Airliner

Customer services Division Publication April - June 1993

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._-
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Commercial Transpon Saft.'1)' Ice Detection S,'stems FuelJculson CFM56 3 Engine

,. E \ 1\ In.s nOI.I,\(; ('( )\l\ll-.lH 'I \ L ,m.PI, \ '\ .: (;R( H I'

Commercial Tr.lllSport Safety 1 Vice President & General Manager

tce Detection SystCtllS ........................... 10 Customer Services Division T. E. SChick
747-400 Fueljcnlson 16
CFM56-3 High-Bypass Turbofan Engine .._ 20
New Video Releases 19
Field Service Representatives 24 Airliner Staff
Division Message to Customers 25
l\1anaging Editor ........................ E.V. Reese
Fuel Conservation & Operations Editor .............................................. A.T. lloyd
N~vslctter Center Pullout Designer D.W. Copeland

Cu.'itOmCf ~ Dh'ision of lIle Boem~ Commercial AirplatlC Group is re<:JlOIl!'ibie for supponmR openton during the:- lil'e of e:a.cll Boeing
jetlin('f In additIon to the stationing of mort" than lOO ~t;lti\'t:l> in mer 50 countti~. the division (umi.~ho spare pan., and engineering
~pport, !r.I[11S nlltht an,s 2nd m:JinlelUl~ pefSOnfll,'1 and PTOy~ oper3tions JnJ mam\ll:na.nct' publicaoons The di\"i'>ion rontinllOOsly
C(>IIlmunic:lles ""1m opt"nuOfS through lechnkal meetings,!iCn'in' Jette" .and bulletin;. and other eommunic.ation.'i; thl'teby asslSling them in
a~11\R regulatory ~uiremems and Airline Transpon Associalion ~pecif)C",1tion.~
TIle: BOEI:->G "IRU:\"ER IS publl~ quarterly b)' the CUSlomlT Sc:rvkes DiVl'>ion, Commertial AIrplane Group. of the lJoelflg Comp;lny. Seanle.
'.t"3shing'lOfl. Cable: 1C\dres"., OOEll\G-AlR Addre:;s All rommunic:ations 10 Cu.'>l"mer Sef\.jre" Di\~ion, "1"he Boelflg Company. Box 3""07 ~n1e,
WlI.'Jllngton C)8Il'l

InfotmlltiOn PUhlish...d in th OOlU:\G AlRUf\ER l~ co~ a<.'C\Ir:aIC and lIuthoritati\l~. Iiow~ cr. no material should be considered as FAA
approved unlc:s..~ ~pc:ciflCll1y SCled. Airhne penonnd .. n:ad\i...ed WI theircompo.n)~.. policy ll\;J). nsriel lhed;n"., use ol published mfomuliOn.
Customer airlmcs nut" republish al1~ from Ihe BOEING AlRU:'\ER (or distribution ooIr witlun their own organiullon .....ithout ",Tinen
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BOEl~G Won- n."J'l'1nling any anide~ (rom thl: AIRUJ\"ER IQ ensure Wt all material ronfOl'TTlS 10 the Ialt:l>l infonnaoon and changes "-hen
published.
Copyright 0 1993 The Boein~ COmpany
The trend of falal accidents is similar 10
hull losses. The annual number of
fatalities grew between 1960--1975 bul
has now leveled at a rate of below 600
per year (see Figure 2).
60,----------------,
60
.._.
"......,.
TRAFFIC INCREASE ALONE WII.L
BOOSI' ACODENT NUMBERS
Annual rates,
accidents
. Military IIClion
CofTImonweahh of Inoepenoent
States aircraft

'1le accident roue trend per million per million 30

flights rulS declined .slight.ly in n.-'Cefll depanures
20
years. and is expected to continue 10
fall. However, the number of aircraft
and annual OC?rtures for !.he worldwide "
jet airline fleet is expected to grow al
such a rate !.hat wecould easily encounter
o~~~~~~
00 A ro n H n n
~ ~ ~ M 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

five more hull loss accidents, or more, Year

per year by 2006.

Figure 3 explains the apparent

discrepancy. The left side shows hull
Joss accidents per million depanures
between 1980-1991. l1'lerightsideshows Figure I. Hull-loss accidents for worldwide commercial jet neet (1959-1992) showing
!.he decline in the proteacd composite annual rates per million departures.
fleet average accident rate. It reflects
some replacement of older airpbnes
with newer, high tcchnology models.
TIlis projection is represented by the
upper dashed line on the right half of
Figure 3. To keep the number of
acddentS from increasing !.he accident
r-..tte must be decreased to approxin13tely ",--------------------,
0.8 hull losses per million depan\lres.
This is no slroll task.

Figure 4 sho\\'S a profile of a rypirnl jet

flight showing perCCnlages of accidents
Annual
fatalities,"
occurring in each phasc of night. It also hundreds
(onboard
depicts the exposure of e'Jch phase as only)
588
5
a percentage of tObI flight time. Two-
thirds of all huU-loss accidents occur
during takeoff, initial climb, final
approach and landing. This exposure
represents only six minutes of a tOl3I oo~~M~ronnnn~~~MMOO~
Year
average flight time of 96 minutes. lllUS
about 65% of all hull loss accidents
occur during 6% of the nights.

JET FLEET GENERATIONS MARKED

BY IMPROVEMENTS
Figure 2. Fallli accidents ror "'orldwide commercial Jet fleet (1959-1992) showing the
TIle modem jet transpon indusuystaned annual rate or aIXidents per million departures and ratalities.

2 AlrUncr/Apr'Jun 1993
 serious growth when the deHavilland
Comet IV entered service, and it was
joined by the Boeing 707 and Douglas
Worldwide DC-8 in the rlISl gen<.T3.tion of the
2.5
rommercial jet fleet. Flight ~""J.tions
in airplanes powen.>d by reciprocating
2.0 engines where chardcterized hy low
Hull loss
1.5 EB I landjng speeds, short runwdY length
requirements and relatively benign
accidents
million
per
departures
1.0 """ .
Teo-year Projected composite lIeet average

Fleet oomposite rate

stability and con[fOl characteristics in
romrnst with d'ICirearlyjet: replacements.

.Jtnumbef olacodents Figure 5 shows hull-loss accident ra(es

05
remains constant of airplane types ranked acrording to
the period in which they were developed
0 and introduced into service. Theaccident
'98' '985 1~

Year
1995
Figure 3" Hullloss accident rate statistical proje<:tion through Z005.
Exposure percentage based on an average flight duration of 1.6 hours
Excludes sabotage and military action
2000 2005
record of early jet entries could reflecl
the limitations of older technology
appl ied toa new operating environn'ICnt.
Design, maintenance and ope....dtional
changes on succeeding airplane
gener:lIions further improved
performance and safety records. The
results are impressive. Toctly, de;igns
have been refined, flight crews arc
better Il1lined, simulators are more
re3listic and there h.we been significant
improvements in airports, navigation
aids, approach aids and all phases of
the aviation infrastnleture. However,
the flying public expects a risk free, zero
accident industry. This must be our
goal.

Figure 6shows the primary cause factors,

--
as determined by the agency which
Takeotl lrullal C~mb Cruise Oescenl InrtiaJ investigated the accident, for hull-loss
accidents since 1959. Investigative

_.-..
145% dImb 74% 4.5% 7.2%
10,7% 12.3'%0 Final authorities have said that night crew
2 48% errors account for 70.75% of accidents.
"nle ratio has remained fairly constant
throughout the 3O-year period.

But the single primary muse rating

system of flight crew contribution to an
accident does not recognize the
,"" I "'" I "" I
Perr:entiIfIIJ of fright time
I '" I contributing cause factors such as
maintenance, air traffic control and
wC'dther which are often present before
the accident ocrurs. In the chain of
Figure 4. Hullloss accidents in ~'orldwide commercial jet neet (1981-1992) as a percentage e\"ents leading to an accident, the crew
of the larious night segments. is the final link influencing theoulcome.

AlrUner/AprJun 1993 3
 --
The crew is usually identified as the Airplane type Accidents per million departures
primary C".I.U5e '-dClor when it fails to
prevent an accident which, in Ihe
judgement ofsafety authorities, il should
have prevenled.
""'"
.....,
"""
e0..-

....
, n,
2345678

... ~_
9

..
,.
~

---!'_ . .
SAFElY RIl,tAINS PARAMOUNT
'!'!!I-Ii! '"
"'''
!lAC II 1
TIle command jel transport accident OC-.
737100I20O
...dle during recenl years has remained
roughly within 1.5-2.0 accidents per '"
7.710Il0'200I300
million flights. Although these rales are OC-"
Llon
significant.ly betler than in earlier years,
any rising accident count caused by the """
offsetting incre-.I.SC in departUte5 will be ""'"
'" ,
perceived by t.IlC public as deteriorating
safety pcrfonnance. Action must be
... '"
"" ,~
737-3OO;4.OOISOO
t.aken to improve in areas Ihat offer Ihe "00 ,'j-
A320
7.7-'00 0
ooj 3.03 Exdudes:
gre'.I.tesl poIential foraccident prevention MOll 0
sabol8ge
as opposed to an excessive
concentration on crashworthiness. ""'"'- ,., Military action

Key safety issues have been identified Figure 5. Hullloss aident rates for world" ide commercial jet neels (1959-1991) showing
as follows: aidents per millton departures as distributed O\'er various generations of jetliners.

Collision -with -Terrain

Collision-with-terrnin accidents are

commonly attributed to crew causes.
"""'" ""'" -....
........ ""celI\lIQ8 ollOllll aa:*lentI with known ~

---
Uisll0
They involve inadvertent controlled
"'" " " " " " '" "
flight imo the ground with impact
<X.'CUrring outside the airport boundaries.
The frequcm oUlcome is a hull loss
'" I . 68.1
73.1

-- " " 11,1

involving many fatalities. Conuiburing 13.\
f.l.aorsoftcn include a navigational error,
misreading of charls or simple ~~3
" !!',.I
distraction.
W_ ,.,
Seldom were the effects of a design

~:
"
--
AWponIATC
change sosuongly fell as in 1975 when 9 1.
the U.S. Fedeml Aviation Administration . ,.,
(FAA) ordt--red the inslallation ofground
proximity warning systems (GPWS) in ,...... ...
.....
, <0

U.S. If'ansport aircraft. U.S. operators

had been experiencing several terrain
collision accidents each year until 1975
""""-'
,...
. ~

........... ..."
'"
"
Exdudes:
Sabol8ge
Mililary action
legend:
_
_
1959101992
last 10 years (1983101992)

(see Figure 7). Accidents in that category '"

then dropped 10 zero and stayed there
until seve J1 recent events. Since 197;. Figure 6. Primary cause factors for hullloss attidents for worldwide commercial jet neel
collision\ ithterrain accidents have (19591992) as distribuled by primary causal factor.
tended to involve aircraft without GPWS
or crews who f:liled to heed GPWS
alens.

