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Brandon L. Garrett
The writ of habeas corpus and the right to due process have long been
linked together, but their relationship has never been more unsettled or impor-
tant. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States detained
hundreds of suspected terrorists who later brought legal challenges using the
writ. In the first of the landmark Supreme Court cases addressing those de-
tentions, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the plurality chiefly relied on the Due Process
Clause to explain what procedures a court must follow. Scholars assumed
due process would govern the area. Yet in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court
did not take the due process path and instead held that the Suspension
Clause extended habeas corpus process to noncitizen detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay. Boumediene correctly grounded the analysis in the Suspension
Clause, not the Due Process Clause. The Court held that the Suspension
Clause demands a traditional habeas process, simply asking whether the de-
tention is legally and factually authorized. This view challenges the set of
standards that judges currently use in executive detention cases and also has
implications for domestic habeas; it could ground innocence claims in the
Suspension Clause. More broadly, this Suspension Clause theory reflects
commonalities in the structure of statutes and case law regulating habeas
corpus across its array of applications to executive detention and postconvic-
tion review. Habeas review now plays a far more central role in the complex
regulation of detention than scholars predicted, because habeas review does
not depend on underlying due process rights. A judge instead focuses on
whether a detention is authorized. As a result, habeas review can inversely
play its most crucial role when prior process is inadequate. Put simply, the
Suspension Clause can ensure that habeas corpus begins where due process
ends.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 R
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE
PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 R
A. The Great Writ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 R
B. Common Law Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 R
1. Origins of Habeas Corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 R
2. Origins of Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 R
47
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INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus and the right to due process have long
been linked together. The Supreme Court has called [v]indication
of due process the historic office of habeas corpus.3 Following hazy
origins at common law, habeas corpus and due process together
formed a powerful current in the stream of constitutionalism.4 Over
time, judges connected notions of due process to the development of
the writ of habeas corpus,5 the great writ of liberty that allows a
judge to inquire into the legality of a prisoners detention.6 Neverthe-
less, until recently, federal courts have had few occasions7 to define
the relationship between the Suspension Clause of Article I, which
limits Congresss ability to suspend the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus,8 and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, which state that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.9 Instead, the
Suspension Clause appeared dormant, its meaning obscure and
elusive.10 The Suspension Clause does not affirmatively define the
power of the court in cases in which this great writ shall be issued,11
as Chief Justice John Marshall put it; rather, the Clause assumes the
existence of the writ and names conditions for suspension. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly avoided defining the Clauses content.12
In contrast, the Court often meticulously defines the procedures the
Due Process Clause requires.13 Scholars noting the Courts avoidance
of the problem stated that the relationship between the Suspension
14 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspen-
sion Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364
(2010); see also Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The
Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and
Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 720 (2012) (describing the relationship between
habeas corpus rights and due process protections as a surprisingly under-explored
topic). I do not address the novel argument that the Due Process Clauses supersede the
Suspension Clause, such that a suspension of habeas corpus must be unconstitutional
unless it satisfies the demands of the Due Process Clause. Redish & McNamara, supra, at
1396.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra notes 23540 and accompanying text. R
17 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 73233 (2008) (holding that noncitizen
petitioners designated as enemy combatants do have the habeas corpus privilege and
that the governments existing procedures were not an adequate and effective substitute
for habeas corpus).
18 See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R.
1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/
31/statement-president-hr-1540 (citing the Administrations effective, sustainable frame-
work for the detention, interrogation and trial of suspected terrorists); infra note 333 and R
accompanying text (discussing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012).
19 See infra Part III for analysis of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case law in
particular.
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20 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. ([T]he text [of the Suspension
Clause] does not confer a right to habeas relief, but merely sets forth when the Privilege of
the Writ may be suspended . . . . (first and second alterations in original) (quoting RICH-
ARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLERS THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1369 (4th ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 See id.; WILLIAM F. DUKER, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Constitution, and State Habeas
for Federal Prisoners, in A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126, 126 (1980) (ar-
guing the Suspension Clause was designed to protect availability of state habeas for federal
prisoners); Redish & McNamara, supra note 14, at 1365 (arguing that the Due Process R
Clause preempts the Suspension Clause); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 6365 (viewing the
Suspension Clause as an affirmative guarantee of habeas availability, while also viewing the
habeas corpus remedy [as] essential to the full realization of other rights, including due
process); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 383
(2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?] ([A]t their respective cores,
the right to due process and the Great Writ are coextensive.); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgot-
ten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 921, 924 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Tyler, Forgotten Core Meaning] (noting that [b]y the time of the Founding, the privilege
had evolved to encompass not just a generic right to due process, but also a particular
demand, a specific right not to be jailed outside formal criminal process).
22 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Sub-
stantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 207071 (2007) (emphasizing
the structural role of the Suspension Clause within the Constitution); Tyler, Is Suspension
a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 342, 38486 (describing the relationship between the R
Great Writ and core due process values). For a related view that the Clauses should be
read together, see David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as
Limits on Congresss Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2484 (1998).
23 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 99193 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that
the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within the
United States and characterizing the Suspension Clause as just another source of constitu-
tional rights to which such aliens have no claim); Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in
Support at 2627, Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2004) ([N]on-resident
aliens in U.S. custody overseas do not have constitutional rights that can be enforced in a
proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
778 (1950))).
24 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
25 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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DAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)) (criticizing the Boumediene court
for treating the citizenship and status of the detainee and the nature of the detention sites
as relevant to the reach of the Suspension Clause when Hallidays research establishes that
the jurisdiction of Kings Bench to issue writs of habeas corpus at the time of the Founding
was effectively indifferent to the status or location of the detainee).
33 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729; see infra Part II.B.3.
34 See infra Part III.
35 This argument has implications for a related question, extensively debated,
whether a suspension of habeas closes access to due process remedies (and more broadly,
whether a formal suspension can authorize otherwise unconstitutional detention). The
problem has rarely arisen, since habeas has rarely been suspended, and I do not directly
address that question here. See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Consti-
tution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 156062 (2007) (arguing suspension of habeas removes
merely one remedy for violation of underlying rights); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 8386
(arguing detention authorized by a valid suspension is lawful); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension
as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 60405 (2009) (rejecting the narrow view . . . that
a suspension extinguishes the judicial power to order a prisoners discharge but that ordi-
narily illegal arrests remain unlawful and unconstitutional (footnote omitted)).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, 9, cl. 2.
37 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV 2047, 2122 (2005); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Sub-
stance in the War on Terror, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2008) (exploring how war
on terror litigation in U.S. courts has been fixated on process); Shapiro, supra note 10, at
6061.
38 See supra notes 2023 and accompanying text. I do not address here important R
questions of whether due process should run to Guantanamo Bay or other detention sites
abroad. See, e.g., Geltzer, supra note 14, at 71921; Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Rad- R
san, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 41011 (2009)
(The logic of Boumedienes five-justice majority opinion is that the Due Process Clause
binds the executive worldwide . . . .); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution
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Court reaffirmed that habeas rights may do work that due process
might not.39
In this Article, I argue that Boumediene can and should provide a
theory of the nature and structure of habeas corpus.40 While the re-
sult in Boumediene may not have been inevitable, it is in fact well sup-
ported. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.41
Behind such statements lies a longstanding and consistent treatment
of habeas process as independent of due process. Boumediene rests
heavily on rulings stretching back decades, particularly in executive
detention cases, which themselves flow from the common law habeas
practice.42 These cases show how habeas process is independent from
due process and has great force when due process protections are
weakest.
To ground this understanding of the differences between due
process and habeas, in Part I, I question a possibly overstated histori-
cal connection between habeas corpus and due process, tracing them
both to Magna Carta, in a celebratory account of the progress of indi-
vidual liberty. Due process and habeas corpus share common law ori-
gins and core concerns with arbitrary deprivations of liberty,43 but
habeas draws on different sources. I contrast habeas process,
grounded in the same process used at common law, with the concept
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 286 (2009) (The characterization of
Guantanamo as effectively U.S. territory for constitutional purposes probably means that
the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment apply there . . . .). By contrast, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that although Boumediene held that Suspension Clause rights run to
Guantanamo Bay, due process rights do not. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) ([T]he Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law
governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Sus-
pension Clause.)
39 See supra notes 3032 and accompanying text. R
40 This subject falls within what Jenny Martinez calls process as substance. Martinez,
supra note 37, at 1041. Gerald Neumans essay, exploring this problem, draws attention to R
the Courts Suspension Clause and Due Process methodology, describing how it invites
future debate and has profound implications. Neuman, supra note 30, at 578. For an R
excellent pre-Boumediene piece sharing a focus on habeas grounded in judicial power, see
Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165 (arguing that individual
rights are not necessary for habeas, which is rather a source of judicial power).
41 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001) (At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest. (footnote omitted)).
