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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR


BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594,
598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for
the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and
as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to
the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares
y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall
have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such
a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There
is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any
possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility,
as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What
I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject
to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:


I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The
plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided
by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the
Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion
of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required
by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision:
Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing
in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one
of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such
a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There
is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any
possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility,
as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What
I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject
to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.


TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The
plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided
by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the
Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion
of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required
by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision:
Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing
in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one
of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.
There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now,
from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically
pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque
language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally
jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas
"where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence
to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings.
Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements
against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions with
three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with
his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their
fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank
& Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted
mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these
obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which
were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the
banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against
said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He
sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the
Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned
in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his
repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,
1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-
Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from
TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs
of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by
a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in
consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September
7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their
auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this
disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as
aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.


CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance
and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint
sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with
stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned.
Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants'
appeal to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 the judgment was reversed, by decision
dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption
and can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated
August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the
contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable
law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration
was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989.
The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt
execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the
Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the
Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be
overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . . ."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;


CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same
Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the
action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground of res judicata, the
only issue raised in the second action i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and,
on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;


CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints
were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC,
this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario
Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint
charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases
just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the
foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On
defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res
judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of
TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th
Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;


CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for the
same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law
office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of
Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants'
motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 14 5) on the ground of litis pendentia.

The RTC ruled that

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable
Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal
Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more defendants
were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two
assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had
nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and
the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation
of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on
November 11, 1991 6 the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on
March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event
the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys Mario Ortiz, Honorato
Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452,
and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again
involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious,
deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On
defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . .,
plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will
ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and its
officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No.
CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been suing TRB and its
officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the
Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the
Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable
to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and pertinent
laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or
laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against
deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently
illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE
DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b)
FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE
PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for
which defendants must be held liable under said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and
recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This
action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial
court, by Order dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted
by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata the subject
matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 and litis pendentia the subject matter
being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against
Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy
trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His
Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the
dates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion
was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a
special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had been
unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31,
1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and
19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional,
Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere
clerk." 15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience drew his
attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June
22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions
simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter,
additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court
start with the opening clause

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated.
_________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that on
July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing
with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him
from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this
Court, notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt with "all the valor of ignorance" to fasten not only
civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause
criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto
Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints
(docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He
claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by
them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed)
properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale
thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received
P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing that
actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to
the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and
moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to
two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo involving the same foreclosed properties and
directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers
both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:

a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY)
for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." This case
was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based
on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of
a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new
owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty.
Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the
period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice
of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through
False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." This case was dismissed by Resolution
dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was
executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over property
registered in its name one of two immovables formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's
sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24
June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is
located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by
Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed lots
was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and
invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante)
and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September
28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any
malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 sustaining the judgment
of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the
subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-
00136. His complaint against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)"
was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as
follows:

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of
Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to
make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence.
The records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the Ombudsman
may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of
if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have
disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT


PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was
constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot
was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for
its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and
consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained from the
Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's
delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of
which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of
title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the
consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced
proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB and
the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal
Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.


No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-
square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao
was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested
Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retro being
in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00, representing the
price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with
the transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to
file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 resulted in a Decision by the Court of
Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution dated
September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion
for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was
unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of
the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any
concurrence of at least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply
noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over
the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo
MARASIGAN, respectively).

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to
vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI)
for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and
Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He
charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybaez, presiding). These processes
were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No.
82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybaez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in
the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibaez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent by
the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the
Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had
repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he
separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation
of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is
that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who
participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He
likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did
not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of
Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases
by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is patently without
merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render
signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the
only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or
for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for
review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court
through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by
quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform
the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The
Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are
actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in
the case G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a
resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court
said "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this
Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require
members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed
by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and
the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of
this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years
and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)


6740; G.R. No. 84054
It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or
SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certain
Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with
P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988.
His first and second motions for reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified
statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second
Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more
remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact or
law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that
"the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was
denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the
result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise
of its judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the
Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or
the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of
the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the
intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's
action to the parties concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series,
was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant
Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in
G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon.
Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along:
that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and
failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment the notice sent to him of the "unsigned
and unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration had been signed only by
the defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to
defendants demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they
ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any
Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently
abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and
worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court
conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra directing that all complaints against officers of that Court be
forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices" committed
against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record
(Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.


CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a
complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB
Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a
time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was
represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano
R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for
moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of
P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That
Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his
appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency
in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31,
1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner
himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without
"express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely
of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been
twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of
Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this
time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and
important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or
the question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only
questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal
requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further
advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to
a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides that
a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that
the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May
25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent signification of the
grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's arguments
aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petition for review and consequently
bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals had failed to persuade the
Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore,
there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there
is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the
Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First
Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the
people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-
LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo
attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated
August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated
August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing "false, impertinent and
scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7,
1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.


SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure
effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was
Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title
with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but
his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that
Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December
26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . .
order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated
October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents
therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L.
Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by
Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989,
again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this
time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella
G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First
Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court to which the case was raffled caused
issuance of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants
in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 in G.R. No. 84999 this Court,
required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles who, as already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo in G.R. No.
84999 filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him
and his client, Borromeo because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge
and advice" and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB
8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23,
1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No.
CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the
Court in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.


CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another
action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the
"San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court
(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale
thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097,
affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of
the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well
as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the
findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution
dated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through various
motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y.
Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual resolution with the
signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R.
No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Court
declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like
the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this
Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the
action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,


JULIETA Y. CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation,
Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.

1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello
III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining
that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including
the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we
find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree
rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,
against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a
violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in
that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273
which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the
respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really
were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial
resolutions." 33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY


BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-


G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank &
Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the
case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.
Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Caares,
presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law
firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC,
solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an
immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the
highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was denied on
March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of
Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration,
Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17,
1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry
of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance and
bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal
concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu
RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Caares. He
denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry,
social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as
litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require
defendants to present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;


CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties
SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Caares but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the
latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one
"for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Caares and Jacinto "for the way they
decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due
process," on account of which he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and
embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge
German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court.
The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said
the Court:

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact, proffer
nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res
judicata under the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant for argumentum
ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the acceptable limits of
argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the
irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and
needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a licensed
law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise contumacious behavior is presently
accorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he
has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the
future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,


CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case No.
CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San
Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of
P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations;
Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which
a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged
to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court
alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by the
Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7,
1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution
denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the
resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this
Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch
18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated
against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action
was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August
31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's
complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent
observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no
jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court.
The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other
personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint
are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their
propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the
Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued
by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows
that all material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which
was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made
directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the case, how
could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third
Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs
petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps,
if there was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the
Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained before
this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be
construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without
supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal
basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers


of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for his
adversaries UCPB and Samson K. Lao in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned,
these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo
Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed
of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders,
all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged
that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure
harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo
in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by
Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director),
Ildefonsa A. Ybaez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with deferential
awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a non-
lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter
disregard to the authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who uses the
instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if their
actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with
supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members of the
Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to bring
dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the
scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence
in the country's judicial system and administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal profession. So
many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other
courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession
who afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the
notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in
seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993
of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo
to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against
lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars,"
flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him
and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees
involved in the said adverse dispositions some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent
lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently
undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to
refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have
authored . . . (which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and
reputation of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the
Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported conferment
on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in
upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings
patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called
Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme
Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after
INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the
irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible
injustices inflicted on me by this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled.
Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of
the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last
resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply
with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated
June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa,"
repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft
and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my)
cases, despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in
your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a
most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what he
regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders
Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne
marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw!
Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme
Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition:
"Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA TYRANTS!!!


CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the judiciary.
Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the supreme Court."
These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by
evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR,
SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of
Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony
bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown
IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have
sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land grabbing What are these
if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the motion for
reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the SC to order a case
dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit"
despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule
of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves! NARVASA
& ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL


"MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
Constitution

VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING


CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE
LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN


RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS TO
ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION

CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL


COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4
MILLION

BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND


PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT
JUSTICES

DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE


IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and
REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter


IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June
21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them that last quoted, above " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City
Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks
against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system" and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and
members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the
letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of
Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No.
83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular"
adverted to by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed
with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano
Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all
resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to
Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters
mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted by
Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.)
and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the
existence of other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already
passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts on record, the
Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against
Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of
the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution
and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T.
Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the
IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and its
annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the
relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building,
Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.

1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just
mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other communications and resolutions sent
to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.
Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated
July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and that dated June
11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he
alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which requires
"signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy
duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"

2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot
be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and
independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty.
Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous
circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of
expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the
circular merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; . . . Atty.
Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;

5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with pertinent facts,
evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of the High Court
to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and be
reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which
was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated
June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court
Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from notice
hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit
such further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set out in his Comment dated
August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment


of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and allegations in his
Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said)
Comment," viz.:

1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged 'libelous'
remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT
. . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for making false charges and
wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH
and the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are patent
violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate
Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since no
less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS
UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of
court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP
and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and admission of the thruth in said circular,"
theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless
and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of
and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. 44 He has stubbornly litigated issues
already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in
many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting
on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite
erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the
attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the
judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have had
the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his
attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions"
of this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings,
causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption
of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument
long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a
charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the
preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of
the prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the
prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and
impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the
prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and
punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the
judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46

His claim that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the circular
are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a
complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial
philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of
public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the
same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes
and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing


the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing
finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite
postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants like
Borromeo to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial


Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or less
established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and
final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties a trial or hearing in the first instance as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2. Paramount Need to end


Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures
and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the
losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no
moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public
policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon
accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a
party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to
harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court


Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the
highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be
appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error
in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other
respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional
principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta involving an attempt by
a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having
knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of
Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-
heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . .
the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court
hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality
all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the
early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of
public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,
judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some
definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond
the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of
law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the
litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the
enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by
petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democractic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions
and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350.
(Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they
see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the
judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the
mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces
at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept
of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the
government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of


Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is adversely
affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to
either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law
only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals
become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by
a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action


against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to
administrative prosecution or the institution of a civil or criminal action as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to
coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are
being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of
damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even
of the Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints


Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered manifestly
unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with the
evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion thereby causing injustice, and
actionable and compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this
sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the
decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise
for a pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for


Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses
for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously
seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have
only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final
and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here
after more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review by appeal or special civil action is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on
the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to
review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such
as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render
their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision
is "unjust" cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of
the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official
duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary,
and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the
action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy
that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs.
Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with
deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of
their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and
resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty.
To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers
mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal
issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme
Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by
the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory. Such
judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or
authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust or was (or was not)
rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers
or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case is an essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and
immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other
entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision whether final and executory or not
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.

