Eulogio vs. Bell Sr.

Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno
Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for annulment of
documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by
Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title
obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160
of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory
limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even
sold it to them for P1 million.

The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home
of respondents. It also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market value
of their house and lot.

The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared
respondents' house and lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was
incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no res judicata.

Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale
of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for
the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the appellate court, is its actual value at
the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was
contrary to law.

Issues

Issue: whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

The Court's Ruling

Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the
Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment.40 The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon
the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted
with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered.41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are determined
by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific
articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.

Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit:

ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds
shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment
and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.

Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the
amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas,
or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable
for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose
annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural
areas. [Underscoring supplied]

To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law.
If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency
fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any
of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided
the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has
been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not
result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the
subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under
Articles 155 and 160.

Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from
levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.

Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family home from
execution or forced sale. They claim that the actual value of respondents' family home exceeds the
P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby private
respondents agreed to sell the property for PI million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly
ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to
them in Civil Case No. 4581.

As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family
home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover,
respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution.48 On the other hand,
there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.

Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot
obtain its satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that
those asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must bring themselves clearly within
the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its enforcement.

To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any
of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by petitioners.
The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality
that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when
petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual
value of the property in dispute.

Arado vs. Alcoran (2015)

Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage produced
a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas).3 In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia)4 but their
union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca
Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 19515 during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.6 In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco.

Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981.

Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan.9 Joaquina had four siblings,
i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado.10 Nemesio had six children, namely:
(1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3)
Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;11 and (6) Felicisima.12 During the pendency of the case, Pedro died,
and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie
Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse,
Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.

On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint
for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction)
against Anacleto and Elenette.13 Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica
Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were inherited
by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not
inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;"16
that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia,
and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio,
Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with
Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of
Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence,
Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the
properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for
not having been executed according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true
intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not submitted
for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the properties; that notwithstanding their repeated
demands for the return of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating their rights in the
properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey the properties, and to pay; P20,000.00
as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.17redarclaw

In their answer,18 the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was expressly recognized
by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus
had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still too young when
Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that
Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the
properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his birth; that such
possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto
then took over the possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for the sake
of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were already lost through laches,
estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership
and possession should not be disturbed.
Issues

In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners,29 implore the Court to nullify the assailed rulings of the
CA, and to determine once and for all the following issues:

(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x x; and

(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.30

We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for different reasons.

The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject properties is properly
characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. According to Caezo v. Bautista,31 an "[a]ccion reivindicatoria
seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper
regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an end to Anacleto's
possession of the properties on the basis of their being the rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being
the spurious child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in the estate of Nicolas.

The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance of evidence pertained
to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of evidence in
Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,32 thusly:

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight
of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove
his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of his opponent. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.

At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions of the Family Code33
should apply because the petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the
effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the classification of children is limited to either
legitimate or illegitimate.34 Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article 175 of the Family
Code, to wit:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article I72, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.

On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with Articles 172 and 173 of the Family
Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or laws.

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto
as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the
column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification
(Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column
in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the
informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand
in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.35redarclaw

Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We have
already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals36 that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal
certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to the
baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.

The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of
Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best,
the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto.
Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap
v. Locsin, Jr.37 that:

[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others
and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in
his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which
indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary value
accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we
stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,38 the recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or
herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary
declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock."

The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding,
Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing that
Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.

How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the respective rights of the parties in
relation to the specific properties subject of the complaint?

To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to
Raymundo, while the remaining two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.

With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the governing law on succession.
Under Article 807 thereof,39 Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate son of
Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In
accordance with Article 834 thereof,40 Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of Raymundo,
while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for
betterment.

When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect.41 Under Article 1000
thereof,42 the heirs entitled to inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his
surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the
properties comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with Article
107843 of the Civil Code.

Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the first eight of the
subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of said
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro
indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in
1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the estate of
Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate
child or spouse, Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her
entire estate.

Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting from the estate of
Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the
legitimate son of Joaquina.46 Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner,
such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,47 the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not inherit from the
estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento)
(Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in
Gallanosa v. Arcangel48 that in order that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory." It appears that
such will remained ineffective considering that the records are silent as to whether it had ever been
presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged
this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the allegation. In the absence of proof
showing that the supposed will of Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent court, we hold that
it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to the effect that Joaquina had
bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that the properties had been transmitted to him upon
her death.

As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit
from her estate.

Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that the estates of
Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate
testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper and valid
partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of
their estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:

x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of
the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a
co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of
a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been previously
partitioned, the Court concludes and holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the
disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they were the rightful
owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal
of the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.

Lahom vs. Sibulo

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization
could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care
Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided
to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all
the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court
order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
In her petition, she averred -

7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his
surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was
prevented by petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

xxxxxxxxx

10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin
M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

xxxxxxxxx

13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to
attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more
frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some
material benefits from petitioner.

16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents
only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner
and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against
petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated
for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.[1]

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters
to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
(emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested
under the regime of then Article 348[2] of the Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers
jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).

Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption
earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.

Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code
should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption
of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed
by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised
Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.[4]

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the
following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?

The Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code[13] and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment
to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the
Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as
well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process[15] that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.[17] Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,[18] absolute, unconditional, and perfect[19] or
fixed and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on
02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an
adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the
case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the
court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21]
spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At
the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption
and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August
1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of
the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.[24] While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed by the states
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.[26] Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to regulation by the State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken
away at anytime before it has been exercised.[28]

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law,
an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude
him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.