42 See infra Part II.B. I second the view of Gerald Neuman that [t]he account of the
Suspension Clause in Boumediene grows incrementally out of established practice, and
makes no revolutionary break. Neuman, supra note 30, at 565. R
43 See Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 383 (noting the senti- R
ments of William Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke that due process and habeas corpus are
linked by their concern for personal liberty); infra notes 114, 166, 247 and accompanying R
text.
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viewed the Suspension Clause as compatible with due process, not de-
pendent on or coextensive with it.51
In Part III, I develop implications of that relationship between
habeas corpus and due process. The Boumediene Court directed lower
courts to elaborate habeas procedures to examine whether the deten-
tion of Guantanamo detainees was authorized. In response, judges
crafted rulesmultifariously modeled on civil, criminal, and postcon-
viction lawby cherry picking from a raft of due process standards,
sometimes from irrelevant contexts, including jurisprudence drawn
from the postconviction context in which there already had been a
criminal trial.
Discomfort with the institution of habeas corpus has led judges to
adopt vague and unsettled procedures. For example, the D.C. Circuit
reasons that review of enemy combatant detention is not a mere ex-
tension[ ] of an existing doctrine but a whole new branch of the
tree.52 Yet the sparse but powerful habeas process is really the trunk
of the tree. Judges should draw habeas process directly from the core
of traditional habeas corpus process,53 which remains largely un-
changed from common law practice and the earliest federal statutes.
While judges must develop the details of how habeas functions in de-
tention challenges, they should draw that process from habeas juris-
prudence designed to provide a judge with power to scrutinize the
factual and legal authorization for a detention, rather than, for exam-
ple, sources from postconviction law.54 Boumediene demands such a
focus.
In Part IV, I explore the broader potential significance of this
view of the Suspension Clause. Habeas corpus has developed along
different paths, with different statutes and case law regulating post-
conviction and executive detainee petitions. The Suspension Clause
provides a unified structure. Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting in
Boumediene, noted that habeas is traditionally more limited in some
contexts than in others.55 The core habeas process explains how
context matters: in each area, habeas takes on a greater role where
due process is constrained. Judges have the strongest Suspension
Clause obligation to review legal and factual questions where there
was no prior adequate judicial review of detention. This has implica-
tions for disparate strands of habeas corpus. For postconviction
I
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HABEAS CORPUS AND
DUE PROCESS
A. The Great Writ
The writ of habeas corpus has a much-celebrated and storied his-
tory that brings with it immediate incantation of the Great Writ.59
The Supreme Court has lauded the indispensable function of the
Great Writ60 that indisputably holds an honored position in our ju-
risprudence.61 The traditional purpose of habeas corpus is elemen-
56 See infra Part IV.A. Congress enacted the REAL ID Act as Division II of a 2005
supplemental defense spending bill. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
101106, 119 Stat. 231, 30211 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1778 (2006)).
57 See infra Part III.
58 See infra Part IV.A.
59 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
60 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 452 (1953).
61 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
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62 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (The [Suspension] Clause protects
the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account.).
63 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (The fact that the Sus-
pension Clause abuts the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, provi-
sions well-accepted to protect individual liberty, further supports viewing the habeas
privilege as a core individual right. (quoting Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra
note 21, at 374 & n.227)). R
64 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (describing the Great Writ as affording . . . a
swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement (quoting Secy
of State for Home Affairs v. OBrien, [1923] A.C. 603 (H.L.) 609 (appeal taken from
Eng.))).
65 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (Habeas is most fundamen-
tally a procedural right, a mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention.).
66 Id.
67 U.S. CONST. art. I., 9, cl. 2.
68 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (The word privilege was used, perhaps, to avoid men-
tioning some rights to the exclusion of others.).
69 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLERS THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1162 (6th ed. 2009) (The constitutional text appears to presup-
pose the existence of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but it does not affirmatively guarantee a
right to habeas corpus . . . .); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970
DUKE L.J. 605, 607 (viewing the Suspension Clause as a direction . . . to make the habeas
privilege routinely available).
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to provide life and activity to the writ.70 The Court more recently
stated in Felker v. Turpin that it assumed for purposes of decision
here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ
as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.71 The Court took a
different stance in INS v. St. Cyr, stating that the Suspension Clause
might at the absolute minimum protect the writ as it existed in
1789.72
While the Court had avoided stating whether the Suspension
Clause affirmatively guarantees some habeas remedy, it had clearly es-
tablished that habeas serves a core purpose as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention.73 Effectuating this purpose may
require courts to examine the legal and factual justifications for hold-
ing a detainee. Once a petition is filed, the government has the bur-
den of showing that a detention is authorized. This burden reflects a
principle central to the concept of due process: deprivation of an indi-
viduals liberty must be in accordance with the law. What judges con-
ducting habeas review do, though, which is different from conducting
a due process analysis, is to inquire whether the detention is lawful or
factually supported.
A judge examining a habeas petition provides process in two
ways. First, a judge reviewing a habeas petition may examine law and
facts concerning the prior process used to place a person in custody.74
Postconviction petitions filed by prisoners seeking review of their state
criminal convictions, in which judges must consider whether the state
violated the defendants constitutional rights, dominate the federal
habeas docket. The second-largest category is postconviction motions
by federal prisoners challenging federal convictions, although they
are filed chiefly under a statutory analogue to habeas.75
Habeas corpus has a second purpose, originally its primary pur-
pose, in which a judge independently examines the justification for
the detention.76 A detainee filing a writ need not allege a violation of
a right, just that custody is unauthorized, thereby placing the burden
on the Executive to show cause for the detention and requiring the
77 See id. at 1153 ([A]n individual whose liberty is restrained may file a petition seek-
ing issuance of the writ, and thereby require a custodian . . . to justify the restraint as
lawful.).
78 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
79 See infra Part III.A.
80 See infra note 171 and accompanying text. R
81 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (noting that habeas has roots deep into
English common law).
82 See infra notes 8788 and accompanying text. R
83 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
84 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
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85 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
86 HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 7. R
87 See WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 2 (Gaunt,
Inc. 1997) (1893) (quoting RICHARD THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA
CHARTA OF KING JOHN 83 (London, John Major & Robert Jennings 1829)).
88 Id. 2, 3(a) (recognizing the use of other ancient writs before Magna Carta).
89 MEADOR, supra note 4, at 5. R
90 Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 581. R
91 HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 16, 13738. R
92 Id. at 17, 4041; see also MEADOR, supra note 4, at 89 (describing early English R
orders used to bring a person before the court).
93 HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 22, 27. R
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94 See id. at 3031 (During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, supervising
wrongs created by statutes formed most of the writs business. In the 1640s, . . . [s]ome
parliamentary leaders took it upon themselves to reform the nations conscience as they
reformed its governance, . . . [and] many used imprisonment orders to convince the un-
convinced. Kings Bench met them head on . . . .).
95 See Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive
Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 974 (2009) (describing how judges would deploy a host
of procedural tools for inquiring into the factual justification for the prisoners deten-
tion); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immi-
gration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 253536 (1998) ([J]udges were not entirely precluded
from reviewing facts on habeas corpus. . . . The main constraint on judicial review of the
facts in a return to habeas corpus was the principle that juries must answer to questions of
fact and judges to questions of law.).
96 See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 69, at 1153. R
97 See HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 10406. R
98 Id. at 106.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 53.
101 Id. at 10405.
102 Id. at 109.
103 Cf. Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra note 22, at 2102 ([E]arly practice was not consis- R
tent: courts occasionally permitted factual inquiries when no other opportunity for judicial
review existed.); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
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In England, the term due process was not in use until long after
Magna Carta, which pronounced that no person could be imprisoned
or punished excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the
laws of the land.108 The term law of the land, was broad and re-
ferred to statutes, custom, common law, and prerogative writs.109 The
narrower term due process was first used centuries later in a 1354
statute, stating that no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be,
shall be . . . taken, nor imprisoned . . . nor put to Death, without being
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 986 (1998) (noting that the general statement that the
petitioner could not controvert the facts stated in the return papered over exceptions).
104 The supposed rule had origins in dicta by Lord Coke, which in fact related, as
Halliday describes, to an unrelated rule regarding suits for trespass or false imprisonment
filed by former prisoners seeking damages after their release. HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at R
10810. The rule operated to separate civil actions seeking compensation after release
from those seeking release from unauthorized detention in the first instance. Judges did
not, despite repeating the apparent rule, require a separate action to challenge facts in a
return. Id. at 109.
105 Id. at 10911.
106 Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 29,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195).
107 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.); see HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 34 (The . . . Habeas Corpus R
Act of 1679 had a . . . mixed effect. Many of the practices it prescribed had long been used
in Kings Bench. (footnote omitted)); MEADOR, supra note 4, at 25 ([C]elebrated though R
it is, the Act dealt with no profound questions and introduced no new principles.).
108 See CHURCH, supra note 87, 2 (quoting THOMSON, supra note 87, at 83). R
109 HALLIDAY, supra note 32, at 145. R
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110 Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM 345 (1810); see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 428 (2010).
