G.R. No.

118702 March 16, 1995

CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.

PUNO, J.:

More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of
the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We gave due
course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.1

The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.

The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga,
MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.

The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San
Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.

The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.

The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.

Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on
April 8, 1959.7

Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi
and Naval and all the territories comprised therein."

On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. It
provides:

Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite
shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this
code. The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in
Congress by the duly-elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new provinces or districts
were created until their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections
and qualified.

The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of
the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba,
Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per
the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held
consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the
Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth
District were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:

First District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700

TOTAL 303,349 178,688

Second District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237

2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387

TOTAL 272,167 156,462

Third District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649

2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474

TOTAL 214,499 125,763

Fourth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140

2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474

TOTAL 269,347 155,995

Fifth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682

2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247

TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable distribution of
inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District
has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with
7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district;
and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.

In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in the Constitution.
Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The
intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it
has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.

We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.

While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer
and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC
does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the
Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
Area as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article
VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where
the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.12

The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished member of this Court. The records
reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall
undertake the apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.14 Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make the
apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the
options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates in extenso, viz.:16

xxx xxx xxx

MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.

MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a
proposed amendment. Also, the chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first by the
Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and cities on the one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So
I propose this simple formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the proposed
amendment.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al.
proposal would also provide for a mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in effect embody
what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all the proponents can work together.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.

It was 3:33 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission will allow this. We will just delete the proposed
subparagraph (4) and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left would only be the
following: "Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section."

But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE
PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."

And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the provinces and to the cities, without indicating
the municipalities comprising each of the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the actual
apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated to each province by us.

MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.

MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally
linked to the baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words, gerrymandering. This Commission, being
a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the circumstances to undertake that
responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared
the report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.

MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.

MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in this respect. We know that the reapportionment of
provinces and cities for the purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the legislative power. And I
would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the constitutional offices created under this
Constitution. We have the assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the Legislative, that even given the
very short time remaining in the life of this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work of reapportionment on
the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the
Constitutional Commission.

So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the
most workable approach that is available to this Commission.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:

MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC.
So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission should now decide
what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the
Legislative will act accordingly on the basis of the decision.

MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.

MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the Committee on the Legislative has precisely
worked on this matter and they are ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole country into various
districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if this body would wish to apportion the
whole country by district itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the Committee on the Legislative is ready with that
particular report which need only to be appended to the Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of the Committee on
the Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to give that information so that the people here would be guided
accordingly when they vote.

MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so desires.

MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.

MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to the first election after the enactment of the
Constitution?

MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election; on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only
apply to the first election.

MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution the reapportionment based on the COMELEC study and between the
approval of the Constitution and the first election the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a bit.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.

MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment and considering the fact that there will be a
corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would there be instances representation of under non-representation?

MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It
will come out to be one for every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.

MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the
redistricting. This was also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had some kind of meeting of
minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the amendment as suggested by
Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. So may I ask
Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on that first as an amendment
to the amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.

MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment of the legislative districts instead of the proposal
that COMELEC be given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.

MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.

MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that
should not really appear as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution where we mandate a
Commission that will become functus officio to have the authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the
ratification of the new Constitution.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?

MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the approval of this proposed amendment.

MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.

MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt that motion?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.

MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment legislative districts.

MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?

MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be
right for him to move that the COMELEC be mandated?

MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission that will be mandated.

MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.

Thank you.

MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.

VOTING

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.

As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)

The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power.
Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the Commission on Elections is empowered to make
minor adjustments on the apportionment made here.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.

MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferred
would be on minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening municipality
in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a district be
transferred to another district and call it a minor adjustment?

MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per
district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang
Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.

MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance
appended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data regarding a division of a municipality by the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality and the new
municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district area.

MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First
District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other district.

MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority
to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the
number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ."

Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and
inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as
his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article
VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled
that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality
of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 112093 October 4, 1994

ANTONIO V.A. TAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RUSTICO T. ILAGAN, Regional Election Director, Commission on Elections, Region XI, Davao City, and
SENFORIANO B. ALTERADO, respondents.

Leonido C. Delante for petitioner.

Eduardo C. de Vera for Atty. S.B. Alterado.

VITUG, J.:

On 10 May 1992, petitioner, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") as
Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the
provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to
represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.

Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia
and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest
of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). The criminal complaint for "Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground
of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC
against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the
Service."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC thereover, he being under the
Executive Department of the government. The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in continuing to take action on the
administrative case. He argues that

1) Petitioner is the City Prosecutor of Davao City. His office belongs to the executive branch of the government, more particularly to
the Department of Justice. As such, he is under the administrative jurisdiction of the said department and not of respondent
COMELEC.

2) The Civil Service Law provides that department heads "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers under their jurisdiction" (Section 47[b], P.D. 807).

3) Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes respondent COMELEC to deputize public officers belonging to the
executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over
 deputized executive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment into the domain of the
executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections.

4) Section 38 of P.D. 807 cited by respondents COMELEC and Ilagan as basis for their authority to investigate petitioner (Annex G)
offers no help to said respondents. The said provision merely lays down the procedure for administrative cases against non-
presidential appointees. Petitioner here, the city prosecutor for Davao City is a presidential appointee.1

We find ourselves being unable to sustain the petition.

The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. In respect
particularly to sanctions against election offenses, we quote:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omission constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized or the imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:

a. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMP Cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the
purpose of enforcing its orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties
relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and
appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from
office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.

It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the
performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and
immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency
and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly
deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either
to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply
with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.

Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its
directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best
position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties, that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To
say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the
regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than
that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned.

Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which
the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is
congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.

Petitioner's assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the
administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other.
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Enriquez, 218
SCRA 1), or vice versa. So, also, the dismissal by the COMELEC of SPC Case No. 92-232 on the ground that the case constituted an electoral protest
within the jurisdiction of the HRET and not of the COMELEC (affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 106452) does not necessarily foreclosure the matter of
possible liability, if warranted, of those who might have improperly acted in the canvass of votes.
There are other issues, mainly factual, that are raised and averred to show petitioner's innocence from the administrative charges. Petitioner's
allegations may well be true but this petition at bench may not preempt the determination of those factual matters yet to be passed upon in the pending
administrative proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in
their capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL
D. VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION FRAUD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199118

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De
Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC
FACT FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) 1 in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike
Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions
against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec
Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found by the Court in the assailed decision, to wit:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint
Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for
the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee.
Pursuant to Section 74 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.

In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces
of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.6 The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and
Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; 7 and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further
investigation.8 The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit 9 for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and
Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011. 10 On November 3, 2011,
petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee11 and respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.13 The petitions were eventually consolidated.

On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings14 before the Joint Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the
same day, GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam 15 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his
complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-
affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents.16 Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency of his petition brought before the Court.

In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration. 19

On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec. 20 On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc
issued a Resolution21 approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral
sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner
GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA
6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served
on GMA on the same day.23

On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam24 with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for
reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She,
likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25 praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a
Warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to
obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No.
001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the
Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule
34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are
pending, proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, these motions for reconsideration.

Issues

Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo
Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec. 28

Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction. 29
Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were
rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government.30

For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised her earnest efforts to defend herself and should not have been
deemed by the Court as acts which purportedly tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing
evidence.31 Citing several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults the Court in not upholding her right to ask for additional time within which to submit her
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec Resolution creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec
resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign prosecutors to assist the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized agency in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of election cases.33

In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue that it does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a
constitutional body because it is still the Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause.35 As to the conduct of the preliminary investigation, respondents maintain
that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence. 36 They, thus,
consider GMAs claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to thwart the investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee. 37

The Courts Ruling

Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the Court in the assailed decision. The issues were all addressed and the
explanation was exhaustive, thus, we find no reason to disturb the Courts conclusions.

At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions attached to the creation of the Joint Panel and, consequently, to the
performance of their assigned tasks, we hereby reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, 38 the constitutionality of Section
4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such
intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated
August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued
when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733 42 and 905743 mentioned
in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting
arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec
Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor
of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the
Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the
Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369
amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the previous role of other
prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in
Banat.

To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our
September 18, 2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

xxxx

None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction
jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator
Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only
one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this
case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of
both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.44

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 45 With
more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.

The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.47 Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to
examine evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished and to
copy them at her expense.48

As to the alleged denial of GMAs right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated in view of the limitation of such right as set forth above. We
reiterate our explanation in the assailed decision, to wit:

While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying
GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested
that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report. Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial
Report, she was already granted the right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only
documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If there are other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not submitted
to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented
during the trial) as the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x x 491wphi1
Neither was GMAs right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was consequently
denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of the
subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory character of the rule. 50 As in any other rule, though,
liberality in the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present a compelling justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the
2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit counter-affidavits when the interest
of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in
support of the complaint or undertake research on novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts of the case. 51

In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period because she needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator
Pimentels complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the only supporting documents available were
those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of time
within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished
those documents because they were not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint
Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she
was earlier required to follow.

And as we held in the assailed decision:

There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval,
and in filing the information in court.

However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The
orderly administration of justice remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each case. To be sure, petitioners were
given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with the Joint Committees directive, several motions were filed but were denied by the
Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases and following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally
reached its conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard. They even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the
constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided.52

Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail and after due
hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and actively participating
therein, she has chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of going back to the Joint
Committee for the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the
absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed against her.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161265 February 24, 2004

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA

vs.
THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The Bible tells the story of how two women came to King Solomon to decide who among them is the babys true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary wisdom,
awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim after he threatened to split the baby into two.

It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to decide the babys fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in half. For
that is what the COMELEC exactly did in this case.

On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of
Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official
candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In
the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. The Manifestation concluded with this prayer:

A. The Honorable Commission recognizes [sic] only those Certificates of Candidacy to which are attached Certificates of Nomination executed by LDP
Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara or by such other officers of the LDP whom he may authorize in writing, and whose written authorizations shall be
deposited with the Honorable Commission by the LDP General Counsel.
 B. The Honorable Commission declares [sic] as a nullity, denies [sic] due course or cancels [sic] all Certificates of Candidacy not endorsed by LDP Party
Chairman Angara or by such other LDP officials as may be authorized by him.

C. The Honorable Commission takes [sic] note of the designation of Ambassador Enrique "Ike" A. Zaldivar as Acting Secretary General of the LDP, and for
the Honorable Commission to honor and recognize the official acts, to the exclusion of everyone, of Ambassador Zaldivar for and in behalf of the LDP as
Secretary General.1

On December 16, 2003, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the
Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.

On December 17, 2003, the parties agreed to file a joint manifestation pending which the proceedings were deemed suspended. On December 22, 2003, however, only
the LDP General Counsel filed an Urgent Manifestation reiterating the contents of the December 8, 2003 Manifestation. The COMELEC also received a Letter from
Rep. Aquino stating that the parties were unable to arrive at a joint manifestation.

The next day, the LDP General Counsel filed a Second Urgent Manifestation disputing newspaper accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended Sen. Angara as Party
Chairman.

On December 26, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Order requiring the parties to file a verified petition. It turned out that, two days before, Sen. Angara had submitted a
verified Petition, in essence, reiterating the contents of its previous Manifestations. Attached to the Petition was a Resolution2 adopted by the LDP National Executive
Council, stating:

WHEREAS, on September 25, 2003, the National Executive Council of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) convened and unanimously passed a resolution
granting full authority to Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara to enter, negotiate and conclude a coalition agreement with other like-minded opposition parties,
aggrupations and interest groups with the sole purpose of uniting the political opposition and fielding a unity ticket for the May 10, 2004 elections;

WHEREAS, on December 3, 2003, the LDP, together with the Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) and the Partido Demokratiko ng Pilipinas - LABAN (PDP-LABAN)
forged a coalition to form the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP);

WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of the KNP subsequently adopted its resolution entitled: "Resolution Choosing Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as the Standard Bearer of
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 National Elections";

....

WHEREAS, the process of unification of the political opposition and the actions taken in connection therewith by Chairman Angara and by other governing bodies of
the LDP required the taking of immediate and forceful action by them to preserve and protect the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity of the LDP, and ensure the
attainment of unification of the political opposition;

WHEREAS, such immediate and forceful action include those that have to do with pre-emptive efforts to diffuse the chaos, confusion and disunity projected by the
pronouncements and acts of some officers and members to the general membership of the LDP and the electorate, such as the one taken by the Regional Committee for
Region VI (Western Visayas) on December 6, 2003; the enforcement of order in the LDP through the voice of a central leadership in command in an otherwise
extraordinary and emergency situation, such as the one taken by Party Chairman Angara on December 6, 2003; the filing of the Manifestation with the COMELEC on
the matter of the authorized signatories for the nominations and, the adoption of resolutions by the regional committees affirming their trust and confidence in Chairman
Angara, and authorizing him to choose the presidential standard bearer for the May 10, 2004 elections; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT

RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, By the National Executive Council, to ratify and confirm the Covenant of National Unity, the Declaration of Unity
entered into by Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and all acts and decisions taken by him to enforce and implement the same;

RESOLVED, FURTHER, To ratify and confirm all other acts and decisions of Chairman Angara and other governing bodies to preserve the integrity, credibility, unity
and solidarity of the LDP; and,

RESOLVED, FINALLY, To reiterate the vote of confidence of the National Executive Council in, and support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to unite the
political opposition.3

Rep. Aquino filed his Answer to the Petition on December 30, 2003. The COMELEC heard the parties on oral arguments on the same day, after which the case was
submitted for resolution.

Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for President was filed with the COMELEC. The Certificate of Nomination
was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary General.

On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came to a decision.

The Commission identified the sole issue as "who among the [LDP] officers [are] authorized to authenticate before the Commission that the person filing the certificate
of candidacy as party nominee for a certain position is the official candidate of the party chosen in accordance with its Constitution." 4

The COMELEC recognized that it "has the authority to act on matters pertaining to the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate
officers."5 In the same breath, however, it held that "internal party matters and wranglings [sic] are purely for the party members to settle among themselves and any
unsettled controversy should be brought to the proper forum with jurisdiction." The "question of who was suspended by whom" was thus left for such proper forum to
resolve.6 Noting that "the intramurals in the LDP as an internal party matter seems to be irreconcilable for the present when the filing of Certificate of Candidacy and
Certificate of Nomination are about to reach the deadline," the COMELEC disposed of the Petition in the following fashion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor. The candidates for President down to the last
Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the Commission as official candidates of LDP "Angara
Wing". The candidates from President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed by LDP Secretary General Agapito "Butz" Aquino are
recognized as official candidates of LDP "Aquino Wing".

