PROPERTY DIGESTS

ATTY. ABAO
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TABLE OF CONTENTS *YU VS. PACLEB (BANTA) 35

COPUYOC VS. DE SOLA (BANTA) 37
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 *MALAYAN REALTY, INC. VS. UY HAN YONG (BANTA) 39
GO VS. BACARON (BANTA) 40
A. PROPERTY: CONCEPT AND KINDS 5 *SPS. VALDEZ V. CA (BANTA) 42
MILLENA VS. CA (BANTA) 44
*MANECLANG VS IAC (CUALOPING) 5
*MANANTAN V. SOMERA (BANTA) 46
CATHOLIC BISHOP VS BURUANGA (CUALOPING) 5
*LAUREL VS ABROGAR (CUALOPING) 6
C.3 USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT 48
*MIAA VS CA (CUALOPING) 8
*VILLARICO VS SARMIENTO (CUALOPING) 9 GO VS. LOOYUKO (DE LUIS) 48
*NHA VS. CA (BANTA) 49
B.1 OWNERSHIP 10 *HEMEDES VS. CA (BANTA) 51
*TAYAG VS LACSON (CUALOPING) 10
D. LIMITATIONS ON OWNERSHIP 54
VALDEZ, JR. VS CA (CUALOPING) 12
*HEIRS OF CABAL VS CABAL (CUALOPING) 13
D.1 EASEMENT/SERVITUDE 54
*DAVID VS BANDIN (CUALOPING) 15
ESLABAN VS ONORIO (ONG) 54
B.2 CO-OWNERSHIP 17 BAPCI VS OBIAS (ONG) 56
*BOGO-MEDELLIN VS. CA (BANTA) 58
*PANGANIBAN VS OAMIL (CUALOPING) 17
PDCP VS CA (ONG) 61
*CRUZ VS. CA (GO) 19
*NPC VS TIANGCO (ONG) 62
RESUENA VS CA (CUALOPING) 20
NPC VS SUAREZ (LIM) 63
*IMPERIAL VS. CA (GO) 22
*GOLDCREST VS CYPRESS (LIM) 65
DINO VS. DINO (GO) 23
*UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL VS CHUNG (ONG) 67
*PADILLA VS. MAGDUA (GO) 23
*INING VS VEGA (ONG) 68
MARMO VS. ANACAY (GO) 25
D.2 ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE 71
C. RIGHTS ARISING FROM OWNERSHIP 26
*GANCAYCO VS QC GOVERNMENT (ONG) 71
C.1 RIGHT OF ACCESSION 26 *TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS INC. VS CA (ONG) 72
MEAD VS ARGEL (LIM) 73
HEIRS OF NAVARRO VS. IAC (GO) 26
*POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (ONG) 75
*CARRASCOSO JR. VS. CA (GO) 27
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO V. CA (REYES) 77
*PNB VS. DE JESUS (GO) 29
*REPUBLIC VS. MARCOPPER (BUGAY) 78
*SPS. ENRIQUETA RASDAS VS. ESTENOR (GO) 30
*SULO SA NAYON INC. VS. NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION (GO) 31
D.3 PREVENTION OF DAMAGES 79
SPS NUGUID VS. CA (GO) 31
*JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI VS. SPS. CARDANA (BUGAY) 79
C.2 RIGHT OF POSSESSION 33
E. ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP 80
*FRONDARINA VS. MALAZARTE (BANTA) 33
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E.1 OCCUPATION 80 G.1 ACQUISITIVE/EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION 113

*DOMALSIN VS. VALENCIANO (BUGAY) 80 *CALICDAN VS CENDANA (TRIAS) 113
DELFINA VS ZOROASTER (TRIAS) 114
E.2 INTELLECTUAL CREATION 81 *SPOUSES RAGUDO VS FABELLA ESTATE (TRIAS) 116
*BAUTISTA VS POBLETE (TRIAS) 117
MIRPURI VS. COURT OF APPEALS (BUGAY) 81
*HEIRS OF RESTAR VS CICHON (TRIAS) 119
*PEARL V. SHOEMART (BUGAY) 82
G.2 PRECRIPTION OF ACTION 120
E.3 DONATION 83
*VDA. DE GUALBERTO VS GO (TRIAS) 120
RAMIREZ V. RAMIREZ (BUGAY) 83
SOLID HOMES VS TAN (TRIAS) 121
*MORENO V. WOLFF (BUGAY) 84
TUMOL VS ESGUERRA (TRIAS) 122
*DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER (BUGAY) 85
*MARIANO VS. PETRON (DE LUIS) 123
JOAQUINO VS. REYES (BUGAY) 86
*SECRETARY VS. HEIRS OF DULAY (BUGAY) 88
H. SPECIAL PROPERTIES/SPECIAL LAWS AND THEORY 124
*DOLAR VS BRGY. LUBLUB (BELLO) 89
H.1 AIRSPACE 124
E.4 DISCOVERY 91
*NPC VS. IBRAHIM (DE LUIS) 124
*SPRDC VS. ROQUE (BELLO) 91
*PREYSLER, JR. VS. CA (DE LUIS) 125
*NOCEDA VS. CA (BELLO) 93
NPC VS TIANGCO (ONG) 127
AUSTRIA-MAGAT VS. CA (BELLO) 95
H.2 WATER 128
F. PROTECTION OF OWNERSHIP 96
*AMISTOSO VS. ONG (DE LUIS) 128
F.1 REGISTRY OF DEEDS 96 CELESTIAL VS. CACHOPERO (DE LUIS) 130
*COLLADO VS. CA (DE LUIS) 131
*VENCILAO VS. CA (BELLO) 96
CHENG VS GENATO (BELLO) 98
H.3 MINERAL LAND 133
*ALMIROL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS (BELLO) 101
*HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. RAMAS (BELLO) 102 *REPUBLIC VS. ROSEMOOR (DE LUIS) 133
*MINERS ASSOCIATION VS. FACTORAN JR. (DE LUIS) 134
F.2 QUIETING OF TITLE 103 PNOC VS. VENERACION (DE LUIS) 135
*SOUTHEAST MINDANAO VS BALITE (REYES) 136
*SECUYA VS VDA. DE SELMA (BELLO) 103
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. RAMOS (DE LUIS) 137
MAESTRADO VS CA (BELLO) 105
ROBLES VS CA (BELLO) 107
H.4 TRADEMARK/TRADENAME 140
*CALACALA VS REPUBLIC (TRIAS) 109
AZNAR VS AYING (TRIAS) 110 *ASIA BREWERY VS CA (REYES) 140
*VALIENTES VS RAMAS (TRIAS) 111 PEARL V. SHOEMART (BUGAY) 142
*COFFEE PARTNERS VS SAN FRANCISCO (REYES) 143
G. PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP 113 HABANA VS ROBLES (REYES) 144

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*MCDONALDS VS MACJOY (REYES) 145

H.5 SUBDIVISION/CONDOMINIUM 147

ZAMORA REALTY VS OP (REYES) 147
*PALANCA VS GUIDES (REYES) 148
*WHITE PLAINS VS LEGASPI (REYES) 149
*PADCOM VS ORTIGAS(REYES) 150
*MARIA LUISA PARK VS ALMENDRAS (LIM) 151
*GOLDCREST VS CYPRESS (LIM) 152

H.6 SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 154

*ESTATE OF SALUD VS EPZA (LIM) 154

H.7 RECLAMATION 157

*CHAVEZ VS PEA (LIM) 157
TEN FORTY VS CRUZ (REYES) 162
*CHAVEZ VS NHA (LIM) 162

H.8 ANCESTRAL DOMAIN 167

*CRUZ VS SECRETARY (LIM) 167
*CATARAN VS DENR (LIM) 168

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A. Property: Concept and Kinds
*Maneclang vs IAC (Cualoping)
G.R. NO. L-66575 |May 24, 1988 | Fernan
Petitioner/s:
ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA,
LOURDES, TEODORO and MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG
Respondent/s:
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO
CASTRO, SALOME RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO
ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES CORDERO, CLETO
PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE PANLILIO
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the then CFI of Pangasinan, Branch XI a
complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located
within the four parcels of land belonging to them situated in
Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment
of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of the Municipal Council of
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Trial court dismissed petition and IAC affirmed decision:
o Body of water traversing the titled properties of
petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the
Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject
to private appropriation.
o Res. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan
Creek and Res. 95 authorizing public bidding for the
lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the
fishpond under consideration, were passed by
respondents herein as members of the Municipal
Council and in the exercise of their legislative powers.
SC asked respondents to comment, but petitioners manifested
that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo
Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, the
parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the
Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be
rendered recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the
land the body of water found within their titled properties
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ISSUE: WON the fishpond is considered public property?
HELD: YES. Fishpond is considered public property.
SC is not a trier of facts. Lower courts clearly stated that the
body of water was originally a creek forming a tributary of the
Agno River
o held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of
Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a
recess or arm extending from a river and participating
in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging
to the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription
Construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation
Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and
out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond,
alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the
public domain,
Compromise agreement is null and void
Note: Art. 420 defines property of public dominion
Catholic Bishop vs Buruanga (Cualoping)
486 SCRA 229 |March 31, 2006 | Callejo, Sr.
Petitioner/s:
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented by BISHOP
JUAN N. NILMAR
Respondent/s:
MUNICIPALITY OF BURUANGA, AKLAN, represented by the
HON.PROTACIO S. OBRIQUE
FACTS:
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo (RCBK), Aklan, filed with the
RTC a complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of
title to land with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan.;
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o Claim that RCBK is the lawful owner and possessor of a
parcel of residential and commercial land (Cadastral
Lot No. 138).
Catholic church built in 1894 in the middle of the lot and exists
up to the present.
In 1978 municipality built municipal building on NE part of lot
with permission of parish priest, but promised to remove it when
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed the land.
10/1989 municipal building razed by NPA
11/25/1989 RCBK wrote to mayor asking to refrain from
reconstructing building b/c it is the property of the church and
is needed for social action projects. Also wrote DPWH to
request not to issue any building permit
Letters unheeded and new building construction proceeded,
so RCBK filed complaint with court.
Municipality denied that RCBK ever acquired ownership. Citing
survey in 1909 and decree in 1919. Possessed land by title for
over 50 years.
Court appointed Eng. Rodrigo Santiago directed to identify lot
138.
o Divided to 3 parts
o 138 - A municipal building
o 138 - B church
o 138 - C Community Medicare building
Court declared that B belongs to church, A and C declared as
public property.
ISSUE: WON Lot 138-A and 138-C is public property?
HELD: YES.
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza and are
property of public dominion; hence, may not be the object of
appropriation either by the petitioner or respondent
municipality.
The following improvements now stand on Lots 138-A and 138-
C: the municipal building, rural health
center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball
court, Rizal monument and grandstand. Except for the
construction of the municipal building, the other improvements
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were made on Lots 138-A and 138-C, and continuously used
by the public without the petitioners objection.
Further, there is no proof that the petitioner merely tolerated
the construction of these improvements. On the other hand,
the free and continuous use by the public of Lots 138-A and
138-C, as found by the court a quo and affirmed by the
appellate court, incontrovertibly establishes that they are
property for public use.
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
o (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities.
Property for public use which has the special characteristics of
a collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by
virtue of their application to the satisfaction of the collective
needs, is in the social group, whether national, provincial, or
municipal. Their purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
person, but the citizens; they are intended for the common and
public welfare, and so they cannot be the object of
appropriation, either by the State or by private persons.
*Laurel vs Abrogar (Cualoping)
G.R. 155076|January 13, 2009 | Ynares-Santiago
Petitioner/s:
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL
Respondent/s:
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional
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Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 & PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS:
Petitioner an accused in a criminal case
o Theft of international long distance calls belonging to
PLDT by conduction international simple resale (ISR)
o ISR: a method of routing and completing international
long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country
where the call is destined.
o Estimated equivalent amount of P20,370,651.92
SC initially held that Amended Information does not contain
material allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal
property since international long distance calls and the
business of providing telecommunication or telephone services
are not personal properties under Article 308 of the RPC.
PLDT insists that the RPC should be interpreted in the context of
the Civil Code definition of real and personal property. The
enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is
exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal
properties.
o International phone calls which are electric currents or
sets of electric impulses transmitted through a medium,
and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a
receiver, are personal properties which may be subject
of theft. Article 416(3) of the Civil Code deems forces of
nature (which includes electricity) which are brought
under the control by science, are personal property.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the
phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It
is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Therefore not
be considered as personal property.
ISSUES:
WON international long distance telephone calls are personal
property?
WON interest in business of PLDT is considered personal property?
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HELD:
NO.
It may be conceded that international long distance calls take
the form of electrical energy, but it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties
belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities.
YES.
Interest in business was declared to be personal property since
it is capable of appropriation and not included in the
enumeration of real properties.
US v. Genato, US v. Carlos, and US v. Tambunting, consistently
ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft.
Term personal property has had a generally accepted
definition in civil law. In Civil Code of Spain, personal property is
defined as anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the foregoing chapter (not real property). Thus, the
term personal property in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in
accordance with the rule on statutory. In fact, this Court used
the Civil Code definition of personal property in interpreting the
theft provision of the penal code in US v. Carlos.
Cognizant of the definition given by jurisprudence and the Civil
Code of Spain to the term personal property at the time the
old Penal Code was being revised, still the legislature did not
limit or qualify the definition of personal property in the Revised
Penal Code. Neither did it provide a restrictive definition or an
exclusive enumeration of personal property in the Revised
Penal Code, thereby showing its intent to retain for the term an
extensive and unqualified interpretation. Consequently, any
property which is not included in the enumeration of real
properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation
can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.
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The only requirement for a personal property to be the object
of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation (def: deprive the lawful owner of the thing). It
need not be capable of asportation, which is defined as
carrying away.
In 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership over
electricity (which an international long distance call consists
of), as well as telephone service, is protected by the provisions
on theft of the Penal Code.
o Acts of subtraction include:
o (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus
installed or used for generating, containing,
conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or
telephone service;
o (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking
any electric current from such wire, meter, or other
apparatus; and
o (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by
means of which one may fraudulently obtain any
current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone
service.
Act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs
telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or
re-route international long distance calls using respondent
PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction
Action of SC
Granted MR but remanded the case to the trial court for
proper clarification of the Amended Information.
Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by
making it appear that what petitioner took were the
international long distance telephone calls, rather than
respondent PLDTs business.
*MIAA vs CA (Cualoping)
495 SCRA 591|July 20, 2006 | Carpio
Petitioner/s:
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MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Respondent/s:
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF
PARAAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAAQUE, CITY
ASSESSOR OF PARAAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAAQUE
FACTS:
MIAA operates NAIA under EO 903 (MIAA charter)
o Administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred
to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land. Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred
to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other
mode unless specifically approved by the President of
the Philippines.
21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061.
o LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate
tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Paraaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the
City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax
already due.
28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years
1992 to 2001. (grand total taxes+ penalties = 624,506,725.42)
7 July 2001, the City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer,
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands
and Buildings. Mayor threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real
estate tax delinquency.
9 August 2001, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying
OGCC Opinion No. 061. The OGCC pointed out that Section
206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to
show proof of exemption.
o Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is considered proof
MIAA filed with CA and sought to restrain the City of
Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against,
and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
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CA dismissed petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. Also denies MR.
Meanwhile in January 2003, the City of Paraaque posted
notices of auction sale at the Barangay Halls of Barangays
Vitalez, Sto. Nio, and Tambo, Paraaque City; in the public
market of Barangay La Huerta; and in the main lobby of the
Paraaque City Hall.
The day before the public auction, 6 February 2003, MIAA filed
with SC an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the
Issuance of a TRO.
Court issued TRO but respondents received it only after the
public auction ended.
MIAA Arguments:
MIAA says cannot claim ownership over these properties since
the real owner is the Republic of the Philippines. Airport Lands
and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service.
Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from
the payment of real estate tax.
Also exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the LGC
because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic. (The government cannot tax itself.)
CA arguments
Section 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of "GOCCs."
o International airport is not among the exceptions
mentioned in Section 193.
Cite Mactan International Airport v. Marcos
o Held that LGC has withdrawn the exemption from real
estate tax granted to international airports.
o note: majority opinion doesnt explain why this is wrong
Since MIAA has already paid some of the real estate tax
assessments, it is now estopped from claiming exemption.
ISSUE:
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate
tax?
HELD: YES. Exempt from tax.
Relevant to Property:
Airport lands and buildings of MIAA are owned by the Republic
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Expressed in art. 420 of civil code:
o (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
o ports includes seaports and airports
Property owned by the republic is not taxable per LGC:
o SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The
following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted,
for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
Other points:
MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality
o Per admin code, GOCC must be must be "organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
Since for public use, the land and buildings are outside the
commerce of man.
MIAA acts as trustee of the republic. Allowed to hold title of the
lands. Even department head cannot sign deed of
conveyance.
*Villarico vs Sarmiento (Cualoping)
G.R. 136438 |November 11, 2004 | Sandoval-Gutierrez
Petitioner/s:
TEOFILO C. VILLARICO
Respondent/s:
VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH
DEL MUNDO, ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES
CARINDERIA
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FACTS: It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged right
Villarico owns 66 square meter lot in Paranaque of way exists belongs to the state. Property of public dominion
o Separated from Ninoy Aquino Ave. (highway) by strip is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
of land belonging to government. o ART. 420. The following things are property of public
o Highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore dominion:
higher than the adjoining areas, so DPWH constructed (1) Those intended for public use
stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is
enable the people to have access to the highway. for the use of the people as passageway to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie and Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
her husband Beth Del Mundo (respondents) had a building Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man
constructed on a portion of said government land. In and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise
November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by
Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia, also prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment
impleaded as respondents. and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary
1993 Deed of Exchange of Real Property easement.
o Petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the
same area owned by the government. The property o Cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right
was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the of way in favor of petitioner. In fact, its use by the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City. public is by mere tolerance of the government through
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for accion the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself
publiciana against respondents, and cannot claim any right of possession.
o alleged that respondents structures on the government o Civil Code ART. 530. Only things and rights which are
land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino susceptible of being appropriated may be the object
Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot of possession.
Respondents denied allegations, claiming that they have been
issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to construct their
buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the
subject property as it belongs to the government.
RTC and CA declare respondents have better right of
B.1 Ownership
possession.
*Tayag vs Lacson (Cualoping)
G.R. 134971|March 25, 2004 | Callejo, Sr.
ISSUE: WON Villarico has right of way to Ninoy Aquino Avenue?
Petitioner/s:
HELD: NO.
HERMINIO TAYAG
Neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession
over the disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a
Respondent/s:
property of public dominion.
AMANCIA LACSON, ROSENDO LACSON, ANTONIO LACSON, JUAN
LACSON, TEODISIA LACSON-ESPINOSA and THE COURT OF APPEALS

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FACTS:
Respondents are owners of three parcels of land located in
Mabalacat, Pampanga
o Properties, which were tenanted agricultural
lands, were administered by Renato Espinosa for the
owner.
On March 17, 1996, a group of original farmers/tillers
individually executed in favor of the petitioner separate Deeds
of Assignment
o Assigned to the petitioner their respective rights as
tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled
by them for and in consideration of P50.00 per square
meter. Payable when the legal impediments to the sale
of the property to the petitioner no longer existed.
o Petitioner was also granted the exclusive right to buy
the property if and when the respondents, with the
concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed to sell
the property.
o In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of money
to the tenants as partial payments, and the latter issued
receipts for the said amounts.
July 24, 1996, the petitioner called a meeting of the
defendants-tenants to work out the implementation of the
terms of their separate agreements. However they refused and
informed him that they were selling their right and interests to
the Lacsons (respondents) instead.
August 19, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga, and prayed for the court to fix a
period within which to pay the agreed purchase price
of P50.00 per square meter to the defendants, as provided for
in the Deeds of Assignment. Also prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendants and the
respondents.
Respondents file for motion to dismiss based on:
o (a) the Deeds of Assignment executed by the
defendants-tenants were contrary to public policy and
P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657;
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o (b) the petitioner failed to prove that the respondents
induced the defendants-tenants to renege on their
obligations under the "Deeds of Assignment;
o (c) not being privy to the said deeds, the respondents
are not bound by the said deeds
o (d) Respondents had the absolute right to sell and
dispose of their property and to encumber the same
and cannot be enjoined from doing so by the trial
court.
Lower court rules for Tayag but CA favors Lacsons.
ISSUE:
WON Lacsons and tenants can be enjoined from selling the rights and
interest of the property?
HELD: NO.
Court cannot enjoin the respondents, at the instance of the
petitioner, from selling, disposing of and encumbering their
property. As the registered owners of the property, the
respondents have the right to enjoy and dispose of their
property without any other limitations than those established by
law, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code. The right
to dispose of the property is the power of the owner to sell,
encumber, transfer, and even destroy the property. Ownership
also includes the right to recover the possession of the property
from any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted
such property, by the appropriate action for restitution, with
the fruits, and for indemnification for damages.
The right of ownership of the respondents is not, of course,
absolute. It is limited by those set forth by law, such as the
agrarian reform laws. Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code,
the respondents may enter into contracts covering their
property with another under such terms and conditions as they
may deem beneficial provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good conduct, public order or public policy.
The respondents cannot be enjoined from selling or
encumbering their property simply and merely because they
had executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of the petitioner,
obliging themselves to assign and transfer their rights or
interests as agricultural farmers/laborers/sub-tenants over the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
landholding, and granting the petitioner the exclusive right to
buy the property subject to the occurrence of certain
conditions. The respondents were not parties to the said deeds.
There is no evidence that the respondents agreed, expressly or
impliedly, to the said deeds or to the terms and conditions set
forth therein. Indeed, they assailed the validity of the said
deeds on their claim that the same were contrary to the letter
and spirit of P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657.
A reading the averments of the complaint will show that the
petitioner clearly has no cause of action against the
respondents for the principal relief prayed for therein, for the
trial court to fix a period within which to pay to each of the
defendants-tenants the balance of the P50.00 per square
meter, the consideration under the Deeds of Assignment
executed by the defendants-tenants. The respondents are not
parties or privies to the deeds of assignment. The matter of the
period for the petitioner to pay the balance of the said amount
to each of the defendants-tenants is an issue between them,
the parties to the deed.
The action of the petitioner against the respondents and the
defendants-tenants has no legal basis. Under the Deeds of
Assignment, the obligation of the petitioner to pay to each of
the defendants-tenants the balance of the purchase price
was conditioned on the occurrence of the following events:
(a) the respondents agree to sell their property to the
petitioner; (b) the legal impediments to the sale of the
landholding to the petitioner no longer exist; and, (c) the
petitioner decides to buy the property.
Valdez, Jr. vs CA (Cualoping)
489 SCRA 369|May 4, 2006 | Chico-Nazario
Petitioner/s:
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ,
Respondent/s:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
FACTS:
Complaint for unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella
Valdezes are owner[s] of residential lot at Carolina
Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal,
acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. in 1992 by virtue of
Sales Contract.
Fabellas without any color of title occupied the said lot
by building their house on it.
Fabellas refused to vacate despite verbal requests and
even after referral to the Barangay.
Respondents:
Fabellas contend that the complaint failed to state that
petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that
they were the lessors.
Claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for
more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection
report from the DENR.
Lower courts:
MTC favored petitioners, ordering Fabellas to vacate the
property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the
same plus attorneys fees.
RTC affirmed MTC decision.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
o Petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer
because they failed to show that they had given the
private respondents the right to occupy the premises or
that they had tolerated private respondents possession
of the same (a requirement in unlawful detainer cases).
MR was denied, hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners can make a case for unlawful detainer?
HELD: NO. There is no case for unlawful detainer.
Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real
property:
o (a) accion interdictal must file w/in one year
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Forcible entry (detentacion) - one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth.
(possession illegal from beginning)
Unlawful detainer (desahuico) - one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. (possession
originally legal)
o (b) accion publiciana if more than one year elapsed
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty
independently of title
o (c) accion reivindicatoria
an action to recover ownership also brought in
the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding
Allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of
fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that respondents
without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in
question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof. Nothing has been
said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started.
Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court
finds that the CA correctly found that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
*Heirs of Cabal vs Cabal (Cualoping)
G.R. 153625 |July 31, 2006 | Austria-Martinez
Petitioner/s:
HEIRS OF MARCELLINO CABAL, represented by VICTORIA CABAL
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Respondent/s:
SPOUSES LORENZO CABAL AND ROSITA CABAL
FACTS:
Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a 4,234-square meter parcel
of land situated at Barrio Palanginan, Iba, Zambales (Lot G)
Sometime in August 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his wife
Higinia Villanueva and his children: Marcelino, Daniel, Cecilio,
Natividad, Juan, Margarita, Lorenzo, Lauro and Anacleto.
Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed
Marcelino to build his house on a portion of Lot G (now the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E.) Since then, Marcelino lived
there and later, Marcelinos son also built his house there.
August 17, 1964: Marcelos heirs extra-judicially settled among
themselves Lot G into undivided equal shares of 423.40-square
meters each.
September 12, 1976: Heirs subdivided Lot G into two portions:
o Lot G-1 in favor of Marcelino,
o Lot G-2 in favor of the others.
On March 1, 1977, Marcelino mortgaged his share (Lot G-1) to
the Rural Bank of San Antonio.
Later, lot G-2 was further subdivided:
o The remaining portion, known as Lot 1 of the subdivision
plan, comprising 3387.20 square meters, had several
co-owners (including Lorenzo).
On August 3, 1978, the co-owners of Lot 1 executed a Deed of
Agreement of Partition with Sale. Lot 1 was subdivided among
the co-owners.
o In the same deed Lorenzo bought the shares of some
of the others. Thus his share in the co-ownership
amounted to 1,737 square meters.
On January 13, 1982, a land survey was conducted on Lot 1 by
and based on the survey, they submitted subdivision survey
plan designating shares of co-owners as Lots 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D
and 1-E. This was approved by the director of the bureau of
lands.
The subdivision plan revealed that Marcelino and his son
occupied and built their houses on a 423-square meter area
located on the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E and not the
adjacent lot designated as Lot G-1.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
On July 13, 1993, TCT No. 43419 covering Lot 1-E was issued in
the name of Lorenzo.
Respondents confronted Marcelino on this matter which
resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots
for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the
agreement did not materialize and efforts to settle the dispute
in the barangay level proved futile.
Hence, on August 10, 1994, respondents filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession with Damages against Marcelino
before the MTC. They alleged that Marcelino introduced
improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that
the adjacent lot is titled in his name.
Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action
against him because he has been in possession in good faith
since 1949 with the respondents knowledge and
acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription
has set in.
On January 24, 1997, during the pendency of the trial of the
case, Lorenzo died.
MTC rendered on November 19, 1997 its Decision in
favor of Marcelino
RTC reversed and set aside MTC decision.
On May 18, 2001, Marcelino filed a petition for review with the
CA, but died during the pendency of the case. CA later
affirmed decision of RTC.
ISSUES:
WON lot with Marcelinos house is co-owned by Marcelos heirs?
WON Marcelino is entitled to the lot because of prescription?
WON Marcelino built his house in good faith?
HELD:
NO.
Undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the property in
1949 with the consent of his father and has been in possession
since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs.
o Even before his father died, when the co-ownership was
created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
was already particularly designated or physically
segregated.
o Even before Lot G was subdivided in 1976, Marcelino
already occupied the disputed portion and even then
co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot.
o Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership
where the portion owned is concretely determined and
identifiable, though not technically described.
Since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the
disputed portion since 1949, with the consent of his father and
knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just and
equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not
one adjacent to it.
NO.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that
the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is
either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just
title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and
other real rights over immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.
The evidence presented during the trial proceedings in the
MTC were sorely insufficient to prove that acquisitive
prescription has set in with regards to the disputed lot. The tax
declaration and receipts presented in evidence factually
established only that Marcelino had been religiously paying
realty taxes on Lot G-1. Tax declarations and receipts can only
be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription when
coupled with proof of actual possession. Evidently, Marcelino
declared and paid realty taxes on property which he did not
actually possess.
YES. At least until the time he was informed that he was
encroaching on Lorenzos property.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges Oblige petitioners to pay for the land (or to rent
bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of if the land value is much greater)
proof. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if The Court notes that petitioners alternative prayer that
he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of swapping of lots be ordered cannot be granted.
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. o Initially agreed to this outside of court but never
In the present case, Marcelinos possession of the disputed lot introduced this in any of the proceedings.
was based on a mistaken belief that Lot G-1 is the same lot on
which he has built his house with the consent of his
father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation of bad *David vs Bandin (Cualoping)
faith.
149 SCRA 140 | April 8, 1987 | Yap
The fact that in 1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 is not an
indication of bad faith since there is no concrete evidence
G.R. No. L-48322 April 8, 1987
that he was aware at that time that the property covered by
FELIPE DAVID and ANTONIA G. DAVID
the title and the one he was occupying were not the same.
vs.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the
EULOGIO BANDIN (substituted by his legal heirs, namely: JUANA
applicable provision is:
SILVERIO, JOSE, GABRIEL, ANICETA, VIRGINIA and FELIX, all surnamed
o Article 448. The owner of the land on which
Bandin); GREGORIO BANDIN, RAYMUNDA BANDIN, VALENTIN BRIONES,
anything has been built, sown or planted in
SOFIO BRIONES and AGAPITA RAMOS.
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
No. L-49712 April 8, 1987
payment of the indemnity provided for in
MAGNO DE LA CRUZ
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, vs.
and the one who sowed, the proper HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; EULOGIO BANDIN (substituted by his
legal heirs, namely: JUANA, SILVERIO, JOSE, GABRIEL, ANICETA,
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
VIRGINIA and FELIX, all surnamed Bandin); GREGORIO BANDIN,
obliged to buy the land if its value is
RAYMUNDA BANDIN, SOFIO BRIONES and AGAPITA RAMOS
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose No. L-49716 April 8, 1987
to appropriate the building or trees after proper JUANITA MARTIN VDA. DE LUCENA MAXIMINA MARTIN VDA. DE COSME,
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the VICTORIA MARTIN VDA. DE OMANBAC, NEMESIO A. MARTIN, LEONORA
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, DE LA CRUZ and AQUILINA DE LA CRUZ
the court shall fix the terms thereof. vs.
EULOGIO BANDIN (substituted by his legal heirs, namely: JUANA,
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, this case must be SILVERIO, JOSE, GABRIEL, ANICETA, VIRGINIA and FELIX, all surnamed
remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for Bandin);, VALENTIN BRIONES, AGAPITA RAMOS and COURT OF
the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 APPEALS
and 548.
o Respondents can choose to: No. L-49687 April 8,1987
Pay for the buildings and appropriate them

