[G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.

]
A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-Appellee.

Case law:

Domiciliary theory

Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila in an action to recover from the
defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018,39 as inheritance taxes
and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and
engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on
February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate
consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of
the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property. All of said
property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So
far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else.
He executed in the Philippine Islands a will where he bequeathed all his property to his only
sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York,
USA.
On February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell. Subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a
petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of the deceased , and the
same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court and it was declared that Ida Palmer is the
sole and only heiress of the deceased Moody.
However the will does not cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of
the inheritance tax.the BIR prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an
inheritance tax return.
The estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July
22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of
which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers
the assessment for income tax against said estate. The protest was overruled by the BIR.
The petitioner contends that that there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or
collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not
domiciled in the Philippine Islands

Issue: Whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of
his death

Held: The Court ruled that Moody was domiciled in the Philippines.
According to the Court, the fact that Moody accumulated a fortune from his business in the
Philippines and that he lived in the Elks Club in Manila for many years and was living there up
to the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928 proved that his domicile at the time of
his death was in the Philippines. And that the only reason why he left the country was that he was
afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed that he would be reported to
the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law.
Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to his doctor
that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of
February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance
certificate.
He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year
1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. There is no statement
of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent
from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of
his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was
precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and
that he had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible is the claim that he established a
legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody
from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to
be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged
in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors
that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. His short stay of three months in Paris is
entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving
treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moodys continued absence from his legal
domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that
caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual
residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this
unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where
he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he
visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment
of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled
with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be
ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in
the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
 Board of Commissioners vs Joselito Dela Rosa gr 95122-23

On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by

the BOI(bureau of Immigration) as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified
that he has 5 children.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and
sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special
inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and
directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which
was that of William Gatchalian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with
Philippine law.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This
is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage
then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a
Filipino citizen.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in
turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to
the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which
provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:" (1) Those who are citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any further
question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother
Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from
Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of
registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing
the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and
issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the
Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special
inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting
commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
 On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of
William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29 thof the same month, he
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but
denied.

Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held: Yes.

ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; FOREIGN LAW PRESUMED THE SAME WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ABSENCE OF
PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. In Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim v. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]),this Court held that in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.

18. ID.; MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW.

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil
Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that" (a)ll marriages performed outside of the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children,
the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Italics supplied).
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts
that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.

19. ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS OR DECLARATORY REGARDING FAMILY REPUTATION OR

TRADITION IN MATTERS OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. The lack of proof of Chinese
law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William
Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having
been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalians testimony subjected to the same
scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34,
Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267
of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws." (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. Having declared the assailed marriages as
valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a
legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of
Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William
Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:" (1) Those who
are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any
further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
 Yao Kee vs Aida Sy-Gonzales GR L-55960

Case law:
Proof of Foreign Law written law

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he
married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao
Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Both parties moved for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.
HELD: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To
establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the
alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, for failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less.
 Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-
699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition
they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
(b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao
Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9;
Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who
alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in
China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c)
Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After
hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee
with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28;
Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-
106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried
woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip,
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to
be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas
Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts
Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix
of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled
"Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao
Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to
deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment
was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme
Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated
September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA
SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS
NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p.
6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law
and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following
testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China;
that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders
to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement
was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
out; that the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two
of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the
eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before
he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage
was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a
sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-
to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then
they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after
that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set
on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic)
where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry
for her daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is
signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the
parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage
where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would
be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom
takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there
were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies
helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her
wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to
the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the
document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was
left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of
that document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and
it was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately
together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the
Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to the
Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines
and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the
several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or
elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to
the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy
Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom
[CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital statusMarried"; "If married give name of
spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931"; and "Place of marriage
China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where
the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried"; and, 'If married, state name
and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the
Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were
married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with
Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes",
July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local
custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390,
395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage
two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and
(2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25,
thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher
110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471
(1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as
proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently,
the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to
prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the
case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as
any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54
Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by
the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the
issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial
notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not
shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage
was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took
place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion
case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact
of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse
is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed
that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13
SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer
as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy
Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to
Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra.,
pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if
any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat,
only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN,
December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy
Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Choshe knows,
and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to
the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of
their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one
another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because
of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children
with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the
benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of
First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children
by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of
such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born
on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided into
two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his
obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 )
monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and
properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually
agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares
to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered
by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a
child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee
and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan',
with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of spouses, and
actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three
of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their
functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P.
Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356,
360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No.
5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA
307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or
testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not
been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same
issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de
Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to
prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Menandro Laureano vs Court of Appeals GR114776

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL).
In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano
was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved,
Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor
case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL.
Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination
of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is
not proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is
indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall
apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all
money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he
was terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982.
Hence he is already barred by prescription.
Gil Miguel Puyat vs Ron Zabarte gr 141536

Civil Law Conflict of Laws Processual Presumption Forum Non Conveniens

Remedial Law Civil Procedure Rule 34 Summary Judgment

Gil Miguel Puyat, a foreigner, lost a collection suit filed against him by Ron Zabarte in a court in
California, USA. The California court ordered Puyat to pay the amount of $241k. Puyat was only
able to pay $5k.

In January 1994, Zabarte filed an action to enforce the California judgment here in the
Philippines against Puyat. Puyat filed an Answer where he alleged, among others, that the
California court had no jurisdiction over the case, hence, the foreign judgment is void. He
likewise averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the issue involved are partnership
matters which are under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Zabarte then filed a motion for summary judgment as he argued that Puyats Answer tendered no
issue. The trial court granted the motion and eventually gave a favorable judgment for Zabarte.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Puyat now avers that the trial court should have never taken cognizance of the case
because it had no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the forum non conveniens rule. He
averred that under this principle, since all the transaction involved in this case occurred in
California, he being a foreigner, and the California law was not properly determined, the trial
court had no jurisdiction. He also assailed the validity of the trial courts act in granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by Zabarte.

ISSUE: Whether or not Puyat is correct.

HELD: No. The allowance of summary judgment is proper. In this case, Puyats Answer did not
really tender an issue. Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that
there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to pierce the allegations in
the pleadings and to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. In short, since the
facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to
the material facts. In this case, Puyats Answer merely alleged that the California court, a civil
court, had no jurisdiction because the case involved was a partnership issue. He however
admitted that the issue involved is the payment of money upon promissory notes with damages.
Puyat also did not attach a copy of the complaint filed by Zabarte with the California court. As
such, the trial court properly presumed, applying the principle of processual presumption, that
the California law is the same as Philippine law that cases involving collection of money is
cognizable by civil courts. And by applying the principle of processual presumption, theres no
longer a need to try the facts in this case, hence, a summary judgment was in order.

Anent the issue of forum non conveniens, such does not exist in this case. Under the principle of
forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may
nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main
aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their
residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum
shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket
may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and

The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

None of the above existed in this case, hence, the trial court properly took cognizance of the
case.