Consequently, each faction or "Wing" is entitled to a representative to any election committee to which it may be entitled as created by the Commission for the May 10,
2004 elections. For the copies of the election returns, the "Angara Wing" will be entitled to the copies corresponding to odd number of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 1,
3, 5, etc., and for the "Aquino Wing" to the even number of precincts, that is Precinct Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that the LDP or as a party within a
registered Political Coalition becomes a recognized and denominated as a Dormant [sic] Minority Party under the Election Laws. The two LDP "Wings" are further
entitled to and be accorded the rights and privileges with corresponding legal obligations under Election Laws. 7

Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. concurred in the Resolution authored by
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier. Chair Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., joined by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, submitted dissenting opinions.

Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari8 assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment.

The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation and Motion praying for the granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus filed a separate Comment to the
Petition.

The COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The
source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.9 In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
"wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to
promote free, orderly and honest elections."10

Thus, in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections which involved the leadership fight in the Liberal Party, 11 this Court held:

that the respondent [COMELEC] has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case No. 85-021 [involving a petition to prohibit Eva Estrada Kalaw "from usurping or using
the title or position of President of the Liberal Party"] in view of its powers under Article IX-C, Section 2, of the Constitution to, among others, enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of elections, decide all questions affecting elections, register and regulate political parties, and insure orderly elections. These powers
include the determination of the conflicting claims made in SP Case No. 85-021, which are likely to cause confusion among the electorate if not resolved. Additionally,
the COMELEC is mandated by the Election Code to inter alia require candidates to specify their political party affiliation in their certificates of candidacy, allow
political parties to appoint watchers, limit the expenditures of each political party, determine whether or not a political party shall retain its registration on the basis of its
showing in the preceding elections, etc. These matters include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts
and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be the
president of the entire party. [Emphasis supplied.]

Likewise in Palmares v. Commission on Elections,12 to which the assailed Resolution made reference and which involved the Nacionalista Party, 13 this Court ruled

that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties
[Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political party must be fixed in certain persons
acting as its officers. In the exercise of the power to register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers are. Consequently, if there is any
controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.

This Court then proceeded to quote from Kalaw, supra.

The two cited decisions find support in Sumulong v. Commission on Elections14 and Sotto v. Commission on Elections,15 where this Court, in resolving the issue as to
who between the factions of a political party was entitled to nominate election inspectors, necessarily settled claims to the partys leadership. Both cases were decided
without question on the COMELECs power to determine such claims. In conformity with jurisprudence, this Court did not identify the COMELECs jurisdiction as an
issue when this case was heard on oral argument.

There is no inconsistency between the above cases on the one hand and this Courts more recent ruling in Sinaca v. Mula 16 on the other. In the latter case, this Court
held:

A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and
preference. Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in
the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. Thus, the rule
is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the courts [sic] jurisdiction.

Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within
a political party, but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the polls. Similarly, in the absence of specific
constitutional or legislative regulations defining how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may
handle such affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish. [Emphasis supplied.]
Sinaca, unlike previous cases, did not involve the question of party identity or leadership; hence, it was not necessary for the COMELEC to delve therein. None of the
candidates involved in that case were claiming to be the political partys sole candidate.

In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the
Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority.
Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or
not.

The repercussions of the question of party identity and leadership do not end at the validity of the endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be
the partys standard bearer. The law grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges, 17 which, naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. It is also
for this significant dimension that Sinaca is not applicable in this case. As conceded in Sinaca itself, the Court will have to assume jurisdiction to determine factional
controversies within a political party where a controlling statute or clear legal right is involved.18 Verily, there is more than one law, as well as a number of clear legal
rights, that are at stake in the case at bar.

The law accords special treatment to political parties. The dominant majority party, the dominant minority party as determined by the COMELEC, for instance, is
entitled to a copy of the election returns.19 The six (6) accredited major political parties may nominate the principal watchers to be designated by the Commission. 20 The
two principal watchers representing the ruling coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on
the election returns for that precinct.21 Three (3) of the six accredited major political parties are entitled to receive copies of the certificate of canvass. 22 Registered
political parties whose candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast in the next preceding senatorial election shall each have a watcher and/or
representative in the procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in the printing of election returns and official ballots and in the printing, numbering, storage,
and distribution thereof.23 Finally, a candidate and his political party are authorized to spend more per voter than a candidate without a political party. 24

It is, therefore, in the interest of every political party not to allow persons it had not chosen to hold themselves out as representatives of the party. Corollary to the right
of a political party "to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference" 25 is
the right to exclude persons in its association and to not lend its name and prestige to those which it deems undeserving to represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy
makes known to the COMELEC that the person therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized political group empowered to act and that it reflects
accurately the sentiment of the nominating body.26 A candidates political party affiliation is also printed followed by his or her name in the certified list of candidates. 27
A candidate misrepresenting himself or herself to be a partys candidate, therefore, not only misappropriates the partys name and prestige but foists a deception upon
the electorate, who may unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken belief that he or she stands for the partys principles. To prevent this occurrence, the
COMELEC has the power and the duty to step in and enforce the law not only to protect the party but, more importantly, the electorate, in line with the Commissions
broad constitutional mandate to ensure orderly elections.

Having revisited and clarified the jurisdiction of COMELEC to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers, this Court
cannot help but be baffled by the COMELECs ruling declining to inquire into which party officer has the authority to sign and endorse certificates of candidacy of the
partys nominees.

The only issue in this case, as defined by the COMELEC itself, is who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates of
candidacy of the official candidates of the party. Indeed, the petitioners Manifestation and Petition before the COMELEC merely asked the Commission to recognize
only those certificates of candidacy signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or his authorized representative, and no other.

To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party
officials. It need only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.

The LDP has a set of national officers composed of, among others, the Party Chairman and the Secretary General. 28 The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer
of the Party, whose powers and functions include:

(1) To represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for and on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the National
Congress and the National Executive Council.29

The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Party. Among his powers and functions is:

(1) When empowered by the Party Chairman, to sign documents for and on behalf of the Party. 30

The Secretary Generals authority to sign documents, therefore, is only a delegated power, which originally pertains to the Party Chairman.

Rep. Aquino claims that he was authorized to exercise to sign the party candidates certificates of candidacy in the previous elections. Indeed, the COMELEC found
that:

In fact, during the May 14, 2001 elections, oppositor Agapito "Butz Aquino, as LDP Secretary General, was authorized by the LDP to sign for the Certificates of
Nomination of the LDP Senatorial Candidates, including the Certificate of Nomination for Senatorial Candidate Edgardo J. Angara, a copy of said Certificate of
Nomination and a copy of the Certificate for Senator Edgardo J. Angara are attached as Annexes A and B, respectively. This action by Secretary General Aquino is in
accordance with the Constitution and By-laws of LDP, not questioned by the LDP signed by its Secretary General. This revocation has not been revoked or recalled by
the National Congress of the LDP which is the one authorized to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President, respectively. 31

Assuming that Rep. Aquino previously had such authority, this Court cannot share the COMELECs finding that the same "has not been revoked or recalled." No
revocation of such authority can be more explicit than the totality of Sen. Angaras Manifestations and Petition before the COMELEC, through which he informed the
Commission that Rep. Aquinos had been placed on indefinite forced leave and that Ambassador Zaldivar has been designated Acting Secretary General, who "shall
henceforth exercise all the powers and functions of the Secretary General under the Constitution and By-Laws of the LDP." 32 As the prerogative to empower Rep.
Aquino to sign documents devolves upon Sen. Angara, so he may choose, at his discretion, to withhold or revoke such power.
Both respondents Rep. Aquino and COMELEC also cited Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 645333 as basis for the Party Secretary Generals authority to sign
certificates of candidacy. Said Section 6 states:

SEC. 6. Certificate of nomination of official candidates by political party. The certificate of nomination of registered political parties or coalitions of political parties
of their official candidates shall be filed not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, which is January 2, 2004 duly signed and attested under oath
by the party president, chairman, secretary-general or any other duly authorized officer and shall bear the acceptance of the nominee by affixing his signature in
the space provided therein. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]

Clearly, however, the above provision presupposes that the party president, chairman or secretary-general has been "duly authorized" by the party to sign the certificate
of candidacy. COMELEC Resolution No. 6453 cannot grant a party official greater authority than what the party itself grants, lest such Resolution amount to a violation
of the partys freedom of association.

Neither does the Party Secretary General have the power to nominate the official candidates of the LDP. That power resides in the governing bodies of the Party. 34 In
particular, the National Congress, which is the highest policy-making and governing body of the Party, has the power

(6) To nominate the official candidates of the Party for President, Vice President, and Senators, and, whenever the corresponding conventions fail to meet or to make the
requisite nominations, to nominate the official candidates for municipal city, congressional district, provincial and regional elective offices. 35

Not only does Rep. Aquino insist on his power to sign Certificates of Candidacy on behalf of the LDP but he would also deny Sen. Angara that power on account of the
latters preventive suspension. It seems, however, that respondent has abandoned this tack by the silence of his Memorandum on the matter.

In any case, it appears that on November 28, 2003, Representative Rolex Suplico, LDP Region VI Regional Chairman, filed a complaint with Rep. Aquino against Party
Chairman Sen. Angara for disloyalty to the Party, gross violation of the Party Constitution, and other divisive acts inimical to the interest of the party and its members.
Rep. Aquino, as Secretary General, created a committee composed of three (3) members of the LDP National Executive Council to investigate the complaint and
recommend appropriate action thereon. On December 12, 2003, the investigating committee issued a resolution placing Sen. Angara under preventive suspension
effective immediately and directing him to refrain from performing acts in behalf of the party until the committee finishes its investigation and submits its final
recommendations.

The authority to create the investigating committee supposedly rests on Section 9 (4), Article VI of the LDP Constitution, which enumerates the powers and functions of
the Secretary General:

(4) With the concurrence of the Party Chairman, to enforce Party discipline. {Emphasis supplied.]

Evidently, just as Rep. Aquino has no power to sign and nominate candidates in behalf of the LDP, neither does he have the power to enforce Party discipline or, as an
incident thereto, to create an investigating committee, without the Party Chairmans concurrence. Much less does the investigating committee so created have the power
to place the Party Chairman under preventive suspension since its authority stems from a nullity. Simply put, the spring has no source.

The lack of Rep. Aquinos authority to sign documents or to nominate candidates for the LDP would not result in the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
certificates of candidacy he may have signed on behalf of the LDP.36 The exclusive ground for the denial of due course to or the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy for any elective office is that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. 37 Since the signature of Rep. Aquino was affixed either
prior to, or on the basis of, the challenged Resolution recognizing his authority to sign on behalf of the LDP, the same would not constitute material representation that
is false. In such case, the candidates are simply deemed as not nominated by the LDP and are considered independent candidates pursuant to Section 7 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6453:

SEC. 7. Effect of filing certificate of nomination. A candidate who has not been nominated by a registered political party or its duly authorized representative, or
whose nomination has not been submitted by a registered political party shall be considered as an independent candidate.

COMELEC Commissioner Sadain referred to the above provision in his Dissenting Opinion, and this Court finds refreshing wisdom so sorely wanting in the majority
opinion in his suggestion that:

All other party members representing themselves to be candidates of the party shall not be deprived of their right to file their respective certificates of candidacy and run
for office, if so qualified, but that they shall not be accorded the rights and privileges reserved by election laws for official nominees of registered political parties.
Instead, they shall be treated as independent candidates.38

From the foregoing, it is plain that the COMELEC misapplied equity in the present case. For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and
not as its replacement.39 Equity is described as justice without legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant, although it may, as often happens, supplement the
law.40 The COMELEC should have decided the case on the basis of the party constitution and election laws. It chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as
respondent Aquino put it, on "unchartered" territories.41 But, as shown above, these territories have long been charted by jurisprudence and, in any case, the
COMELEC need not have sailed far from the shore to arrive at the correct conclusion. In truth, the COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity.

Worse, the COMELEC divided the LDP into "wings," each of which may nominate candidates for every elective position. Both wings are also entitled to
representatives in the election committees that the Commission may create. In the event that the LDP is accorded dominant minority party election status, election
returns of odd-numbered precincts shall be furnished the Angara wing and those of even-numbered precincts, the Aquino wing.

By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs strength and undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the Commissions nod as the
dominant minority party.

By allowing each wing to nominate different candidates, the COMELEC planted the seeds of confusion among the electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two
candidates from a single political party. In Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,42 this Court declared that the electoral process envisions one candidate from a
political party for each position, and disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery thereof. The admonition
against mocking the electoral process not only applies to political parties but with greater force to the COMELEC.

By according both wings representatives in the election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance of political parties and effectively divided the
opposition. The COMELEC has lost sight of the unique political situation of the Philippines where, to paraphrase Justice Perfectos concurring opinion in Sotto, supra,
the administration party has always been unnecessarily and dangerously too big and the opposition party too small to be an effective check on the administration. The
purpose of according dominant status and representation to a minority party is precisely to serve as an effective check on the majority. The COMELEC performed a
disservice to the opposition and, ultimately, to the voting public, as its Resolution facilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority party.

By splitting copies of the election returns between the two factions, the COMELEC has fractured both wings. The practical purpose of furnishing a party with a copy of
the election returns is to allow it to tally the results of the elections at the precinct level. Ultimately, it is a guard against fraud. Thus, resort to copies thereof may be had
when the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed,43 or when they appear to be tampered or falsified.44 A split party without a complete set of election returns
cannot successfully help preserve the sanctity of the ballot.

It bears reminding respondent Commission of this Courts pronouncement in Peralta v. Commission on Elections,45 which, while made in the backdrop of a
parliamentary form of government, holds equally true under the present government structure:

political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, active or passive, of a
coalition of elements of society. In modern times the political party has become the instrument for the organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that
government exists with the consent of the governed. Political parties perform an "essential function in the management of succession to power, as well as in the process
of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the contrary, they attract or
organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a
substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the national weal."

The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, but subverts, this philosophy behind political parties.

