Processism PDF

1 of 36 Ontology of Process.
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Ontology of Process
Shashikant Padalkar
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Ontology of Process
Index 2
0.0 Introduction 3
0.1 History of Processism 4
0.2 Process Identity 5
1.0 Process Abstraction 8
1.1 Topological Process Model 10
1.2 Dynamic System Model 11
2.0 Space-time Ontology 14
2.1 Time and Entropy 17
2.2 State-space ontology 19
2.3 Ontology of Intensive 21
3.0 World Process 22
3.1 Computational Process 24
3.2 Mind Process 25
3.3 Mentalistic Process 26
3.4 Quantum Process 29
4.0 Synopsis 31
4.1 Whitehead's Philosophy 31
4.2 Deleuze's Metaphysics 33
4.3 Process Theology 35
5.0 References 36
Shashikant Padalkar
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Ontology of Process.
0.0 Introduction
Reality is an assertion of 'existence'. Ontology backs this assertion by
making observations and proposals about the reality of entities 1.
Ontological proposals are metaphysical in nature; they are not scientific
theories. They may seek support from scientific theories of the day. They
may, on other hand, criticize or extrapolate the scientific theories while
promoting their own view.
Ontological observations and proposals can be classified in many ways.
One of the classification schemes is on the basis of 'change' and 'identity':
Processism assumes 'change' (Becoming) as the reality while absolutism or
essentialism assumes 'no change' (Being or non Being) as the reality.
Implicit in processism is the premise that change or difference is more basic
than identity or sameness. Processism defines entity's identity by the
process in which entity eventualizes (originates, survives and transforms as
a series of space-time events), while essentialism defines entity's identity
by its 'essence' or essential characteristics which is a timeless static entity.
Ontological commitment can also be on the basis of cognition:
Idealism assumes that reality has no meaning outside cognition - reality
solely exists in the mind and does not have mind-independent existence.
Solipsism is a kind of idealism where reality is no more than a subjective
perception. Realism assumes that reality exists independent of cognition
there exist things which are not perceived and there exist things which are
perceived; both types of entities are real. Agnostic realism accepts mind-
independent existence of perceivable entities, but is unsure about the
existence of entities which can not be perceived.
Traditionally existence is associated with causality. Something exists if it
has effect of some kind somewhere. This effect may manifest in properties
of the traditionally classifiable kinds - intrinsic (subjective, mental) or
extrinsic (objective, material) properties; intensive (scale invariant) or
extensive (scale dependent) properties, measurable (objective, intensive-
extensive) or immeasurable (phenomenal-perceptual) properties etc. 2 Some
properties may exist as propensities and potentialities while some entities
may exist as transcendental (platonic) universals; these later entities
though seemingly defy causal classification; are brought under such
classification in process oriented philosophies as we shall see later.
1 Entities may take forms and contents of processes, objects, particles, concepts, systems, models, events, fields,
percepts or any thing whose reality is to be asserted.
2 All properties are experiential-phenomenal in general sense in as much as they are perceived or conceived.
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In attributive monism entities have only one category emanating from

single source or having common substratum; in substantial monism entities
have only one substance. Absolute monism assumes that all entities have
only one substance and one category. This position usually slips into
reductionism (everything is reducible to One), platonism (platonic space is
the ultimate reality) or panpsychism (consciousness is fundamental), or
noumenalism (noumenon is basic), or nihilism (there is no absolute reality).
Pluralism assumes existence of many causally unconnected or independent
entities; while relational monism sees causal connection between all
entities. Neutral monism is a kind of attributive monism where mental
(intrinsic) and physical (extrinsic) properties are attributes of the same
anterior reality. Panentheism is a kind of attributive monism where
'becoming', 'being', and 'non-being' are aspects of the same reality.
Each assumption of reality has nuances leading to further classification and
subclassifications, however; (1) identity and change (2) cognition or
experience (3) causality and origination, and (4) 'composition and inter-
relationships' of entities remain the main ontological concerns. An entity
classified in a particular way may exhibit features of other classes. This
valid intermixing of classes leads to further classification. There can be
linguistically proper but ontologically invalid intermixing of classes such
as process being described in terms of its essential features, adding a
circularity in the process description. It is quite possible that the reality
could be neutral to any particular classification we are talking about, but
here we will explore the reality from the process point of view.
0.1 History of Processism
Western philosophy credits the 'process approach' to Greek thinker
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.500BC). He said: World is a manifold of opposed
forces joined in mutual rivalry and interlocked in constant conflict. The
fundamental "stuff" of the world is not a material substance of some sort
but a natural process, namely "fire," and all things are products of its
workings (puros tropai). Fire is the destroyer and transformer of things and
"all things happen by strife and necessity". The changeability so pervades
the world that "one cannot step twice into the same river".3
In oriental tradition, process approach is clearly evident in early Buddhism 4
(Gautama Buddha - c.500BC). According to Buddha, neither Being nor non-
Being is the truth, but only Becoming. Buddha sees incessant change in
everything (Sarvam kshanikam)5; world is a flux (santana) or a process of
3 ref. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

4 ref. Rhys Davids (Buddhism), Oldenburg (Buddha) and Radhakrishnan (Ind. Philosophy: vol-1).
5 This is one of the three processual principles of early Buddhism which are acceptable to all latter Buddhist
Schools; other two are Pratitya Samutpada (dependent origination) and Anatmavada (doctrine of no Self).
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Becoming. Buddhism denies supernatural intervention in this process. It

also denies the process to be mere self-unfolding of cause. Effect is not a
manifestation of the cause but a conditional occurrence of a consequent
event. Each state of Becoming is dependent on cause as well as factors
external to the cause but immanent in the World. Thus the next momentary
reality is dependent on the previous state as well as external conditions.
This law of Becoming is termed as 'pratitya-samutpada' or 'dependent
origination'. Buddhism sees everything, including sentient beings, as
aggregates (sanghata) of physical or psychical elements without any
timeless transcendental essence or soul (Anatmavada or doctrine of no-
self)6. Constituents of these aggregates assume new reality every moment 7
and acquire new properties. These aggregates exist as reality states and
evolve through time according to principle of pratitya-samutpada. They can
be distinguished only by their properties at any given moment of time 8.
This is applicable to sentient beings too; mind states are properties of
particular type of aggregate (sanghata of chitta-chaitta skandha).
Buddha's teachings are primarily ethical, empirical and positivist, 9 however,
there is a metaphysical view underneath which comes to the fore in some
of his discourse. This view is process oriented and forms the metaphysical
basis of early Buddhism. Later Buddhist schools were developed in India by
2nd century AD and spread in East Asia in first millennium AD retaining
their process orientation. The strand of Mahayana Buddhism which spread
and later developed in China and other parts of East Asia is known as Zen.
Oriental philosophies have other streams; some of them are collectively
known as Taoism (Daojia). Both Zen and Taoism exhibit elements of process
philosophy.
In last few centuries, process approach is discernible in the works of
Leibniz, Bergson, James Williams, Whitehead and Deleuze amongst many
others. We shall concentrate on the last two.
0.2 Process Identity
One can intuitively describe process as a 'evolving sequence of states'. The
term 'evolving sequence' suggests progressive and structured cause-effect
relationship with respect to time while 'state' denotes properties or
attributes of entities associated with certain length of the evolved
sequence at a given moment of time. The properties and attributes in turn
could be of entities participating in the process, that is of entities affected
6 This culminates into Madhyamika School which sees only void (Shunya) behind ever changing flux of the
World. Only Becoming is the reality; there is no reality otherwise.
7 This leads to the Vaibhashika School which assigns new reality to every momentary state.
8 This leads to Yogachara School which equates reality with knowledge of the entity.
9 Buddha refused to answer metaphysical questions on issues such as life after death, eternity of universe, and
soul-body relation. His main concern was to find causes of human sufferings and their alleviation.
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or effected by the cause-effect relationship inherent in the process.

Rescher10 defines a process as a coordinated group of changes in the
complexion of reality, an organized family of occurrences that are
systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally. He
argues that the entities we categorize as things in the ordinary sense are
better understood as instantiations of certain sorts of processes or process-
complexes.
To answer the question of how such a thing as 'process' can preserve its
identity over time be a particular individual entity and yet change,
Rescher proposes the factor of internal complexity. A process can
incorporate change through its unifying amalgamation of stages or phases
(which may themselves be processes). The identity of a process is
constituted through a sequential pattern of action. Pursuing this line
further, Rescher claims that type homogeneity between cause and effect is
not required: existential facts and substantial things can be grounded in
non-existential ones and non-substantive circumstances or principles
respectively. Explanations can then be made in terms of processes rooted
in the operation of fields or forces that pervade nature at large and in their
turn engender the particularized powers and potentialities of identifiable
things. Rescher looks to the entities of quantum physics for confirmation
of this approach. At this level, there appear to be only patterns of process
that exhibit stabilities. In line with recent developments in relational
quantum mechanics, entities at this level exist only by virtue of their
reciprocal interactions. To explain the emergence of higher levels of reality,
Rescher suggests that cosmic evolution itself exhibits the emergence of
more and more complex and elaborate forms of order, the development of
ever more complex concatenations of processes, for which he uses the
expression creative spontaneity. He thus ultimately relates the
processual structure of reality to energy. Complex processes will be the
consequence of the interactions of processes and processes of processes
and so on, involving the same kinds of relations as exist within energy itself.
Deleuze11 however, scrupulously avoids using any transcendental essence
to identify process. He instead introduces multiplicities, a new entity with a
novel ontological status. Multiplicities specify 'the structure of spaces of
10 Nicolas Rescher was borne in Germany (1928) and obtained his PhD in Philosophy at the age of 22 from
Princeton University (US). He has served as a President of American Philosophical Association. Amongst his
prolific writings, Process Metaphysics (1995), Complexity (1996), and Process Philosophy A Survey of Basic
Issues (2001) are related to processism.
11 Gilles Deleuze (19251995) was a French realist empiricist philosopher of Continental School. His
metaphysical ideas are expressed in Difference and Repetition (DR) (1968), Logic & Sense (LS) (1969), Anti-
Oedipus (AO) (1972), A Thousand Plateaus (ATP) (1980), What is Philosophy (WIP) (1991). His incisive (and
some times controversial) interpretation of scientific resources to construct his metaphysical position gives him
a unique style.
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possibilities'. These spaces in turn explain regularities exhibited by

