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1. No.

Police power is the inherent power of the State lodged in the legislative department to
regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. PNP is under Executive.

2. A. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Section 1, Article 3, 1987 Constitution)

b. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. (Article 3,
Section 9, 1987 Constitution)

c. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the Government. (Section 18, Article 12, 1987
Constitution)

3. A. It may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value
of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended.
b. The imposition of an easement of a 3-meter strip on the plaintiffs property was considered
taking. (Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215)
c. A municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which would impair the view of the plaza from
the highway was likewise considered taking. (People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil 44)
d. The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the
fence to provide for a parking area. The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the
setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that
it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for
use by the public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent
domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
4. Genuine necessity, Private property is involved, There must be taking, It must be for public use,
Payment of just compensation, Observance of due process of law.

5. Reckoning point for determination of just compensation: "Fair market value" of the property at
the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier

6. It holds that a law is vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution because: a) It violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid. b) It leaves law enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (People v.
de la Piedra, GR No. 128777, Jan.24, 2001)

7. Substantive Due Process serves as a restriction on the governments law and rule-making
powers. It requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty, or property.
8. a) Rest on substantial distinctions b) Be germane to the purpose of the law c) Not be limited to
existing conditions only d) Apply equally to all members of the same class.

9. This standard of review is used to examine laws that discriminate against non-suspect classes
including economic classifications as well as classifications based on age, wealth, and mental
disability. The standard of review requires that the use of the classification be rationally related
to a legitimate government justification.

10. Under strict scrutiny review, used to review laws that utilize classifications based on race or
ethnicity and other suspect classifications, the standard of review is whether the use of the
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government objective. In these cases,
the government sometimes lacks a compelling objective and may even lack a legitimate one.

11. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. (Section 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution)
12. Give at least five subject matters involving personal decisions that are protected under the right to
privacy:
a) The right of individual to enter contract
b) To engage in any of the common occupations in life
c) To acquire useful knowledge
d) To marry
e) To establish a home and bring up children
f) To worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience
g) To enjoy those privileges long recognized at common-law as enacted to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.

>Informational Privacy- refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters;

>Decisional Privacy-to refer to the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.

278. What are three basic strands of the right to privacy?

Three strands of the right to privacy, viz:


(1) Locational or situational privacy;

(2) Informational privacy- the right of individuals

to control information about themselves; and

(3) Decisional privacy. (Vivares vs. St. Theresas

College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014).

309. Public figure doctrine

Honest criticisms on conduct of public officials and public

figure are insulated from libel judgments.


13. Is there a right to privacy specifically guaranteed

under the Constitution? Briefly explain.

Yes. (1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order

of the court, or when public safety or order requires

otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the


preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

proceeding. (Section 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution)

276. What are the Constitutional provisions that

protect an individuals right to privacy?

(1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order

of the court, or when public safety or order requires

otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

proceeding. (Section 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution)

14 Aspects of the freedom of speech

1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint.

2. Freedom from subsequent punishment.


15.Content-neutral regulation
Substantial governmental interest is required for their

validity, and they are not subject to the strictest form of

judicial scrutiny rather only an intermediate approach-

somewhere between the rationality that is required of a law

and the compelling interest standard applied to content-

based restrictions.

Note: When the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral

regulation, it is subject to an intermediate review. A content-

based regulation or any system or prior restraint comes to the

Court bearing a heavy presumption against its

unconstitutionality and thus measured against the clear and

present danger rule, giving the government a heavy burden to

show justification for the imposition of such restraint and

such is neither vague nor overbroad.

. Content-based regulation
Content-based restrictions, are imposed because of the

content of the speech and are subject to the clear-and present

danger test. For example, a rule such as that involved

in Sanidad v. COMELEC,

[37] prohibiting columnists,

commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for

or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling

reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict

scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and

therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional

invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible

overbreadth and vagueness. (Osmena vs. COMELEC)What is the presumption with respect to prior

restraints?

16. With regard to prior restraint in free press, the rule is that it is

presumed to be invalid. This rule overrides the standard


presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid.

17 Clear and present danger test

The question in every case is whether the words used are

used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create

a clear and present danger that they will bring about the

substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a

question of proximity of degree. (Schenck vs. United States)

Emphasis: The danger created must not only be clear and

present but also traceable to the ideas expressed. (Gonzales v.

COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969)

Note: This test has been adopted by our SC, and is most

applied to cases involving freedom of expression

18. 297. What is a facial challenge of a law?

A facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in court, in which

the plaintiff alleges that the legislation is always, and under all
circumstances, unconstitutional, and therefore void.

Note: Facial challenge to a statute is allowed only when it

operates in the area of freedom of expression. Invalidation of

the statute on its face, rather than as applied, is permitted in

the interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of

expression. ( Separate opinion of Justice Mendoza in Cruz v.

Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA

128, 2000)

19. What is unprotected speech? What are the socalled unprotected speech?

Libel

Obscenity

Grave threats

Contempt of court

Incitement to rebellion or sedition


The government can do prior restraint and subsequent

punishment in case of unprotected speech

20
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a

public official or public figure from recovering damages for a

defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he

proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e.,

with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of

whether it was false or not. (Borjal vs. CA)

21. Valid, admissible


Consented search, less expection of privacy

To establish a violation of ones right against unreasonable searches and

seizures, one must first prove that he has exhibited an actual (subjective)

expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized; and second, his

subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable

(objective).
22. No. Requisites: Genuine necessity, Private property is involved, There must be taking, It must
be for public use, Payment of just compensation, Observance of due process of law.
No genuine necesdity un this case

23.invalid. Req: lawful subject, lawful means


Means not reasonable to prevent the evil sought to avoid

24. Yes. But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review

and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to

suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that

issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the

MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January

1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host

or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television

programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast

of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition,

but it may not suspend television personalities, for such

would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond
what the law provides. Only

persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within

the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be

within the decrees penal or disciplinary operation. And when

it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the

person charged with violating the statute and for whom the

penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCBs decision in

Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and


the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must

be modified. The suspension should cover only the television

program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the

offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the

law and the facts obtaining call for. (Soriano vs. MTRCB)
25. Claims against the gov in case of eminent domain not barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel

26. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect

ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method

by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the

agricultural land is the alternative. By using the word collectively, the Constitution

allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.

Thus, allowing corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the

farmers becoming stockholders or members does not violate the agrarian reform

policy under the Constitution.


27. Any private communications. The law does not

make any distinction. (Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995)

Yes, the right to privacy is a protection against illegal

wiretaps.

In Ramirez, the Court elucidated that in enacting R.A.

4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,

unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or

communications taken either by the parties themselves or by

third persons. The law does not make any distinction.


28. Why the aggregate-based time air-time limits on campaign advertising is

invalid

Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelecs rule --

limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties

for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)

minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or

advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the

freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of

candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.

29.The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting

tarpaulins expressing political views in their own private property is an

impermissible encroachment on the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a

deprivation of property without due process.

30.

312. May detention guards read the letters of

prisoners or persons under government detention? State

your legal basis.

American jurisprudence initially made a

distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by

convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees.

The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono (317 F. Supp. 776

(1970) recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted

prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication.

Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public


officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While

incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in

certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could

not be inspected or read at all.

In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell (418 U.S.

539 (1974) involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme

Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of

the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates.

However, prison officials could not read such mail from

attorneys.

xxx xxx xAmerican cases recognize that the unmonitored use

of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a genuine

threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his letter

in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee

knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail

officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of

privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail from

lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison

officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but

could not read the contents without violating the inmates

right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of

privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to

verbal contraband.

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that


the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the

present case violated the detainees right to privacy of

communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope.

The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it

serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for

the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP

authorities were not confidential letters between the

detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the

letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was

merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as

their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the

present case, since the letters were not confidential

communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the

officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.

If the letters are marked confidential communication between

the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should

not read the letters but only open the envelopes for

inspection in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer

could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that

is available only to the public at large but not to persons who

are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those

detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the


limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By

the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and

convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy

rights. (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of

Capt. Gary Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792 August 25,

2005)
30.
It holds that a law is vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution because: a) It violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid. b) It leaves law enforcers an unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (People v.
de la Piedra, GR No. 128777, Jan.24, 2001)

Lawful subject. The first requisite simply means

that the subject of the measure is within the scope of the

police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be

regulated affects the public welfare. The interests of the

public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular

class, require the exercise of the police power.

Lawful means. The end does not justify the means.

The lawful objective, in other words, must be pursued

through a lawful method; that is, both the end and the means

must be legitimate. The means employed are reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not

unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The requisites for the valid exercise of police power

by the delegate are as follows: (a.) Express grant by law; (b.)


Must not be contrary to law; (c.) As a general rule, within

territorial limits of LGUs. As an exception, when exercised to

protect water supply

31. It must be for public use. As a requirement for

eminent domain, public use is the general concept of

meeting public need or public exigency. It is not confined to

actual use by the public in its traditional sense. The idea that

public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the

public has been abandoned. The term public use has now

been held to be synonymously with public interest, public

benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. (Reyes vs.

National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003)

The public use requirement for the valid exercise of

the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving

concept influenced by changing conditions. It is accurate to

state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially

employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of

public use. (Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA, G.R. No. 137282,

January 16, 2001) The meaning of public use has also been

broadened to cover uses which, while not directly available to

the public, redound to their direct advantage or benefit.

(Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220)