As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a free and open party system. 46 This policy, however, envisions a system that shall
"evolve according to the free choice of the people,"47 not one molded and whittled by the COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi-party system, it does not
contemplate the COMELEC splitting parties into two. For doing just that, this pretender to the throne of King Solomon acted whimsically and capriciously. Certiorari
lies against it, indeed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Respondent Commission on Elections is directed to
recognize as official candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by LDP Party Chairman Senator
Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized representative/s.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Puno, J., on leave.
Vitug, J., please see separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Gutierrez.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The instant petition fundamentally calls on the Court to determine who between Senator Edgardo J. Angara, the Chairman, and Representative Agapito A. Aquino, the
Secretary General, of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), has the power and the authority under the LDP Constitution to nominate official candidates of the
party and to correspondingly sign and endorse the certificate of nomination. The contending parties have performed acts which they, respectively, claim to be within the
mandate of the LDP Constitution.

Petitioner Angara asserts that long-standing LDP practice, as well as the provision of Section 5.5, Article VI, of the LDP Constitution, 1 empowers him as the party
Chairman to nominate the official candidates of the LDP for president and vice-president in the event that its LDP National Congress does not, or fails to, convene. He
states that the National Executive Council has met on 22 December 2003, where thirty-six (36) out of forty (40) members of the Council attended, during which a
resolution "ratifying and confirming the covenant of national unity, the declaration of unity entered into by party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and all acts and
decisions taken by him to enforce and implement the same; ratifying and confirming likewise all other acts and decisions of Chairman Angara, and other governing
bodies to preserve the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity of the party; and, further reiterating the vote of confidence of the national executive council in, and
support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to unite the political opposition," has been adopted.

Respondent Aquino assails the resolution of the National Executive Council in that, allegedly, no proper notices have been sent for the holding of the meeting held on
22 December 2003 and that, on the basis of LDP records, only thirteen (13) members of the council have signed and approved the resolution. He claims that Senator
Angara has deliberately refused to call a National Congress of the party. Representative Aquino relies on his authority in past elections to sign certificates of nomination
of official candidates of LDP which, according to him, has not been revoked or recalled by the National Congress of the LDP. He also asseverates that on 04 December
2003, during the national meeting at Club Filipino attended by hundreds of members of the LDP, Senator Panfilo Lacson has been nominated unanimously as the partys
candidate for president in the national elections scheduled on 10 May 2001, and that it has become ministerial for him, being the authorized signatory of the party, to
issue the certificate of nomination in favor of Senator Lacson.
It does appear to me that the matter involved in this controversy is an internal matter that the political party itself should resolve. More importantly, the petition is
replete with factual problems which this Court cannot take on. The conflicting claims of the parties, such as the alleged intentional inaction of Senator Angara to
convene the National Congress of the party, the disputed membership of the national Executive Council which passed the resolution supporting the questioned actions
of petitioner Angara, the determination of an "extraordinary and emergency" situation that would entitle the party chairman to act, the validity of the actions taken at the
behest of respondent Aquino in the National Congress on 04 December 2003, are but a few of the factual issues which need to be first established before any decision
can conclusively be arrived at. The absence of factual determination by the COMELEC on the matters now being disputed by the parties hardly makes it feasible for
this Court to rightly and decisively rule on the case.

Once again, I submit, the Supreme Court is being tasked to exercise the judicial power on something where it should not as yet be asked.

To the above extent, I, therefore, take exceptions from the ruling of the majority.

DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The instant case arose from an internal squabble between two (2) factions of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered national political party, which
put up their respective presidential candidates in the May 2004 national elections.

I find it necessary to state the following important antecedent facts culled from the parties pleadings, some of which were not mentioned in the ponencia of Justice
Dante O. Tinga.

On November 28, 2003, Representative Rolex Suplico (5th District Iloilo), LDP Region VI Chairman, filed with the Office of Representative Agapito A. Aquino, LDP
Secretary General, herein respondent, a complaint1 against Senator Edgardo J. Angara, LDP Chairman, herein petitioner. The complaint charges petitioner with acts of
disloyalty to the party, culpable violation of the LDP Constitution and By-Laws, disregard of duly approved Resolution of the LDP Executive Council, and other
divisive acts inimical to the interest of the party.

On December 4, 2003, a National Consultative Meeting of the LDP was held at the Club Filipino, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila wherein Senator Panfilo Lacson
was unanimously nominated as the partys official candidate for president in the May 10, 2004 national elections. 2

On December 8, 2003, LDP General Counsel Demaree J.B. Raval filed wit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Manifestation 3 stating that only its Party
Chairman (petitioner Sen. Edgardo J. Angara) and only those whomsoever he may authorize in writing x x x are authorized to endorse, by way of a Certificate of
Nomination, the Certificate of Candidacy of an LDP candidate. The Manifestation prays that the COMELEC: (a) recognize only those Certificates of Candidacy
endorsed by petitioner Angara or his authorized representative; (b) deny due course all Certificates of Candidacy not endorsed by petitioner Angara or his
representative; and (c) note the designation of Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar as LDP Acting Secretary General, in place of Rep. Agapito A. Aquino who was
placed on indefinite forced leave as LDP Secretary General effective December 6, 2003 by virtue of an Advisory 4 dated December 7, 2003 issued by
petitioner.

Going back to the Suplico complaint, respondent Aquino, claiming to have authority as Secretary General under the LDP Constitution and By-Laws, issued an Order 5
dated December 10, 2003, creating a committee composed of three (3) members of the National Executive Council (the LDP governing body) to investigate and
recommend appropriate action thereon. He likewise sent petitioner Angara a letter 6 of even dated informing him of the complaint and requesting him to respond thereto
within five (5) days from receipt.

On December 12, 2003, the 3-member Investigating Committee of the National Executive Council issued a Resolution 7 placing petitioner on preventive
suspension as party Chairman effective immediately and directing him to refrain from exercising official acts in behalf of the party until and after the Committee
finishes its investigation and submits its final recommendation to the National Executive Council and/or National Congress. The Resolution states that such suspension
is deemed necessary to forestall further dissention within the party members detrimental to the partys image and interest.

On December 16, 2003, respondent Aquino submitted his Comment8 on the Manifestation, claiming that he was not given prior notice when petitioner Angara
unilaterally placed him on indefinite forced leave. Thus, the Advisory, upon which the Manifestation was based, is a total nullity and must be disregarded by the
COMELEC.

Subsequently, petitioner Angara converted the Manifestation into a verified petition, 9 docketed as E.M. 03-018. The Petition further alleges that on December 22, 2003,
the National Executive Council met and, 36 out of its 40 members, adopted a Resolution 10 entitled, A Resolution Ratifying and confirming the Covenant of
National Unity, the Declaration of Unity Entered Into by Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and All Acts and Decisions Taken by him to Enforce and Implement the
Same; Ratifying and Confirming All His Other Acts and Decisions and Other Governing Bodies to Preserve the Integrity, Credibility, Unity and Solidarity of the Party;
and, Further Reiterating the Vote of Confidence of the National Executive Council in Support of the Continued Efforts of Chairman Angara to Unite the Political
Opposition.

Among the actions/decision of petitioner Angara which were allegedly ratified and confirmed by the LDP National Executive Council in said Resolution were: (a) the
creation of an opposition coalition Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) which later adopted a Resolution entitled, resolution Choosing Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as
the Standard Bearer of the KNP for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 National Elections; (b) the decision to place respondent Aquino
on indefinite forced leave; and (c) the filing of the aforementioned LDP Manifestation before the COMELEC.

In his Answer11 to the Petition, respondent Aquino assailed the so-called Resolution of the National Executive Council allegedly adopted during a meeting on
December 22, 2003, claiming that it is unauthorized and illegal because no proper notices have been sent for the holding of such meeting. Moreover, based on
LDP records, only 13 members of the Council have signed and approved the supposed Resolution. Which means that it was not approved by a majority of those
present, taking into account petitioner Angaras claim that 36 Council members attended the meeting. Thus, the supposed Resolution is void and cannot ratify/confirm
any act of petitioner Angara.

Respondent Aquino further asserted in his Answer that since the 2001 national elections, he, as LDP Secretary General, was the sole officer who endorsed the
Certificates of Nomination of the partys national candidates and who delegated such authority to duly authorized representatives.

The COMELEC then heard the parties on oral arguments, after which the case was submitted for resolution.

On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor. The candidates for President down to the
last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the Commission as official candidates of LDP
Angara Wing. The candidates from President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed by the LDP Secretary General Agapito
Butz Aquino are recognized as official candidates of LDP Aquino Wing.

Consequently, each faction or wing is entitled to a representative to any election committee to which it may be entitled as created by the Commission for the May 10,
2004 elections. For the copies of the election returns, the Angara Wing will be entitled to the copies corresponding to odd number of precincts, that us Precinct Nos.
1, 3, 5, etc., and for the Aquino Wing to the even number of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that the LDP or as a party within a
registered Political Coalition becomes a recognized and denominated as a Dormant Minority Party under the Election Laws. The two LDP Wings are further entitled
to and be accorded the rights and privileges with corresponding legal obligations under Election Laws.

SO ORDERED.

Claiming that the Resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner Angara filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.

The contending parties raise the issue as who between the petitioner, as LDP Chairman, and the respondent, as LDP Secretary General, shall nominate its official
candidates in the coming national elections.

Undoubtedly, this is to me a purely internal party concern, the determination of which rests solely within the party itself, in the absence of statutes giving the courts
jurisdiction over the same. The party has its own machinery to govern such conflict. Consequently, this Court cannot step into such private turf and dictate on the LDP
party members who should be their official candidate for president. In Sinaca vs. Mula,13 this Court en banc, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled:

We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL (Sinaca) that the decision as to which member a party shall nominate as its candidate is a party concern
which is not cognizable by the courts.

A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and
preference (see 26 AM Jur 2d, Elections Sec. 255, 67). Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this
common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing the political
processes to operate without undue interference (Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn 65, 652 A2d 1013). Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party
nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the courts jurisdiction (Hunt v. Superior Court, 64 Ariz 325, 170 P2d 293. See also Oniel v.
OConnell, 300 Ky 707, 189 Sw2d 965, 169 ALR 1271, holding that courts have no power in the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction to interfere with operations
of a political party).

Quintessentially, where there us no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies
within a political party, but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the polls (25 Am Jur 2d,
elections Sec. 205, 982). Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting
nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may handle party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish (Tucker v.
State Board of Alcoholic Control, 240 NC 177, 81 SE 2d 399; Brewster v. Massey [Tex Civ App] 232 SW2d 678). (Underscoring ours)

In fine, we should not assume jurisdiction over the petition, the issue here being purely an internal party matter not cognizable by this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the instant petition.

G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION
ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, Respondents.

DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question
their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons
move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to
declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition 1 with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive
Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, 2 party
officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on
that occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the
amendments3 to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the
term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,4 partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the
holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly
did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may
be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, 5 granting respondent Drilons
petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that
the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were
supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and
raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin
Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction6 before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas,
Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO
assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a
list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the
NECO had 103 members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner
Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and
"railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The
partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because supervening events changed the bodys number and
composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election
bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also became part of the
NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended
LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP
officers on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like
petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were
dropped from the roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed
the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors
members of that body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO
which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action
within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first
resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.

The Courts Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party.
Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with
finality without making the LP a party to the case.7

But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders
and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of "despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who
controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilons "railroading" of
election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer
for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.

Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no
longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties. 8 As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the
action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,9 legal standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the
allegations in the petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them
from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If
Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to
recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et
al. who want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to
pursue this petition.

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should
have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as
holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts decision in the earlier
cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as party
chairman and changed the NECOs composition.10

But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections,
changes in the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as
common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly
convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.

Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be pegged to the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There
would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section 27 11 provides that the
NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six
months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to
changes brought about by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices
had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO
that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to nominate
"persons of national stature" to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent
Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly
nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO
composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.12 The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to
November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Courts resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the
party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 2913 and 4614 of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw
fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into
the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the
Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes. 15

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of
the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in
question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that
the NECO held.1avvphi1

While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers
could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications
of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of
Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as
president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was
purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO
proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when
necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections 16 that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case 17 that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president
is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers
to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. 18 In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations
upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the
peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.19

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily
expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings 20 and are, therefore, covered
by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. 21

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality
"contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function." 22 The constitutional limitations that generally
apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees
against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens.
The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the
latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties. 23

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a
state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An
individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in
relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the
party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due
process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political
party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, 24 the Court said that judicial restraint in
internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of
allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.25

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s
expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership
and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-
001.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 172563 : April 27, 2007]

MIKE A. FERMIN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALIMUDIN A. MACACUA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006.

The facts are:

Petitioner Mike A. Fermin and private respondent Alimudin A. Macacua were candidates for Mayor in the May 2004 local elections in the Municipality of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Kabuntalan. The COMELEC, however, annulled
the proclamation due to the failure of clustered polling Precinct No. 25A/26A to function in Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The existence of 264
registered voters in the clustered precinct would affect the results of the election. Thus, the COMELEC scheduled a special election in clustered Precinct No. 25A/26A
on July 28, 2004.

In the special election of July 28, 2004, private respondent was proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. Petitioner challenged the special election due to alleged
procedural infirmities. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2005, the COMELEC nullified the special election. Private respondent's proclamation was set aside and the vice
mayor-elect temporarily assumed the mayoralty post.

The COMELEC scheduled another special election for clustered Precinct No. 25A/26A on May 6, 2006. It constituted a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers
(SMBOC) for this purpose. One Hundred Seventy - Eight (178) out of the 264 registered voters cast their votes.

Per SMBOC canvass, petitioner garnered 39 votes, while private respondent obtained 136 votes. When the election results were added, petitioner and private respondent
got 2,208 votes each, ending in a tie.

Pursuant to Sec. 2401 of the Omnibus Election Code, SMBOC issued a notice suspending its proceedings and setting a Special Public Hearing on May 14, 2006.

In a Memorandum dated May 8, 2006, the SMBOC Chairman submitted to COMELEC a report on the conduct of the second special elections.