15

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
JOSE RAMIREZ and HEIRS OF AMBROCIA P. VDA. DE SOTERO RAMIREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO BANDIN (substituted by his legal
heirs, namely: JUANA, SILVERIO, JOSE, GABRIEL, ANICETA, VIRGINIA
and FELIX, all surnamed BANDIN); GREGORIO BANDIN, RAYMUNDA
BANDIN, VALENTIN BRIONES, SOFIO BRIONES and AGAPITA RAMOS
FACTS:
Spouses Juan Ramos and Fortunate Calibo (both died in 1919)
were owners of two parcels of land situated in Las Pinas, Rizal:
o The Talon Property and the Laong Property
They left as heirs two legitimate children, Candida and
Victoriana Ramos, and grand-daughter, Agapita Ramos.
Both Candida and Victoriana Ramos died intestate.
o Candida Ramos was survived by the following heirs: 1)
Victoria Martin-Omanbac, 2) Antonio Martin, 3) Juanita
Martin Vda. de Lucena, 4) Maximina Martin Vda. de
Cosme, 5) Raymundo Martin, 6) Aquilina de la Cruz,
and 7) Leonora de la Cruz.
o Victoriana's heirs are her children from her two
marriages: 1) Eulogio Bandin, 2) Gregorio Bandin, 3)
Raymunda Bandin, 4) Valentin Briones, and 5) Sofio
Briones.
o Note: respondents are Victorianas heirs + Agapita
Ramos
Several transactions involving portions of the properties where
done involving several parties. (read case for explicit details)
The trial court held that the Talon and Laong properties formed
part of the estate of the spouses Juan Ramos and Fortunate
Calibo, which after their death devolved by right of succession
upon their heirs, namely, Candida Ramos, Victorians Ramos
and Agapita Ramos, each of whom was entitled to one-third
(1/3) pro-indiviso share of the properties.
The estate of the deceased spouses was never judicially or
extra-judicialy settled among their heirs, who, therefore,
remained pro-indiviso co-owners of the said properties, and
upon the death of Victorians and Candida, their respective
shares in turn passed to their heirs.
Trial court declared the plaintiffs, Agapita Ramos, and the heirs
of Victorians Ramos, entitled to two- thirds (2/3) pro-indiviso
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
share of the Talon and Laong properties, and ordered the
defendants heirs of Candida Ramos to reconvey to plaintiffs
their shares in those properties.
However, such reconveyance was no longer possible with
respect to the portions which, in the meantime, had been sold
and disposed of to third parties who were purchasers in good
faith and for value.
CA affirmed decision with modification: with respect to the
finding that third parties who bought portions of the properties
from the defendants heirs were purchasers in good faith This
finding was reversed by the respondent appellate court.
Separate petitions were then filed by various interested parties.
o G.R. No. L-49716 Heirs of Candida Ramos
o Various purchasers of portions of the properties
G.R. No. L-48322
G.R.No. L-49867
G.R. No. L-49712
ISSUE:
WON heirs of Candida Ramos can claim prescription?
WON the various purchasers are buyers in good faith?
HELD:
G.R. No. L-49716. Heirs of Candida Ramos
Primarily, petitioners alleged that the CA erred in not declaring
that private respondents' claim if any, is barred by prescription.
Petitioners claim that Juanita Martin, widow of Hermogenes
Lucena and daughter of Candida Ramos, had been in
possession of the property since 1943 to the exclusion of private
respondents. The trial court, however, found that Candida
Ramos, until her death in 1955, administered the Laong
property, and that plaintiffs-appellants were given their shares
of the fruits thereof, though irregular and at times little,
depending on the amount of the harvest.
Under Article 494 of the new Civil Code (Article 400 of the old
Civil Code), prescription generally does not run in favor of a
co-heir or co-owner as long as, he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. While an implied or constructive
16
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
trust prescribes in ten years, the rule does not apply where a
fiduciary relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the rights of the
plaintiffs as co-owners were repudiated by Candida Ramos in
her lifetime; in fact, the evidence as found by the trial court
show the contrary.
G.R. No. L-48322 Spouses who purchased portions of Laong
Property
Spouses Felipe David and Antonia G. David purchased
portions of the Laong property the spouses Gregorio and Mary
Venturanza, who, in turn, purchased the property from Juanita
Martin Vda. de Lucena.
Claim that they are buyers in good faith and for value.
As the record shows, petitioners bought the property when it
was still unregistered land. The defense of having purchased
the property in good faith may be availed of only where
registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good
faith on the clear title of the registered owner. One who
purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril His claim of
having bought the land in good faith, i.e. without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property,
would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not
actually own the property.
G.R.No. L-49867 Other purchasers claiming good faith
Petitioners Jose Ramirez and the heirs of Ambrocia P. Vda. de
Ramirez (widow of Sotero Ramirez), assail the decision of the
respondent CA declaring them purchasers in bad faith and
ordering them to reconvey to the plaintiffs Gregorio Bandin,
Raymunda Bandin&A Valentin Briones and Soto Briones, four-
fifteenth (4/15) share pro-indiviso of the properties they
purchased from the spouses Rufino Miranda and Natividad
Guinto.
The appellate court held that Jose Ramirez and his father
Sotero Ramirez were not purchasers in good faith, not having
made diligent investigation of the true ownership of the
properties they bought, but relied merely on the tax
declaration shown to them by the seller, Rufino Miranda.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
As mentioned earlier, the issue of good faith or bad faith of the
buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is
registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the
registered owner, whose title to the land is clean.
G.R. No. L-49712 Magno de la Cruz
The property purchased by him from Victoria Martin and
Maximina Martin were registered lands, covered by Torrens
title. Being a purchaser in good faith for value, Magno de la
Cruz is protected by the law. In the absence of a showing that
he had actual notice of the defect in the title of the vendors or
that he is a buyer in bad faith the deed of sale in his favor and
the corresponding certificate of title issued in his name cannot
be nullified and cancelled.
B.2 Co-Ownership
*Panganiban vs Oamil (Cualoping)
G.R. 149313|January 22, 2008 | Ynares-Santiago
Petitioner/s:
JULITA ROMBAUA PANGANIBAN, PAQUITO ROMBAUA, RUPERTO
ROMBAUA, TERESITA ROMBAUA TELAJE and LEONOR ROMBAUA
OPIANA
Respondent/s:
JULITA S. OAMIL
FACTS:
Property with two parts:
o 204.5 square meters facing 21stStreet (the 21st St.
portion)
o 204.5 square meters facing Canda Street (the Canda
St. portion).
Petitioners and their father Partenio are acknowledged co-
owners of the subject property to the following extent:
o one-half to Partenio as his conjugal share
17
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o one-sixth each of the remaining half to petitioners and
Partenio as the surviving heirs of Juliana (partenios
deceased wife).
April 26, 1993 Oamil (respondent), filed a complaint for specific
performance with damages with RTC of Olongapo City
o Wants Partenio to execute a final deed of sale over
land described in a prior "Agreement to Sell."
o "Agreement to Sell" consists of 21st street portion, and is
claimed by Oamil to be Partenios conjugal share.
December 26, 1993: RTC ordered Partenio to execute deed of
sale over the portion of the property.
o But did not specify which half of the property the
21st St. portion or the Canda St. portion should be
deeded to respondent as buyer of Partenios conjugal
share.
Partenio failed to appeal, and the decision became final and
executory on February 4, 1994.
In June 1994, petitioners filed a verified petition for relief from
the decision of the trial court, grounded on the following:
o 1) that Partenios conjugal share in the property, and
that of petitioners as well, are being litigated in a
judicial partition proceeding (the partition case) which
is pending with the CA.
o (2) that petitioners were unjustly deprived of the
opportunity to protect and defend their interest in Civil
Case No. 140-0-93.
January 13, 1995: Trial court denied the petition for relief
because the decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had become
final and executory.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but deferred the
proceedings to await the resulting decision of the partition
case, where the trial court, in its decision, awarded specifically
the Canda St. portion to Partenio as his conjugal share.
In the meantime, or sometime in 1995, a Motion for leave of
court to file a Complaint in Intervention was filed by Sotero
Gan (Gan), who claims to be the actual and rightful owner of
Partenios conjugal share.
In another Order dated October 23, 1997, the trial court
denied Gans motion, as well as the petitioners motion for
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
reconsideration of the January 13, 1995 order denying the
petition for relief.
March 2, 2001: CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,
which affirmed the appealed October 23, 1997 Order.
o Sustained ruling that Partenios conjugal share in the
subject property consists of the 21st St. portion, thereby
disregarding the prior final and executory decision in
the partition case, which declares that Partenio is
entitled to the Canda St. portion.
o Based the award of the 21st St. portion to respondent
on the ground that petitioners have always
acknowledged their father Partenios "acts of
ownership" over the 21st St. portion; signifying their
consent and barring them from questioning the award.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners can intervene in the civil case proceedings in order
to protect their rights as co-owners?
HELD: YES.
Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. During the existence of the
co-ownership and before a partition:
o no individual can claim title to any definite portion of
the community property;
o All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota
or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
o Every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property.
o Co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this
undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights.
The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion
which may be awarded to him upon the partition of
the property.
Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or
partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or
more of the co-owners may take part in the division of the
thing owned in common and object to its being effected
without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in
18
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the
debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
The decision in the partion case determines what Partenio, and
ultimately, respondent, as his successor-in-interest, is entitled to
in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. As Partenios successor-in-interest to
the property, respondent could not acquire any superior right
in the property than what Partenio is entitled to or could
transfer or alienate after partition.
As early as May 17, 1990, when respondent and Partenio
executed the "Agreement to Sell", the former knew that the
property she was purchasing was conjugal property owned in
common by Partenio and the heirs of his deceased wife. And
while Civil Case No. 140-0-93 (the specific performance case)
was pending, respondent was informed of the pendency of
Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (the partition case). Yet,
respondent did not intervene, nor did she take part, nor enter
any formal opposition as assignee of Partenios conjugal
share in the property in said partition proceedings. She did
not exercise the rights granted her under Article 497 of the Civil
Code. Instead, when the court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93
decided to suspend the proceedings and hold the same in
abeyance while the appeal in the partition case remained
unresolved, the respondent unconditionally agreed to its
temporary abatement. In other words, she chose to sit back
and await the resolution thereof.
Consequently, when the decision in the partition case became
final and executory without the respondent having questioned
the same in any manner whatsoever, by appeal or otherwise,
the division of property decreed therein may no longer be
impugned by her.
Thus,the trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 could not award
the 21st St. portion to Partenio, since the court in the partion
case specifically awarded the Canda St. portion to him.
The decision in the partion case should put an end to the co-
ownership between Partenio and the respondents, and the
award made to each co-owner of specific portions of the
property as their share in the co-ownership should be
respected.
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Partenio, as declared owner of the Canda St. portion, could
have transferred to respondent only that part of the property
and not the 21st St. portion. Although Partenio was free to sell or
transfer his undivided interest to the respondent, the effect of
such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to
him upon the partition of the property.
The court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is not a partition court but
one litigating an ordinary civil case. It cannot pass judgment
on evidence which should be presented in the partition case.
The ruling in the partition case that the Canda St. portion shall
go to Partenio became the law of the case and continues to
be binding between the parties as well as their successors-in-
interest, the decision in said case having become final and
executory. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of
that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew in Civil Case
No. 140-0-93 since said issue had been resolved and finally laid
to rest in the partition case, by conclusiveness of judgment, if
not by the principle of res judicata. It may not be reversed,
modified or altered in any manner by any court.
With respect to Gans intervention, it is no longer proper
considering that the decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had
become final and executory. In addition he did not appeal the
assailed CA decision so the decision has become final and
executory.
*Cruz vs. CA (Go)
G.R. No. 122904|April 15, 2005 |Tinga, J.
Petitioner/s: Adoracion E. Cruz, Thelma Debbie E. Cruz, Gerry E. Cruz,
and Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals, Summit Financing Corp., Victor S. Sta.
Ana, Maximo C. Contreras, Ramon G. Manalastas, and Vicente Torres
FACTS:
Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners. They
inherited land from Delfin Cruz, her deceased husband.
On Aug. 22, 1977, the petitioners, including Arnel Cruz (their
brother) executed a Deed of Partial Partition, distributing to
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
each of them their shares consisting of several lots previously
held by them in common. A day after, they also executed a
Memorandum of Agreement wherein they agreed to share
equally the proceeds of the sale of properties although the
properties have already been subdivided and individually
titled in the name of the former co-owners.
In January 1983, Thelma Cruz discovered that the TCT of one of
the properties located in Taytay, Rizal was transferred to
Summit. It was discovered that Arnel Cruz loaned P104,000
from Summit in favor of Nelson Tamayo (husband of one of the
petitioners), and secured this by executing a REM over the
subject property. Arnel Cruz failed to pay, thus, Summit
foreclosed the property.
Petitioners argue that they co-owned the properties with Arnel
Cruz, and thus, the mortgage was void since they did not
consent to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners stating that the heirs
had intended to keep the inherited properties in a state of co-
ownership, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement.
Also, the RTC stated that Summit was negligent for failing to
inquire further into the TCT of the property. The REM was
declared null and void ab initio.
Summit appealed and the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC. The CA held that the Memorandum of Agreement does
not contain any proscription against the mortgage of the
subject property, although it provides that the parties are
entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale.
ISSUE: WON the REM is valid.
HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court ruled that the co-ownership among the
parties was already terminated when they executed the Deed
of Partial Partition. Co-ownerships are terminated upon judicial
or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned in common.
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment
of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong.
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In the Deed of Partial Partition, the subject property was
assigned to Arnel Cruz. He thus acquired absolute ownership of
the subject property. As the absolute owner, Arnel Cruz had
the right to enjoy and dispose of the property, as well as the
right to constitute a real estate mortgage over the same,
without the need to secure the consent of the petitioners.
The CA correctly held that in the MOA, the parties only bound
themselves to share in the proceeds of the sale of the
properties.
Resuena vs CA (Cualoping)
G.R. 128338|March 28, 2005 | Tinga
Petitioner/s:
TINING RESUENA, ALEJANDRA GARAY, LORNA RESUENA, ELEUTERIO
RESUENA, EUTIQUIA ROSARIO and UNISIMA RESUENA
Respondent/s:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, 11th DIVISION and JUANITO BORROMEO, SR.
FACTS:
Borromeo (respondent) is the co-owner of certain parcels of
land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos.
2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate.
o Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587
o Late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja
(Spouses Bascon) own two-eights (2/8) thereof.
o Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and
the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the
proportion of their undivided shares was not
determined a quo.
Petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena,
Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper
portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of
the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon.
Petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592,
allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja,
one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions
of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.
Respondent developed portions of the properties into a resort
known as the Borromeo Beach Resort and demanded
petitioners vacate but they refused.
16 February 1994: respondent filed a Complaint for ejectment
with the MTC against the petitioners.
o Held that respondent had no right to evict petitioners.
RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC.
o Held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any
one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment,
may successfully be invoked by the respondent
because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and
possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-
owners.
ISSUE: WON respondent Borromeo can legally evict petitioners?
HELD: YES.
No argument was presented in this petition with regard to
Eutiquia Rosarios claim to be allowed to continue in her
occupation of Lot No. 2592
o SC maintains lower court decision that respondent has
the right to eject Eutiquia Rosario from Lot No. 2592.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides simply that [a]ny one of
the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment, is a
categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of
respondent to evict petitioners from Lot. No. 2587.
One co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the
rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for
the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an
adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the
property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are
authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled
with respondents right under Article 487, clearly settles
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy
the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by
an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them.
Petitioners pose the strange claim that respondent had
estopped himself from filing an ejectment case against
petitioners by his testimony in Civil Case No. R-14600.
o Irrelevant to the case at bar, as it does nothing to
strengthen the claim of petitioners that they had a right
to occupy the properties. It merely indicates that there
might have been an agreement between the Spouses
Bascon and Borromeo as to which of them would
occupy what portion of Lot No. 2587. Yet this averment
hardly establishes a definitive partition, or moreover,
any right of petitioners to dwell in any portion of Lot No.
2587.
o Besides, [e]stoppel is effective only as between the
parties thereto or their successors in interest; thus, only
the spouses Bascon or their successors in interest may
invoke such estoppel. A stranger to a transaction is
neither bound by, nor in a position to take advantage
of, an estoppel arising therefrom.
Thus, in order that the petition may acquire any whiff of merit,
petitioners are obliged to establish a legal basis for their
continued occupancy of the properties.
o Mere tolerance of one of the co-owners, assuming that
there was such, does not suffice to establish such right.
o Tolerance in itself does not bear any legal fruit, and it
can easily be supplanted by a sudden change of heart
on the part of the owner.
There is no writing presented to evidence any claim of
ownership or right to occupancy to the subject properties.
o Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that acts which
have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public
instrument.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
All six (6) petitioners claim the right to be reimbursed necessary
expenses for the cost of constructing their houses in
accordance with Article 546 of the Civil Code.
It is well-settled that while the Article allows full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good
faith
o Occupation by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith
o Therefore petitioners have no right to reimbursement for
the expenses incurred when building their houses.
*Imperial vs. CA (Go)
G.R. No. 102037|July 17, 1996 |Panganiban, J.
Petitioner/s: Melanio Imperial
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Guillermo Solleza, et al.
FACTS:
Lot No. 1052 and Lot No. 1091, both situated in Lucban,
Quezon, were originally owned by Maria Cuvinar Imperial, who
died on June 12, 1979. She was survived by her two children:
Adela and Melanio. Adela died on May 4, 1986 and is survived
by her husband Guillermo Solleza and her children.
On May 1, 1979, Adela and Melanio agreed to register the lots
in the name of Melanio to expedite the titling of the parcels of
land. For this purpose, Adela executed a document captioned
Kasulatan ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan dated May 1, 1979
waiving her rights over the lots. On the same date, Melanio
ISSUE: WON Adela and her heirs exclusively own Lot No. 1091.
executed a document entitled Pagwawalang Bisa sa
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan declaring that the earlier document
HELD: YES.
executed by Adela was simulated in order to expedite the
registration of the lots.
By virtue of the waiver, Melanio was able to obtain titles over
the lots in his name. Melanio also executed a document
entitled Sa Sino Mang Dapat Makatalastas Nito
acknowledging the one-half share of his sister in Lot Nos. 1091
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and 1052, and that Adela is also entitled to one-half share in
the proceeds of the sale of subdivision lots in the said lots.
On May 4, 1985, Melanio sold Lot No. 1052 for P20,000. The sale
was discovered by Rose Solleza, one of Adelas children.
Adelas heirs filed a case praying that inasmuch as Lot No.
1052 has been sold by Melanio without giving any share of
proceeds to Adela, Lot No. 1091 should be reconveyed or
returned to the estate of Adela.
The RTC of Lucena ordered Melanio to pay the heirs of Adela
P10,000 plus 16% interest, litigation expenses, and exemplary
damages. The RTC also declared Melanio as the true and
rightful owner of Lot No. 1091.
Upon appeal, the CA held that Lot Nos. 1052 and 1091 were
owned in common by Melanio and Adela. The CA took note
of the document Pagwawalang Bisa sa Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan acknowledging that the waiver of Adela was only
simulated. Melanio however breached the trust reposed upon
him by his sister. When Melanio appropriated for himself the
entire proceeds from the sale of Lot No. 1052, he was deemed
to have waived his share in Lot No. 1091. Lot No. 1091 should
now be solely owned by Adela and her heirs, otherwise,
Melanio would be enriching himself at the expense of his sister
and her heirs.
However, Melanio claims that Adela already sold to him her
share of Lot. 1091 as evidenced by the receipts with the
amounts of P4,575 on June 16, 1979; P200 on Nov. 8, 1979; and
another P200 on May 7, 1980, representing the one-half price
of Lot No. 1091.
Law and equity dictate that Lot No. 1091 should now belong to
the estate of Adela Imperial Solleza.
Adela did not execute a deed in favor of Melanio ceding her
share in Lot No. 1091. The amounts mentioned in the receipts
were not intended to be part of the purchase price of Lot No.
1091. The SC found it clear that the amounts paid to Adela
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
constituted her share in the proceeds of the sales of subdivision
lots which were part of Lot No. 1091 in relation to the
agreement found in the document Sa Sino Mang Dapat
Makatalastas Nito.
Since Melanio did not give his co-heir her share on of the
proceeds of the sale of Lot No. 1052, Lot No. 1091 rightfully
belongs to the heirs of Adela.
Dino vs. Dino (Go)
G.R. No. 178044|Jan. 19, 2011 |Carpio, J.
Petitioner/s: Alain M. Dino
Respondent/s: Ma. Caridad L. Dino
FACTS:
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They decided to live together in 1984 until they
decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, they decided to live
together again, and eventually got married on Jan. 14, 1998.
On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, using psychological incapacity as his
ground. He stated that respondent failed in her marital
obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family. Also, petitioner
alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon
respondent who was already living in the U.S. Petitioner later
found out that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner which was
granted by the Superior Court of California on May 25, 2001.
Petitioner also learned that respondent already married a
certain Manuel Alcantara on Oct. 5, 2001.
Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, submitted a report
stating that respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
and that her disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable. On Oct. 18, 2006, the trial court granted the petition
on the ground that respondent was psychologically
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage shall be issued only after the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Art.
147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of
the Family Code.
HELD: YES.
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdez v. RTC that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
Art. 147 or Art. 148 of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, Art. 147 is applicable because the following
elements are present:
o The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
o They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
o Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
Since the marriage of the petitioner and respondent is
included in the ambit of Art. 147 of the Family Code, what
governs the liquidation of the properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership found
in the Civil Code.
Under Art. 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity marriage.
*Padilla vs. Magdua (Go)
G.R. No. 176858|Sept. 15, 2010 |Carpio, J.
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Juanita Padilla, represented by Claudio Padilla
23
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Respondent/s: Dominador Magdua
FACTS:
Juanita Padilla, the mother of the petitioners, owned a piece
of land in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After her death on
March 23, 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs, sought to have the
land partitioned.
The petitioners sent word to Ricardo Bahia, their eldest brother,
regarding their plans for the partition of land. On June 5, 1998,
Ricardo replied stating that he had declared the land for
himself, prejudicing the rights of the petitioners as his co-heirs. It
was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a
notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in favor of
Ricardo on June 4, 1966 making him the sole owner of the
land. The records do not show that the land was registered
under the Torrens system.
On Oct. 26, 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of
Tacloban City for recovery of ownership, possession, partition,
and damages. Petitioners also sought to declare void the sale
of the land by Ricardos daughters (Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas) to respondent Dominador Magdua.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation,
had the land transferred in his name without the consent and
knowledge of hi co-heirs. They further alleged that the
signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable
because on May 15, 1978, Juanita executed a written
instrument stating that she would be leaving behind to her
children the land which she had inherited from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC dismissed the case. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the action was not merely for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition, and damages,
but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul
contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case
was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC ruled that the case was only filed in 2001, or more than 30
years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is
imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the
property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then
prescription can set in.
Moreover, Dominador maintains that Juanita, during her
lifetime, never renounced her signature on the Affidavit or
interposed objections to Ricardos possession of the land,
which was open, absolute, and in the concept of an owner. As
a buyer in good faith, Dominador invoked the defense of
acquisitive prescription against petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the present action is already barred by prescription.
HELD: NO.
Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed
in Art. 494 of the Civil Code.
o Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners of co-heirs as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order
that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur:
o (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or other co-owners;
o (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners;
and
o (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After
Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of
their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified
24
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
of the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998,
notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the
land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the
land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs
after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land.
In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title
may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be
clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others,
and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to
run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to
run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice
of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the land. Since
petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October
2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year
period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to
claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot
invoke acquisitive prescription.
Marmo vs. Anacay (Go)
G.R. No. 182585|Nov. 27, 2009 |Brion, J.
Petitioner/s: Josephine Marmo, Nestor Esguerra, Danilo del Pilar and
Marisa del Pilar
Respondent/s: Moises O. Anacay
FACTS:
On Sept. 16, 2003, respondent Anacay filed a case for
Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the
petitioners. The complaint states that the respondent is the
bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife Gloria Anacay
(now deceased) of a 50-square meter parcel of land located
in Dasmarinas, Cavite.
They authorized Josephine Marmo to sell the property. Marmo
then sold it to Danilo del Pilar for 520k payable in monthly
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
installments from May 2001 to June 2006. Danilo however
defaulted in his payments from December 2002 onwards.
Anacay then discovered that the title over the land was
cancelled and a new one was issued in Marmo's name by
virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale. The same title was
subsequently transferred to Danilo. Anacay sought for the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the cancellation
of the title. Anacay also demanded petitioner Danilos
payment of the balance of P347,000 with interest.
In her answer, Marmo averred that the children, who
succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the
property, should have been included as plaintiffs because they
are indispensable parties. Anacay argued that his children are
not indispensable parties because the issue in the case can be
resolved without their participation.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anacay, and noted that the motion
to include the children was simply filed to delay the
proceedings. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling and held that
the children are not indispensible parties.
ISSUE: WON the children are indispensible parties in the case.
HELD: NO.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action and who, for this
reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
However, when the controversy involves a property held in
common, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
When a suit is brought by a co-owner, without repudiating the
co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the
benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without
impleading the other co-owners. Conversely, where the co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership
of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner,
his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be
impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights
and interests of these other co-owners.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
In the case at bar, Anacoy never disputed the existence of a
co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of
the litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a bona-fide
co-owner of the questioned property, along with his
deceased wife.
Moreover and more importantly, the respondents claim in his
complaint revolves around the issue that his and his wifes
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Marmo were
falsified. This issue of falsification does not require the
participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can
be determined without their presence because they are not
parties to the document; their signatures do not appear
therein. Additionally, their rights and interests as co-owners are
adequately protected by their co-owner and father, Moises
Anacay, since the complaint was made precisely to recover
ownership and possession of the properties owned in common,
and as such, will redound to the benefit of all co-owners.
C. Rights arising from ownership
C.1 Right of Accession
Heirs of Navarro vs. IAC (Go)
G.R. No. 68166|Feb. 12, 1997 |Hermosisima, Jr., J.
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Emiliano Navarro
Respondent/s: Intermediate Appellate Court and Heirs of Sinforoso
Pascual
FACTS:
On Oct. 3, 1946 Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately 17
hectares. This application was denied on Jan. 15, 1953.
Subsequently, Emiliano Navarro filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore
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land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, the application
was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries on May 27, 1988,
granted the application but only to the extent of 7 hectares of
the property. The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan
opposed Navarros application, but the Secretary of Natural
Resources and the Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the
President, affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforo
Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan
(described in Plan Psu-175181) with an area of 146,611 square
meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River as
well as the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing
sand and silt on Pascuals property resulting in an accretion on
the northern portion of his land. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner.
On Feb 13, 1961, Navarro filed an opposition on Pascuals
application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be
registered is part of the public domain, it being part of the
foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession
of a part of the subject property by virtue of his fishpond
permit. During the pendency of the case, both Sinforoso and
Emiliano died and were substituted by their heirs.
The RTC ruled that the subject property is part of the public
domain and thus cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings. Upon appeal, the IAC reversed the findings of
the lower court and granted the petition for registration of the
subject property but excluding therefrom 100 meters.
ISSUE: WON the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore
land, or WON said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of
Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of Manila Bay. If formed by the
action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion
but if formed by the action of Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
26
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