4 Airliner/Apr-jun 1993
 InterViev.-s with flight crews provide
insight about why GPWS has 001 been

. totally successful in elimin:uingcollision

\\'1th-terrain accidems. Early ...-ers1OOS d
the equipment were prone to false
12 warnings and were not believed by
piloc.s. A common reaction was to
" ~GPWS troubleshoot: the \\--amings and cr0ss-
Hulloss
ac:<:odents
Imj)lefnentatiOn
check other cockpit instnJmenlS to
funher ronfum the need for a pull-up
respcll'lSe. Analysis of many accidents
has oonfumed thaI avoidance of a
collision often requires initiation of a
2 pun-up maneuver \\ithin a few seconds;
there is no time for troub&eshooting or
0 forotherassessments. FOI't\Ul3tefy. early
Y.ro71n~N~nnn~~81G&~~.VM.~~~
GPWS equipment designs have been
Vow improved to greatlr reduce false
\\'3mings. AJ.'>O, additional \\-aming
modes are available. particularly in
relation logljdesk>pesignals. Equipmeru

"'Igurr 7. Collision,,-ilhturain hull-loss accidf:nts (1968-1.991).

I This \lodel127 e'\perienced run\ol8) oH~rron.

Airliner/Apr-)un 1993 s
This Model?37 experiend rontrolled night.into-terrain.

improvemems, available through retrofit.

and implememation of pilOl: U'3ining to
respond properly to GPWS alerts deserve
top priority among safety initi:uives. Short off airport
The following actions are
Short on airport
recommended:
Hard landing
Complelethewor\dwideinslalbtion
ofGPWS 12
Overrun
Train pilots to ensure proper
response to GPWS alerts
Gear up
Update olderGPWS instlllations to Total accidents _ 87
avoid nuisance alerts and to Offside Appfoach and landing _ 42
incol'JXll"lte ClIrrem warning modes
o 23' 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Approach and Landing Accidents

Figure 8 shows the types of landing

accidents for one airpl:ine type. It Figure 8. Approach and landing accidents for one airplane type.

6 AlrUner/Apr.Jun 1993
This Model 737 came to rest after controlled night-into-terrain.
includes all accident damage categories.
Fony-lWo of the 87 accidents occurred
during llpprooch and landing.
The first two types (landing short on
and off the airport) involve accidents in
which the airplane was aligned on the
runway. ll1ese twO categories, as well
as hard landingsandovenuns, typicdlly
involve problems with vertictl guidance
or speed control. They can also result
from a poor transition from instrument
rughl to visual flighl at or nearapprooch
minimums.
Approach and landing is the most ait.ical
phase of night. It acoounts for more
than half of the worldwide jet transport
accidents. Strong accident prevention
Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993
resources should be directed to this
area. The following actions are
recommended:
Every runwa.y used by commercial
jet transports should be equipped
with precision glide path
information, such as an instrument
landing system (lLS). lLS provides
glide slope information through
visual cues on a primal)' cockpit
inslrumenl and provides the vilal
glide slope infom13.tion required
by GPWS and automatic approach
systems.
VISUal approach slope indicator
(V AS!) lights should Ix= used to give
the pilOt a visual reference to the
glide slope. Also, they are helpful
in making the transition from
instrument references to visual
references on fmal approach. VASI
is relatively inexpensive and belongs
at the approach end of every
ruO\V'JY
A judicious balance of automatic
and manual landings will optimize
s.'lfety and maintain pilot skills. To
d:ue, no hull-loss accidents have
resulted from :I fully-coupled
automatic landing.
Noo-Stabilized Approaches
Records of approach and landing
7
accidents show dUll many of these
mishaps had their beginnings in non-
st:lbiIi7.ed approaches. The accident
chain of events often starts with high,
fasl and close-in positioning. The pilot
auempts [0 slow and configure the
airplane for landing, but he or she is not
able to stabilize airspeed and rate of
descent before touchdown. The
problem is particularly acute with
modem airplanes as air traffic control
(ATC) may not allow for adequate
descent dist:.lOce8 for airplanes with
lower drag characteristiCS.

A solution will require a combined

effort by ATC, night crews and airline
management. 'me following actions
are recommended:

ATC procedures must assure

positioning at the initial approach
fIX with ample time to configure
the airplane before starting an
approach.
Controllers must be trained in the
night charaaeristics of various
airplane rypes.
r1ight crew training must empl13Size
approach stabilization.
Airline op;.>:rJtors must define oiteri.'l
for an acceptable, stabilized
approach.
Non-punitive airline policies must
be established that mandate go-
arounds for approaches nOt
stabilized by;oo feet above ground
level (AGL).

Nonstabilized parameters
Number of
nonstabilized
Steep Late Shallow Low
approaches Speed Flaps Gear Engines
approach alignment approach speed

265 11 130 18 - 152 14 99 3

(4.2%) (49.1%) (6.8%) (57.4%) (5.3%) (37.4%) (1.1%)

Figure 9. F1ight data recorder monitoring results orm non-stabilized approach.

8 Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993
Go/No-Go Takeoff Decision
The worldwide jet lransport fleet
experienced 67 rejected takeoff (RTO)
accidents through 1990. A go/no-go
decision near VIis a rare event thai
occurs only once in eve!)' 300,000
departures. A long-haul crew nying an
8O-hour duty cycle, but making only
eight nights a month, can expect to
experience a critical RTO only once in
3,000 years.
pilots are trained to properly stop an
airplane on the ground. Also, they
demonstrate their ability to do so during
simulator checks. But about two-thirds
of the go/no-go decisions made
dUring the 67 RTO accidents were
found to be incorrect.
Overall, go/no-go decision statistics are
incomplete. We know about the events
that failed, but much less is known
about the successful events.
RTO accidents result from a variety of
factors. Go/no-go choices are ('.Ire and
too often incorrect 111e reliability and
correctness of decisions under the
stressful circumstances of a go/no-go
choice must be improved. Thefollowing
actions are recommended:
Setstandardsforhigh-speedrefusal
eu.s. and European regulators are
at work on this).
Establish consistent training and
checking policies (U.S. and
Euro~J11 regulmors areat work on
lhis). Boeing rulS recently completed
and distributed a TakcoffTroi1lirl8
Aidwhich isexpead to have major
impact in reducing RTO accidents.
Develop realislicsimulatorexertises
thaI repliC"dte RTO accidents and
stress realistic gross weights, tire
and engine failures and engine
vibrations.
Flight Data Recorder Monitoring
Flight data recorder monitoring,
sometimes called night operational
quality assurnnce, is an effective fiight
s.1.fety tool. Digital flight dam recorders
(DFDR) provide considerable
information for fligln crew self-
evaluation, flight operations and training
departments.
Figure 9 is an example of infonnmion
thaI one airline collected dUring 2,100
flights. [t shows 265 approaches in
which pilots exceeded established
parameters.
After analysis of the data, a
standardization pilot can further
inveslig3le operational circumstances
that led to rushed approaches. He or
she can then require corrective training
with emphasis on appropriate areas.
Right da13 recorder monitoring is now
in use in m:lny regions of the world,
However, no U.S. operators employ
this technique. The system requires
safeguards to prevent punitive misuse.
To enhance the effectiveness of flight
operational quality assurance, the
following actions are recommended:
All jet transport operators should
adopt a flight operational quality
assurance program.
Moniloringand analysis techniques
should be patlemed after quality
assurance programs already proven
by experienced airlines.
Management and unions must
cooperate to support a successful
program.
The pro.iectcd increase in the number of
hull losses per year should not be
accepted as inevimble. The ltCnd can be
reversed, but it will require tlle concen.ed
efforts of the industry to be successful.
11tis effort should make iX'SSible a level
annual accident count with decn..>asing
accident rates by [he year 2005.

Control of the Crew Caused Accident Apr-jun 1986

The When and HowofGPWS Pullups Oct-Dec 1986
Approach and Landings-Back to Basics jan-Mar 1987
Visual Approacbes Apr-jun 1991
The Last Two Minutes-Stopping on the Runway jan-Mar 1991
Go/No-Go, TIle Takeoff Decision Apr-jun 1984
Lufthansa's Go/No-Go Philosophy Oct-Dec 1986
Takeoff Training Aid juJ-5ep 1992
Flight Data Recording & Airplane Condition Monitoring - Apr-jWl 1992

Pre"ious AlRLI1\'ER issues with articles on relaled subjects.

Airliner/Apr-jun 1993 9
A inmmek,,,del<ction
systems are chosen
by many operntors
to assist night crews in the
identification of inflight aircraft
icing conditions or to provide
automatic inflight operation of
aircraft anliicing systems.
Boeing offers twO typeS of ice
detection systems as customer
requested optiOns: advisory
and primary.
The Ad-
visory Ice
Detection
System
advises the
night crew
thaI the air-
craft is in
icing con-
ditions. The
Primary Ice
Detection
System
controls me
operation of
anti-icing system valves during
flight operation. Benefits of The ice deledor probe for the 737 It(h'I.sory Ice detection s)stem is inslalled on the len side
the ice detection systems of the forward fuselage.
include improved night safelY,
reduced fuel burn by llO(
activating bleed air when nOl lUck A Johnson
needed and reduced crew Senior SIX-ci:!.list Engineer
737n57 Mt."'Chanical SyslC~ms
worklood. The Advisory and
Primary Ice Detection Systems
do not ope~lIe on the ground.