4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness


and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or
interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow
institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous
exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by
a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought
up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it
would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the
decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust most certainly an act of
supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public
prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question despite its
having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4)
courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an
indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial
Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already
passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal
action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense,
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is a
civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly
rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative


Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites
are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is
ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in
the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to
which the same being unappealable it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press
that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc.
Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly
unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to
the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against
the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from


Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized
independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and
in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make
his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious,
or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an
imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction
are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions
when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still
good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or
assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment
rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee,
or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is
not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory
order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to
the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final
judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.
E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less than
sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative measure. The imposition on the
time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and
require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the
repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his
understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been
declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the
Court's forbearance had no effect on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and impotence.
Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado
or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman
included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must
come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent
and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it
will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive
sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly
committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious
errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve
a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any
similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity
initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a
result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having
persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right
to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must
have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all.
An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners
as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard
of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at
the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued
his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his
license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry
on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it
on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the
test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for
past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of
fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of
good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring
discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice
of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this
by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in
after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead
of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty
of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity,
and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his
guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very
real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within
ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.


Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters
No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied
solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or
lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were
in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the
room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window,
there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been
inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after
events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down
on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to
the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant
his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the
mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room
at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano
heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in
the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately
went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy
in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way
into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being
attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but
one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and
cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as
most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm
and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to
do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted
from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is
no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is
no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church,
there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every
action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or
less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while
the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood
to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought"
are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is
not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act.
Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It
is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by

Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done
by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In
times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in
act from his neighbors does not offend. And

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an
evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering
one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first
in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention
of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law,
and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded,
if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he
mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he
was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array
of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger
at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of
malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the
code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and
a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief
over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-
defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch
of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and
that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory
penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal
intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation
and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his
wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and
in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense,
nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not
given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might
bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated
a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of
the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and
is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which,
and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all
of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors,
who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just
self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.


Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice
or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 197522 September 11, 2013

ELISEO V. AGUILAR, Petitioner,


vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PO1 LEO T. DANGUPON, 1ST LT. PHILIP FORTUNO, CPL.
EDILBERTO ABORDO, SPO3 GREGARDRO A. VILLAR, SPO1 RAMON M. LARA, SPO1 ALEX L.
ACAYLAR, and PO1 JOVANNIE C. BALICOL, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated June 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 which affirmed the Resolution3 dated November 27, 2008 of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in I.S. No. 2002-414, upholding the provincial prosecutors dismissal of the criminal complaint for murder
filed by petitioner Eliseo V. Aguilar against respondents.

The Facts

Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet (Tetet). On April 10, 2002, he filed a criminal
complaint4 for murder against the members of a joint team of police and military personnel who purportedly arrested
Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him, resulting to his death. The persons charged to be responsible for Tetets
killing were members of the Sablayan Occidental Mindoro Police Force, identified as respondents SPO3 Gregardro
A. Villar (Villar), SPO1 Ramon M. Lara (Lara), SPO1 Alex L. Acaylar (Acaylar), PO1 Leo T. Dangupon
(Dangupon), and PO1 Jovannie C. Balicol (Balicol), and members of the Philippine Army, namely, respondents 1st
Lt. Philip Fortuno5 (Fortuno) and Cpl. Edilberto Abordo (Abordo). 6

In the petitioners complaint, he averred that on February 1, 2002, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the morning, at Sitio
Talipapa, Brgy. Pag-asa, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro (Sitio Talipapa), Tetet was arrested by respondents for
alleged acts of extortion and on the suspicion that he was a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/National Peoples Army Revolutionary Movement. Despite his peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by
respondents. In particular, Tetet was hit on different parts of the body with the butts of their rifles, and his hands
were tied behind his back with a black electric wire. He was then boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga
River where he was gunned down by respondents.7 Petitioners complaint was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida
Samillano and Rolando Corcotchea who stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands asa sign of
surrender but was still mauled by armed persons.8 A certain Dr. Neil Bryan V. Gamilla (Dr. Gamilla) of the San
Sebastian District Hospital issued a medical certificate dated February 1, 2002,9 indicating that Tetet was found to
have sustained two lacerated wounds at the frontal area, a linear abrasion in the anterior chest and five gunshot
wounds in different parts of his body.10

In defense, respondents posited that on February 1, 2002, they were engaged in an operation headed by Chief of
Police Marcos Barte (Barte)and Fortuno organized to entrap a suspected extortionist (later identified as Tetet) who
was allegedly demanding money from a businesswoman named Estelita Macaraig (Macaraig). For this purpose, they
devised a plan to apprehend Tetet at Sitio Talipapa which was the place designated in his extortion letters to
Macaraig. At about 11:00 in the morning of that same day, Tetet was collared by Sgt. Ferdinand S. Hermoso
(Hermoso) while in the act of receiving money from Macaraigs driver, Arnold Magalong. Afterwards, shouts were
heard from onlookers that two persons, who were supposed to be Tetets companions, ran towards the mountains.
Some members of the team chased them but they were left uncaught. Meanwhile, Tetet was handcuffed and boarded
on a military jeep. Accompanying the latter were Dangupon, Fortuno, Abordo, Barte, and some other members of
the Philippine Army (first group). On the other hand, Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were left behind at Sitio
Talipapa with the instruction to pursue Tetets two companions. As the first group was passing along the Viga River,
Tetet blurted out to the operatives that he would point out to the police where his companions were hiding. Barte
stopped the jeep and ordered his men to return to Sitio Talipapa but, while the driver was steering the jeep back,
Tetet pulled a hand grenade clutched at the bandolier of Abordo, jumped out of the jeep and, from the ground,
turned on his captors by moving to pull the safety pin off of the grenade. Sensing that they were in danger,
Dangupon fired upon Tetet, hitting him four times in the body. The first group brought Tetet to the San Sebastian
District Hospital for treatment but he was pronounced dead on arrival. 11