On May 9, 2006, private respondent filed with the COMELEC en banc an Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion:

A. To investigate why the May 6, 2006 Special Election was stopped at 2:15 p.m. with 30 to 40 voters still lined-up to vote;
B. To require the SMBOC of Kabuntalan headed by Atty. Radam and the PNP Contingent headed by a certain Supt. Gunting to show cause why they should not be held
liable for an election offense under paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec. 261 and Sec. 262 of the Omnibus Election Code; andcralawlibrary

C. To hold in abeyance the Special Public Hearing set by the Board on May 14, 2006 for purposes of Sec. 240 of the Omnibus Election Code until after the Commission
shall have ruled on the incidents.2

On even date, the COMELEC issued the first assailed Order dated May 9, 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The Commission, after due deliberation, hereby orders as follows:

1. to require the petitioner and the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao to file their respective comments within five (5) days from
receipt hereof;

2. to hold in abeyance the Special Public Hearing set by the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers on May 14, 2006; andcralawlibrary

3. to set this Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion for hearing on May 18, 2006 at 10:00 a.m., Comelec Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros,
Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

Despite the Order dated May 9, 2006, the Special Public Hearing pushed through on May 14, 2006, and the SMBOC proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of
Kabuntalan. Private respondent alleged in his Comment4 that he was absent during the Special Public Hearing.

On May 16, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Order, 5 which annulled the proceedings of the Special Public Hearing conducted on May 14, 2006
and set aside the proclamation of petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

The issue is whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated May 9, 2006 and May 16,
2006.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on private respondent's Extremely Urgent Motion despite the alleged lack of
sufficient notice to the parties.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide:

Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any
portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.

Moreover, Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections6 held:

Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to 'enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative referendum and recall.' There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

xxx

More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et al., that ' [O]ur elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. x x x Too often,
COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may
not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.'

The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections'

'. . . [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest
canvass of votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created ' to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission
of Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. 7
In this case, the assailed Orders were issued by the COMELEC in the performance of its duty to promote free, orderly and honest elections. Private respondent's
Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion invoked COMELEC'S authority to investigate why the May 6, 2006 Special Election was stopped at 2:15 p.m. with 30 to 40 voters
still lined-up to vote and determine the accountability of the SMBOC of Kabuntalan on the matter.

According to private respondent, a scripted scenario of violence initiated by persons identified with petitioner and abetted by the PNP contingent marred the second
special elections on May 6, 2006. Further, the Chairman of the SMBOC allegedly stopped the election at 2:15 p.m. although there were still voters lined up to vote in
the precinct.

Hence, the COMELEC issued the first Order dated May 9, 2006 requiring petitioner and the SMBOC to file their respective Comments on the omnibus motion, and to
hold in abeyance the Special Public Hearing set on May 14, 2006.

However, despite notice to both parties and the SMBOC, the Special Public Hearing proceeded on May 14, 2006. In its Order dated May 16, 2006, the COMELEC
annulled the proceedings of the Special Public Hearing and set aside the proclamation of petitioner therein as the duly elected mayor of Kabuntalan, evidently for failure
to heed its Order dated May 9, 2006.

Under the circumstances, COMELEC's action is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner also assails the COMELEC for taking cognizance of private respondent's omnibus motion although the matters raised therein did not constitute that of a pre-
proclamation controversy, but should have been the subject of a separate criminal prosecution for election offenses.

The argument is without merit.

Under Section 2278 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is vested with the power of direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers; hence, it
took cognizance of the complaint in the omnibus motion which questioned the conduct of the special elections by the SMBOC.

The Solicitor General aptly stated that the COMELEC cannot just cast a blind eye and concede to be powerless in the midst of allegations of electoral fraud and
violence in the second special elections held in Precinct 25A/26A in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao by the mere expedient of an alleged procedural flaw on the part of the
party aggrieved. To do so would be an abandonment of COMELEC's constitutionally enshrined duty of ensuring an honest and clean election.

Petitioner's allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in issuing the assailed Orders implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. 9 It is absent in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Orders of the COMELEC dated May 9, 2006 and May 16, 2006 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS
composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, in her capacity as Director of
the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO, Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of Manila, petitioners, vs.
ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES
ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA. ALBERTINA RICAFORT,and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D. REYES,Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 36),i[1] nullifying an order of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on December 4, 1992
in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first elections for the SK under the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).

Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides
that the first elections for the SK shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992.

The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499,
providing guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control and
supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.ii[2] After two postponements, the elections were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.

Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing
certificates of candidacies. The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding
elections for the SK on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-enacted Local Government Code.
The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila and a member of City Council of Manila, which called attention
to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held on May 26, 1990. In
its resolution, the DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those
kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of
office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.

On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in
the RTC of Manila to set aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local Government had no power to amend the
resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question denied them the equal protection of the laws.

On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman, Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners to desist
from implementing the order of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of the Court. On the same day, he ordered petitioners to
perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement Resolution No. 2499 dated August 27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for the
holding of a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay throughout the country.

The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1)
the DILG had no power to exempt the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2)
the COMELEC had already in effect determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in every barangay
without exception; and (3) the exemption of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILGs records,
in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no
elections held on December 4, 1992.

Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from
holding elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that:

All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sanggunians shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan
chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of
office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this
Code. (emphasis added)

They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to be exempt
from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.

The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996iii[3] rendered this case moot and academic. There are two questions raised in
this case. The first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can exempt a local government unit from holding elections for SK officers on December
4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that the Department of Interior and Local Government shall have direct control and supervision over the
election of sangguniang kabataan with the technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of
those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial court and these officers continued in
office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.iv[4] For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection
with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections.

In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from
granting a shipper what the ICC perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges. The cease and desist order was for a period of about two
years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November 15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time the cease
and desist order expired. The case was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had
thereby become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these
considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the government, and at
another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without a chance of redress. v[5]

In Roe v. Wade,vi[6] petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no longer pregnant. But the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human
gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy
litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of
repetition, yet evading review.vii[7]

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether
under 532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As already stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side
of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power which Art.IX,C, 2(1) of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further
argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay, the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections
for the KB previously held in the City of Manila.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to
respondents contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of
the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In
Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,viii[8] it was contended that

COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and
inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that
it shall govern all elections of public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally
and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52,
Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code. ix[9]

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELECs exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election
Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay
officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage.
They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and
municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial
Courts.

....

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an
elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective
members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.x[10]

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15,
1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development
shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421
of the President of the Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government,
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in
a Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue the necessary rules and regulations for
effecting the representation of the Kabataang Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local government units.

The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised within the framework of
detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was the enforcement of the rules.

Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the barangays which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4, 1992. That these barangays were precisely to be
determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for
kabataang barangay officials whose term of office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of elections in that year must necessarily be
deemed to include the authority to determine which kabataang barangay would not be included in the 1992 elections.

The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a
given kabataang barangay. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the
kabataang barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under [the Local Government Code of 1991].
In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will was to take effect.xi[11] There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is
constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases.xii[12]

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C.
Lopez who did not have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.

The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990
stated:

WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since the advent of the present
national administration;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the government to ensure the participation of all sectors of our population in
the task of nation building;
WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985 yet, which is over their three years term of office;

WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under the law;

....

The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30, 1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.

It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local
Government Code that the exception clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee which drafted the Code show the
following:xiii[13]

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!

HON. LINA: . . .

Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The
rationale. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?

HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for,
in Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, up to the effectivity. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to. . . .

HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?

HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na ginawa, eh. There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of
the DILG, out of forty thousand, imagine that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB Constitution and By-Laws, and theyre sitting already, now if we do
not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.

Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise
would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are recognized in this jurisdiction. xiv[14]

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992
would deny the youth voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim that only in the barangays in the City of Manila, which then
numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 there had already been SK elections held, when,
according to petitioners own evidence, during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted in 5,000 barangays.

Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were permitted to hold elections on December 4, 1992. For one
thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568 barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992
either, because they already had elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted
to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this fact does not
give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here.

In People v. Veraxv[15] this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application of its benefits by making its applicability depend on the
decision of provincial governments to appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers, with the result that those not disposed to allow the
benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the salaries of probation officers. The difference between that case and the one
at bar lies in the fact that what youth voters in the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right which was denied to youth voters in Manila. If those
barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila
should similarly have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact was that they already had their own, just two years before on May 26,
1990. Respondents equal protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private respondents is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO
NAVARRO, and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and
PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents.

Villarama & Cruz for petitioners.

Marciano LL. Aparte, Jr. for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners would have Us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public
respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the
proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a
taxpayer's suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners
likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground
that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order. It is the petitioners'
thesis that the said case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively
vested in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the private respondent is not a
real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in
issuing the TRO.

In Our Resolution of 20 April 1992, We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the
respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the challenged Order of 10 April 1922, and from continuing with the proceedings
in Special Civil Action No. 465.

At the time of the filing of both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Antonio Arevalo, Cresencio Echaves, Emmanuel Aranas
and Palermo Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial budget officer of Camiguin, respectively. Their co-
petitioners Ronnie Rambuyon, Primo Navarro and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private respondent was the
incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional District of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the
Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated.

On 10 April 1992, private respondent filed his Petition 1 (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners Gallardo, Arevalo,
Echaves, Aranas and Sia to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or
spending any public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device for the future delivery of money, goods
and other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the said projects as (1) said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-
day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated a few days before 27
March 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project; hence, they could not have been lawfully and validly undertaken; (2) the hiring of
hundreds of laborers in the different projects continues unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code; (3) the projects were undertaken in violation of the provisions of the Local Government Code2 governing the use and expenditure of the
twenty percent (20%) development fund of the Province of Camiguin; (4) these projects, which are "Locally-Funded", were pursued without the requisite
approval of the provincial budget by the Regional Office of Budget and Management as required by Section 326 of the Local Government Code; (5)
some of the projects which are "Foreign-Assisted" and funded by the Spanish Assistance for Integrated Livelihood Program (SAIL) lack the required
building permits and are without any relevance to those livelihood projects envisioned by the SAIL; and (6) more importantly, as alleged in paragraph VII
of his Petition:3

. . . the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring massive outlay of public funds during this election period has been
and is being done maliciously and intentionally for the purpose of corrupting the voters and inducing them to support the candidacy
of Respondent Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11, 1992 election.

In support of his prayer for a restraining order to be issued upon the filing of the petition and a writ of preliminary injunction immediately thereafter, herein
private respondent alleges in paragraph XV of his Petition:

That unless the illegal acts of Respondents are enjoined or restrained immediately first by the issuance of the restraining order upon
the filing of this Petition and immediately after that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, great or irreparable loss and injury shall be
caused not only to Petitioner himself, as a candidate and as a taxpayer, but also to the entire LDP slate of candidates, whose
supporters are being corrupted and illegally induced to vote for Respondent Antonio A. Gallardo and his candidates in consideration
of their employment in these projects, but (sic) most of all the greatest and most irreparable loss, damage and injury, in terms of
wanton, irresponsible, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, is now being caused and shall continue to be caused,
primarily and principally to the sixty-thousand or more taxpayers of the Province of Camiguin, whom Petitioner represents as
Congressman and whose interests Petitioner is sworn to uphold, promote and protect.4

The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a ) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of twenty-nine (29) different projects for the
maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those
designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of the Human Resource Development Center, various
Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory
equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.5

On the same day that the private respondent filed his petition, public respondent Judge issued the questioned TRO,6 the pertinent portion of which
reads:

It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner
as candidate and taxpayer, such damage and injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive,
abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice, the respondents are hereby Temporarily
Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the projects itemized in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of the petition; from releasing, disbursing
and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device undertaking
future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with said projects. (Emphasis
supplied).

In the same order, the public respondent directed the petitioners to file their Answer within ten (10) days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for 24 April 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, alleging as grounds therefor the
following:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465, BEING (sic) A SUIT INTENDED TO
ENJOIN AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.

II

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO CRIMINAL ACTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE.

III

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF COMPLAINTS/PETITION BASED ON
ELECTION OFFENSES PRIOR TO THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; FURTHER, PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO FILE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465 SINCE THE
AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES BELONGS TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

IV

PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

THE PETITION DATED 09 APRIL 1992 FILED WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS COMPLETELY BASELESS SINCE:

A. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY PETITIONERS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE
PUBLIC WORKS BAN ENFORCED BY THE COMELEC.

B. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE COMMENCED ONLY AFTER APPROVAL OF THE DETAILED
ENGINEERING PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS AND PROGRAM OF WORK.

C. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY A BUDGET DULY PASSED AND
APPROVED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT FUND MAY VALIDLY BE USED TO FINANCE THE MAINTENANCE OF PROVINCIAL
ROADS.

VI

THE TAXPAYER'S SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IMPROPER SINCE HE IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

VII

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE, MANIFEST PARTIALITY AND EVIDENT BIAS IN FAVOR OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST PETITIONERS IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.7
As adverted to earlier, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 20 April 1992.

After considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the Petition, the Comment thereto and the Reply to the Comment, We gave due
course8 to this Petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda which they complied with.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. The material operative
facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w),
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters.

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay
officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph;
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds.

Private respondent likewise focuses on Resolution No. 2332 (not 2322 as erroneously stated in page 10 of his Petition) of the COMELEC, promulgated
on 2 January 1992, implementing the aforesaid paragraphs (v) and (w) of Section 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-day ban for purposes of the
synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922.

Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections; corollarily, the issue that
is logically provoked is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the same. If the respondent Judge had only hearkened to this Court's teaching
about a quarter of a century earlier, this case would not have reached Us and taken away from more deserving cases so much precious time.

Zaldivar vs. Estenzo,9 decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice
Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the
Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by
the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory
provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions."10

Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on
21 June 1947. The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt
that the present COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law"11 and had the power to
deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections,12 and
under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections"13 (b) "[D]eputize, with
the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections,"14 and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law,"15
it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That power could only originate from a special
law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such other
functions as may be provided by law."

