Formal Fallacies
Type A propositions: All S is P (universal
A. Fallacies in Categorical Syllogism
1. The Fallacy of Four Terms (Quaternio Terminorum)
2. The Fallacy of Undistributed Middle 3. The Fallacy
of the Illicit Process of the Major Term and Minor
Term
Case: Suga, et al. v. Lacson, et al., G.R. No. L-26055,
29 April 1968
4. The Fallacy of Negative Premises/Exclusive
Premises
5. The Fallacy of Particular Premises (Drawing an
affirmative conclusion from a negative premise, or
drawing a negative conclusion from an affirmative
premise)
6. Existential Fallacy
B. Fallacies in Hypothetical Syllogism
1. Hypothetical Syllogism
2. Hypothetical proposition a. Antecedent component
proposition following if b. Consequent component
proposition following then
3. Forms and fallacies:
a. Modus ponens Fallacy of affirming the consequent
b. Modus tollens Fallacy of denying the antecedent
C. Fallacies in Disjunctive Syllogism
1. Fallacy of Missing Disjuncts
2. Fallacy of Non-exclusivity
A. Formal Fallacy is a type of argument the logical
form of which is not validating, that is, there are
arguments of that form that are not valid. Formal
Fallacy is the most general fallacy
for fallacious arguments that are not formally valid,
and a given argument will usually commit a more
specific formal fallacysee the Subfallacies, below. A
given fallacious argument would be classified as a
Formal Fallacy only if it could not be given a more
specific classification. For this reason, there is no
Example of Formal Fallacy given; instead, see the
Examples under the Subfallacies.
A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of
exactly three categorical propositions (two premises
and a conclusion) in which there appear a total of
exactly three categorical terms, each of which is used
exactly twice.
A.
affirmative) {S= Distributed, P =
undistributed}
B. B. Type E propositions: No S is P (universal
negative) {S = distributed, P = distributed}
C. C. Type I propositions: Some S are P
(particular affirmative) {S = undistributed, P
= undistributed}
D. D. Type O propositions: Some S is not P
(particular negative) {S = undistributed, P =
distributed}
E. In modern systems of formal logic there are
usually an infinite number of argument
forms that are not validating. For this
reason, to count as a formal fallacy, a non-
validating form of argument needs at least
one of the following additional
characteristics:
It is deceptive and likely to be
committed, usually by having a logical
form that is similar to and liable to be
confused with a validating form of
argument. The fallacies of propositional
logic are of this type.
It is part of a system of rules such that
any argument of a type which the rules
can be applied to, and which commits
no fallacy, thereby breaks no rules.
Syllogistic fallacies are of this type.
Exposure:
The distinction between a Formal and an
Informal Fallacy is that a formal fallacy is based
solely on logical form, and an informal fallacy
takes into account the non-logical content of the
argument. This roughly parallels the distinction
between deductive and non-deductive modes of
reasoning. Typically, formal fallacies are
committed by deductive arguments, whereas
informal fallacies occur in arguments that could
be at best inductively strong. However, there are
exceptions to this pattern, for instance Begging
the Question.
Fallacy of Four Terms
(also known as: ambiguous middle term)
Description: This fallacy occurs in a categorical syllogism
when the syllogism has four terms rather than the
requisite three (in a sense, it cannot be a categorical
syllogism to begin with!) If it takes on this form, it is
invalid. The equivocation fallacy can also fit this fallacy
because the same term is used in two different ways,
making four distinct terms, although only appearing to be
three.
Logical Form: There are many possible forms, this is one
example:
All X are Y.
All A are B.
Therefore, all X are B.
Example #1:
All cats are felines.
All dogs are canines.
Therefore, all cats are canines.
Explanation: When you add in a fourth term to a
categorical syllogism that can only have three terms to be
logically valid, we get nonsense -- or at least an invalid
argument.
Example #2:
All Greek gods are mythical.
All modern day gods are real.
Therefore, all Greek gods are real.
Explanation: Again, nonsense. If we take away one of the
terms, we end up with a valid syllogism:
All Greek gods are mythical.
All mythical gods dont really exist.
Therefore, all Greek gods dont really exist.
Exception: None.
1. The fallacy of four terms (Latin: quaternio
terminorum) is the formal fallacy that occurs
when a syllogism has four (or more) terms rather
than the requisite three.
2. The fallacy of the undistributed
middle (Lat. non distributio medii) is a formal
fallacy that is committed when the middle
term in a categorical syllogism is
not distributed in either the minor premise or
the major premise. It is thus a syllogistic fallacy.
Description: A formal fallacy in a categorical
syllogism where the middle term, or the term that
does not appear in the conclusion, is not
distributed to the other two terms.
Logical Form:
All A's are C's.
All B's are C's.