111 Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law,
19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 266 (1975) (noting the tendency of scholars to focus on the
words due process of law at the expense of the remainder of the 1354 statute). Sir Ed-
ward Coke famously equated due proces of law with law of the land, as the true sense
and exposition of the phrase. EDWARDO COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1642). Cokes conflation of
law of the land with due process has been much criticized. See, e.g., MEADOR, supra note 4, R
at 22 ([T]he final welding together of [habeas corpus and due process] was probably
effected by Cokes monumental Institutes on the Law of England, though they have been
heavily criticized as to quality of scholarship.); Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 640 R
(pointing out law of the land also referred in significant part to property law, literally law
concerned with land, and more generally with franchises over subjects); Jurow, supra, at
271 (It would have been impossible to subsume all that was considered to be the law of
the land in a single statute.). Coke may have simply been describing judicial process, not
broader questions of individual rights we now associate with due process. See Jurow,
supra, at 272, 277. After all, the word process itself meant writs, including those sum-
moning parties to appear in court. Id. at 272.
112 Coke turned from calling law of the land as due proces [sic] of the common law
to habeas, noting that orders for arrest must be based on just cause of suspicion to be
determined by the justices . . . upon a habeas corpus. COKE, supra note 111, at 50, 52. R
113 Id. at 54.
114 As William Blackstone wrote, Of great importance to the public is the preservation
of this personal liberty . . . . 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131. Blackstone also
explained that habeas dealt with the personal liberty of the subject. Id. Elsewhere, Black-
stone explained that habeas did so by permitting the court upon an habeas corpus to
examine the validity of a confinement and according to the circumstances of the case may
discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*133.
115 See supra notes 8692 and accompanying text. R
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note 32, at 70912 (describing and interpreting a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case review- R
ing custody of enemy aliens detained in War of 1812).
124 Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1195. R
125 28 U.S.C. 2242 (2006).
126 Id. 2243. Those statutory procedures have been modified only slightly since the
First Judiciary Act.
127 RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 6(a)
(2010) (permitting discovery for good cause).
128 335 U.S. 160, 171 & n.17 (1948). To be sure, such habeas rulings did not adopt any
particular standard of proof. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that seven- R
teenth century English courts also avoided adopting a uniform standard of proof); infra
Part III.A (discussing the post-Boumediene question of standard of proof).
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129 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 50911 (1963) (Why is it . . . that we go so far to allow relitigation of
constitutional questions . . . and yet do not allow any relitigation of the fundamental ques-
tion of the factual guilt or innocence of the accused?). Those debates relate to postcon-
viction habeas, not review of federal detention in which there has been no judgment
receiving finality. A related debate about scope of early twentieth century postconviction
habeas opinions concerns the relationship between habeas and due process. The Court
described early decisions denying habeas as follows: Absent an alleged jurisdictional de-
fect, habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner . . . if he had been given an ade-
quate opportunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state
courts. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 45960 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). That view has been criticized
as conflating the scope of habeas corpus with that of the Due Process Clause. Thus, Justice
OConnor explained, [W]hen the Court stated that a state prisoner who had been af-
forded a full and fair hearing could not obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the Court was
propounding a rule of constitutional law, not a threshold requirement of habeas corpus.
Id. at 298 (OConnor, J., concurring); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 575, 597601 (1993) (describing more complex history in which habeas review was
more limited than scope of available constitutional rights, but courts did not conduct
purely jurisdictional review).
130 28 U.S.C. 2255 (2006).
131 Id. 2241.
132 For statutory requirements referring to claims, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D)
(timely presentation of claims based on new evidence); id. 2254(d) (standard of review
for any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court); see also Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (requiring total exhaustion of each federal claim).
133 See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), (e).
134 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (holding that new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to petitioners with cases pending post-
conviction review at the time a new rule is announced).
135 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28 and 42
U.S.C.); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that AEDPA restrictions on
successive habeas petitions do not amount to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ).
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of the argument that due process is the equivalent of the law of the
land in Magna Carta.146 Into the twentieth century, petitioners often
filed common law actions, such as trespass, that did not assert due
process rights.147 However, in response, officials could raise a defense
that a statute authorized their acts.148 A court might find the statute
unconstitutional and the acts not immunized, citing the Due Process
Clause. As in traditional habeas litigation, the constitutional issue
arose through anticipation of a defense.
As common law pleading forms eroded, habeas and civil litiga-
tion drifted apart. While habeas practice remained largely the same
in the federal executive detention context, in civil cases courts began
to require the civil rights petitioner to name a constitutional or statu-
tory source for relief.149 This reflected a slow-to-emerge and more
positivist view of rights.150 The Court now emphasizes that the Due
Process Clause requires a court to ask if a particular right is funda-
mental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.151 The
focus is on the essential principle . . . that a deprivation of life, lib-
erty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.152 Additionally, the Court
adapted hearing and notice concepts into standards that apply to the
full spectrum of state action.
The result is not one but many due process tests regulating dispa-
rate areas where government action touches on life, liberty and prop-
erty interests, including administrative procedure, criminal
investigations and procedure, civil procedure, jurisdiction, and judi-
cial remedies.153 In areas of civil procedure, most notably personal
jurisdiction but also notice requirements, the Court has cited to reali-
ties of modern society, as well as costs, and has broken with traditional
forms of process.154 In other areas, including substantive due process,
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory
. . . .).
155 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (noting that at the time of the
Courts opinion the right to same-sex intimacy was accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries and only thirteen states had antisodomy statutes on the
books); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 13940 (1973) (In the past several years, however, a
trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-
third of the States, of less stringent laws . . . .).
156 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
157 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
158 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
159 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
160 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 75051 (1987).
161 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 33031 (1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
12728 (1990); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
162 470 U.S. 68, 7682 (1985).
163 See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedures: The Supreme
Courts Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 31012 (2001) (describing
the law of the land as understood by Coke as requiring that the monarchy, as well as the
courts, to adhere to legal regularity, basing their decisions upon the common law, custom,
or statute, and not personal whim).
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The sheer breadth of modern due process can distract from areas
in which habeas is broader than due process. The Supreme Court has
emphasized only in narrowly defined substantive due process deci-
sions that some deprivations of liberty may be barred regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,164 although
overlap is greater, as I discuss in Part IV, in decisions regarding limita-
tions on indefinite civil detention. The focus of a judge using habeas
process on the legal and factual authorization for a detention, apart
from adequacy of procedure, is quite different from that of a judge
relying on modern due process jurisprudence. Due process tests pro-
ceed differently by balancing cost, tradition, dignitary interests, liberty
interests, federalism, and policy concerns. Indeed, due process doc-
trine has developed a strikingly managerial aspect, promoting
schemes and incentives adequate to keep government, overall and on
average, tolerably within the bounds of law.165 In general terms this
description of due process has something in common with habeas
corpus, but the complex contours of evolving modern aspects of due
process jurisprudence, with its various tests adapted to different con-
texts, share little in common with the core, persistent purpose of
habeas corpus: reviewing the basis for detention.
164 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (noting also that the
Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
165 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993).
166 372 U.S. 391, 40102 (1963).
167 See 28 U.S.C. 2241(c) (2006) (requiring generally that the writ shall not extend
unless the applicant is in custody); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (The writ of habeas corpus is availa-
ble only to one who is in custody. (citing 28 U.S.C. 2241(c))).
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color of the authority of the United States.168 But, as the Court held
in INS v. St. Cyr, habeas also permits review of statutory entitle-
ments.169 Why is that? Legal questions may arise in habeas in ways
they could not in a due process challenge. A judge may grant habeas
if the statute authorizing the detention is legally invalid. This situa-
tion arises when the statute is unconstitutional, conflicts with other
law, or when it is valid but does not authorize the type of detention at
issue. Factually, the individual may not be of the type who may be
detained under the applicable statute. In contrast, due process juris-
prudence, aside from substantive due process rulings, focuses on the
general adequacy of process used when deciding to detain a person,
not on the substantive authorization for the individual detention.
While scholarship has focused on the effect of a suspension or a
statute stripping federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, some suggest
that lack of a due process right cuts off access to habeas corpus.170
Habeas process may be provided, however, even in cases without a due
process violation. As noted, the Court directly addressed this scenario
in immigration rulings involving noncitizens at the border who have
limited due process rights. The Court has repeated that habeas
corpus nevertheless permits an inquiry into the detentions authoriza-
tion.171 In that setting, as in others, habeas corpus may provide reme-
dies where a due process claim would not.
Habeas corpus may prove narrower than due process in other
contexts, particularly for state convicts. Convicts cannot raise some
due process claims challenging their state trial convictions in a habeas
172 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 48687 (1994) (determining that a criminally
convicted person cannot bring a civil suit challenging the conviction (e.g., for malicious
prosecution) until the conviction is overturned by reversal on appeal or by executive
pardon).
173 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987) ([I]t is clear that the State need
not provide any appeal at all. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974))).
174 Id. at 559.
175 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983) (Whether analyzed in terms of equal
protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeon-
hole analysis . . . . (footnote omitted)); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); see also
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (recognizing a defendants due process right to
have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake).
