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Issue/s: WON Illinois as the choice-of-law should have jurisdiction over the case.
Held: YES.
The agreement states that it shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the State of Illinois, and it was also drawn and signed
by the complainant in Illinois.
The traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these factors as
conclusive and result in applying Illinois law.
The parties intention and place of making of the contract are to be given heavy
weigh in determining which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute.
o When these important factors are taken together with others of the
significant contacts in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law.
Among these other Illinois contacts are the following:
o Both parties are designated in the agreement as being of Chicago,
Illinois, and the defendants place of business is and always has been
in Illinois;
o The child was born in Illinois;
o The persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a
third alternate) are Illinois residents, also the attorneys of both parties
who drew the agreement; and
o All contributions for support have been, and still are made from
Chicago.
Babcock v. Jackson (1963)
Facts:
Georgia Babock and her friends, Mr and Mrs Jackson are all residents of NY who
left for a weekend trip to Canada
Mr. Jackson lost control of the car and Babock was badly injured so she filed a
case against him in NY after
NY doesnt have a guest statute but Ontario Canada has a statute rendering the
driver/vehicle owner NOT liable for injuries unless it operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation
Jackson moved to dismiss since the law that governs the place of accident
governs
Issue/s:
Shall the law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief or
shall the applicable choice of law rule be considered?
Held:
NY has greater and more direct concern, Ontario has minimal interest
Injuries sustained by NY guest as a result of negligence of NY host in vehicle
licensed in NY
NY has a policy of requiring tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
NY is where the parties resided, where their guest-host relationship arose and
where the trip began and was to end
Although the rightness/wrongness of defendants conduct depends upon the place
where it happened, the rights and liabilities of the parties stem from their guest-
host relationship
Where the issue involves standards of conduct, law of the place of the tort
governs but the dispositions of other issues (in this case, being able to claim
relief) must turn to the jurisdiction which has greatest interest w/c is NY in this
case
Application of NY law advanced the policy reflected in that law, while failure to
apply Ontario law did not impair the policy behind that law (which was to
prevent fraudulent assertion of claims against insurance companies)
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Voorhis
There is no overriding public policy which justifies the change in the established
rule
This case makes substantial changes in the law of torts
Problem of Characterization
Gibbs v. Gov't of Pi (1933)
Facts:
Allison Gibbs is the husband of Eva Johnson Gibbs .
o They are both citizen and are domiciled in California
During their marriage, they acquired three parcels of land in Manila, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership.
Eva died and Allison was named as administrator. Allison then filed an ex parte
petition. Allison claims that under the law of California the community property
of spouses, who are citizens of California, upon death of the wife previous o the
husband, belongs absolutely to the husband without administration.
o The court issued a decree proclaiming Allison as the absolute owner of
the lands in accordance with Art. 1401 of California Civil Code.
Allison presented the said decree to the Register of Deeds (RoD) of Manila
demanding that a TCT be issued to him.
o RoD declined since the inheritance tax was not yet paid
Allison filed with CFI of Manila requiring RoD to issue the titles to him without
paying the inheritance tax.
After the CFI affirmed the denial of RoD, the case went to the SC which
remanded it to the CFI for the presentation of the pertinent law of California in
force at the time of death of Eva.
Issue/s:
WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Admin Code (basis for
rejection of RoD) should apply Philippine law
Held:
Article 10 Civil Code of Phil (?) applies only when the deceased was vested with
a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
In Clarke v. Clarke, it was held that it is a principle firmly established that to the
law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which
govern its descent, alienation, and transfer.
Such principle is stated in Art. 10 of our Civil Code: real property to the laws
of the country which it is situated.
Under 5 Cal. Jur., 478: In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the
absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties.
o Mrs. Gibbs property must be determined by lex rei sitae
Under Philippine law Art. 1407 of the Civil Code it provides:
o All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Art. 1426 states:
o Upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory and
liquidation, the net remainder of the partnership property shall be
divided share and share alike between husband and wife, or their
respective heirs.
Therefore, under Philippine law, the wife is vested with a descendible interest.
That interest was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance. The case then
falls within the transfers requiring the payment of inheritance tax.