The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into
account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said Constitution
was drafted and ratified, to:

xxx xxx xxx

Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer, . . . .16

Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and
more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is
made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,17 and to serve as the guardian of the
people's sacred right of suffrage the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting
political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

l) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the
purpose of enforcing its orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties
relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and
appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from
office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.18

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.19

Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commission. As a matter of fact, the specific allegations in the petition therein of violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code provide a stronger basis and reason for the application of the Zaldivar doctrine. At most, the facts in the latter case do not
illustrate as clearly the announced doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific provision of the Revised Election Code then in force was
alleged to have been violated. What was sought to be enjoined was the alleged wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of the power, by virtue of
his office, to appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize voters into supporting the congressional candidate of his choice. In holding that the then
Court of First Instance did not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court considered the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to exercise all other functions which may be
conferred by law. We likewise relied on the provisions of the Revised Election Code vesting upon the COMELEC (a) direct and immediate supervision
over municipal, city and provincial officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and (b) authority to suspend them
from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal
if found guilty of non-feasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their duties relative to the conduct of elections.20

Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new employees or the creation or filling up of new positions
in any government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is banned during
the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a special election if made without the prior authority of the
Commission on Elections. A violation thereof constitutes an election offense.21 Then too, no less than the present Constitution and not just the
Election Law as was the case at the time of Zaldivar expressly provides that the Commission may "[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order,
or decision."22

Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices."23

It may thus be said without fear of contradiction that this vast array of powers and functions now enjoyed by the Commission under the present
Constitution provides a stronger foundation for, and adds vigor and vitality to, the Zaldivar doctrine.

The rationale of the said doctrine needs to be stressed here so that henceforth, no judge will lose his bearings when confronted with the same issue.
Otherwise, he should be held to account for either the sheer ignorance of the law or the callous disregard of pronouncements by this Court to
accommodate partisan political feelings. We declared in the said case:

The question may be asked: Why should not the judiciary be a

co-participant in this particular instance of enforcing the Election Code as its authority was invoked? The obvious answer is the
literal language of the Constitution which empowers the Commission on Elections to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections." Moreover, as was so aptly observed by the then Justice
Frankfurter, although the situation confronting the United States Supreme Court was of a different character: "Nothing is clearer than
that this controversy concerns matters that brings courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the
politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the
abstract phrases of the law."24 Then, too, reference by analogy may be made to the principle that sustains Albano v. Arranz. For
 even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no inference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Albano v. Arranz,25 while not precisely in point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: "It is easy to realize the chaos that would
ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or
contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

This conclusion finds' support from a consideration of weight and influence. What happened in this case could be repeated
elsewhere. It is not improbable that courts of first instance would be resorted to by leaders of candidates or political factions
entertaining the belief whether rightly or wrongly that local officials would employ all the power at their command to assure the
victory of their candidates. Even if greater care and circumspection, than did exist in this case, would be employed by judges thus
appealed to, it is not unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged partisanship would fall on their actuations, whichever way
the matter before them is decided. It is imperative that the faith in the impartiality of the judiciary be preserved unimpaired.
Whenever, therefore, the fear may be plausibly entertained that an assumption of jurisdiction would lead to a lessening of the
undiminished trust that should be reposed in the courts and the absence of authority discernible the from the wording of applicable
statutory provisions and the trend of judicial decisions, even if no constitutional mandate as that present in this case could be relied
upon, there should be no hesitancy in declining to act.26

The foregoing disquisitions should have rendered unnecessary the resolution of the remaining collateral issues raised in this petition. In view, however,
of their importance, they will be dealt with in a general way.

It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for
violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal
officials.27 Neither can We agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the court below involves the prosecution of election
offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the
further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing.

There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a
complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done
motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the
party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.28 However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law
Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State
Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal."29 As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his
alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he
may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

We have, therefore, no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis Our resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly
emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be understood
as approving of the acts complained of by the private respondent. If his charges for the violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code are true, then no one should be spared from the full force of the law. No government official should flout laws designed to ensure
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or make a mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past have
shown that only elections of that nature or character can guarantee a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect, preserve and enhance
an institution which is vital in any democratic society.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent Judge of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is
SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is hereby ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice on the part of the private respondent to file, if he is so minded, the
appropriate complaint for an election offense pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur but, regretfully, not with the statement that the Commission on Elections now derives the power to promulgate resolutions directly from Article
IX-C, Section 2(l) of the Constitution, to wit:
 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

With all due respect, I submit that what the COMELEC is authorized to do under that provision is only to "enforce and administer" such laws and
regulations, not to promulgate them. The addition of the word "regulations" in the new subsection does not empower it now to promulgate regulations
any more than it can promulgate laws. As I read it, all that the change imports is that the scope of the measures the COMELEC may enforce and
administer has been expressly widened, to include "regulations."

Regulations are mainly intended to implement or supplement a law and may be generally issued only pursuant to a valid delegation of legislative power.
That is why they are known as "subordinate legislation." In the case of the COMELEC, I see no constitutional vesture in it of the power to promulgate
regulations, much less laws. There does not seem to be even an "implicit" grant of that authority, as the ponencia suggests.

Narvasa, C.J., and Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur but, regretfully, not with the statement that the Commission on Elections now derives the power to promulgate resolutions directly from Article
IX-C, Section 2(l) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

With all due respect, I submit that what the COMELEC is authorized to do under that provision is only to "enforce and administer" such laws and
regulations, not to promulgate them. The addition of the word "regulations" in the new subsection does not empower it now to promulgate regulations
any more than it can promulgate laws. As I read it, all that the change imports is that the scope of the measures the COMELEC may enforce and
administer has been expressly widened, to include "regulations."

Regulations are mainly intended to implement or supplement a law and may be generally issued only pursuant to a valid delegation of legislative power.
That is why they are known as "subordinate legislation." In the case of the COMELEC, I see no constitutional vesture in it of the power to promulgate
regulations, much less laws. There does not seem to be even an "implicit" grant of that authority, as the ponencia suggests.

Narvasa, C. J., and Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur.

G.R. No. 97108-09 March 4, 1992

DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O' HARA, petitioners,

vs.

ERNESTO DE JESUS and CECILIA DAVID, and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 97108-09 March 4, 1992

TOMAS TOBON UY, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE C. NEYRA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in electoral contests involving
municipal and barangay officials is the common question addressed in these election cases, hence, their consolidation.

The antecedent facts follow:

(1) G.R. No. 88158 (The Antipolo Case)

In the 18 January 1988 local elections. Petitioners Daniel GARCIA and Teodoro O' HARA were the winning candidates for Mayor and Vice Mayor,
respectively, of Antipolo, Rizal. They were proclaimed as such on 22 January 1988.

On 1 February 1988, Private Respondents Ernesto DE JESUS and Cecilia DAVID instituted an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72 (RTC), docketed as Election Case No. 02-A, where the results in twenty-five (25) precincts were put in issue.

On 25 July 1988, the RTC issued an Order directing the delivery to it of all ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia used in the 25 protested
precincts so that the ballots could be examined and the votes recounted.

After five (5) ballot boxes were already examined and revised, Petitioners' newly-hired counsel moved for the suspension of the hearing being conducted
on 18 September 1988 alleging that an error was committed in the proceedings because there was no basis for the opening of the ballot boxes. He
contended that the irregularities alleged in the election protest do not relate to the appreciation of ballots and thus, the opening of those boxes would not
effect the result of the election.

On 26 September 1988, Petitioners GARCIA and O' HARA filed before the RTC a "Motion To Dismiss Opening of Ballot Boxes And/Or To Dismiss The
Protest" which was premised on the ground that the allegations in the election protest were merely self-serving.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion, the RTC issued an Order dated 28 October 1988, amending its Order Dated 25 July 1988, limiting the opening of ballot
boxes to only nine (9) precincts out of the 25 protested ones, and limiting the examination of the ballot boxes only to those anomalies specified in the
annexes attached to the election protest by Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID.

The latter moved for reconsideration thereof which was denied by the RTC, in an Order dated 27 December 1988. On 9 January 1989, Respondents DE
JESUS and DAVID filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus before the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 2-89, which sought to nullify the RTC Order
limiting the examination of ballot boxes to only 9 precincts.

On 13 January 1989, respondent COMELEC temporarily restrained the proceedings before the RTC and set for hearing Respondents DAVID and DE
JESUS' application for Preliminary Injunction on 29 January 1989.

Petitioners GARCIA and O' HARA, meanwhile, registered their objection to the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over the Petition for
certiorari and mandamus through their "Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss." It was their contention that the COMELEC was not empowered to take
cognizance of Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the COMELEC issued the questioned Decision, dated 27 April 1989, which directed the RTC to
open all the ballot boxes in the 25 protested precincts.

(2) G.R. Nos. 97108-09 (The Isabela Case)

After the canvass of election returns was made in the same local elections, Respondent Jose C. NEYRA was proclaimed Mayor of Gamu, Isabela over
Petitioner Tomas TOBON UY, with a plurality of 28 votes.

Petitioner TOBON UY filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, isabela, Branch 16 (RTC), docketed as Election Case No. 369.
On 7 January 1991, the RTC declared TOBON UY the winner "by a majority of five (5) votes" over (RTC Decision, p. 24). On the same date that said
RTC Decision was promulgated, NEYRA filed a "Notice of Appeal," and TOBON UY, a "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal," with the latter pleading set
for hearing on 10 January 1991.

The day before, or on 9 January 1991, NEYRA filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition, docketed as SPR No. 1-91,
seeking to enjoin the RTC from further acting on TOBON UY's aforesaid "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal."

On 10 January 1991, the RTC, after due hearing, gave due course to NEYRA's appeal, granted execution pending appeal stating the special reasons
therefor, and required TOBON UY to post a bond in the amount of P300,000.00. On the same date, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case. NEYRA's application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise set for hearing by
the COMELEC on 24 January 1991.

On 15 January 1991, NEYRA filed a second Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 2-91. This time, he
sought to set aside the RTC Order, dated 10 January 1991, which granted TOBON UY's "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.

The COMELEC took cognizance of both Certiorari Petitions and, on 15 February 1991, issued the questioned Resolution (in SPR Nos. 1-91 & 2-91),
declaring as null and void and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal granted by the RTC, premised on Rule 35, Section 18, of its Rules of Procedure, and
enjoining TOBON UY from "assuming the office and performing in whatever and however manner the duties of Mayor of Gamu, Isabela, until the final
disposition of the appeal.

Principally, Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA in G.R. No. 88156, and Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09, question the arrogation unto itself by
the COMELEC of the power of issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. They invoke the previous ruling of this Court in Pimentel v.
COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 53581-83, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 769), which maintained that no such jurisdiction was ever conferred on respondent
Commission by the 1973 Constitution or by law.

On the other hand, all Respondents in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88185) and in the Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09) contend that since the 1987
Constitution now expressly empowers the COMELEC to exercise "appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction" (Section 2[2], Article IX-C), and to "promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it" provided they
do "not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" (Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C), the COMELEC validly promulgated the rule
which empowers it to issue the special Writs.

As a subsidiary issue, Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA maintain that the COMELEC denied them due process in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158)
when it rendered its questioned Decision without benefit of hearing. For his part, TOBON UY, in the Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09), raises the
question of whether or not Regional Trial Courts have the authority to order execution pending appeal in election contests decided by it. His view is that
said Courts possess that authority. Respondent NEYRA contends otherwise.

In the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to
issue said Writs.

It is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally invested appellate jurisdiction and rule-making power, that arrogated unto itself the authority to
issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule 28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure, thus:

SECTION 1. When available. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction in election cases before courts of general jurisdiction relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal officials, and before courts of limited jurisdiction in cases relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of elective barangay officials, the Commission en banc may hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus."

However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. It may be classified into original
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of
a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review (Remedial Law Compendium, Regalado, Florenz D., Fifth Revised Edition, Vol. I, p.
3). Since the two jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, each must be expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from, the
other.

In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such
authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a mater of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law (Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication.
Indeed, "(w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated" (J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202;
Underscoring ours).

Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative
enactment. To enumerate:

(1) Section 5[1], Article VII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such jurisdiction;

(2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate
Appellate Court);

(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;

(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created
Shari'ah Appellate Court; and

(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'a District
Courts.

Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no mention of any power given the
COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitioners for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which was
specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is fixed by law, the power to issue such Writs can
not be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Just as implied repeal of statutes are frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body tabooed. If appellate jurisdiction has to be statutorily granted, how much more the original
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs?
Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the previous authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was
specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129).
It does not follow that just because the 1987 Constitution, without more, it can issue such Writs in aid of that appellate jurisdiction.

The view that the subject Writs are but common-law Writs not owing their existence to any constitutional provision or statutory enactment may be true in
foreign jurisdictions but not in the Philippine judicial system where such Writs are specifically characterized as original Special Civil Actions (Rule 65,
Rules of court). It is original jurisdiction, that is exercised in the issuance of said Writs. And although there may be authorities in other jurisdictions which
maintain that such Writs are inherent in the power of higher Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to judicial tribunals, which the
COMELEC is not. What this agency exercises are administrative and quasi-judicial powers (Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, G.R. No.
L-31455, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 25).

As defined, Certiorari "is a writ from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal commanding the later to send up the record of a particular case"
(Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra). The function of a Writ of Certiorari is to keep an inferior court Within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8
March 1989, 171 SCRA 49). The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily make it a "superior Court" vs-a-vis Regional Trial
Courts. In fact, in People v. Delgado (G.R. Nos. 93419-32 18 September 1990, 189 SCRA 715), we ruled that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to
review the actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions for violations of election laws. This, notwithstanding the grant to the COMELEC of
"exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses punishable under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The power vested in the COMELEC to promulgate its Rules of procedure neither confers upon itself the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs.
Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a Court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into
action (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523). Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substative. They cover only rules on
pleadings and practice. And in respect of the COMELEC, the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure was specifically "in order to expedite
disposition of cases" (Section 3, Article IX-C). That limited purpose can not be expanded to include the conferment upon itself of jurisdiction which is
substantive in nature and can only be fixed by law.

The doctrine laid down in Pimentel, supra, holding that the COMELEC has not been invested with jurisdiction to issue the Writs in question, therefore,
still finds application under the 1987 Constitution. Said case also involved an elective municipal official except that it was decided under the regime of
the 1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296).

There is no gainsaying that, unlike the 1987 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not grant appellate jurisdiction to the
COMELEC over election contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial court of general jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such appellate
jurisdiction was conferred upon it by Section 196 of the 1978 Election Code (Pre. Decree No. 1296), reading:

Section 196. Appeal. From any decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in the cases stated in Section 190 hereof, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission within five days after receipt of a copy of the decision; Provided, That no motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the court (Underscoring ours)

The appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case and shall be decided within sixty days after the case has been submitted for
decision.

