Safety and Reliability Engineering

Part 8: Markov Chains and Fault Trees

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Stefan Kowalewski

Chair Informatik XI, Embedded Software Laboratory
RWTH Aachen University

Summer term 2007

Reminder
 Agenda

Markov Chains

System Analysis
- Fault Tree
 Motivation: Markov Chains

up to now static view one failure Event

failure event
system system
functional failure

4 components
operational
frist
component repair
failure
3 components third
operational component
second
failure
component repair
failure
2 components
operational

Consider the dynamic properties different model

Markov Chains
 Markov Chains: Basic Property

Probability of failure m in the next t time units does only

depend on t
t does not matter
Markov Chain: Modelling

OK BROCKEN
Solution for the state OK
Solution for the state OK
Solution for the state BROKEN
Solution for the state BROKEN
Representation

OK BROCKEN
Considering repair rates

OK BROCKEN
Markov Matrix
Solution for both States
Analysing moo3 system
Summary Markov Chains
 Agenda

Markov Chains

System Analysis
- Fault Tree
 System Analysis

Up to now:
- Introduction to Definitions
- Reliability and Availability
- Modeling with Reliability Block Diagrams of Availability
- Redundancy
- Safety
- Mathematical Modeling with Markov Chains (more detailed
than RBD)
Now:
- Methods for System Analysis:
Fault Tree Analysis
FMEA
- Constructive Approaches (Safety)
 Facts of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

FTA is a top-down approach to failure analysis, starting

with an accident (unwanted event), and then determining
all the ways it can happen.
FTA proceeds by determining how the TOP event can be
caused by individual or combined lower level failures.
FTA consists of:
- Events
- logical connections
FTA is a common way of causal analysis in risk and
reliability studies.
FTA was first used by Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962
(Minuteman missle launch)
 FTA: Mains Steps

Definition of the TOP (unwanted) event, and the boundary

conditions
Constructing of the fault tree
Analyzing the Fault Tree:
- Identification of the minimal cut sets
- Qualitative / Quantitative analysis of the fault tree
Reporting and documenting the results
 Preparation for FTA

RBD
FMEA
FMEA
FMEA
FMEA

Fault Tree
 Boundary Condition

Possible Conditions:
Physical boundaries of the system
(Parts of the system)

Initial conditions
(Operational status of the System)

Boundary conditions with respect to external stresses

(types of external stresses should be included)

The level of resolution

(How detailed?)
 Fault Tree Construction

Define the TOP event in a clear and unambiguous way.

Important facts:

WHAT? e.g. explosion

WHERE? e.g. in a chemical reactor
WHEN? e.g. during normal operation

What are the immediate necessary, and sufficient

events and conditions causing the TOP event?
Connect via the logical gates e.g. AND- or OR-gate
Proceed to an appropriate level (=basic events)
- Independent basic events
- Events for which we have failure data
 Fault tree symbols

based on slides from Marvin Rausand, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, October 2005
 Example: Redundant fire pumps

based on slides from Marvin Rausand, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, October 2005
Example: Redundant fire pumps (2)

based on slides from Marvin Rausand, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, October 2005
Example: Redundant fire pumps (3)

based on slides from Marvin Rausand, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, October 2005
 Cut Sets

A cut set in a fault tree is a set of basic events whose

(simultaneous) occurrence ensure that the TOP event
occurs
A cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be
reduced without loosing its status as a cut set

Unwanted Event (TOP event) happens if all basic events

in a cut set occur in the time.

cut set are needed for

Qualitative assessment and
Quantitative assessment
Example: Cut Set
 Qualitative assessment

Qualitative assessment by investigating the minimal cut sets:

Order the cut sets
Ranking based on the type of basic events involved
1. Human error
2. Failure of active equipment
3. Failure of passive equipment
Look for large cut sets with dependent items
 Summary

Markov Chains:
- Assumption
- Modeling in States
- Modeling repair model (Markov Matrix)
- moo3
Fault tree analysis:
- top down approach
- cut sets
- Quantitative assessment
- Qualitative assessment