THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104386. March 28, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, and ARNULFO C. TALISIC, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reminds members of the bench and the bar alike that the
right of an accused to a speedy trial is not violated by well-grounded motions for postponement, and
that courts should not be too hasty in denying reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the
prosecution of its day in court. In the end, precipitate dismissals, instead of unclogging court dockets
and easing the burden of the accused, unnecessarily delay cases and, ironically enough, cause the
very evil sought to be avoided.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the Solicitor General to set
aside the order of the respondent Judge dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-91-17782, on the ground that
the prosecution was not prepared for the first scheduled hearing of the case due to the non-
availability of its witness who was out of town on official business.
The Antecedent Facts
The following Information[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] for libel was filed against private respondent Arnulfo
C. Talisic in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City:
That on or about the 10th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty,
virtue and reputation of one DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu and with
the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Democrito T. Mendoza to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused (sic) to be published in
Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines based in Cebu City an article
with the following statements:
x x x Meanwhile, Liloan Councilor Arnulfo Talisic has called the attention of the National Government,
especially the Department of Environment and National Resources (DENR) to speed up the
resolution of the Silot Bay problem.
Silot Bay, according to Talisic, had been allegedly grabbed by an influential labor leader resulting in
the deprivation of livelihood of small fishermen in the area.
Silot Bay, Talisic alleged, had been titled in the name of a former Marcos man in connivance with
corrupt DENR officials.
Talisic said the government has already ruled in favor of the protesting residents, but its reopening
until now has been deferred for unknown reasons. (italics supplied)
wherein the offended party was portrayed to be a landgrabber having grabbed Silot Bay and caused
the same to be titled in his name and of his children: accused knowing fully well that the same is not
true, thereby causing dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the person of said Democrito T. Mendoza,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of Criminal Case No. Q-91-
17782 was scheduled for July 29, 1991.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Three days before said scheduled hearing or on July 26, 1991, private prosecutor Amado A. Caballero
filed an urgent motion for postponement,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] citing as ground therefor, the fact that
the complainant, Atty. Democrito T. Mendoza, would still be out of town during said date for the
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reason that he would be in Cebu City to attend to the strike of some workers in some firms in Cebu
City and his personal presence thereat is very necessary. Since said witness would be out of the
country during the month of August 1991 to attend to some official transaction relative to the
International Labor Movement and would be back during the first week of September 1991, private
prosecutor prayed that the scheduled hearing be reset to a later day, preferably on September 9 or
13, 1991 at 8:30 a.m. Only the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was furnished a copy of this motion.
Also on July 26, 1991, private respondent, through Atty. Lorenda Estrella-Amion of the Public
Attorneys Office, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the facts charged in the
Information do not constitute an offense.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Invoking Kunkle vs. Cablenews-
American and Lyons[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] holding it not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed but that a third person must be able to identify the
complainant as the object of the libelous publication, private respondent claimed that the
Information did not identify the person allegedly alluded to in the article and neither did it state that
a third person could identify said Democrito T. Mendoza as the object thereof. Private respondent
stressed that he did not write the article nor cause its publication, and never had the intention to
publish the same. The Office of the City Prosecutor was duly served a copy of this motion.
On July 29, 1991, the day of the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifested in open court that
he had filed an urgent motion for postponement, and moved for the cancellation of hearing for that
day due to the unavailability of the prosecution witness. The public prosecutor did not object to the
postponement. On the other hand, the defense manifested that it had filed a motion to dismiss. The
respondent Judge then issued in open court the following Order[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] now being
assailed:
There being no showing that the prosecution is ready for this morning (sic) scheduled hearing, in
view of the manifestation of counsel for the accused, that they have filed a Motion to Dismiss dated
July 25, 1991, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The Cash Bond of accused Arnulfo G. Talisic in the amount of P4,200.00 covered by Official Receipt
No. 0498706 S dated March 8, 1991 is hereby ordered returned to him.
Furthermore, upon motion of the private prosecutor, he is hereby allowed to file a motion for
reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of said Order, stating that the
prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection to the motion to dismiss as it was served a copy
thereof only on the day of hearing itself. He insisted that the court should have considered as valid
the reason for the absence of the prosecutions principal witness, as his presence in Cebu City was
duly certified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On August 7, 1991, the trial court gave the defense five (5) days from notice within which to file a
comment to the motion for reconsideration furnishing copy to the opposing counsel who shall have
five (5) days to file a reply, after which the matter shall be deemed submitted.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
On August 14, 1991, Atty. Estrella-Amion withdrew her appearance as counsel for accused (private
respondent), which the court duly approved.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] On the same day, Atty. Gregorio
Tanaka Viterbo, Jr. of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) entered his appearance as counsel for
private respondent. In compliance with the August 7, 1991 order of the trial court, he also filed an
opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
On November 5, 1991, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order which reads:
1
For the reasons stated by the complaining witness through his Private Prosecutor in his Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 31, 1991, and considering the opposition interposed by the
accused through his counsel, the Court finds said Motion to be untenable and hereby denies the same
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Hence, the present recourse.