morphogenetic processes12. Multiplicities are virtual they are not
actualized but are concrete possibilities. In that sense they are real though
not actual. (see 2.2).
Processes can be used to identify class of an individuated entity. Normally
class (or a natural kind or a type) is identified by its essence. For example,
'basalt' stone can be identified by its properties like composition and color
which are assumed to be time less and essential characteristics (essence)
of that type. Any stone having these idealized properties is normally
considered as an instantiation of type basalt. This 'essential' identity can be
replaced by the igneous geographical process which solidifies earth's
internal molten magma into basalt rock from which the stone is mined and
milled. Any piece of stone which undergoes this process is a basalt stone.
Process based identity is perfectly feasible to categories of living beings
too. For example, elephant can be essentially identified as a large sized
herbivorous animal with a trunk. In a process based ontology, however,
elephant can be identified by a particular morphogenetic process that gives
rise to it. Its class can be identified by a particular Darwinian evolution
process of natural selection and reproductive isolation from other classes of
species. Every animal which originates, survives, and transforms every
instant (and ultimately transforms into corpse) in these processes will
qualify itself as an elephant. Process differentiates entity by giving it
dynamic identity instead of essence based static identity. This is applicable
even to abstract entities like models and geometrical objects which we tend
to treat as time less universals. In Deleuze's process view, these platonic
(mathematical) objects are conceived through their response to
transformations, differentiation, and symmetry breaking operations. A
metric space13 (such as Euclidean space) is not seen as abstract essence of
certain static geometrical properties but as a space transformed from non-
metric topological space. Thus, topological differential projective affine
Euclidean geometric spaces can be seen as a transforming cascade of
least differentiated space (topological) to most differentiated space
(Euclidean) by symmetry breaking operations. 14 The geometrical axioms
12 Morphogenesis is one of the three fundamental aspects of developmental biology along with control of cell
growth and cellular differentiation. It is concerned with the shapes of tissues, organs and entire organisms and
positions of the various specialized cell types. Here the term is used in larger context to cover any natural
process which produces organic or inorganic entities (objects).
13 Metric space is abstracted by set S with a function d: S x S [0, called metric such that (d(x,y) = 0 iff x =
y) d(x,y) = d(y,x)) (d(x,y)d(x,z)+d(z,y))x,y,zS.Themetricisalsocalleddistancefunction.
14 Mathematically, topological space is a set along with its open subsets which remain open under unions and
finite intersections. Intuitively, in an open set one can move from any point in any direction at least by a small
distance without hitting the edge. Roughly speaking, a topological space is a geometric object, which can be
continuously stretched, shrunk or bent into a new shape. Differential space is the space of differential manifold
(ibid). Projective space adds transformations called projectivities where straightness is preserved but
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and postulates, though they are basic assumptions on which the theory is
constructed, are seen as concepts resulting from intuitive thought (mind)
processes. They are seen as constructed models from which mathematical
form can not be eliminated, and not seen as autonomous transcendental
universals.15
1.0 Process Abstraction
Abstraction is a process complex unique to the living beings (it is
reasonable to assume that non-living beings can not abstract, or if at all
they abstract it must be in a participative way in the process of cognition-
perception (3.2)). In a 'realistic' view the external world has existence
independent of our mind processes and the mind processes are seated in
the physical body (brain or nervous system). We do not know as to how the
external reality is perceived qualitatively. There are useful operational data
as well models16; however, all that we know for sure is that brain is a
neural-electro-chemical process complex in absence of which humans and
most of the animals can not have qualitative experience of the external
world. Brain is the device which maps the physical reality into the
perceptual space. Physical objects and processes are abstractions in this
perceptual (intensive) space. One may argue that consciousness and
sensory perception itself is a process of abstraction at the very
fundamental level. Abstraction processes seem to have intermeshed
hierarchies. Perceived objects can be further abstracted and their behavior
can be modeled.
An actual process may be abstracted to be events occupying a finite
amount of a four dimensional space-time. Every event in space-time is
overlapped by other events, i.e., events are not impenetrable. A space-time
order results from a relation between events. Also, in terms of these events
spatio-temporal point-instants, lines, surfaces, and regions can be defined
by using the Method of Extensive Abstraction (see Russell 1927, and
Whitehead 1929):
A fundamental relation in construction of point-instants in a four
dimensional space-time is a five-term relation of co-punctuality, which
holds between five events having a common area to all of them. A set of
five or more events is called co-punctual if every quintet chosen out of the
set has the relation of co-punctuality. A point-instant is a co-punctual set
parallelism is lost. Affine space adds transformations preserving parallelism and straightness but losing length
invariance. In Euclidean space lengths, angles, shapes are unaltered under transformations like rotations,
translations, and reflections. This hierarchy of spaces however, is oversimplification of the original
classification (Erlanger Program) which was proposed by Felix Klein.
15 Deleuze avoids universal essence at any cost, while Whitehead supports eternal objects which are ingressed
into occasions. There are simple as well as complex eternal objects with abstraction hierarchies. (PR).
16 Such as Holonomic Model of Bohm and Pribram (1987) which explains the holistic aspect of our experience.
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which cannot be enlarged without ceasing to be a co-punctual. The

existence of point-instant so defined is provided if all events can be well-
ordered, i.e. if the Axiom of Choice is true. (Russell 1927).
Given two point-instants and , we denote by their logical product, i.e.,
the events which are members of both. If is non-empty, then and are
said to be connected. A set of point-instants is defined to be collinear, if
every pair of point-instants are connected, and every triad of point-instants
, , are such that either is contained in , or is contained in . A
set of point-instants is defined to be a line, if it is collinear, and it is not
contained in any larger collinear set. The lines so defined are not supposed
to be straight.
The definition of a line is analogous to that of a point-instant. It is possible
to extend this method to obtain surfaces and regions, as well. A set of lines
is called co-superficial, if any two lines intersect, i.e. they have a common
point-instant, but there is no point common to all the lines of the set. A
surface is a co-superficial set of lines which cannot be extended without
ceasing to be co-superficial. A set of surfaces is called co-regional, if any
two surfaces have a line in common, but no line is common to all the
surfaces of the set. A region is a co-regional set of surfaces which cannot
be extended without ceasing to be co-regional.
A space-time order is constructed out of the relation between events. Two
events are said to be compresent when they overlap in space-time. With
respect to a given event it is possible to divide events into zones as follows:
In the first zone there are those events that are compresent with a given
event. Then, in the second zone, there are those events which are not
compresent with a given event, but compresent with an event compresent
with it, and so on. The nth zone will consist of events that can be reached in
n steps, but not in n1 steps, in which a step is taken to be as the passage
from an event to another which is compresent with it. Assuming a minimum
size of events, it is possible to pass from one event to another by a finite
number of steps. Two point-instants are connected, if there is an event
which is a member of both. Thus, point-instants can be collected into zones
as well, and the passage from event to event by the relation of
compresence can be replaced by the passage from point-instant to point-
instant by the relation of connection. Accordingly, suppose there are n
events, e1, e2, ... , en, and suppose e1 is compresent only with e2, e2 is
compresent with e1 and e3, e3 with e2 and e4, and so on. We can then
construct the order e1, e2, ... , en. The relation of connection is a causal
relation between events, where the cause of an event occurs earlier than
its effect.
Events emanating in a living brain are distinguished from events elsewhere,
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(Russell 1948). So thoughts should be among the events of which the

brains consist; each region of the brain is a representation of a set of
events called mental events. Mental events can be known without
inferences and they consist of bundles of compresent qualities. Events,
which are not mental, are called physical events, and they, if known at all,
are known only by inference so far as their space-time structure is
concerned. (See other interpretations of mind mentality in 3.2 & 3.3).
1.1 Topological Process Model17
We can construct a topological process model in which events are
interpreted as open sets, i.e., events will have a one-one correspondence
with open sets. To get an idea, a few topological concepts are defined as
follows. Consider a set T. Let {OiI} to be a set of subsets of T (that is
{OiI} power_set (T)) satisfying following properties:
A1 The union of any number of sets in {OiI} is a set in {OiI}
A2 The intersection of two sets in {OiI} is a set in {OiI}
A3 Set T and the empty set are sets in {OiI}
Set {OiI} satisfying properties A1, A2, A3 is called topology on T. Set T
along with {OiI} is called a topological space T; while each element of
{OiI} is said to be an open set.
A set of open subsets {OiI} of T is said to be an open covering of T, if the
union of OiI contains T. An open covering {VjI} of a space T is said to be a
refinement of an open covering {OiI}, if for each element Vj of {VjI} there
is an element Oi of {OiI} such that Vj Oi. If {OiI} is any open covering of
T, and there is some finite subset {Oi1, Oi2, ... , Oin} of {OiI}, then a space
T is called a compact.
A topological space T is separated, if it is the union of two disjoint, non-
empty open sets. A space T is connected, if it is not separated. A space T is
said to be path-connected if for any two points x and y in T there exists a
continuous function f from the unit interval [0, 1] to T with f(0) = x and f(1)
= y. This function is called a path from x to y. A space T is simply
connected iff it is a path connected, and it has no holes. 18 A space T,
17 Jari Palomki & Harri Keto (2006) of Tampere University of Technology, Pori, Finland have proposed this
model based on ideas from Russell (The Analysis of Matter) and Whitehead (Process & Reality). Though, the
model is meant for Software Engineering process, it seems general enough to be applicable for any process.
18 More formally, a path-connected space T is simply connected if given two points a and b in T and two paths p :
[0,1] T and q : [0,1] T joining a and b, i.e., p(0) = q(0) = a and p(1) = q(1) = b, there exists homotopy in
T between p and q. Two maps p, q : X Y are said to be homotopic if there is map H : [0, 1] X Y such
that for each point x in X, H(0, x) = p(x) and H(1,x) = q(x). The map H is called a homotopy between p and q.
Intuitively, maps p and q are homotopic, if p can be continuously deformed to get q while keeping the
endpoints fixed, and a path-connected space T is simply connected, if every closed path in T can be
continuously deformed into a point. (Topology and Geometry Bredon, 1993).
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which is connected, but not simply connected, is called multiply connected.