The first ice detection system

delivered by Boeing was a 767
advisory system in 1982. In
Ice Detection
1984 a similar system was
delivered on the 757.
addition, 737 advisory. 767
primary and 747- 400 advisory
In
S
and prim3ry systems have been
delivered. present in visible form and local may become ingested by me engines
temperature is 32F or lower or impact other aircraft SUifaces. For
AIRCRAFT ICING Uncontrolled aircraft icing may resuh thesereasons, transport aircr.lft include
inhazar<k>usoper.ttion. lcingincreases ice protection for engine inlets and
Ice may form on the leading edges of aerodynamic drag. decreases lift and wing leading edges. Boeing aircr.lft
moving aircraft when moislUre is adds weight. Ice shed from a surface utilize thermal anti-icing (TAl) S)"Stems

10 AirlinerlApr~un 1993
which deliver hOI. engine bleed air to
the protected surfaces. Thermal anti
icing a surface requires sufficient heat
application to prevent the fOnTIation
of ice, whereas deicing removes
existing ice from a surface.
The Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
requires the use of anti-icing when
visible moiSlUre is present and total air
temperature (TAD is W"e (5O'F) or
lower. This defines potential icing
conditions. Visible moisture consists
of supercooled water droplets
suspended in the air. 1110ugh water
generally freezes at tempemtures less
than 32'F, supercooled droplets in an
icing cloud do nOl. have the means to
fonn ice crystals. These unstable
droplels will freeze on COntact with an
airplane surface.
ICE DETECfOR PROBE
TIle heart of the ice detection systems
is the ice sensor. The probe-type icc
detector is manufaClured by Rosemount
Inc. It is installed on the forward
fuselage in a carefully dctcnnined
location to avoid a thick boundary
layer, interfcrence on or from air data
sensors, vorti<:es or water concenlmtion
from upstream sl'ntcture, wheel splash
dUring ground operation or cOntact
with ground crews, jetways, etc. The
sensing element is a cylinder 1/4 inch
in diameter and one inch long. The
probe strut e.xtends the sensing element
beyond the airplane boundary layer
and into freestream conditions. Since
the element represents a small body to
approaching supercooled water
droplets, the element has a high
collection efficiency and will
experience maximum impingement of
droplets. Fundamental to ice detection
system design is that the detector
element will accrete ice earlier and
more readily than the leading edges of
the engine inlets and wings, and
thereby will proVide an C'drly sensing
of icing.
Airliner!Apr-Jun 1993
The major working componenl'S of the
probe are:
Sensing element
SlrUt
Element and SlrUt heaters
Oscillation and feedback coils
Microprocessor-based electronics
Electrical interface
The probe oper,lIes on Ihe principle of
magnctostriction - the property of
certain ferromagnetic materials to
change length when a fluctuating
magnetic field is applied. l1le sensing
element is caused to vibrate axially at
a base or resonant frequency. The
addition of mass during the accretion
of ice reduces thevibrationa.l frequency.
At a preset drop in frequency,
corresponding to 0.02 inches of ice,
the internal probe heaters are energized
and melt the accumulated ice. This
constitutes one probe cycle. Following
deicing, the probe again cools, returns
to the base frequency and is free to
accrete and sense another cycle of
icing. Detector electronics registers
these icing/deicing cycles, as shown
in Figure 1. The major difference
berween the advisory and primary ice
detection probes is U,e manner in
which the cycles are used.
l1le ice detector requiresairOow across
the sensing element to proVide a
reliable signal. For this reason, the ice
detection systems are operable only
during flight (the icingsignal is inhibited
on the ground).
ADVISORY ICE DETECTION
SYSTEMS
The Advisory Ice Detection System
annunciates the presence of icing
conditions. The flight crew remains
responsible for monitoring icing
conditions, as defined in the AFM.
Manual activation of engine inlet Cowl
Thennal Anti-Icing eCTAl) and Wing
Thcnnal Anti-Icing (WfAl) bythecrew
also remains a requirement. The
advisory system provides an additional
icing cue 10 the crew.
The Advisory Ice Delection System
employs a single fuselage-mounted
detector probe. When the probe
detects 0.02 inches of ice, the sensor
outputs an icing signal. This signal is
processed by system electronics and
flight deck a nnunciation oficing occurs.
Components that make up the Advisory
Ice Detection System vary somewhat
from model to model due to customer
preference and model differences. A
generalized schematic of the 737 systcm
is shown in Figure 2. It is noted UIat no
flight deck TAl control switches are
added or modified for the advisory
system. The system generally consists
of:
I Ice Detector Probe
Flight Deck Annunciation
System Control Circuitry
System Wiring
The advisory annunciation is based on
aClual detected icing <:onditions. The
flight crew is thus provided an icing
cue, in addition to their monitoring of
visible moisture and TAT reading. l1le
crew assures that CTAI is activated
upon receiving ule icing annunciation.
Boeing recommends deicing of the
wing (aaivating WTAl to shed existing
ice), so the crew uses system
annunciation as deemed appropriate.
PRIMARY ICE DETECTION
SYSTEMS
The Primary Ice Del'ection System has
automatic comrol of the engine cowl
antHce and wing anti-ice valves infliglu
when the flight crew has selected the
AlITO switch position. When selected,
the system is the primary means by
which icing is dctected and the crew
no longer has the AFM requirement to
11