The Parties Submissions
Petitioner claims that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-91-17782 because the absence of the complaining witness during the scheduled hearing
was neither capricious nor designed to delay the proceedings in the case. [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] He
adds that the trial court likewise gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the dismissal order on the strength of private respondents opposition thereto,
notwithstanding that the same was filed by a stranger to the case as the FLAG lawyer who filed it was
not the counsel so directed by the court.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that since he was not served a copy of the motion for
postponement, it was nothing but a scrap of paper which the clerk of court should not even have
received for filing. He contends that the dismissal of the case was based on the right of the accused to
speedy trial as the prosecution was not ready and could not present any other witness on the day set
for hearing. He further avers that a reopening of the case will place him in double jeopardy as the
dismissal was without his express consent.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The Issues
From the foregoing submissions and assertions of the parties, the issues may be simply stated as
follows:
(1) Was the order of dismissal tainted with grave abuse of discretion? Put differently, would the
grant of the prosecutions motion for postponement have violated the accuseds right to a speedy trial?
and
(2) Would the reversal of the trial courts assailed Orders place the accused in double jeopardy?
We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, and in the process effectively
deprived the State of due process.
The first Issue: Speedy Trial
To be perfectly clear, we restate the general rule: motions for postponement are granted only upon
meritorious grounds and no party has the right to assume that this motion will be granted. The grant
or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, (which)
should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts
or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After all,
postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
justice.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Thus, when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay
is not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully
ventilated. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with
either by mandamus or appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be
accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] this Court
has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. [if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
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As this Court held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] an order of the court granting
the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely
an irregularity in the proceedings xxx (which) cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over
the case.
In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very first one ever
requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reason: the principal prosecution witness,
a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to attend a concilliation meeting concerning a strike/picket.
Such reason is likewise easily verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified into writing
by the National Conciliation and Mediation Boards officer-in-charge in Cebu City. There being no
showing that any substantial right of the accused would have been duly prejudiced by the
postponement, respondent Judge should have granted the motion to afford the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case. As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to
denying the State due process. In People vs. Navarro[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] this Court held that:
A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the
case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense
charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial
right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby.
The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of scheduled
hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of
time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows
reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. [if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] As
held in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:
x x x (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay, are considered.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The Second Issue: Double Jeopardy
Anent private respondents claim that a reopening of the case would place him in double jeopardy,
this Court previously ruled in Tampal that:
x x x The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that of the first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment,
(2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. (italics supplied)
In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused (private respondent)
through his motion to dismiss.
In any event, private respondents right to speedy trial not having been violated, he cannot invoke the
right against double jeopardy:
2
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State.
For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. [if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] (italics supplied)
In sum, it must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and
to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead
of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole and
caused uncalled-for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate
action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the
litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil
it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of July 29, 1991 as
well as the Order of November 5, 1991 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-91-17782 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to proceed with the trial and resolution
of the case with judicious and deliberate dispatch, with a stern warning to avoid similar unjustified
and unwarranted dismissals in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., submits that this grave abuse of discretion lies in the dismissal because the prosecution
was not ready despite the pendency of the motion to dismiss (or quash) filed by accused which
should have been first resolved.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila,
and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this
petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated 13 March 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1)
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2),
Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No.
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96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun
Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two
(32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal.
.380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal.
380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along
Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date which is covered by an election
period, without first securing the written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections,
as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead
interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police
operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. 5 Thereafter,
joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against
Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police
Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble
and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
popularly known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor
Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order
another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were
about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and
gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
3
Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following
morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa
Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the
illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men
then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996,
Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards
a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other
police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name
and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the
back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of
Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded
with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and
found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the
amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo
9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25
days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. 9 On 19 December 1996,
the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the
charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and
not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and
Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not
yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on
20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the
warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is
now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed
Resolution14 granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused is
acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of
evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed
pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the
government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous
Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of
Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the
accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred -
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I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND
THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE
AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND
FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE
PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the
public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent
Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which the Office of the Solicitor
General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial courts
resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him
without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was
lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the
Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal
not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right
to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege
which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals 21).
Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal,
the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the
prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases
throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any
appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the
very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People
from judgments of acquittal.
4
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court
has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who
by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a
petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the
time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by
military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court,
which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too
easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders
moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals
Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness
suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make
him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of
the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these
arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral
and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception
and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from
the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused
before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process
of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In
death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mock trial the non-trial of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed
in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated.
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The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30,
1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-
12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation
may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the
same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower
court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy,
and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal
case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v.
Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence
filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their
respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari
filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v.
Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully
adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal
are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way,
People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative
cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is
to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States
"(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
(Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the case
of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
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dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. (Italics
in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed the accuseds acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of
court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the
prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as
Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CAs power to review the order
granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court
may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its
ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly,
once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution
of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was
stressed thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into
the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in
unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
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Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on
an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where
the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting
an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the
order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via
certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case
is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law,
which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the distinction
between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule
in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an
error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble
through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised
for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis
either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if
the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error
of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power
of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of
the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to
an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are
the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
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As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared
are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against
an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final
order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of
the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely
filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available
under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different
remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is
not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is
allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this petition is
outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by
appeal without violating private respondents right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which
definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the
succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to
a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made; the process cannot be reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search
and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused
may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court
granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack
of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from
an invalid warrantless search. The trial courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless
arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a
warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
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has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested.