176 See supra notes 14445 and accompanying text. R
177 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001). Daniel Meltzer has suggested that 1789 is
not the relevant year; 1789 is the year of the First Judiciary Act, not the Constitutional
Convention (1787) or ratification of the Constitution (1788). Meltzer, supra note 30, at 15 R
n.62.
178 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 66364 (1996) (But we assume, for pur-
poses of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as
it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.).
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II
FROM HAMDI TO BOUMEDIENE
The Supreme Court in Boumediene clarified that, standing alone,
the Suspension Clause ensures access to certain procedures: Even
when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound,
the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.179
The Court developed the substantive content of the process habeas
provides. This is not to say that process can be substantive, but rather
that process addresses the underlying question of whether the deten-
tion is authorized and is freestanding and distinct. Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedys majority opinion drew from due process
principles to explain what process the Suspension Clause guaran-
tees.180 This triggered a vigorous debate with Chief Justice Roberts in
dissent about the relationship between habeas corpus and due pro-
cess.181 The Courts Hamdi ruling helps to explain how the Court
reached its Boumediene result, clarifying that habeas corpus alone en-
sures access to habeas process, which entails an independent review by
a federal judge to examine the legal and factual authorization for a
detention. This view of the Suspension Clause anchors the central
role for habeas corpus in regulating detentions.
194 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
1044, 113738 (1984).
195 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Courts Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 5354 (1976); Rubin, supra note 194, at 1046; Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due R
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
111, 155 (1978); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 25257
(2004).
196 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (OConnor, J., concurring).
197 Id. at 45354.
198 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 55354 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (disagree-
ing with the suggestion that government should benefit from an evidentiary presumption
placing the burden on the detainee).
199 Id. at 57576 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Scholars have criticized the Hamdi Courts use of the Mathews analysis. See, e.g., Goldstein,
supra note 40, at 1206 (noting the absence of a reliable scale upon which to measure and R
balance the detainees liberty interests against the governments national-security inter-
ests); Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine Enemy Combatant Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 355, 398400 (2006) (noting that the interests on both
sides can be described with apocalyptic intensity and that the test is likely to succumb to a
result-oriented malleability). I do not view the Mathews test as more or less malleable than
alternatives; it may be more transparent.
200 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579, 594 & n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 529 (plurality opinion).
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221 Trevor Morrison explored the implications of Justice Scalias views, which he help-
fully terms suspension as authorization. Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdis Habeas Puzzle: Sus-
pension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 424 (2006).
222 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 Id.
224 See id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1783, at 661 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833));
Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, supra note 21, at 384 n.280 (The Court correctly R
held that due process governed the inquiry; its conclusion, by contrast, that all due process
promised the citizen-detainee was a hearing on his status was troubling.).
225 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
226 Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Dir. of Pub. Affairs,
Regarding Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2004/September/04_opa_640.htm.
227 See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secy of Def., to the Secy of
the Navy 14 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf.
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to the D.C. Circuit and limiting review to whether the process com-
plied with CSRT procedures and the Constitution.237
Like the district courts, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Due Pro-
cess Clause when reviewing habeas petitions. For example, the D.C.
Circuit dismissed the consolidated cases of Lakhdar Boumediene and
five Algerian men who were arrested in Bosnia, detained at Guanta-
namo, and accused of having links to al-Qaeda and planning to bomb
a U.S. Embassy.238 The court reasoned that the petitioners were held
outside the United States, had no constitutional rights under either
the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause, and that regardless,
Congress had stripped federal courts of jurisdiction.239 On appeal,
the Supreme Court relied on the Suspension Clause, not the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and ultimately concluded that the MCA procedures were
not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus, and they
operate[d] as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.240 This
language, which found for the first time that a statute unconstitution-
ally suspended the writ, has justifiably been the focus of commentary.
237 28 U.S.C. 2241(e) (2006); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (providing that the amendment to 28 U.S.C. 2241(e) would
apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment).
238 Del Quentin Wilber, Cases Against Detainees Have Thinned, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2008,
at A2; Andy Worthington, Profiles: Odah and Boumediene, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2007, 5:48 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7120713.stm.
239 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 99294 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
240 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
241 Id. at 739.
242 Supra note 84 and accompanying text. R
243 499 U.S. 467, 47879 (1991).
244 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORI-
GINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 17
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959)).
245 Id. (citing 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926)).
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very different from the habeas practice historians and judges often
detail.246 Importantly, and perhaps because of this historical ground-
ing, the Court did not directly link habeas corpus to due process. In-
stead, the Court more accurately described how habeas corpus
became part of the foundation of liberty for the Kings subjects,
even though the writ developed as common-law courts sought to en-
force the Kings prerogative.247
The Court did not clearly establish whether the Suspension
Clause protects the scope of the writ as it existed at the time it was
drafted or whether the scope of the writs protections ha[s] ex-
panded since the Founding.248 Instead, the Court focused on the
development of habeas as a source of power and its growth to encom-
pass detentions of aliensincluding those abroadso long as the
jailer could be held accountable as the Kings agent.249 In my view,
this is the proper approach; if habeas corpus is a dynamic judicial in-
stitution, as history tells us, we should not select an isolated moment
in time to fix its definition.
246 Id. at 740, 747, 752 (citing Halliday & White, supra note 32, at 586). R
247 Id. at 74041.
248 Id. at 746 (noting that the analysis may begin with precedents as of 1789).
249 See id. at 751 ([A] categorical or formal conception of sovereignty does not pro-
vide a . . . satisfactory explanation for the general understanding that prevailed. . . . En-
glish law did not generally apply in Scotland . . . , but it did apply in Ireland. . . . This
distinction, and not formal notions of sovereignty, may well explain why the writ did not
run to Scotland . . . but would run to Ireland.).
250 Id. at 785.
251 Id.
252 See supra note 30. R
253 Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV.
BULL. 39, 51 (2010). The Hamdi plurality also contains important separation-of-powers
language. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 53536 (2004) (plurality opinion) ([T]he
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position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case . . . cannot be
mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers . . . .).
254 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
255 Id. at 74445, 785, 794, 797; Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdic-
tion-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 377,
41112 (2009); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 211011. But see Huq, supra note 236, at 386, 395 R
(describing a touch of the ineffable to the Courts separation-of-powers discussion).
256 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
257 Id. at 781 (alteration in original).
258 See id.
259 See id. at 733.
260 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
261 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
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Robertss view is that due process analysis can displace habeas analysis,
placing him in dispute with the majority about the relationship be-
tween due process and habeas corpus. The Boumediene petitioners
were not citizens (only Hamdi and two others detained abroad post-9/
11 have been U.S. citizens).294 Roberts argued, [S]urely the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not afford non-citizens in such circumstances greater
protection than citizens are due.295 He added that if prior CSRT pro-
cess was adequate, there is no need to reach the Suspension Clause
question since [d]etainees will have received all the process the
Constitution could possibly require, whether that process is called
habeas or something else.296 He ignored, however, that habeas can
offer noncitizens more than due process; habeas may be a mecha-
nism for contesting the legality of a detention, but it is not merely a
procedural right.297
The Boumediene majority opinion almost entirely spoke past the
dissent, because it adopted a fundamentally different view that the
Suspension Clause guarantees a process independent of due process.
As a result, the Court also had a completely different view of Hamdi
and the adequacy of the DTA. The Court pointed out that Hamdi was
not a case about habeas process, but rather due process: None of the
parties in Hamdi argued there had been a suspension of the writ. Nor
could they.298 As a result, the Hamdi plurality concentrated on
whether the Executive had the authority to detain and, if so, what
rights the detainee had under the Due Process Clause.299 The
Boumediene Court noted crucially that there are places in the Hamdi
plurality opinion where it is difficult to tell where its extrapolation of
2241 ends and its analysis of the petitioners Due Process rights be-
gins.300 As a result, the Hamdi plurality had no occasion to define
the necessary scope of habeas review, for Suspension Clause
purposes.301
Roberts countered that due process should begin and end the
analysis, analogizing to postconviction habeas. As the majority noted,
the DTA provided for a form of judicial review of detentions, includ-
294 Jeffrey Kahn, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5041, 5042
(2010).
295 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
296 Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 784.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. (The closest the plurality came to doing so was in discussing whether, in light
of separation-of-powers concerns, 2241 should be construed to prohibit the District
Court from inquiring beyond the affidavit Hamdis custodian provided in answer to the
detainees habeas petition. The plurality answered this question with an emphatic no.
(citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527, 53536 (2004))).
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302 See id. at 788 (describing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 274243).
303 Id. at 805 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ([I]t is not necessary to consider the availabil-
ity of the writ until the statutory remedies have been shown to be inadequate to protect the
detainees rights.).
304 Id. at 810 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
305 Neuman, supra note 30, at 547. R
306 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 ([T]here is considerable risk of error in [CSRT] find-
ings of fact.).