Therefore, all As are Bs.
Example #1:
All lions are animals.
All cats are animals.
Therefore, all lions are cats.
Explanation: We are tricked because the
conclusion makes sense, so out of laziness we
accept the argument, but the argument is invalid,
and by plugging in new terms, like in the next
example, we can see why.
Example #2:
All ghosts are imaginary.
All unicorns are imaginary.
Therefore, all ghosts are unicorns.
Explanation: While there may be ghosts that are
unicorns, it does not follow from the premises:
the only thing the premises tell us about ghosts
and unicorns is that they are both imaginary --
we have no information how they are related to
each other.
Rules and Fallacies for Categorical
Syllogisms
Rule 1: The middle term must be distributed at
least once.
Fallacy: Undistributed middle
Example:
All sharks are fish
All salmon are fish
All salmon are sharks
Justification: The middle term is what connects
the major and the minor term. If the middle term
is never distributed, then the major and minor
terms might be related to different parts of the M
class, thus giving no common ground to relate S
and P.
Rule 2: If a term is distributed in the conclusion,
then it must be distributed in a premise.
Fallacy: Illicit major; illicit minor
Examples:
All horses are animals
Some dogs are not horses
Some dogs are not animals
And:
All tigers are mammals
All mammals are animals
All animals are tigers
Justification: When a term is distributed in the
conclusion, lets say that P is distributed, then
that term is saying something about every
member of the P class. If that same term is NOT
distributed in the major premise, then the major
premise is saying something about only some
members of the P class. Remember that the
minor premise says nothing about the P class.
Therefore, the conclusion contains information
that is not contained in the premises, making the
argument invalid.
Fallacy of the Illicit Minor Term and Fallacy of the
Illicit Major Term
I. We continue our discussion of the syllogistic
fallacies with the third and fourth fallacies on our
list. Consider the following argument.
All [subversives]D are [radicals]U.
No [Republicans]D are [subversives]D.
No [Republicans]D are [radicals]D.
A. We can see
from the Venn
Diagrams
corresponding
to this argument
that this
argument is
fallacious.
 B. When we 2. No C are A
plug in the 3. Therefore, no C are B
distribution
statuses for the
classes in each E. The second argument is as follows.
argument from
the chart learned All [good citizens]D are [nationalists]U
when we All [good citizens]D are [progressives]U
studied All [progressives]D are [nationalists]U
categorical
propositions, we
notice 1. We can
something see from the
interesting. Venn
Diagram for
C. Notice how in the argument, the major term "P- this
radicals" is undistributed in the major premiss, but argument
is distributed in the conclusion. that it is
fallacious.
1. Since a term is said to be "undistributed"
when not every member of the class is being
referred to, and a term is said to be
"distributed" when each and every member of
the class is being referred to, we are reasoning 2. When we
from information about part of a class to plug in the
information about the whole of the class. distribution
statuses for
2. When reasoning from a few instances to a the classes in
conclusion involving all instances, we are, each
metaphorically speaking, committing the argument
fallacy of converse accident. from
the chart lear
That is, in the premiss, we are referring to ned when we
"some radicals" and then reasoning to "all studied
radicals" in the conclusion. categorical
propositions,
Another way of looking at this fallacy is to
we notice
compare the process with subalternation on something
the Square of Opposition. interesting.
We are moving from a subaltern being true F. Notice how in the argument, the minor term "S-
(some radicals) to a superaltern being progressives" is undistributed in the minor premiss,
undetermined (all radicals) in truth value .
but is distributed in the conclusion.
3. Since this fallacious reasoning involves the 1. As in the first argument above, we are
major term in the syllogism, the fallacy
moving from referring to some of the
committed there is termed the Illicit Process
progressives in the premiss to referring to all
of the Major Term or Illicit Major, for short.
of the progressives in the conclusion
D. The Fallacy of the Illicit Major occurs when the
3. Since this fallacious reasoning involves the
major term is undistributed in the premiss but is
minor term in the syllogism, the fallacy
distributed in the conclusion (but not vice versa!).
committed there is termed the Illicit Process
of the Minor Term or Illicit Minor, for short.
Illicit major is a formal fallacy committed in
a categorical syllogism that is invalid because its major
G. The Fallacy of the Illicit Minor occurs when the
term is undistributed in the major premise but minor term is undistributed in the premiss but is
distributed in the conclusion.
distributed in the conclusion (but not vice versa).
This fallacy has the following argument form:
1. All A are B

Illicit minor is a formal fallacy committed in
a categorical syllogism that is invalid because
its minor term is undistributed in the minor
premise but distributed in the conclusion.
This fallacy has the following argument form:
All A are B.
All A are C.
Therefore, all C are B.
Rule: In a valid standard form categorical
syllogism no term can be distributed in the
conclusion unless it is also distributed in the
premisses...