Given two points a and b of a space T, a set {O1, O2, ... , On} of open sets is
a simple chain from a to b provided that O1 (and only O1) contains a, On
(and only On) contains b, and Oi Oj is non-empty iff (i j) 1. That is,
each link intersects just the one before it and the one after it, and, of
course, itself. It can be proved that if a and b are two points of connected
space T, and {OiI} is a set of open sets covering T, then there is a simple
chain of elements of {OiI} from a to b, (Theorem 9.23 in Sheldon Davis,
2005). Moreover, let C1 = {O11, O12, .. , O1n} and C2 = {O21, O22, ... , O2m}
be simple chains from point a to point b in a space T. The chain C2 will be
said to go straight through C1 provided that i) every set O2i is contained to
some set O1j ; and ii) if O2i and O2k, i < k, both lie in a set O1r, then for every
integer j, i < j < k, O2j also lies in O1r. Accordingly, the finer chain C2 goes
straight through the coarser chain C1.
This model is interpreted as follows: a process as a whole is interpreted as
a topological space T, which, at least for empirical reasons, is compact and,
depending on the number of parallel processes, is either simply or multiply
connected. The space T contains a start point a and an endpoint b of the
process. The start point a is an event, which is included in the open set O1,
and, similarly, the endpoint b is an event, which is included in the open set
On. The simple chain from a to b consists of sequences of events
interpreted as a set {O1, O2, ... , On} of open sets. Moreover, it is possible
to get as coarse or as fine a chain from a to b as necessary. In a case there
are parallel processes, i.e., processes which we want to keep distinct in a
certain moment, for example feedbacks, we just add holes to our space
T. This prevents the parallel processes from deforming to each other. The
space T will then be multiply connected.
1.2 Dynamic System Model
Our every day space is abstracted by Euclid's geometry in which sum of
three interior angles of a triangle is 180 0 and sum of squares of two right
angled sides in a triangle equals the square of closing side (Pythagoras
theorem). Euclid's geometry is basically formulated in flat and two
dimensional (2-d) space and then extended to 3-d space. Its properties can
be derived in the form of theorems from axioms19. However, Euclid's is not
the only geometry and we can formulate other geometries by changing the
axioms and derive new properties for geometrical objects. For example a
geometry on a sphere will lead to different properties for triangles where
sum of interior angles of a triangle is more than 1800 and where Pythagoras
theorem fails. Such a two dimensional curved surface can be 'coordinated'
19 These are basic assumptions from which 'maximally consistent' theory is constructed. By changing Euclidean
axiom(s) other equally consistent geometries (such as elliptic and hyperbolic geometries) can be constructed.
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in patches (it suffices to say that such a technique exists) and is embedded
in a three dimensional space. Here the surface itself is the space in which
the geometry is formulated. Coordinating the surface, that is putting
coordinate (numbered) axes on the surface helps in formulating the
geometry by using differential equations. One feature of this procedure is
that the coordinate axes are immanent in the spherical surface (2-d space)
and does not take help of external third dimension for embedding the axes.
German mathematician Riemann extended this technique to n-dimensional
differential curved spaces (manifolds)20. In a dynamic systems theory these
manifolds are used to model a process involving physical object(s) where
dimensions of the manifold are used to represent the properties of the
process, the degrees of freedom or the ways in which the process (system)
can change, while the manifold itself becomes the state-space of the
process, that is it becomes the space of all possible states the system can
have. A particular process state becomes a point in the state-space21. It is
the space of possibilities which are actualized when the process advances
with time. These advances form a trajectory in the state-space of the
modeling manifold. The manifold can have singularities which act as
attractors for the state trajectories starting in the 'sphere of influence' or
basin of attraction. Trajectory may eventually end up in singularity, may
oscillate around a limit cycle, or may bifurcate to another singularity or
limit cycle depending on state's response to certain system conditions
(perturbations) which are injected into the state-space. In 'dynamic
systems theory' attractors or limit cycles are the indicators of long term
tendencies of the process. Process behavior is modeled or predicted using
mathematical techniques such as n-manifolds, differential equations,
vectors, tensors and transformations22. For physical systems this modeling
could involve writing Lagrangian or Hamiltonian (function of position and
velocity or momentum of a system state) and applying the principle of
extremal action23. The interpretation, say of Lagrangian, would be the
20 The topological definition is however more involved. The Bredon's text (1993) says, n-manifold is a n-
dimensional Hausdorff space (that is a topological space where two distinct points have non overlapping
neighborhoods), each point of which has a neighborhood that is homeomorphic (that is continuous and one-one
corresponding) to n-Euclidean space or equivalently to its open subset. In each of these Euclidean
neighborhoods one can introduce a coordinate system. The whole manifold space can be coordinated using
overlapping patches. The overlapping regions need to be continuous and differentiable to allow multi-variable
calculus on the manifold leading to the idea of differential (smooth) manifold. For formal definitions of
manifolds see Ch 2 (differential manifolds) in the Bredon's text (1993).
21 This is also known as 'configuration space' since each point of modeling manifold represents an entire possible
configuration of family of abstracted point particles and rigid bodies. In statistical mechanics it is known as
phase-space of a 'closed system' comprising many particles.
22 These mathematical resources include Groups, Matrices, and geometrical transformations.
23 This principle states that process evolves from one point to another point in state-space so as to extremize the
action in between. Action is defined as path integral of appropriate function such as Lagrangian or
Hamiltonian between the two end points of the path. For a one variable function extrema means maxima,
minima, or saddle points. The same interpretation can be extended to multi-variable function on n-manifold.
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difference value between kinetic energy and potential energy of the system
at that point, any change in which while moving to another point is
extremized (minimized, maximized, or saddled). This interpretation is
difference driven action is path integral of difference between potential
and kinetic energy.
In general, difference plays an important role in Deleuzian ontology. In
'multiplicities' it takes the form of nested vector fields24. Difference
(gradient) in intensive properties25 drives fluxes of matter-energy and form
the basis of individuating processes producing extensities as well as
qualities while difference in extensive properties26 forms the basis of
assembly processes. In adaptive assembly processes differences are
meshed up or differentiated towards divergent evolutions. (See 2.3).
Some process philosophers formulate the action principle as the principle
of dynamic opposition27 which states that dialectical characteristics of
energy can be formalized as a logical principle of dynamic opposition, an
antagonistic duality inherent in the nature of energy and accordingly
applicable to all phenomena, physical and mental, including information,
propositions and judgments. Homogeneity, exteriority and objectivity
characterize the process of extensity, and heterogeneity, interiority and
subjectivity that of intensity, time intervening in the second due to the
necessary aspect of succession in change, but not in the first. Intensive and
extensive properties of various forms of energy were examined by German
Nobel laureate Ostwald (1853-1932) and are fundamental to the dynamic
opposition. The 'measures' of intensive energies are vectors or tensors,
whereas extensity always implies a certain measurement in terms of
scalars. For example, volume, mass and electric charge are extensive;
temperature and gravitational and electric potential are intensive. Ostwald
pointed out that an intensity and an extensity could be both actual and
potential, but not at the same time. He thus provided the philosophical
basis for both the alternation of actuality and potentiality (see below) and
the relation in energy itself of intensity and extensity. Instead of classical
logic of Identity (A = A), non-Contradiction (A = not non-A), and Excluded
middle (A and non-A can not be at the same time as third state), Lupasco 28
Calculus of Variation was created around this idea leading to partial differential equations of fundamental
importance in physics such as the wave equation, the diffusion equation, Poisson's equation, Schrdinger's
equation, Maxwell's equations, and equations of General Relativity.
24 On differentiable manifolds vectors are defined at each point in terms of differential operators forming a field.
Symmetry breaking bifurcations create multiple nested fields which Deleuze call multiplicities (2.2).
25 Theses are 'indivisible' properties such as temperature and pressure which can not be divided without change in
kind or without disturbing the equilibrium. They are generally linked not to the size but to the qualitative
change. In the event of sudden changes in the equilibrium state they tend to average out.
26 Empirically, these are 'divisible' and size dependent properties such as length-area-volume and entropy.
27 See Joseph Brenner (Logic & Logical Philosophy vol 14).
28 Stephane Lupasco (1900-1988) was a Romanian philosopher who lived in Paris and wrote in French.
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proposed following logic for the dynamics of energy:

L1 Non-identity: There is no A at a given time that is identical to A at
another time.
L2 Conditional Contradiction: A and non-A both exist at the same time,
but only in the sense that when A is actual (but never to the extent
of 100%), non-A is potential (but never to the extent of 100%),
reciprocally and alternatively.
L3 Included Middle: An included or additional third state T emerges
from the point of maximum contradiction at which A and non-A are
equally actualized and potentialized, but at a higher level of reality,
at which the contradiction is resolved.
There is a difference between Lupasco's view of dynamic opposition and
the Deleuze's difference driven ontology; Deleuze does not relate
difference necessarily to any universal entity such as 'energy' but relates it
to class of properties of two thermodynamically connected systems or
processes. He however, extends meaning of intensive difference to link
heterogeneity with assemblage (see 2.3).
2.0 Space-time ontology
Motion being the main indicator of the physical (matter-energy) processes,
it is fruitful to examine the ontological status of space and time in terms of
which the motion is generally defined and vice versa while abstracting
(modeling) the process.
Euclidean flat space matches our every day experience. The homogeneity
(every point the same) and isotropy (every direction the same) is well
captured in this abstraction. It is a metric space where the concept of 'non-
negative, symmetrical and shortest distance between any two distinct
points' exists. In Special Theory of Relativity (STR) we interpret spatial
dimensions as a 3-d surface embedded in 4-d spacetime. We call this
spacetime as homogeneous and isotropic; however, these symmetries are
of space and not of spacetime. The metric 29 of STR satisfy the constraint of
maximum speed limit of the nature and becomes non Euclidean. As the
speed approaches the speed of light its non Euclidean character is
manifest. In General Theory of Relativity (GTR) spacetime metric takes a
more generalized form to reflect the curvature of spacetime caused by the
gravity. In GTR gravity itself takes the form of geometry; the structure of
the world is identical with the dynamic distribution of matter-energy of the
world.
Further ontological insight is obtained if we try to conceive how causal
29 Here we equate it with differential line element of a particular geometry, though its mathematical formulation
is slightly different.
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effects (influences such as electromagnetic or gravitational forces) are

