2012 (approximately two-thirds below current levels). Although this treaty is
commendable, as Dr. ElBaradei indicated, unfortunately it is not verifiable and irreversible, and
it does not address non-operational warheads. Moreover, both Washington and Moscow have
recently demonstrated a renewed interest in their nuclear weapons.
83. The United States, which long ago ceased producing fissile material for nuclear weapons,
recently authorised studies by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the
National Academy of Science on the possible development of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons.
In May 2003, Congress approved a series of provisions sought by the administration that could
facilitate the development of new nuclear weapons. Legislators lifted a ten-year-old ban on
research into smaller nuclear weapons, and backed initiatives cutting the lead-time for conducting
nuclear tests from three years to 18 months. The US government insisted that it had no plans for
such tests and that no new nuclear weapons were under development. The request to decrease
the lead-time for conducting nuclear tests, according to the US State Department, is related to the
possibility of having to test an existing design for stockpile reliability.
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84. However, the Bush administration requested $27.6 million in the 2005 fiscal year to research
a robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP); $9 million for other advanced concepts, including plans
for research into a weapon of five kilotons or less of explosive force; and $30 million to shorten the
time needed to prepare a site in Nevada for the production of more modern plutonium pits,
essential for the eventual testing of new nuclear weapons. The feasibility study for the RNEP was
projected to cost $45 million between FY 2003 and FY 2005, but in March 2004 the NNSA
submitted a revised budget plan extending the projection to FY 2009 and requesting a five-year
total of $485 million. Such request, according to a Congressional Research Service report, seems
to cast serious doubt on assertions that RNEP is only a study. The lack of a revised Nuclear
Stockpile Plan along with continued debate over the RNEP development has brought about
Congressional restrictions: $4 million of the $6 allotted for advanced concepts has been fenced by
Congress and will be released for use once the Administration provides plans for the nuclear
stockpile in accordance with the Moscow Treaty. Though research on low-yield nuclear weapons
has been permitted, R&D may not proceed to the engineering development phase without prior
Congressional approval.
85. On 20 November 2004, the US Congress approved the FY2005 budget eliminating all
funding to continue research into the RNEP and to prepare the site for the plutonium pits. The $9
million requested by the Bush administration to study ideas for new low-yield weapons have been
re-directed by Congress into studies of current technologies to make existing warheads more
robust and easier to maintain without more testing.
86. Despite signing the Moscow Treaty in 2002, Russia is worried about Washington's plans to
develop a RNEP. Also, President Vladimir Putin has made nuclear deterrence a central element of
its national security policy. While Russia committed to building a modern conventional force, in
practice most R&D and procurement funds are being channelled into nuclear projects. Both the
Strategic Nuclear Forces (RVSN) and the Navy have recently enjoyed the levels of funding last
seen during the Cold War. The RVSN is replacing its third-generation Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) with highly accurate silo-based Topol-M SS-27 missiles. It already fields four
Topol-M regiments, with a total of 34 missiles, and is due to receive six more missiles in 2004.
Russia has also decided to retain on alert and to upgrade two existing multiple warhead ICBM
systems: the silo-based SS-18 Satan and mobile SS-24 Scalpel. The Navy is developing its
next-generation Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) based on Topol-M technology.
It has also revived a project to build three new Borey class nuclear-powered SLBM submarines
(SSBNs), each equipped with twelve Bulava missiles.
87. Of the other three nuclear-weapon states, China is the only one that has announced its
desire to develop new generations of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. According to the
US Department of Defense, Beijing has the infrastructure to triple its stockpile (currently around
400 tactical and strategic warheads) without significant new investment. Once an exporter of
nuclear technology, China has, since the early 1990s, improved its export controls and pledged to
halt exports of nuclear technology to non-safeguarded facilities.
88. Both France and the United Kingdom have reduced their small nuclear arsenals and ceased
production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the 1990s. Paris dismantled in 1996 its
Plateau d'Albion land-based ballistic missile system. The United Kingdom, following the Strategic
Defence Review of 1998, removed from service all air-delivered nuclear weapons, leaving the
SSBNs as the United Kingdom's only nuclear deterrent. The Review mandated that only one
submarine be on patrol at a time, with its missiles detargeted and with a reduced number of
warheads.