Section 190 referred to in the first paragraph deals with election contests for municipal and municipal district offices.

Again, while the 1973 Constitution did not empower the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure, Section 192 of the same 1978 Election
Code granted it such powers. Thus:

Section 192. Procedure in election contests. The Commission shall prescribe the rules to govern the procedure and other matters
relating to election contests pertaining to all national, regional, provincial, city municipal and barangay offices. Such rules shall
provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the expeditious disposition of election contests (Underscoring ours).

It would appear, therefore, that what were merely statutory provisions under the 1978 Election Code became constitutional grants under the 1987
Constitution. Significantly, however, neither the 1973 Constitution nor the 1987 Constitution expressly confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to
issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. In essence, therefore, the statutory set-up in the present Petition and in Pimentel, insofar as the
COMELEC power to issue those WRITS is concerned, is on all fours.

Then, as now, there is no specific grant to the COMELEC, either in the Constitution or by legislative fiat of jurisdiction over said petitions.

It may be that, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, division of authority between the courts and the COMELEC could affect the expenditious
settlement of election contests. That is no justification, however, for conferring a quasi-judicial body with original certiorari jurisdiction. That would place
the COMELEC in a class by itself apart from similar administrative and quasi-judicial agencies. Neither would there be "sharing of appellate jurisdiction"
thereby, since the issuance of the special Writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction.

In the last analysis, the remedy lies with the legislature and not with this Court. It is Congress that has the power to define prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various Courts (Arts. VIII, sec. 2, 1987 Constitution). That should include quasi-judicial bodies.

Considering that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, it would thus be moot and academic
to still pass upon GARCIA and O' HARA's contention that they were denied due process when the respondent Commission issued the questioned
Decision in the Antipolo Case. Suffice it to state that absence of hearing per se, does not necessarily imply denial of due process. The fact that they
were afforded reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy through their pleadings, destroys the validity of their argument. As long as
the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC,
G,R. No. 95016, 11 january 1991, 194 SCRA 25).

We now come to the subsidiary issue raised by Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09 of whether or not Regional Trial Courts can order execution
pending appeal in election contests decided by it involving elective municipal officials.

The COMELEC Rules of procedure would also deprive Regional Trial Courts of the prerogative to order execution pending appeal in Rule 35, section 18,
reading:

SEC. 18. Decision on the contest. The Court shall decide the election contest within thirty (30) days from the date it is submitted
for decision, but in every case within six (6) months after its filing and shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or in a
proper case, that none of them has been legally elected, or in proper case, that none of them has been legally elected. The party
who in the judgment has been declared elected shall have the right to assume the office as soon as the judgment becomes final.
(underscoring ours).

The COMELEC, however, is bereft of authority to deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to order execution pending appeal. For one, it is
essentially a judicial prerogative. For another, it is a pronouncement of the COMELEC alone in its procedural rules, without benefit of statute, unlike in
the past where it was specifically provided for in section 177 of the Revised Election Code (Rep. Act No. as amended) 1 and Section 224 of the Election
code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388) 2 from whence the rule was lifted verbatim. Significantly, however, when the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No.
6388) was superseded by the 1978 Election Code (Pres. decree No. 1296), said clause was deleted therefrom. It is likewise absent in the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (Rep. Act No. 6646) and in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.881), which were the election laws in effect during the 18 january
1988 local elections.

There is no express provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing executions pending appeal, and the COMELEC, in its procedural rules alone, should not
be allowed to divest Regional Trial Courts of that authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a substantive right to move for such relief contrary to the
constitutional mandate that those Rules can not diminish nor modify substantive rights (Section 6, Articles IX-A, 1987 Constitution).

At any rate, the clause "as soon as the judgment becomes final" had already been interpreted by this Court as a general one defining the effect of a final
judgment on the right of the winner to assume the contested office as the right of the winner to assume the contested office as the de jure elected official
to serve up to the end of the term (Gahol v. hon. Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA 494 at p. 514). It does not disallow Regional Trial
Courts from ordering execution pending appeal.

Admittedly, unlike in Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971, applied in Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, supra, there is no express provision in the Electoral
Reforms Law (Rep. Act No. 6646) nor in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) that would allow execution pending appeal. Said Section 218 reads:

Sec. 218. Assumption of office notwithstanding an election contest. Every candidate for a provincial, city, municipal or municipal
district office duly proclaimed elected by the corresponding board of canvassers shall assume office, notwithstanding the pendency
in the courts of any contest against his election, without prejudice to the final decision thereon and applicable provisions of the Rules
of court regarding execution of judgment pending appeal.

Nonetheless, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good reasons stated
in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided by them (Rule 43, Section 1, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure). Indeed, as much recognition should be given to the decision of judicial body as a basis for the right to assume office as that given by law to
the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers. In the words of Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, supra:

... Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as a basis of the right to assume office, subject to future
contigencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from
their being more apt to yield to external considerations, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while
on the other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation
and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering
judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the
court, good reasons therefor.

To construe otherwise would be to bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest" techniques so often resorted to by devious
politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate
(See Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570, 29 July 1969; Lagumbay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444, 31 january 1966, 16 SCRA 175).

In retrospect, good reasons did, in fact, exist which justified the RTC Order dated 10 January 1991, granting execution pending appeal. Among others
mentioned by the RTC are the combined considerations of the near expiration of the term of office, public interest, the pendency of the election contest
for more than three (3) years, and that TOBON UY had filed a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 (Rollo, p. 46).

To recapitulate, in the absence of an express Constitutional or legislative authorization, the COMELEC is devoid of competence to issue special Writs
simply on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction and its rule-making power. Neither is the COMELEC empowered, through its procedural rules alone, to
deprive Regional Trial Courts of authority, in the exercise of their discretion, to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons stated in special
order.

It must be noted that the term of office of the contested positions is nearing expiration. There is need, then for this Decision to be immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and prohibition are hereby GRANTED.

In G.R. No. 88158, the COMELEC Decision, dated 27 April 1989, in SPR No 2-89 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, dated 28 October 1988 in Election Case No. 02-A, limiting the opening of ballot boxes to only nine (9) precincts, is hereby
REINSTATED, the case to proceed until final disposition.

In G.R. Nos. 97108-09, the COMELEC Resolution dated 15 February 1991, in SPR Nos. 1-91 and 2-91, is likewise SET ASIDE, and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, dated 10 January 1991, in Election Case No. 369 granting execution pending appeal, is hereby
REINSTATED, without prejudice to the disposition of respondent Jose Neyra's appeal before the COMELEC.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

No costs.

Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur

Paras, J., took no part.

Narvasa, C.J, Feliciano, Medialdea, and Davide, Jr., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and would add only the following brief observations.

It is argued that the competence of the Commission on Elections to issue writs of certiorari is derived from its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
elective barangay officials. I do not believe that this power can be that simply and easily implied nor am I persuaded by the cases cited, which are of
American origin and have no application here. in our country, the controlling rule is found in the Constitution, which clearly says that it is only Congress
that has the power to "define prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, " subject only to certain specified limitations. (Article VIII,
Section 2). Conformably, every judicial tribunal must trace its power to issue writs of certiorari to an express authorization from the legislature and not to
mere inference. I know of no such tribunal that exercises this power on the sole justification that it is an appellate court. The Supreme itself derives its
power to issue writs of certiorari not by implication only from its action. Furthermore, it may exercise this power only "as the law or rules of Court may
provide" under paragraph 2 of that section, which means that the conferment is not automatic or self-executing. Without such implementation, this Court
is powerless to issue writs of certiorari in the appealed cases mentioned in that provision even if it is the highest court in the land.

We cannot be less strict with the Commission on Elections, which is essentially only an administrative body. If even the Supreme Court itself can be so
inhibited by no less than the Constitution. I see no logic in allowing the Commission on Elections a wider latitude in the exercise of what is clearly a
judicial power. And on such a fragile ground. While I may concede that this agency can exercise the power if expressly allowed by the legislature, I reject
the notion that it can claim such jurisdiction by mere implication.

BIDIN, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to the arguments advanced in the majority opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Madame Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera, it is my humble submission that the Commission on Elections is empowered to issue the assailed prerogative writs, hence, this dissent.

The majority opinion that in the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC,
either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

The ponencia further maintains the proposition that "(i)n the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction" (Decision, p. 8) and that it is original jurisdiction that is exercised in the issuance of said writs (Ibid., p. 10).

The foregoing postulations overlook the fact that the subject writs may also be issued not only in the exercise of original jurisdiction but also in aid of
appellate jurisdiction as now conferred upon the Court of Appeals (Sec. 9 [1], BP 129). Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had been issuing writs of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 9 [1], BP 129, and before that Sec. 4, Rule 65, it cannot be said that certiorari is limited to the
exercise of original jurisdiction only.
The ponencia states that the COMELEC Rule cannot pattern its certiorari jurisdiction after that of the Court of Appeals because the latter's jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative writs is specifically provided by law, while on the other hand, no statutory provision grants the COMELEC with similar powers.
Relying on the case of Pimentel v. Comelec (101 SCRA 769 [1980]), the main ponencia is likewise of the view that in the absence of an express
statutory provision granting the COMELEC the power to issue the special writs, such authority cannot be deduced by mere implication.

In Pimentel, this court ruled that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus in election contests
cognizable by the then Court of First Instance and appealable to the Commission on the ground that such jurisdiction was not conferred to it by
constitutional or statutory enactment. It must be noted, however, that the Pimentel case was decided under the 1973 Constitution which limited the
Commission's jurisdiction over election contests relating to the members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials, and excluded
therefrom election contests involving municipal and barangay officials. Such limitation no longer holds true under the present state of the law. Neither is
this a case where the COMELEC justifies its assumption of jurisdiction by applying, by analogy, Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it did in the case
of Pimentel.

In entertaining the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by private respondents, the COMELEC now does not trace its authority to the provisions of
the Rules of Court but rather to the constitution itself. This constitutional grant of power to the COMELEC, which, in my considered view, authorizes the
latter to issue the prerogative writs, marks the point of departure from the majority opinion.

Section 2 (2) Art. IX-C of the 1987 Contitution now grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal official
decide by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction, as follows:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied)

Taken in conjunction with Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, * which empowers the Commission to promulgate its rules of procedure, the above constitutional grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over limited jurisdiction is broad enough to cover petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

It is significant to note that no similar provision granting respondent COMELEC with rule-making power as provided in the present Constitution is found
in the 1973 Constitution, the fundamental law in force when the Pimentel case was decided. Such constitutional conferment of rule-making power in
favor of the COMELEC necessarily implies, if not in itself inherent, the authority of the Commission to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction expressly conferred by the constitution. For one thing, it is elementary that the function of the writ is to keep an inferior
court within its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 429 [1989]; Calagui v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564 [1990]; Brillo v. Buklatan, 87 phil. 519 [1950]). How can the COMELEC
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction over election cases cognizable by trial courts if it could not issue auxilliary writs necessary to keep them
within their jurisdictional confines? It would be highly incongruous, if not outright illogical, to split the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC by depriving it
of appellate jurisdiction over certiorari proceedings involving election cases decided by trial courts while at the same time vesting it with jurisdiction over
the ultimate appeal thereon from decisions rendered in the same case and by the same trial courts.

As aforesaid, the 1987 Constitution grants the respondent Commission not only appellate jurisdiction over election contests cognizable by the trial courts
but also, broad rule-making power to expedite the disposition of election cases. The COMELEC's assumption of certiorari jurisdiction is consistent with
the constitutional mandate to expedite the disposition of election cases.

The power to issue special writs also flows from the existence of appellate jurisdiction is a doctrinal pronouncement and settled jurisprudence. It has
been held that "grant of jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to its effective exercise and to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action and give effect to the final determination of the appeal" (Kjellander v. Kjellander 132 P 1170 [1913]). Premises
considered, the COMELEC may issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The Court must not lose sight of the fact of the origin and historical development of the special writs as it was understood in common law jurisdiction
from where it evolved and carried over to the Philippine court system (i.e., from Act 190 through RA to 296 to BP 129) that "(t)he writ of certiorari does
not owe its existence to constitutional provision or statutory enactment. It is a common law writ, of ancient origin, and one of the most valuable and
efficient remedies which came to us with that admirable system of jurisprudence" (Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Campbell, 75 SW 1012 [1903]):

More importantly, "(i)t is an established doctrine that one of the essential attributes of appellate jurisdiction, and one of the inherent powers of the
appellate court, is the right to make use of all writs known to the common law, and, if necessary, to invent new writs or proceedings in order to suitably
exercise the jurisdiction conferred (Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 11 P 103 [1886]; citing Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425;
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; U.S. v. Commissioners, 1 Morris, (Iowa,) 42; Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277).

The ponencia posits that such a view obtaining in foreign jurisdiction cannot apply in the country's judicial system since the subject writs are specifically
characterized as original special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. if the subject writs are original in character, why then can the Court of
Appeals exercise the same in aid of its appellate jurisdiction? Concededly because of BP 129. But then again, doesn't the constitution itself grants such
appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC? Do we still need a statutory enactment for such conferment of certiorari jurisdiction? Is the constitutional grant of
appellate jurisdiction not enough? The ponencia stresses that the grant of power to the COMELEC must be express. I believe, however, that the
constitutional provision investing the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction is clear and broad enough to comprehend the issuance of the questioned writ.
The power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of any public official is essentially judicial. As such, ... it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 [1966]; citing
Matthews, American Constitutional System; Cooley, Thomas M., A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, pp. 270-271, 1972 ed.; 23 W & P 147
[1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So 2d 507, 511, 23 W & P 148 1927 ed.; 23 W & P 147 [1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v.
Duncan, 10 So. 2d 507,511,23 W & P 148, supra). In granting the COMELEC with the powers and functions to "exrcise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving all elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by the trial
courts of limited jurisdiction" (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C, Constitution), the Constitution vested upon the COMELEC judicial powers to decide all contests
relating to elective local officials as therein provided.

As defined in the Constitution, (j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to SEc. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This I believe, is the Constitutional intent although not spelled out in black and
white.