Reason: ...otherwise the conclusion would
assert more than what is contained in the
premisses.
Rule 3: Two negative premises are not allowed.
Fallacy: Exclusive premises
Example:
No fish are mammals
Some dogs are not fish
Some dogs are not mammals
Justification: If the premises are both negative, then the
relationship between S and P is denied. The conclusion
cannot, therefore, say anything in a positive fashion. That
information goes beyond what is contained in the
premises.
follow logically -- it is an invalid argument. Based on the
first two premises, there is no way logically to deduce that
conclusion. Now look at examples #2 and #3. We use
the same logical form of the argument, committing the
same fallacy, but by changing the terms it is much more
clear that something went wrong somewhere, and it
did. This kind of argument, the categorical syllogism,
cannot have two negative premises and still be valid.
Just because the conclusion appears true, it does not mean
the argument is valid (or strong, in the case of an informal
argument).
Rule 4: A negative premise requires a negative
conclusion, and a negative conclusion requires a negative
premise. (Alternate rendering: Any syllogism having
exactly one negative statement is invalid.)
Fallacy: Drawing an affirmative conclusion from a
negative premise, or drawing a negative conclusion from
an affirmative premise.
Example:
All crows are birds
Some wolves are not crows
Some wolves are birds
Justification: Two directions, here. Take a positive
conclusion from one negative premise. The conclusion
states that the S class is either wholly or partially
contained in the P class. The only way that this can
happen is if the S class is either partially or fully
contained in the M class (remember, the middle term
relates the two) and the M class fully contained in the P
class. Negative statements cannot establish this
relationship, so a valid conclusion cannot follow.

Description: A standard form categorical syllogism that Take a negative conclusion. It asserts that the S
has two negative premises either in the form of no X are class is separated in whole or in part from the P
Y or some X are not Y. class. If both premises are affirmative, no
Logical Form: separation can be established, only connections.
No X are Y. Thus, a negative conclusion cannot follow from
Some Y are not Z. positive premises.
Therefore, some Z are not X. Note: These first four rules working together
indicate that any syllogism with two particular
No X are Y. premises is invalid.
No Y are Z.
Therefore, no Z are X. Rule 5: If both premises are universal, the
Example #1: conclusion cannot be particular.
No kangaroos are MMA fighters. Fallacy: Existential fallacy
Some MMA fighters are not Mormons. Example:
Therefore, some Mormons are not kangaroos.
All mammals are animals
Example #2:
All tigers are mammals
No animals are insects.
Some tigers are animals
Some insects are not dogs.
Therefore, some dogs are not animals. Justification: On the Boolean model, Universal statements
Example #3: make no claims about existence while particular ones do.
No animals are insects. Thus, if the syllogism has universal premises, they
No insects are dogs. necessarily say nothing about existence. Yet if the
Therefore, no dogs are animals. conclusion is particular, then it does say something about
Explanation: Remember why fallacies are so dangerous: existence. In which case, the conclusion contains more
because they appear to be good reasoning. The information than the premises do, thereby making it
conclusion in example #1 makes sense, but it does not invalid.

The Aristotelian Standpoint
Any syllogism that violates any of the first four rules is
invalid from either standpoint. If a syllogism, though,
violates only rule 5, it is then valid from the Aristotelian
standpoint, provided that the conditional existence is
fulfilled. Thus, in the example above, since tigers exist,
this syllogism is valid from the Aristotelian point of view.
On the other hand, consider this substitution
instance:
All mammals are animals
All unicorns are mammals
Some unicorns are animals
Since "unicorns" do not exist, the condition is not
fulfilled, and this syllogism is invalid from either
perspective.
FELIPE SUNGA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs. HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Martin B. Isidro for petitioners-appellants.
Asst. City Fiscal Melecio M. Aguayo for respondents-
appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
On November 11, 1948 the appellants Felipe Sunga, et
al., filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila to stop
the two appellees the mayor and engineer,
respectively, of the City of Manila from demolishing
the appellant's houses along the Estero de Vitas in Tondo,
Manila. The court ordered summons to be served on the
appellees "upon payment by the petitioners [the appellants
herein] of the corresponding Sheriff's fees." Ten days
later, or on November 24, 1958, the court, after hearing
both parties, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the filing by the appellants of a bond in
the amount of P1,000, "to be approved by this court."
Neither order was complied with by the appellants. Thus
although the appellants appear to have filed a bond, they
never asked the court to approve it, nor did they pay the
sheriff's fees. The result was that after four long months
from the filing of the suit had elapsed, summons was yet
to be served on the appellees and an injunction was yet to
be served. On March 20, 1959 the appellees asked the
court to dismiss the case. Although no copy of their
motion was served on the appellants, it appears
nevertheless that the latter were notified by the court that
the motion would be heard on June 13, 1959.