Probe ice
thickness
Figure 1. Ice dctiK:lor proM king dekiog q-ck$.
Ice detector System logic
probe module
115 VAC 28 VDC
Figure 2. 737 Ad\ Isory ice detection slslem genenl schematic.
monitor icing conditions (visible
moisrure and TAT of w'e or lower).
Though the system offers the crew a
ballds off approach to inflight anLi-
icing aa.iv,:uion. the Ixtsic ON..QFF
manmll oper.llion of OAf and WTAI
remains completely unchanged.
Primary ice detection may be de-
selected (O\'erridden) inflight. Two
redundant detector probes are installed.
one on each side of the forward
12
Probe heaters activate to de-ice
sensing element and strut
TIme
Flight deck
annunciation
AIRlGR
fuselage. Since the detector requires
airflow to operate reliably. the primary
system is inactive during ground
operntion - manual 3Clh"3tion of crAI
and \\TfAI is required, as with the basic
and advisory systems.
Generalized Primary Ice Detection
System components are:
2 Ice Detector Probes
Flight Deck }-Position
Control Switches
(OFF-AlITQ.ON)
Flight Deck Annun-
ciation
System Control Clrcuiuy
System WIring
The probe used in
Boeing's Primary Ice
Detection Systems has
more sophisticated
microprocessor-based
citcuiuy for icing deicing
cyde counting than the
advisOry probe. Testing
and analysis have
established !he number of
cycles required to open
the engine cowl anti-ice
vah.-es (2 cycles) and the
wing anti-ice valves (10
cycles). These preset cycle
counts are based on
airframe ice accretion
characteristics and
allowable ice shedding
requiremenlS. More cycles
are needed before WfAI
activation than eTAI
activation. This allows for
more effective deicing of
the wings.
When the system control
cIecLrOnics unit has nOl
received the probe icing
signal for 180 consecutive
seconds, CfAl and WfAJ vah'es are
aUiomatically closed, This delay
pre....ents unwanted valve cycling
during intenniuent cloud activity.
System control software is common
for!he "767. 74:-400 and --r:'airplanes
Primary Ice Detection S)'Slem retrofit
ki~can be pI'O\'ided to!hoseCUSlomers
requiring them.
(Continued on page 13)
Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993
 CONTENTS
Introduction ........................._.
Summary or Boeing Fuel Conserva
tion Articles 1974 to Date ..._...... 1
L'VI'RODU010N
In this issue. we categorize and list p::lSI
fuel ronsenoalion rel:ued articles pub-
lished in the Airliner Maguine to date,
Since our Iasl: listing which appe:ut.'d fh-e
)'ears ago In me Jan-Mar 1988 issue we
ha\-e seen many changes in the industry.
The 737-400 \\'35 inltOduced and entered
into revenue service in lale 1988. the 747-
400 in January of 1989, followed by lhe
737-500 in early 1990. New and higher
tluusl f'Jtings were introduced for me
PW4<XXl, R0211, CF6, and CFMS6 seires
englOCS. and many other models beccame
ETOPS qualined.
As in the p:lst. we group me articles into
the following rruljor areas:
Gen=1
Maintenance
Ground OpeTations
Flight Planning
Inflight Perfomunce Optimiz:ltion
Flight PrtlttdUre'i and Techniques
Perfomunce Monitoring
SrSlem5
Within each c:uego'l, each article is lisled
chronologically by amde lilk (in OOkl).
Airliner date. followed b)' a brief descrip-
tion rJ me artick.
We also upWte)'OO on tilt btesllnining
fuel Consenation e" lelterl No. 50
\;deos released b)' Customer Tmning and on the GE CF6-8OC2 engine from design
FhgJu Open""'" Suppoo (5 1"8" 19) philosophy to ~lh \ersions. Shows
cruISe: ~IC fuel ronsumplions (SFC)
SUMMARYOF80EL"iGflIRCOXSER- ro< <he -'<lE, ;02_ - . -lllC2 engines
VATION ARTIaES-1974 TO DATE and R: deterioration after ini.ia.1 instalb-
"""-
]I1lD - Most WMIdy lJs<d)et EDgin<
Fuel Conservation Jul-Sep 1989Auhne< - A<ticIeromribu,<d
January 1974 Airliner - Boeing's m<)S( by Prall & \tllitnl").. Shows the thrusl
comprehensive anide on fuel consen..- 8JO"1h <ren<J. of <he )T8D "'"'" engines
tion, CO\'ering aU phases of flighl and used on ~rs and earfy 7J7s.
ground operations. and ll12inlenartt.
Forty V~ of Powc:rpbnts
Airplane Perfon:nance Deterioration JuJ-Sep I990Airliner - AfuU length article
Jul-sep 1984 Airliner-Genera.!diSC\l.5Sion whX:h capcures the entire sp4tl of Jet
on why ailplane performance dtteriora(~ engine de\oclpmems from the low BPR
and cites typiclJ in-service fuel mileage turoo,etstomodemhigh BPRfan'i. Shows
deterioration for major Boeing models. takeoff lhrusl: 8J'O"'1h and TSFC trends.
Conserving Fuel is Still Important Fuel Conservation Cbecklist
Apr-Jun 1987 NewslCller No. 26 - [n limes Apr-Jun 1992 ~ewsleuer No. 46 - Fuel
of declining fuel COStS. efforts to S3\-'e fuel conservation measures listed in a check-
Cln have a signifiClnt impact on an airline's list fonn:lt. A general guide published as
direct operating COStS. aquick reminder of common fuel conser-
v:ltion items.
Fuel Conservation at Lan Chile
Jul-Sep 198"1 Nev-,'slener No. V - An MAL",TENANCE
extenSive di.scusskln of how one com-
p:my implemented procedures to save Fuel ConMrvation through Airplane
fuel and reduce m-erall fuel COSlS. Maintenanet:
April 1976Airlmer(Seealso Boeing Docu-
Why saving Fuel is Still Important ment 06-42858) Fuel consumption U'3de
Jan-Mar 1988 Xewsleu.er 1\0. Z9. Shows Sludtes compare d1e fuel bum pef13.hy
hisl:ory of fuel price \-"2riati0n5 and esti- innured because of deceriooted defKienl
mated annual fuel consumption for en~ Items :J.g;Unst the expense: of corrective
Boeing jet fleel in operation. action.
GE a6-8OC2 Engine: lnstalbtion on Surfaa: Finish
747 67 Jul-Sep 1981 ~-sJener Ko.3 - Briefly
Oct-Dec 1988 Auhne< - FuIlIenglh '1tide commenlS on weight of procecti\"e painl.,
painted versus unpainled surfaces and
surface polishing.
Ma1nlenan for Drag Reduction
Jan-Mar 1982 Newsletter No.5 - Reviews
major reasons for drag deterioration.
Engine Cleaning
Oct-Dec 1982 Newsleller No.8 - Methods,
frequency and results of internally clean-
ing CF6-;O, RB-211 and )T3D/-8D/-9D
engines.
Mainlenan for Reduced Fucl Bum
Oct-Dec 1983 Newsleuer No.12 - An ex-
lensh'e discussion of maintenance prac-
tices to reduce fuel bum. Topics dis-
cussed include Aircraft trimming and in-
night check; Fuselage pressurization seal-
ing; 1meranl airflow; Flight control rig-
ging; Mismalched surfaces; Surface rough-
""".
Fuel Conservation Through Scheduled
Airline Maintenance-Models 757/767
Jan-lol:lr 1985 Newsletter No.17 - An-
nouncement of the recently issued 757
and 767 Airplane Maintenance for Fuel
Conservation documents.
Fuel Flow Measurement on BoeingAlr-
planes
Apr-Jun 1989 Airliner - Anicle discusses
fuel flow measuring devices and measure-
ment methodology.
Drag Benefits of Washing Airplanes
Jan-Mar 1991 Newsletter No.41 - Shows
that there is a drag and hence fuel bum
benefit to keeping airplanes clean.
GROUND OPERATIONS
More on Fuel Conservation
October 1979 Airliner - American Airlines
article reprint discusses the fuel savings
potential of towing the airplane vetSUS
laXiing the airplane.
Fuel Conservation
Oct-Dec 1980 Airliner - Boeing response
10 American Airlines question on whether
10 shut down the APU in fa\'or of ground
u Fuel Conservation Newsletterl No. SO
power for fuel savings.
Fuel Conservation TechnIques for AIr
craft on the Ground
Apr-Jun 1981 'ewsleuerNo.2-Condenscd
reprint of a paper presented by Easlem
Airlif'ICS at the 1980 Miami ATA Engineer-
ing and Maintenance Forum. APU vs
Ground Power Unit V$ Fixed Power Air-
pon Systems is discussed.
Engine.()ut Taxi
Jul-Sep 1981 Airliner - Infonnation 10
consider before adopting procedures to
tui-out or laXi-in with engine(s) shut
down. Fuel bum comparisons are also
made.
Survey of Engine(S}oUI Taxi Proce-
dure
Jan-Mar 1982 Newstener No.5 - Results of
all-ope1'3tor survey.
APU Usage Accountability using Cock-
pit Hourmeters
Jul-Sep 1982 Newsletter No.7 - United
Airlines describes their experience in moni-
toring and reducing APU usage.
Taxi wllh Engine(s) Shut Down
Jan-M:tr 1983 Newsletter No.9 - Reviews
Boeing policy for providing engine(s).out
taxi procedure infonnation.
Jet Engine Operatlon On-Ground - A
Strong Handle to Conserve Fuel
JulSep 1985 Newsletter No.19 - Various
operatioinal and technical methods evalu-
aled by Lufthansa German Airlines as part
of effortS to.save fuel by reduction of jet
engine ground operntions.
Engine-out Taxi
J:tnMar 1991 Newsletter No. 41- RC'o'iews
reasons why Boeing does not recommend
taxiing out with engine(s) shutdown.
GTCP85 - Most Widely used Auxiliary
Power Unit
Apr-Jun 1991 Airliner - Article by Garrett
Auxiliary Power Division of AlliedSiW\al
Company InKing the historical develop..
ment of modem APUs. Discusses the
component changes and advances in lhe
APUs e\oIution.
FUGHT PLANNING
Redispatch for Fuel Savings and In-
creased Payload
July 19n Airliner - The use of enroute
redi.spatch to reduce fuel reserves is dis-
cussed. Regulatiions, techniques, ben-
efilS and implenlCTlt.:ltion considerations
are covered.
Retrofil Wdght Redudion
Oct-Dec 1980 Airliner Shows average
decrease in trip fuel per 1000 1b weight
reduction in OEW for 707n27n37n47
airplanes.
The Effect of landing Weight on Trip
Fuel
Apr-Jun 1981 Airliner and Newsleuer
No.2 Shows how trip fuel is affected by
airplane weight changes.
Fuel contained in Manifold and lines
Apr-jun 1981 Newsletter No. 2 -Identifies
a small reduction in reserve fuel.
Airplane Weight/Fuel Bum Trades
Apr-Jun 1981 Newsletter No.2 - Discusses
the \'ariables which affect weighllfuel
bum Irnde factors and the magnitudes of
their impact.
C.G, Change with Weight Reduction
Jul-Scp 1981 NewsleuerNoj- Discusses
the combined effect of C.G. change and
weight reduction on fuel.sa\ings.
Reserve Fuel Policies
Apr-Jun 1982 Newsletter No.6 - Reviews
legal requirements for reserve fuel and
points out several ways reserve fuel can
be reduced.
Fuel Tankering
Apr-Jun I987Ne\\'5IcnerNo. 26- Tankering
of fuel to reduce toul fuel COSlS is pre-
sented from the economic and perfor-
mance view points. Amethod of perfoml-
ing a tankering analysis is also shown.
IN-FUGHT PERF OP'fIAllZA1l0N
747 Climb and Descent Speeds for
Fucl Economy
October 1976 Airliner - Shows how trip
fuel varies with climb and dc~cenl speed
and develops simple optimum speed
schedules.
70717271737 Climb Speed for Fuel
Economy
April 1978 Airliner - Reviews effect of
climb speed on trip fuel for 707nZ7n37
mcxIels.
introducing the Performance Data
Computer
October 1978 Airliner - Acomprehensive
introduction to me BoeinglLear Siegler
Performance Data Computer System
(POCS) onboard the 727n37 airplanes.
Describes system ClpabUities, controls and
functions, and predicted fuel savings.
Cruise Speeds
Ooober 1979 Airliner - Short discussion
on the fuel bum penalty associated wim
flying tOO faSi when cruising below opti-
mum altitude.
Speed Stability &Croise Fuel Mileage
Jan-Mar 1981 Airliner- Discusses airplane
response 10 almospheric disturbances and
me impaa of cruise speed excursions on
fuel mileage. Reviews pilot Slt:llegies for
response to speed excursiOns.
The Effect of1'hrust Derate on Climb
Fuel
Jul-Sep 1981 Newsletter No.3 - Shows
increase in trip fuel due to reduced climb
mlUSl policies.
Why does a Slow Descent Speed save
Fuel?
Oct-Dec 1981 NewsJeuer No.4-Shows in
simplified teons why a slow speed de-
scent saves fuel.
Wind Effects during Cruise
Apr-Jun 1982 Airliner and Newsletter No.
6 - This article shows that a small increase
in longrangecruisespeed may be justified
Fuel Conservation Newsletter! No. 50
in vet)' high headwind conditions.
Descent Fuel Economy
Oct-Dec 1982 Newsletter No.8 - De-
scribes how a 747 operator (QANTAS
Airways) has realized significant descenl
fuel savings.
Fuel Conservation and the 757 and
767 Models
Jan-Mar 1983 Newslener No.9 - The fuel
and cost-effective operations possible with
lhe 757n67 Flight Management Systems
are discussed.
Reverse Thrust Fuel Bums
Jan-Mar 1983 Newslener No. 9 - Fuel
saving by nOl. using reverse thrust during
landing is shown flOl. to be COSt effective
due to additional brake wear.
747PerfonnanceManagementSystem
Apr-Jun 1983 Airliner - Acomprehensive
description of the 747 PMS from concept
to hardware.
CondensedSummaryorFuelEconomy
Items for Boeing Models 707 through
767
Jul-Sep 1983 Newsleuer NO.ll Each
model's optimum climb speed and opti-
mum cruise altitude al a glance. Fuel bum
penalties for off-Qptimum altitude cruise
and premature descent is quoted.
767 Fuel Conservation
Apr-Jun 1984 Newsletter No. 14 - Trip fuel
variation with cost index, speed, altitude,
et cetera are reviewed in this article for me
767.
757 Fuel Conservation
Jul-Sep 1984 Newsletter No. I; - Trip fuel
variation with COSt index, speed, altitude,
et cetera are reviewed for me 757.
The Effect of Speed on Cruise Perfor-
mance
Apr-Jun 1985 Newsleller No. 18 - Reo.'iew
of how drag, fuel flow, and fuel mileage
vary wim speed. Explains why using
lower cruise speeds will save fuel.
737-300 Fue.l Conservation
Oct-Dec 1985 Newsletter No. 20 - Trip fuel
\'3rialion with cost index, speed, altitude,
et cetern. are reviewed in mis article for the
737-300.
Optimum Cruise Altitude
Jan-Mar 1986 Newsletter No. 21 - The
deftnition and use of optimum altitude for
fuel conservation are discussed in detail.
Step Oimb
Apr-Jun 1986 Newsletter No. 22 - sequel
to me Optimum Cruise A1tilude article
which appeared in Newslener No. 21.
Cost Index
Jul-Sep 1986 Newslener No. 23 The
derivation and definition of COS! index
and its effect on night operatiOns is dig.
"'ssed.
Cost Index Detennination Sensitivity
Jul-Sep 1988 Newsletter No. 31 Shows
percent trip cost penalty due to errors in
estimating true Cost Index for 737-YYJ,
757,767, 'nd 747-400.
737-500 Fuel Conservation
Oct-Dec 1990NewslettcrNo. 40- Trip fuel
variation wim cost index, speed. altitude,
et cetera are reviewed for the 737-500.
Block Time vs Block Fuel: Another
Look at Cost Index
Apr-Jun 1991 Newsletter No. 42 Shows
how block time and block fuel is affected
by changes in Cost Index for me 747-400.
AJGHTPROCEDURF.S&TECHNIQUES
Overweight Landing vs Fuel
Dumping
Apr-Jun 1980 Airliner - Reviews pertinent
regulations and airplane stnIClural and
perfonnance capabilities in landing.
747 Rescm~ Tank 2 & 3 Fuel Transfer
Apr-Jun 1981 Newsletter No.2 - A small
fuel savings is made by delaying fuel
transfer (keeps CG further aft).
11I
Effect of Sideslip 00 Drag
Oc(.J)ec 1981 Nev.'Slener No." - Dis-
cusses drJg penalty due to sideslip.
TakeoffProcedun= effect 00 Fue18um
Jan-Mar 1982 NewslenerNo.; - Fuel bum
is compared for two different {.1keoff aocl
cleanup procedures for the 707n27n371
747 airplanes. The effect of takeoff flap
position and reduced takeoff mrust are
also discussed.
Flap RetractJon & Extension Schedule
Apr-Jun 1982 Newsletter No.6 - The
various items that must be considered in
determining flap rel13etion and extension
schedules are reviewed.
Proper Trim Technique (or laleraV
Directional Unbalance
Jul-Sep 1982 Newsletter No. 7 - The
procedure for {rimming the airplane to
correct fOf laleraVdireaional unbalance in
cruising flight is reviewed.
TakeoffProcedure Effect on Fud Bum-
747 Follow-up
Jul-Scp 1982 Newsleuer No.7 - Expands
OIl previous NC\\'SlelterNo. ; article. Shows
effectSofflap retraction height, flap retrac-
tion speed schedule. and takeoff flaps
selection on takeoff fuel bum for the 747
using Type I lakeoff procedure.
Recommended Trim Procedures for
BoelngAircraft
Jan-Mar 1991 Newsleller No. 41 - Reviews
the procedure to properly trim a Boeing
airplane in cruise to attain lowest drag
configuration.
PERFORMANCE MONITORING
Statistical Method (or Evaluating Fuel
Saving
Jul-Sept 198i Newsletter No. 3 - This
article shows TransWorld Airlines (TWA)
developed a statistical method dut could
be used for measuring fuel sa\ings.
Cruise Performance Analysis
Oct -Dec 1981 Newsletter No.4- Discusses
aCGJracy and limitations ofin.service cruise
da~.
IV
Measuring Performance by the Gal-
lon/Hour Method
Oct-Dec 1981 Newsletter No." - Revievo-s
the use of food fueltlOtlI time mefhod for
lnIcking overall airplane perfonnance.
Adoption ofFuel EconomyTechniques
OcI-Dec 1981 Newsletter No... - Sho\\'S
dut optimum fuel bum procedures should
be flown, even if nor refleaed in flight
plan fuel load
Cruise Performance Analysis Com-
puter Program
OcI-Dec 1982 Newsletter No.8 - Ad\'ises
th3t Boeing Cruise Perforrrutnce Analysis
Program has been modified for use by
CUSlOmers on Iheir own computers.
Fue.! Energy Content vs. Fue.! Density
Jan-Mar 1983 Newsletfer No.9 - Present.s
result.s of worldwide sUfvey of a\'iation
turbine fuel, showing how fuel energy
content varies.
Performance Monitoring
Apr-Jun 1983 Newsletter No. 10 - Summa-
ri7.es many aspects of perfonnance moni-
toring, including aCGJracy, data recording
methods, and analysis, and the impaa of
PerformancelFlight Management Systems.
Airplane Performance Monitoring
Apr-Jun 1989 NewslctfCr No. 34 - Intro-
duces the newly 3\':J.ilable perfonnance
analysis software called APM. and dis--
cusses ilS progrJm enh.1ncements O\'er
the older Cruise perf Analysis Program.
New Performance So(tware Available
Jan-~lar 1992 Nev.sletter No.4; - De-
scribes the newly available APi\1!HISTRY
and INFlTfREPORT perfomlance soft-
ware for computing fuel mileage and
Operalions Manual perfonnance data re-
spectively.
Flight Data Recording & Airplane Con-
dition Monitoring
Apr-Jun 1992 Airliner- Explains in general
the inter-relationships and funclions of
FOR, FOAU, aocl ACMS units onboard the
737,7;7,767, and 747-400 airplanes.
767 Airplane & Engine Condition
Monitoring
Jul-Sep 1992 Airliner - Article by Air New
Zealand on how one operator uses the
ACMS, DFDAU, ACARSS}'SIem 10 monilor
wrnme and engine performance trends
in their 767 and 747-400 flCCl:,
SYSTEMS
747 Stalic Sourc~ Error Correction
Jan-Mar 1981 Newsletter No.1- Shows
lhat early 747 airplanes may be flying
faster than indicated. and mal a modifica-
lion to the SSEC can save fuel.
Improving APU Fue.! Consumplion
Apr-Jun 1981 Newsletter No.2 Advises
thaf 727n37 APU modification is being
offered by \'endor to save fuel.
Fue.!Savlng -727100/100cAirCondi.
tioDing System
Jan-Mar 1982 Ncv.'Sletter No. ;- Describes
how to save fuel by a\'oiding 13th stage
bleed on 727100 airpl:anes.
747 APU Economy Mode
Apr-Jun 1982 Newsletter No.6 - Brief
S1alement explaining why Garrett sus-
pended program 10 install an ECON mode
into the 747 APU.
747 - Removal ofAPU Inlet Door Ram
Air Scoop
Apr-Jun 1982 Newslcller '0.6- Advises
thaI modification will save fuel due to
small weight and drag reduction.
)T8D Bleed Air Revision (or Fuel
Economy
Apr-Jun 1983 Newsletter No. 10 - Advises
thaI Prau and Whitney Service Bulletin
revising surge bleed configuration will
result in small fuel saving.
Flight Operatioll5 Engineering
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
P.O. Box 3707, Seallie. Washington
98124
Telephone (206) 544-stlSO
Fuel Conservation Newsletter! No. 50
 Cross section of
leading edge
Impingement of
supercooled droplets