On this score, the classic pronouncement of Justice Holmes in his landmark dissent should serve as timely reminder:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the fundamental
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain lattitude or our government could not go on. (Springer v.
Government of the philippines islands, 277 US 189 [1927])

In upholding the authority of the COMELEC to issue the subject writs, I do not wish to imply that as a general Proposition, the COMELEC is superior
over the Regional Trial Courts. (The case of People v. Delgado cited in the ponencia involves criminal prosecutions which are undoubtedly, within the
province of the regional trial courts.) However, a criminal case instituted by the People is one thing; an electoral contest involving private litigants is
another. As a general rule, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases. The COMELEC has none. In other words, what is at issue here is
not a criminal prosecution, or a civil action for that matter, but rather an election contest involving as it does public interest calling for a proper resolution
before an appropriate body. As to which forum is superior in litigations relating to election contests involving local public officials, as in the case at bar,
there is no doubt the COMELEC has jurisdiction ascendency since it has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barabgay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C,
Constituion; underscoring supplied).

In Angara v. Electoral Commission (63) Phil. 139 [1936]), the Court held:

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the national Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission. (citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol I pp. 138-139; underscoring supplied).

The above doctrine was reiterated by this Court in the case of Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) and should find application to
the similar power conferred upon the COMELEC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in the exercise of its judicial function. In the absence of a constitutional
proscription, I submit that this court should not narrow down the appellate and incidental powers which the constitution confers upon the respondent
COMELEC.

And finally, in the 1941 case of Sumulong v. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288), this Court had occasion to note that:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions it should not be hampered with restriction that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free orderly and
honest elections.We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter ...

xxx xxx xxx

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve
the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections ... we must not by
any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as
ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this Court to review the acts of that body should as general proposition be
used sparingly but firmly in appropriate cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases. (underscoring
supplied)

In issuing the assailed writs, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC did not overstep its authority nor did it act in a capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner amounting to grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the instant petitions.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and would add only the following brief observations.

It is argued that the competence of the Commission on Elections to issue writs of certiorari is derived from its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
elective barangay officials. I do not believe that this power can be that simply and easily implied nor am I persuaded by the cases cited, which are of
American origin and have no application here. in our country, the controlling rule is found in the Constitution, which clearly says that it is only Congress
that has the power to "define prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, " subject only to certain specified limitations. (Article VIII,
Section 2). Conformably, every judicial tribunal must trace its power to issue writs of certiorari to an express authorization from the legislature and not to
mere inference. I know of no such tribunal that exercises this power on the sole justification that it is an appellate court. The Supreme itself derives its
power to issue writs of certiorari not by implication only from its action. Furthermore, it may exercise this power only "as the law or rules of Court may
provide" under paragraph 2 of that section, which means that the conferment is not automatic or self-executing. Without such implementation, this Court
is powerless to issue writs of certiorari in the appealed cases mentioned in that provision even if it is the highest court in the land.

We cannot be less strict with the Commission on Elections, which is essentially only an administrative body. If even the Supreme Court itself can be so
inhibited by no less than the Constitution. I see no logic in allowing the Commission on Elections a wider latitude in the exercise of what is clearly a
judicial power. And on such a fragile ground. While I may concede that this agency can exercise the power if expressly allowed by the legislature, I reject
the notion that it can claim such jurisdiction by mere implication.

BIDIN, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to the arguments advanced in the majority opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Madame Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera, it is my humble submission that the Commission on Elections is empowered to issue the assailed prerogative writs, hence, this dissent.

The majority opinion that in the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC,
either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

The ponencia further maintains the proposition that "(i)n the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction" (Decision, p. 8) and that it is original jurisdiction that is exercised in the issuance of said writs (Ibid., p. 10).

The foregoing postulations overlook the fact that the subject writs may also be issued not only in the exercise of original jurisdiction but also in aid of
appellate jurisdiction as now conferred upon the Court of Appeals (Sec. 9 [1], BP 129). Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had been issuing writs of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 9 [1], BP 129, and before that Sec. 4, Rule 65, it cannot be said that certiorari is limited to the
exercise of original jurisdiction only.

The ponencia states that the COMELEC Rule cannot pattern its certiorari jurisdiction after that of the Court of Appeals because the latter's jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative writs is specifically provided by law, while on the other hand, no statutory provision grants the COMELEC with similar powers.
Relying on the case of Pimentel v. Comelec (101 SCRA 769 [1980]), the main ponencia is likewise of the view that in the absence of an express
statutory provision granting the COMELEC the power to issue the special writs, such authority cannot be deduced by mere implication.

In Pimentel, this court ruled that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus in election contests
cognizable by the then Court of First Instance and appealable to the Commission on the ground that such jurisdiction was not conferred to it by
constitutional or statutory enactment. It must be noted, however, that the Pimentel case was decided under the 1973 Constitution which limited the
Commission's jurisdiction over election contests relating to the members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials, and excluded
therefrom election contests involving municipal and barangay officials. Such limitation no longer holds true under the present state of the law. Neither is
this a case where the COMELEC justifies its assumption of jurisdiction by applying, by analogy, Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it did in the case
of Pimentel.

In entertaining the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by private respondents, the COMELEC now does not trace its authority to the provisions of
the Rules of Court but rather to the constitution itself. This constitutional grant of power to the COMELEC, which, in my considered view, authorizes the
latter to issue the prerogative writs, marks the point of departure from the majority opinion.

Section 2 (2) Art. IX-C of the 1987 Contitution now grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal official
decide by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction, as follows:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

 (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied)

Taken in conjunction with Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, * which empowers the Commission to promulgate its rules of procedure, the above constitutional grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over limited jurisdiction is broad enough to cover petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

It is significant to note that no similar provision granting respondent COMELEC with rule-making power as provided in the present Constitution is found
in the 1973 Constitution, the fundamental law in force when the Pimentel case was decided. Such constitutional conferment of rule-making power in
favor of the COMELEC necessarily implies, if not in itself inherent, the authority of the Commission to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction expressly conferred by the constitution. For one thing, it is elementary that the function of the writ is to keep an inferior
court within its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 429 [1989]; Calagui v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564 [1990]; Brillo v. Buklatan, 87 phil. 519 [1950]). How can the COMELEC
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction over election cases cognizable by trial courts if it could not issue auxilliary writs necessary to keep them
within their jurisdictional confines? It would be highly incongruous, if not outright illogical, to split the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC by depriving it
of appellate jurisdiction over certiorari proceedings involving election cases decided by trial courts while at the same time vesting it with jurisdiction over
the ultimate appeal thereon from decisions rendered in the same case and by the same trial courts.

As aforesaid, the 1987 Constitution grants the respondent Commission not only appellate jurisdiction over election contests cognizable by the trial courts
but also, broad rule-making power to expedite the disposition of election cases. The COMELEC's assumption of certiorari jurisdiction is consistent with
the constitutional mandate to expedite the disposition of election cases.

The power to issue special writs also flows from the existence of appellate jurisdiction is a doctrinal pronouncement and settled jurisprudence. It has
been held that "grant of jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to its effective exercise and to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action and give effect to the final determination of the appeal" (Kjellander v. Kjellander 132 P 1170 [1913]). Premises
considered, the COMELEC may issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The Court must not lose sight of the fact of the origin and historical development of the special writs as it was understood in common law jurisdiction
from where it evolved and carried over to the Philippine court system (i.e., from Act 190 through RA to 296 to BP 129) that "(t)he writ of certiorari does
not owe its existence to constitutional provision or statutory enactment. It is a common law writ, of ancient origin, and one of the most valuable and
efficient remedies which came to us with that admirable system of jurisprudence" (Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Campbell, 75 SW 1012 [1903]):

More importantly, "(i)t is an established doctrine that one of the essential attributes of appellate jurisdiction, and one of the inherent powers of the
appellate court, is the right to make use of all writs known to the common law, and, if necessary, to invent new writs or proceedings in order to suitably
exercise the jurisdiction conferred (Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 11 P 103 [1886]; citing Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425;
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; U.S. v. Commissioners, 1 Morris, (Iowa,) 42; Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277).

The ponencia posits that such a view obtaining in foreign jurisdiction cannot apply in the country's judicial system since the subject writs are specifically
characterized as original special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. if the subject writs are original in character, why then can the Court of
Appeals exercise the same in aid of its appellate jurisdiction? Concededly because of BP 129. But then again, doesn't the constitution itself grants such
appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC? Do we still need a statutory enactment for such conferment of certiorari jurisdiction? Is the constitutional grant of
appellate jurisdiction not enough? The ponencia stresses that the grant of power to the COMELEC must be express. I believe, however, that the
constitutional provision investing the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction is clear and broad enough to comprehend the issuance of the questioned writ.

The power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of any public official is essentially judicial. As such, ... it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 [1966]; citing
Matthews, American Constitutional System; Cooley, Thomas M., A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, pp. 270-271, 1972 ed.; 23 W & P 147
[1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So 2d 507, 511, 23 W & P 148 1927 ed.; 23 W & P 147 [1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v.
Duncan, 10 So. 2d 507,511,23 W & P 148, supra). In granting the COMELEC with the powers and functions to "exrcise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving all elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by the trial
courts of limited jurisdiction" (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C, Constitution), the Constitution vested upon the COMELEC judicial powers to decide all contests
relating to elective local officials as therein provided.

As defined in the Constitution, (j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to SEc. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This I believe, is the Constitutional intent although not spelled out in black and
white.

On this score, the classic pronouncement of Justice Holmes in his landmark dissent should serve as timely reminder:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the fundamental
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain lattitude or our government could not go on. (Springer v.
Government of the philippines islands, 277 US 189 [1927])
In upholding the authority of the COMELEC to issue the subject writs, I do not wish to imply that as a general Proposition, the COMELEC is superior
over the Regional Trial Courts. (The case of People v. Delgado cited in the ponencia involves criminal prosecutions which are undoubtedly, within the
province of the regional trial courts.) However, a criminal case instituted by the People is one thing; an electoral contest involving private litigants is
another. As a general rule, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases. The COMELEC has none. In other words, what is at issue here is
not a criminal prosecution, or a civil action for that matter, but rather an election contest involving as it does public interest calling for a proper resolution
before an appropriate body. As to which forum is superior in litigations relating to election contests involving local public officials, as in the case at bar,
there is no doubt the COMELEC has jurisdiction ascendency since it has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barabgay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C,
Constituion; underscoring supplied).

In Angara v. Electoral Commission (63) Phil. 139 [1936]), the Court held:

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the national Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission. (citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol I pp. 138-139; underscoring supplied).

The above doctrine was reiterated by this Court in the case of Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) and should find application to
the similar power conferred upon the COMELEC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in the exercise of its judicial function. In the absence of a constitutional
proscription, I submit that this court should not narrow down the appellate and incidental powers which the constitution confers upon the respondent
COMELEC.

And finally, in the 1941 case of Sumulong v. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288), this Court had occasion to note that:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions it should not be hampered with restriction that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free orderly and
honest elections.We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter ...

xxx xxx xxx

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve
the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections ... we must not by
any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as
ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this Court to review the acts of that body should as general proposition be
used sparingly but firmly in appropriate cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases. (underscoring
supplied)

In issuing the assailed writs, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC did not overstep its authority nor did it act in a capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner amounting to grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the instant petitions.

G.R. No. 95346 January 18, 1991

PERFECTO V. GALIDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SATURNINO R. GALEON, respondents.

Paulino G. Clarin and Giselo Galido for petitioner.

De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to prohibit respondent Commission on Elections
from implementing its questioned decision dated 14 December 1989 and resolution dated 20 September 1990, and private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon from
assuming office as Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol.
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez,
Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, 7th Judicial Region, Branch I,
Tagbilaran City. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes.

Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the trial court's
decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in
its en banc resolution of 20 September 1990 which affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct
containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. The COMELEC said:

On the argument relied upon by the appellee that the case of Inguito vs. Court of Appeals is not the case in point but the cases of Bisnar vs. Lapasa and
Katigbak vs. Mendoza, supra should be the applicable jurisprudence, the settled rule and which is controlling is where a word or a letter recurs in a pattern or
system to mark and identify ballots, the ballots containing the same should be rejected as marked ballots (Silverio vs. Castro, supra; Inguito vs. Court of
Appeals, 21 SCRA 1015), and the introduction of evidence aliunde is not necessary when the repetition of a word or letter in several ballots in the same
precinct constitutes a clear and convincing proof of a design to indentify the voters. (P. 38, Rollo of G.R. No. 95346)

On 25 September 1990, petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. 95135.

On 27 September 1990, we resolved to dismiss the said petition for failure of petitioner to comply with paragraph 4 of the Court's Circular No. 1-88 which requires that
a petition shall contain a verified statement of the date when notice of the questioned judgment, order or resolution was received and the date of receipt of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration, if any was filed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which we denied with finality in the resolution of 4 October 1990.

Undaunted, petitioner filed on 6 October 1990 the present petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a restraining order (G.R. No. 95346) which contains the
same allegations and legal issues contained in G.R. No. 95135.

On 11 October 1990, we issued the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner and required respondents to file comment on the petition.

In his Comment, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon moves for the dismissal of the present petition, for the following three (3) main reasons:

1. Final decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and
not appealable. Private respondent cites Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:

Decisions, final orders, or ruling of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.

The above constitutional provision is implemented in the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the COMELEC, particularly Part VII Rule 39, Section 2 thereof, which
reads:

Sec. 2. Non-reviewable decisions. Decisions in appeals from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election cases relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of municipal and barangay official are not appealable.

According to private respondent, since appeals of COMELEC decisions in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials are not allowed by the
Constitution, it follows that the COMELEC decision in the case at bar should be executed or implemented.

2. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of this Court. The COMELEC
found that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design to identify
the ballots and/or voters. This finding should be conclusive on the Court.

3. Exactly the same petition involving identical allegations, grounds and legal issues was dismissed with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 95135. The inadvertent
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court in this case has wreaked havoc and chaos in the municipality of Garcia-Hernandez where private respondent has
already assumed his position as the duly-elected mayor.

In his Reply to the Comment, petitioner avers

1 Article IX (A), Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

Since under the same Constitution (Article VIII, Section 1), judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court, the present petition can still be brought to the Supreme
Court by certiorari. Petitioner contends that this petition is not an ordinary appeal contemplated by the Rules of Court or by provision of the Constitution.

2. The petition involves pure questions of law. The correct interpretation of Section 211. No. 10 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is definitely a question of law. It states:
 10. The erroneous initial of the first name which accompanies the correct surname of a candidate, the erroneous initial of the surname accompanying the
correct first name of the candidate, or the erroneous middle initial of the candidate shall not annul the vote in favor of the latter.