On June 13, 1959 the court dismissed the case. The
appellants asked for a reconsideration but the court stood
pat on its order. Hence this appeal, originally taken to the
Court of Appeals but certified by the latter to this Court
on the ground that the issue involved is one purely of law.
1. It is first of all contended that the lower court could not only through the use of the "illicit major."
act on the motion to dismiss filed by the appellees
because the former had not acquired jurisdiction over the Summonses are Notices, Appearances are not
persons of the latter. The claim of lack of jurisdiction is
predicated on the fact that no summons was served on the
appellees. The appellants argue that before summons is
issued to the appellees only they (the appellants) can
dismiss the action under section 1 of Rule 17 (formerly
Rule 30) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Dismissal by the plaintiff . An action may be dismissed
by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in
the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent
court an action based on or including the same claim. A
class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court.
The appellants overlook the fact that while it is true that
no summons was served on the appellees (because of the
appellants' own failure to pay the sheriff's fees), the
appellees appeared in court and were in fact required by it
to file a memorandum at the hearing held on November
17 on the appellants' prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. A defendant's voluntary appearance in an
action is equivalent to the service of summons upon
him.1Nor was that the only time the appellees voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the lower
court. Their filing of a motion to dismiss (not because of
lack of jurisdiction over their persons, but because of the
appellants' failure to prosecute their action) was an act of
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.2 This bears
strong emphasis because jurisdiction over the person,
unlike that over the subject-matter, is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of the party who has the right to
question the court's jurisdiction, namely, the defendant.
2. Nor is there merit in the claim that until the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, a defendant has no
standing to move for the dismissal of an action. Applied
to this case this proposition means that the appellants
own neglect to pay the sheriff's fees can be the very
means by which they can maintain in perpetuity an
action they have neglected to prosecute.
Nothing in the language of section 1 of Rule 17
supports the view that before the defendant has
answered, the action can be dismissed ONLY at the
instance of the plaintiff. To paraphrase Frankfurter, only
literary perversity or jaundiced partisanship can sponsor
such a particular rendering of the law.3 For what the rule
says is that before the defendant has answered, the
plaintiff can withdraw his action by merely giving notice
to the court,4 but that after the defendant has answered the
plaintiff may do so only with prior leave of the court. 5 In
other words, the rule governs the conditions under which
the plaintiff may dismiss his action; it does not purport to
deny thereby to the defendant the right to seek the
dismissal of the action, in much the same way that to say
that all men are mortal does not mean that all women are
not.6 Such implication rests on a fallacy and is possible
Summonses, Appearances are not Notices
Exclusive Premises
(also known as: fallacy of exclusive premises)
Description: A standard form categorical syllogism that
has two negative premises either in the form of no X are
Y or some X are not Y. exactly twice.
Logical Form:
No X are Y.
Some Y are not Z.
Therefore, some Z are not X.
No X are Y.
No Y are Z.
Therefore, no Z are X.
Example #1:
No kangaroos are MMA fighters.
Some MMA fighters are not Mormons.
Therefore, some Mormons are not kangaroos.
Example #2:
No animals are insects.
Some insects are not dogs.
Therefore, some dogs are not animals.
Example #3:
No animals are insects.
No insects are dogs.
Therefore, no dogs are animals.
Explanation: Remember why fallacies are so dangerous:
because they appear to be good reasoning. The
conclusion in example #1 makes sense, but it does not
follow logically -- it is an invalid argument. Based on the
first two premises, there is no way logically to deduce that
conclusion. Now look at examples #2 and #3. We use
the same logical form of the argument, committing the
same fallacy, but by changing the terms it is much more
clear that something went wrong somewhere, and it
did. This kind of argument, the categorical syllogism,
cannot have two negative premises and still be valid.
Just because the conclusion appears true, it does not mean
the argument is valid (or strong, in the case of an informal
argument).
Exception: None.
Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Premise
Get the Book!
This is our first fallacy in formal logic out of about a
dozen presented in this book. Formal fallacies can be
confusing and complex, and are not as common in
everyday situations, so please dont feel lost when reading
through the formal fallaciesdo your best to understand
them as I do my best to make them understandable.
New Terminology:
Syllogism: an argument typically consisting of three
parts: a major premise, a minor premise, and a
conclusion.
Categorical Term: usually expressed grammatically as a
noun or noun phrase, each categorical term designates a
class of things.
Categorical Proposition: joins together exactly two
categorical terms and asserts that some relationship
holds between the classes they designate.