Among others, the Commission on Human Rights investigated Tetets death and thereafter issued a Final
Investigation Report12 dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution13 dated October 8, 2002, recommending that the case,
i.e., CHR CASE NR. IV-02-0289, "be closed for lack of sufficient evidence." It found that Tetets shooter,
Dangupon, only shot him in self-defense and added that "Dangupon enjoys the presumption of innocence and
regularity in the performance of his official duties, which were not sufficiently rebutted in the instant case."14

Likewise, the Office of the Provincial Director of the Occidental Mindoro Police Provincial Command conducted its
independent inquiry on the matter and, in a Report dated September 21, 2002, similarly recommended the dismissal
of the charges against respondents. Based on its investigation, it concluded that respondents conducted a legitimate
entrapment operation and that the killing of Tetet was made in self-defense and/or defense of a stranger.15

The Provincial Prosecutors Ruling

In a Resolution16 dated March 10, 2003, 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Levitico B. Salcedo
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro (Provincial Prosecutor) dismissed petitioners
complaint against all respondents for lack of probable cause. To note, Barte was dropped from the charge, having
died in an ambush pending the investigation of the case.17

The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on record shows that the shooting of Tetet by Dangupon "was done
either in an act of self-defense, defense of a stranger, and in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right
of office."18 He further observed that petitioner failed to submit any evidence to rebut Dangupons claim regarding
the circumstances surrounding Tetets killing.19

In the same vein, the Provincial Prosecutor ruled that Villar, Acaylar,Lara, and Balicol could not be faulted for
Tetets death as they were left behind in Sitio Talipapa unaware of what transpired at the Viga River. As to the
alleged maltreatment of Tetet after his arrest, the Provincial Prosecutor found that these respondents were not
specifically pointed out as the same persons who mauled the former. He added that Hermoso was, in fact, the one
who grabbed/collared Tetet during his apprehension. The Provincial Prosecutor similarly absolved Fortuno and
Abordo since they were found to have only been in passive stance. 20 Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter via a
petition for review21 to the DOJ.

The DOJ Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated November 27, 2008, the DOJ dismissed petitioners appeal and thereby, affirmed the
Provincial Prosecutors ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that respondents conspired to kill/murder Tetet.
In particular, it was not established that Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were with Tetet at the time he was gunned
down and, as such, they could not have had any knowledge, much more any responsibility, for what transpired at the
Viga River.23 Neither were Barte, Fortuno, and Abordo found to have conspired with Dangupon to kill Tetet since
their presence at the time Tetet was shot does not support a conclusion that they had a common design or purpose in
killing him.24 With respect to Dangupon, the DOJ held that no criminal responsibility may be attached to him since
his act was made in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office under Article 11(5) of the Revised
Penal Code25 (RPC).26 Lastly, the DOJ stated that petitioners suppositions and conjectures that respondents
salvaged his son are insufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in respondents favor. 27
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari 28 with the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated June 30, 2011, the CA dismissed petitioners certiorari petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutors ruling. It found no evidence to show that
Tetet was deliberately executed by respondents. Also, it echoed the DOJs observations on respondents
presumption of innocence.30

Hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

Petitioner builds up a case of extralegal killing and seeks that the Court resolve the issue as to whether or not the CA
erred in finding that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in upholding the dismissal of petitioners complaint
against respondents.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

At the outset, it is observed that the Provincial Prosecutors ruling, as affirmed on appeal by the DOJ and, in turn,
upheld on certiorari by the CA, may be dissected into three separate disquisitions: first , the lack of probable cause
on the part of Dangupon, who despite having admitted killing the victim, was exculpated of the murder charge
against him on account of his interposition of the justifying circumstances of self-defense/defense of a stranger and
fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right of an office under Article 11(5) of the RPC; second , the lack of
probable cause on the part of Fortuno and Abordo who, despite their presence during the killing of Tetet, were found
to have no direct participation or have not acted in conspiracy with Dangupon in Tetets killing; and third , the lack
of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol in view of their absence during the said incident.
For better elucidation, the Court deems it apt to first lay down the general principles which go into its review process
of a public prosecutors probable cause finding, and thereafter apply these principles to each of the above-mentioned
incidents in seriatim.

A. General principles; judicial


review of a prosecutors
probable cause determination.

A public prosecutors determination of probable cause that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in
court is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The
exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes
correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari . It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of
discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying
precise definition, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.31 To note, the underlying principle behind the courts power to review a public prosecutors determination of
probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely
abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which
underpins the very core of our system of government. As aptly edified in the recent case of Alberto v. CA: 32

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the
general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle
of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari , has been tasked by the
present Constitution " to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutors resolution if
he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable
cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.33 As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearl bank Securities, Inc.:34

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed , and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all
reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without
which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense.36

With these precepts in mind, the Court proceeds to assess the specific incidents in this case.

B. Existence of probable cause on


the part of Dangupon.