The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked
BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not
committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was
about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm
Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front
pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward
indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The
arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed
handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that
were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32
bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the drivers
seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were
inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on
mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03
Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have
previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
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Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness? Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the back A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
compartment of his car. SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that? PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise when the Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
shabu (were found). xxx xxx xxx
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness? Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.
under the seat of the driver. xxx xxx xxx
Q. Then what happened? Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us the
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation. antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that? A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory examination. Junio.
Q. Did you come to know the results? COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996). A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS COURT: The same date?
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck mentioned
11:00 p.m., is it not? the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.
A. Yes, Sir. COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not? A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
A. Yes, Sir. COURT: How were they arrested?
xxx xxx xxx A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another previously
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not? arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
A. Yes, Sir. COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not? A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios,
A. I supposed, Sir. a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the Glenmore the source.
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not? A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the name of the
A. Yes, Sir. person from whom they get shabu.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it COURT: Whose name did they mention:
not? A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call Redentor
A. Yes, Sir. Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched the BMW COURT: So there was an entrapment?
car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not? A. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Yes, Sir. COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
xxx xxx xxx A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not? COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the shabu?
A. He was outside, Sir. A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it not? COURT: What was the information?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir. A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not? COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. Yes, Sir. A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not? COURT: When?
A. Yes, Sir. A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
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COURT: At what place? Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu scheduled
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m. A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out? Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car together with his A: No, Sir.
driver. xxx xxx xxx
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him? Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter
A. Probably, Sir. concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team
COURT: What did you do? suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the Joseph?
compartment of the car. A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do? Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a gun?
A. We approached him. A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
COURT: What happened when you approached him? Q: It was concealed?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car. A: Yes, Sir.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do with that? Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when he
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who inspected was bodily search?
and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996). A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me the
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT gun.
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has gathered Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of A: None, Sir.
whom is a police officer. Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something
A: Yes, Sir. unlawful or illegal?
xxx xxx xxx A: No, Sir.
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from them? Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching his
A: Yes, Sir. car?
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover that Redentor A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were
men that you have arrested? without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the
A: Yes, Sir. exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two men, therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio? The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and
A: Yes, Sir. finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise
xxx xxx xxx unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team? evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
A: Yes, Sir. Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it has
Q: You were present while they were investigated? been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
A: I was the one whom investigated them. unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon probable cause and
xxx xxx xxx under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the time of regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto,
the (their) arrest? and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful." 28 In effect, the People now
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an
accused. exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police

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officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he
was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of
credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition for
certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal
order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable only by
certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The
only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court
upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest
provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a)
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had
just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 291awphi1.nt
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior
on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked
BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded
him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David
Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless
arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly
established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously
arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify
Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos
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declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17,
which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along
Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in
appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered
his arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no
factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and
belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33 Moreover, the
continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment
bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles
for defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to
as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late
afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled
on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number
AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up
a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front
going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at
the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
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same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were
merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
11
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado;
Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to
a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
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When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted
by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including,
to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal
filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded
only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7
He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984,
and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what
were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana
he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several
bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
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testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result
of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did
not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had
not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and
dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record.
But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he
was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he
was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported
to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to
the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21
and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of
the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on
June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves
on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the
coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
13
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin. no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
Q What were those activities? personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
A Purely marijuana trafficking. witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
Q From whom did you get that information? things to be seized.
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
reason and we cannot Identify the person. determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
Q But you received it from your regular informer? government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
A Yes, sir. committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
ATTY. LLARIZA: the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs? warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are
A Marijuana, sir. subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing? The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities. is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before? search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
A Yes, sir. was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming? could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
marijuana stuff. In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
COURT: Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance? popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable
A Yes, sir. because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned? In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
A Yes, sir. was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
Q Are you sure of that? descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman. his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984? suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
A Only on the 23rd of June. arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
your intelligence report? Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
A No, more. despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
Q Why not? punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result. return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant guarantees.
anymore? While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23 that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
of men. Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear: must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
14
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to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY,
9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the
filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
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A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by
the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of
August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment
of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his
threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have
finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge
denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency
of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check
involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer
can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence
not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity,
the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the
moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further
orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said
decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his
threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the
information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the
said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within
ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the
petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply
to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
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Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course
to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the
evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled
by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21
They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced
that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a
puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the
fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a
Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if
he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court
any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since
this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal
who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts
that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move
for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his
guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who
did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction,
preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and
vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the
Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
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information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought
to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on
the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not
believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution
of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of
his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of
the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much
less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for
then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue
to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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