Categorical Syllogism: an argument consisting of exactly
three categorical propositions: a major premise, a minor
premise, and a conclusion, in which there appear a total
of exactly three categorical terms, each of which is used
Description: The conclusion of a standard form
categorical syllogism is affirmative, but at least one of the
premises is negative. Any valid forms of categorical
syllogisms that assert a negative premise must have a
negative conclusion.
Logical Form:
Any form of categorical syllogism with an affirmative
conclusion and at least one negative premise.
Example #1:
No people under the age of 66 are senior citizens.
No senior citizens are children.
Therefore, all people under the age of 66 are children.
Explanation: In this case, the conclusion is obviously
counterfactual although both premises are
true. Why? Because this is a categorical syllogism where
we have one or more negative premises (i.e., no
people... and no senior citizens...), and we are
attempting to draw a positive (affirmative) conclusion
(i.e., all people...).
Example #2:
No donkeys are fish.
Some asses are donkeys.
Therefore, some asses are fish.
Explanation: This is a categorical syllogism where we
have a single negative premise (i.e., no donkeys), and
we are attempting to draw a positive (affirmative)
conclusion (i.e., some asses).
Exception: None.
Existential Fallacy
(also known as: existential instantiation)
Description: A formal logical fallacy, which is committed
when a categorical syllogism employs two universal
premises (all) to arrive at a particular (some)
conclusion.
In a valid categorical syllogism, if the two premises are
universal, then the conclusion must be universal, as well.
The reasoning behind this fallacy becomes clear when
you use classes without any members, and the conclusion
states that there are members to this class -- which is
wrong.
Logical Form:
All X are Y.
All Z are X.
Therefore, some Z are Y.
Example #1:
All babysitters have pimples.
All babysitter club members are babysitters.
Therefore, some babysitter club members have pimples.
Example #2:
All forest creatures live in the woods.
All leprechauns are forest creatures.
Therefore, some leprechauns live in the woods.
Explanation: In both examples, the fallacy is committed
because we have two universal premises and a particular
conclusion, but our example #1 conclusion makes sense,
no? Just because the conclusion might be true, does not syllogisms, two of which are valid, while two of which
mean the logic used to produce it, was valid. This is how are invalid.
tests like SATs and GREs screw us over and,
technically, in the above example, all babysitter club The VALID forms are:
members have pimples, not just some.
Now look at the second example. Same form, but when
we use classes that obviously (to most people) have no (AA) Affirming the If p, then q.
members (leprechauns), we can see that it results in a Antecedent p.
conclusion that is false. q
Exception: There actually is an exception to this formal or Modus Ponens
fallacy -- if we are strictly using Aristotelian logic, then it
is permissible because apparently Aristotle did not see a
problem with presupposing that classes have members (DC) Denying the If p, then q.
even when we are not explicitly told that they do. Consequent Not q.
Not p.
Hypothetical Syllogisms or Modus Tollens

Hypothetical syllogisms are short, two-premise And the INVALID forms (or pretenders) are:
deductive arguments, in which at least one of the
premises is a conditional, the antecedent or
consequent of which also appears in the other (AC) Affirming the If p, then q.
premise. Consequent (AC) q.
p.

I. Pure Hypothetical Syllogisms:

(DA) Denying the If p, then q.
In the pure hypothetical syllogism (abbreviated HS), Antecedent (DA) Not p.
both of the premises as well as the conclusion are Not q.
conditionals. For such a conditional to be valid the
antecedent of one premise must match the consequent
of the other. What one may validly conclude, then, is a You will want to remember these rules for validity!!!
conditional containing the remaining antecedent as
antecedent and the remaining consequent as You can perhaps see why these forms are valid or
consequent. (You might simply think of the middle invalid by considering a very simple example. Think
term the proposition in common between the two of the following four syllogisms:
premises as being cancelled out.)

Its not hard to visualize the valid hypothetical 1. Affirming the 2. Denying the
syllogism. The following schema illustrate whats Antecedent (AA) Antecedent (DA)
going on:
If Tweety is a bird, then If Tweety is a bird, then
Tweety flies. Tweety flies.
If p, then q. If p, then not r. Tweety is a bird. Tweety is not a bird.
If q, then r. If not r, then not q. Tweety flies Tweety doesnt fly.
(So) If p, then r (So) If p, then not q

3. Affirming the 4. Denying the

Other forms are invalid (unless they can be converted Consequent (AC) Consequent (DC)
into a valid form by the law of contraposition see
my notes for categorical syllogisms). If Tweety is a bird, then If Tweety is a bird, then
Tweety flies. Tweety flies.
Tweety flies. Tweety doesnt fly.