Droplet kinetIc en

..
Modes of heat tnmsrer aCling on a leading edge.The ice protection
pcrfonnance of B healed leading edge during icing conditions depends upon
the balance orheallnmsfer modes Heling on its surface. Energy gained and
lost is shown for a leading edge surface abo"c freezing.

Rime Icing (A). Rime is a streamlined Ice fonnation Ihat occurs at cold
tempu81uresand where Iberelsa I'1Ipid freezing process. Thesupercooled
water d roplelS freeze on impact, trapping ai r bubbles in the icingstructure.
This results in a milky-white appeal"llnce.

Runback Icing (B)- Runback icing occurs when the surface temperature
A issuch that accretion orlee is prel"ented on leading edges but waterfreezes
further back on the body. Runback icing is typically in glal.e foml.

Glaze Icing(C) Glaze ice forms at temperatures near rreezing. The rreezing process is more gradual and water fills most
existing air spaces. The resulting ice rormation is generally clear and often rorms a double horn shape, which results in higher
drag than rime king.

AirUner/Apr'Jun 1993 13
FUGUT DECK CONTROLS AND
ll\'DICAll0NS
Advisory Ice Detection Systems
Advisory systems have no added flight
deck controls. (The Anti-Ice Control
Panel retains the ON-OFF CfAJ and
WTAl SWitches.) Model 737, 757 and
767 airplanes include a fault light
located on the flight deck overhead
panel (P-;),which annunciates a fault.
Table J shows flight deck lights and
Engine Indication and Crew Alerting
System (EICAS) messages. The 737
incorporales an ICING and a NO ICE
light on the Captain's Main Panel. The
amber ICING light illuminates when
icing is detected. When icing is no
longer detected the ICING light
extinguishes and the white NO ICE
light illuminates. Both lights have a
press-to-cancel feature and wilt
extinguish when pressed. (ICING light
latching circuitry precludes light
Icing annunciation for 737 advisory ice detection system. (See inset & boxed area)
14
flickering during intenniuent icing
conditions.) On the Model 737, the
control electronics are contained in a
separate logic module located in the
Aft Overhead Panel. Either a self-
detected probe fault (described below)
or a logiC module fault will illuminate
the ICE DE'TECfOR light on the 737
TAl Control Panel and the Master
Caution Syslem. The logic module
includes twO red LEDs that also
illuminate when a module fault has
occured.
The 757 and 767 Advisory Ice Detection
Systems include an amber IClNG light
on the Overhead TAJ Control Panel
that annunciales Ihe delection of icing.
EICAS displays the messages ICE DET
ON and ICE DET OFF when icing is
detected and when icing is no longer
detected, respectively. A probe fault
will result in an ICE Dl:.iECfOR
message displayed on ElCAS in addition
to the illuminalion of the ICE DETfault
light on the Overhead l>anel. Icing
annunclauons are inhibited when a
probe failure has been found.
Primary Ice Detection Systems
The Anti-Ice Control Panel on the
Flight Deck Overhead Panel includes
three lhree-position switches for cowl
and wing anti-icing COntrol. The
switches are labeled OFFAlJfO..QN.
Manual TAl control remains available
to the crew during flight using the
OFF..QN switch positions(this requires
crew monitoring of AFM icing
conditions). IfCfAJ is not required for
lakeoff, the night crew would nonnally
switch the CfAl and WfAI controls 10
AlITO during preflight. 111is amlS the
Primary Ice Delection System for
automatic activation during flight
operation.
Several variations ofthe primarysystem
are available for the 747-400. TIle
most popular option is described
herein. EICAS Status and Mainlenance
Page messages are identified in Table
2. The 767 Anti-Ice Control Panel has
an amber ICING light and an amber
ICE DET Faull light. The ICING light
ilJumin:ltes when engine or wing icing
condilions have been detected and
either engine or the wing anti-ice is
selected ofr. The ICE DET light
annunciates a fault in both detectors.
SYSTEM DISPATCH REQUlRE-
'lENTS
Advisory Ice Detection is nOl required
fordispatch. For both the 767 and 747-
400 primary systenlS, both detectors
must be operational al dispatch for
inflighl use of Ihe primary sys(em. If
either or both detectors are failed
before dispatch, the crew must revert
lxIck toAFM procedures for monitoring
of icing conditions and manual
activ3(ion ofCfAl and \VfAl. If either
detector fails following dispatch, the
operational detector will continue to
provide automatic control. No crew
Airllner/Apr.Jun 1993
 " '" J" JI., "<--..- HI.-... "I'l~~' "." "1" 41. I..... "I~""
ICING up.
...... ........ 1117

_
_ ......)_cr"I._.......
*--
.:..l-~'-WO'..,

_.........
ICISe:; I./PI
lose ICEDETON
1dD&.-di........ Ict.'1G E."lCINt: lCL..;cS-\C
"'lo.sM~

......
t:l(;AS "'''''''

lCEDIITOI--. ICISC
w....... _ .... _ ( ' "
NOICL"C:; ~ISG IOSGI'iISG ...... ,....)_101'1""'10 . . _
1\01<:1::" F-lCASM-. lUCAS"'. . . .

_ft_
L ICB DETCn)It ICE Dt..'TECT0It L F_Mo .............. ..,. ..........
let:
....,.
()1'C1"OR
ICE O...T t:CTQR
lUCAS MtMllIt
IQOllECTOK
EICASM.-..
F...It .... IIHII'. ...... 100
ndcunor"
It ICE Df;'TI:CT()ll ICE DIm:CTOR ........... r.-Iloo ...... 1<0 . .. . -

r _ ................
ICE Ot:Tl!CTORS ICE Oll'TU:TORli
I,."T Al OR W"fA I If OS.
AIIo"T1ICE
TAT> IZ' Cand ~ nol
t:JCASM-aor CTA'
dftft1ftl1...,. ...,...) MI"JlICENAC _loo..TAT>ll'C_b
_... 1.., ........)