Records bear out that Dangupon admitted that he was the one who shot Tetet which eventually caused the latters
death. The Provincial Prosecutor, however, relieved him from indictment based mainly on the finding that the
aforesaid act was done either in self-defense, defense of a stranger or in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise
of a right of office, respectively pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, Article 11 37 of the RPC. The DOJ affirmed the
Provincial Prosecutors finding, adding further that Dangupon, as well as the other respondents, enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

These findings are patently and grossly erroneous.

Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder namely: (a) that a person was
killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 24838 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide 39 are, in all reasonable
likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot
and killed Tetet.1wphi1 Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained by
respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless.40 Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetets killing can
neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to
Dangupon.
At this juncture, it must be noted that Dangupons theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and performance of
an official duty are not clear and convincing enough to exculpate him at this stage of the proceedings considering the
following circumstances: (a) petitioners version of the facts was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida Samillano and
Rolando Corcotchea who stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands as a sign of surrender but was still
mauled by armed persons41 (hence, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Tetet and the lack of any
sufficient provocation on the part of Dangupon,42 the actual motive of Tetets companions,43 and the lawfulness of
the act44 are put into question);(b) it was determined that Tetet was handcuffed 45 when he was boarded on the
military jeep (hence, the supposition that Tetet was actually restrained of his movement begs the questions as to how
he could have, in this state, possibly stole the grenade from Abordo); and (c) petitioners evidence show that Tetet
suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, 46 the shots causing which having been fired at a close
distance47 (hence, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel 48Tetets supposed unlawful
aggression, and whether the injury committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right49 are, among others, also put into question). Given the foregoing, Dangupons
defenses are better off scrutinized within the confines of a criminal trial.

To add, neither can the dismissal of the murder charge against Dangupon be sustained in view of his presumption of
innocence. Jurisprudence holds that when the accused admits killing the victim, but invokes a justifying
circumstance, the constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived and the burden of proving the
existence of such circumstance shifts to the accused.50 The rule regarding an accuseds admission of the victims
killing has been articulated in Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:51

Well settled is the rule that where the accused had admitted that he is the author of the death of the victim and his
defense anchored on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove this justifying circumstance to the satisfaction
of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution,
for the accused himself had admitted the killing. The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the
elements of self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, otherwise the conviction of the accused is
inescapable.52(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Therefore, due to the ostensible presence of the crime charged
and considering that Dangupons theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful performance of ones duty
and the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the circumstances, not compelling enough to over come a
finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case against
Dangupon. Consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling with respect to the latter is in order.

C. Existence of probable cause on


the part of Fortuno and
Abordo.

In similar regard, the Court also finds that grave abuse of discretion tainted the dismissal of the charges of murder
against Fortuno and Abordo.

To elucidate, while petitioner has failed to detail the exact participation of Fortuno and Abordo in the death of Tetet,
it must be noted that the peculiar nature of an extralegal killing negates the former an opportunity to proffer the
same. It is of judicial notice that extralegal killings are ordinarily executed in a clandestine manner, and, as such, its
commission is largely concealed from the public view of any witnesses. Notably, unlike in rape cases wherein the
victim albeit ravaged in the dark may choose to testify, and whose testimony is, in turn, given great weight and
credence sufficient enough for a conviction,53 the victim of an extralegal killing is silenced by death and therefore,
the actual participation of his assailants is hardly disclosed. As these legal realities generally mire extralegal killing
cases, the Court observes that such cases should be resolved with a more circumspect analysis of the incidental
factors surrounding the same, take for instance the actual or likely presence of the persons charged at the place and
time when the killing was committed, the manner in which the victim was executed (of which the location of the
place and the time in which the killing was done may be taken into consideration), or the possibility that the victim
would have been easily overpowered by his assailants (of which the superior number of the persons detaining the
victim and their ability to wield weapons may be taken into consideration).

In the present case, the existence of probable cause against Fortuno and Abordo is justified by the circumstances on
record which, if threaded together, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that they were also
probably guilty of the crime charged. These circumstances are as follows: (a) Fortuno and Abordo were with
Dangupon during the time the latter killed Tetet54 in an undisclosed place along the Viga River; (b)Tetet was
apprehended, taken into custody and boarded on a military jeep by the group of armed elements of which Fortuno
and Abordo belonged to;55 (c) as earlier mentioned, Tetet was handcuffed 56 when he was boarded on the military
jeep and, in effect, restrained of his movement when he supposedly stole the grenade from Abordo; and (d) also, as
previously mentioned, Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, 57 and that the shots causing the
same were fired at a close distance.58 Evidently, the confluence of the above-stated circumstances and legal realities
point out to the presence of probable cause for the crime of murder against Fortuno and Abordo. Hence, the
dismissal of the charges against them was similar to Dangupon improper. As such, the CAs ruling must also be
reversed with respect to Fortuno and Abordo.

D. Lack of probable cause on the


part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar,
and Balicol.

The Court, however, maintains a contrary view with respect to the determination of lack of probable cause on the
part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar and Balicol.

Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned respondents as opposed to Dangupon, Fortuno, and
Abordo directly participated in the killing of Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by the DOJ, Villar, Lara,
Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet at the time he was shot; thus, they could not have been responsible for his
killing. Neither could they be said to have acted in conspiracy with the other respondents since it was not
demonstrated how they concurred in or, in any way, participated towards the unified purpose of consummating the
same act. It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by
the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. 59 Therefore, finding no direct participation or
conspiracy on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol, the Court holds that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its
discretion in affirming the Provincial Prosecutors dismissal of the charges against them. In this respect, the CAs
Decision must stand.