Grant v. McAuliffe (1953)
Facts:
Plaintiffs are all residents of California
They were injured after their car collided with another car which was driven by
Pullen (also Californian)
Pullen died
This happened in Arizona
Plaintiffs brought a suit against Pullens estate with McAuliffe as administrator
Trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss based on Arizona law
where a tort action, which has not been commenced before the death of the
tortfeasor, must be abated
Meantime, in Cali law such actions/suits survive the death of the tortfeasor and
can be maintained against the administrator
Issue/s:
WON the law of the forum applies in this case Yaze
Held:
We have concluded that survival of causes of action should be governed by the
law of the forum
Survival is not an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates to the
procedures available for the enforcement of the legal claim of damages.
As this is a settlement of an estate, this is a purely local proceeding.
All of the parties are residents of this state, and the estate is found in this state so
it is just right that the matter be governed by the laws of this state and kebs to
Arizona law
The order granting defendants motion to abate is reversed
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator (1994)
Facts:
In 1984, Bienvenido Cadalin, et. al., instituted a class suit with the POEA for
money claims arising from their recruitment by Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC), a domestic corporation, and employment by Brown and
Root International Inc. (BRII), a foreign coporation based in Texas.
The petitioners sought the payment for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, as well as unpaid benefits. They also sought for the
suspension of license of AIBC and BRII, and the imposition of penalties due to
prohibited practices.
In the state of Bahrain where some of the complainants were deployed, Amiri
Decree No. 23 was issued which provides the terms and conditions of
employment of workers. Such Decree gives 1 year as prescription to institute
claims arising from. their employment.
Issue/s:
WON the 1 yr prescriptive period in the Amiri Decree applies No
Held:
There was dispute as to which prescriptive period will apply: (1) 10 years as
provided by the Civil Code, (2) 3 years as provided by the Labor Code and (3) 1
year as provided by the Amiri Decree.
As a general rule, foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters such as service of process, joinder and appeal are governed by
the laws of the forum even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of laws for it may be
viewed as either procedural or substantive depending on the characterization
given.
The characterization becomes irrelevant however if the country of the forum has
a borrowing statute which directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign state
of limitations to pending claims based on foreign law.
In the Philippines, Sec. 48 of the Code of CivPro is treated as a borrowing statute.
However, this cannot be enforced as this would contravene the public policy on
protection to labor, based on our Constitution.
NOTES: This is a case of DOUBLE RENVOI, if single revoi then English law will
apply, but since its cooler and more inception-like double, so French law (parle a ma
main! merde! salope! bite!)
University of Chicago v. Dater (1936)
Facts:
Spouses George and Nellie Dater and Spouses John and Clara Price, residents of
Benton Harbor, Michigan, obtained a loan from the University of Chicago for
$75,000, which was secured by George and Johns property in Chicago.
In Chicago, the plaintiff prepared the trust deed and promissory notes, which
were drawn up between the Daters and the Prices, as first parties, and the
Chicago Title & Trust Company, as trustee. These notes were payable in Chicago
and at such place and time as the legal holder might appoint.
The trust mortgage and notes were sent by mail to the Benton Harbor State Bank
for the signature of the parties. The parties signed the papers in Benton Harbor,
Michigan and mailed them back to the plaintiffs agent in Chicago, where the
trust deed was recorded. Consequently, the loan was made and a check was
issued payable to the Daters and the Prices and cashed in Chicago.
John Price died, consequently, Clara became the actual and recorded owner of at
least of the property.
Foreclosure proceedings were instituted on the property and its subsequent
chancery sale, in Chicago. However, a collection suit was filed in Michigan
before the foreclosure suit was completed in Chicago.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the University of Chicago against George
Dater. However, plaintiff has no cause of action against Clara Price, because she
has no capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
WON Clara Price has capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan, and thus
liable to pay the plaintiff?
Held:
Clara Price has no capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan and thus she
in not liable to pay the plaintiff.
The law of Chicago, Illinois applies because the plaintiff signed the notes and
completed the same in the said State. The notes were only sent to Michigan for
the signature of the defendant and her co-executors. After signing the notes, the
same were returned to Chicago. Manual delivery was completed in Chicago.
There was no agreement that the mortgagee (Univ. of Chicago) will make the
loan prior to delivery.
In Burr v. Beckler, the wife, a resident of Illinois but was temporarily in Florida,
executed a note and trust deed in Florida and mailed them to her husband in
Chicago. The court held that the delivery of the note and trust deed by the wife
was completed in Florida, hence, the law of that state governed her capacity to
contract. She was not competent to enter into a contract under Florida law, hence,
her note and trust deed were void. This case applies squarely in the case at bar.
Since the law of Chicago, Illinois applies, under which the capacity of Clara
Price is governed by the law of Michigan. Under the law of Michigan, a married
woman cannot bind her separate estate through personal engagement for the
benefit of others.