AtnOIIpuled by MMur C.lltk1a ............ tlool \0\,.,,1100... TAT> I r e _ a

Or ~ ...... ~locl'" for Ibt 7Y1 ANn_leIl: I'i 1)1;
-~(_""'I

Table I. Ad\ isory Ice detection system antiice panel lights and Table 2. I)rimary Ice detec::llon S)'slem [ICAS messages for
EICAS messages. 767 and 747400.

action is required. If both detectors
fail after dispatch, the crew mUSI revert
to AFM rules and manual anti-icing
operation.
REUABILITY/MAJNTAINABILITYI
TESTABn.ITY
System conlrOl design, probe selftesling
and microprocessorbased electronics
ensures reliable and safe operation for
bOlb the advisory and primary systems.
The design provides for safe and
reliable detection and aUfomatic control
over the extensive icing envelope - for
light tosevcre aircmft icing conditions.
The probe executes a built-in-test
during every power-up and
continuously during power-on
operation on the ground and innighl.
This diagnostic is designed to identify
over 95% of potcntial internal faults.
Probe fault is signalled to airframe
control. Probe electrical interface
includes a press-to-test inpul. The 737
Advisory Ice Detection logic module
also perfonns a power-up self-test and
routine operational self-tests. In
addition, a dual control circuit
comparison is made. Failure of this
self-monitor wilt fault the system.
Primary system design includes tWO
redundant probes. Either probe may
detect ice and control the valves open.
They are powered by separ.lleelectrical
buses. Engine inlet cowl ice protection
is fault-isolated. A failure of either
probe will not affect crAI or engine
operation.
Rosemount offers an inductive device
for measuring the vibmtional frequency
of the probe and 3 protective probe
ground cover useful during layover or
maimenance activity. It is noted that
though the probe icing outpUt signal is
not used on the ground, while lhe
probe is powered it remains cap.'lble
of icing/deicing cycles. If the sensing
element is grasped or touched by
ground personnel, the heaters may
engage and raise probe surface
temperatures very quickly. Abum can
result. As with alt heated aircraft
probes, caution should be exercisect.
Summary
Ice detection systems have been
designed 10 assist flight crews in the
idenlificnion ofinflight icing condilions
(Advisory Ice Detection System) and
10 provide automatic inflight activation
of cowl and wing ami-icing sySlems
(Primary Ice Delection System). These
SYSlems are not ground operational.
The Advisory Ice Detection System
utilizes a single fuselage-moumcd ice
detection probe. The Primary Ice
Detection System employs dual,
redundam fuselage-moumed probes.
The flight crew remains responsible
for monitoring AFM icing conditions
during operation with the advisory
system. OperaLOrs have chosen
optional Boeing ice detection systems
to provide the benefits of reduced
engine bleed/fuel bum, improved Oight
safety and reduced crew workload.
NOTE TO OPERATORS
for 0PC'r:ltors who have
purchased IhC' ))rlmar}' Ice
Delectlon SySlem opllon, but
ha"'e not )'CI installed it on their
C'nl.ire in-service fleet of the same
model aircraft, Boeing Strongly
Recommcnds operating the anti
ice syslems manually untU all
airplanes h3\'C' been retrofitted.
This will maintain operational
commonality. standardize crew
procedures and wi.U minimize the
possibility ofcrews forgen1ng 10
turn on anlilcC' systems on Ute
unmodified airplanes when lee
protection is required_

Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993 15
..
jettison manifold. Fuel from the reserve
and outboard main tanks is lfaosferred
by gravity into the inboard mains for
jettison. Fuel is pumped overboard
when the jenison nozzle valves near
the wing tips are opened (see Figure
I).
Standpipes in the inboard main tanks,
and the gravity transfer ports in the
outboard main w.nks ensure Ihat, even
after jettisoning, sufficiem fuel remains
to fly the airplane from the jettison
1000tion to a nearby airport.
SYSTEM CONTROL
System control is divided imo two
parts, the flight deck comrols and the
jettison comrol cards in the fuel system
card file in the electronics equipmem
b...y. The night deck controls allow
crew command and system display
while the jettison control cards proVide
the actual electrical signals required to
operate the pumps and valves.
FUGHT DECK CONTROLS AND
jE1TISON DISPLAY
Jenison is controlled from the panel in
the center of the pilots overhe-J.d panel
just above the fuel feed controls (see
Figure 2).
The jettison system is designed to
reduce the fuel weight onjboard to an
amount selected by the flight crew.
This fuel weight is called the Fuel to
Remain (YfR). The amoum selected
can be preset prior to flight, during
night, orllt the start ofjeUison. The YfR
can also be changed at any time
including during jenison. An optional
control panel is available which
includes additional switch positions
for jettison to maximum landing weight
without the need to select a
specific amount of fuel
to remain.
Turning the select switch from OFF to
A or B activates one of the twO fuel
jettison control cards (FJCC) to a Set
M<xle and allows the YfR value to be
adjusted. No pumps or valves are
activated while in the Set Mode.
The Frn value is displayed at the
lower right comer of the upper Engine
Indicaling and Crew Alening System
(EICAS) display (displacing the fuel
temperalure re'J.ding). Rerating lhe YfR
knob changes lhe display to reflect the
fuel to remain at the completion of
jettison. The quantity can be set al any
\~llle in 1.000 pound or 1,000 kilogram
increments from that abo\'e the current
fuel quantity down to the unjettisonable
level of 28,000 pounds.
Center

Pumps ((boost and override/jettison)

------ Valves (motor operated)

Check valves
_ Denotes jettison items
Horizontal Stabilizer
Figure I. Fuel system schematic showing the equipment
and plumbing u.wd duringjeUison operations.

Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993 17
 Figure 2. The pilots'
control panel .. r~ltison
controls need mlftJnuzes the
jell:...... ed to initiate
-""

F"_gurt': J. The rue!

s~noptic display on th
pilots center console e
provid~ a magenta
J::~red mdication orlhe
son operation.

18 Air llocr/Apr.Jun 1993

nozzle switches, while the select switch
is on, puts the jettison card into the
Active Mode and opens the associated
jettison nozz.le valve. Since the system
requires that Ix>th the select switch
and alleast one nozzle valve switch be
on before actual jenison can begin,
accidental jettison is avoided.
]ETIlSON COMltOL CARDS
Two identical FJeC printed circuit cards
provide control of the pumps and
valves involved in jettison. Both cards
are continuously powered throughout
night. Either card can be selected by
the flight crew in the event jenison
becomes necessary. Continuous Built-
in-Test (BIn is run on each elrd and
a message displayed on EICAS if a
failure is found.
When the Active Mode is selected the
FJCC first detennines if the current fuel
quantity on board exceeds the FrR
quantity. Since fuel cannot be jettisoned
from a tank if the pump switches are
off, the pumps must be either on or
anned. The normal fuel feed sequence
of the 747-400 ensures that the pump
switches are already on.
initiated when appropriate fuel levels
in the Inboard Main tanks are reached.
This controls center of grnvity and
maintains wing bending relief while
the airplane weight is still high.
During jettison the rnleoffuel reduction
is monitored by lhe jenison card and
compared 10 the I<'TR value. From this
the remaining jettison time iscalculated
and displayed on lhe fuel synoptic.
This information, together with the
fuel nowbardisplay, provides the nighl
crew visibility of the jettison operation
and progress (see Figure 3).
When the fTR quantity is reached, the
pumps and isolation valves are returned
to FSMC control and the jettison transfer
valves are dosed. ll1ese actions stop
jenison.
AFTER }E1TlSON
As the aaualtotal fuel quantity reaches
the FTR value the fTR display color
ch:mges from magenta to white and
nashes for five seconds. Two minutes
later, if the crew has not turned offlhe
jenison nozzle SWitches. a fuel ;enison
system message will be displayed on
EICAS.
The action of turning off pumps in
tanks which have been emptied during
jettison is left to the nighl crew. Pump
low pressure messages on EICAS
prompt Ihis action.
The crew is also responsible forc!osing
the nozzle valves which, if left open,
will result in nozzle valve open EICAS
messages.
SUMMARY
The 747400 fuel jenison system
provides a fully dual redundanlsystem
in both mechanical and electronic
aspects. Crt.."w control is simplified and
amomated while indiVidual control of
the amount and loc:uion of fuel to be
jenisoned is still available to the crew
if desired. Jenison functions and
progress are available to the crew via
the EICAS fuel synoptic, FuelTo Remain
display and EICAS messages.

If fuel is to be jellisoned, the four

- - - - - - New Video Releases - - - - - -
jeUison tmnsfer valves and the four
Ill! 1 ( \1 \1 Ill. ' " IU'II\lI
horizontal stabilizer isolation valves
131 Air SlJll" O(X'.... tiom M'20722 00:16:05
are opened. Pump control for the
horizontal stabilizer and the inboard 137 '\lr SIal,." O\"lCL M920721 00:14:00
main override/jenison pumps is 7J1 Cnl56 ""!tine Chan~ RI \1920916 00: 11I:l1
transferred from the Fuel Syslem 131 'on.,,"onnal l'rllCft;lurr$-
~"20J05 00:15:50
Management Cards (FSMC) to the Elll:ine F.lIurf ann' \ I
jeUison cud. Pumps are commanded 70&1400 \ir Condilionina
M920820 00:19:21
on and jettison starts. "y~IMI("L

10&1..0&00 Eltrkal r .....fr ~)~1f.1Il)

M92OJ20 00:31:57
L'neral balance of the inboard main O\/CI,
tanks is monitored using fuel quantity 10&1..0&00 FIH'I S)~lem 0\ feL M9t'.I0914 00:25:01
inputs and is controlled, if required, by
757 ~IH'I \.~tem ~l'\lclnlt Mnd
3utomatic.llly turning ofT the inboard M920414 OO:16:~
\Ilentate rl'Odu~
main override; jettison pumps for the
~1n.' .1IIplSlal Ur<:t~1 Uoh n M920128 00:13:56
low quantily wing.
, . , E.1ll("~ ~R>opt DooQ'
\1920915 00:10:35
O\'/CL
Fuel transfer from the resen'e and
161 ~:nt" and s.-ni Doon
outboard main tanks is aUlomatically owel. \11I20!U4 00:22:35

Airliner/Apr-]un 1993 19
CFMS6-3
High-Bypass
TurbofanEngine
CHI I:\TER:\ATlONAI.

Andrew J. Brignoli Roben P. Barton
CFM56-3 GenerJI Manager Sales Engineer,
eFM International Commercial Engines
Sales Engineering OperJtion
GE Aircraft Engines
I
n the late 1960s and early 1970s it became apparent
that the engine technology used in high bypass ratio
engines(JT9, CF6, RB211) which had been developed
for wide body airliners could also be applied to
produce modem commerdal engines in the 10 ton thrust
class. TIle intent was to offer a more powerful, more fuel
efficient. quieter turbofan with lower emission levels 3S an
alternative to lheJf3 and]T8D. In 1971, SNEC.I\IA of France
and GE elected to develop such an engine calling it the
CFM;6. The leuers CFevolved from me GE Commercial Fan
engine family (CF6-6, CF6-;O, CF6-80). The leuer Mrepresems
the French word for engine Moteur. The number 56 is a
projea rank number assigned this engine.