307 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 232, at 2; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d R
981, 100607 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra
note 232, at 3739) (mentioning the study in the course of determining that CSRT process R
is not an adequate substitute for the habeas writ); Marc D. Falkoff, Litigation and Delay at
Guantanamo Bay, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 393, 394 (2007) (describing Guantanamo detainees
as denied absolutely their day in court).
308 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 78890.
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309 Id. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306
(2001)).
310 See 533 U.S. at 301 n.13, 30405, 314 & n.38.
311 Id. at 301.
312 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. R
313 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, De Facto Sovereignty: Boumediene and Beyond,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (2009) (describing de facto sovereignty and its relationship to
habeas in the extraterritorial detention context); Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Boumediene
v. Bush and Guantanamo, Cuba: Does the Empire Strike Back?, 62 SMU L. REV. 117, 16788
(2009) (discussing the legal anomaly of the United States extraterritorial reach into
Guantanamo); Neuman, supra note 38 (examining Boumedienes functional approach to R
extraterritorial application of U.S. constitutional limitations).
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III
PROCESS IN THE SHADOW OF BOUMEDIENE
In Boumediene, the Court established that the Suspension Clause is
a source of habeas process for detainees; to give that process contours,
however, the Court turned to due process sources.320 The Court did
not answer the key question whether enemy alien detainees have
any due process rights.321 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued
that the result would lead to a set of shapeless procedures.322 Rob-
erts may have predicted correctly, but perhaps only because lower
courts have adopted reasoning mirroring his dissent by focusing on
due process, not habeas process. The Court left it to the lower courts
to fill in the details,323 and in response, they drew broadly from due
process and habeas jurisprudence.324 The D.C. Circuit has noted that
Boumediene did not provide a detailed procedural regime but rather
a spare but momentous guarantee that a judicial officer must have
adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant
law and facts.325 The result provides process in the shadow of
Boumediene.326
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 5354 (describing the devel-
opment of the Courts doctrine holding Congresss power to exclude aliens as plenary).
Yet even in the Courts rulings addressing nonadmitted noncitizens, the Court permitted
review (as in Eisentrager) of whether the detention was authorized. Knauff, 338 U.S. at
54247; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 ([Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.); Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles,
Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 87987 (2010) (ar-
guing for a limited government interpretation of the rulings); Fallon, Jr. & Meltzer, supra
note 22, at 2097 (arguing that courts traditionally pursued a pragmatically adaptive R
approach).
320 Baher Azmy termed this a largely unlimited invitation to create a new common
law of habeas. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 450 (2010).
321 Yin, supra note 199, at 414. R
322 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision
replaced statutes with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at
some future date).
323 Id. at 796 ([T]he other remaining questions are within the expertise and compe-
tence of the District Court to address in the first instance.).
324 See generally BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DE-
TENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 13 (2010) (describing the lower
courts initial work in carrying out the task delegated to them); Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Note,
Meeting Boumedienes Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsoles-
cence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 244, 247 (2010) (arguing that the lower
courts habeas litigation should be allowed to proceed and develop, and that Congress
should not legislatively intervene).
325 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 787).
326 Id. at 877.
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327 See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
328 See Huq, supra note 236, at 421, 428 (noting that [t]he black-letter law of deten- R
tion, and the implementation of that law by the government, is no clearer, no more stable,
and no more coherent than it was before Boumediene, but [d]etention policy thus largely
unspools in the shadow of the Suspension Clause).
329 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
330 See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Once Awad was part
of al Qaeda by joining the al Qaeda fighters . . . the requirements of the AUMF were
satisfied. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 87273 (reasoning
that the scope of the governments detention authority includes those who are part of
forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially
support such forces).
331 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing all necessary and appropri-
ate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons); see Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c, 123 Stat. 2574, 257576 (defining unprivileged
enemy belligerent to include a person who was a part of al Qaeda); Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 948a(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (defining unlawful
enemy combatant to include a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
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forces); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion) (Congress has
in fact authorized Hamdis detention, through the AUMF.); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 87273.
332 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 2131 (approving of the Hamdi pluralitys R
conclusion that the AUMF provides an independent source of authority for establishing
military commissions); Huq, supra note 236, at 416 (If ongoing detentions can be de- R
fended by a detention power that is redefined by statute four years into the detention,
there is little to prevent an amendment of the law so as to justify post hoc propter hoc
detentions that otherwise would be illegal.). Robert Chesney has argued that in practice,
questions of the scope of authorization have largely not come up, but rather cases have
turned on the sufficiency of the governments evidence. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May
Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 77273 (2011).
333 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (affirming the position that the AUMF authorizes the
government to detain a person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces).
334 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 19798 (D.D.C. 2008) ([B]ecause the
Government has failed to establish . . . that Messrs. Boumediene, Nechla, Boudella, Ait
Idir, and Lahmar are enemy combatants, the Court must, and will, grant their petitions
and order their release.).
335 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008).
336 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at
*14 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order). The CMO provides that district
court judges may alter the framework based on the particular facts and circumstances of
[the] individual cases. Id. at *1 n.1; see, e.g., Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3
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sentence, the CMO cites to Hamdi and Boumediene.337 The CMO cru-
cially placed upon the Government the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the lawfulness of the petitioners de-
tention,338 though the government could also benefit from a rebut-
table presumption of accuracy and authenticity if there were a
showing of great need in a case.339 When detainees challenged the
CMO as inadequate, the D.C. Circuit approved the procedures, rea-
soning backward from Hamdis due process analysis rather than rea-
soning forward from Boumediene.340 The Al-Bihani v. Obama panel
reasoned that the Hamdi plurality described as constitutionally ade-
quateeven for the detention of U.S. citizensa burden-shifting
scheme in which the government need only present credible evi-
dence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria
before the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evi-
dence.341 The D.C. Circuit concluded that such a process mirrors a
preponderance standard like that in the CMO.342
The choice of standard of proof goes to the heart of the habeas
process developed in Boumediene. Recall that the CSRT process, which
the Boumediene Court found lacking, used a preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence standard, while the Hamdi plurality rejected a some-evidence
standard.343 The D.C. Circuit did not reach the question of what pro-
cess the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause mandated and
suggested that even a some evidence, reasonable suspicion, or proba-
ble cause standard of proof could constitutionally suffice.344 A subse-
quent D.C. Circuit panel in Al-Adahi assume[d] arguendo that the
government must meet a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.345
The panel urged the government to pursue a some-evidence stan-
dard, citing to immigration removal decisions prior to the 1952 Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.346 Chief Justice Roberts cited similar
(D.D.C. 2009) (This Court adopted, in large part, the provisions of [the CMO], while
modifying it somewhat . . . .).
337 Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 (case management order).
338 Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
339 Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *3 (case management order).
340 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
341 Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 53334 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
342 Id. at 878 & n.4.
343 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
344 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 n.4. Similarly, other courts often rely on the Courts
Hamdi language describing a burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Sulayman v. Obama, 729
F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534).
345 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 110405 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The panel chiefly
relied upon INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001), and Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892).
346 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 110405; see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306 (In [pre-1952 deporta-
tion] cases, other than the question whether there was some evidence to support the or-
der, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive.
(footnote omitted) (citing Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659)). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The
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Constitutional Requirement of Some Evidence, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 63135 (1988) (sur-
veying the history, nature, justifications, and applications of the some-evidence standard).
347 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
348 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. R
349 See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E) (2006) (providing for substantial evidence test for on the
record administrative adjudication); Neuman, supra note 346, at 64346, 73132. Simi- R
larly, in postconviction law, some-evidence review has been replaced by sufficiency-of-the-
evidence review under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See
Neuman, supra note 346, at 656. Such some-evidence review is distinct from Mathews re- R
view, since it relates to review of fact-finding and not procedure. Id. at 69798.
350 See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 854 (1st Cir. 1980) (Our review . . . is limited to
determining whether in fact there was any evidence providing . . . a reasonable ground
to believe the accused guilty. (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)));
Neuman, supra note 346, at 736. R
351 See Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312 (noting, in the context of an extradition treaty with
Mexico, that every technical detail need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
that [f]orm is not to be insisted upon beyond the requirements of safety and justice).
352 The Immigration and Nationality Act preserves habeas review of status-related
questions in expedited removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. 1252(e)(2) (2006); see Neuman,
supra note 30, at 577. R
353 See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(B) ([A]dministrative findings of fact [in specified con-
texts] are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary . . . .); id. 1252(b)(4)(D) (judicial review of asylum). The Immigration and
Nationality Act, amended by the 2005 REAL ID Act, bars habeas review of an order of
removal of criminal aliens, but permits petitions for review to be filed in a court of appeals
regarding constitutional claims or questions of law. See id. 1252(a)(2)(A)(B), (D).
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354 See, e.g., Rafaelano v. Wilson, 471 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 48182 (2006).
355 See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5)(B).
356 The relevant statutes do not explicitly exempt detention-related habeas challenges;
rather, the statutory provisions limiting judicial review refer only to removal orders. See 8
U.S.C. 1252(b)(9); Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the Real ID Act
of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 138, 141 (20062007). The legislative history stated as
much. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 17576 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (stating section 106 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act would not preclude habeas review over challenges to
detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders).