transmitted across spacetime. One approach is the field approach where
causation alters properties of the surrounding spacetime and propagates
from point-A to another point-B as a disturbance in the form of waves. This
disturbance exerts force on B and that is how effect travels from A to B.
Another approach is the once popular (and Newtonian in origin) 'action at a
distance' view. In this view, influence from point-A on the word line of
particle-a is transmitted directly across spacetime to the point-B on the
world line of particle-b in a straight line (that is covering shortest possible
distance). Gravity can be modeled based on both these approaches.
Einstein in his GTR took the former approach30 while conformal theorists
used the later approach based on Mach Principle 31. These two approaches
view the spacetime (or causal conveyance through it) in different manner
and use different mathematical procedures to arrive at convergent views.
In Einstein's Relativity the spacetime is not scale invariant but the mass is.
Spacetime is curved due to gravitation of (massive) material bodies or
energy lumps. The curvature of spacetime is proportional to the embedded
matter-energy density. Here gravity itself assumes the form of geometry.
Gravity changes the coordinate units of the spacetime and hence is not
scale invariant. In alternative 'action at a distance' approach, transmitted
effect does not change the spacetime coordinate units (scale invariance)
and does not change the form of objects (conformal invariance), but inertial
mass invariance is lost. Inertial mass of a particle, in principle, will depend
on position of that particle and configuration of the rest of the Universe.
Mass-energy conservation law suggests that mass-energy redistribution
happens all the time and the Universe is in a continual flux.
What about origin of the Universe? Current popular Big Bang models
assume that Universe (matter) came into existence at t = 0 from the
singularity of infinite density and infinite energy an euphemism for
indeterminacy. This singularity however, is deemed to be 'out side' any
conceivable process. There are other models of 'matter-origin' which do not
have this singularity and are more amenable to the process view but are
not as popular as big-bang models.32
30 Einstein's initial motivation was based on Mach Principle; though later development of Relativity went into
another direction possibly because 'action at a distance' was mistakenly supposed to be instantaneous. Some
physicists however believe that Einstein's Relativity has Machian elements.
31 Mach's principle assumes connection between local and the distant. It postulates that inertia of the mass is the
property of the object-matter as well as the background provided by rest of the Universe. This is 'action at a
distance' view as well as holistic view where whole Universe participates in the process. Branse-Dicke theory
of gravity and Hoyle-Narlikar theory of cosmology are based on Machian 'action at a distance' principle. In the
later theory the Einstein's field equations are derived as a special case of scale invariant gravitational equations
which in turn are obtained by formulating scale invariant action in place of usual Einstein-Hilbert action.
32 One such model is Quasi Steady State Cosmology (QSSC) proposed by Hoyle, Burbidge and Narlikar (1993)
which has creative and non creative modes. In this model particle world lines are not endless but are subject to
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Einsteins GTR collapses the physical and the spatial-temporal into a single
metric, so that gravity and spacetime are essentially identified together.
Whitehead33 pointed out that this then loses the logical relations necessary
to make meaningful cosmological measurements. Since Einsteins theory
loses the distinction between the physical and the geometrical, the only
way we can know the geometry of the space we are trying to measure is if
we first know the distributions of matter and energy throughout the cosmos
that affect that geometry. But we can only know these distributions if we
can first make accurate measurements of space. Thus, as Whitehead
argued, we are left in the position of first having to know everything before
we can know anything. Whitehead's solution to this problem was to
separate the necessary relations of geometry from the contingent relations
of physics, so that ones theory of space and gravity is bimetric, or is built
from the two metrics of geometry and physics.34 However, this is a measure
of convenience and ontological issue of metric duality remains. On a
different (quantum) scale this ontological concern resurfaces in the form of
duality of wave and particle and still on another plane challenges the
philosophers as duality of mind and body.
Deleuze views the spacetime abstraction both metaphorically and
speculatively. He views hierarchy of topological-differential-projective-
affine-Euclidean spaces metaphorically as an abstract scenario leading to
the birth of real metric space as if the metric space which we inhabit and
measure was born from non metric topological continuum as the latter
differentiated and acquired structure following a series of symmetry
breaking transitions. He assigns a new ontological dimension to this
cascade of broken symmetries through comparison of their metric and non
metric geometrical properties along with extensive and intensive physical
properties. The symmetry breaking cascade of transformations here are not
viewed as mere abstraction but as a physical process in which an
undifferentiated intensive space, a space defined by continuous intensive
properties, progressively differentiates and eventually give rise to extensive
discontinuous structures with definite metric properties. This concept of
creation / annihilation process in cyclic epoch. The matter is created in a mini-bang or mini-creation event
which unlike big-bang, is a non singular phenomenon with defined dynamics. The typical epoch cycle has a
lifetime long enough for most stars of masses exceeding ~0.5-0.7 times that of our Sun to have burnt out. Thus
stars from previous cycles would be mostly extinct as radiators of energy. Their masses will continue however,
to exert gravitational influence on visible matter, offering one possible explanation for so called 'dark matter'.
33 Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was a mathematician and philosopher who taught mathematics in
England (Trinity College, Cambridge University and then Imperial College) and later was a professor of
philosophy in Harvard University (US). His philosophical discourse mainly comes from his three books
Science and The Modern World (SMW) (1925), Process and Reality (PR) (1929), and Adventures of Ideas
(ADI) (1933). He is considered by many to be the main protagonist of the modern process view.
34 ref The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy for Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1946). He proposed
alternative theory of Relativity based on this bimetric spacetime in his book Principles of Relativity and Its
Applications to Natural Science. Subsequently there are many successful bimetric formulations of Relativity.
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spontaneous symmetry breaking is now incorporated in the present

cosmological models of early Universe where at extremely high
temperatures the four basic forces (electromagnetic, strong, weak, and
gravity) are expected to lose their individuality and blend into one. As the
Universe expanded and cooled, a series of phase transitions broke the
original symmetry and allowed the four forces to differentiate from one
another. If the geometrical nature of gravity and the above hypothesis that
the gravity itself emerged at some critical value of intensive property
(temperature) are taken together, then according to Deleuze, the idea that
an intensive space gave birth to extensive ones through progressive
differentiation becomes more than a suggestive metaphor. This idea of
associating intensive properties with topological space is an ontological
novelty.
2.1 Time and Entropy
If we assume our 3-d space to be embedded in 4-d spacetime what
ontological status we can give to time? We can measure our physical metric
space by dividing it, or rather by comparing it with itself. Existence of
matter allows us to do so. However, time, being the 'exterior' dimension, is
not accessible to us for such measurement. There is no way we can
measure time by cardinal division, the way we can measure metric space.
Material and energetic processes give time its apparent measurable form
by their characteristic time scales. Time in this sense is a topological
dimension which we metricize by cyclic motion in 3-d Euclidean space. In
strict sense any oscillatory (cyclic) motion is countable35 but not
measurable due to ordinal nature of time. Cycle count of any periodic
motion is an ordinal number36; we (humans) use it as a cardinal number37
by associating it with metric space for practical time measurement.
Ontological concerns about time are different than those of space though
both are conceived as a single continuum named spacetime. Physical laws
are symmetric with respect to time with the possible exception of Law of
Entropy (LE) of Thermodynamics. This begs the question as to why we
observe the events as a sequence of cause-effect. That is to say why do we
observe glass breaking into pieces but not broken pieces making into glass.
Why do we have notion of past, present, and future? Why only certain
35 Set S is countable if there is injection (1-1 mapping) between S and the set of non-negative integers.
36 Ordinal number is a transitive set of transitive sets. Set z is transitive if every element of z is a subset of z. In
transitive set z, (x y z) (x z). Transitivity defines order. Ordinal set is well ordered by . One may
introduce ordinals between two ordinals but may not measure distance between them. Ontologically, ordinals
can be related to linear order or a topological (non-metric, non-measurable) space while cardinals can be
related to size (measure) of the set or a metric (measurable) space.
37 Two sets have the same cardinal number if there is bijection (1-1 and 'onto' mapping) between them. A set is
well ordered if it is 'linearly ordered' and each of its subset has a least element. There is bijection between a
well ordered set S and some ordinal. The smallest such ordinal is called the 'cardinality' of set S.
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events are remembered by us as a part of our memory? One sledge-

hammer answer to all such questions is: time and memory are both illusion.
There is nothing like past and future. There is only the 'present' which is
real only for that given moment. There is no arrow of time. It is creation of
our mind. Memory too is only a peculiar emergent property of our brain
process. It maps certain events as cognitive states and creates a sense of
time. This helps us to survive in the Darwinian evolutionary process.
Another explanation about the directionality of time is normally given on
the basis of Thermodynamic LE. This law allows events to take place so as
to increase (and not reduce) entropy of the closed system38. If we take the
mathematical formulation of entropy to be some kind of measure of order
(or lack of order) of a particular closed system LE apparently makes a trivial
statement that a closed system naturally moves from order to disorder
which assumes importance due to its temporal asymmetry. Physically,
entropy can be conceived as extensive property of the heat energy. Any
change in entropy can be equated with heat dissipation or absorption per
degree temperature.
LE, in addition to being asymmetric in time, is statistical and probabilistic. It
applies well to thermodynamic systems in equilibrium or tending towards
equilibrium and with large number of particles. It is applicable to all stable
material processes that is processes with gradual changes in their
intensive properties. Entropy in a way measures the degree of irrevesibility.
Irreversible processes are all those processes in which friction and its
generalizations play a role. They are those processes which increase the
sharing or mixing of energy. Irreversible processes, in the sense in which
the term is used in thermodynamics, transform macroscopic motion into
the disorganized motion of all the small microscopic components involved:
they are therefore not strictly irreversible but their reversal is extremely
improbable39. This irreversibility of process gives a sense of direction to
time. It is not the property of the time, but the property of the process
which orders events in certain sequence, and property of the brain which
maps the observed events as ordered cognition states.
The ontological status of entropy is difficult to capture. There is certain
fuzziness in the definition of thermodynamic entropy. The terms such as
'coarse graining' or 'macroscopic state' that are used while defining entropy
are fuzzy and subjective. Entropy can not be equated with disorder in the
38 If a given macroscopic state has W distinct microscopic states (realizations) then thermodynamic entropy can
be defined as k ln W; where k is the Boltzmann constant. Sometimes, 'coarse graining' principle is applied to
total phase space to partition it into sub-regions (boxes) of macroscopically indistinguishable microscopic
states. The evolution (trajectory) of a point in such a phase space will be naturally from the smaller boxes to
the larger boxes. LE is the simple statement of this fact.
39 ref Motion Mountain by Christoph Schiller (2006)
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normal sense of the word except in specific context of equilibrium oriented