Notes:
By accepting renvoi, Michigan protected the interest of a Michigan wife, especially since
Illinois disclaimed any desire in applying its law. It promoted uniformity of results.
PFAU v. Trent Aluminum co. (1970)
Facts:
Plaintiff, Steven Pfau, a domiciliary of Connecticut, was a student at Parsons
College in Iowa, and the defendant, Bruce Trent, a domiciliary of New Jersey, was
a student at the same college.
After Easter vacation, Trent agreed to drive the plaintiff to Columbia, Missouri, in
the automobile registered in New Jersey in the name of the Trent Aluminum
Company, a New Jersey corporation owned by Bruce's father. Bruce was using the
car with the owner-corporation's consent. The vehicle was insured in New Jersey
by a New Jersey carrier.
Shortly after leaving Parsons on April 22, 1966, and while still in Iowa, Bruce
failed to negotiate a curve and the car he was operating collided with an oncoming
vehicle driven by Joseph Davis. Mr. Davis and his wife and child, who were Iowa
domiciliaries, causing injuries to Pfau.
Iowa has a guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable to his
passenger-guest for ordinary negligence
Issue:
Whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to this action?
Held:
this case, however, we are faced with a more complex situation since plaintiff is a
domiciliary of Connecticut. Thus, we must consider the law of both New Jersey
and Connecticut.
Connecticut long ago repealed its guest statute and now permits guest-passengers
to recover from their host-drivers for ordinary negligence. There is no doubt that
if this plaintiff-guest had been injured in a Connecticut accident by a Connecticut
host-driver, there would be no bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were
brought in that state.
It would appear that Connecticut's substantive law allowing a guest to recover for
his host's ordinary negligence would give it a significant interest in having that law
applied to this case.
Defendants contend that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover when he could
not do so in either Iowa where the accident occurred or in Connecticut where he is
domiciled. We cannot agree for two reasons. First, it is not definite that plaintiff
would be unable to recover in either of those states. More importantly, however,
we see no reason for applying Connecticut's choice-of-law rule. To do so would
frustrate the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Connecticut's choice-of-
law rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci delicti was
born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a
state's interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.
To conclude, since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive
laws of Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this case presents a false conflict
and the Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for
ordinary negligence in our courts (New Jersey). In this situation principles of
comity, and perhaps the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of
the Constitution, dictate that we should afford the Connecticut plaintiff the same
protection a New Jersey plaintiff would be given.
Zalamea v. CA (1993)
Facts:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets
from the Manila agent of Trans-World Airlines, Inc. The tickets of the spouses
were purchased at a 75% discount while their daughter paid full fare. All tickets
were confirmed in Manila and were re-confirmed in New York.
On the date of the flight, they were wait-listed because all seats were taken.
Eventually, Mr. Zalamea, holding his daughters ticket was allowed to board
while the other 2 were constrained to purchase tickets from another airline.
They filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage before
RTC Makati.
RTC- ruled in their favor Granted them refund, moral damages, attys fees.
CA affirmed but no moral damages since overbooking is an accepted practice
of US airlines. So, no fraud.
Issue/s:
WON the law of the forum applies in this case Yes
WON lex loci celebrationis No
Held:
The US law allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proven.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agents that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from that, no official publication
of the Code was presented.
Even if the claimed Code does exist, it is not applicable to the case at bar
according to lex loci contractus. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Phil. law.
Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith entitling passengers to
moral damages. TWA is guilty of bad faith for not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if the tickets are
already confirmed.
TWA is also liable for exemplary damages.
Note:
The attempt to probate the will executed in the Philippines in 1929 was also denied
for failure to prove the provisions of a lost will by testimony of at least 2 credible
witnesses.
In attempting to prove Chinese laws, unverified answers to questions propounded
by counsel to the Consul General of China on the matter of probate were submitted
but were deemed inadmissible by the Court.
o Court held that the Consul General does not qualify as an expert on the
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters and;
o Admitting the unverified answers into evidence would deprive the adverse
party of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness as consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher (1961)
Facts:
Walter G. Stevenson, born in the Philippines of British parents, married another
British subject, Beatrice, in Manila. He died in 1951 in California where he and
his wife moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal
properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines (Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed
an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the
waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses
Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines
shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a
refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed
in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate
of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is
exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
Issue/s:
WON the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock. NO
Held:
Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not
exempt any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties, there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance
tax.
But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although
the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a
disadvantage. This is not what the legislators intended.