II. Mixed Hypothetical Syllogisms: Tweety is a bird Tweety is not a bird.

In mixed hypothetical syllogisms, one of the premises

is a conditional while the other serves to register While syllogisms 1. and 4. above seem to follow
agreement (affirmation) or disagreement (denial) with logically, its clear that 2. and 3. do not, and for
either the antecedent or consequent of that precisely the same reason that there are things that
conditional. There are thus four possible forms of such fly other than birds (bats, for instance). And Tweety
might just happen to be one of those. AA and DC are not q.
thus considered valid, while AC and DA are considered
invalid.
1 Only if 1 Given
3. p, q 4. p, not
III. Exercises: The following is a list of schematized Not p. q.
hypothetical syllogisms. First, put them into standard Not q Not q.
form and then determine their validity by identifying p.
their form (HS, AA, AC, DA, or DC)
1 P 1 Not p,
Examples: 5. whene 6. should
ver q. it be q.
i. P, if SOLUTI ii. P only SOLUTI q. Not p
not q. ON: if Q ON: p. Q
q. If not q, Whene If p, then
Not then p. ver Q, q. 1 Not p
p. q. not R If q, then 7. only if
Not p. Not r, not r. q.
given If p, then Whene
Invalid p. not r. ver q,
(DA) r.
Valid R
(HS) unless
p.
1. If p, q. 2. P only
q. if q.
p. Not p. Answers to odd exercises:
Not q.
3. Withou 4. P, 1. Invalid (AC)
t p, q. provide 3. Valid (AA)
Not p. d that 5. Valid (HS)
q. q. 7. Invalid (AA [but wrong conclusion!])
Not p. 9. Valid (HS)
Not q. 11. Invalid (AC)
5. If p, 6. If p, 13. Valid (DC)
then then r. 15. Valid (AA)
not q. If p, 17. Valid (HS)
R, then q.
unless If r, A hypothetical syllogism is a syllogism that has a
q. then q. hypothetical proposition as one of its premises.
If p,
then r. 1.Hypothetical Propositions A hypothetical
proposition is one whose predicate does not assert of
7. Assum 8. P if q. the subject in an absolute manner. There are three
ing p, Not q. kinds of hypothetical propositions:
q. Not p. a.conditional (if, then) the assertion of the
p. consequent is dependent upon
not q. the condition established by the antecedent.
9. P only 1 P else If the elections will not push through then there will
if q. 0. q. violence in the country.
Q only Not q. b.disjunctive (either, or) affirms the possibility of
if r. Not p. one or more of the
P only alternatives.
if r. A candidate for public office is either qualified on
unqualified.
c.conjunctive (not both, and) denies the
1 P 1 Unless simultaneous possibility of both
1. unless 2. p, q. alternatives.
q. Not q. The farmer cannot be environment friendly and not
p. p. environment friendly at the
same time. 1. If A then B
An antecedent is the first half of 2. B
a hypothetical proposition, whenever the if-clause Therefore, A
precedes the then-clause. It is also known for a person's No matter what claims you substitute for A and B, any
principles to a possible or hypothetical issue. In some argument that has the form of I will be valid, and any
contexts the antecedent is called the protasis.[1] argument that AFFIRMS THE CONSEQUENT will be
Examples: INVALID.
Remember, what it means to say that an argument is
If , then . invalid is that IF the premises are all true, the conclusion
This is a nonlogical formulation of a hypothetical could still be false. In other words, the truth of the
proposition. In this case, the antecedent is P, and premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
the consequent is Q. In an implication, Heres an example:
1. If I have the flu then Ill have a fever.
2. I have a fever.
if implies then is called Therefore, I have the flu.
Here were affirming that the consequent is true, and
the antecedent and is called the consequent.[2] from this, inferring that the antecedent is also true.
But its obvious that the conclusion doesnt have to be
If is a man, then is mortal. true. Lots of different illnesses can give rise to a fever,
so from the fact that youve got a fever theres no
guarantee that youve got the flu.
" is a man" is the antecedent for this proposition.
More formally, if you were asked to justify why this
If men have walked on the moon, then I am the king argument is invalid, youd say that its invalid because
of France. there exists a possible world in which the premises are
Here, "men have walked on the moon" is the antecedent. all true but the conclusion turns out false, and you could
defend this claim by giving a concrete example of such a
A consequent is the second half of a world. For example, you could describe a world in
hypothetical proposition. In the standard form of such a which I dont have the flu but my fever is brought on by
proposition, it is the part that follows "then". In bronchitis, or by a reaction to a drug that Im taking.
an implication, if P implies Q, then P is called Another example:
the antecedent and Q is called the consequent.[1] In some
1. If theres no gas in the car then the car wont run.
contexts the consequent is called the apodosis.[2]
2. The car wont run.
Examples: Therefore, theres no gas in the car.