In several cases decided by this Court, according to petitioner, it was held that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliunde of a purpose to identify
the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as marked ballots. The COMELEC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the cited decisions of
this Court and declared that the suffix "C" after the name Galido was in reality a countersign and not a mere erroneous initial.

3. The dismissal with finality of G.R. No. 95135 (the first petition) did not refer to the merits of the petition. The said dismissal was due to the failure of petitioner to
submit requisite papers duly certified. That is why upon petitioner's submission of the requirements in his second (the present) petition, this Court granted the request
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

The Court finds the petition to be without sufficient merit.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution).

In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C"
after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May this COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein
petitioner)?

Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."

On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)

We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in
the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Thus

MR. FOZ. So, the amendment is to delete the word "inappealable."

MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page 26, line 26, we should have a transposition because decisions are always final, as distinguished from interlocutory
orders. So, it should read: "However, decisions, final orders or rulings," to distinguish them from intercolutory orders, ". . . of the Commission on Elections
on municipal and barangay officials shall be final and IMMEDIATELY executory."

That would be my proposed amendment.

MR. FOZ. Accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. It is understood, however, that while these decisions with respect to barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately
executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as
the case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

MR. FOZ. That is understood, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. At least it is on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.1

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply
established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which
should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. (Rollo, p. 107)

Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by
virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light,
the petition at bar has become moot and academic. (G.R. No. 81383. Atty. Felimon et al. vs. Atty. Belena et al. Apr. 5, 1988 resolution.)

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSSED. The temporary restraining order earlier issued by the Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171248 April 2, 2007

DR. MAHID M. MUTILAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the 28 December 2005 Order2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc.

The Antecedent Facts

Dr. Mahid M. Mutilan (petitioner) and Zaldy Uy Ampatuan (private respondent) were candidates for Governor during the election of regional officials held on 8 August
2005 in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On 11 August 2005, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the ARMM.

On 19 August 2005, petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections. The case was docketed as EPC No. 2005-3. Petitioner contested the
results of the elections in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on the ground that no actual election was conducted in the precincts in these four provinces.
Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters in the four provinces. Petitioner also contested the
results in the municipalities of Butig, Sultan Gumander, Calanogas, Tagoloan, Kapai, Masiu, and Maguing in Lanao del Sur where massive substitute voting allegedly
took place.

The Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division

In its 21 November 2005 Order,3 the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition.

The COMELEC Second Division stated that during the initial hearing of the case, petitioners counsel admitted that the petition was not an election protest but one for
annulment of elections. Petitioners counsel prayed that the case be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner argued that "jurisdiction over the x x x petition is
vested by law in the entire Honorable Commission both in banc and in division, such that this Honorable Commission (Second Division) can legally elevate the case to
the Honorable Commission En Banc pursuant to its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election case." 4

The COMELEC Second Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is vested in the COMELEC En Banc. However, the elevation of the
case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
The dispositive portion of the 21 November 2005 Order reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and considering the categorical admission of the [petitioner] that the instant petition is not an election protest but one for
annulment of elections, the Commission (Second Division) hereby DISMISSES the same for lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of Republic Act 7166 confers upon the
Commission sitting en banc the exclusive jurisdiction over petition for annulment of election.

Anent the prayer to elevate the petition to annul the elections to the Commission en banc, the Commission (Second Division) hereby DENIES the same for want of
requisite authority therefor under the Rules.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)

On 29 November 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 21 November 2005 Order of the COMELEC Second Division. On 29 December 2005,
petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Verified Copies of Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners counsel alleged that at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner was in Marawi City and his verification arrived in Manila only after the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners counsel alleged
that he had to file the unverified motion for reconsideration because he had only five days from receipt of the 21 November 2005 Order to file the motion.

The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

In its Order dated 28 December 2005, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration for petitioners failure to verify it in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the 21 November 2005 Order of the COMELEC Second Division had become final
and executory on 8 December 2005. Thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the Clerk of the Commission, Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD)[,] this Commission, is hereby directed to immediately issue an
Entry of Judgment.

Let copies of this Order, the Entry of Judgment and Order of 21 November 2005 be furnished Her Excellency, Hon. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Hon. Secretary. Department of Interior and Local Government, the Hon. Chairman, Commission on Audit and the Secretary, Regional
Assembly, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues before this Court:

1. Whether the COMELEC Second Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing the petition to annul elections and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc.

2. Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of verification.7

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is partly meritorious

The COMELEC Second Division is Not Prohibited from Elevating the Petition to the COMELEC En Banc

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of elections. Citing Section 3, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution, petitioner alleges that "[p]ublic respondent en banc or in division possesses the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution in the entire public
respondent as one whole collegial body or unit and such jurisdiction continues to exist when the public respondent sits either en banc or in a division."8 As such, the
COMELEC Second Division has the "jurisdiction and authority to take action on the petition x x x [and] to legally elevate the petition to public respondent sitting en
banc."9

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC.

In his Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections, petitioner seeks for a declaration of failure of elections in the contested areas. Petitioners counsel readily
admitted during the initial hearing that the petition was for annulment of elections.

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),10 jurisdiction over postponements, failure of elections and special elections vests in the COMELEC En Banc.11
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc over a petition to declare a failure of elections has been affirmed by this Court which ruled that a petition to declare a
failure of elections is neither a pre-proclamation controversy nor an election case.12 A prayer to annul election results and a prayer to declare failure of elections based
on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous causes are actually of the same nature and are denominated similarly in the Omnibus Election Code. 13 Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division has no jurisdiction over the petition to annul the elections.

Petitioner alleges that the docketing of the case as an election protest case was based on the determination of the administrative docket staff. Petitioner argues that the
internal docketing should not prejudice his rights and should not divest the COMELEC, sitting either En Banc or in Division, of its jurisdiction over the petition.

The argument has no merit. Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections. Petitioner cannot put the blame on the docketing clerk because he
clearly tried to avail of two different remedies, each one falling under separate jurisdictions.

The COMELEC Second Division ruled that automatic elevation of the case to the En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that the
COMELEC Second Division should have elevated the petition to the COMELEC En Banc instead of dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

We agree with petitioner. While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
such action is not prohibited. Section 4, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the
Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any suitable
process or proceeding may be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, there is nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to prevent the COMELEC Second Division from referring the petition to annul the elections to the
COMELEC En Banc.

Nevertheless, the petition must still fail.

In his Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections, petitioner alleged that no actual election was conducted in the contested areas. Petitioner further alleged
that the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also alleged massive disenfranchisement and substitute voting.
Petitioner argued that the irregularities warrant the annulment and setting aside of the elections in the contested areas.
There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or

(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.14

In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect.15 In the first instance, the election has not been held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In
the third instance, the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is interpreted to mean that
nobody emerged as a winner.16

None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact, private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the
results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute voting, and farcical and statistically improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no actual
election was conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.

Petitioner alleges that "[i]n some instances, the ballots were forcibly grabbed by armed persons and the same were filled-up even before election day." 17 However,
petitioner did not cite the particulars of his allegations. Petitioner further alleges that "election returns were already filled up even before the counting started;" 18 "votes
credited to candidates even exceeded the number of registered voters of the precincts;" 19 and "in one of the counting areas, the tally boards were filled up in the presence
of some Comelec officials even before the ballots were counted."20 Again, petitioner failed to state the particulars of these incidents except that "[s]ome of these
anomalies were committed in the municipalities of Butig, Sultan Gumander, Calanogas, Tagoloan, Kapai and Maguing of Lanao del Sur." 21

The other allegations of petitioner, particularly the transfer of venue of the canvass without previous notice to the candidates, the proclamation of private respondent
without canvassing the results of the "farcical election" in Tawi-Tawi, the erasures in the certificate of canvass, the lack of initials by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers, the use of different inks and handwritings, and the act of the Provincial Board of Canvassers in simply noting his objections to the canvass of the returns,
are not grounds that would warrant the annulment of the elections.

In Pasandalan v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained:

To warrant a declaration of failure of election on the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or suspend the holding of an election, or mar fatally the preparation,
transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. The conditions for the declaration of failure of election are stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for
losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.

The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting, and other electoral anomalies should be resolved in a proper election protest in the absence of any of
three instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. In an election protest, the election is not set aside, and there is only a revision or recount of the ballots cast
to determine the real winner.

The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of elections is an extraordinary remedy. The party who seeks the nullification of an election has the burden of
proving entitlement to this remedy. It is not enough that a verified petition is filed. The allegations in the petition must make out a prima facie case for declaration of
failure of election, and convincing evidence must substantiate the allegations.22

Here, the allegations of petitioner in his petition to annul the elections fail to make out a prima facie case to warrant the declaration of failure of elections.

Motion for Reconsideration Must Be Verified

Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that the motion for reconsideration be verified. 23 The COMELEC En Banc ruled that there was no
valid motion for reconsideration because petitioner failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that
the Order of the COMELEC Second Division had become final and executory.

Petitioner alleges that the absence of verification in his motion for reconsideration constitutes a slight or minor lapse and defect. Petitioner further alleges that the
absence of verification is merely a formal defect and does not affect the validity and efficacy of the pleading.

Petitioner alleges that the motion for reconsideration was filed within five days from receipt of the COMELEC Second Divisions Decision in accordance with Section
2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner alleges that the motion for reconsideration was not verified because he was then in Marawi City.
Petitioners verification did not arrive in Manila until after the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleges that upon the arrival of the verification in
Manila, his counsel filed a Motion to Admit Verified Copies of Motion for Reconsideration and explained the reason for the delayed submission of petitioners
verification.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was filed on 29 November 2005. The COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration in its Order dated 28 December
2005. Petitioner filed the Motion to Admit Verified Copies of Motion for Reconsideration only on 29 December 2005, one day after the COMELEC En Bancs denial of
his motion for reconsideration and one month after the filing of the original motion for reconsideration.

Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because
of passion or personal hostility.24 It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. 25 The grave abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.26 In this case, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC En Banc in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Motion to Admit Verified Copies of Motion for Reconsideration was filed only
after the denial by the COMELEC En Banc of the original and unverified motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 28 December 2005 Order of the COMELEC En Banc.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON, respondents.

The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Ruben A. Songco for respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents as follows:

1) by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor, against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong for
violation of Section 261, paragraph a-1, for vote-buying;

2) by Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot for violation of Section 261, paragraph a-1, also for vote buying; and

3) by PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson for violation of Section 261, paragraph p, for carrying of deadly weapon.

After preliminary investigation of the foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Cataingan,
Masbate,. the following criminal complaints: (1,) Criminal Case No. 324 against the spouses Tayong; (2) Criminal Case No. 326 against Salvacion
Colambot and (3) Criminal Case No. 375 against Melchor Yanson.

In three (3) separate orders, all dated 6 October 1987, and Identical in tenor save for the names of the accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu
proprio dismissed the three (3) informations filed by the Provincial Fiscal, giving the following justification:

xxx xxx xxx

The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not
investigate the case.

The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says:

"Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

... ; investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions,
constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg, 881) says:

Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute
the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government; Provided,
however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing,
the complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice. for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66. BP 697)

In the landmark case of De Jesus vs. People, L-60998, February 120 SCRA 760, the the Supreme Court ruled:
 The grant to the COMELEC of the power. among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to ensure
the free, and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result i ii the frustration of the true will of the
people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest
the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by public officials in
relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

Consistently, and lately, in Corpu[s], et al. vs. Tanodbayan of the Philippines', et al., L-62075, April 15, 1987, our Supreme Court
rules:

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to
place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any
person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of
whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all embracing power over the
conduct of election.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not investigated and prosecuted by the
COMELEC. the case is motu proprio dismissed. 1

The People moved for reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without success.

The instant Petition for Review assails the three (3) orders dismissing the three (3 ) criminal informations against the private respondents, as constituting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Petition argues principally that the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to
deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,
and that the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and
to institute criminal informations therefor.

The Petition must be granted.

There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. Section 265 of this Code reads as follows:

See. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act
on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1973 EC; and Sec. 66, BP 697) (Emphasis
supplied)

We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same
upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of
Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcementi agencies and instrumantalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

xxx xxx xxx

 (Emphasis supplied)

The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government, was expressed in general terms and in
advance in Executive Order No. 134. dated 27 February 1987, entitled "Enabling Act for the Elections for members of Congress on May 11, 1987, and
for other purposes." Executive Order No. 134 provided in pertinent portion as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

See. 11. Prosecution. Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That
in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the Office the Fiscal or with the Department for Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

(Emphasis supplied)

On 9 March 1987, the Comelec enacted its Resolution No. 1862. The pertinant operative portions of this resolution are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the,
Philippines, the Omnibus Election Code and Executive Orders Nos. 50, 94, 134 and 144, has RESOLVED to designate, as it hereby
designates the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscalss and their respective Assistants as its deputies in connection
with the elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987, to perform the following duties and functions:

1. Conduct prelimiry investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code which may be filed
directly with them, or which may be endorsed to them by the Commission or its authorized representatives; and

2. Whenever a prima facie case exists, file the proper information in court and prosecute the same.

Preliminary investigation of cases filed directly with, or endorsed to, Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective Assistants
shall be conducted immediately and shall be finished within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof and, for this purpose, they are
enjoined to hold office on a twenty-four (24) hour basis during the registration of voters on April 11 and 12, 1987, on Election Day on
May 11, 1987, and until midnight on Revision Day on May 2, 1987.

Provincial and City Fiscals and their respective Assistants shall submit to the Commission a report on every case directly filed with
them and thereafter, monthly progress reports on the status of the cases handled by them, including those endorsed by the
Commission or its authorized representatives.

This Resolution shall take effect immediately. 2 (Emphasis supplied)

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before
the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack
substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of
the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and
prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in
election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections
would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution
officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the
Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority
are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies
relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-may be recommended by the
Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid
potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio dismissed the criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in his identical
orders De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983) and Corpus, et al. v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987) can offer him no comfort at all; for these
cases do not relate to the authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED due course and the Orders of the trial court all dated October 6, 1987 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 324, 326 and 375 and the Order dated December 7, 1987 in the same cases denying the People's Motion for Reconsideration, are
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The trial court is ORDERED to proceed forthwith with the continuation of Criminal Cases Nos. 324, 326 and 375
and until termination thereof. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
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