processes. It is quite possible that some physical-thermodynamical
processes produce well ordered structures, creative artwork, or complex
scientific models or theories. One may assume processual intelligence
when we see order, complexity and creativity in the process.
Morphogenetic processes responsible for individuating species, brain
processes involved in abstractions and modeling, body processes
preserving the metabolism of life, and even material or assembly
manufacturing processes whether automated or manual, producing
products of high quality and complexity like steel or automobiles are all
having certain kind of processual intelligence. This intelligence itself can be
taken as an indicator of the existence of life forms (living beings) which use
their free will (assuming such a thing exists) to act against LE by way of
trying to decrease or stabilize the entropy. Alternatively, in Heraclitus
tradition this intelligence can be conceptualized as a force opposing the
increase in entropy which drive the thermodynamic systems towards
equilibrium. The purpose of this force could be attributed to Darwinian
instincts of survival or towards achieving other objectives not directly
related to Darwinian process of evolution, at least in highly evolved species
like humans.
2.2 State-space ontology
In process modeling, n-dimensional differentiable manifold is used as a
state-space. Change is expressed as a rate of change related to the
relationship between two (or more) degrees of freedom of the manifold.
Differential operators are used to give instantaneous rate at a point
generating vector fields. Integration operators on the other hand
reconstruct the trajectories, initially from the experimental observations,
and then over the resultant vector fields for predicting future behavior
(trajectories). The state-space populated with actualized trajectories is
known as phase portrait. Deleuze interprets the phase portrait as
actualization of tendencies inherent in the vector fields. These tendencies
are represented, in general, by directional derivatives (vectors) at a given
point and singularities, in particular, of the vector field. Most of the times
these singularities (attractors) remain limiting tendencies only because the
trajectories do not reach them. Though attractors are not actualized in this
sense, we may call them real because they do have definite effect on
actual entities. They confer on trajectories a certain amount of stability
(asymptotic stability). This stability can be tested by injecting perturbations
by adding a small vector field to the main one. Attractors resist change and
tend to preserve their distribution pattern in the state-space against small
perturbations. Against large perturbations however, they become unstable
and bifurcate into new pattern by symmetry breaking continuous
deformation of the original field into new topologically inequivalent one.
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Deleuze defines multiplicity in terms of these nested vector fields related to

each other by symmetry breaking bifurcations together with pattern of
attractors embedded in each level. He separates the reality of state-space
in actualized phase portrait trajectories from unactualized but ontologically
real vector fields and attractors. To clearly distinguish the later unactualized
reality from the reality of actualized process states, Deleuze introduces a
new ontological category to refer to the ontological status of multiplicities
virtuality. In his words:
The virtual is not opposed to the real but to the actual. The virtual is real
in so far as it is virtual... Indeed the virtual is defined as strictly a part of
real object as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into
which it is plunged as though into an objective dimension...The reality of
the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along with the
singular points which corresponds to them. The reality of the virtual is
structure. We must avoid giving the elements and the relations that form a
structure an actuality that they do not have, and withdrawing from them a
reality which they do have40.
The virtuality of state-space can be seen as continuum of nested
topological spaces of multiplicities. It is a space of spaces with each
component space having capacity of progressive differentiation. Further,
the singularities (attractors) as well as bifurcations (symmetry breaking
transitions) can be accorded the status of ideal events. Each of these ideal
events possesses capacity to be extended as an infinite series of ideal
events. Deleuze explains this by a metaphor of steam-water condensation.
When steam is cooled down to critical point (about 100 oC) it condenses into
liquid, but when cooled further it will cascade into series of ordinary events
till it reaches another critical point (0 oC freezing point). Similarly,
singularities defining a multiplicity would become origin of series of
ordinary ideal events extending up to the vicinity of other singularities
belonging to other multiplicities. This series however, is not a cardinal
sequence of ideal events but an ordinal series that is a series of events
with ordinal distances. This means the singularities do not form a
measurable time sequence but an ordering of coexisting events in a one
dimensional topological continuum. Many such continua spring from each
member of the population of multiplicities forming a heterogeneous
continuum. Virtual continuum41 involves not only singularities but also
virtual affects. Unlike actual capacities which affect and be affected; virtual
affects are sharply divided into pure (unactualized) capacity to be affected
40 See Difference and Repetition as well as Bergsonism by Deleuze. He borrows the ontological distinction
between actual and the virtual from Bergson. Also see, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy by Manuel
Delanda. (2002).
41 Deleuze uses other equivalent terms such as Intensive Spatium, Plane of Consistency, Plane of Immanence,
Machinic Phylum, Body without Organs, Metaphysical Surface etc. to express the same idea.
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(represented by unreachable multiplicities) and pure capacity to affect.

Deleuze introduces another ontological entity to exhibit this capacity and
refer to it as quasi-cause. This is a virtual operator which is characterized
by its capacity to affect multiplicities but does not give rise to them.
Multiplicities being incorporeal effects of material causes, are acausal
(causally sterile) entities. Quasi-causal operator assembles heterogeneous
population of multiplicities into plane of consistency and give them minimal
of actuality and, in this sense, it breaks the first symmetry in the cascade
that culminates in 'actual becoming'. With this causal operator Deleuze
completes the construction of virtual machinery mathematical and
conceptual resources of virtuality: virtual continuum or plane of consistency
comprising multiplicities which in turn include singularities, bifurcations and
affects with quasi-causal operator. While doing so he is clear about the non
causality of the state-space. It only defines vector fields which captures
overall tendencies of the system as a distribution of singularities.
2.3 Ontology of Intensive
One key aspect of intensive property is the role played by difference. The
difference in the intensive properties of two connected thermodynamic
systems drives them towards equilibrium by averaging the intensities. The
intensive difference drives the fluxes of matter or energy towards
equilibrium and forms the basis of simple individuation processes. The
difference may change the system in kind while driving towards the
equilibrium or may undergo a phase transition if the intensive difference is
too sharp and crosses the critical (threshold) value.
Deleuze conceives a progressive metamorphosis of continuous topological
space into measurable metric space. He compares the relation between
topological and metric spaces to that between intensive and extensive
properties. The cascade of symmetry breaking events are compared to
phase transitions occurring at critical values of intensity. He enlarges the
meaning of intensive to include the systemic properties of processes. The
intensive property of process links and coordinates diverse and
heterogeneous elements associated with the process without homogenizing
them. This coordination includes interaction amongst process entities
(organisms) and process ecosystem. Process ecosystem it self is the
complex assemblage of heterogeneous entities42: animals, plants, micro-
organisms, geographical sites, and changing weather patterns. Similarly,
the meaning of extensive can be expanded to include systemic properties
of process whereby homogeneous components are linked together to form
42 In the physical world, entities and individuals possess a capacity to form novel combinations of elements.
Some systems philosophers argue that the capacity to form novel assemblages when objects are put into
functional relations with one another may require formulations similar to state-space and may reveal
universality analogous to that revealed by singularities.
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an assembly. As thermodynamic intensive process is characterized by

'difference driving the flux'; in the enlarged meaning the process is
intensive if it relates 'difference to difference'. In an assembly process of
adaptive components, flexible links allow not only meshing of differences
but allow divergent evolution by 'differentiating the difference'. In the case
of singularities the virtual manifests in those situations where intensive
differences are not canceled, while in case of affects, assemblage meshes
differences without canceling them through homogenization which calls for
virtuality. Conversely, virtuality traces are erased when intensive
differences are canceled and thermodynamic systems are maintained
under equilibrium by concealing the underlying process. This can happen
with or without human intervention. All such 'equilibrium areas' of the
world, according to Delueze, constitute an objective illusion.
3.0 World Process
In Whiteheads process philosophy, the macroscopic processes of transition
and the microscopic processes of concrescence are the two fundamental
kinds of processes. Whitehead describes them as two species of process.
The macroscopic process is the transition from attained actuality43 to
actuality in attainment44; while the microscopic process is the conversion of
conditions which are merely real into determinate actuality45. (ref PR).
In combination processes of the two fundamental species self-creative
processes of concrescence and other-creating processes of transition
constitute the evolving world-process that consists of the coming into being
of ever new causally related actual occasions (ref PR). The actualities of the
Universe are processes, each process an individual fact. The whole
Universe is the advancing assemblage of these processes. (ref ADI).
The world-process is moreover the expansion of actuality, because actuality
is cumulative and the number of its concrete components is ever increasing
or shifting, with the emergence of each new creature [i.e. occasion]. This
means that occasions which have been actualized do not disappear when
they are superseded by new occasions but remain in being, i.e. in their
static state of attained actuality, so that each actual occasion qua being is
a stubborn fact which cannot be evaded (ref PR). Yet this does not merely
mean that the world-process is an irreversible evolvement. It means that at
every stage of the world-process the past is as actual as the present,
though in a different mode of actuality: the past occasions are attained
actualities whereas the present ones are actualities in attainment (ref PR).
One consequence of this doctrine is obviously that the notions
43 This is the process of 'being' the past occasions.

44 This is the process of 'becoming' the present occasions.
45 This is the process of 'becoming' determinate actuality from potentiality.
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evolvementand expansion, when referring to the processual character

