G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT"

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the
latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY,
DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance
immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.

(p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty ofreclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the
cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or
meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
was already in effect when the offense was committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the
evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay
Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao
City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son, who
were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April
29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one
Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera
coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the
said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain
Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw,
causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went
down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you".
(TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from
the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a
small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had
nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a ready answer Benito
said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and
19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of about one minute, Patricio returned
and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded
in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and
simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and
run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still
chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which
hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of
the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since
there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger
to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the
left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing
Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus,
she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and
consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated
by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July
12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly
confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH SEPSIS (an
overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the
death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed
by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should bereclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing happened, the computation
of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty
is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying
circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal
Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so,
the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa
in People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo
L. Paras inPeople vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half
ofreclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine
announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution.
This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by
many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation
should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty
for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new
periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section
19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition
of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition.
Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding
modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the
Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such
intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation
that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another or strangely, considering their
loquacity elsewhere did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the
Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a
second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It
is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And
well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown
rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best,
this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing
inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the
current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return
to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed
the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period
although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the
workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the
day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court over
the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a penny?

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are
essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or
revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking
body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the
commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the
penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the
others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased
to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476
[1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for
sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of
sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on
the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or
the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they
are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post
a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and
surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use
of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the
provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the
principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety
bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance
with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC
are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are
governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of
this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon
and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the
appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the
POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC?
It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money,
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid
and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of
employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of
its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as
well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last
resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against
the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the
herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be
enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the
satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of
the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple
explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to
insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be
sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary,
we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book
II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond
required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution.
By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once
again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that
is important and which matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words
would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover
cases not within the literal meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the Legislature in enacting the
law is as much within the statute as if it were within the latter. Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is
within the province of the courts to correct said error. This is not to correct the act of the Legislature, but rather to carry out
and give due course to the true intention of said Legislature.

Must interpret not by the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life legal maxim 2 Corinthians 3:6

our Constitution should be construed so it may bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events

It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:

The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of
the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our
delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather
its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks
to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

AN ACT TO REGULATE THE RELATIONS AMONG PERSONS ENGAGED IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY AKA SUGAR ACT by Manuel
Quezon (FEDERATION OF FREEDOM FARMERS V CA)

doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which
is expressed. Every statute is to understand by implication to contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to
its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX
NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the law.

This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est is a Latin maxim which means that A case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted.

It is a rule of statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted from being enumerated in a statute, it must be held
or considered to have been omitted intentionally.

STARE DECISIS: Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the
present case, should be decided in the same manner

IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of
legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur, Court must construe, through reconciliation to give
effect to the statute. If it is impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute has to give way to the other. The latest statute
shall prevail being the latest expression of the legislative WILL. When it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more
specific statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes provide different procedures on the same subject matter,
"the general must give way to the specific.

In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law definition.