As a final word, the Court can only bewail the loss of a family member through the unfortunate course of an
extralegal killing. The historical prevalence of this deplorable practice has even led to the inception and eventual
adoption of the Rules on Amparo60 to better protect the sacrosanct right of every person to his life and liberty and
not to be deprived of such without due process of law. Despite the poignancy natural to every case advanced as an
extralegal killing, the Court, as in all courts of law, is mandated to operate on institutional impartiality that is, its
every ruling, notwithstanding the sensitivity of the issue involved, must be borne only out of the facts of the case
and scrutinized under the lens of the law. It is pursuant to this overarching principle that the Court has dealt with the
killing of Tetet and partly grants the present petition. In fine, the case against Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo must
proceed and stand the muster of a criminal trial. On the other hand, the dismissal of the charges against Villar,Lara,
Acaylar, and Balicol is sustained.

WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The Resolution dated March 10, 2003 of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Resolution dated November 27, 2008 of the Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-414 are
NULLIFIED insofar as respondents PO1 Leo T. Dangupon, 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno, and Cpl. Edilberto Aborado are
concerned. Accordingly, the Department of Justice is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution in order to charge
the above-mentioned respondents in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL,
SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL
B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,


vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity
hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions for
Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ'
these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as
respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and
Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the
validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over
the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the
criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from
slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide. 3

Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153
and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel
Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our
Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R.
No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence
of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case: 6

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel
"Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at
the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went
to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation
rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon
as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the
Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan
"initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the
"Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their
first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever
they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived
the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were
subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.
The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for
the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)


6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)


4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the
trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters
that had to be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining
25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced
to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of
prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000
by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on
the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005,
the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25
October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
(Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated,
since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused
Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time
that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot
be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we
apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent
to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes
that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the
penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the
Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused
was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one committed
with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless
manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed
despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their
other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of
Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and
service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA
rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which
carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et
al.contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates
in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective
Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 12 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof,
discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April
2003.13

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation
and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case
against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into
finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.

ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies

III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them
from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of


Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa
in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly
considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize
that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CAs dismissal of the
criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in
a violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may
be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established
that the CAs Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or
toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to
dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioners arguments and found no basis to
rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of
petitioner Villa with finality.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101
(Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a
mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSGs theory that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or
negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We
emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or
criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its
maximum period toprisin correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an
unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe
classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for
an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind accompanying an act,
especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the
"moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to
produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done "willfully,"
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

xxxx

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill or animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death
resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.

xxxx

In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the
employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus,
incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the
overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent,
does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.

xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are
ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate
personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the
part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In
contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate,
and the danger is not openly visible.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in
the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution
against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the
danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor,
not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be
required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus
malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of
the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the
ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted
to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed
by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the
distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the
death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already resolved and the
OSG agrees that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in
inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

filed by Tecson et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis--vis G.R.
No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not


bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight
physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the probation program
and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People 23 to support
their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after
the matter is ultimately resolved.

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified
or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions
that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the
correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the
accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accuseds waiver of the right to appeal as when applying
for probation makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v.
Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has
already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade
the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendants already established
innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and
prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and
resources of the State.

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to
persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial,
all in a process where the governments power and resources are once again employed against the defendants
individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by
the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is
not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that
issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we
quote:30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes
place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the
verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the
question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decisions error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden a very heavy one is on the
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
While this Courts Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as
soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the
modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct
and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty
of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its
jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a
Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of
jurisdiction.

In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and
irrelevant where the courts jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the
modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy.
As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its
finality, as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC


Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice
system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to
the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That power and
capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment, 32 and enforce or suspend33 the
execution of a sentencein accordance with law.

The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of the applications,
considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed withthe trial
court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally
convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 not Branch 130 of the Caloocan
City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any
explanation or shown any special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed
with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA
issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.
accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they
may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of
authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation
applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial courts judgment or final order, 38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate
court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin
then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other partys time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease including the authority to order execution pending appeal the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate
court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce
its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until
it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the
incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final under
any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been
partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality,
the judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. 43 If the case was previously appealed to
the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then
be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. 44 The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of
the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts applications for
probation.46

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the
accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court. 50 In
September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA 52 and
this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on
25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment thereon. 55 After their
submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of
Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order
their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a
clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130
or Tecson et al., or both to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation 58 is a special
privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce
their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a
chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some
of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency
conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should
not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or remedies,
unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of
the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out that when
they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek
probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In the
2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for
probation even after the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a
maximum term of eight years of prisin mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months
and 21 days of prisin correccional.

In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation
Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law
from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as
a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders
discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of
this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to
the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall
within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation
at the time.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it
divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications
for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we
declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson et


al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of their
discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

4. By absolute pardon.

5. By prescription of the crime.

6. By prescription of the penalty.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no
judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to
replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition
of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the
conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.


In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our pronouncements
insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of
9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all: 69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have
been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two,
a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based
on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty
that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a
lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgment even if this has been found in error. And,
worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the
whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the
ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Franciscoand this case.

xxxx

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did
not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not
to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling
that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound
ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option
to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

xxxx

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide,
is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right
from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two
years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears
he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should
be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two
years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No one could say with
certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have
crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1wphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation
when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court,
subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisin correccional
in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling
in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.