This doesnt follow either. Maybe the battery is dead,
If , then . maybe the engine is shot. Being out of gas isnt the only
possible explanation for why the car wont start.
is the consequent of this hypothetical proposition. Heres a tougher one. The argument isnt written in
standard form, and the form of the conditional isnt quite
as transparent:
If is a mammal, then is an animal.
You said youd give me a call if you got home before 9
PM, and you did call, so you must have gotten home
Here, " is an animal" is the consequent. before 9 PM.
If computers can think, then they are alive. Is this inference valid or invalid? Its not as obvious as
"They are alive" is the consequent. the other examples, and partly this is because theres no
The consequent in a hypothetical proposition is not natural causal relationship between the antecedent and
necessarily a consequence of the antecedent. the consequent that can help us think through the
If monkeys are purple, then fish speak Klingon. conditional logic. We understand that cars need gas to
"Fish speak Klingon" is the consequent here, but operate and flus cause fevers, but theres no natural
intuitively is not a consequence of (nor does it have causal association between getting home before a certain
anything to do with) the claim made in the antecedent that time and making a phone call.
"monkeys are purple". To be sure about arguments like these you need to draw
Affirming the Consequent is the name of upon your knowledge of conditional claims and
an invalid conditional argument form. You can think of conditional argument forms. You identify the antecedent
it as the invalid version of modus ponens. and consequent of the conditional claim, rewrite the
Below is modus ponens, which is valid: argument in standard form, and see whether it fits one of
1. If A then B the valid or invalid argument forms that you know.
2. A Heres the argument written in standard form, where
Therefore, B weve been careful to note that the antecedent of the
Now, below is the invalid form that you get when you conditional is what comes after the if:
try to infer the antecedent by affirming the consequent:
1. If you got home before 9 PM, then youll give me a
call.
2. You gave me a call.
Therefore, you got home before 9 PM.
Now its clearer that the argument has the form of
affirming the consequent, which we know is invalid.
The argument would be valid if the you said that youd
give me a call ONLY IF you got home before 9 PM, but
thats not whats being said here. If you got home at
9:30 or 10 oclock and gave me a call, you wouldnt be
contradicting any of the premises.
If these sorts of translation exercises using conditional
statements are unfamiliar to you then you should check
out the tutorial course on Basic Concepts in
Propositional Logic, which has a whole section on
different ways of saying If A then B.
Denying the antecedent, sometimes also called inverse
error or fallacy of the inverse, is a formal fallacy of
inferring the inverse from the original statement. It is
committed by reasoning in the form:[1]
If P, then Q.
Therefore, if not P, then not Q.
which may also be phrased as
(P implies Q)
(therefore, not-P implies not-Q)[1]
Arguments of this form are invalid. Informally, this
means that arguments of this form do not give good
reason to establish their conclusions, even if their
premises are true.
The name denying the antecedent derives from the
premise "not P", which denies the "if" clause of
the conditional premise.
One way to demonstrate the invalidity of this argument
form is with a counterexample with true premises but an
obviously false conclusion. For example:
If you are ski instructor, then you have a job.
You are not a ski instructor
Therefore, you have no job[1]
That argument is intentionally bad, but arguments of the
same form can sometimes seem superficially convincing,
as in the following example offered, by Alan Turing in
the article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence":
If each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by
which he regulated his life he would be no better than a
machine. But there are no such rules, so men cannot be
machines.[2]
However, men could still be machines that do not follow
a definite set of rules. Thus this argument (as Turing
intends) is invalid.
It is possible that an argument that denies the antecedent
could be valid, if the argument instantiates some other
valid form. For example, if the claims P and Q express
the same proposition, then the argument would be
trivially valid, as it would beg the question. In everyday
discourse, however, such cases are rare, typically only
occurring when the "if-then" premise is actually an "if and
only if" claim (i.e., a biconditional/equality). For
example:
If I am President of the United States, then I can veto
Congress.
I am not President.
Therefore, I cannot veto Congress.
The above argument is not valid, but would be if the first
premise ended thus: "...and if I can veto Congress, then I
am the U.S. President" (as is in fact true). More to the
point, the validity of the new argument stems not from
denying the antecedent, but modus tollens (denying the
consequent).
the consequent does not hold ( not-q ), then the negation
of the antecedent ( not-p ) can be inferred.
Disjunctive Syllogism
Description
The basic form of the disjunctive syllogism is: Either A
is true or B is true. (A exclusive-or B). Thus, if A is
true, B is false, and if B is true, A is false. A and B
cannot both by true.
Major premise
The major premise is given in the form of a choice
between alternatives, with the assumption that one out
of two or more alternative choices is right and that the
rest are wrong.
This may appear in a single sentence:
Either Jim, Fred or Billy did it.
Minor premise
The minor premise either selects or rejects alternatives,
thus leading to the conclusion.
Jim was in the bar. But Fred had the motive.