HELD: The land is part foreshore land and thus cannot be subject of 457 of the Civil Code, but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
land registration proceedings. 1866.

The claim of Pascuals ownership of the subject land is

anchored on Art. 457 of the Civil Code. Accretion as a mode *Carrascoso Jr. vs. CA (Go)
of acquiring property under Art. 457 requires the concurrence G.R. No. 123672|Dec. 14, 2005 |Carpio-Morales, J.
of the following requisites:
o That the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual Petitioner/s: Fernando Carrascoso
and imperceptible;
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals, Lauro Leviste, as Director and
o That it be the result of the action of the waters of the
Minority Stockholder and On Behalf of Other Stockholders of El Dorado
river; and
Plantation, Inc. and El Dorado Plantation Inc., represented by one of
o That the land where the accretion takes place is
its minority stockholders, Lauro Leviste
adjacent to the bank of the river.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while
FACTS:
alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the
El Dorado Plantation, Inc. was the registered owner of a parcel
riverbank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian
of land with an area of approximately 1,825 hectares in
owner. Riparian owners are distinct from littoral owners, the
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro.
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or
On Feb. 15, 1972, the Board of Directors of El Dorado issued a
lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Art. 457,
Resolution authorizing Feliciano Leviste (then President of El
is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the
Dorado) to negotiate the sale of the property.
moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically
On March 23, 1972, El Dorado through Feliciano Leviste, sold
registered property, hence, subject to the acquisition of third
the property to Fernando Carrascoso for P1,800,000. Of the
persons.
P1,800,000, P290,000 shall be paid to PNB to release the
The SC finds that the respondents claim of ownership over the
property from being mortgaged, P210,000 shall be paid to El
disputed property under the principle of accretion is
Dorado, and the remaining P1,300,000 plus interest with the
misplaced.
rate of 10% per annum, shall be paid within a period of three
In the case at bar, if the accretion were to be attributed to the
years (P519,833.33 per year). From the provisions of the Deed of
action of the two rivers, the alluvium should have been
Sale, Carrascoso was to pay the full amount of the purchase
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western
price on March 23, 1975. On the same day, Carrascoso
boundaries of the tract of land, not on the northern portion
registered the property under his name.
thereof which is adjacent to Manila Bay. Clearly lacking is the
The Board of Directors of El Dorado also passed a Resolution
third requisite of accretion, which is that the alluvium is
stating that the corporation interposes no objection to the
deposited on the portion of the claimants land which is
property being mortgaged by Carrascoso to any bank of his
adjacent to the river bank. The SC has held in several previous
choice as long as the balance on the Deed of Sale is
cases that the Manila bay is part of the sea.
recognized.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a riverbank but
On March 24, 1972, Carrascoso and his wife Marlene executed
on a sea bank or what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay
a Real Estate Mortgage over the property in favor of Home
which adjoined private respondents own tract of land on the
Savings Bank (HSB) to secure a loan in the amount of
northern side. As such, the applicable law in this case is not Art.

27

BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
P1,000,000. This was later amended to include an additional
three year loan of P70,000.
The three-year period for Carrascoso to fully pay for the
property on March 23, 1975 passed without him having paid
the remaining amount.
In the meantime, on July 11, 1975, Carrascoso and PLDT,
through its president Ramon Cojuangco, executed an
Agreement to Buy and Sell whereby the former agreed to sell
1,000 hectares of the property for a total of P3,000,000. This
Agreement however was not registered and annotated on
Carrascosos TCT.
On Dec. 27, 1976, Lauro Leviste, one of the stockholders of El
Dorado, through his counsel, called the attention of the Board
to ask for a rescission of the sale between El Dorado and
Carrascoso due to the latters default. On Feb. 21, 1977, Jose
Leviste, President of El Dorado, sent a letter to Carrascoso
informing him of his default and that El Dorado was seeking for
a rescission of the March 23, 1972 Deed of Sale of Real
Property. Carrascoso did not respond.
On March 15, 1977, El Dorado filed a complaint for rescission of
the Deed of Sale of Real Property with damages before the CFI
of Occidental Mindoro. They also sought for the cancellation
of Carrascosos TCT. On the same day, El Dorado caused to be
annotated on the TCT a Notice of Lis Pendens.
In the meantime, Carrascoso and PLDT forged on April 6, 1977
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the 1,000 hectare portion of the
property subject of their July 11, 1975 Agreement to Buy and
Sell.
PLDT, on their comment to El Dorados complaint, prayed that
they be considered as purchasers in good faith and that they
be entitled to the possession and ownership of the 1,000
hectare portion of the property, together with all the
improvements they built thereon. Moreover, they averred that
they bought the property even before the Notice of Lis
Pendens was annotated on the TCT.
ISSUE: WON PLDT can keep the 1,000 hectare portion of the land.
HELD: NO.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
PLDT cannot keep the land.
A notice of Lis Pendens is an announcement to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property. A purchaser who buys
registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation
between vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his
vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the
pending litigation.
PLDT contends that they purchased the property on July 11,
1975, before the Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated (March
15, 1977). However, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between
Carrascoso and PLDT entered on July 11, 1975 was merely a
preparatory contract in a nature of a contract to sell. Being a
contract to sell, what was vested by the July 11, 1975
Agreement to Buy and Sell to PLDY was merely the beneficial
title to the 1,000 hectare portion of the property what was
acquired by PLDT was merely an inchoate and expectant right
which would ripen into a vested right only upon the acquisition
of ownership.
Since the April 6, 1977 Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the
Notice of Lis Pendens, and the SC affirmed the rescission of the
Deed of Sale executed by El Dorado in favor of Carrascoso,
possession of the 1,000 hectare portion of the property should
be turned over by PLDT to El Dorado.
As regards to the improvements introduced by PLDT on the
1,000 hectare portion of the property, a distinction should be
made between those which PLDT built prior to the annotation
of the Notice of Lis Pendens and those which it introduced
subsequent thereto.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Art.
448 of the Civil Code governs.
o Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for
in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
28
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is delivered to El Dorado, subject to the reimbursement of
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In expenses if El Dorado opt to appropriate the improvements.
such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner If El Dorado opts for compulsory sale however, the payment of
of the land does not choose to appropriate the rent should continue up to the actual transfer of ownership.
buildings or trees after the proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. *PNB vs. De Jesus (Go)
The right to choose between appropriating the improvement
G.R. No. 149295|Sept. 23, 2003 |Vitug, J.
or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder,
planter or sower stands, is given to the owner of the land.
Petitioner/s: Philippine National Bank
On the other hand, when a person builds in bad faith on the
Respondent/s: Generoso de Jesus represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
land of another, Articles 449 and 450 govern,
Christian de Jesus
o Art. 449. He who builds plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
FACTS:
without the right to indemnity.
Respondent acquired a 1,144-square meter parcel of land in
o Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. On March 26, 1993,
been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
respondent discovered that the northern portion of the lot was
the demolition of the work or that the planting or
being encroached upon by a building of PNB to the extent of
sowing be removed, in order to replace the things in
124-square meters. Respondent sent two demand letters but
their former condition at the expense of the person
PNB refused to vacate the area.
who built, planted of sowed; or he may compel the
On June 10, 1995, respondent filed a complaint against PNB
builder or the planter to pay the price of the l and, and
before the RTC of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of
the sower the proper rent.
ownership and possession with damages over the disputed
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PLDT commenced
property.
construction of improvements on the 1,000 hectare portion of
PNB asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
the property immediately after the execution of the July 11,
sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Ignacio, the encroachment
1975 Agreement to Buy and Sell, with full consent from
was already in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor
Carrascoso. Thus, until March 15, 1977 when the Notice of Lis
Ignacio offered the area in question (which then belonged to
Pendens was annotated, PLDT is deemed to have been in
Mayor Ignacio) to PNB at P100 per square meter which PNB
good faith in introducing improvements over the subject
claimed to have accepted. However, the sale did not
property. After March 15, 1977 however, PLDT could no longer
materialize, and without the knowledge and consent of PNB,
invoke the rights of a builder in good faith.
Mayor Ignacio mortgaged the lot to DBP.
Should El Dorado then opt to appropriate the improvements
Both the trial court and the CA decided in favor of respondent,
made by PLDT, it should only be made to pay for those
declaring him to be the rightful owner of the disputed 124-
improvements at the time good faith existed on the part of
square meter portion of the land. PNB appealed contending
PLDT or until March 15, 1977.
that the CA gravely erred in law in adjudging PNB a builder in
The commencement of PLDTs payment of reasonable rent
bad faith over the encroached property in question.
should start on March 15, 1977 as well, to be paid until such
time that the possession of the 1,000 hectare portion is
ISSUE: WON the respondent is the rightful owner of the disputed land.

29

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
HELD: YES.
Both the RTC and the CA have rejected the idea that the
petitioner can be considered as a builder in good faith. In the
context that such term is used in particular reference to Art.
448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one
who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any defect in
his title or mode of acquisition.
The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity
of ones rights, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intentions to overreach another.
Evidently, PNB was aware, prior to its acquisition of the land
and building from Ignacio, that a part of the building sold to it
stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on
the land by Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property
transferred to petitioner. Art. 448 refers to a piece of land
whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of
who has built some works, and not to a case where the owner
of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated,
where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own
land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. In
fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provision
of Art. 448.
*Sps. Enriqueta Rasdas vs. Estenor (Go)
G.R. No. 157605|Dec. 13, 2005 |Tinga, J.
Petitioner/s: Sps. Enriqueta Rasdas and Tomas Rasdas, Sps., Esperanza
A. Villa, and Ernesto Villa
Respondent/s: Jaime Estenor
FACTS:
The dispute centers on a parcel of land with an area of 703
square meters located in Ilagan, Isabela.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
On Oct. 29, 1992, Estenor filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership and Possession with Damages against the
petitioners (Civil Case No. 673). In the complaint, Estenor
asserted that he was the owner of the subject property, which
was then in possession of petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed
the judgment of the RTC. Further, the CA directed the
petitioners to vacate the land.
Petitioners filed a complaint against Estenor for just
compensation relating to the houses they had built on the
property, owing to their purported status as builders in good
faith (Civil Case No. 1090).
ISSUE: WON petitioners were builders in good faith.
HELD: NO.
In the decision of the CA in Civil Case No. 673, it was observed
that the occupancy of the lot by the predecessors of the
petitioners expired in April 1965. Thereafter, Vivencio Aggabao,
begged and pleaded that he be allowed to stay on the
premises of the land as his children, herein petitioners, were still
studying and it will be hard for them to transfer residence at
that time. Out of compassion, they were allowed to
temporarily stay on the land in question.
In this case, the possession of the land by the petitioners until
March 31, 1965 was by virtue of a contract. However, after
March 31, 1965, their possession of the land was only by
tolerance.
Evidently, the CA observed that as early as 1965, the father of
the petitioners had already known that he did not own the
property, and that his stay therein was merely out of tolerance.
The structures for which the petitioners sought to be
compensated were constructed in 1989 and 1990, or long after
they had known they were not the owners of the subject
property. It is clear that the petitioners are not entitled to the
just compensation they seek. Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code,
the builder in bad faith on the land of another loses what is
built without the right to indemnity. Petitioners were in bad faith
30
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
when they built the structures, as they had known that the
subject property did not belong to them.
*Sulo sa Nayon Inc. vs. Nayong Pilipino FoundatIon (Go)
G.R. No. 170923|Jan. 20, 2009 |Puno, C.J.
Petitioner/s: Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. and/or Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.
and Jose Marcel E. Panlilio
Respondent/s: Nayong Pilipino Foundation
FACTS:
Nayong Pilipino foundation is a GOCC and is the owner of a
parcel of land in Pasay City known as the Nayong Pilipino
Complex. Pettioner Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. (PVHI) formerly
called Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws. Jose Marcel
Panlilio is its Senior Executive Vice President.
On June 1, 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong
Pilipino Complex to petitioner for the construction and
operation of a hotel building, to be known as he Philippine
Village Hotel. The lease was for a period of 21 years, or until
May 1996. It is renewable for a period of 25 years under the
same terms. On March 7, 1995, petitioner notified respondent
of its intention to renew the contract for another 25 years.
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment
of their monthly rental. Respondent repeatedly demanded
petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.
On Sept. 5, 2001, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC of Pasay City. Respondent
computed the arrears of petitioners in the amount of
P26,183,225.14 as of July 31, 2001.
The MeTC ruled in favor of respondent directing the petitioner
to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals.
The RTC modified the MeTCs decision stating that the
petitioners were builders in good faith, considering the
permanency of the construction and substantial value of the
improvements they have made over the property.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
The CA held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on
accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
when it held that the petitioners were builders in good faith
and thus have the right to indemnity.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were builders in good faith.
HELD: NO.
The late Senator Arturo Tolentino, a leading expert in Civil Law
explained that Art. 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to
cases where one builds, plants or sown on land in which he
believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to land where
the only interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a
holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to
the land. In fact, as lessees, they recognize that the
respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is
that because of the improvements, which are of substantial
value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with
the permission of respondent, they should be considered
builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of
the property until they are reimbursed.
The SC affirms the ruling of the CA that the introduction of
valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give
the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which
rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such
situation would allow the lessee to easily improve the lessor out
of hit property. A lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in
bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code. His rights are governed by Art. 1678.
SPS Nuguid vs. CA (Go)
G.R. No. 151815|Feb. 23, 205 |Quisumbing, J.
Petitioner/s: Spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda T. Nuguid
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Pedro Pecson
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
FACTS:
Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27
Kamias Road, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-
storey apartment building. He failed t pay realty taxes, thus,
the lot was sold at a public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno,
who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda
Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale, but the RTC
upheld the spouses title but declared that the four-door two-
storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale.
On Nov. 15, 1993, the RTC, relying upon Article 546 of the Civil
Code, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse
Pecson for his construction cost of P53,000, following which, the
spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ
of possession over the lot and improvements. In the same order
the RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same amount of
monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants
occupying the apartment units or P21,000 per month from
June 23, 1993, and allowed the offset of the amount of P53,000
due from the Nuguids against the amount of rents collected by
Pecson from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993 from the
tenants of the apartment.
Upon appeal, the CA, relying upon Art. 448 of the Civil Code
affirmed the order of the RTC.
Frustrated, Pecson filed a petition for review. The SC ruled that
the Spouses Nuguid must reimburse Pecson, otherwise, he shall
be restored to the possession of the apartment building until
payment of the required indemnity. The SC remanded the
case to the trial court to assess the current market value of the
improvements.
In so ruling, this Court pointed out that:
o Article 448 of the Civil Code is not apposite to the case
at bar where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later lost ownership of the
land by sale, but may, however, be applied by
analogy;
o The current market value of the improvements should
be made as the basis of reimbursement;
o Pecson was entitled to retain ownership of the building
and, necessarily, the income therefrom;
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
o The Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the
trial courts determination of the indemnity, but also in
ordering Pecson to account for the rentals of the
apartment building from June 23, 1993 to September
23, 1993.
On Oct. 7, 1997, the trial court issued their Order stating that on
Nov. 21, 1996, the parties manifested that they have arrived at
a compromise agreement that the value of the said
improvement/building is P400,000. The Court noted that
Pecson has already received P300,000.00 and directed the
spouses Nuguid to pay the remaining P100,000. On December
1997, after paying the said P100,000 balance to Pedro Pecson,
the spouses Nuguid prayed for the closure and termination of
the case.
Consequently, on July 31, 1998, the trial court directed the
spouses to pay the sum of P1,344,000 as reimbursement of the
unrealized income of Pecson for the period beginning
November 22, 1993 up to December 1997. The sum was based
on the computation of P28,000/month rentals of the four-door
apartment.
Records show that Pecson was dispossessed of the premises on
November 22, 1993 and that he was fully paid the value of his
building in December 1997. Therefore, he is entitled to the
income thereof beginning on November 22, 1993, the time he
was dispossessed, up to the time of said full payment, in
December 1997, or a total of 48 months. Thus, Pecson is
entitled to be paid the amount of P1,344,000.
The Nuguid spouses appealed and the CA reduced the rentals
from P1,344,000 to P280,000 in favor of the Nuguids.
ISSUE: WON Pecson can retain ownership of the building until he is
reimbursed and WON Pecson should be paid P1,344,000.
HELD: YES.
It is not disputed that the construction of the four-door two-
storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was undertaken at
the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot by virtue of
entry of judgment of the Courts decision, the apartment
building was already in existence and occupied by tenants.
32
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

In its decision, the Court declared the rights and obligations of petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement
the litigants in accordance with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil introduced by the respondent during said period, without
Code. paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to construction costs and expenses. They should account and
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the pay for such benefits.
proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor
in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary
and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention C.2 Right of Possession
until full reimbursement is made.
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures *Frondarina vs. Malazarte (Banta)
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. G.R. No. 148423 | December 6, 2006 | Velasco, Jr., J.
Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it
permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he
Petitioner/s: ESPERANZA G. FRONDARINA, joined by her husband,
has not been reimbursed for those necessary expenses and
PEDRO A. FRONDARINA
useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed.
Respondent/s: NAPOLEON MALAZARTE and LAURA P. MALAZARTE
Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to
pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in
DOCTRINE: It has been settled jurisprudence that although tax
his possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, as in this
declarations or real estate payments of property are not conclusive
case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the
possession in the concept of an owner.
fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith.
Otherwise, the security provided by law would be impaired.
FACTS:
This is so because the right to the expenses and the right to the
On July 22, 1970, Lot 5, Block 15-B, Gordon Heights Subdivision,
fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation
Olongapo City (disputed lot) was acquired by Flordelina
juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the
Santos from Iluminado Amar
other.
On June 17, 1971, petitioner Esperanza Frondarinas sister (Cirila
Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for
Gongora), acquired the disputed lot from Santos (seen in the
themselves as early as June 1993, when they applied for a writ
Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right over Lot
of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not
o On the same day: Gongora (Frondarinas predecessor-
include the apartment building, they could not benefit from
in-interest) filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
the lots improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full,
(MSA)
based on the current market value of the property.
Disputed lot was also declared in Gongoras name for taxation
The right of retention, which entitles the builder in good faith to
purposes; 1 she also paid the real estate taxes due on said
the possession as well as the income derived therefrom, is
property2
already provided for under Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder
























































in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for
1 Tax Declaration No. 32821 in 1970; Tax Declaration No. 16-0611 in 1974; Tax Declaration
No. 16-0431 in 1980
almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of 2 As shown by the April 12, 1985 Official Receipt No. 7841503, representing real estate
2 As shown by the April 12, 1985 Official Receipt No. 7841503, representing real estate
rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The
taxes for the years 1980-1985
33

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Frondarina then obtained the disputed lot from her sister on
February 19, 1985
On July 1, 1985, Frondarina likewise filed an MSA with the
Bureau of Lands; likewise, she:
o Declared the disputed lot in her name in 1986
o Paid real estate taxes on the property for the years 1986
to 1988
o Had the lot surveyed, fenced it with four strands of
barbed wire, and tended two mango and one
coconut trees and planted vegetables on it
Respondents Malazartes alleged however, that they bought
the same lot from Romeo Valencia on March 1, 1988 and they
have been residing on the same since May 1988
o They also claim that they started constructing their
house on the lot on the same date but without a
building permit because their petition was denied due
to petitioners complaint
Records reveal however, that on March 18, 1988, respondents
threatened petitioners caretaker, Lorenza Andrada
On March 298, 1988, when confronted by petitioners on why
they entered the disputed lot, respondents replied that they
got permission from Mr. Valencia who sold the same to them
Petitioners then reported the incident to the City Engineers
Office and the respondents were told to stop the construction
of the house
Respondents nonetheless continued construction on the lot
Petitioners then sent letters to City Engineer Nicolas de Leon,
Mayor Richard Gordon, and Atty. Ma. Ellen Aguilar about
respondents intrusion
Olongapo City MTCC found that Romeo Valencia admitted
that his possession of the disputed lot had already been
questions for almost three years by petitioners before he sold it
to the respondents
MTCC ruled in favor of petitioners; RTC ruled in favor of
respondents
o RTC was convinced that respondents were in actual
and physical possession of the disputed lot through
Valencia, their predecessor-in-interest while petitioners
failed to prove the same by preponderance of
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
evidence, since their possession was through a
caretaker
o RTC also held that most of the petitioners allegations
were of hearsay nature; caretaker Andrada was not
even presented as witness
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto
ISSUE/S: WON respondents were in actual, physical possession of the
disputed lot3
HELD:
NO. It was the spouses Frondarina and their predecessor-in-interest
who had been in peaceful, physical possession of the said lot since
1971. Where the dispute over possession arises between two persons,
the person first having actual possession is the one who is entitled to
maintain an action granted by law.
Neither Frondarina nor Valencia actually resided at the said lot
yet the Court believes that the Frondarinas went to the lot 3-4
times a week and exercised acts of ownership and possession
over it (e.g. fencing, planting vegetables, overseeing of
caretaker); meanwhile, it could not have been possible for
Valencia to be on the said lot most of the time because of his
job as Councilor Danugraos driver
Valencias claim that there was no owner of the lot before he
occupied it in 1975 is clearly fallacious, since the lot was
declared for taxation with the City Assessor in the name of
Cirila Gongora, which became effective in 1974, and was
registered with the Bureau of Lands in 1971
Frondarinas testimony revealed acts that are consistent with
one who has been deprived of possession by force, strategy,
and stealth by respondents
o Despite the inability of Ms. Andrada to testify, there was
ample documentary and parol evidence to support
petitioners claim of possession
3Dissected into three issues: 1) WON the CA rendered the decision in grave abuse of its
discretion in the appreciation of facts; 2) WON the affirming decision of the CA omitted
petitioners prior, actual possession on the disputed property, essential to the issue in
forcible entry; 3) WON the appellate decision renders recognition of private
respondents unlawful entry as lawful, disregarded the menacing attitude [or] intent to
forcibly acquire the land by force
34
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