While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for
Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial
court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under
probation at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.

Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty
imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this
Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as maximum.

As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as
follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it
important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty
automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The
applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before
the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes
ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of
accessory penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" 73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court.
We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory
penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment
period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison
term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccionalin its medium period. As this provision
grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the
ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months
of prisin correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisin correccional
automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisin Correccional Its accessory
penalties. The penalty of prisin correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the
right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided
in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four
years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes
effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this
accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular
election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any public office
that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned accessory penalties
can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court
find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, 86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno
v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon
Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by
the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional
Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders,
resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for
probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, 88 without prejudice to their
remaining civil liability, if any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and
hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence
shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner


vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-
island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the
young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave
the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple
established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they
finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay
together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez,
11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his
drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical
violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive
respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the
Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was
convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor
children and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by
the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial
court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on
03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion
between the parties. 1wphi1.nt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late,
was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth
of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property.
Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly,
in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the
case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that
his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set
out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein
outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no
evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity'
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim -
"legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital
relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee


vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee,
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1'
x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with
masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves.
He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn,
pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the
Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p.
38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being
the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to
the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS
WERE NOT OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible
any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling
and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache &
Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by
the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers,
and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous
cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of
police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d
621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938
(1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel
in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not
be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8;
Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the
NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of
the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search
and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by
police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone
else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious
legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the
records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:

Fiscal Formoso:

You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate
the accused together with the girl?

WITNESS:

Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination.
As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession
while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is
there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner
of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant
met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship
the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the
country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary
to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour
could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and
for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by
the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand,
appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously
convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and
that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p.
66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172
SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records
further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated
in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,


vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995

JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,


vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of
Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their
AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995

RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,


vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L.
DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.

G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.


CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,


vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995

COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE
OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.

G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF


PHILIPPINE BOOK SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of Customs, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of
the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in
G.R. No. 115931.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines,
Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan
T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a
rejoinder to the PPI's reply.

On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.

I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,
Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate
previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it
was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and
third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,
1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by
striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a
House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

The contention has no merit.

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the
Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the
enrolled bills. These were:

R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING
FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX
CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is
actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920,
which was approved by the Senate on February 3, 1992.

R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY
FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the President on
May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on
August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.

On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the consolidation of House
and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on which the laws were approved by the
President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers of Congress were respectively passed:

1. R.A. NO. 7642

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
(December 28, 1992).

House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992

Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992

2. R.A. NO. 7643

AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE


THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28,
1992)

House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992

Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992

3. R.A. NO. 7646

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO


PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE
TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)

House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992

Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992

4. R.A. NO. 7649

AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,


INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-
ADDED TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR
THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR
SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)

House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993

5. R.A. NO. 7656

AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO


DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)

House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993

6. R.A. NO. 7660

AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF


THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(December 23, 1993)

House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993

7. R.A. NO. 7717

AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF


STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR
THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW
SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)

House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993


Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994

Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to
propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a House revenue measure.
It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the
Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.

On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a mere matter
of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this
case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . .
. H.B. 11197."

Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:

RULE XXIX

AMENDMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.

No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted in writing.

Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.

69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the subject
matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.

xxx xxx xxx

70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which covers a
subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution. (emphasis added).

Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less
power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between constitutional provisions giving them the power
to propose or concur with amendments.

Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.

Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on
other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution
to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word
"exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to
show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."

The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional intent are
nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935
Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a
bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House
of Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the National Assembly,
acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers,
sought to curtail the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:

All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the
same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed
enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the
Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the
opening of the next regular session of the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of
two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be
deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.

The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It deleted
everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National Assembly and embodied
in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66
(1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18,
1940.

This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the present Constitution
was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from which the framers of the
Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of
the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete
"as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is
passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject
matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.

That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is clear from the
following commentaries:

The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction.
It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to
come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For example, a general revenue
bill passed by the lower house of the United States Congress contained provisions for the
imposition of an inheritance tax . This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The
amending authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme Court to be
sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S.
107, 55 L. ed. 389].

(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))

The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it
is more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover,
its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the
enactment of the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur
with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed
inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House
of Representatives.

(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).

In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,"
it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee
to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections
or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case
it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.

(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing
that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of
the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere
technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as
much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.

II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is
an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that
there is something substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197.
From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the
product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of
Congress."

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the
corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between
the two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be
amendments to the House bill.

Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere
amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three
readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills
could be referred to the Conference Committee.

There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the House bill
and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a
conference committee, the question was raised whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference,
considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put
the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is passed by
the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the
Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject of a conference, and can a
law be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance
does not refer to investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of deposits in banks
but also investigation of investments in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in
their subject matter, I believe that no law can be enacted.

Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:

THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in cases like
this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been approved by the Senate, there
would have been no need of a conference; but precisely because the Senate passed another bill on
the same subject matter, the conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering
the report of that committee.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))

III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and
unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President
separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and
void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the moment was being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills
as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified.
It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on
March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on
June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which
at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No.
11197.

As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies
not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three
days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three
readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.

Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:

(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in
its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when
the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):

(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days before its passage,
except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of the present
Constitution, thus:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are
required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered
academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the
Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does
not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.

Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an
urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the
bill on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's
acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay
of the judicial hand.

At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed
for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the
voting on second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the
submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it
was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members
of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the
enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to
it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These
purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.

IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of the constitutional policy
of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art. II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met
for two days in executive session with only the conferees present.

As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions with only the
conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was adopted requiring open
sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings
for conference committees.

It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff members
were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be
their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the conference were excluded.
There is no showing that the conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner
Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees keep
notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in
this case submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must contain "a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached
to the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been
made in the original bills without the need of a statement detailing the changes.

The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of
1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:

MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the
conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the provision of Section 11,
Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides specifically that the conference report must
be accompanied by a detailed statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House.
This conference committee report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker.
Therefore it is out of order to consider it.

Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:

MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with the point
of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.

There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan,
but this provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill have been amended. In this
case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading of the
bill what the provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.

After some interruption, he continued:

MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the
provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision cited by the gentleman
from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in or deleted from the
provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we cannot understand what those
words and phrases mean and their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a
detailed statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but when the
entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not necessary. So when the
reason for the Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))

Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was appealed, it was
upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)

Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as these are
germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA
703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to
resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is
important is that its report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it
would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was
thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed."

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may be given
instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without instructions. Normally the
conference committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to
as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited
authority to change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that
were not in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference
committees are difficult to determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I
killed a bill on export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I
could not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both
houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged
and new members are appointed.

(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND LEGISLATURES:


A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).

In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to say that
conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we
noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the
power "to determine the rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the
method and procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.

V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, 26 (1) of the
Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption
from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.

Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other taxes,
duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied,
established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or national authority or government agency,
now or in the future."

PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, which provides as follows:

103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory.

R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending 103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential
Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS


TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY]
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its
intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.

PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D.
No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already
stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order
to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the
subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of the NIRC as
among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency
of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.

In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A.
No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS
POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking
privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In
holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking
privileges, this Court held:

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly
explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act.
Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to
be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles
in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the
subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have
special mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)

(227 SCRA at 707-708)


VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not
exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws
which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation
of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law
could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI. The
license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory
because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000,
with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for
the law was thus evident.

On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d
295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales tax
or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not.
Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of
paper and ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold
at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of
regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would
therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in
that case)

Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely and
unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted to PAL,
petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority, and many more are
likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base
of the tax.

The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are
profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions
will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the
Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in
other cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn,
sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture
of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional instruments and implements,
by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this
assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):

The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the
First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional
validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares
and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment
does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in
preferred position.

The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence,
although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups,
such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which
invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It
was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining
the free exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange
of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is
not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the
sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that
to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the
resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from
any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to
follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible
burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended by 7 of R.A. No.
7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions
such as those relating to accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not
liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate
whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt
without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation."

With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real
property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly
amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the
buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.

The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous sources are
cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one,
interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such
taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another,
or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless
prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true
legal sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only
existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968))
Contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of
the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and
Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).

It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products,
food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which
is equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but
CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless,
should likewise be exempted.

The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was
already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in
error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to
the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor"
in the example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the
meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is
inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil.
912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).

Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, 28(1) which
provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation."

Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at
the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms
and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)

Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716
merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned in Kapatiran ng
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in
these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI,
28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public,
which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner
sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are
sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as
they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of
the general public.

(At 382-383)

The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the mandate of Congress to
provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax
burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What
it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has
been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes
should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)).
Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes,
which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII,
17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law
minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No.
7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4,
amending 103 of the NIRC).

Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from the VAT:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn
sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture
of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional instruments and
implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and services which
are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and
other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion
picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants
and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common
carriers, services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.

The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by tendering issues
not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to adjudication
the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in the concrete the application of the law to actual
contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been
assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.

The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation,
as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint.
Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he has not
made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process
and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.

(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)

Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that postponement of
adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of the law may
give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be
presented.

Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication
would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.

We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our
jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of
that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a court to hear
and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the courts of law and equity"
(Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power
cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case
of Art. VIII, 5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction,"
defined as "the power conferred by law upon a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all
others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court
cannot inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.

VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines
(CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax
exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject
cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D.
No. 175 was promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984,
because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in
1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991,
but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution
"repudiated the previous actions of the government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated
revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by
way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:

1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for
the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for
all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.

15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as
instruments for social justice and economic development.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out cooperatives by
withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, 5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was
to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore granted to private business enterprises in
general, in view of the economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had
restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but then
again cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives
applied to all, including government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really
require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is
no basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of vacillation, as far
as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the constitutional
provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that
is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination to
cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be charged.

Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).

CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the equal protection
of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The classification between electric and other
cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a
congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as
possible, especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We
cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.

We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have
in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now
come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its
enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as
to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally
responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194
U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we
should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by
voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment.
This Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate opinion.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ, maintained their dissenting opinion.

Panganiban, J., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented
by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by
her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R.
FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN,
JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO,
MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors,
represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,
minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area
of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical
pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading
to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by
the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:


CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are
left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn
are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors
and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is


contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on
two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises
a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask
this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right
to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-
five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-
777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna
who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily


carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective
of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:


. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.
It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In
the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right
is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to
the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances.
Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind,
is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to
require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of
activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining
or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources;
loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and
P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:


(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal
right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable
care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs
dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not,
in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation
of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of
the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the
legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be
asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind,
is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to
require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of
activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining
or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources;
loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and
P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal
right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable
care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs
dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not,
in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation
of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of
the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the
legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be
asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

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