of the world of actualities, are synonymous within Whiteheads theory.
According to Whitehead the aggregate of all already actualized occasions at
some stage of the world-process is uniquely divided into sub-aggregates
the actual worlds at that stage. From each of these actual worlds will arise a
single transition process that begets a single new but incomplete occasion
that in turn completes itself in a process of concrescence. Each occasion is
thus efficiently caused by the settled occasions in its corresponding actual
world. All transition processes which arise from the different actual worlds
at some single stage of the world-process are causally independent or
isolated from one another. The same is true for the concrescence processes
arising from the outcomes of these transition processes. But this mutual
isolation does not mean that jointly becoming occasions do not have
common causes. The causes of a concrescent occasion are the occasions in
its actual world and two actual worlds will, in general, contain common
occasions, so that two occasions of the same stage of the world-process, in
general, will have common causes. Thus it is to be expected that two
occasions which arise from minimally different actual worlds will be quite
similar in their initial ontological make up (i.e. their spacetime regions, their
creative activities and their initial definiteness). But nevertheless the
transition processes from which they arose as well as their concrescence
processes are completely isolated from each other in all their
supersessional phases.
The hypotheses of actual world is part of the causal structure of
Whiteheads original process view (ref PR). The actual world of an occasion
E consists of all and only those occasions which are efficient causes of E it
is Es causal past. In Whiteheads ontology this means that the actual world
of E contains all and only those occasions which contribute to the transition
process by which the initial ontological constituents are created. No
occasion belongs to its own actual world because no occasion can be a
cause of its own initial constituents. Thus, the actual world of occasion E is
its causal past sans itself. The causal future of occasion E consists of all and
only those occasions to whose actual world E belongs to. Two occasions are
contemporaneous (causally independent) to one another if neither belongs
to the actual world of the other. Causal independence is reflexive and
symmetric but not transitive.46 Causal structures of Einstein's STR and GTR
satisfy the causal requirements of Whitehead's occasions. However, his
hypotheses of actual world needs to be reconciled with another of his
hypotheses that of extensive continuum in which occasions come to be.
Extensive continuum can be understood as infinite and undivided, but
infinitely divisible, extension. It is not the physical metric space, but a
46 Relation R is reflexive iff xRx; R is symmetric iff xRy yRx; and R is transitive iff xRy yRz xRz.
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topological structure without any metric. One has to assume that relativistic
causation travels through this extension (that is through gaps in physical
relativistic spacetime). Whitehead's process ontology does not prevent such
assumption, neither does it prevent emergence of contingent metric space
in some part of the world process e.g. in the part that is empirically
accessible to us in our cosmic epoch. Even if we assume that relativistic
connection between causation and the regions of occasions is not a general
feature of all parts of the world-process, causal conveyance across
spacetime gaps violates STR's causal contiguity. This and other
inconsistencies force one to modify (or abandon) the hypotheses of actual
world (see 4.1).
3.1 Computational Processes
Computational processes gained importance due to proliferation of
computers and computation (software) in the later half of 20th century.
Computation is a mechanical process of abstraction and simulation.
Further, every finitely realizable physical process can be perfectly
simulated by a Universal Computing Machine (UCM) operating by finite
means (Church-Turing-Deutch (CTD) Hypothesis, 1985)47. CTD hypothesis
is an empirical conjecture with stupendous implications if we could build up
computers equivalent to UCM. Even if we are not able to do so, there is a
large class of useful processes which can be simulated by conventional
stored program architecture. Any useful and consistent software code can
be seen as an example of abstraction. Any program which is executable in
finite time is a Turing computation48 and in that sense is an algorithmic
process, well researched in terms of implementation and well equipped
with resources. In real world applications, Turing instruction set is replaced
by powerful programming languages while Turing mechanism is replaced by
today's state-of-the-art computers. These computing resources are being
applied for abstracting and controlling diverse real word processes
business, chemical, industrial, utility, and social processes. Their
application domain includes all the three traditional ontological categories
those of matter (physical or energetic), mind (socially interactive), and
mathematics (transcendental models). The abstraction process of software
development is aided by meta languages and supplemented by other
47 Quantum theory, the Church-Turing principle and the universal quantum computer by David Deutsch. (From
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A 400, pp. 97-117 (1985))
48 A program (set of instructions) that can run on simple hypothetical machine (called Turing machine) with
unlimited storage and which will come to halt within finite time. A Turing machine that is able to simulate any
other Turing machine is called a Universal Turing Machine (UTM). A more mathematical definition with a
similar "universal" nature was introduced by Alonzo Church, whose work on lambda calculus intertwined with
Turing's in a formal theory of computation known as the Church-Turing thesis. The thesis states that Turing
machines indeed capture the informal notion of effective method in logic and mathematics, and provide a
precise definition of an algorithm or 'mechanical procedure'.
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computational tools such as fuzzy logic, neural nets and decision trees.
Some of these concepts and techniques are being used to understand and
simulate intelligent behavior in humans. The explosion of computing power
in terms of hardware platforms and software tools and techniques have
emboldened some computer scientists to aim for total simulation of human
experience.
3.2 Mind Processes
Process approach has been used in understanding the phenomenon of mind
in the model of Computational and Representational Understanding of Mind
(CRUM). The basic premise of CRUM is: intelligent beings (say, humans)
have 'mental representations' and computational (algorithmic) processes.
Processes operate on representations to produce intelligent behavior.
CRUM49 uses logic, rules, analogies, images, concepts, and neural nets for
modeling. However, it is not adequate to explain the subjective experience
such as perception and qualia50. One may argue that it is not even
adequate to explain mental representations.
CRUM assumes computational process acting on representation to be self
sufficient autonomous process. Contrary to this, in holistic process view 51
cognitive processes or entities are not isolated or autonomous. Any causal
power of X is not entirely located on X, but belongs to the process taking
place between at least two interacting systems. For instance, X can do A
only when interacting with some Y, and it can do B only when interacting
with some Z. Carrying this rationale a little further, we may argue that
neither X, Y nor Z exist in isolation, independent of their interaction. X and
Y are two ways of describing the process X doing A with Y . This process is
the real, primordial unity: X, Y and A are just conventional shortcuts to
address the process under different particular perspectives.
The same rationale can be used in domain other than those of macroscopic
perceptual processes. For instance, does an individual electron have a
charge? We cannot be sure of it, since the only way to know if an electron
has a charge is to make it interact with another charged particle. Further,
electron creates or superposes its own field in spacetime altering properties
of environment around it. From an empirical standpoint there is no way to
test if an isolated particle has a charge. The same holds for other extrinsic
properties of physical systems: mass, spin, etc. In a certain sense it is
meaningless to refer to them independently of an experiment wherein they
are measured. An experiment is a physical process from which we
49 Mind by Paul Thegard (2002)

50 An experiential raw feel which we have when we are fully awake and which is missing when we are dreaming,
or in deep sleep, or anesthetized (and almost certainly missing when we are dead).
51 Riccardo Manzotti (Mind & Matter vol. 4(1)): Consciousness & Existence as Process.
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conventionally infer the existence of perceived entities to be autonomous

and to exist in a separate domain. In the holistic processual view, so called
intrinsic (phenomenal) properties and extrinsic (relational) properties do
not belong to different domains. They are two different ways of describing
one and the same process. Furthermore, the existence of objects is a
concept derived from processes. Objects do not exist autonomously.
Objects are a way to provide a timeless description of a recurrent process.
Similarly, having an experience of something can be seen as the processual
occurrence of that something as a whole. Existence itself is a process.
There is no need to distinguish a phenomenal entity and a physical entity.
Subjects and their surrounding environment are made of processes, some
of them shared by both. The body and the brain are made in such a way
that, given the same external systems, the same processes take place.
These are basic underlying processes which are constitutive of what there
is and what is perceived. They refer to a reciprocal causation in which the
traditional distinction between cause and effect, perceiver and perceived is
missing. They provide the foundation for viewing reality as a processual
whole.
Adopting a holistic processual point of view, a different framework begins to
unveil. Consciousness and existence can be conceived as two perspectives
on the same processes. At the basic perceptional level, the world of the
subjects experience is identical with the real world. This makes it possible
to overcome some of classical hurdles in understanding the cognitive
processes of direct perception. The problem of representation is (dis)solved
since the need to represent an internal image of the external world
disappears. Phenomenal experiences coincide with the aspects of reality
they are to represent. More precisely, they do not represent reality but are
reality. The subject does not perceive an image of an object. A process
takes place which is constitutive of both subject and object, and can be
described as a subjective experience or as an objective event.
The forgoing experiential process can be conceived as an 'enlarged mind'
which includes empirical subject-object and the cross section of
environment participating in the process. Mind is not confined to the
physical size of the brain or the immediate present. It envelops the whole
experience including memory, dreams, and imagination.
3.3 Mentalistic Processes
Neo-realist processism of section 3.2 seems to (dis)solve the problem of
representation (how phenomenal properties represent the external world);
problem of emergence (how mind emerges from matter)52 and problem of
52 This problem is known as hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996, 2003). Strong AI (Artificial
Intelligence) holds that this hard problem is solvable by computation appropriate computation in principal
can evoke all aspects of human intelligence including consciousness, emotions, volitions and intentionality.
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mental causation (how mind produces effect on matter). The phenomenon

of memory (as delayed perception) and illusions (as biased perception) too
can be explained by this logic of unified perceptional processes or enlarged
mind. However, one gets the feeling that by extending the perceptional
(mind) processes spatio-temporally beyond the perceiving subject to
include perceived objects and cross section of the external world as if in an
enlarged mind, we may be side stepping the emergence-causation-
representation (ECR) issues. The enlarged mind approach may remind us of
enlarged solipsism. On this background it is interesting to have a look at
the ontology proposed by Whitehead in line with the legacy of Leibniz. 53
(For a more radical approach of Deleuze, see 4.2)
According to Whitehead, the idea that reality is constituted by particles,
isolated from each other, prisoners of an existence connected to the
instantaneous dimension of time and space, compels physicists and
philosophers to build a world starting from components that have no real
grounding in our empirical experience. This is what Whitehead calls the
mistake of misplaced practicalness that derives, among other things, from
an uncritical acceptance of the classical metaphysical categories of
substance and quality. According to him, the fallacy of misplaced
practicalness, resulting in the idea of instantaneous matter with simple
location, has been the occasion of great confusion in philosophy, and the
paradox [of mind] only arises because we have mistaken our abstraction for
practical realities (ref SMW).
In order to obviate such a fundamental mistake, Whitehead proposes
metaphysics based on different principles and on a few simple elementary
entities. Whiteheads fundamental starting point is what he terms the
ontological principle, i.e. the principle according to which no actual entity,
no reason (ref PR) or, alternatively, according to which to search for a
reason is to search for one or more actual entities (ref PR). With actual
entity, Whitehead means a unity of existence. Whitehead believes that the
classical concept of event ought to be abandoned in favor of a new entity
endowed with characteristic proprieties from our everyday experience. His
'philosophy of organism' proposes a mentalistic ontology. His lowest level
entities are 'actual occasions', a spatio-temporal quanta with mentalistic
characteristic like 'experience', 'subjective immediacy', and 'appetition'.
These characteristic of the occasions are termed as dim protomentality.
Whitehead conceives the elementary particles as temporal chain of
occasions without doing any significant distortion to the established physics
except a caveat: The notion of physical energy which is the base of physics
must then be conceived as an abstraction from the complex energy, mental
and purposeful, inherent in the subjective form of final synthesis in which
53 An 18th century German mathematician and philosopher who conceived monads.