The pieces of documentary proof like the tax declarations, tax It has been settled jurisprudence that although tax
o
receipts, and miscellaneous sales applications, which declarations or real estate payments of property are
antedate those of respondents, unquestionably demonstrate not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
the truth and factual basis of petitioners claim of possession they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
Admitted facts rule: evidence of whatever description must an owner
yield to the extent that it conflicts with admitted or clearly o Coupled with proof of actual possession of the
established facts property, tax receipts and declarations may become
o Mr. Valencias testimony on his alleged occupation of the basis of a claim for ownership
the said lot must give way to the clearly established Gongoras MSA was filed much ahead in time than the MSA
facts that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest filed by Valencia
had been in possession of the lot much earlier than Where the dispute over possession arises between two persons,
respondents and Mr. Valencia the person first having actual possession is the one who is
Circumstantial or presumptive evidence: the existence of the entitled to maintain an action granted by law
principal facts xxx only inferred from one or more
circumstances which have been established directly
o In effect, the absence of Andradas testimony did not *Yu vs. Pacleb (Banta)
do any damage to petitioners cause of actionas
G.R. No. 130316 | January 24, 2007 | Corona, J.
ample circumstantial evidence is extant on record
sufficient to convince the Court that respondents
Petitioner/s: ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU
committed acts of forcible entry
Respondent/s: BALTAZAR PACLEB
The chain of transfers from the original owner of the lot
(Iluminado Amar) to petitioner Frondarina reveals the latters
DOCTRINE/S: In the grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to
possession of the lot
actually and physically occupy a thing, with or without
o The Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim executed by
right; two things are paramount in possession: 1)
Valencia in 1988 pales in comparison with the three
occupancy, apprehension, or taking, and; 2) intent to
successive transfers that resulted in the transfer of rights
possess (animus possidendi).
in favor of Frondarina
The first in time is the first in right
The payment of real tax state tax is one of the most
o Thus, the much earlier conveyance by Iluminado Amar
persuasive and positive indications showing the will of a
on July 22, 1970, without doubt, prevails over the Deed
person to possess in concepto de dueo or with claim
of Renunciation and Quitclaim executed on March 1,
of ownership.
1988 in favor of the Malazartes
o Petitioners tax declarations and tax receipts are dated
much earlier than those of Valencias and respondents FACTS:
Tax declarations are clear manifestations and strong Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered
indications of possession and occupation of a parcel of land to sell Lot No. 6853-D4 to petitioners Yu for P75 per sq.m.
o Similarly, the old tax receipts of petitioners are
evidential and suggestive demonstration of their
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner
























































4The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters and was located in Barangay
Langkaan, Dasmarias, Cavite.
35

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o Javier supposedly purchased the lot from one Rebecca
del Rosario who, in turn, acquired it from respondent
Pacleb and his wife
o The title of the property however, remained in the
names of respondent Pacleb and his wife
o The instruments in support of the alleged sales were not
registered
On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and
gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment
o Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title
and subsequently, the property, to petitioners
At the time of turn-over, part of the lot was occupied by
respondents son, Ramon Pacleb, as tenant
On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly
surrendered possession of their portion
Later on, petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over the
subject lot
Petitioners also caused the annotation on TCT No. T-118375,
declared with finality on April 19, 1995
Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights over
the property from September 12, 1992 until the early part of
September 1995
o During this time, respondent was in the United States
Upon respondents return in May 1995, he allegedly entered
the property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy
and stealth, thereby ousting petitioners and their trustee,
Ramon
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to vacate the
premises and surrender ownership of the same
MTC ruled in favor of petitioners; RTC affirmed in toto; CA
reversed and dismissed the petitioners action for forcible entry
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Pacleb had prior physical possession of
the subject property (and consequently, WON the action for
forcible entry is bereft of merit)
HELD:
YES. Petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical
possession to justify a ruling in their favor. Their contention regarding
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
respondents forcible entry is therefore untenable. Petition is DENIED,
and the CAs decision is AFFIRMED.
Art. 523 of the Civil Code states that possession is the holding
of a thing or the employment of a right
Possession always includes the idea of occupation
o It is not necessary that the person in possession should
himself be the occupant
o The occupancy can be held by another in his name
Elements of possession:5
1. Occupancy, apprehension, or taking; and
2. Animus possidendi6 or intent to possess
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992
was self-serving; in fact, subject lot was in the possession of
respondents sons (Ramon and Oscar) during the contested
period
The payment of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive
and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess
in concepto de dueo or with claim of ownership
o As such, the tax declarations and receipts in the name
of respondent in 1994 and 1995 established his
possession of the property
On the invalidity of petitioners citation of an alleged
document proving turn-over of possession (Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan), the Court held:
a. Ramon and his wife were tenants of respondents
b. Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such
document, waiving all rights to the land
c. No clear proof in the records of Ramons appointment
as trustee
d. At the time of the documents execution, the caretaker
was no longer Ramon, but Oscar
The title of the land remained in the name of the respondent
5 Paras provided a third element. According to him, possession must be by virtue of
ones own right, as an owner or by virtue of a right derived from the owner such as that
of a tenant.
6 The animus possidendi may be contradicted and rebutted by evidence which tends
to prove that the person under whose power or control the thing in question appears to
be, does not in fact exercise the power or control and does not intend to do so.
(Tolentino, supra note 13, at p. 239)
36
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

o As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the Respondents title was traced back to Ana Maria
o
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes Pilarta Figueras, who was the previous holder of TCT No.
of ownership7 76045 issued on January 6, 1993, and from whom
Quesada bought the property
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the MeTC of QC
Copuyoc vs. De Sola (Banta) a complaint of Forcible Entry with Injunction and Urgent Prayer
G.R. No. 151322 | October 11, 2006 | Austria-Martinez, J. for Temporary Restraining Order; her allegations included the
following:
Petitioner/s: MARIO L. COPUYOC o De Sola is owner of parcel of land known as Lot 25,
Respondent/s: ERLINDA DE SOLA Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision9
o Respondent has been in actual possession of the
DOCTRINE/S: The only question that the courts must resolve in property since June 7, 1993 when it was sold to her by
ejectment proceedings iswho is entitled to the Christine Quesada
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the o Petitioner started construction of a house on the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. property without respondents consent
o Despite demands, petitioner refused to stop the
The execution of a deed of sale is merely a prima facie construction and vacate the premises
presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real On January 15, 1997, the MeTC conducted a hearing and
property, which is destroyed when the delivery is not issued a TRO against petitioner on the same day
effected because of legal impediment. Petitioners, on the other hand, contended:
o He is the lawful possessor by virtue of the 1995 Contract
to Sell with the Bank of Commerce
FACTS:
o Respondents title 10 is forged, and the property
Petitioner Mario Copuyoc and his spouse are holders of a
described therein is located in Tandang Sora, not
Contract to Sell dated September 6, 1995 between them as
Xavierville
buyers and the Bank of Commerce as seller who, in turn,
o The Bank of Commerce is a holder of duly reconstituted
bough the property from the Xavierville Estate, Inc. in a Deed
title covering the property, and had possessed the
of Sale of Real Estate dated September 8, 1967, and from
same for 43 years
which TCT No. 265907 issued on December 5, 1979 was based
o A syndicate was able to procure forged titles after the
o Respondent Erlinda De Sola has TCT No. 875698 in her
office of the Register of Deeds was burned during the
name on June 8, 1993
fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall
MeTC dismissed both complaints
7 Art. 538 of the Civil Code Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in the cases of copossession. Should a question
Upon finding11 that petitioners and respondents titles refer to
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there the same property, RTC reversed the decision and ordered
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the petitioner to vacate the premises
same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall
be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
8 Described the property as follows: xxx situated in the Dist. of Tandang Sora, Quezon 9Located at No. 6 Guerrero St., Xavierville I, Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
City, Is. of Luzon. Bounded on the West, pts. 1-2 by Lot 23, Blk. 6; on the North, pts. 2-4 by 10Described in the TCT as follows: Bounded on the N., points 2 to 4, by Road Lot 5; on
Road Lot 8; on the East, pts. 4-5 by Lot 27, Blk. 6; and on the South, pts. 5-1 by Lot 26, Blk the E., points 4 to 5, by Lot 27; on the S., points 5 to 1 by Lot 26; and on the W., points 1 to
6, all of the cons.-sub. plan. 2 by Lot 23, all of Block 6, all of the consolidation subdivision plan.
37
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision; CA dismissed the same property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
o CA held that respondent has a better right to the him
property since the sale between her and Quesada was While it may be true that the Absolute Deed of Sale of Real
on June 7, 1993, while the Contract to Sell between Estate between respondent and Christine Quesada was
petitioner and the Bank of Commerce was dated executed on June 7, 1993, prior to the Contract to Sell
September 6, 1995 between petitioner and the Bank of Commerce on September
6, 1995, it should be emphasized that the execution of a deed
ISSUE/S: WON Respondent had priority of possession over the of sale is merely a prima facie presumption of delivery of
property subject of this case12 possession of a piece of real property, which is destroyed
when the delivery is not effected because of a legal
HELD: impediment
NO. Given the surrounding circumstances (see dates of titles and o Records show that respondent never occupied the
deeds of sale abovementioned) of this case, the Court finds that property from the time it was allegedly sold to her on
petitioner is in prior possession of the property, and is entitled to remain June 7, 1993 or at any time thereafter
therewith. Petition is hereby GRANTED and the CA decision is o Moreover, her regular visits to the property are not
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. unequivocal proof of her actual or physical possession
The principal issue to be resolved in forcible entry cases is mere since from 1993 until the complaint was filed, she only
physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not visited the property five times; her visits were not
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the coupled with any actual exercise of dominion over the
property involved property
o Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the In contrast, petitioner was able to establish his actual physical
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall possession over the property (i.e. construction of
not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror improvements)
o Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can o The fact that he has not filed any tax declarations
recover such possession even against the owner cannot be taken against him since the property is still
himself; whatever may be the character of his owned by the Bank of Commerce
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, Unlike the RTC, this Court is inclined to believe that petitioners
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the and respondents titles specify different properties; the title is



































































































































the conclusive proof of a propertys metes and bounds and
11 During the RTC hearings, the Chief of the Reconstitution Division of the Land the difference between the two titles cast a shadow of doubt
Registration Authority, Benjamin Bustos, testified that the lot described in the title of the on the identity of the disputed lot
Bank of Commerce is identical with the lot described in respondents title. This was Additional note: in this case, all three courts committed a basic
allegedly corroborated in the Order of Reconstitution issued by Bustos, stating that
[T]he lot described in TCT No. 265907 is identical to the lot described in TCT No. 265984
error by entertaining the impression that petitioners possession
issued in the name of spouses Miguel Uy and Carmela Lim and was ordered is based on his claim of ownership of the property
reconstituted under administrative Order No. Q-366 on September 23, 1992. o Petitioners right to possess the property is not derived
12 In detail, petitioner contends that the CA erred: 1) in holding that Respondent had
from any claim of ostensible ownership over the same
priority of possession over the property subject of this case; 2) in taking cognizance of
the tax declarations which were presented for the first time on appeal and ruling that
but on the provision in the Contract to Sell allowing him
these tax declarations prove Respondents prior possession of the property subject of to take possession of the property pending
this case; and 3) in not finding as conclusive, the report of the chief of the surveys reconstitution of the title and full payment of the
division of the department of environment and natural resources that the properties as purchase price
described in the parties respective titles are not located in one and the same place.
38

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o Ownership remained in the name of the Bank of
Commerce, and petitioner is yet to become the owner
of the property at the time the ejectment proceedings
were had
*Malayan Realty, Inc. vs. Uy Han Yong (Banta)
G.R. No. 163763 | November 10, 2006 | Carpio-Morales, J.
Petitioner/s: MALAYAN REALTY, INC. represented by Alberto C. Dy
Respondent/s: UY HAN YONG
DOCTRINE: Where the lessor has been deprived of its possession
over the leased premises for so long a time, and it is
shown that, indeed, the lessee was the recipient of
substantial benefits while the petitioner was unable to
have the full use and enjoyment of a considerable
portion of its property, such militates against further
deprivation by fixing a period of extension.
FACTS:
Malayan Realty, Inc. is the owner of an apartment unit known
as 3013 Interior No. 90, located at Nagtahan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila
1958, Malayan entered into a verbal lease contract with Uy
Han Yong over the property at a monthly rental of P262
o Monthly rental was increase starting 1989; by 2001, the
rental was already P4,671.65
On July 17, 2001, Malayan sent Uy a written notice, informing
him that the lease contract would no longer be renewed or
extended upon its expiration on August 31, 2001, and asking
him to vacate and turn over the possession of the property
within five days from said date or until September 5, 2001
Despite receipt of notice, Uy refused to vacate the property
o Uys refusal prompted Malayan to file an ejectment suit
before the MeTC of Manila
Trial Court held that Uy cannot be ejected on the ground of
termination of contract, noting that there was no showing that
the lease contract was on a monthly basis and that it was for a
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
definite period (given that Uy has been occupying the leased
property continuously for more than 40 years)
RTC set aside the lower courts decision
o On the basis of Article 168713 of the New Civil Code, the
RTC extended the lease contract for a period of five
years
o RTC also ruled that Malayan acted arbitrarily and
awarded damages (deleted after Malayans MR)
CA modified the RTC decision, shortening the extension of the
lease contract to one year from the finality of the decision; CA
also increased rental rate at 10% per annum starting
September 6, 2002
ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in granting a one-year extension of the
lease reckoned from the finality of the decision
HELD:
YES. Respondent Uy is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY VACATE and
surrender possession of the property. Petition is GRANTED.
The power of the courts to establish a grace period is
potestative or discretionary, depending on the particular
circumstances of the case
Where a petitioner has been deprived of its possession over the
leased premises for so long a time, and it is shown that, indeed,
the respondent was the recipient of substantial benefits while
the petitioner was unable to have the full use and enjoyment of
a considerable portion of its property, such militates against
further deprivation by fixing a period of extension
13 Article 1678 If the period or the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from
year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly;
from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has
been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied
the premises for over one year.
If the period of a lease contract has not been specified by the parties, it is understood to
be from month to month, if the rent agreed upon is monthly. The lease contract thus
expires at the end of each month, unless prior thereto, the extension of said term has
been sought by appropriate action and judgment is eventually rendered therein
granting the relief
39
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Respondent has remained in possession of the property

o FACTS:
from the time the complaint for ejectment was filed on On October 1, 1993, as evidenced by the Transfer of Rights,
September 18, 2001 up to the present time respondent Eliodoro Bacaron conveyed a 15.3955-hectare
o Effectively, respondents lease has been extended for parcel of land located in Langub, Talomo, Davao City, in favor
more than five years, which time is, under the of petitioner Benny Go for P20,000
circumstances, deemed sufficient as an extension and About a year after, Bacaron, seeking to recover his property,
for him to find another place to stay14 went to Go to pay his alleged P20,000.00 loan but the latter
As the lease expired on August 30, 2001, petitioner is entitled to refused to receive the same and to return his property saying
the 10% per annum increase in rentals since September 1, that the transaction between the two of them was a sale and
2001, not on September 6, 2001 not a mortgage, as claimed by respondent
Where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the On March 5, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for
one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer Reformation of Instrument with Damages and prayer for the
must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Davao
reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of City against petitioner
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain o Respondent explained in his Complaint that it was in
meanwhile in the premises the middle of 1993 that he suffered business reversals
which prompted him to borrow P20,000 from petitioner
o Petitioner however, allegedly required him to execute
Go vs. Bacaron (Banta) the Transfer of Rights Document first before loaning the
G.R. No. 159048 | October 11, 2005 | Panganiban, J. money
o Respondent notes that he only accepted the deal,
even with the knowledge that the transaction did not
Petitioner/s: BENNY GO
reflect the real intent of the parties (i.e. a mere
Respondent/s: ELIODORO BACARON
equitable mortgage), because he was in a tight
financial situation; plus, petitioner assured him that he
DOCTRINE/S: Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
could redeem his property
a right, whether by material occupation or by the fact
o To support his claim, respondent stressed the fact that
that the rightor, as in this case, the propertyis
the consideration in the instrument was merely
subjected to the will of the claimant.
P20,000.00, which is grossly inadequate as the selling
price of a 15-hectare land considering that, at that
Payment of [real property] taxes is a usual burden
time, the market value of land in Davao City amounts
attached to ownership. Coupled with continuous
to P100,000.00 per hectare
possession of the property, it constitutes evidence of
o Because petitioner, later on, insists that it was a real
great weight that a person under whose name the
transfer of right over the property, respondent was
realty taxes were declared has a valid and rightful
forced to consign the P20,000 with the RTC of Davao
claim over the land.
City and file the complaint
Petitioner Go, on the other hand, claims that:
o When respondent suffered business reverses, his
14In De Vera v. CA, the Court found that the lessees continued possession of the accounts with the petitioner, as evidenced by
property for more than five years from the supposed expiration of the lease sufficed as postdated checks, cash vouchers and promissory
an extension of the period
40
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

notes, remained unpaid and his total indebtedness, the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and
exclusive of interests, amounted to P985,423.70 contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
o Respondent even offered to pay his indebtedness o The instances16 in which a contract of sale is presumed
through dacion en pago, giving the land in question as to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated in
full payment thereof Article 1602 of the Civil Code
o Petitioner was forced to accept the land in exchange Article 1604 of the Civil Code further provides
for over a million pesos of indebtedness because that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also
respondent told him that if he refused the offer, other apply to a contract purporting to be an
creditors would grab the same absolute sale
o Respondent is estopped because he himself admitted Three of these instances are present in the
that he voluntarily signed the document, knowing full instant case: 1) inadequate consideration; 2)
well the contents of the same possession; and 3) payment of real taxes
Trial court dismissed respondents complaint and found Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right,
petitioners counterclaim meritorious whether by material occupation or by the fact that the right
o Respondents claim of possession is further belied by or, as in this case, the property is subjected to the will of the
the fact that the actual occupants of the property claimant
recognize that the petitioner Go owns the same o In the present case, the witnesses of respondent swore
o In fact, said occupants prevented respondents wife that they had seen him gather fruits and coconuts on
from entering the premises the property
CA reversed and declared the transaction an equitable o Based on Director of Lands v. Heirs of Abaldonado,
mortgage, because the consideration was grossly inadequate respondents actions sufficiently establish that even
after the execution of the assailed Contract, respondent
ISSUE/S: WON Respondent remained in possession of the land in has remained in possession of the property
question (and consequently, WON the transaction was a o On the other hand, petitioner only informed the tenants
mere equitable mortgage)15 that he was the new owner of the property, which is
why they recognized him as such; it hardly signifies that
HELD: he exercised possession over the land
YES. Respondent has sufficiently proven by establishing inadequate Payment of [real estate taxes] is a usual burden attached to
consideration, clear acts of possession, and payment of realty taxes ownership
that the disputed property remained in his possession, and o In this case, it was respondent who paid realty taxes on
subsequently, that the transaction was an equitable mortgage, and the property for the years 1995-1997 hence, before the
not a sale. Petition is hereby DENIED, and the CA decision is AFFIRMED. filing of the present controversy; while, petitioner only
Equitable mortgage has been defined as one which although
























































lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites 161) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; 2) when
demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; 3) when upon or after the
expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; 4) when the purchaser retains for
























































himself a part of the purchase price; 5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes
15Dissected issues: 1) WON the CA erred in ruling that there was inadequate on the thing sold; 6) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
consideration; 2) WON the CA erred in ruling that the respondent remained in intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
possession of the land in question; 3) WON the CA erred in ruling that the taxes were not performance of any other obligation.
paid by petitioner; and 4) WON the CA erred in ruling that reformation is proper.
41

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
paid the remaining taxes due on October 17, 1997, or
after the case has been instituted
o That the parties intended to enter into an equitable
mortgage is bolstered by respondents continued
payment of the real property taxes subsequent to the
alleged sale
o Coupled with continuous possession of the property, it
constitutes evidence of great weight that a person
under whose name the realty taxes were declared has
a valid and rightful claim over the land
Additional note on the additional issue concerning WON
reformation was the proper remedy: the Court held that it is
the intention of the parties that determines whether a contract
is one of sale or of mortgage
o In the present case, one of the parties to the contract
raises as an issue the fact that their true intention or
agreement is not reflected in the instrument
o As such, parol evidence becomes admissible and
competent evidence to prove the true nature of the
instrument
o Hence, unavailing is petitioners assertion that the
interpretation of the terms of the Contract is
unnecessary, and that the parties clearly agreed to
execute an absolute deed of sale
o Moreover, under Article 1605 of the New Civil Code,
the supposed vendor may ask for the reformation of
the instrument, should the case be among those
mentioned in Articles 1602 and 1604
*Sps. Valdez v. CA (Banta)
G.R. No. 132424 | May 4, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J.
Petitioner/s: SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M.
VALDEZ
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA,
and FRANCISCA FABELLA
DOCTRINE/S: Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three
kinds of actions available to recover possession of real
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana;
and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal
comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico).
The jurisdiction of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court.
FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer
filed by petitioners against private respondents before the MTC
of Rizal
Petitioners Sps. Valdez are the registered owners of a piece of
residential lot denominated as Lot No. 3 Blk. 19, located at
Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Maria, Antipolo, Rizal,
which they acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. sometime in
November 1992, through a Sales Contract
o Respondents Sps. Fabella, without any title whatsoever,
allegedly occupied the said lot by building their house
in the same, depriving petitioners of their rightful
possession thereof
o For several times, petitioners verbally asked respondents
to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the
latter continued to refuse
o Because of this, the Barangay Captain was forced to
issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor
of the Sps. Valdez so the necessary cause of action be
taken before a proper court
In their answer, the Sps. Fabella claimed ownership over the
land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous,
and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
42
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department FORCIBLE ENTRY UNLAWFUL DETAINER
of Environment and Natural Resources Detentacion Desahuico
MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the One illegally withholds
Fabellas to vacate the premises; RTC affirmed the decision in One is deprived of physical
possession after the
toto possession of real property
expiration or termination of
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC by means of force,
his right to hold possession
o Held that petitioners Sps. Valdez failed to show that intimidation, strategy,
under any contract, express
they had given the private respondents the right to threats, or stealth
or implied
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private Possession of defendant is
respondents possession of the same, which is a originally legal but became
requirement in unlawful detainer cases illegal due to the expiration or
o Further, CA added that petitioners complaint lacked Possession of defendant is termination of the right to
jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires illegal from the beginning possess;
an allegation of prior material possession; MTC should and the issue is which party
not have had jurisdiction over the case and dismissal has prior de facto Plaintiffs supposed acts of
thus, is in order possession tolerance must have been
present right from the start of
ISSUE/S: the possession which is later
1. WON the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case sought to be recovered
of unlawful detainer Action must be brought one Action must be brought
2. WON based on the allegations of the complaint, the MTC year from the date of within one year from the date
clearly has original jurisdiction over the instant complaint filed actual entry on the land of last demand
before it
The jurisdiction of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
HELD: are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
NO. The allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of metropolitan trial court
fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of
tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. Nothing has possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial
been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year
dispossession started. Since the complaint did not satisfy the o An ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the right of possession of realty independently of title
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petition is Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
DENIED and the CA judgment dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED. brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of proceeding
actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
reivindicatoria such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the
Accion interdictal comproses two distinct causes of action, class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as
namely: these proceedings are summary in nature