20 Airliner/Apr-Jun 1993
lNTRODUcnON
The first protol)'pe engine was tested
inJune 1974 anda joint company, CFM
International, was created in September
1974 to market it. Flight testing of the
first CFM56 engine commenced in
early 19n. In parallel programs, the-
2 model, with a 68" fan diameter, was
installed and flown on a Douglas YC-
15 protol)'pe and a Garavelleaircraft.
In 1979, the -2 underwent extensive
nigln testing on a Boeing 707-300
aircraft. (A production version would
have become the Model 707-5OQ.) 11lis
was followed by the program launch
order on the re-engined DC..s in 1979
which was service introduced in 1981.
Shortly after initiation of the DC-S
program, the USAF and Boeing
contracted with CFMI to produce
engines for a re-engined version of
the KC-135A Stmtotanker. The first
USAF KC-135R, re-engined with four
CFM)6.2s, flew in 1982. Olherversions
of this engine also power military
versions of the Model 707 such as the
E-6A Hemlesand some versions of the
KElE-3A Selltry airborne control and
warning aircraft (AWACS).
In 1981 Boeing launched the new 737-
300 program to be powered by the
CFM56-3, a smaller diameter fan version
ofthe CFM56-2 specifically tailored for
the 737. "nle -3 flight testing program
began in 1983 with the engine installed
on a 707. The engine was certified in
1984. With its 60" diameter fan and
side mounted gearbox, the -3 enabled
a high bypass ratio turbofan engine to
be close-mounted under the wing of
the 737 while maintaining adequate
ground clearance.
In 1988 and 1990. successive versions
of the 737-300 entered service and
were designated the 737-400 and 737-
500 aircraft. These three aircraft now
combine to offer a unique capabiliry
and flexibiliEy to the airlines: 100 to
160+ passenger capacity range with
Airliner!Apr-Jun 1993
common cockpit and engines.
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
Engine Design Concept: TheCFM56-
3. as with all CFMS6 engines, is built
around the same basic architecture:
two spools, two frames, five bearings,
and two sumps. A single stage, high
bypass fan and a low pressure
compressor are built around a compact
core and close coupled low pressure
turbine. This concept yields significant
length and weight reduaions, through
the elimination of heavy engine mid
frames and a reduced numberofstages,
compared with Olher engines in the
same thrust class.
Modular Construction: The basic
CFM56 design incorporates a modular
construction concept to facilitate
maintainabiliEy. The CFM56 can be
separated into four major modules or
up to 17 individual shop modules.
These individual modules can be
combined into major assemblies to
suit individual airline shop
requirements. Engine modular
imerfaces are dimensionally controlled
with modular balancing being utilized
during build lip to facilitate module
interchangeabilil)'.
Design Philosophy: The CFM56
design approach was basic to future
flexibilil)' and started in incremental
steps: 1) Degin with leading edge
technology, a compact core and
advanced cycle; 2) Build in capabilil)'
for infusing new. cost effective,
technologies when proven; 3)
EmphaSize performance, material and
manufaauring improvement progrnrns;
4) Deliberately and consciously design
and test at maximum severity
conditions; 5) Enterintoservice derated
in order to build up e..xperience before
moving to the full deSign capability.
lltis emphasis on technology evolution
rather than revolution provides the
best of all worlds: perfonnance,
reliability, and reduced risk of surprises
in service.
The high by-pass wrbofan concept
was chosen to improve fuel efficiency
and to reduce noise. Through use of
the high by-pass fan, the engine has a
better cycle efficiency and
consequently a better Specific Fuel
Consumption (SFC). The high by-pass
fan directS 7Q.SO%ofthe airflow around
the core producing reduced exhaust
gas velocity and temperature thereby
resulting in lower noise. Any design is
the result of tr'dde.-offsj and the CFM56
not withstanding. While significant
operational benefits result from
incorporation of the high by~pass fan,
the need for ground personnel to
avoid engine area hazMds has been
heightened because the CFM56 has a
larger inlet and no inlet guide vanes.
Consequently Boeing initiated a
vigorous safety awareness campaign
in late 1984, resulting in a series of all-
operator messages, a safeEy video, a
safeEy poster, and a series of articles in
the AIRLINER mag.1.zine; the latest being
published in the October-December
1992.
REUABlLITY
In the eight years since service entry.
the CFM)6.3 engine has accumulated
over 25 million engine flight hours
(EFH) and 18 million engine flight
cycles (EFC). Today, a CFM)6 powered
737 departure occurs every 14 seconds
and averages over seven hours a day
of operation. Engine flight hours are
expected to double in three years and
by the year 2000, the -3 will have
accumulated over 100 million hours.
The CFM56-3 deSign approach has
been proven in service. During the
latest 12 month period the -3 averaged
only one (I) engine<aused delay or
cancellation for every 2,500 aircraft
departures.
21
 1GB
Fan rolor and
and Number
booster 3 bearing
module module
Number
1 and 2
bearing
module
Fan
Accessory~
WsJ ~
gearbox
I Transfer
Accessory drive
This statistic is commonly expressed
as a disp,uch reliability rme of 99.96%
and is establishing a new benchmark
for industry dispatch reliability.
In-flight ShUl-downs OFSD) and their
causes are of prime concern to
regulatory agencies, engine
manufacturers, airframe manufaaurcrs,
operdtors, and ultimatelylhe passenger.
While all modem commercial twin
engine aircraft operated today can
sustain flight on one engine, an IfSD
will usually result in a deviation from
the scheduled flight plan. TIle engine
caused IFSD rate for the CFM56-3 is
0.004 per I,000 engine flight hours. In
real tenns this means th:ll one IFSO
mused by me engine occurred on an
average of once every 250.000 engine
flight hours. For a 737 operator who
utilizes one aircraft 7.2 hours per day
an IFSD would, statistically occur only
once every 45 years of operntion.
A prime e,xample of reliability
22
Combustion
casing module
Fan frame
module Combustor HP turbine
module rotor module
Compressor
modules (3) HP turbine
nozzle
module
I
Core engine
gearbox
improvements incorporated into !.he
CFM56-3 has been the inlrOduClion of
design modificatiOns which have
significantly enhanced the engines
ability to ope....JlC sm()(){hly in inclement
weather (see AIRUNER Janu:uy-Ma reh
19(2). A one-of-a-kind test facility was
designed and constnlCted to assess the
full wea!.her threat on the -3. In
precedem setting testing the most
critical conditions for severe wea!.her
engine operation wcre dctcnnined so
that the engine modific-.Jlions could be
defined to allow sustained Ope"'dlion
in !.he worst weather conditions. It is
now believed that all future engines to
be cenifiC'.ued will have 10 pass this
type of testing.
Aircraft engine durabiliry and reliability
are evaluated by the length of time an
engine remains on wing betwccn shop
Visits. A shop visit for scheduled or
unscheduled engine maintenance is
the major source of engine related
maintenanceCOSl foranoperator. Thus,
LP turbine
module
Theml'l,joroomponents
or the modular design
of the CFM563 are
shown in this iIIustra
tion
longer on wing times mean reduced
maintenance costs. During a shop
visit, for restoration of perfonnance
and EGT margin an engine is also
workscoped for any condition which
might cause prem:lture removal. The
CFM56-3 has a total shop visit rate (for
all causes) of 0.097 per 1,000 engine
flight hours or about 10,500 hours
between shop visits on average.
Second and third nlO engines avernge
more man 6,000 hours on wing before
a subsequent removaL Time on tJle
wing for second and subsequem run
engines is a function of the level of
restoration performed by a repair
facility in a given shop visit for !.hat
engine. The level of restoration is
different for each repair facility and is
designed to present the most COSI
effective balance of shop COSt and on
wing life. The CFM56-3 is constantly
being improved and over the yC'dtS the
on wing times for these mature engines
has increased dramatically and will
continue [0 do so for years [0 come.
Alrliner/Apr.Jun 1993
 i------------;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;l
_ .. _ . . ._ .. 100.00 SUMMARY
99.96
99.80
Dispatch reliability C Since its inception over 20 rears ago
<>
(delays longer ,u 99.80 the CFM56 program today represents
<> one of the largest engine production
than 15 min.) D-
99.40
programs in the free world. Their are
99.2Q '988 '988 '990 '99' '992 currently 3,030 aircraft and 7,338
engines on firm order and over 169
99.00
customers worldwide. The 737/
,::I: 0.10
CFM56-3 is the largest contributor to
IFSD rate lilt '988 '988 '990 '99' '992
this production program. Success has
(engine-caused) <>0 0.05
-0

-
"'0
c: . 0.00 . . .004 been achieved by :lpplying proven
technology 10 satisfy market
0.6 requirements. Inherent in its moclem
=1_liI: high bypass design are low fuel
,::I: - Total
0.4 consumption, noise, emissions, and
Shop visit rate
8.lb -Engine-
caused excellent reliability/maintainability. By
<>0
-0 applying new technology 10 the existing
c:
-
"'0_
0.2
~--.l-L.097
I produa the CFMS6-3 is continually
seuing new standards for commercial
0.0 I , .080 aircrafl engine reliability. TIle net
'988 '98' '990 '99' '992 result is lower COSts of operation and
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' longer on wing times. Forecasting
nlC CFM56-3 cngine bas the hJghcst disp:uch rcUabllity and lowest lnfllght sales well beyond the year Z(X)() the
shutdown ratcs In the Industry. CFMS6-powered Model 737 will
continue its heritage as one of
conunercial aviation's best combination
Some second and third run engines sao
nauliClI mile mission. CFM56-3 of engine and aircraft.
are already achieving 9,000 hours on NOx emission levels are currently 40%
thewing.lnNovember 1991, [WoAloha below regulatory limits.
Airlines engines accumulated an REFERENCFS: I. Homan,
unprecedemed 16,OOO+cycleson wing Future improvements in fuel F.R., The )e,'elopment of the
before removal for a life limited part consumption and combustor design CFM56 Family of High
replacemem. At the time of removal technology will reduce NOx levels Te<:hnologyEngines,I987 ATA
the engines still had in excess of 30' C funher. For some European operators Engineering and Maimenance
EGT operating margin. lhis means lower taxes on aircraft Forum, Cincinnati. Ohio,
oper.llions because ofrecently emleted September 1987.
GOOD NEJGHBOR ENGINE environmental regulations which limit 2 Bilien. J. and MatL.1, R., TIle
the quantity of pollutants which can CFM56 Venture, AlAA/AIiS/
With modem design techniques, high be emitted lOto the atmosphere. ASEE Aircraft Design, Syslcms
bypass ratio engines like the CFM56-3 and Operations Conference,
burn Ies... fuel for a given amount of Noise from aircraft operations is a Seaule, Washington, August
thrust than older technology engines. concern for everyone who works or 1989.
Burning less fuel per pound of thrust lives close to an airport. 11,e modem The facts and opinions
means thai less emissions are produced. turbofan's high bypass ratio designs contained in tllis article are
contribute, significantly, 10 quieter presented by the autllors and
Oxides of itmgen (NOx) i:; one of a aircraft without imposing the penalty are not ne<:ess.1rily concurred
number of major aircraft engine of increased fuel burn generally in or endorsed by The Boeing
emissions that have a mandatory limit. associated with noise suppression Company. Queslionsregarding
NOx is panicu1:lrly imponant becau$C modifications. CFM56-3-powered 737s the contents of the ankle may
it accounts for 80% by weight ofengine are currently as much as seven EPNdB be addressed to the authors.
produced emissions during a typical below Stage 3 takeoff noise limits.