357 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690, 699702 (2001); see 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6).
358 Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2006).
359 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
360 See, e.g., Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
([T]he phrase questions of law as it is used in . . . the Real ID Act includes review of the
application of statutes and regulations to undisputed historical facts. (footnote omitted));
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a strict
rule, but explaining that [t]he court would need to determine, regardless of the rhetoric
employed in the petition, whether it merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual
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findings or justification for the discretionary choices, in which case the court would lack
jurisdiction, or whether it instead raises a constitutional claim or question of law); see
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 1296 (7th ed. 2012) (Those courts that are inclined to preserve as much review as
possible tend to find ways to subdivide the questions presented and locate a separately
identifiable question of law, or possibly a due process issue. Other courts are more resis-
tant to such arguments by the petitioner.).
361 See Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 51516 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
969 (2008) (contending that [b]ecause no administrative case can be decided without
applying some law to some facts, the Ninth Circuit approach misread the statute, and only
pure questions of law should be examined).
362 28 U.S.C. 2243 (2006). In response, the petitioner may deny any of the facts set
forth in the return or allege any other material facts. Id. Then [t]he court shall summa-
rily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require. Id.
363 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality opinion) (Because we
conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen-detainee to refute his classifi-
cation, the proposed some evidence standard is inadequate.).
364 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
365 See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 42930 (2000).
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366 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 326 (1979).
367 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 110405 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Although we
doubt, for the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the
preponderance standard, we will not decide the question in this case.).
368 Chief Justice Roberts cited three cases involving military trials and the some-evi-
dence standard when arguing that habeas may be traditionally more limited in some con-
texts than in others. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 814 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
369 Id. at 78586 (contrasting a habeas petition after the most rigorous proceedings
imaginable, a full criminal trial, with the closed and accusatorial CSRTs, and concluding
that the latter situation justifies more searching scrutiny).
370 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court cited to In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946), in which the petitioner received a full military commission
trial.
371 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
372 The D.C. Circuits approach has attracted criticism and lacks strong defenders. See
Azmy, supra note 320, at 52122 ([I]t makes no more sense to ask if there was sufficient R
evidence in the prior CSRT recordso one-sided as it wasto support the militarys judg-
ment than it would to ask if there was sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction
in a criminal trial in which the defendant was prohibited from calling witnesses or con-
fronting the Governments evidence.); Falkoff, supra note 95, at 101720 (arguing that R
civil commitment cases provide an appropriate standard of proof); see also Fallon, Jr. &
Meltzer, supra note 22, at 209293, 2104 (arguing that the preponderance standard is the R
minimum necessary for citizen-detainees although not untroubling); Walter E. Kuhn,
The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 221, 242 (2011) (calling it politically impossible to adopt a standard lower than
preponderance); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and De-
tention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 141011 (2008) (proposing prepon-
derance standard for initial detention decisions, but substantially stricter review after
appropriate duration). In two cases, petitioners sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme
Court arguing that a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof should be
adopted. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Al Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S.
filed Sept. 28, 2010); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S.
filed Nov. 30, 2010). To date, the Court has not granted certiorari on this question. See
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vide judges with a great deal of discretion on how they weigh the
evidence.373
Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Al Odah v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
373 See Nesbitt, supra note 324, at 26872 (describing variation between judges in apply- R
ing standards).
374 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 (If it is constitutionally permissible to place that higher
burden on a citizen petitioner in a routine case, it follows a priori that placing a lower
burden on the government defending a wartime detentionwhere national security inter-
ests are at their zenith and the rights of the alien petitioner at their nadiris also
permissible.).
375 Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case
management order).
376 Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *2 (case management order);
Colin C. Pogge, Note, A Dissentious Debate: Shaping Habeas Procedures Post-Boumediene, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1073, 109091 (2010).
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The CMO rules were later revised to refer solely to evidence relied
upon to justify detention, not to all evidence relied upon in the
return.377
Further discovery beyond those categories is provided by leave of
the Court for good cause shown.378 The CMO quotes verbatim the
discovery standard in federal habeas corpus cases, but adds that such
requests must (1) be narrowly tailored, (2) specify the discovery
sought, (3) explain why the request is likely to produce evidence
that demonstrates that the petitioners detention is unlawful, and (4)
explain why the request is not unfairly disrupting or unduly burden-
ing the government.379 The CMO requirements appear adapted
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.380 Detainees may face dif-
ficulties in making itemized requests if they cannot know what the
government possesses. Automatic disclosures are better suited to the
habeas process.
As discussed, Boumediene emphasized that traditionally a detainee
can supplement the record and introduce exculpatory evidence in re-
sponse to the governments return.381 The CMO required the govern-
ment to produce all reasonably available evidence in its possession
that tends materially to undermine the information presented to sup-
port the governments justification for detaining the petitioner.382
The standard refers to information the government chooses to pre-
sent. It is not as broad as Brady requires at a criminal trial, since it
does not hold the government responsible for disclosing all material
exculpatory evidence.383 To be sure, the D.C. Circuit later clarified
that the government must supply information that has been strategi-
cally filtered out when preparing the return, even if the individual
doing the filtering works for a different agency than the Department
of Justice (DOJ).384 In contrast, another judge adopted a modified
377 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 5245890, at
*1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (order amending case management order).
378 Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *2 (case management order).
379 Id.
380 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(c) (For good cause, the court may order discovery of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.).
381 See supra note 290 and accompanying text. R
382 Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *1 (case management order)
(citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008)). One judge modified the standard
to state that the government must supply exculpatory evidence contained in the material
reviewed in developing the return for the petitioner, and in preparation for the hearing
for the petitioner. Al Shurfa v. Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2008).
383 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
384 Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Similarly, the revised
CMO notes the Government must supply evidence contained in any information reviewed
by attorneys preparing factual returns for all detainees. See In re Guantanamo Bay De-
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tainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 5245890, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (order
amending case management order).
385 Al-Adahi v. Bush, 585 F. Supp. 2d 78, 7880 (D.D.C. 2008).
386 Batarfi v. Bush, 602 F. Supp. 2d 118, 11920 (D.D.C. 2009).
387 Zaid v. Bush, 596 F. Supp. 2d 11, 1213 (D.D.C. 2009).
388 Bin Attash v. Obama, 628 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2009).
389 See id.; Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (addressing a claim
that the DTA requires broader discovery than Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
390 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 8889.
391 See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the CSRT was
not provided with exculpatory evidence on the same point, which emerged from a differ-
ent detainees CSRT).
392 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008).
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393 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 WL 4858241, at
*23 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order).
394 See WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 4041 ([I]t would be unwise for the govern- R
ment to expect a court to admit or give weight to any statement in an intelligence report
when the source is entirely anonymous . . . .).
395 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790 (2008).
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1. Hearsay
Take the issue of hearsay evidence, for example. The D.C. Cir-
cuit has called it always admissible, but with a catch.400 Al-Bihani
argued that the lower court relied mostly upon government reports
of his interrogation answers, which, he argued, were hearsay im-
properly admitted absent an examination of reliability and neces-
sity.401 The D.C. Circuit noted that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause applies only in trials.402 Since a habeas pro-
ceeding does not involve a trial, but rather a judge who must weigh
the reliability of the evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply
instead.403
With no trial, there is no formal occasion to consider admissibil-
ity. The D.C. Circuit noted: In Hamdi, the Supreme Court said hear-
say may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence
as long as the petitioner is given the opportunity to rebut that evi-
dence.404 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit has said that absent other
evidence corroborating the sources, hearsay alone cannot reliably sup-
port a detention.405 Judges have also insisted, without recognizing a
formal confrontation right, that detainees lawyers have an opportu-
399 See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that
the court need not rule on al-Madhwanis constitutional due process claim that the lower
court relied on evidence outside the record in violation of Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961), because even if a violation occurred, such error would be harmless).
400 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 FED. R. EVID. 1101(e). For a discussion of the argument that hearsay should be
excluded in such proceedings unless falling into an applicable exception under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, see Azmy, supra note 320, at 531. R
404 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 53334
(2004) (plurality opinion)); see also Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (Al-Bihani also forecloses Al-Adahis argument that admitting hearsay violated his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.).
405 Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 84647 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing, in a nonhabeas
DTA case, how the principal evidence consisted of documents that do not say who re-
ported or said or suspected the statements at issue, [n]or do they provide any of the
underlying reporting upon which the assertions were made, nor any assessment of the
reliability of that reporting); see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 4150 (discussing R
corroboration requirements for evaluating the reliability of detainee statements obtained
during interrogations).
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2. Self-Incrimination
Other criminal procedure protections apply in a different sense.
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply absent a jury trial,407 federal judges have drawn no
inference[s] based on [a detainees] decision not to testify in [a]
case.408 Indeed, judges reviewing a record for the purpose of con-
ducting a habeas review operate using some of the same evidentiary
principles as they would at a trial. Applying an effective privilege
against self-incrimination is consistent with a habeas process in which
it is the governments burden to defend the detention and where the
detainee traditionally was not obligated to testify.