43

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint
o When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court
Millena vs. CA (Banta)
G.R. No. 127797 | January 31, 2000 | Bellosillo, J.
Petitioner/s: ALEJANDRO MILLENA
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA JACOB, represented
herein by her attorney-in-fact JAIME LLAGUNO
DOCTRINE/S: An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by
prescription, but prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed.
In an action for reconveyance the issue involved is one
of ownership, and for this purpose, evidence of title
may be introduced. However, land registration
proceedings cannot be made a shield for fraud or for
enriching a person at the expense of another. The
inclusion of an area in a certificate of title which the
registered owner or successful applicant has placed no
claim on and has never asserted any right of ownership
thereof is void and of no effect.
FACTS:
This case involves a 3,934-square meter parcel of land in Bgy.
Balinad, Daraga, Albay
o Land was originally part of Lot 1874, a 14,248-square
meter land that was subject of a cadastral proceeding
during the 1920s before the CFI of Albay
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
o Among the claimants in the cadastral case were
Gregoria Listana and Potenciana Maramba (Gregorias
sister-in-law), together with the latters seven children
(Felix, Marcela, Ruperta, Emeteria, Florencio, Gaspar
and Nicomedes Listana)
On August 17, 1926, claimants reached a compromise
agreement to divide Lot 1874 among themselves:
o went to Gregoria Listana
o went to Potenciana Maramba and her seven
children
The subject parcel (3,934 sq.m.) was then awarded to Gregoria
Listana, who was seriously ill of tuberculosis at that time
o On October 9, 1926, Gregoria executed a power of
attorney in favor of her cousin Antonio Lipato which
authorized the attorney-in-fact to sell the portion of Lot
1874 belonging to the principal
o Proceeds of the sale would be used for Gregorias
interment
On October 23, 1926, Antonio Lipato (as attorney-in-fact) sold
the portion to Gaudencio Jacob; Gregoria died the same day
Jacob thereafter entered the lot and started harvesting
coconuts found therein; Potenciana confronted him but the
former explained that he is now the rightful owner since he had
lawfully bought it from Gregoria Listana
Potencia filed an ejectment case against Jacob before the
Justice of Peace in Albay
o On December 31, 1926, the case was dismissed; the
Justice of Peace found that Jacob did not use force or
intimidation since he had with him a document of sale,
authorizing him to take possession of the subject parcel
of land
Jacobs continuous, actual, and peaceful possession of the
land lasted for almost 40 years
On April 4, 1966, Gaudencio Jacob and his children executed
an extrajudicial settlement which adjudicated to respondent
Felisa Jacob (Gaudencios daughter) the 3,934-square meter
portion of Lot 1874
o Felisa then had the land annually declared as her
property and paid the corresponding realty taxes
44
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Sometime in November 1981, respondent Felisa Jacob o Registration of an instrument in the Office of the
discovered that Florencio Listana (Potencianas son) acquired Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the
from the Bureau of Lands in Legazpi City Free Patent Certificate whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is
of Title (dated 28 August 1980) covering the entire Lot 1874, deemed to have taken place at the time of registration
including the portion adjudicated to the former in 1966 o In this case, Felisa Jacob was in possession of the
On November 6, 1981, respondent filed a protest before said contested portion of Lot 1874
Bureau and prayed that an investigation be conducted and o Following the elements of possession (namely, control
have the Free Patent Certificate of Title annulled and intent), respondent Felisa Jacob had exercised
After Florencio Listanas death, his heirs SOLD the entire Lot dominion over the contested property (i.e. instructing
1874 (including Felisas portion) to petitioner Alejendro Millena her nephew, Jaime Llaguno, to work as caretaker,
(nephew of Florencio and grandson of Potenciana) on making improvements, paying of taxes
September 30, 1986 for P6,000 2. YES. The Court examined the copy of the decision of the
o A Transfer Certificate of Title covering the whole Lot Justice of Peace in 1926 and found it genuine.
1874 was then issued in the name of petitioner Millena 3. YES. The evidence on record undoubtedly tilts in favor of
On March 17, 1992, Felisa Jacob filed a complaint against respondent Felisa Jacob. Although petitioner Alejandro Millena
Millena holds a certificate of title covering the disputed land, the title
RTC of Legazpi rendered a decision in favor of private alone does not necessarily make the holder thereof the true
respondent Jacob, ordering Millena to reconvey the portion owner of all the property described therein.
belonging to the former; CA affirmed the decision, but deleted o GENERAL RULE: after the lapse of one year from entry, a
the award for attorneys fees decree of registration is no longer open for review or
attack, even though the issuance thereof may have
ISSUE/S: been attended by fraud and that the title may be
1. WON prescription has now barred the action for inherently defective
reconveyance o EXCEPTION: law allows the aggrieved party to bring an
2. WON the documents and pieces of evidence used by action for reconveyance as long as the property has
respondent CA as basis in its assailed Decision were duly not been transferred or conveyed to an innocent
authenticated and proved by private respondent, Felisa purchaser of value
Jacob o In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one
3. WON respondent CA correctly affirmed the order of of ownership, and for this purpose, evidence of title
reconveyance may be introduced
o Nonetheless, land registration proceedings cannot be
HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED. made a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the
1. NO. Although an action for reconveyance can be barred by expense of another
prescription,17 it must be stressed that prescription cannot be The inclusion of an area in a certificate of title
invoked in an action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is in which the registered owner or successful
possession of the land to be reconveyed. applicant has placed no claim on and has
























































never asserted any right of ownership thereof is
17 If based on FRAUD: must be filed 4 years from discovery of fraud, and such discovery is void and of no effect
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title; if
based on IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: prescribes in 10 years from the date of the
issuance of the original certificate of title
45

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
*Manantan v. Somera (Banta)
G.R. No. 145867 | April 7, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J.
Petitioner/s: ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by
Gilbert Manantan
Respondent/s: ANICETO SOMERA
DOCTRINE/S: A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before
the proper MTC or MeTC within one year from the
unlawful withholding of possession (counted from the
date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate
the real property).
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them. Possession becomes
illegal when plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate
the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their contract,
and defendant refused to heed such demand.
FACTS:
On March 10, 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the MTCC,
Baguio City a Complaint for Ejectment and Damages against
respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain Presentacion Tavera
o Manantan alleged that she was the owner of a
214-square meter parcel of land located in Fairview
Subdivision, Baguio City (subject property), as
evidenced by TCT No. 54672 issued in her name by the
Registry of Deeds in Baguio City
o After causing a relocation survey of the subject
property, she discovered that respondent and Tavera
occupied certain portions thereof (disputed portions)
o Manantan advised both to vacated the premises as
soon as she would decide to sell the subject property to
an interested buyer
o A prospective buyer did eventually approach
Manantan, but the former decided not to proceed
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
with the sale until after respondent and Tavera vacated
the same
o Manantan repeatedly requested Somera and tavera
to vacate the land but the two refused
o A lawyer representing Manantan then sent a formal
letter demanding the respondents and Taveras
abandonment of the disputed portions, but the two
ignored said notice
Meanwhile, respondent Somera and Tavera contended that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction because it was neither an action
for forcible entry nor for unlawful detainer
o Respondent further claimed that he and his family had
been using one of the disputed portions of the subject
property as driveway since the latter part of 1970 and
that he even caused the improvement and cementing
of the same
o In the same way, Tavera explained that she had been
utilizing the other disputed portion of the subject
property as an access road to her residence and that
her occupancy was continuous and uninterrupted
o Both noted that their utilization of the disputed portions
had been recognized by the Bayot family, Manantans
predecessors-in-interest
o Further, both claimed that they showed their interest to
pay Manantan the equivalent amount of the disputed
portions, but the latter ignored the proposal and
insisted to buy the whole property
o Alternatively, Somera and Tavera argued that they are
builders of good faith
MTCC ruled in favor of Manantan; RTC affirmed the MTCC
decision in toto
During the cases pendency in the CA, Manantan died on
January 20, 2000
o Four months later, the CA rendered its decision
reversing and setting aside the MTCC and RTC
decisions; CA ruled that the complaint failed to allege
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
o CA held that the complaint merely presented a
controversy arising from a boundary dispute, in which
46
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

case a different remedy should have been sought was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
within the RTCs jurisdiction express or implied contract between them
v In this case, respondents possession of
ISSUE/S: the disputed portion was not pursuant to
1. WON the MTCC of Baguio City had the jurisdiction over the any contract, express or implied, with
action Manantan, and, resultantly,
2. WON a portion of petitioners land encroached by respondent respondents right of possession over the
can be recovered through an action for ejectment disputed portion is not subject to
expiration or termination
HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED in toto. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted
1. NO. Petitioners Complaint does not allege facts showing before the proper MTC or MeTC within one year
compliance with the prescribed one-year period to file the from the unlawful withholding of possession
action for unlawful detainer. It does not state material dates (counted from the date of plaintiffs last
that would have established compliance with the said period. demand on defendant to vacate the real
Such allegations are jurisdictional and crucial, because if the property)
complaint was filed beyond the prescribed time (one year), o Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court,
period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful as well as the nature of the action, are determined by
detainer over which the MTCC can exercise jurisdiction. It may the allegations in the complaint
be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or
o Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction
of possession of real property in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential
This may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or that the complaint specifically allege the facts
other person against whom the possession of constitutive of unlawful detainer
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after o Accion publiciana: the plenary action to recover the
the expiration or termination of the right to hold right of possession, which should be brought before the
possession by virtue of any contract, express or proper regional trial court when dispossession has
implied18 lasted for more than one year
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the o Accion reivindicatoria: an action to recover ownership,
defendant was originally legal, as his possession as well as possession, which should also be brought
before the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
























































proceeding
18An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of 2. UNNECCESSARY. Since Civil Case No. 10467 is already
Court, Section 1 of which provides: SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
dismissible upon this ground, it is no longer necessary to discuss
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, whether petitioner availed itself of the proper remedy to
or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or recover the disputed portion of land from respondent.
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold Resolving the second issue shall be a mere surplusage and
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
obiter dictum.
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)
47

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
C.3 Usufructuary Right
Go vs. Looyuko (De Luis)
G.R. 196529 |July 1, 2013 | J. Mendoza
Petitioner/s: William Go
Respondent/s: Alberto Looyuko
FACTS:
Looyuko and Jimmy Go, brother of William Go, were business
partners in Noahs Ark Group of Companies (Noahs Ark). This
partnership was embodied in written agreement, dated
February 9, 1982.
William Go was appointed Chief of Staff of Noahs Ark Sugar
Refinery. Because of this he was allowed by Looyuko to
occupy the townhouse in Gilmore Townhomes, Granada
Street, Quezon City.
In a letter, dated Oct. 28, 1998, Looyuko demanded William
Go to vacate the townhouse.
Jimmy Go filed an adverse claim in the RTC of pasig, citing his
interest on the title as co-owner because he claimed that the
townhouse was bought using funds from Noahs Ark, hence,
the townhouse is part of the property of the business
partnership.
William refused to vacate the property relying on the strength
of his brothers adverse claim.
Looyuko filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William
Go before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). He adduced as
evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 108763
issued in his name as well as his demand letter to William Go.
He also alleged that Williams occupation was merely by
tolerance, on the understanding that he should vacate the
property upon demand.
On the other hand, William presented the partnership
agreements, the contract to sell of the subject property to
Noahs Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment for the
acquisition of the property. William also asserts that Looyuko
failed to prove his prior physical possession of the property,
which for William Go, is fundamental in an ejectment case.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
The MeTC ruled in favor of Looyuko, stating that he had the
right to possession of the townhouse because he is the
registered owner.
William Go filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the
unlawful detainer case because a complaint for specific
performance against Looyuko had been filed by Jimmy Go to
establish his alleged right as a co-owner. (There are two
proceedings in this case.)
The QC RTC ruled in favor of William and deferred the
proceedings in the unlawful detainer case to await the
outcome of the Jimmy Gos complaint in the RTC of Pasig.
The CA reversed the QC RTC orders and directed the
execution of the MeTC decision in favor of Looyuko.
March 29, 2004, QC RTC, in the unlawful detainer case,
reversed the decision of the MeTC and ruled in favor of William
Go. It held that the townhouse was purchased in the name of
Noahs Ark and that Williams authority to occupy the disputed
property was part of his privilege as Chief of Staff of Noahs
Ark. (usufructuary right) (Note: the phrase usufructuary right
was never mentioned in the case.)
Oct. 29, 2009, the CA ruled in favor of Looyuko and held that
the issue of possession (involved in the unlawful detainer /
ejectment case) could be resolved without ruling on the claim
of ownership (in the case where Jimmy Go asserts his right as
co-owner of the property).
ISSUE:
1. WON the ejectment case can proceed without resolving the
issue of ownership? (This issue is the most relevant to
usufructuary right.)
2. WON Looyuko is the real owner of the property?
3. WON prior physical possession is necessary in an action for
unlawful detainer?
HELD:
1. YES (but, with an exception, this case falls under the
exception).
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
48
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue brought by a person against whom the possession of any
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
to determine the issue of possession. termination of a right to hold possession.

The Court agrees with William Go that the issue of

ownership should be ruled upon considering that such has *NHA vs. CA (Banta)
been raised and it appears that it is inextricably linked to G.R. No. 148830 | April 13, 2005 | Carpio, J.
the question of possession. It is linked to the question of
possession, because William Go allegedly had usufructuary Petitioner/s: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
right over the townhouse as a privilege of being Chief of
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION
Staff of Noahs Ark, which, according to Jimmy Go, is the
and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC.
real owner of the property.
DOCTRINE/S: A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and
NOTE: UNLAWFUL DETAINER (definition) an action to recover
under such conditions as the parties may deem
possession of real property from one who unlawfully
convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct; a
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful
A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners
detainer case is originally legal but becomes illegal due to
inter-estsa usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property
the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
2. YES
otherwise provides.
Looyuko has a TCT, which is an evidence of indefeasible
title over the property, and thus, he is entitled to possession
FACTS:
of the property as a matter of right. The partnership
Background: on 24 October 1968, President Marco issued
agreements and other documentary evidence presented
Proclamation No. 481, setting aside a 120-hectre portion of
by Go are not enough to offset Looyukos right as
land in Quezon City owned by the National Housing Authority
registered owner. (Note: This ruling on ownership is merely
(NHA) as reserved property for the National Government
provisional and would not bar or prejudice the action filed
Center (NGC)
by Jimmy Go, claiming shares in the title over the property.)
o On September 19, 1977, Marcos removed a seven-
hectare portion from the coverage (Proclamation No.
The registered owners superior right to possess the property
1670) 19 and giving the Manila Seedling Bank
in unlawful detainer cases has been consistently held by
Foundation (MBF) usufructuary rights over the property
the Court.

3. NO 19 xxx certain parcels of land embraced therein and reserving the same for the Manila
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court does not require the Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and projects, subject to private
rights if any there be, and to future survey, under the administration of the Foundation.
plaintiff to be in prior physical possession of the property.
49
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Over the years, MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-year trial court for a joint survey to determine finally the metes and
hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBFs
o By 1987, MSBF has occupied approximately 16 hectares usufructuary rights. The seven-hectare portion shall be
On August 18, 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it contiguous and shall include as much as possible all existing
occupied to Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC)20 and other major improvements of MSBF.
stallholders o A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and
On November 11, 1987, President Aquino, through under such conditions as the parties may deem
Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127), revoked the reserved convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct
status of approximately 50 hectares left from the 120 hectares o A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct;
of the NHA property originally intended for the NGC; MO 127 thus, NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter
authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and sell it to the portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare
public area held in usufruct by MSBF
On August 15, 1988, NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its o The entire controversy revolved on the question of
occupied aread; any structure left will be demolished by NHA whose land survey21 should prevail
On April 21, 1988, BGC filed a complaint for injunction before BGC presented he testimony of Mr. Lucito M.
the trial court; late on, MSBF was included as co-plaintiff Bertol (Bertol), General Manager of MSBF
Trial court dismissed the complaint Bertol presented a map, which detailed the
CA reversed the lower court decision area presently occupied by MSBF
It was clear from both the map and Bertols
ISSUE/S: testimony that MSBF knew that it had occupied
1. WON petition is now moot because of the demolition of the an area in excess of the seven-hectare area
structures of BGC granted by Proclamation No. 1670
2. WON the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within the Malto, surveyor of MSBF, also testified that he
seven-hectare area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted to was asked to survey a total of 16 hectares, not
MSBF by way of usufruct just seven; it was only later in 1986 that he was
instructed to determine the seven-hectare
HELD: portion
1. NO. BGC may have lost interest in this case due to the Inobaya, a geodetic engineer and witness
demolition of its premises, but its co-plaintiff, MSBF, has not. The presented by NHA, followed the same technical
issue for resolution has a direct effect on MSBFs usufructuary descriptions used by Malto
rights. o Article 565 of the Civil Code states, [t]he rights and
2. UNDETERMINED. The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer obligations of the usufrucutary shall be those provided
easily determinable considering the varied structures erected in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such
within and surrounding the area. Petition is REMANDED to the title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in
the two following Chapters shall be observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is
This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future
survey based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most
the title constituting the usufruct
particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the
subdivision survey dated April 19-25, 1968. (Emphasis added)
20 Specifically, BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square meters 21MSBFs survey shows that BGCs stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the other
of the 16-hectare area. hand, NHAs survey shows otherwise.
50
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Where the CA and the trial court disagree on

concerns the issue on WON MSBF seasonably
exercised its right to determine the location of *Hemedes vs. CA (Banta)
its seven-hectare usufruct G.R. No. 108472 | October 8, 1999 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
It is clear that MSBF conducted at least two
surveys; although both surveys covered a total
Petitioner/s: MAXIMA HEMEDES
of 16 hectares, the second survey specifically
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPELAS, DOMINIUM REALTY AND
indicated a seven-hectare area shaded in
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES,
yellow
and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION
To prefer the NHAs survey to MSBFs survey will
strip MSBF of most of its main facilities
DOCTRINE/S: The annotation of usufructuary rights in a certificate of
o On the other hand, the Court cannot countenance
title in favor of another does not impose upon the
MSBFs act of exceeding the seven-hectare portion
mortgagee the obligation to investigate the validity of
granted to it
its mortgagors title.
A usufruct is not simply about rights and
privileges
In a usufruct, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the
A usufructuary has the duty 22 to protect the
property is transferred to the usufructuarythe owner of
owners interests
the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power
A ususfruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the
another with the obligation of preserving its form
same.
and substance, unless the title constituting it or
the law otherwise provides
FACTS:
o Finally, the law23 clearly limits any usufruct constituted in
favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A The case involves a question of ownership over an unregistered
parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6, plan Psu-111331, with an
usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant
area of 21, 773 square meters, situate in Sala, Cabuyao,
In this case, MSBF only has 22 years left
Laguna
o MO 127 does not affect MSBFs seven-hectare area
since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs Jose Hemedes (father of herein petitioner Maxima Hemedes
seven-hectare area was already exclude[d] from the and Enrique Hemedes) originally owned the land
operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, o On March 22, 1947, Jose Hemedes executed a
1968, which established the National Government document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With
Center Site Resolutory Conditions
o He conveyed ownership over the subject land,
together with all improvements, in favor of his third wife,

22 Art. 601 The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third
Justa Kausapon, subject to the following resolutory
person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of conditions:
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been a. Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE,
caused through his own fault. the title to the property donated shall revert to
23 Art. 605 Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or

association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration
any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR
of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the expressly designated by the DONEE in a public
usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
51
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

document conveying the property to the latter; The annotation in favor of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin
or was maintained in the new title
b. In absence of such an express designation On May 27, 1971, Kausapin executed a Kasunduan, where
made by the DONEE before her death or she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique Hemedes,
remarriage contained in a public instrument as pursuant to the resolutory conditions
above provided, the title to the property shall o Enrique Hemedes obtained two declarations of real
automatically revert to the legal heirs of the property, one in 1972, and another in 1974; he has
DONOR in common been paying realty taxes on the same from 1971-1979
On September 27, 1960, pursuant to the first condition, Justa On February 28, 1979, Enrique Hemedes sold the property to
Kausapin executed a Deed of Conveyance of Unregisered herein respondent Dominium Realty and Construction
Real Property by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes Corporation
the subject property under specific terms24 On April 10, 1981, Justa Kausapin executed an affidavit
Maxima Hemedes then filed an application for registration and affirming her conveyance of the property to Enrique and
confirmation of title over the land denying conveyance to Maxima
o She thereafter obtained and OCT, with annotation the On May 4, 1981, Dominium leased the property to its sister
Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over corporation Asia Brewery, Inc.
the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime Upon learning of Asia Brewerys constructions upon the subject
or widowhood property, R&B Insurance informed its owner via letter of the
According to R&B Insurance, petitioner Hemedes and Raul latters ownership and that R&B Insurance had the right to
Rodriguez (her husband) constituted a real estate mortgage appropriate the constructions therein since Asia Brewery is a
on June 2, 1964over the subject property to serve as security builder in bad faith
for a loan (P6,000) On May 8, 1981, Maxima Hemedes asserted her ownership
On February 22, 1968, R&B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed against Asia Brewery, and denied that she executed a real
the mortgage and the land was sold at a public auction on estate mortgage in favor of R&B Insurance
May 3, 1968, with R&B Insurance as the highest bidder On August 27, 1981, Dominium and Enrique Hemedes filed a
o Since Hemedes failed to redeem the property during complaint with the Court of First Instance, claiming absolute
the redemption period, R&B Insurance executed an ownership over the property and prayed for the annulment of
Affidavit of Consolidation the title in favor of R&B Insurance
Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents Dominium and Enrique
Hemedes
























































CA affirmed the decision in toto
24xxx That, wherefore, in virtue of the deed of donation above mentioned and in the
exercise of my right and privilege under the terms of the first resolutory condition therein
contained and hereinabove reproduced, and for and in consideration of my love and ISSUE/S:25
affection, I do hereby by these presents convey, transfer, and deed unto my designee, 1. WON the conveyance to Maxima Hemedes was an effective
MAXIMA HEMEDES, of legal age, married to RAUL RODRIGUEZ, Filipino and resident of transfer of ownership (or otherwise, to Enrique Hemedes)
No. 15 Acacia Road, Quezon City, who is one of the children and heirs of my donor,
JOSE HEMEDES, the ownership of, and title to the property hereinabove described, and
all rights and interests therein by reversion under the first resolutory condition in the
above deed of donation; Except the possession and enjoyment of the said property
























































which shall remain vested in me during my lifetime, or widowhood and which upon my 25 These summarized the issues of the consolidated petitions; the case tackled several
death or remarriage shall also automatically revert to, and be transferred to my issues but I only concentrated on the Property-related principle indicated in the syllabus:
designee, Maxima Hemedes. usufructuary (see Ratio No. 2)
52

BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
2. WON R&B Insurance should be considered an innocent
purchaser of the subject land
HELD: CA decision is REVERSED. Ownership of R&B Insurance over the
property is UPHELD, subject to the usufructuary rights of Just Kausapin.
1. YES. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not
acquire any rights over the subject property. Justa Kausapin
sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier
transferred to Maxima Hemedes. Thus, the donation in favor of
Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object
thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having already
been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject
property to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot
acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is
definitely not an innocent purchaser for value.
o A party to a contract cannot just evade compliance
with his contractual obligations by the simple expedient
of denying the execution of such contract
If, after a perfect and binding contract has
been executed between the parties, it occurs
to one of them to allege some defect therein as
a reason for annulling it, the alleged defect
must be conclusively proven, since the validity
and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the
will of one of the contracting parties
Public respondent held that the registration of
the property on the strength of the spurious
deed of conveyance is null and void and does
not confer any right of ownership upon Maxima
Hemedes; in her defense, Maxima emphasizes
that this assertion is not supported by factual
findings and it was merely grounded upon the
mere denial of the same by Justa Kausapin
(who, according to Maxima, favored Enrique
because she was dependent on him for
financial support)
o Article 1332 is inapplicable here, for it is useless to
determine whether or not Justa Kausapin was induced
to execute said deed of conveyance by means of
fraud employed by Maxima Hemedes when Justa
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Kausapin denies even having seen the document
before the present case was initiated in 1981
o The provision was intended for the protection of a party
to a contract who is at a disadvantage due to his
illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or other
handicap
Article 1332 assumes that the consent of the
contracting party imputing the mistake or fraud
was given, although vitiated, and does not
cover a situation where there is a complete
absence of consent
o Further, the Court held that private respondents have
failed to produce clear, strong, and convincing
evidence (preponderance of evidence is not enough
to overthrow a certificate of a notary public) to
overcome the positive value of the Deed of
Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversiona notarized document
2. YES. Petitioner R&B Insurance is entitled to protection of a
mortgagee in good faith.
o It is a well-established principle that every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property
o The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa
Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes OCT does not
impose upon R & B Insurance the obligation to
investigate the validity of its mortgagors title
o Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another
with the obligation of preserving its form and substance
The usufructuary is entitled to all natural,
industrial and civil fruits of the property and may
personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to
another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by
a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may
enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate
upon the expiration of the usufruct
o Only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is
transferred to the usufructuary
53
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
The owner of the property maintains the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber,
transform, and even destroy the same
o The owner therefore, may validly mortgage the
property in favor of a third person and the law provides
that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be
obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and should
the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the
payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the
usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason
thereof
o Even assuming, arguendo, that R&B Insurance was
obligated to look beyond the COT, it would not have
discovered any better rights in favor of private
respondents since the Kasunduan in favor of Enrique
is a nullity
Further, the the land was mortgaged to R & B
Insurance as early as 1964, while the
Kasunduan was executed only in 1971 and
the affidavit of Justa Kausapin affirming the
conveyance in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes
was executed in 1981
Thus, even if R & B Insurance investigated the
title of Maxima Hemedes, it would not have
discovered any adverse claim to the land in
derogation of its mortgagors title
o Being an innocent nnocent mortgagee for value, R&B
Insurance validly acquired ownership over the
property, subject only to the usufructuary rights of Justa
Kausapin thereto, as this encumbrance was properly
annotated upon its certificate of title
D. Limitations on Ownership
D.1 Easement/Servitude
Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired under CA. 141, as
Eslaban vs Onorio (Ong)
G.R. 146062 |June 28, 2001 | Mendoza
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Petitioner/s: Santiago Eslaban
Respondent/s: Clarita Vda. De Onorio
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the RTC ordering the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) to pay respondent the amount of
P107,517.60 as just compensation for taking the latters
property.
Respondent is the owner of a lot in South Cotabato with an
area of 39,512 sq. meters. It is covered by a TCT.
Eslaban, project manager of NIA approved the construction of
the main irrigation canal of NIA on the said lot affecting 24,660
sq. meters thereof.
Respondents husband agreed to the construction provided
that they be paid by the government for the area taken after
processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.
In 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between
respondent and NIA. NIA paid respondent P4,180 as Right-of-
Way damages. Respondent then executed an Affidavit of
Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any
ompensation for damages to crops and improvements which
she suffered as a result of the right-of-way.
The same year, petitioner offered respondent P35,000 as
settlement pursuant to EO No. 1035 Sec. 18.26
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her
property, petitioner refused to pay.
Respondent filed a case before the RTC praying that petitioner
be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation,
litigation expenses, and costs.
Petitioner said that:
o The government had not consented to be sued;
o The total area used by NIA was only 2.27 hectares, not
24,600 sq. meters; and
26
amended, for the area or portion subject to the reservation under Section 12 thereof in
such amounts as may be determined by the implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned in consultation with the Commission on Audit and the assessors office
concerned.
54
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o Respondent was not entitled to compensation
considering that she secured title over the property by
virtue of a homestead patent.
The RTC ordered NIA to pay plaintiff P107,517.60 as just
compensation for the area of 24, 660 sqm.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petition failed to comply with the provisions of Sec. 5,
Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure regarding forum
shopping. - YES
2. WON land granted by virtue of a homestead patent and
subsequently registered under PD 1529 ceases to be part of
the public domain. YES
3. WON the value of just compensation shall be determined from
the time of the taking. Depends
4. WON the affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by
respondent exempts petitioner from making payment to the
former. - NO
HELD:
1. YES
In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago
Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA.
However, the verification and certification against forum-
shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the
administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the
NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly
authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation,
neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales could
sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying
the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the
petition should be dismissed.
2. YES
3. Depends
The land under litigation is covered by a TCT and was
originally covered by an OCT issued pursuant to a
homestead patent.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
The Solicitor General contends that an encumbrance is
imposed on the land in question in view of Sec. 39 of the
Land Registration Act:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance
of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of
title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from
all encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting, namely:
....
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established
by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that
the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined.
The only servitude which a private property owner is
required to recognize in favor of the government is the
easement of a public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.
This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at
the time of the registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to respect it.
Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is
sought to be imposed only after the land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.
Since the irrigation canal constructed by NIA was built on
Oct. 6, 1981, several years after the property had been
registered on May 13, 1976. Prior expropriation proceedings
should have been filed and just compensation paid before
taken for public use.
55
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
The value of the property must be determined whether as
of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
4. NO
The CA correctly held that if NIA intended to bind the
appellee to said affidavit, it would not have bothered to
give her any amount for damages.
The waiver of rights and fees pertains only to
improvements and crops and not to the value of the land
utilized by NIA for its main canal.
BAPCI vs Obias (Ong)
G.R. 172077 |October 9, 2009 | Peralta
Petitioner/s: Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative Inc.
Respondent/s: EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR
BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO MONTERO,
PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI, PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON,
PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., MARIA VILLAMER and ROBERTO PADUA.
FACTS:
In 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO)
was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.
BISUDECO constructed a road (the disputed road)
measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9km long. This
was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane
to and from its mill site and this become indispensable to its
The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
sugar milling operations.
On Oct. 30, 1992, petitioner acquired the assets of BISUDECO.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents alleging that
on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably
barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods,
placards, and stones across it causing serious damage and
prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed
road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the
ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that
BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on
their properties.
Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous
use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in
turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECOs assets.
The RTC ordered respondents to cease and desist from placing
barricades on the disputed road.
Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with
BISUDECO and alleged that it surreptitiously and without their
knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road on
their properties.
Respondents claimed that they tolerated BISUDECO in the
construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
GOCC, and the entire company was then under Martial Law.
Respondents denied that they barricaded the road.
Petitioner filed an amended complaint and with leave of court
a Re-Amended Complaint, where it averred, as an alternative
cause of action in the event the lower court does not find merit
in its causes of action, that it will avail of the benefits provided
for under Article 649 of the New Civil Code.27 Petitioner thus
demanded from respondents a right of way over the disputed
road for its use.
Respondent claimed that there is another road with a distance
of 15km, which is shorter and was a more appropriate right of
way.
27
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous
for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient
estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.
56
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete
evidence to prove that there was an agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents and that the petitioner did not
acquire the same by prescription. However, it held that the
petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of
way under Art. 649 upon payment of proper indemnity.
The CA modified the RTCs decision reversing the declaration
that the plaintiff BAPCI shall become the absolute owner of the
disputed road upon full payment of the indemnity. The owners
of the servient estate shall retain ownership.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA erred in not finding that BISUDECO and
respondents forged an agreement for the construction of the
road in dispute. NO
2. WON an easement of right of way may be acquired by
prescription. NO
3. WON laches or estoppel bar respondents from exercising
ownership rights over the properties traversed by the road.
NO
4. WON the road is a barangay road. NO
5. WON there was unjust enrichment. - NO
HELD:
1. NO
The easement of right of way the privilege of persons or a
particular class of persons to pass over anothers land, usually
through one particular path or linenis characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and
depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an
easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of
a title.
Art. 622 is the applicable law in the case at bar:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the
disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an
agreement with the owners of the lands that said road
traversed.
While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the
alleged agreement, petitioner posits that they presented
circumstantial evidence which, if taken collectively, would
prove its existence.28
However, only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court and the Court finds no justification to warrant the
application of any exception to the general rule.
2. NO
In Bogo-Medellin, this Court discussed the discontinuous nature
of an easement of right of way and the rule that the same
cannot be acquired by prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by
virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
The reasoning that if a road for the use of vehicles or the
passage of persons is permanently cemented or asphalted,
then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature is
erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either
continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications of the existence of such easements.
28
a. The agreement was of public knowledge. Allegedly BISUDECO and respondents
entered into an agreement for the construction of the road provided that the latter,
their children or relatives were employed with BISUDECO.
b. The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and the public in general.
c. There was no protest or complaint from respondents for almost a period of two
decades.
d. The portions of the land formerly belonging to respondents affected by the road were
already segregated and surveyed from the main lots.
e. The road in dispute is already a barangay road.
57
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous
because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles
or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a
train operated by a person passes over another's property. In
other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon
the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is
inevitable that the road in dispute is a discontinuous easement
notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To reiterate,
easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to
the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence
of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
such easements. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code
states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
3. NO
The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous
easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates
against petitioners claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous
easements can only be acquired by title. More importantly,
whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question
involving a factual determination by the trial court.
This Court likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that
petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an
admission, representation or conduct by respondents that will
give rise to estoppel.
4. NO
Petitioner presented a Tax Declaration or Field Appraisal and
Assessment Sheet to prove that it is indeed a barangay road.
The same is again a question of fact which cannot be the
proper subject of herein petition.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
In any case, after a closer scrutiny of the 1991 FAAS, this Court
holds that the same is insufficient to prove petitioners claim
The RTC findings of fact thus shows that while certain portions
of the property of Edmundo is a barangay road, the same only
pertains to Lots A, B and C, or a total of 1,497 square meters,
which is distinct from the road in dispute which pertains to
different lots (lots E to P) and covers a total area of 10,774
square meters.
5. NO
Despite the grant of a compulsory easement of right of way,
petitioner, however, assails both the RTC and CA Decision with
regard to the amount of indemnity due respondents.
Petitioner likens the proceedings at bar to an expropriation
proceeding where just compensation must be based on the
value of the land at the time of taking.
Petitioner thus maintains that the compensation due to
respondents should have been computed in 1974 when the
road was constructed.
This Court does not agree. Article 649 states that: the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and
the amount of the damage cause to the servient estate.
The law does not provide for a specific formula for the
valuation of land. The only consideration is that the same
should consist of the value of the land and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate. Hence, it is a question
of fact which has already been decided by the RTC and the
CA.
*Bogo-Medellin vs. CA (Banta)
G.R. No. 124699 | July 31, 2003 | Corona, J.
Petitioner/s: BOGO-MEDELLING MILLING CO., INC
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MADALENO VALDEZ,
SR.
DOCTRINE/S: An acknowledgement of the easement is an admission
that the property belongs to another. Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as against
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the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as
an owner. Acts of possessory character executed by
virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter
how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
Easements are continuous easements are either
continuous or discontinuous according to the manner
they are exercised, not according to the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications of the existence
of such easements. Under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by title.
FACTS:
On December 9, 1935, Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. (father of herein
respondents), purchased from Feliciana Santillan a parcel of
unregistered land with an area of one hectare, 34 ares, and 16
centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu
Prior to the sale, the entire length of the land from north to
south was already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks
owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co, Inc.
(BoMedCo), which the latter used for hauling sugar cane from
the fields to petitioners sugar mill
In 1948, the respondent heirs inherited the land after their
father passed away
Unknown to them, BoMedCo was able to have the disputed
middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed
in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965
The entire subject lot was divided into three: Cadastral Lot Nos.
953 and 955, which remained in the name of private
respondents, and Cadastral Lot No. 954 (the narrow lot where
the tracks lay), which was claimed by BoMedCo as its own and
was declared for tax purposes in its name
In 1989, private respondents discovered the aforementioned
claim of BoMedCo
On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a Complaint for
Payment of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of
Real Property and Damages with Application for Restraining
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Or-der/Preliminary Injunction against Bomedco before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu
o According to them, Santillan granted to SoMedCo,
in1929, a railroad right of way for a period 30 years,
before she sold the subject land to Valdez, Sr
o When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the
grant that expired sometime in 1959
o Still, respondent heirs allowed BoMedCo to continue
using the land because one of them was then an
employee of the company
BoMedCos defense: it was the owner and possessor of
Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought the same from
Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale of the property by
the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935
o Petitioner also contended that respondents were
already barred by prescription and laches because of
the formers open and continuous possession of the
property for more than 50 years
Trial court rejected BoMedCos defense of prior ownership but
held that BoMedCo had been in possession of Lot No. 954 in
good faith for more than 10 years thus, it has already acquired
ownership of the same under Article 620 of the Civil Code
CA reversed the ruling of the lower court, holding that
BoMedCo only acquired an easement of right of way by
unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not ownership,
under Article 620 of the Civil Code
ISSUE/S:29
1. WON BoMedCo gained ownership of the land through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code
2. WON petitioner BoMedCo became legally entitled to the
easement of right of way over said land by virtue of
prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code
29Another issue: 3) WON petitioner can use the laches defense to defeat the claim for
compensation or recovery of possession by respondent heirs NO. The second element
of laches (which in turn has three aspects) is lacking in the case at bar. These aspects
are: (a) knowledge of defendants action, (b) opportunity to sue defendant after
obtaining such knowledge, and (c) delay in the filing of such suit.
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HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFRIMED (re: attorneys fees)
WITH MODIFICATION, and BoMedCo is hereby ordered to vacate the
Cadastral Lot No. 954, and return its possession to the private
respondents.
1. NO. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive
right, must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must
be adverse. Unless coupled with the element of hostility
towards the true owner, possession, however long, will not
confer title by prescription.
o An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on
the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue
of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must
allow someone to do, something on his property, for the
benefit of another thing or person
o It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal
interest on the land but grants no title thereto
o An acknowledgment of the easement is an admission
that the property belongs to another
Having held the property by virtue of an
easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its
occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of
an owner
o Mere material possession of land is not adverse
possession as against the owner and is insufficient to
vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner
There should be a hostile use of such a nature
and exercised under such circumstances as to
manifest and give notice that the possession is
under a claim of right
o In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or
conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse
claim can be implied, its possession of the lot can only
be presumed to have continued in the same character
as when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the land
only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of
right of way), or was by mere license or tolerance of
the owners (respondent heirs)
Acts of possessory character executed by virtue
of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter
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how long, do not start the running of the period
of prescription
2. NO. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous
because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody elses land.
o Under civil law and jurisprudence, easements are either
continuous or discontinuous according to the manner
they are exercised, not according to the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications of the existence
of such easements
o Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of man;
and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of right
of way
o In this case, the presence of permanent railroad tracks
does not make an easement of right of way
continuous
The presence of physical signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent
Thus, the presence of railroad tracks for the
passage of petitioners trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous
easement of right of way
o Under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired
only by title
In this case, BoMedCos use of the right of way,
however long, never resulted in its acquisition of
the easement because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of
way can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription
o When is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of
such land (that is, title over the easement of right of
way)? If:
a. It had subsequently entered into a contractual
right of way with the heirs for the continued use
of the land under the principles of voluntary
easements; or
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b. It had filed a case against the heirs for
conferment on it of a legal easement of right of
way under Article 629, then title over the use of
the land is deemed to exist
PDCP vs CA (Ong)
G.R. 136897 |November 22, 2005 | Garcia
Petitioner/s: Private Development Corporation of the Philippines,
Pelagio Tolosa, and Atancio Villegas
Respondent/s: CA and General Santos Doctors Hospital
FACTS:
Spouses Agustin Narciso and Aurora Narciso were the original
owners of 2 lots in Barrio Lagao, General Santos City.
The first lot is a portion of a bigger parcel of land hereinafter
referred to as the interior lot with an area of 1 hectare.
Adjacent to this lot and abutting the national highway is the
second lot referred to as the exterior lot.
On Sept. 6, 1968, the Narcisos executed in favor of respondent
General Santos Doctors Hospital Inc (GSDHI) an option to buy
the interior lot subject to the ff. conditions:
o GSDHI shall construct a 10 meter wide road from the
National Highway, traversing the property of the
Vendors and terminating perpendicularly at the
midpoint of the Southern boundary of the property
subject of the Option.
o Additionally, the vendors shall also construct a 10 meter
wide road alongside the same southern boundary of
the subject land, forming a right angle with the road
first above described.
o The vendors shall also provide drainage facilities.
They executed a Memorandum of Agreement containing the
aforementioned conditions.
Years later in 1977, the exterior lot was mortgaged by the
Narcisos to PDCP and was foreclosed. PDCP was the lone
bidder.
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In 1988, GSDHI filed a complaint for specific performance at
the RTC of Gensan claiming that it has an easement right-of-
way over the foreclosed property.
GSDHI alleged that the easement was a condition and prmary
consideration for its purchase from the Narcisos of the interior
lot so that the hospital it intends to build thereat would have
access to the national highway.
GSDHI claimed that the portion covered by the easement was
inadvertently and erroneously included in the mortgage of the
exterior lot as the same was not segregated from the mother
title.
PCDP denied any knowledge of the alleged easement of
right-of-way. It also said that it cannot be bound by it because
it was not inscribed and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
During the pendency of the case, PDCP sold the exterior lot to
Villegas who was impleaded as additional party-defendant.
RTC rendered judgment for plaintiff GSDHI.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON GSDHI is entitled to a legal easement of right-of-way over
the exterior lot. YES
2. WON petitioners are innocent mortgagees/purchasers for
value of the same lot. NO
HELD:
1. YES
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
must refrain from doing or allow somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.
Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary
easements.
The easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot in favor of
GSDHI was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the
latter and the original owners thereof.
True, the Deed of Absolute Sale between respondent and the
Narcisos covering the interior lot did not embody the
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aforementioned condition. It was precisely to cure this
deficiency, however, that on the very same day the deed of
sale was executed, the Narcisos and respondent forged a
Memorandum of Agreement to reflect what they failed to
state in the document of sale.
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Narcisos
grant of the easement to respondent was for a valuable
consideration. The total consideration for the sale was P100,000
and an additional P10,000 was paid for the 10 meter wide road
right-of-way (P10 per square meter)
2. NO
A person, be he a buyer or mortgagee, dealing with a
titled property, is not required to go beyong what appears
on the face of the covering title.
Unfortunately for petitioner PDCP, the aforementioned rule
does not apply to banks.
Banks should exercise more care and prudence in dealing
with registered lands for their business is one affected with
public interest.
PDCP sent its personnel to inspect the land and conducted
an appraisal. PCDPs feigned ignorance of the road right-
of0way, much less of the road itself along the exterior lot, is
simply ridiculous.
*NPC vs Tiangco (Ong)
G.R. 170846 |February 6, 2007 | Garcia
Petitioner/s: National Power Corporation
Respondent/s: Aurellano Tiangco, Lourdes Tiangco, and Nestor
Tiangco
FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of a parcel of land with an area
of 152,187 sq. meters at Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
NPC is a GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the
development and generation of power from whatever source.
NPCs charter authorizes the corporation to acquire private
property and exercise the right of eminent domain.
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NPC requires 19,423 sq. meters of respondents property for its
Kalayaan San Jose Transmission Line Project.
NPCs Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired
right-of-way will cut through the respondents land, in such a
manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be left
separated from 99,372 square meters of the property. Within
the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing trees.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents,
NPC filed with the RTC of Tanay a complaint for expropriation
against them.
The trial court granted NPC the right to take possession of the
area sought to be expropriated.
The RTC ordered the parties to nominate their respective
commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation.
The trial court directed NPC to pay and deposit P81,204 as
temporary provisional value of the area.
According to the municipal assessor, the value of the
respondents property is P21,000 per hectare.
Commissioner for the respondents pegged the price of the
area at P30 per sqm or P582,690 in the aggregate and
P2,093,950 for the improvements. The respondents valued the
area at P600,600 and P4,935,500 for the improvements.
NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 sqm
of the original 20,220 sqm.
For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in
acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the respondents
property and that ownership of that area shall remain with the
respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in
addition to the adjudged value of the improvements only an
easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the
property as declared by the respondents or by the municipal
assessor, whichever is lower.
The trial court made a determination that the market value of
the property is P2.09 per sqm or P40,594.07 and it also found as
reasonable the amount of P324,750 offered by NPC for the
improvements.
Neither did the trial court consider NPCs reliance on Section
3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential
Decree 938, the court placing more weight on the
respondents argument that expropriation would result in the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even
though what is sought is a mere aerial right-of-way.
The CA disregarded the P2.09 per sqm valuation of the trial
court which was based on a 1984 tax declaration and placed
reliance upon a 1993.
The CA increased the compensation for the land to P116,538
and improvements to P325,025.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON value of the land should be based on the 1993 valuation.
- NO
2. WON NPC should be limited to paying 10% of the market value
of the land considering that the purpose is merely for the
establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead
transmission lines. - NO
HELD:
1. NO
In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the
complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence,
in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of
the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in
determining the just compensation due the respondents.
The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value,
while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two
determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation,
the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of
the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be
the time of taking the property.
2. NO
In several cases, the Court struck down NPCs consistent
reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended
by Presidential Decree 938.18 True, an easement of a
right-ofway transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
the respondents would retain full ownership of the property
taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not
gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an
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indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use
thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a
just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than
the monetary equivalent of the land taken.
If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely
deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the
imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions
and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the
attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures
or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the
probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and
property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should
be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.
The evidence suggests that NPCs transmission line project that
traverses the respondents property is perpetual, or at least
indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact
that the high-tension current to be conveyed through said
transmission lines evidently poses a danger to life and limb;
injury, death or destruction to life and property within the
vicinity.
Finally, if NPC were to have its way, respondents will continue
to pay the realty taxes due on the affected portion of their
property, an imposition that, among others, merits the rejection
of NPCs thesis of payment of a mere percentage of the
propertys actual value.
NPC vs Suarez (Lim)
G.R. No. 175725|October 08, 2008|Carpio-Morales
Petitioner/s: National Power Corporation
Respondent/s: Angel Suarez, Carlos Suarez, Maria Theresa Suarez and
Rosario Suarez
FACTS:
Petitioner, NPC, filed before the RTC of Sorsogon a complaint
for the expropriation of a parcel of land for a property in Brgy.
Bibincahan, Sorsogon. The property is registered under the
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names of Respondents, Angel Suarez, Carlos Suarez, Ma. that the just compensation of the land in question is in the
Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez. amount of P783,860.46.
The property will be used to implement the 350 KV Leyte Luzon The petitioner assailed the report as bereft of legal basis, the
HDVC Power Transmission Project, which aims to transmit the Market Data Analysis and Income Productivity approaches
excess electrical generating capacity from the Leyte being mere assumptions, whereas the Zonal Valuation
Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers approach is being used only for real estate tax purposes.
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 4230, The trial court adopted as basis for determining just
petitioner deposited P7,465.71 with the Philippine National compensation the recommendation of the Commissioners.
Bank. Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial
The P7,465.71 will be used to represent the provisional value easement over the property, the decision of the appellate
of the property, alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square court affirming the trial courts order for the payment of just
meters. compensation in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the
On September 23, 1996, it served a Notice to Take Possession of total value of the property and excluding the application of
the property to respondents. Section 3A (b) of RA 639531 is erroneous.
The respondents allege that the property covers an area of
34,950, not 24,350 square meters, and that petitioner had ISSUE: WON the Petitioner, NPC, must pay only a fee and not the full
already constructed two transmission towers in the middle of value of the land in its acquisition of an easement of right of way
the property, cut down more or less 737 trees of different (aeriel) over a parcel of land.
varieties (169 fruit bearing coconut trees, 11 coconut trees
seven years old and below, 36 various species of fruit trees, 89 HELD: NO
bamboo trees, 77 banana trees, 39 shade trees and 50 madre
de cacao trees) and an estimated 562.86 board feet of Petitioners plea for the application of Section 3A(b) of RA 6395
hardwood trees and 706.80 board feet of softwood trees. which directs the payment of an amount equivalent to only
Thus, the respondents move for the determination of just 10% of the market value of the property as just compensation
compensation, which was granted by the court. The court for an easement of right of way is not correct.
appointed commissioners for such purpose. The acquisition of such easement falls within the purview of the
From the Commissioners Report the commissioners determined
the just compensation by using Market Data Analysis, Income
Productivity and Zonal Valuation, the Commissioners manifest Sec. 3-A of R.A. 6395 (Revised Charter of the National Power Corporation), as
31

amended, provides:

30 P.D. 42 (Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent Domain Proceedings to Take Possession of In acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation
the Property Involved Upon Depositing the Assessed Value, for Purposes of Taxation) proceedings where the land or portion thereof, will be traversed by the transmission
Section 2. Upon filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine lines, only a right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal
National Bank at its main office or any of its branches of an amount equivalent to ten purpose for which such land itself or portions thereof will be needed for the project or
percent (10%) of the amount of compensation provided in Section 1 hereof, the works, such land or portion thereof as necessary shall be acquired.
government or its authorized instrumentality agency or entity shall be entitled to
immediate possession, control and disposition of the real property and the In addition to the just compensation for the easement of right of way, the owner of the
notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the courts. (Italics supplied) land or owner of the improvement, as the case may be shall be compensation for the
improvement actually damaged by the construction and maintenance of the
transmission lines x x x. (Emphasis and undersigned in the original)

64

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
power of eminent domain. Under this, just compensation for
private property condemned for public use must be awarded.
True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the
property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not
gratis.
Considering the nature and the effect of the installation of
power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an
indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of
the property.
Thus, the respondent is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land.
Petitioners assertion that respondents can still make use of the
property by planting corn, rice, root crops and similar plants
fails to consider that the property was originally tilled and
suited for various fruit bearing trees.
The petitioner prohibited respondents from planting trees
higher than three meters clearly shows that the easement had
impaired respondents beneficial enjoyment of their property
to warrant the imposition of payment of its full value.
The measure is thus not the takers gain but the owners loss.
The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of
taking is thus the principal criterion in determining just
compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and
capabilities, must thus be considered.
*Goldcrest vs Cypress (Lim)
G.R. No. 171072|May 07, 2009 | Quisumbing
Petitioner/s: Goldcrest Realty Corporation
Section 4. The Limited Common Areas.Certain parts of the common areas are to be
Respondent/s: Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation
FACTS:
Petitioner, Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest), is the
developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located
at Legaspi Village, Makati City.
On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens
into a condominium project and incorporated respondent
Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to
manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the
common areas.
Title to the land on which the condominium stands was
transferred to Cypress under a TCT but Goldcrest retained
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and
tenth floors of the condominium under the CCT (Condominium
Certificate Title) of the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
Goldcrest controlled the management and administration of
the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management
of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in
1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining
to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest.
Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against
Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), seeking to compel Goldcrest to vacate the common
areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures
it built.
Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest
along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as
the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the
removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress
likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation
of the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned
structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive
use of the roof decks limited common area by Section 4(c)32
32
set aside and reserved for the exclusive use of certain units 4. The Limited Common
Areas.Certain parts of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the
exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive
easement for the use of such limited areas:
xxxx
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex
B) by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it that the HLURB Special Division in effect ruled that Goldcrest
constructed the contested doors for privacy and security could erect structures on the roof decks limited common area
purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied and lease the same to third persons.
by it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit The Office of the President dismissed the appeal. It ruled that
owners. the deletion of the award for actual damages was proper
Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular because the exact area encroached by Goldcrest was not
inspections were conducted on the condominium project. determined.
During the first inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the Court of
and used the common area fronting the two elevators on the Appeals, which partly granted its appeal.
ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that The right of Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed
Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which for the exclusive use of the easement covering the portion of
encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common the roof deck appurtenant to the penthouse did not include
area. the unrestricted right to build structures thereon or to lease
During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest such area to third persons. Thus the appellate court ordered
failed to secure an alteration approval for the said permanent the removal of the permanent structures constructed on the
structure. limited common area of the roof deck.
In his Decision dated December 2, 1999, Arbiter San Vicente ISSUE: WON the Court erred in ruling that the Petitioner impaired the
ruled in favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest, among other easement on the portion of the roof deck designated as a limited
things, to: (1) remove the questioned structures, including all common area.
other structures which inhibit the free ingress to and egress from
the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2) HELD: NO
vacate the roof decks common areas and to pay actual
damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the
administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse and limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the
for making an unauthorized alteration of the condominium same.
plan. Not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also
On review, the HLURB Special Division modified the decision of illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section
Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the award for actual damages 22 of Presidential Decree No. 95733.
after finding that the encroached areas were not actually The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the
measured and that there was no evidentiary basis for the rate following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient
of compensation fixed by Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the
that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the use of the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except
roof decks limited common area because only Goldcrest has for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it
the right to use the same.
Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It questioned
SEC. 22. Alteration of Plans.No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads,
33
the deletion of the award for actual damages and argued open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision
development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its
advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or
consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter,
by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.

66
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that Petitioner/s: Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation
previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it Respondent/s: Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung, and Kleto Chung
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the
easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more FACTS:
burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and by a TCT of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of
owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.35
constitutes impairment of the easement. Such encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of
A careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a every title covering Sandicos property until it was issued in
number of the aforementioned restrictions. petitioners favor.
First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the On the other hand. Hidalgos property was eventually
office structure were neither necessary for the use or transferred to respondents Chung.
preservation of the roof decks limited area. On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the
Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way8 on the
on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to
common limited area, making the easement more a public road which is Matienza Street.
burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the The trial court ruled that the dominant estate has an egress to
condominium unit owners. Matienza St. and does not have to use the servient estate.
Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond The CA reversed the decision of the RTC because according
the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved to the CA, the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway
condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not
condominiums Declaration of Restrictions34. voluntary easements like in the instant case. It can only be
extinguished by mutual agreement.

ISSUE/S: WON the easement in this case is a voluntary easement. YES

*Unisource Commercial vs Chung (Ong)
G.R. 173252 |July 17, 2009 | Quisumbing HELD: YES

As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property,

corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
34
Section 4. Maintenance, Repairs and Alterations....

























































xxxx Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the owner, tenant or 35
By order dated 08 October 1924 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Chamber IV
(AP-7571/T-23046), it is declared that Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right to
occupant of a unit may not undertake any structural repairs or alterations, or any other open doors in the course of his lot described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650 of the map that
work which would jeopardize the safety of the Building, or another unit, or impair any has been exhibited, towards the left of the Callejon that is used as a passage and that
easement, without the prior written approval of the Condominium Corporation and of appears as adjacent to the said Lot 2 and to pass through the land of Encarnacion
the owners of the units directly affected by such work. Sandico y Santana, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and
towards the right of the other Callejon that is situated between the said Lot 2 and Lot 4

of the same Block N.