V. CONCLUSION

89. The recent, grave developments in nuclear proliferation have brought this problem at the
forefront of international security concerns. In particular, the discovery of a global nuclear black
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market has significantly raised public awareness about the risks of proliferation to new states and
possibly terrorist groups, and stimulated a debate about strengthening global non-proliferation
efforts. Your Rapporteur believes that revisiting and hardening the nuclear non-proliferation regime
must be the centrepiece of all international strategies against the proliferation of nuclear materials
and technologies. The proposals by President Bush, Secretary Straw, and Dr. ElBaradei have
offered new ideas and stimulated discussions among policymakers.
90. On 28 April 2004 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540 on non-proliferation of
WMD. During the Sub-Committee visit to the United Nations in New York last May, UN officials
and the ambassadors of 3 permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, unanimously highlighted the adoption of such resolution as a
major breakthrough in the UN non-proliferation strategy. The resolution will compel member
countries to make it a crime "to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist
purposes". Moreover, countries should establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The Security Council has
also established a special committee to implement the resolution, which will report on the steps
countries have taken within six months from the adoption of the resolution. This resolution puts into
practice President Bushs proposal to criminalize proliferation activities (point 2 of his proposition).
91. Your Rapporteur intends to endorse most of the elements of the authoritative proposals
outlined above, together with the suggestions that some of the Science and Technology Committee
members have kindly submitted, and put forward our own set of policy recommendations to
strengthen nuclear non-proliferation:
1. Tightening controls over the export of nuclear material: as highlighted by both President
Bush and Dr. ElBaradei, it is necessary to universalise the export control system, remove
loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls, while preserving the rights of all states
to peaceful nuclear technology. States participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group should
increase their efforts to engage discussions with countries outside the group, and in
particular with China, India, Iran, Israel and Pakistan.
2. Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): President Bush is right to call for
greater co-operation not only in the areas of intelligence, military services but also in law
enforcement, through involvement with agencies such as Interpol to intercept illicit weapons
shipments and thwart any nuclear weapons black market. Your Rapporteur would like to
endorse also Secretary Straws proposal to amend the Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts at Sea, and make it an internationally recognised offence to transport WMD on
commercial vessels.
3. Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: a global agreement to cut off the production
of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, a measure advocated by
all NATO members, is an urgent step that the international community should take. Also the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should be expanded. Innovative
technologies could help strengthen the protection, control and accounting of nuclear
weapons and nuclear material at their sources. This Convention should be amended and
expanded to cover nuclear material used in civilian programmes, storage and transport, and
civil nuclear facilities.
4. Expanding assistance to secure weapons, materials and technical expertise: the G-8
Global Partnership and all other initiatives to support co-operative non-proliferation projects
in Russia and NIS should be expanded and better coordinated. The Russian government
should adopt a more transparent and cooperative attitude in order to facilitate foreign aid
programmes. In addition, the international community should develop programmes to deal
with countries where WMD programmes have been eliminated, such as Iraq and Libya, but
also, as suggested in last years general report, convince India and Pakistan to accept
assistance in protecting their nuclear material. This Committee will address these issues in
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2005. In addition, we believe that NATO has naturally a role to play in the context of the
NATO Russia Council, but also within the activities of the Nuclear Policy Directorate and the
WMD Centre.
5. Promoting the Additional Protocol: all states should adhere to the IAEA Additional
Protocol and by the end of 2005 only states that have signed it should be allowed to import
equipment for their civilian nuclear programmes. In addition, as Secretary Straw suggested,
states, which fail to comply with their safeguards obligations, should forfeit the right to
develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly enrichment and reprocessing capabilities civil
nuclear power stations could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their
safeguards obligations. The fuel would be subject to IAEA monitoring while in the receiving
country, and would be returned to the country of supply when spent. The 40 nations of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group should nonetheless ensure that states have access to fuel for
civilian reactors at reasonable cost.
6. Reform the IAEA Board of Governors: Creating a special Board committee, which will
focus intensively on safeguards and verification, is certainly a very useful suggestion. It
would also be correct that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their
nuclear safeguards obligations should not participate in decisions of the IAEA Board of
Governors regarding their own cases.
7. Empowering IAEA inspectors: Your Rapporteur agrees with President Bush that the
Agency should have the right to conduct broader inspections such as those performed
recently in Libya and Iran in every member country.