Airllner/Apr-Jun 1993 23

l
Customcr Scnkcs Rcprcscntalh cs
lhll,'lIllo: ( 1I_1IJII,.,. .... niu"Uh i,mll. I iLid '(On In" 1111. ','ulll." "a,hlll~lnll

-DAllAS
R_"'"
D, B Wall. REGIONAL DlREcrOR.(214) 55().n47
PARIS (CDG)
PARIS (ORY)
L Ralumane.. J. Walker 03+ I) 4864-1069
E. FtHItr. M VIllOVtr. T Alusi.03+I) 4686-1047
ATl.A.VfA K. L 00mI. C. G. AndcnonJ). WiIoen(404r714-3120
ROME C s.re.. (39+6) 6501-0135
SOFIA M FIln:naa (359+2) 720216
CHARLOTTE R. Pecmocl. (704) J59-2Ool9 TUNIS T Bray 1116+1) 781996
DAllAS
FORTWORTlf
LOUISVIU
R.Aky,R.TiJC'Ii (114)904-5862
F Wiesl.R.E~C.Sanp(817)~
S, SliIl~II. (X)2) 363-7679
MEXICO CITY (AMX) B Komea. (52+5) 12J.8388 -DURAl
...... "'"
C Anmuuaa. REGIONAL DIRECTOR.
MEXiCO CITY CT'ES) A. CoIoa (52+51 227-oT21.ItlL 1217 (9'71+4)314077
MIAMI R. BIlnIl. (J0:5) 593-1747 ABU DHABI J. Krtul:ltrJ. (971+2) 7067~
MOmREAL 1 Roscot. R. Ru..w (514)422-6839 ADDIS ABABA G. Haley. {n1+1)61l1S66
fIo'EW YORK A.1...enlqlmc m8199S-9707 8O~IBAY Jc. L)'Ildl, (91+22) 611-7822
PlTISBURGH C. ~ F QardiDer4124n7279 CAIRO J. ~ (20+2) 660389
SAN SALVADOR G.Oslllmd (5OJ+) 39-9214 JEDDAH TC. Mootcru)W.G. 8akIwlD (966+2) 6&5-501 I
TORONTO R. t..dInbM (416) 612-20:56 MANE D. BIlW. (265+ ) 632763
11JLSA f, Jo)u. D H1bb1.. P. Bmcdia (918)292-2707 MANAMA L Gilw-l.(973+) 327442
NAIROBI T. MJ.Ib. {2S4+2)12202J
Rrpoa T,.-o
JUPo-~'n1
SA..'1 FRAM:lSCO S, R. H - . REGIONAL DIRECTOR.
(415)574-2613 R. D. Hoot. REGIONAL DlRECTOR..
CALGARY 0, l.oorowy (403) 221-4858 (65+) 732-94]5
CHICAGO L RJdlaod:soIl. R. Webb (J12) 601-4631 AUCKLA....D J H. L)utl (64+9l27~J981
DNYER K. AndenoII. P. I...emkeD-La~Ue. (303) 780-4340 BMGKOK R. L I'tumIct. M. V15OCb,1. KiJn (66+2) 531 -2274
HQ:>;OLULU 1 W_(*-)8J6.4211 JAKARTA J Barber (62+21)5501614
HOUSTON' M 1..oIey. nil) 9I.S-)611 KUALA LUMPUR R. L.opts. E. ROOI (60+3) 7462569
lfIo'"DIANAPOUS M ~(317)24().7099 MANILA \t. otctun.. (63+2) 8J1..Q6J7
KANSAS CITY R. ......... C. P'Innlore. (816) 1191-#41 MEl...8OURNE(ANS) Yo' Cht5ty(61+3j ]38-3713.
LOS ANGELES W. Poner. T Aukcf. D. MilelJ. DeH.a\"C:l1 M~"E(AlJS) D.eon.o(61+3)3JO.J060
(310) 67'G-011J6 NA..'ODf Yo' Cull (679+) 723266
MINNEAPOLIS J. Hapn. M MIII'bKh. L WeMaI'C4. SL""OAPORE 1. H.p. R. Rocas. R. AdmIl. M_SWllIJndac. R.
J.~(612)726-2691 F.nPo-onh (65+) Sot 1-M14
OAKlAND C. Wn (510) 5n-3823 SYDl'I.'EY Mike Harni.... MIrt. ~ CIiotM:l'. ILM.
PHOENIX Eo DIy. D. Moore (602)693-1075 Andtno-. f, Sdlaffcr (61+2) 691-TlJ9
SAN FRANCISCO G. Nc.dm. M Ci.wtaotUo.. C. BI~. B. T AIPfJ (CHI) T Tam. L~(186+33)IJJ02Jor
Dubowsky. P.~lpoo.Jl>Iaks, A. NOOII 134251. t.J.L 469
(415)634-6901 TAIPEI lEVA) R. Lohsc:. S. Mtmtllh. J Veitz (886+3) 3]~2401
SEATAC H Sumlltf.M.DooIy(206)4]1-7273
VANCOUVER. B.C. 1. BIIlpL E. Shore (604) 276-5351 RqicMll'lllW
RccioD Thfft BEUlNO TEo L.ant. REGIONAL DIRECTOR. {86+I)5006404
f86+11437~
-MONTEVIDEO L Bou. REGIONAL DIRECTOR. (S98+2)921745 BEUINO D. Chau. M. HUldungs, (86+1)456-1567
BOGOTA G. TOI!tll (57+1) 413-8218 CHENODU H. SdlutUke. (86+28) 51t466 en 3012
BUENOS AIRES R. Torrcs.1. Charval (54+1)4&0-0620 CHITOSE O.l.ucas (11+123126-5544
RlO DE JANEIRO J. Connell. J. Sveins.son (55+21) 393-3343 OUANGZHOU H. BowtB. D. Babcock (86+20)6667994
SAN'11AGO (LAH) O. Dtlbosqllt. D. BI1IlJI (56+2) 92314467 HONO KONG T. BI)'I'\: M. Heil (&52+) 747 8946
SANTIAGO (WE) D, BrllU ($6+2) 6018509 KUNMING T. Price (86+871) 717-527Q
SAO PAULO J. Bartashy.155+11)50-4429 NAHA D. Kl!11a (81+98S) 57-9216
NARITA (JAL) f. Piwenitzky. J. Pcd. (11+476) 32-6911
H~on Four NARITA (NCA) J. Bradlty (11+476) 32-6899
PUSAN R. Lowry (82+51) 325-4144
E. W. Berthiaume. REGIONAL DIRECTOR. SEOUL (KAL) A. Ornlk. P. Thron!iOll (82+21663--6540
(44+81)7593301 or BTN (206) 662-1007 SEOUL (AAR) H. Lall. J. Morrison (82+2) 66S4095
COPENHAGEN R. Nitdtrkom. 1. Campanoli (45+ ) 32324373 SHANGHAI S. Chell (86+21) 2556llO4 01'255&558. t.J.l 2114
DUBLIN V, Rabbet\S.,(]53+I)7OS-3086 TOKYO (ANA) O. Romine. M. Casebeer. R. HortOn. P. Kizer (81+3)
EAST MIDLANDS K. HOlda!. (44+]32)852870 3747-5745
GATWICK W EdmiSltn. H. Riagins. (44+293) 51().i65 TOKYO (JAL) J. RllIIitll. S. Samolis. S Sherman. R. Nagel.
KEFLAVIK A. Cox. (354+2) 50289 (81+3) 3747 0085
LONDON w. MUwl. H. KrucKt!'. C GrtcDt.!). Root. T. Novasio XIAME..... E. Chanl (86+592) 6282Q.J
(44+81) 562-]150
LIJT()N (BRI) D. SupsinsW. (44+582) 4280n Rtgion Ttn
UrTON (MON) M. Blum., (44+582) 41 1649or42421 I. t.J.L m
STAVANOER M. MtWillialns.(47+4) 65-9345 w. S~ REGIONAL DtRECTOR
STOCKHOLM W Koptrek. K. UtD (46+8) 797-JOI6 (49+89)269070
m.AVIV O. Vandtvca. (972+]) 'n11147 AMSTERD....'1 (KLM) R. ~cs. M. Holland. S. GoBki. A. Gardner,
lit Muniock(lI+20)6493ti04
Rqfoft Fhe AMSTERDAM (MTH) M. Hollud. E. Akunde:nen
AMSTERDAM (fAV) D a,)'S. (31+20)64846.)9
a.c. c.et-a.. REGiONAL DIRECTOR. DERUN W Smltb(49+30)4101-3458
Ul+I)4723-m7BTN (206)662-IOU BRUSSEUi M. Kohl ()2+2) 7U4822
ALGIERS R.Comwdl (213-t2)~ BUDAPEST A. JbTy, (36+1) 151-6828
ASHGAB It. PiolJooIoUi n+36J)WI0:S2 FRANKfURT K. Taht.G_1llomas(49+69)~23J I
ATHENS D~(30+I)98I3409 HAMBURG R.N<wa.PHuzanl.(49+40)~36JO
CASABL\NCA R. Tes.PIl,(212+2)Jm97 HANOVER H.ScheuJle-.(49+SII)9727387
HARARE. R. ~ (263+4) 720430 KIEV M. Coffm 0+441
ISTANBUL Q,SmabL(90+I)57J...8709 LUXEMBOURG S.ClUd(J52+)4798-2378
US80N 8 HubNrd. (ll I... !) 84i-992J PRAGUE I. JIIDCllU(42+2) 360616
MADRID W ShIw. (34-t I) 329-mS VIE''NA T. Moms. (O+I)7II1~illl
PAlMA J. De<:. (34+71) 490870 WARSAW S. Gobnka. (48+) )9121310
-REGIONAL HEADQliARTERS HNdqIW'Un. f1dd Senior ~1tJe. WMitinpoe

24 Airliner/Apr'Jun 1993
 "0ur reputation isn't based on the next
jetliner we build. It's based on the last 7,170."
'X11cn we ask airlines how we C:ln support them in today's tough business climate, they answer: Bener solutions to

equipment problems. faster. That's precisely OUf commiunent. We will reduce. and are reducing, the time it takes 10 solve

major problems. We will resfX>Od faster on spares orders. LaSt ye-.lr we shipped 55% of all paftS wilhin 24 hours of order
receipt. The percentage will increase in 1993. through systems improvement and through capilaJ investment, such as our

new sp:ues center:u Sea-Tae airpon. We will through advanced lr.lining methods :lOd a new tr3imng facility reduce the

time il takes to lJ"3in airline personnel. and increase their retention of me materbl \X'e will be i.ht:.--re when you need us. with

around the clock response at our sp:tres cenlen; and wilh more than 200 ..pecialislS stationed at

major lr3l1Slx)ftnion hubs around the world. And. for the long leon, we're working on

imprD\'en'leTlt through teams or airline speci:llisls and Boeing people. We all want faster response.
higher quality. lower costs. Working together. we'll get alllhree. Let's talk." ,7'2'
TomSchid
Via Prrsidnll and WMroJ Mano~r. Customn' ~","ica Dnuioll

Alrliner/Apr-Jun 1993 25