3. Voluntariness of Confessions
Confession statements produced using physical coercion have
fortunately largely disappeared from U.S. courtrooms since the Su-
preme Court ruled that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments forbade such statements409 and as professional
police turned to use of psychological techniques during interroga-
tions.410 However, government use of harsh interrogation techniques
post-9/11 created difficult problems in relying on the resulting state-
ments to support indefinite detentions. Criminal procedure scholars
have criticized the Courts focus on voluntariness as the touchstone
for admissibility of confessions, arguing that the Court should rather
406 See, e.g., Sadkhan v. Obama, 608 F. Supp. 2d 33, 3642 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting
some discovery requests while denying other discovery requests that petitioner claimed the
government must comply with pursuant to the CMO disclosure requirements).
407 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .).
408 Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 2021 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (The Court has drawn no
inference based on Al Kandaris decision not to testify in this case.); Al Odah v. United
States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (The Court has drawn no inference based on Al
Odahs decision not to testify or submit a declaration in this case.); Awad v. Obama, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (No inference was drawn from Awads decision not to
testify or from his failure to sign or swear to his affidavit.).
409 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 28687 (1936) (holding confessions ex-
tracted through torture inadmissible in state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding involuntary confessions
inadmissible in federal proceedings under the Fifth Amendment).
410 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) (surveying police interrogation
techniques and concluding that [e]ven without employing brutality . . . the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness
of individuals).
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411 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
110913 (2010).
412 Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (It is also well
established that in criminal proceedings, statements of the accused that are extracted by
threats or violence violate the Due Process Clause. (quoting United States v. Karake, 443
F. Supp. 2d 8, 51 (D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bostan v. Obama,
674 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing why coerced evidence might be less relia-
ble, but refusing, where the Government has not produced a witness or supported the
reliability of alleged statements, to conduct a virtual trial over the efficacy of torture it-
selfa prospect . . . both distasteful and distracting).
413 Al Rabiah, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 3233.
414 Id. at 38.
415 Id. at 39.
416 Id. at 27, 39 (noting the threats and Al Rabiahs placement in the frequent flier
program, which prevented a detainee from resting due to frequent cell transfers).
417 Id. at 34.
418 Id.
419 Id. at 36 ([T]he Court must consider the totality of the circumstances in order to
determine whether there exists evidence from which to find that there was a clean break
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between the coercion and the later confessions. (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 8, 8788 (D.D.C. 2006))).
420 Id.
421 Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2009).
422 Id. at 2123.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 24.
425 Id. (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)).
426 Id. at 27, 29 (quoting Shane OMara, Torturing the Brain: On the Folk Psychology and
Folk Neurobiology Motivating Enhanced and Coercive Interrogation Techniques, 13 TRENDS COG-
NITIVE SCI. 497, 498 (2009)).
427 Id. at 32. For a decision finding that the effects of torture had dissipated by the
time of confession, see Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2010).
428 See Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26, 33, 40 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that
despite detainees lack of due process rights, statements resulting from coercion may
nonetheless be disregarded due to the likelihood that the [statements are] untrue (al-
teration in original) (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 5051 (D.D.C.
2006))). One court emphasized an inapposite concern, finding that because a detainees
will was not overborne . . . , it [would] not disregard the statements [the detainee] made
during his interrogations at Bagram, Kandahar, or Guantanamo Bay. Abdah v. Obama,
709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 3637 (D.D.C. 2010).
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4. Harmless Error
The D.C. Circuit imported another doctrine from appellate and
postconviction law: harmless error analysis. The court ruled, for ex-
ample, that denying Al-Bihanis discovery requests was harmless error
because discovery would not have changed the outcome of the
case.431 More recently, the D.C. Circuit cited a harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, quoting the Chapman v. California stan-
dard governing state criminal appeals.432 Harmless error rules were
designed to avoid unnecessary trial do-overs. A Chapman harmless er-
ror standard requires the government to show error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, and, while not unduly onerous, the standard is
somewhat incongruous where there has been no jury conviction find-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, unlike after a crimi-
nal trial in which a state cannot appeal an acquittal, the D.C. Circuit
has applied a harmless error rule for the government, finding harmful
errors that supported reversal of an order granting habeas corpus.433
The role of harmless error may need to be reconsidered; regardless, it
will necessarily play a reduced role in the context where there is no
trial and only a judge examines authorization for a detention.
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit in Latif v. Obama held, with no
precedent in habeas case law, that courts should afford the accuracy
of government reports, including intelligence, a presumption of reg-
ularity.434 The court cited to habeas decisions presuming state court
opinions were accurately transcribed.435 As Judge David S. Tatel ar-
gued in dissent, such a rule makes sense in the context of court or
business records, but has no place in a habeas inquiry, where the pur-
pose is to evaluate reliability of evidence produced under uncertain,
nontransparent, and nonroutine conditions.436 The result places an-
429 See Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846, at *1 (D.D.C. July 30,
2009) (order granting habeas petition); Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (ESH) (Jawad, ISN
900), 2009 WL 2149949, at *1 (D.D.C. July 17, 2009) (order granting motion to suppress).
430 See Rabbani v. Obama, 656 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009).
431 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
432 Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 2324 (1967)).
433 Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
434 666 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2011), reissued, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
435 See id. at 751 n.2.
436 Id. at 772.
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437 See Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket: A History of the Detainee Popula-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?hp (last updated Sept. 11,
2012) (stating that 603 detainees at Guantanamo have been transferred, with 167
remaining).
438 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008).
439 See Huq, supra note 236, at 41011, 421. R
440 Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
441 Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 605 F.3d 1046, 105152 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); see generally Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas CorpusThe
Uighurs, Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the
detention of Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay). Three Uighur detainees remain at Guanta-
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namo Bay as of this writing. Jane Sutton, Two Uighur Detainees Sent to El Salvador, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 2012, at A9.
442 See supra Part II.D.
443 See 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
444 Id. at 95.
445 Id. at 96.
446 Id. at 97.
447 Id.
448 See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 319, at 85154; Huq, supra note 236, at 40307; see R
also Rod Nordland, Detainees Are Handed over to Afghans, but Not out of Americans Reach, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A4 (discussing the change of control over detainees in
Afghanistan).
449 The government may have strategically chosen places of detention, such as
Bagram, in an attempt to avoid the Boumediene analysis. Cf. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 9899
(dismissing such an argument but noting that the manipulation by the Executive in de-
liberately confining detainees in a theater of war was a potential additional factor in the
analysis).
450 See Michael J. Buxton, Note, No Habeas for You! Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the Bagram
Detainees, and the Global Insurgency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 52333 (2010).
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IV
THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Habeas Process as an Organizing Principle
The Suspension Clause casts a broad shadow over the regulation
of all forms of detention. It has exerted direct and indirect influence
even in contexts where statutes largely supplant habeas corpus as the
primary vehicle for judicial review. The Executive, courts, and Con-
gress have long been concerned with avoiding Suspension Clause
problems, and the Supreme Courts own sometimes-carried-out warn-
ings that it will narrowly interpret efforts to restrict judicial review to
avoid potential Suspension Clause problems have, many years before
Boumediene, helped to structure judicial review of detention. I have
argued that the Suspension Clause explains why, as the Court put it in
INS v. St. Cyr, [a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and
it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.451 Post-
Boumediene, judges may rely on the Suspension Clause more directly,
and not just as a principle of constitutional avoidance. Understanding
the Suspension Clause as affirmatively guaranteeing a right to habeas
process to independently examine the authorization for a detention
helps to explain habeas and constitutional doctrine across a range of
areas.
Why does habeas corpus sometimes provide access to process un-
available under the Due Process Clause, while sometimes due process
provides more process than habeas would? At its core, habeas corpus
provides judges with process in situations where the need for review of
legal and factual questions surrounding detention is most pressing.
This view of habeas process can be seen as related to the Courts long
line of decisions that guarantee a right of access to courts without
clarifying the source of that [s]ubstantive [r]ight.452 In Boumediene,
the Court grounded that right in the Suspension Clause.
This basis for the right makes some sense of the varied nature of
habeas review in which statutes and case law differ depending on the
type of detention. Judicial review does not vary categorically; for ex-
ample, immigration does not receive less review than postconviction
or military detention habeas. Instead, judicial review varies within
each category. This is the product of evolving executive detention
policies, varying postconviction practice, and changes over time in
federal statutes, some poorly conceived and some sensible. No one
actor provides coherence to habeas practice at any time, and some of
the statutes are notoriously Byzantine, poorly drafted, and illogical.
458 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). For an earlier decision taking an inconsistent approach,
see United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 26164 (1905) (dismissing a petition alleging
citizenship that disclosed neither abuse of authority nor the existence of evidence not laid
before the Secretary).
459 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978).