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each occasion completes itself. Only the evolution of highly organized and
complex aggregates of occasions permits primitive mentality to be intense,
coherent and self conscious; the functioning of organic matter remains
intact amid the functioning of living matter. The aggregating process of
these actual entities into other actual entities is termed prehension. Actual
entities involve each other by reason of their prehension of each other. In
this way prehension becomes the heart of Whiteheads philosophy of
organism, as well as the unifying moment of the actual entities. A
prehension is the elementary process that makes the becoming of reality
possible. Whitehead defines it in this way:
A prehension is only a subordinate element in an actual entity. Every
prehension consists of three factors: (a) the subject which is prehending,
namely, the actual entity in which that prehension is a practical element;
(b) the datum which is prehended; (c) the subjective form which is how that
subject prehends that datum. Prehensions of actual entities i.e.,
prehensions whose data involve actual entities are termed physical
prehensions; and prehensions of eternal objects are termed conceptual
prehensions. The term 'prehension' is adopted to express the activity
whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things. (ref PR).
According to Whitehead, the world is constituted by a never-ending flow of
prehensions that would transform actual entities into other actual entities.
From the external world towards our brain there is a progressive increase in
the subjective content of every actual occasion, up to what we call
consciousness. This progression gives rise to our experience of reality as
well as to reality itself. The way in which he defines the single moment of
prehension allows him to spread unities of experience all over reality. (ref
PR).
Instead of tackling the curious phenomenon of emergence of mind from the
material made of atomic particles, Whitehead attributed mind like
properties to basic entities. Still the ontological gap between protomentality
of postulated occasions and the holistic experience of humans remains
unsolved. Further, there has to be scientific evidence of low level
protomentality which Whitehead attributed to basic occasions. Till such
times his scheme of protomental occasions is open to the charge of
semantic trick to rename the problem as a solution. His followers 54 tried to
answer these objections by adding or modifying the original scheme.
Modern Whiteheadianism draws heavily from Quantum Mechanics and
recurring advances of science. In fact, when Whitehead wrote his most
significant work Process and Reality (1927, 1929), Quantum Mechanics was
at that time in the process of formulation with important concepts and their
ontological and epistemological implications being discussed by the leading
54 Abner Shimony (1993) - Search for a Naturalistic World View v2 (Cambridge University Press).
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scientists55. It is quite possible that Whitehead was aware about some of

the implications and trends and developed his core concepts anticipating
future trends.
Neo-Whiteheadianism explicitly incorporates two important quantum
concepts; potentiality and entanglement. A wave function of the system of
particles can be expressed as a linear superimposition of individual state
vectors. The resultant state vector gives only the possibilities of system
status which is actualized by way of measurement or observation. Here the
possibility, chance or indefiniteness represented by the wave function is
objective and can be termed as potentiality. The second concept of
entanglement gives a composite (and not superimposed) wave function of
entangled systems. Here the composite vector represent a holistic state
which a correlation of individual state vectors of the two systems. If
potentiality of system-A is actualized then correlated potentiality of system-
B is actualized in tandem. By incorporating these two concepts process
philosophy hopes to bridge the ontological gap between the dim
protomentality and the consciousness. The human or similar nervous
system can transit from unconsciousness (sleep or otherwise) to
consciousness (and vice versa) as a change in its state without any change
in its ontological status. Dim protomentality is readily available for electron
or photon while for more complex systems from primitive single cell
amoeba to complex multi cell human brain much richer space of observable
properties can be expected in the entangled state. Entanglement of
primitive systems with narrow mentality can generate much broader range
from unconsciousness to high level consciousness.
3.4 Quantum Processes
Heisenbergs uncertainty relation implies that a quantum particle cannot
posses a definite position in space and a definite momentum at the same
instant of time. Consequently, quantum particles cannot posses continuous
trajectories. All that the bubble-chamber experiment, in agreement with
Heisenbergs uncertainty relation, shows is that there is a succession of
spatiotemporally discrete, finitely extended and qualitatively similar events.
But this is precisely what one would expect on the basis of Whiteheads
ontology in which there are neither enduring substances (particles) which
could produce continuous trajectories nor are there any spatiotemporal
processes that connect or produce actual occasions. The only
spatiotemporal consequence to be expected from Whiteheads ontology is
indeed the observed succession of spatiotemporally discrete, finitely
extended regions in which certain properties are instantiated. Thus it seems
that the spatiotemporal consequences of Whiteheads ontology as well as
55 Scientists like Niels Bohr, Max Born and Heisenberg had interpreted the quantum behavior in a certain way
known as Copenhagen Interpretation (1927).
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the possibility of some kind of non-spatiotemporal transition-processes

that bridge the spatiotemporal gaps between the discrete, concrete events,
seems to find experimental as well as theoretical support from quantum
physics. Moreover, the fact that the properties instantiated in the different
regions along the trajectory of the particle are very similar and thus could
indeed give rise to the idea that there is some object that travels through
the chamber and causes the sequence of bubble-events can also be
understood within Whiteheads theory. The impression that the world is
made up of objects existing self-identical in time (like the hypothetical
particle in the bubble-chamber) is recovered by his theory of societies of
occasions, which are a kind of Ersatz-substances in Whiteheads system.
A society is a pattern of occasions which by reason of the causal influences
of their predecessors in the pattern instantiate (nearly) the same properties
and thus give rise to the impression of objects existing self-identical in time.
The mistake to take this impression as already representing the
fundamental ontological level of the world is what according to Whitehead
provided the foundation for the ontological misconception of a world that is
made up of independently existing and enduring substances which move
through a pre-existing container-space.
Another important feature of quantum physics that is in agreement with
Whiteheads ontology is the fact that the actualization of quantum events
can be consistently interpreted to involve an element of free choice.
According to the standard view, Quantum Mechanics (QM) is a truly
probabilistic theory. This means that the probabilities inherent in the
formalism of QM are genuine features of this theory which cannot be
eliminatedin particular it means that the probabilistic structure of QM is
not a sign of its incompleteness and thus is not reducible to an underlying
more complete deterministic theory. According to the standard view, QM
predicts, on the basis of the complete state of the world up to some time t,
probabilities for outcomes of measurements made at times later than t. But
which of the possible outcomes of a measurement does in fact occur may
be regarded as a free choice of nature, limited only by the probability
assignment. This limited freedom of nature, that is involved in the
actualization of each quantum event, is in agreement with Whiteheads
account of the actualization of the outcome of a concrescence process.
According to Whitehead, which of the possible properties available to a
concrescent occasion are in fact integrated into the final outcome is an
autonomous decision settled solely in the concrescence, limited only by the
propensities provided by the creative character of the corresponding
individualized manifestation of the underlying activity.
Another parallel between quantum physics and Whiteheads philosophy of
process is the atomic character of concrete quantum events. Instantiation
of electronic properties do not gradually or even continuously unfold in
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spacetime. To the contrary, either they occur fully or they do not occur at
allthere is no observational or theoretical evidence for a thing like a
spacetime region containing half an electron, i.e. half of the electronic
charge, mass and spin, before there is a bigger region that finally contains
the whole electron. Clearly, this fact could also be explained by the
assumption that electronic events are point like. Or using another particle
based terminology it could be explained as assumption of point-particles.
But Quantum Field Theory (QFT) only allows non-trivial properties to be
instantiated in extended regions and not at spacetime pointsanother
important agreement between Whiteheads view and quantum physics.
Since the move to assume that electronic events are located at spacetime
points is thus prohibited, it seems at least possible that Whiteheads
solution could be the right one. According to Whiteheads ontology the
reason for the fact that we never observe half an electron is grounded in
two things: first, the internal process of concrescence by which the complex
of electronic properties is created is not a spatiotemporal process, so that
in this internal process nothing like an unfolding of properties into a region
of spacetime happens. Second, the way in which the result of this internal
process is made available to the external world, i.e. is actualized, is an
atomic act. There is no gradual unfolding of electronic properties in this act
either and consequently there can be no thing like a region containing half
an electron, before there is a larger region containing the whole electron.
These observations show that Whiteheads ontology is able to capture
some important features of quantum physics.
4.0 Synopsis
There are two streams of process philosophy which are discernible today;
one mainstream view is represented by Whitehead, Hartshorne, Griffin,
Ray, Rescher, Shimony and many others. It is styled in analytic tradition
and has monist leanings. Another stream is represented by Deleuze,
Delanda, Zizek, Massumi et al mainly of continental tradition. There are
various strands which can not be included in either streams or if at all to be
included, can be included tenuously. The two main styles of Western
philosophy, one following analytical (mainly Anglo-American) tradition and
another following continental (mainly European) School however, stand out.
4.1 Whitehead's philosophy56 did not get the attention it deserved
during his life time in the annals of analytic philosophy 57. This lack of
attention could be due to his presumed commitment to panpsychism; and
to his willingness to embrace a version of theism. Whitehead's process
metaphysics was eminently adaptable for quantum ontology. Copenhagen
Interpretation (1927) however, had taken a positivist position on ontological
56 Section 3.4 & 4.1 is based on 'Whitehead's Process Philosophy and QFT' (WPPQ) by Frank Hattich (2003).
57 Lewis Ford (1970).
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issues which might have discouraged application of Whitehead's psychic