92. The international community needs to focus its attention on the two most serious cases of
nuclear proliferation in recent years, North Korea and Iran. All NATO and partner countries should
engage, in every appropriate forum, to avoid that either country acquire nuclear weapons. Your
Rapporteur therefore suggests:
8. Continue to engage North Korea in the Six Party Talks: The international community
should make all efforts to convince Pyongyang to resume the Six Party Talks as soon as
possible. The recent US proposal illustrated by Assistant Secretary Kelly to Congress
constitutes a new important element and that the United States should take the lead during
the next round of talks and convince all parties to agree on such a proposal.
9. Clarify all outstanding issues related to Irans nuclear programme: Iran should comply
with the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 29 November 2004. Ideally, Tehran should
be prevented from developing a full nuclear fuel cycle, particularly enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities. Iranian civil nuclear power stations could operate with fuel
supplied by other countries having signed the IAEA Additional Protocol. In discussions with
Tehran, however, negotiations should be favoured over excessively aggressive tones, which
could harden Iranian positions. An Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should be avoided.
93. A number of measures might serve the purpose of strengthening the NPT. Some of them are
certainly controversial or may appear, at this stage, too improbable. Nonetheless, your Rapporteur
believes that the international community must also demonstrate a little more boldness and
creativity to advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, resolve impasses and close loopholes.
For these reasons, your Rapporteur would like to suggest:
10. Suppress Article X point 1 of the NPT: Your Rapporteur agrees with Dr. ElBaradei that no
country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. If such an amendment to the NPT
proves too difficult, any withdrawal should prompt an immediate review by the UN Security
Council.
11. Consider a separate agreement with India, Israel and Pakistan: India, Israel and
Pakistan cannot realistically be expected to give up their nuclear weapons and accept to join
the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. But changing the NPT text will destroy the
credibility of the treaty itself: it would mean officially rewarding nuclear proliferators. One
168 STC 04 E Rev.1 22

answer, as two international experts (an Israeli and an American) have recently proposed,
would be a separate, freestanding agreement or protocol that might allow the three countries
to retain their programmes but hamper further development. Such an agreement (or
agreements), signed separately by the five nuclear weapons states with India, Israel and
Pakistan, should also require full cooperation with the IAEA (including signature of the
Additional Protocol), signature and ratification of the CTBT, and a phased elimination of
fissile material production. Your Rapporteur, in proposing such a solution, would like to
make clear that a similar policy would not be acceptable toward NPT member states that
have violated or abused the treaty, such as North Korea and Iran.
12. Encourage the five nuclear-weapon states to further reduce their arsenals and refrain
from researching, developing or deploying new nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon
states have unequivocally committed themselves to move toward verifiable and
irreversible nuclear disarmament. France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
States have all substantially reduced their arsenals and are fully committed to the NPT
goals. However, researching or developing new nuclear weapons, even low yield devices,
can be considered a violation of such commitments. Your Rapporteur would like to urge
China to refrain from developing new nuclear weapons. At the same time, this Committee
should make any effort to discourage the United States to continue its research into the
development of a robust nuclear earth penetrator or any other new nuclear devices.
13. Consider the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. At the Washington
Summit, in April 1999, Alliance leaders committed NATO to consider options for confidence
and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and
disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of
nuclear weapons. In this regard, in December 2000, NATO ministers approved a set of
recommendations, which the North Atlantic Council is following up on. In particular, NATO
seeks to promote greater openness and transparency on nuclear weapons with Russia.
Thousands of sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons are not monitored or controlled by
any formal agreement, but only by a regime of unilateral, parallel reductions signed in 1991
by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. According to recent estimates, more than 3,300
warheads are still deployed on the Russian soil. Despite massive reductions of US nuclear
forces in Europe after the end of the Cold War, about 150 gravity bombs associated with
dual-capable aircraft are still deployed by the United States in seven European NATO
countries. Given the fact that NATO and Russia share an interest in eliminating or securing
such relics of the Cold War, which do not add substantially to the security of Europe, Allied
countries should begin discussing the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in the context of the
NATO-Russia Council and eventually table a proposal on a phased and verifiable withdrawal
of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Such discussions would have several
advantages: (a) increase confidence building between NATO and Russia; (b) send a positive
signal about the real commitment to disarmament of nuclear weapons states; and (c) begin
to address the proliferation problem, as US Secretary of State Colin Powell defined it, of
thousands of nuclear devices, scattered on the Russian territory and sometimes poorly
protected.