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement. Easements are established either
by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal,
and the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary
easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. Having
made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that
what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be
cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate
as it has an adequate access to a public road which is
Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an
adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the
case at bar.
A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract,
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract.
As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs
and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law.
*Ining vs Vega (Ong)
G.R. 174727 |August 12, 2013 | Del Castillo
Petitioner/s: ANTIPOLO INING (deceased), survived by MANUEL
VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMlLO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (deceased) FRANCISCO, CELEDONIO
FRANCISCO; TAJONERA, survived by EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA,
MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ,
EUGENIO RUIZ and PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (deceased)
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
survived by JESUS RIMON, CESARlA RIMON GONZALES and REMEDIOS
RIMON CORDERO; and PEDRO INING (deceased) survived by ELISA
TAN INING (wife) and PEDRO INING, JR.,
Respondent/s: LEONARDO R. VEGA, substituted by LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO,
and LENARD VEGA
FACTS:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menes, is the owner of a 3,210
sqm parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan.
Leon and Rafaela died. Leon was survived by his siblings
Romana and Gregoria, who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson Leonardo Vega, also both deceased.
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and Children
Restonilo, Crispulo, Milbuena, and Lenard.
Gregoria was survived by her 6 children: Natividad, Antipolo,
Dolores, Pedro, Jose, and Amando.
Natividad is survived by Edilberto, Josefa, Martha, Carmen,
Amparo, Henry, and Pastor.
Dolores is survived by Jesus, Cesaria, and Remedios.
Antipolo si survived by Manuel, his daughter Teodora, Camilo,
Adolfo, Lucimo, Milagros, Celedonio, and Herminigildo.
Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa, and Pedro Ining Jr.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

He alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the

Leon Roldan Rafaela Menez partition of the property but Gregorias heirs refused to heed
his demands.
Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr., and Herminigildo claimed
that Leonardo had no cause of action against them and that
they have become the sole owners of the subject property
Romana through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
Edilberto
Roldan Gregoria sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same from
Josefa
Roldan Ining Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
Martha
Carmen In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was substituted
Amparo by his heirs.
Henry During the course of the proceedings, the ff. additional
Anunciacio Leonardo Natividad Pastor relevant facts came to light:
n Vega Vega o The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez
through an unnotarized document and Enriquez in turn
Dolores Jesus sold the property to Lucimo Sr.
Cesaria
o Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for
Remedios
more than 30 years.
Lourdes Restonilo
o On Feb 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an affidavit of
Crispulo Antipolo
Milbuena Manuel Ownership of Land claiming sole ownership of the
Lenard Teodora property and canceled the Tax declaration under
Camilo Leons name.
Pedro Adolfo o Lucimo Jr. died in 1991
Lucimo o The property was partitioned among petitioners to the
Elisa Milagros
Pedro exclusion of Leonardo.
Celedonio
Jose Herminigildo
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription.
o It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez and then to Lucimo Sr.
Amando o Leons siblings, Romana and Gregoria this inherited the
property in equal shares and Leonardo and the
respondents are entitled to Romanas share.
In short, herein petitioners except for Ramon Tresvalles o However, Leonardo had only 30 years form Leons
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias death to file a petition. Thus, it has already prescribed.
grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs). The CA reversed the RTCs decision.
In 1997, Leonardo filed with the RTC for partition, recovery of o The CA did not agree with the trial courts
ownership and possession, with damages, claiming that one- pronouncement that Leonardos action for partition
half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving was barred by prescription. The CA declared that
heir. prescription began to run not from Leons death in
1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
repudiation of his co- ownership of the property with
Leonardo.
o Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, which provides that [n]o prescription shall run in
favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
ISSUE/S: WON the action of Leonardo is barred by prescription. NO
HELD: NO
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had
long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of
Leons estate.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana
and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.
In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein
became entitled to the property upon the sisters passing.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria
and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof.
As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common,
provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which
it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. They have the full ownership of their
parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute
another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs
against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set it, the repudiation must be done by a co-
owner.
Time and again, it has been held that a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co- owners,
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that
the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial
court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which
Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962.
Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co- owner and
against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation
to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the
property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former
executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new
tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of
the property.
However, while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed
acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property.
Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos
son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the
property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership. For this reason, prescription
did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a
partition of the property has not been lost.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

D.2 Abatement of Nuisance The property of Justice Gancayco was covered by the
ordinance. He then sought the exemption of a two-storey
*Gancayco vs QC Government (Ong) building being constructed on his property from the coverage
G.R. 177807 |October 11, 2011 | Sereno of the ordinance.
The City Council granted the request subject to the condition
Petitioner/s: Emilio Gancayco that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within
Respondent/s: City Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his
Development Authority own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, the MMDA conducted operations to clear
FACTS: obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA pursuant to Resolution
In 1950s, Justice Gancayco bought a parcel of land located No. 02-28, Series of 2002.36
at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, QC with an area of 375 MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco
sqm. alleging that a portion of his building violated the Building
On March 1956, the QC Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, Code. MMDA gave him 15 days to clear the portion of the
entitled: An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, building that was supposed to be an arcade.
for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Justice Gancayco did not comply. After 15 days, the MMDA
Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to
City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. as the wing walls, of the ground floor. At the time of the
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being
first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey used as a restaurant.
wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. On May 29, 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a petition with prayer
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of QC
construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of QC
5.00 meters along EDSA. from demolishing his property.
At the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city He alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national property without due process of law and just compensation.
legislature. Regulation of the construction of buildings was left The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
to the discretion of local government units. The CA upheld the validity of the Ordinance ruling that it was a
Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to
the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its
ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the police powers. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went
property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It
construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks,
creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private
arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own
purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times to exempt certain
























































36 The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the
areas.
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro
Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed
with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Ordinance No. 2904 is constitutional. YES
2. WON the MMDA legally demolished the property of Justice
Gancayco. NO
HELD:
1. YES
Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are
valid exercises of police power.
Congress expressly granted the city government police power
by virtue of the Revised Charter of Quezon City.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate
the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly
provided that the city government had the power to regulate
the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected
within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing
them.
2. NO
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco
an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication
that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se.
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect
the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance
may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses;
(3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or,
(5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se
is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may summarily be abated under the undefined
law of necessity.
When Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the
building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider
such building or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the
safety of persons and property.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a
nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine
whether a thing is a nuisance.
MMDA Illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco.
The Building Code clearly provides the process by which a
building may be demolished. The authority to order the
demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official.
The Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. All its functions are
administrative in nature.
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904
itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed
buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a
punishment of a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
(P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days,
or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
Court
*Technology Developers Inc. vs CA (Ong)
G.R. 94759 |January 21, 1991 | Gancayco
Petitioner/s: Technology Developers Inc.
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals, Hon. Narciso Atienza, Hon. Vicente
Cruz, and the Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan
FACTS:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Petitioner, a domestic corporation enegaged in the
manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a
letter from private respondent Cruz ordering full cessation of
the operation of the formers plant until further order.
The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando
Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on
February 20, 1989 the following:
a) Building permit;
b) Mayors permit;
c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources
Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other documents.
In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced
to secure Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit, although among the permits
previously secured prior to the operation of petitioners plant
was a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation
issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage
where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to
determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be
installed as part of petitioners request for the renewal of its
permit.
Petitioner sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure a mayors permit but they were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipalitys
station commander to padlock the premises of petitioners
plant.
Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent.
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction but this was later
on set aside after a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent. Respondent showed an investigation report
stating that the fumes coming from the factory may contain
particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the
people.
The CA denied the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S: WON the CA committed GADALEJ. - NO
SEC. 9. Prohibitions.No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
HELD: NO
The following circumstances militate against the maintenance
of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
o No mayors permit had been secured. It must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,
and by virture of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures
are taken.
o The acting mayor called the attention of the petitioner
to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant and
was required to submit some documents.
o This action of the acting mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents in the area.
o The closure order of the acting mayor was issued only
after investigation was made.
o Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria.
o The temporary permit to operate issued by then
National Pollution Control Commission has already
expired.
Mead vs Argel (Lim)
115 SCRA 256|July 20, 1982 | Vasquez
Petitioner/s: Donald Mead
Respondent/s: Hon. Manuel A. Argel
FACTS:
On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain
Isaac Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with
a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 3931
The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him
and his co-accused with a violation of Section 9, in relation to
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931 37 . It alleges that the
37
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

accused, being then the president and the general manager, pollution of a waterway (highway canal).
respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) drain or The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by
dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to the law in the Commission. Section 6, among others, gives the
be drained or allow to seep into such water-way the industrial Commission the authority to determine whether a pollution
and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the
the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by Philippines. (Section 6(a), No. 1); to hold public hearings, x x x
them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the make findings of facts and determinations all with respect to
resulting damage and/or destruction to the living plants in the the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission.
vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the (Ibid., No. 3); to institute or cause to be instituted in the court
same vicinity. of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel
It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National compliance with the provisions of this Act (Ibid., No. 5); and,
Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter after due notice and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any
referred to as the Commission) as created under Republic permit issued under this Act whenever modifications are
Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water and/or
existence of pollution before a criminal case can be filed for atmospheric air of the Philippines. (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8
a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the
authority to prosecute violations of the same. Commission to determine the existence of pollution and to
Petitioner states that the Commission, not having finally ruled take appropriate court actions to abate or prevent the same.38
that the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931, the The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the the authority to be exercised by the Commission and by the
petitioner for a violation of said law. ordinary courts in respect of preventing or remedying the
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The
Republic Act No. 3931 grants the power and duty to the provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only
Commission to investigate and prosecute violations of Republic the determination of and the filing of court actions involving
Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly
exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other public directed that on matters not related to nuisance no court
prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute
violations of the said law committed within their respective
jurisdictions. 38SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission.The Commission may, on its own
motion, or upon the request of any person, investigate or may inquire, in a manner to be
From Section 9 of RA No. 3931, the prohibited act is to throw,
determined by it, as to any alleged act of pollution or the omission or failure to comply
run, drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or with any provisions of this Act or any order of this Commission.
atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic
matter or substance that shall cause pollution of such waters xxx
or atmospheric air. Stated in simpler terms, the offense
allegedly committed by the petitioner was the act of causing No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission shall prejudice
any action which may be filed in court by any person in accordance with the provisions
of the New Civil Code on nuisance. On matters, however, not related to nuisance, no
of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and
thrown, run, drain, allow to see or otherwise dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, no order of the Commission discontinuing the discharge of waste shall be stayed by the
any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall filing of said court action, unless the court issues an injunction as provided for in the Rules
cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air. of Court.

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action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally
ruled thereon.
This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action
involving the determination of the existence of pollution may
not be initiated until and unless the Commission has so
determined the existence of what in the law is considered
pollution.
It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only
to the filing of civil actions, and not to criminal cases as is the
one herein involved, there being no basis either in the context
in law nor from a consideration of the purpose behind the
enactment of the same upon which such a distinction may be
made.
ISSUE: WON a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information
for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled An Act Creating a
National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission.
HELD: NO
The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the
information charging the petitioner with a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding
or determination by the Commission that the act of the
petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air
of the Philippines.
As may be seen from the law, the determination of the
existence of pollution requires investigation, public hearings
and the collection of various information relating to water and
atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of
the term pollution in itself connotes that the determination of
its existence requires specialized knowledge of technical and
scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the
competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice. It
is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4 of the
law, it is provided that the basic personnel necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists,
biochemists, physicists, and other technicians; and required in
Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall be the
Chairman of the National Science Development Board, one of
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of the
Philippine Council of Science and Technology, and one of the
two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer.
It is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public
prosecutor may not file an information for a violation of the
said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a
finding or determination that the law or any of its orders had
been violated. In the case at hand, there had been no prior
determination by the Commission that the supposed acts of
the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the
Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of
Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and unauthorized.
Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the offense charged therein.
*Pollution Adjudication Board (Ong)
G.R. 93891 |March 11, 1991 | Feliciano
Petitioner/s: Pollution Adjudication Board
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation
FACTS:
On Sept 22, 1988, petitioner issued an order directing Solar to
immediately cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater
pollution source installations which were discharging untreated
wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
The order was based on findings of several inspections of
Solars plant made by NPCC and DENR.
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solars
wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its
plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater,
80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal.
Chemical analysis of the samples showed the presence of
pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under
PD 984 and its IRR.
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Solar went to the RTC of QC on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. However, this was dismissed by the RTC
for 2 reasons:
o Certiorari is not the proper remedy
o Boards subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
temporarily had rendered Solars petition moot and
academic.
The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case to the
RTC for further proceedings.
o The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari
was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner
Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar;
and that while the case might be moot and academic,
larger issues demanded that the question of due
process be settled.
ISSUE/S: WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on
the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. -
YES
HELD: YES
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it
has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie
evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Boards own
rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life. In the
instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before
the Board made no finding that Solars wastewater discharged
posed such a threat.
Under Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and
desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the
wastes discharged by an establishment pose an immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]. On the one
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an
immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life exists before an ex parte cease and desist
order may be issued.
Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been
the subject matter of allowable standards set by the
Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or
material involved presents an immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out the
maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater
treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed when
discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D,
SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations.
The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland
waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations.
Reports on the inspections carried on Solars wastewater
treatment facilities have identical findings it violates Section
103 of the IRR of PD 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent
Regulations of 1982.
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there
was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the
effluents emanating from Solars plant exceeded the
maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC.
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was
issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution
Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government
charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of
a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
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litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential
appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course
may take several years.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February
1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP
18821 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Estate of Francisco v. CA (Reyes)
199 SCRA 595 |July 25, 1991 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
Petitioner/s: Estate of Gregoria Francisco, represented by Silvestre F.
Tan, Administrator
Respondent/s: CA, Hon. Salvador A. Memoracion, in his capcity as
presiding judge of the RTC of Isabela; Municipality of Isabela
represented by Bejamin Valencia, in his capacity as Mayor; municipal
employees
FACTS:
Point of contention is the building situated in Port Area, Strong
Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan. Said building was ordered
demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor Valencia.
The building was constructed in 1944 and was purchased by
petitioner Gregoria Francisco in 1946. Said building stands on a
lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and faces the
municipal wharf. It was for the exclusive use of port facilities.
On January 10, 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of
Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of
Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the
building stands for 1 year. Tan Gin San used it for the storage of
copra.
On May 8, 1989, Respondent Mayor Valencia notified Tan Gin
San by mail to remove or relocate the building, citing Zoning
Ordinance No. 147; noting its dilapidated structure; and
stressing the clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard.
A second letter was sent on May 19, 1989.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Petitioner Tan Gin San ignored the notifications. Mayor
Valencia ordered the demolition on May 24, 1989.
On September 6, 1989, Tan Gin Sans building was completely
destroyed. In its place sprang shanties and nipa huts.
Trial Court: Upheld power of Mayor to order demolition without
judicial authority
CA: initially reversed Trial Court but upon reconsideration,
reversed its first ruling
ISSUE: WON Mayor Valencia could summarily, without judicial process,
order the demolition of the building.
HELD: NO
The Court ruled that Mayor Valencia is not empowered to
summarily order the demolition of the building. No Municipal
Ordinance empowers the Mayor to execute such orders.
Mayor Valencia relied on Ordinance No. 147 of the
Municipality of Isabela. The Court does not deny that the
building, which is used for the storage of copra, is located
outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in the
Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be
relocated.
By Ordincance No. 147, Tan Gin San should have applied for a
Certificate of Non-conformance, which he did not do.
However, even granting that Tan failed to apply for a
certificate, Ordinance 147 should not be interpreted as
authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building
by the municipal government.
Ordinance No. 147 also provides that the enforcement and
administration of the provisions of the said Ordinance resides
with the Zoning Administrator, not the mayor.
The LGC only provides that the Mayor has the duty to institute
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of
ordinances.
By extra-judicially ordering the demolition of the building,
Mayor Valencia violated due process. The fact that Tan filed a
suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard on will not cure
the defect, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to
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hearing and the authority to demolish without judicial order
being a prejudicial issue.
Tan Gin San is entitled to a just compensation but not to
damages because he ignored the Mayors demand to
remove or relocate the building.
*Republic vs. Marcopper (Bugay)
G.R. 137174 |July 10, 2000| Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Petitioner/s: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR)
Respondent/s: MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a
tailings sea disposal system.
In the meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission
(NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192 dated June 10, 1987, and
its powers and functions were integrated into the
Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB).
On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as
Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to
"cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan
Bay."
This was appealed by the MMC with the Office of the President
(OP).
In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay
Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted
the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to
the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30,
1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it
likewise ceased from making further deposits to the ETF.
The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the
OP, however, the CA acted on Marcoppers petition and
ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid
Order
ISSUE:
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WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No.
7942 repealed the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to the
power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board
to issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine
tailings.
HELD:
YES, the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the
Order. PAB has jurisdiction to act and rule on the letter-complaint of
Mayor Wilfredo Red of Marinduque for violation of PD 984 and its
implementing rules and regulations which jurisdiction was not lost upon
the passage of RA 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
Nevertheless, MMC must be declared not to have arrears in deposits
as admittedly, the ETF already has more than sufficient funds to
undertake the rehabilitation of Calancan Bay.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been
divested of authority to act on pollution-related matters in
mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA
7942(Philippine Mining Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of EO
192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate
pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the
term pollution as referring to any alteration of the physical,
chemical, and biological properties of any water, air, and/or
land resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of
any liquid, gaseous, or solid wastes as will or is likely to create a
harmful environment.
The authority of the mines regional director is complementary
to that of the PAB.
While the mines regional director has express administrative
and regulatory powers over the mining operations and
installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for
violation of pollution control statutes and regulations.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-
judicial powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is
vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was such authority
conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines
Adjudication Board, which were created by said law.
The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines
Adjudication Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude
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adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases. ISSUE:

D.3 Prevention of Damages
*Joaquinita P. Capili vs. Sps. Cardana (Bugay)
G.R. 157906 |Nov. 2, 2006| Quisumbing, J.
WON petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin
Cardaa.
HELD:
YES. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of
the schools premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate
danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to
exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.

Petitioner/s: JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely

carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be
Respondent/s: SPS. DOMINADOR CARDANA AND ROSALITA CARDANA
one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to
another because of the expectable action of the other, a third
FACTS:
person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the
from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position,
perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a
in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do
on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents -
the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for damages
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree
before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against
could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is
petitioner.
foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to
The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as
see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of
December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio
the children within the school and its premises. That she was
Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to
unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had
passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that
caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averred that
responsibility of her position.
petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died
death of their daughter.
as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time
premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to
Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied
anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of
knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her
res ipsa loquitur.
point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of
meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios
the dead and rotting tree, which caused the death of
Palaa to negotiate the sale.
respondents daughter, was a result of petitioners negligence,
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed
being in charge of the school.
the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
negligence on the part of the petitioner.
petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
decision.
respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the
79