ontology to quantum physics. The current upsurge in the popularity of
Whiteheadian process view is indicative of the renewed interest in the
quantum ontology which is expected to offer better insight in the ongoing
'unification' in Physics. The resistance to panpsychism faced during the
days of Whitehead is no more prevalent today; on the contrary the
panpsychism has become an attractive proposition due to its envisaged
potential to explain the 'hard problem' of philosophy of consciousness.
Whitehead's process metaphysics (ref PR, SMW, ADI) has now been
analyzed for various scientific domains including Relativity and Quantum
Physics (example, J. Nobo, 1986 and F. Hattich, 2004). There are few
inconsistencies as pointed out by Stapp, Nobo and others in the dynamics
of the World process proposed by Whitehead:
The actual world of a particular occasion in a particular stage of the
world-process needs to be determined before this occasion or any of
its ontological constituents are created.
There may arise a situation where independently determined World
regions overlap each other, thereby conflicting with the separative
property of the extensive continuum.58
To secure the separateness of all realized regions, one has to give up either
the requirement of the causal independence of occasions belonging to the
same layer of the world-process or the requirement of the distinctness of
their concrescence processes. Hattich has argued that the second
alternative is the more appropriate one within the framework of
Whiteheads ontology and has accordingly modified the latter. The most
important differences of the ontology resulting from incorporating generally
undivided, bifurcating activities, compared to Whiteheads original ontology
have been that:
(1) All occasions belonging to the same layer of the world-process have
the same causes, which, in particular, rules out Whiteheads doctrine
of actual worlds
(2) Like the individuality of concrescent occasions due to the freedom of
their activities, the individuality due to the particularity of their
activities too, becomes a matter of degree.
A consequence of (1) is that there will generally be superluminal causal
effects between occasions belonging to different layers of the world-
process giving rise to a possible conflict with STR 59. If STR is understood as
58 The extensive continuum is that wherein actual occasions come to be. It is a topological space.
59 STR postulates that (1) all inertial frames are equivalent and (2) speed of light in vacuum is an absolute
universal constant for all inertial frames. The second postulate can be generalized: In every inertial frame there
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a pure spacetime theory, not making any claims about causation at all,
then there is obviously no such conflict. On the other hand, if STR is
believed to prohibit superluminal causation, but presupposes that causal
influences involve a transfer of energy-momentum, it depends on the
crucial concept of transfer and on the question whether the Whiteheadian
notion of activity can be understood as an analog of physical energy.
However, even if STR is not understood as making any claims about
causation, there is another source for a conflict. A central assumption of
Whiteheads ontology is that the world is an expanding process. This
requires that occasions are grouped into linearly ordered layers, which in
turn give rise to a distinguished foliation of spacetime a preferred
reference frame. Hattich has shown how such a layer-cake structure can
be established, by means of the underlying activities envisagement of
occasions. To avoid a conflict between the thereby implemented
distinguished foliation of spacetime and the Poincar invariance implied by
STR, one has to admit that STR does not deserve an ontological
interpretation and that the distinguished foliation of the Whiteheadian
world-process is not empirically detectable not even in principle. Yet the
fact that one can avoid a conflict with STR only if a central feature of
Whiteheads ontology is empirically unknowable, is clearly a drawback for
Whiteheadian interpretation of QFT, since the latter incorporates the
relativistic spacetime structure with Poincar transformations constituting
the spatiotemporal invariance group. (ref WPPQ).
Further, the very Whiteheadian conception of eternal objects as universals
is not supported by QFT. To the contrary, it can be seen that the formalism
of axiomatic QFT neither provides natural candidates for a representation of
objective eternal objects (i.e. boundary surfaces) nor of subjective eternal
objects (i.e. qualitative properties) if these are understood as universals.
4.2 Deleuze's Metaphysics represents realist, empiricist school of
process philosophy. He was a thorough going philosopher in continental
tradition and had diverse interest in arts, science and on social issues. His
attitude towards philosophy is best expressed in the following paragraph
from his book on Nietzsche60:
When someone asks 'what's the use of philosophy?' the reply must be
aggressive, since the question tries to be ironic and caustic. Philosophy
does not serve the State or the Church, who have other concerns. It serves
no established power. The use of philosophy is to sadden. A philosophy
which saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not a philosophy. It is useful
for harming stupidity, for turning stupidity into something shameful. Its only
is a finite universal limiting speed for physical entities.

60 Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962)
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use is the exposure of all forms of baseness of thought. Philosophy is at its

most positive as a critique, as an enterprise of demystification.
Deleuze's constructivism is seen in most of his work; and was openly
proclaimed in his book What is Philosophy which he wrote with Guattari:
Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts. The
philosopher's only business is concepts and the concept belongs only to
philosophy.
The metaphysical concepts which he promoted 61 include multiplicity, plane
of consistency, affect, and quasi-causal operator. Deleuze's ontology is
sometimes straight forward construction of existing scientific and
mathematical resources while at a times it is unconventional interpretation
or extrapolation of such resources to express his speculative ideas. His
notion of virtuality is both acclaimed for its novelty and criticized for its
redundancy. His ideas about perception may sound idiosyncratic: He says -
What is called perceptions is no longer a state of affairs but a state of the
body as induced by another body, and affection is the passage of this state
to another state as increase or decrease of potential power through the
action of other bodies... Even when they are non living, or rather inorganic,
things have a lived experience because they are perceptions or affections.
(ref WIP).
Foregoing paragraph may suggest that Deleuze is panexperientialist. Here
the experience is not the intrinsic property of the subject which is
perceiving or objective property of the object being perceived, but
relational property of the two objects involved in the process of perception.
Elsewhere, he is more explicit about emergence of consciousness in every
spatio-temporal dynamism (ref DR):
Actualization takes place in three series space, time, and also conscious-
ness. Every spatio-temporal dynamism is accompanied by the emergence
of an elementary consciousness which itself traces direction, doubles
movements and migrations, and it is borne on the threshold of the
condensed singularities of the body or object whose consciousness it is.
Here Deleuze clearly grants a fundamental ontological status to the
consciousness on par with space and time. In Deleuze's ontology, the
dynamic system model of state-space and differential manifold is
applicable to cognitive processes as well. In such cases dynamic system is
assumed to be chaotic62 to explain the unpredictable behavior of cognitive
processes.
Deleuze does not accord any special ontological position to social entities
61 For summarized illustration of Deleuze's process metaphysics refer Manuel Delanda (2002).
62 A dynamic system is chaotic if it is very sensitive to the initial conditions, that is, if very small changes in the
values of the system variables can produce dramatically different outputs as the system develops.
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like society, institutions, nation states and culture in his flat realistic
ontology. They are not abstract totalities; they are concrete social
individuals like human beings but operating on larger spatio-temporal
scale. Particularly, he identifies animal species by the Darwinic process of
speciation. He subscribes to the view proposed by Michael Ghiselin 63(1997)
that species formed through double process of natural selection and
reproductive isolation does not represent higher ontological category than
the individual organism that compose it. The relation of species to
individual organism, the so called individuated sample of this species is one
of whole and parts. Ontologically this relation is much as the same between
an organism and individual cells that comprise it. The fact that species are
constructed through historical process suggests that they are ontologically
just another individuated entity but operates at much larger spatio-
temporal scale than organisms. This demolishes the ontological hierarchies
and leads to flat ontology.
4.3 Process Theology
Whitehead's process view lends itself to theology. In Whitehead's process
theology it is useful to think about Gods being by means of two
abstractions: Gods primordial nature and Gods consequent nature. The
primordial nature envisages and orders the eternal objects into a single
infinitely complex ideal. The consequent nature of God interacts with the
world, prehending fully every single actual occasion in the world upon its
concrescence and, thus, preserving the past. This consequent nature of
God is the aspect of God that is continuously changing and experiences the
world with subjective immediacy.
The trend of establishing theological positions by metaphysical, meta-
scientific arguments is not new. Process theology however, does not
endorse classical theism, the doctrine that God is completely transcendent,
supernatural, beyond time and space, and unchanging. Nor does process
theology endorse pure immanence or pantheism. Instead, it endorses
panentheism, the belief that all is in God and God is immanent everywhere
in the universe, but is more than the universe. A frequently used analogy
here is that the universe is Gods body and God is the consciousness that
directs and interacts with that body. God is the divine subject of all
experience.64 This position is not new, but in Whitehead's theology it was
offered with a certain sophistication using a new terminology. Whitehead
provided a respectable metaphysical foundation to the proposition of God
as a process which was later consolidated by Hartshorne, Griffin and
others. At present, process theology has support of many theosophical
organizations. It is noteworthy that eminent process philosopher Nicolas
63 Michael T. Ghiselin (b. 1939) is an American biologist, and philosopher/historian of biology.
64 See Wikipedia Process Theology
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Rescher was the president of American Catholic Philosophy Association.

Another, perhaps not so obvious reason of acceptance of process theology
seems to be its flexibility to change with time and its adaptability to explain
empirical phenomenon. Instead of declaring the past doctrine as a mistake
one can always adopt the new position as an important step in the ongoing
process of evolvement which is the consequent nature of God. It is not for
nothing that Rescher described process philosophy as 'philosophy in
process'. This pragmatic approach is likely to minimize the dichotomy
between scientific inquiry and religious discourse.
5.0 References and Bibliography

Physics
1. Motion Mountain Christoph Schiller (2006)
2. Road to Reality Roger Penrose (2004)
3. Intro. to Cosmology Jayant Narlikar (2002)
4. Chaos: Classical & Quantum Cvitanovic, Artuso, Mainieri et al (2006)
5. Quantum Physics Roger Newton (2002)
6. Gravity James Hartle (2003)
7. The Direction of Time H. D. Zeh (2007)
Mathematics
8. Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems Lawrence Perko (2001)
9. Topology and Geometry Glen Bredon (1993)
10. Topology Sheldon Davis (2005)
11. Set Theory Thomas Jech (2006)
Philosophy
12. Process and Reality A. N. Whitehead (1927)
13. Difference & Repetition Gilles Deleuze (1970)
14. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy Manuel Delanda (2002)
15. Analysis of Matter B. Russell (1927)
16. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Russell (1948)
17. After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, edited by M Weber (2004)
18. A Process In Reality: Joseph Brenner - Logic & Logical Philosophy vol 14 (2005)
19. Whitehead's Process Philosophy and QFT Frank Hattich (2003)
20. Whiteheads Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity J. Nobo (1986)
21. Metaphysics and Origin of Species Michel Ghiselin (1997)
22. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (vol VII - IX on Buddhism) Ed. Carl Potter
23. Internet: Wikipedia, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and articles in public domain.
Shashikant Padalkar

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1 of 36 Ontology of Process.

In attributive monism entities have only one category emanating from

3 ref. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Becoming. Buddhism denies supernatural intervention in this process. It

or effected by the cause-effect relationship inherent in the process.

possibilities'. These spaces in turn explain regularities exhibited by

which cannot be enlarged without ceasing to be a co-punctual. The

(Russell 1948). So thoughts should be among the events of which the

which is connected, but not simply connected, is called multiply connected.

proposed following logic for the dynamics of energy:

effects (influences such as electromagnetic or gravitational forces) are

spontaneous symmetry breaking is now incorporated in the present

events are remembered by us as a part of our memory? One sledge-

normal sense of the word except in specific context of equilibrium oriented

Deleuze defines multiplicity in terms of these nested vector fields related to

(represented by unreachable multiplicities) and pure capacity to affect.

an assembly. As thermodynamic intensive process is characterized by

43 This is the process of 'being' the past occasions.

evolvementand expansion, when referring to the processual character

49 Mind by Paul Thegard (2002)

conventionally infer the existence of perceived entities to be autonomous

mental causation (how mind produces effect on matter). The phenomenon

53 An 18th century German mathematician and philosopher who conceived monads.

scientists55. It is quite possible that Whitehead was aware about some of

the possibility of some kind of non-spatiotemporal transition-processes

issues which might have discouraged application of Whitehead's psychic

is a finite universal limiting speed for physical entities.

use is the exposure of all forms of baseness of thought. Philosophy is at its

Rescher was the president of American Catholic Philosophy Association.

5.0 References and Bibliography

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