460 385 U.S. 276, 28586 (1966); see also 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3)(A) (In the proceed-
ing the Service has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the
case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.); 8
C.F.R. 1240.8(c) (2012) ([T]he Service must first establish the alienage of the respon-
dent.). In contrast, the statute places the burden on a noncitizen contesting inadmissibil-
ity grounds. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(2).
461 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. R
462 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. R
463 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. R
464 8 U.S.C. 1252(e)(2).
465 Id.
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466 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 31112 (2001) (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229,
235 (1953)).
467 Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 23536.
468 335 U.S. 160, 16373 (1948).
469 Id.
470 533 U.S. 678, 699702 (2001).
471 See 538 U.S. 510, 52931 (2003); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 360, at 1257 (Some- R
what surprisingly, the lower courts have found significant constraints on lengthy detention
. . . despite the Supreme Courts apparent endorsement of that provision in Demore.).
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472 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (2006) (stating that no court has the authority to
review listed waivers and matters committed to official discretion, excepting asylum, and
preserving judicial review of constitutional claims and questions of law).
473 See id.; id. 1252(b)(4)(B).
474 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) (footnote
omitted) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001)).
475 Noncitizens may also waive judicial review. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1187(b)(2).
476 Judges (and the Executive) have increasingly reached further to examine facts, in-
cluding facts not part of the criminal record, to decide whether a court convicted a nonci-
tizen of a deportable offense. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 3637 (2009) (holding
that the question of loss to the victim calls for a circumstance-specific, not a categorical,
interpretation); Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (Atty Gen. 2008) (adopting an
approach permitting the judge in an immigration case to consider any additional evi-
dence or factfinding to decide if the crime was one involving moral turpitude). See
generally Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (criticizing the disarray caused
by departures from the traditional categorical approach); Jeremiah J. Farrelly, Note, Deny-
ing Formalisms Apologists: Reforming Immigration Laws CIMT Analysis, 82 U. COLO. L. REV.
877 (2011) (same).
477 533 U.S. at 30405.
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tion, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a some-
what liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty.478 Extradition is treaty based and involves diplomatic issues,
but there is another explanation for the traditionally limited judicial
review: although extradition may not involve much in the way of prior
judicial process, the process that does exist takes the form of a magis-
trate finding probable cause. Following the magistrates determina-
tion, however, there is the anticipation of future judicial process: the
individual will receive full criminal process in a foreign court. This
explains, perhaps, the very limited judicial review prior to
extradition.479
Summarizing the procedures in each area of habeas corpus dis-
cussed, Table 1 below illustrates the inverse relationship between
habeas corpus and due process. In key areas, the broadest habeas pro-
cess is provided where process lacked in prior proceedings, while
more deferential review occurs where there was more substantial prior
process, in part due to the influence of the Suspension Clause.
B. Three Hypotheticals
How much of a difference does it make whether judges examine
the authorization for a detention under a habeas corpus process or
whether they determine if procedures comport with due process? To
press the role of the distinction in Boumediene and Chief Justice Rob-
ertss concern that CSRT procedures supplied adequate process,485
suppose Congress legislates a set of enhanced CSRTs. Perhaps these
CSRTs include the D.C. Circuits adopted standards for habeas hear-
ings: discovery of potentially exculpatory evidence, a preponderance
standard of review, a right to retain counsel, and the ability to rebut
the governments case.486 A due process approach would simply ask
whether that set of procedures comports with the minimal Mathews
standards following the Hamdi analysis.487 Under the Suspension
Clause, a judge would question whether the scheme provided an ade-
quate and effective alternative to full habeas review by an Article III
judge.488 Even though these hypothetical procedures are more ro-
bust, they do not resemble the alternatives to habeas the Court has
previously approved, which streamlined, but maintained the
equivalent of, full habeas review with federal judges. Further, a pre-
liminary administrative procedure to screen detainees status does not
absolve federal judges of their independent obligation to review the
authorization for each detention. On the other hand, a statute could
require federal judges to defer, in some respects, to the record or
findings of an enhanced set of CSRTs.
483 Motomura, supra note 354, at 48691 (discussing the REAL ID Act and advocating R
a direct review model, arguing that the collateral review model is insufficient without a
prior formal process in which the facts are laid bare).
484 Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitutions Most Important Human Right:
Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368
(2006) (urging courts to defer to agency findings of historical facts, but to engage in de
novo review of . . . determinations that a given set of facts do or do not rise to the relevant
legal standard).
485 See supra notes 29396 and accompanying text. R
486 See supra Part III.
487 See supra Part II.A.1.
488 See supra Part II.B.2.
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493 Commentators have proposed that such courts be created. See generally Amos N.
Guiora, Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617 (2009) (exploring potential
processes and complications for such a court); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for a National
Security Court, ATLANTIC, Feb. 2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/
02/the-case-for-a-national-security-court/305717/ (arguing in favor of these courts).
494 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 78182, 786 (2008).
495 Id. at 78687.
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and not just review of questions of law. Such a view has important
implications for domestic habeas.496
Since its 1993 Herrera v. Collins497 decision, the Supreme Court
has failed to recognize, except for the sake of argument, that inno-
cence alone could be a basis for a constitutional entitlement to post-
conviction relief. The Herrera Court noted that such a claim would be
disruptive of our federal system and federal habeas courts sit to en-
sure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tionnot to correct errors of fact.498 The Court assumed that any
such claim of innocence would require a truly persuasive show-
ing.499 Federal courts have yet to release a convict on the basis of a
hypothetical truly persuasive Herrera claim (and I have developed
how even innocent convicts, including those later exonerated by
DNA, tried and failed to assert such claims).500 The Court does, how-
ever, permit a showing of innocence to excuse procedural barriers
that would otherwise bar review of claims, and the Court has indicated
that this hypothetical innocence claim may be asserted in noncapital
cases.501
What Boumediene and executive detention jurisprudence highlight
is that habeas at its core is centrally preoccupied with examining facts
or questions of innocence. Justice Lewis Powell wrote, [H]istory
reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas corpus to a constitutional
claim relating to innocence or guilt.502 That is incorrect. In deten-
tion cases, judges must examine innocence or guilt absent any consti-
tutional claim at all when performing the core of their habeas
function. As Gerald Neuman has suggested, following Boumediene, the
Courts failure to recognize a freestanding claim of innocence may
stand on weaker constitutional ground.503 A claim of innocence
could be grounded in the Due Process Clause, its natural founda-
tion,504 whether a court uses a Mathews balancing approach con-
cerned with risk of error, or a fundamental fairness approach under
which an innocent prisoner has a powerful and legitimate interest in
496 Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 837 (2009) (suggesting that the proposed cutback of habeas
may be unconstitutional if states fail to maintain robust postconviction review).
497 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
498 Id. at 40001.
499 Id. at 417.
500 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 169192 (2008).
501 See Dist. Attorneys Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009); Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 321 (1995).
502 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
503 Neuman, supra note 30, at 56364 (noting that the Boumediene balancing method- R
ology could supply a new doctrinal foundation for a Herrera-type innocence claim).
504 Garrett, supra note 500, at 1704. R
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CONCLUSION
The Suspension Clause has long cast a shadow over the regula-
tion of detention. Now the Supreme Court has brought the Clause
out of the shadows, giving it substance. It does not merely describe
when the government may suspend the writ, nor does it solely reflect
an important principle of constitutional avoidance in interpreting
statutes that restrict judicial review of detention. Instead, the Clause
affirmatively offers a simple but powerful form of process to detainees.
Moreover, the Court emphasized a Suspension Clause concern with
both legal and factual error. This Article has explored this new un-
derstanding of the Suspension Clause in light of the changing and
unsettled relationship between two complex areas of law: due process
and habeas corpus. Both due process and habeas corpus are quite
general, amorphous, and capacious in their content.508 Despite ring-
505 Id. at 1705 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)).
506 Currently, a federal court may grant an evidentiary hearing to develop facts a state
court failed to develop, but it may not necessarily rely on facts undeveloped in state pro-
ceedings when ruling on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2) (2006); Cullen v. Pinhol-
ster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that review under 2254(d)(1) is limited to the
record presented to the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (noting that 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2) does not bar an
evidentiary hearing where a prisoner was unable to develop his claim in state court de-
spite diligent effort). The Court also suggested a claim of innocence could be pursued in
federal habeas discovery despite failure to recognize such a claim. Dist. Attorneys Office v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 7273 (2009).
507 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTIONS GO WRONG 26574 (2011) (advocating for criminal procedure reforms to improve
accuracy); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safe-
guards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486 (advocating reliability review of
confessions). See generally State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (adopting social
science framework to regulate eyewitness evidence).
508 Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1720
(2007).
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509 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
494507 (2010).
510 See supra notes 44247 and accompanying text. R
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511 See WITTES ET AL., supra note 324, at 83 (arguing that courts desperately need gui- R
dance but prospects of legislative intervention are . . . exceedingly remote); Kuhn, supra
note 372, at 242 (describing congressional deference to current judicial process); supra R
note 333 and accompanying text. R
512 MEADOR, supra note 4, at 8283. R
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