Conclusion
The conclusion may be spoken, although often it is not,
as it is intended that the target of the major premise
concludes this by his or herself. For example:
Fred killed Julius.
Example
Politicians love disjunctive syllogisms, as they offer
stark choices:
Either you vote for me or you vote for
disaster.
Advertisers love them too. Note here how an airline
uses unspoken scare tactics about driving or going by
train.
Flying is the safest way to travel.
Discussion
When comparing two or more items, you are using
the contrast principle in highlighting the differences
between a target item and the other items.
A fallacy happens here when it is assumed that the
choices offered are the only choices. By offering
alternatives, the listener is given the impression that
this is all there is, and that other choices do not exist.
This is the basis of the sales person's alternative close.
Another fallacy occurs where it is assumed that the two
alternatives are mutually exclusive. So if one has a
particular characteristic, the other is assumed not to have
any of this characteristic. For example, you can cast
yourself and your ideas as good by criticizing others as
bad. The other guy is bad, which means I am good.
Affirming a Disjunct
(also known as: the fallacy of the alternative disjunct,
false exclusionary disjunct, affirming one disjunct, the
fallacy of the alternative syllogism, asserting an exclusive. If it is not for any one case at all, then there is a
alternative, improper disjunctive syllogism, fallacy of the possibility that the classification is not applicable to the
disjunctive syllogism) case or cases at issue in the argument. If the classification
New Terminology: is faulty in general, then it may be faulty in important
Disjunction: A proposition of the "either/or" form, which particulars. Again it should be observed that the fault may
is true if one or both of its propositional components is not be deliberate. It is very hard to make adequate
true; otherwise, it is false. classifications, and the classifier may simply not have
Disjunct: One of the propositional components of a noticed that his divisions are not applicable to certain
disjunction. elements of the situation. The thing to do is to examine
Description: Making the false assumption that when the fundamentum divisionis, the basis of the division, and
presented with an either/or possibility, that if one of the see if the classification can be repaired.
options is true that the other one must be false. This is EXAMPLE COMMENT
when the or is not specifically defined as
being exclusive. Peter argues, "You either Many forms of savings are
This fallacy is similar to the unwarranted contrast fallacy. save your money or you relatively free of risk --
Logical Form: invest it. If you save it, you deposits in banks,
P or Q. get caught in the inflation, government bonds, and
P. since money in the some types of investment
Therefore, not Q. stocking will buy less trusts. The accumulated
tomorrow than it will if interest is normally larger
P or Q. you spend it today. If you than the rate of inflation. In
Q. invest it, you run the risk of the case of sound stocks
Therefore, not P. losing it. They've got you and some real estate, the
Example #1: going and coming." value inflates with the rest
I cant stop eating these chocolates. I really love of the economy. Peter's
chocolate, or I seriously lack will power. I know I really argument is a false
love chocolate; therefore, I cannot lack willpower. dilemma.
Explanation: Ignoring the possible false dilemma, the fact All arguments pose a dilemma insofar as they rest on
that one really loves chocolate does not automatically classification. The dilemma becomes a false dilemma
exclude the other possibility of lacking willpower. when the classification is faulty. False dilemmas turn on a
Example #2: non-exclusive classification whenever one of the
I am going to bed or watching TV. I am exhausted so I alternatives is not as represented, just as it will be non-
will go to bed; therefore, I cannot watch TV. exhaustive whenever there is a third alternative. In this
Explanation: It is logically and physically possible to go connection it will be instructive to review #7 and see if
to bed and watch TV at the same time, I know that for a you can decide which of the dilemmas cited there get their
fact as I do it just about every night. The or does not plausibility from non-exhaustive classifications, which
logically exclude the option that is not chosen. from non-exclusive, that is, which violate Rule 1 and
Exception: If the choices are mutually exclusive (either which Rule 2.
by necessity or indicated by the word "either"), then it can
be deduced that the other choice must be false. Again, we
are working under the assumption that one of the choices
we are given represents the truth.
b) Non-exclusive Classification (Rule 2)
A classification is non-exclusive when elements in the
situation get put under more than one co-ordinate head.
The trouble here can sometimes be corrected by choosing
a different basis of division. A simple artificial example
would be for someone to attempt to divide animals as
"cold-blooded" or "vertebrates." Since reptiles, fish, etc.,
are both, this classification does not operate for these
important sections of the animal world. The classification
is easily corrected by distinguishing first among the
vertebrates and invertebrates, then perhaps among the
cold and warm-blooded animals. The shark then is
properly classified as species vertebrate, subspecies cold-
blooded; elephants as vertebrates, warm-blooded; crabs as
invertebrates, cold-blooded. This is not very profound, but
it is at least applicable to the animal world.
One way to examine an argument dependent on a
classification is to test whether or not the classification is