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
outweigh the inference.
E. Acquisition of Ownership
E.1 Occupation
*Domalsin vs. Valenciano (Bugay)
480 SCRA 114/ G.R. No. 158687 |Jan. 25, 2006| Chico-Nazario, J.
Petitioner/s: FRISCO F. DOMALSIN
Respondent/s: SPS. JUANITO VALENCIANO and AMALIA VALENCIANO
FACTS:
The property subject of this action for forcible entry is a parcel
of land at sitio Riverside, Benguet. Domalsin claims to be the
lawfulowner and possessor for 19 years. He declared it for
taxation purposes and allegedly introduced improvements
(e.g. road, trees)
In 1998, Spouses allegedly entered the premises to construct a
building without consent of Domalsin and without a building
permit from the DPWH. Domalsin protested and demanded
that Sps. halt construction but they refused.
Sps. claimed that the ongoing construction was with the
consent of DPWH and in fact the improvements found in the
property were introduced by the residents thereof, including its
first residents, William and Gloria Banuca, and not by Domalsin.
Domalsin testified that he is a lawyer-businessman formerly
engaged in trucking business, hauling sand and gravel. While
he was passing Kennon Road, he discovered that a portion of
the Bued River, can be a potential source of supplies for his
business. He scouted a place where he can construct a road
from Kennon Road to the Bued River.
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In the course of cleaning the area, his workers noticed that the
place had been tilled. A certain Castillo Binay-an appeared
informing him that he was the occupant of the site of the
proposed private road. After agreeing on the consideration,
the former executed a Deed over the land in his favor.
Thereafter, Domalsin obtained necessary permits to extract
construction materials.
Apart from construction of the road, Domalsin constructed 2
houses, the first was located along the road-right-of-way of
Kennon Road while the second was located below the private
road few meters down from Kennon Road. The first house was
used for sleeping quarters and resting center for laborers, while
the second one as petitioners quarters.
Domalsin hired William Banuca who applied for foreman. Due
to the nature of his job, Banuca was permitted to stay in the
second house beside the private road. Banuca now lives
permanently in said house after petitioner gave it to him.
Petitioner revealed that the houses his former laborers
constructed were awarded to them as a kind gesture to them.
As to the land he occupied along the Kennon Road where the
first house was erected, he claims that it still belongs to him. This
house, which his laborers and drivers used as a resting area,
was cannibalized and leveled, and the land over which it
once stood was taken possession by respondent sps. who are
now building their house thereon.
Gloria Banuca, wife of William, said that it was she who invited
respondents to come and reside there. She said that Domalsin
abandoned the lot as he stopped working on it and never
returned. She claimed that after an earthquake, the private
road constructed by Domalsin became impassable and it was
she who hired the equipment used to clear the same.
MCTC found that what is being contested is the possession of a
portion of the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is
located in front of a parcel of land that Domalsin bought from
Castillo Binay-an. It ruled that although the house was not
reconstructed after the earthquake, it was not tantamount to
abandonment because it was destroyed by a fortuitous event.
It explained that respondents who came later after the
earthquake must recognize his possession over the land.
However, it pronounced that respondents spouses action to
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
occupy the land was done in good faith considering that their
occupation was with the assurance of the seller (Gloria
Banuca) and that they were armed with the DPWH permit.
MCTC came out with its decision in favor of DOMALSIN, and
against defendants, spouses VALENCIANO and ordered latter
to vacate and pay. Appeal by latter to RTC denied.
It may be well to consider that even after plaintiffs business
ceased operation; he religiously paid the taxes due
thereon. Appellants theory that the plaintiff-appellee
abandoned the property finds no support in the record.
Knowing fully well that Domalsin has prior possession of the
property; Glorias actions are unjustified. But as Gloria claims to
have heard no word from the plaintiff, sheunilaterally declared
that the place is now abandoned as she invited and
allowed the defendant spouses to live and construct
their house.
Gloria is clearly in bad faith. If the Banucas are in bad faith,
then the spouses cannot have better rights either. The Banucas
transferred nothing to them. Defendants-appellants cannot
even be considered as builders in good faith. It must be noted
that they were prohibited by the plaintiff from going further but
they ignored it. They shall lose what was built (Art. 449,
CivilCode). Notwithstanding the fact of leveling without the
knowledge of Domalsin, the same did not affect his possession
(Art. 537, Civil Code)
CA REVERSED the MCTC and RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in holding that Domalsin abandoned the
property.
WON CA erred in reversing the decision of MCTC & RTC. Who is
the rightful owner of the property?
HELD:
YES. A, MCTC, & RTC are in error. Despite the foregoing findings, this
Court finds that the MCTC and the RTC, as well as the Court of
Appeals, to be in error when they respectively declared that petitioner
and respondents to be entitled to the possession of the land in
dispute. The parties should not be permitted to take possession of the
land, much more, claim ownership thereof as said lot is part of the
public dominion.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
We must emphasize that the subject of the deed of quitclaim
and waiver of rights of Castillo Binay-an was not the road-right-
of-way but the sloping terrain below it. This was the property
acquired by the respondent to have access to the sand and
gravel on the Bued River. It did not include the road-right-of-
way.
As regards Gloria Banucass claims, the evidence show that
her agreement with Jularbal involved only the improvements
near her residence down the private road and not the road-
right-of-way.
Since the subject property is a road-right-of-way, it forms part
of the public dominion. It is not susceptible to private
acquisition or ownership.
Prolonged occupation thereof, improvements introduced
thereat or payment of the realty taxes thereon will never ripen
into ownership of said parcel of land.
Thus, what We have are two parties, neither of which can be
owners, only possessors of the subject property. Beyond these
two, only the government has a better right to the subject
property which right it may exercise at any time.
This bears emphasizing because if either party has possessory
rights to the subject property, it is not predicated on ownership
but only on their actual possession of the subject property.
E.2 Intellectual Creation
Mirpuri vs. Court of Appeals (Bugay)
G.R. No. 114508 |Nov. 19, 1999| Puno, J.
Petitioner/s: PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI
Respondent/s: CA, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and the BARBIZON
CORPORATIONS
FACTS:
On June 15, 1970, one Lolita Escobar, the predecessor-in-
interest of petitioner Pribhdas J. Mirpuri, filed an application
with the Bureau of Patents for the registration of the trademark
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Barbizon for use in brassieres and ladies undergarments.
Escobar alleged that she had been manufacturing and selling
these products under the firm name L & BM Commercial
since March 3, 1970.
Private respondent Barbizon Corporation, a corporation
organized and doing business under the laws of New York,
U.S.A., opposed the application.
On June 18, 1974, the Director of Patents rendered judgment
dismissing the opposition and giving due course to Escobars
application.
This decision became final and on September 11, 1974, Lolita
Escobar was issued a certificate of registration for the
trademark Barbizon. The trademark was for use in brassieres
and ladys underwear garments like panties.
Escobar later assigned all her rights and interest over the
trademark to petitioner Pribhdas J. Mirpuri who, under his firm
name then, the Bonito Enterprises, was the sole and exclusive
distributor of Escobars Barbizon products.
In 1979, however, Escobar failed to file with the Bureau of
Patents the Affidavit of Use of the trademark required under
Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, the Philippine
Trademark Law. Due to this failure, the Bureau of Patents
cancelled Escobars certificate of registration.
On May 27, 1981, Escobar reapplied for registration of the
cancelled trademark. Mirpuri filed his own application for
registration of Escobars trademark. Escobar later assigned her
application to herein petitioner and this application was
opposed by private respondent.
On March 2, 1982, Escobar assigned to petitioner the use of the
business name Barbizon International. Petitioner registered
the name with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for
which a certificate of registration was issued in 1987.
Private respondent filed before the Office of Legal Affairs of
the DTI a petition for cancellation of petitioners business
name.
On November 26, 1991, the DTI, Office of Legal Affairs,
cancelled petitioners certificate of registration, and declared
private respondent the owner and prior user of the business
name Barbizon International.
ISSUE:
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WON (Paris Convention) affords protection to a foreign corporation
against a Philippine applicant for the registration of a similar
trademark.
HELD:
YES. The Court held in the affirmative.
RA 8293 defines trademark as any visible sign capable of
distinguishing goods. The Paris Convention is a multilateral
treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of
patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service
marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations
of origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair
competition.
In short, foreign nationals are to be given the same treatment
in each of the member countries, as that country makes
available to its own citizens. Nationals of the various member
nations are thus assured of a certain minimum of international
protection of their industrial property.
*Pearl v. Shoemart (Bugay)
G.R. No. 114508 |Nov. 19, 1999| Puno, J.
Petitioner/s: PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI
Respondent/s: CA, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and the BARBIZON
CORPORATIONS
FACTS:
Pearl and Dean is a corporation engaged in the manufacture
of advertising display units called light boxes (you see this in the
malls and sometimes along the streets. Theyre like small
billboards lighted from the inside). They secured a Certificate
of Copyright Registration for the lightboxes, and where
marketed to advertisers under the trademark Poster Ads. The
manufacture of the light boxes was contracted to Metro
Industrial Services. While Pearl and Dean secured copyright
and trademark registration, they never did so for patents.
Pearl and Dean was supposed to enter into a contract with SM
for the installation of these lightboxes at SM Makati and SM
Cubao. However, the contract for SM Cubao was not signed
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
and returned, and while the contract for SM Makati was
signed, SM was later seeking its recission. 2 years later, Metro
Industrial offered to construct light boxes for SM. 10 light boxes
were manufactured by Metro Industrial for SM. SM then
engaged the services of EYD Rainbox to construct more
lightboxes.
Later on, North Edsa Marketing (NEMI), a sister company of SM,
was set-up to primarily sell advertising space in lightboxes
located at different SM branches. Upon filing of an
infringement suit, the Court of Appeals eventually ruled that
there was neither any copyright nor trademark infringement.
ISSUE:
WON there was any copyright, trademark or patent infringement.
HELD:
NO. There could not have had been copyright infringement as a light
box is not a proper subject of copyright laws. It was neither a literary
nor an artistic work, but engineering or marketing invention.
Copyright is a statutory right, and thus, protection may only be
obtained for works enumerated by the law. At best, what
copyright laws can protect is the technical drawing of the light
boxes, and there would be infringement if SM had reprinted
these technical drawings for sale to the public without a
license from Pearl and Dean. Only the expression of an idea is
protected by copyright, not the idea itself.
Neither was there patent infringement. Patent requires
registration. There can be no infringement of a patent until a
patent has been issued, since whatever right one has to the
invention covered by the patent arises alone from the grant of
patent. x x x (A)n inventor has no common law right to a
monopoly of his invention. He has the right to make use of and
vend his invention, but if he voluntarily discloses it, such as by
offering it for sale, the world is free to copy and use it with
impunity. A patent, however, gives the inventor the right to
exclude all others.
The patent law has a three-fold purpose: first, patent law
seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes
disclosures of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
seek to ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there for
the free use of the public.
As for trademark infringement, the court said, the certificate
of registration issued by the Director of Patents can confer
(upon petitioner) the exclusive right to use its own symbol only
to those goods specified in the certificate, subject to any
conditions and limitations specified in the certificate x x x. One
who has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does
not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by
others for products which are of a different description (note:
technical infringement is stricter than unfair competition).
Assuming arguendo that Poster Ads could validly qualify as
a trademark, the failure of P & D to secure a trademark
registration for specific use on the light boxes meant that there
could not have been any trademark infringement since
registration was an essential element thereof.
E.3 Donation
Ramirez v. Ramirez (Bugay)
G.R. No. 165088 |Mar. 17, 2006| Azcuna, J.
Petitioner/s: POTENCIANO RAMIREZ
Respondent/s: MA. CECILIA RAMIREZ
FACTS:
On October 8, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent Ma. Cecilia Ramirez before the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City (RTC) for annulment of: 1) a Deed of
Donation; 2) Waiver of Possessory Rights; and 3) Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-5618 and T-5617.
Petitioner claimed that respondent caused the execution of
the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to
acquire ownership over the land and improvements.
Furthermore, petitioner alleged that with the Waiver of
Possessory Rights, respondent was able to cause the Office of
the City Assessor to transfer to her name the tax declarations
on the improvements in the land.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Petitioner and his wife, Dolores Ramirez, allegedly executed
the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights on
January 29, 1993 and October 24, 1995, respectively. However,
the death certificate presented showed that Dolores died on
April 5, 1991 and, consequently, could not have executed the
assailed documents.
Petitioner repudiated the other signatures appearing on the
two documents that were purportedly his and insisted that he
did not intend to transfer the properties to respondent.
Respondent alleged that her father, petitioner, would not have
filed the case were it not for the fact that he remarried despite
his age of 84 years.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the signature of Dolores on the
Deed of Donation was a forgery while her signature on the
Waiver of Possessory Rights was genuine. It also found
petitioners signatures on both documents to be genuine.
It then held petitioner and respondent in pari delicto, as
participants to the forgery, and ruled that they must bear the
consequences of their acts without cause of action against
each other in accordance with Article 1412 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner went to the CA, which held that Doloress signature
on the Deed of Donation as well as her alleged signature
appearing in the Waiver of Possessory Rights were forgeries
Petition was denied and the CA likewise held both parties in
pari delicto.
ISSUE: WON petitioner and respondent are in pari delicto.
HELD: YES. The Court agrees with the rulings of the CA and the RTC
that petitioner and respondent are in pari delicto. Nevertheless, both
courts erred on the applicable law.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which they applied, refers to a
situation where the cause of the contract is unlawful or
forbidden but does not constitute a violation of the criminal
laws.
Where the act involved constitutes a criminal offense, the
applicable provision is Article 1411.
Object and cause are two separate elements of a donation
and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application
of the doctrine of pari delicto. Object is the subject matter of
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
the donation, while cause is the essential reason which moves
the parties to enter into the transaction
Petitioner wrongly asserts that the donated real properties are
both the object and cause of the donation. In fact, the
donated properties pertain only to the object. Therefore, while
he is correct in stating that the object of the donation is legal,
his argument misses the point insofar as the cause is
concerned.
The cause, which moved the parties to execute the Deed of
Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights, the motive
behind the forgery, is the desire to evade the payment of
publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which became
due upon the death of Dolores.
Undeniably, the Deed of Donation and the Waiver of
Possessory Rights were executed for an illegal cause, thus
completing all the requisites for the application of Article 1411.
*Moreno v. Wolff (Bugay)
441 SCRA 584 |Nov. 10, 2004| Quisumbing, J.
Petitioner/s: VICTORIA MORENO-LENTFER, GUNTER LENTFER and JOHN
CRIAGIE YOUNG CROSS
Respondent/s: HANS JURGEN WOLFF
FACTS:
The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina
wife, Victoria Moreo-Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross,
an Australian citizen, all residing in Sabang, Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German
citizen, residing in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
Petitioners alleged that with respondent, on March 6, 1992,
they engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C.
Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by
petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro,
and (2) the assignment of Cross contract of lease on the land
where the house stood.
The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease
right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreo-
Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
(DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A
promissory note was executed by said respondent in favor of
petitioner Cross.
According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were
his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account
in the amount of DM 200,0004 at Solid Bank Corporation.
Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the
Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross beach house
and lease rights in Puerto Galera
Respondent agreed and through a bank-to-bank transaction,
he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,7005 as total
consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.
However, Cross, Moreo-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac
surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach
house was made to appear as sold to Moreo-Lentfer for only
P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made
in favor of Moreo-Lentfer.
ISSUE: WON Art. 1238 of the New Civil Code is applicable in this case.
HELD: NO. Article 1238 of the New Civil Code is not applicable in this
case. The qualifying circumstance in Art. 1238, absence of intention to
be reimbursed, is negated by the facts of this case.
Since the subject of donation is the purchase money, Art. 748
of the New Civil Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation
of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance
should have been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is
invalid for noncompliance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law.
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient
principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another. It applies where (1) a payment is made
when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who
has no duty to pay, and the person who received the
payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and
not through liberality or some other cause.
We are convinced petitioner Moreo-Lentfer had been unjustly
enriched at the expense of respondent. She acquired the
properties through deceit, fraud and abuse of confidence. The
principle of justice and equity does not work in her favor but in
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
favor of respondent Wolff. Whatever she may have received
by mistake from and at the expense of respondent should thus
be returned to the latter, if the demands of justice are to be
served.
We note, however, that subject properties consist of a beach
house and the lease right over the land where the beach
house stands. The constitutional prohibition against aliens from
owning land in the Philippines has no actual bearing in this
case. A clear distinction exists between the ownership of a
piece of land and the mere lease of the land where the
foreigners house stands. Thus, we see no legal reason why
reconveyance could not be allowed.
*Del Rosario vs. Ferrer (Bugay)
630 SCRA 834 |Sept. 20, 2010| Abad, J.
Petitioner/s: JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO
Respondent/s: ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VIVENTE,
PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and
MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA
FACTS:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe
Gonzales executed a document entitled Donation Mortis
Causa1 in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano,
and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their
predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126-square
meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila2 in equal
shares.
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in
law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation
clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named
donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation
on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few
months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion.
Leopoldo died in June 1972.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the August
27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.
RTC rendered a decision dated June 20, 2003, finding that the
donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors
intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees
during the donors lifetime, given its irrevocability.
Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent
assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void
since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the
registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal
shares.
On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision on December 23, 2008, reversing that of
the RTC.
CA held that the donation, being one given mortis causa, did
not comply with the requirements of a notarial will, rendering
the same void
ISSUE: WON the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to
Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it
was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
HELD: INTER VIVOS
That the document in question in this case was captioned
Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. This Court has held
that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
survive the transferee.
The donors in this case of course reserved the right,
ownership, possession, and administration of the property
and made the donation operative upon their death. But
this Court has consistently held that such reservation
(reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation
simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived.
This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates
that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a
requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime
in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.Since the donation in this case was
one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and
final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed
perfected from the moment the donor learned of the
donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance
makes the donee the absolute owner of the property
donated
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one
given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be
regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to
assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo
dat quod non habet.
Joaquino vs. Reyes (Bugay)
G.R. No. 154645 |July 13, 2004| Panganiban, J.
Petitioner/s: MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES
Respondent/s: ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VIVENTE,
PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and
MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA
86
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
FACTS:
Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on
January 3, 1947 in Manila. They have four children, namely:
Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes
and co-[respondents] in this case. Rodolfo Reyes died on
September 12, 1981. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes
was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, x x x
with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo,
Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes.
During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and
Company and later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co., where
he assumed the position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until
he retired on September 30, 1980. His monthly salary at Warner
Barnes & Co. was P15,000.00 x x x and upon his separation or
retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a lump
sum of P315,011.79 in full payment and settlement of his
separation and retirement benefits.
During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and
[petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they
decided to buy the house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad
Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila. A Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name
of [petitioner only] on July 20, 1979.
To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of
the property in the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner]
executed on July 20, 1979, a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the latter, as attorney-in-fact, to secure
a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. Rodolfo
Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company filed an
application for mortgage loan and a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan.
The loan was payable in ten (10) years with a monthly
amortization of P1,166.67. The monthly amortizations were paid
by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death, the balance of
P109,797.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth Insurance
by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
ISSUE: WON the property purchased and subsequent registration in
petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to
Milagros.
HELD: NO. Under the circumstances, the purchase and the
subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name was
tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision
of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it
was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid
for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this
issue depends the determination of whether the property is
conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned
by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought
during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives
rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they
have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by
Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan
was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were
conjugal funds under the Civil Code.
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name,
it is enough to stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens
system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an
instrument for the deprivation of ownership. It has been held
that property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law
relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal
marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the common-law
wife. In this case, a constructive trust is deemed created under
Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly
designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory
heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to
hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely
on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a
well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a
certificate of title.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
*Secretary vs. Heirs of Dulay (Bugay)
G.R. No 164748 | Jan. 27, 2006 | Callejo, SR., J.
Petitioner/s: THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and DR. BENITO
TUMAMAO, Schools Division Superintendent of Isabela
Respondent/s: HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY SR., represented by IGNACIA
VICENTE, RUFINO SULAR JR., SUSANA DULAY, ADELAIDA DULAY,
LUZVIMINDA DULAY and CECILIA DULAY
FACTS:
The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were the
owners of a parcel of land located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela,
with an area of 29,002 square meters. The lot was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-6776.
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of
donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property
in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]
The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143337 covering the portion
identified as Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the Ministry
of Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel,
the Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However, the
property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started
construction of the Rizal National High School building on a
parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school
site was about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by
the spouses Dulay.
In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the
spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to
them considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a
period of more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the
Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No.
39 recognizing the right of the donors to redeem the subject
parcel of land because of the DECS failure to utilize it for the
intended purpose. It further resolved that the Rizal National
High School no longer needed the donated land considering
its distance from the main campus and [the] failure to utilize
the property for a long period of time.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at the
age of 80. His heirs sought the help of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Santiago City via an undated letter requesting
the approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the
donated property. The Sangguniang Panlungsod denied the
request inasmuch as the city government was not a party to
the deed of donation.
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents,
filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of donation
and cancellation of TCT No. T-143337 before the RTC of
Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, against the DECS Secretary
and Dr. Benito Tumamao, the Schools Division Superintendent
of Isabela.
Respondents alleged that there was a condition in the deed of
donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property
for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to
house the Rizal National High School. Respondents alleged
that the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land
remained idle up to the present.
Respondents also averred that the donation inter vivos was
inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than
what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS complied with
said condition because the land was being used by the school
as its technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the
donation was not inofficious for the donors were the owners of
five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c)
the DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase
made on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal,
Santiago City in the amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its
former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan and (d) the action
of the respondents had prescribed. The OSG also claimed that
students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany
seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees; the produce would then be
sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a school
building on the subject property.
On March 6, 2001, an ocular inspection of the property was
conducted by the parties and their respective counsels,
including the Presiding Judge. It was confirmed that the land
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
was barren, save for a small portion which was planted with
palay. A demolished house was also found in the periphery of
the donated lot.
On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of respondents.
OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
On July 30, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment
affirming the decision. The court held that the DECS failed to
comply with the condition in the donation, that is, to use the
property for school purposes. The CA further ruled that the
donation was onerous considering that the donee was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land for school
purposes; therefore, the four-year prescriptive period under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Moreover, the
CA declared that a deed of donation is considered a written
contract and is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code, which provides for a 10-year prescriptive period from
the time the cause of action accrues. According to the CA,
the respondents cause of action for the revocation of the
donation should be reckoned from the expiration of a
reasonable opportunity for the DECS to comply with what was
incumbent upon it.
ISSUE: WON petitioner DECS was able to comply with the condition
imposed in the deed of donation.
HELD: NO. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the purpose
specified in the deed of donation. The property remained barren and
unutilized. Even after respondents sought the return of the property
before the courts, petitioner DECS still failed to draw up plans to use
the property for school purposes. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for
the property; hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents.
Petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that
the palay found in the property was planted by DECS
personnel or at its instance or even by students of the Rizal
National High School. No evidence was adduced to prove
that there were existing plans to use the property for school
purposes. Petitioners even debilitated their cause when they
claimed in the trial court that the barangay acquired the
property by purchase, relying on the certification of former
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.
Since a deed of donation is considered a written contract, it is
governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from
a written contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of
action accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the
cause of action is from the expiration of the time within which
the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations of
the donation. In the instant case, however, it must be noted
that the subject donation fixed no period within which the
donee can comply with the condition of donation.
*Dolar vs Brgy. Lublub (BELLO)
G.R. No. 152663 |November 18, 2005| Garcia, J
Petitioner/s: Edgardo D. Dolar
Respondent/s: Barangay Lublub (now P.D Monfort North) of the
municipality of Dumangas, et al.
FACTS:
Dolar and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay
Lublub, subject to the following conditions:
A.) That the area donated shall be for the purpose of
constructing building and/or establishing public plaza,
sports complex, public market, health centers and the
like for the use of the Barangay of Lublub which area
shall be hereinafter be known as DON VENANCIO DOLAR
PLAZA and shall be so designated in a proper landmark
B.) That the construction and development of the area
above-described shall be initiated and completed within
five (5) years from the execution of this Deed of Donation
and should the same be not made or completed then
this Deed of Donation shall have no force and effect
whatsoever and the ownership of the above-described
property will revert back to the DONORS including all or
any unfinished improvement the DONEE might have
placed or constructed.
C.) That . . . should the use of the area be converted to
uses other than herein stipulated, then this DEED OF
DONATION shall be deemed revoked and the ownership
shall revert back to the DONORS
The Barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in
behalf of Brgy. Lublub. The donated property become the site
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
of government office building and recreational facilities.
However, the barangay did not have the donation registered
under it name.
8 years from contract execution, Dolar issued TCT by the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo covering the donated area. Dolar
also executed another deed donationg to brgy. Lublub,
represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very
same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the
same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly
the same conditions expressly set forth in the first.
The donated area were included in the published list of tax
delinquent properties for disposition. At the auction sale that
followed, Dolar emerged as the highest bidder and was,
accordingly, awarded the property.
In 1998, Dolar filed a complaint against against Brgy. Lublub a
complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With
Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he had earlier
donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in
question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay
having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
ISSUE: WON Militar was clothed with an authority to accept the
donation.
HELD: NO!
On the contrary, the respondent barangay has been enjoying
the material and public-service benefits arising from the
infrastructures projects put up on the subject property. In a very
real sense, therefore, the Sangguniang Barangay and the
good people of P.D. Monfort North, by availing themselves of
such benefits for more than two decades now, effectively
ratified Militars acceptance of the donation.
2. Hence, the acceptance of the donation becomes valid.
ISSUE: WON automatic rescission in the deed of donation is valid?
HELD: Yes!
3. In the case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court
of Appeals thus:
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the
same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence
a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
4. If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides
for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of
the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply
with the condition, the donated property reverts back
automatically to the donor.
5. In the cases of UP vs. De los Angeles and Catholic Archbishop
of Manila held that:
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on
contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . .
not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior
judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination
of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is
sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
My words (In short, automatic rescissions is valid, but it is always
subject of Judicial Scrutiny)
ISSUE: WON the action for quieting title has prescribed?
HELD: Yes!
Under Art. 764, the action shall prescribe after four years from
the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to
the heirs of donor, and may be exercised against the donees
heirs.
It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay
traces its claim of ownership over the disputed property to a
valid contract of donation which is yet to be effectively
revoked. Such rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the
supposed title of petitioner over the same property removable
by an action to quiet title. Withal, the remedy afforded in
Article 476 of the Civil Code is unavailing until the donation
shall have first been revoked in due course under Article 764 or
Article 1144 of the Code.
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Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of and their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with
actions to quiet title admits of exceptions. The trial court the Registry of Deeds is not needed for its validity and efficacy.
correctly mentioned one, referring to a situation where the In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,the Court
plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not in actual possession of emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was
the land. In the case at bench, petitioner is not in possession of necessary to make the donation a binding commitment insofar
the property. For sure, he is even asking in his complaint in Civil as the donor and the donee were concerned.
Case No. 98-033 for recovery of possession of the donated
property.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions upon a
written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from E.4 Discovery
accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September 1986
the date when petitioners right to revoke accrued - would be *SPRDC vs. Roque (BELLO)
September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioners G.R. No. 148775 |January 13, 2004| Vitug, J
suit to revoke was filed only in May 1998.
In all, petitioners right of action to revoke or cancel the Petitioner/s: Shoppers Paradise Realty & Development Corporation
donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether the
Respondent/s: Efren P. Roque
applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article
1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard,
FACTS:
however, that respondent barangay had disputed the
SPRDC Entered into a 25 year lease with Dr. Feliper C Roque
existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his
(Deceased Dad of Respondent), over a parcel of land, with an
right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the
area of 2,036 square meters, at Novaliches Quezon City.
construction and development conditions of the donation.
SPRDC issued to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000 by way of
With the view we take of the case, the execution of the 1989
reservation of payment. Dr. Roque likewise entered in to a
deed of donation is really of little moment in terms of furthering
memorandum of agreement for construction, development
petitioners cause. For, at that time, the property subject of this
and operation of a commercial building complex on the
recourse was no longer his to donate, having earlier
property. Hence, SPRDC issued another check for P250,000 as
relinquished his ownership thereon. Nemo dat qui non habet
down payment.
No one can give what he has not. Stated a bit differently,
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement,
respondent barangays right over the donated area proceeds
both notarized, were to be annotated within 60 from 23
from the 1981 donation. The legal effects, therefore, of its
December 1993 or until 23 February 1994. The annotations,
action or inaction respecting the donated property should be
however, were never made because Dr. Roque died. The
assayed on the basis of the 1981 donation.
death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained SPRDC to
deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving
ISSUE: WON respondent barangay can acquire the subject property
children of the late Dr. Roque. Hence, the negotiations broke
by acquisitive prescription?
down due to some disagreements.
Respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease
HELD: Yes! and the memorandum of agreement in RTC QC. He was the
Parenthetically, petitioners contention that the donation was absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of deed of
invalid because it was not registered in the Registry of Property donation inter vivos, executed on December 26, 1978. The
deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to the donation donation was made in public instrument duly acknowledged
91

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
by the donor-spouses before notary public and duly accepted
on the same day.
The title of the property remained in the name of Dr. Roque
because respondent was still residing in the US and delegated
to his father the mere administration of the property.
Respondent came to know the assailed contracts with
petitioner only after the death of his father.
RTC in favor of SPRDC, while CA reversed the decision in favor
of Respondent.
ISSUE: WON holding a non-registration of a deed of donation does
affect the validity of the lease contract & memorandum of
agreement.
HELD: NO!
Donation is a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in
an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. Hence, donations of immovable property, the law
requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy
It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, that the donation be made in a public
document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land
Titles and Deeds). Consistently, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), as so amended by Section 51 of P.D. No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree) states:
SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.-
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases
under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
ISSUE: WON SBRDC was a lessee in good faith having had prior
knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent?
HELD: NO!
It was established that a deed of donation would have to be
registered in order to bind third persons. Howeer, actual
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as SBRDC was
concerned.
During Cross examiniation:
Q. What I am only asking you is, were you told by Dr. Felipe C. Roque
at the time of your transaction with him that all these three properties
were given to his children by way of donation?
A. What Architect Biglang-awa told us in his exact word: Yang mga
yan pupunta sa mga anak. Yong kay Ruben pupunta kay Ruben.
Yong kay Efren palibhasa nasa America sya, nasa pangalan pa ni Dr.
Felipe C. Roque.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When was the information supplied to you by Biglang-awa? Before
the execution of the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of
Agreement?
A. Yes.
A person dealing with registered land may thus safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore, and
he is not required to go beyond the certificate to determine
the condition of the property but, where such party has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at
the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest would have the effect of registration
as regards to him
ISSUE: WON Dr. Roque had been authorized agent of respondent.
HELD: NO!
Art. 1878 of the CC states that a special power of attorney is
necessary to lease any real property to another person for
more than one year. The lease of real property for more than
one year is considered not merely an act of administration but
an act of strict dominion or of ownership.
Dr. Roque is not authorized agent of respondent because he
did not have SPA nor respondent consented the act of his
father/agent.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is guilty of lached and estopped from
repudiating the contracts
HELD: NO!
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it.
Respondent learned of the contracts only in February 1994
after the death of his father, and in the same year, during
November, he assailed the validity of the agreements. Hardly,
could respondent then be said to have neglected to assert his
case for unreasonable length of time.
Neither is respondent estopped from repudiating the
contracts. The essential elements of estoppel in pais are
present in this case.
Party sought to be estopped, are:
1) A clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of
material facts or, at least, calculated to convey the impression that the facts
are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those, which the party subsequently
attempts to assert;
2) An intent or, at least, an expectation, that this conduct shall influence, or be
acted upon by, the other party; and
3) The knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts.
Party claiming the estoppel,
1) Lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts
in question;
2) Reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be
estopped; and
3) Action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his
position or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice
ISSUE: WON the Court exceeded its judicial authority with regard to the
actual area of the subject property.
*Noceda vs. CA (BELLO)
G.R. No. 119730 |September 2, 1999| Gonzales-Reyes, J
HELD: NO!
The records disclose that the trial court in an Order dated June
Petitioner/s: Rodolfo Noceda
Respondent/s: CA & Aurora Arbizo Directo
FACTS:
Trial court in view of its earlier Order directing Engineer
On June 1, 1981, Aurora Directo(daughter), Rodolfo Noceda
(grandson) and Maria Arbizo (widow) extra judicially settled a
parcel of land, of the late Celestino Arbizo. The land located at
Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,
530 square meters.
*Share: Directos 11, 426sqm
Noceda 13, 294sqm
Arbizo 41, 810sqm
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her
share to Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her
deceased sister, Carolina.
On August 17, 1981, the same parties executed another
extrajudicial-settlement partition of the same lot. Three fifths of
the said land went to Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got
only one-fifth each.
In 1981, Noceda constructed a house on the land donated to
him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in
the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated lot and
constructed thereon 3 huts.
In 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by
Directo and occupied the 3 huts and fenced earlier
constructed by Directo and occupied the 3 huts and fenced
the entire lot of Directo without her consent.
Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land, but the
latter refused. Directo filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and rescission/annulment of donation, against
Noceda before the trial court.
Both RTC and CA rendered decision in favor of Directo. Hence,
the extrajudicial settlement dated on Aug. 17, 1981 valid and
revoked the deed of donation dated on June 1, 1981.
8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to have the
subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to
determine the actual area of Lot 1121.
Quejada to undertake the survey of the land Engr. Quejada
conducted the survey with the conformity and in the presence
of both parties, taking into consideration the extrajudicial
partition dated August 17, 1981, deed of donation dated June
1, 1981 executed by plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of
defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual area occupied by
the parties, as well as the sketch plan and the technical
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

description of Lot 1121 taken from the Records Section of the owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
Bureau of Lands, Manila. exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
Trial Court ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine the
actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with the ISSUE: WON there is no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence
conformity and in the presence of both parties. there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him?
The actual land area based on the survey plan, which was
conducted in the presence of both parties, showed a much HELD: NO!
bigger area than the area, declared in the tax declaration but It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only
such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora
are, more often than not, based on approximation or Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
estimation rather than on computation. which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's
We hold that the respondent court did not err in sustaining the act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent
trial courts findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of
square meters. usurpation which is an offense against the property of the
donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee
ISSUE: WON there is no final determination as to the exact areas against the donor.
property pertaining to the parties, hence they are still considered as The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough
co-owners? that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
Hence, there is valid ground for the revocation of the 625sqm
HELD: NO! donated to Noceda.

The source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate ISSUE: WON the action to revoke donation has prescribed?
succession39.
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment HELD: NO!
of a thing held in common among those to whom it may The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within
belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co- one (1) year to be counted from the time:
ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of (a) The donor had knowledge of the fact;
each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific (b) Provided that it was possible for him to bring the
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate action.
without supervision or interference from the other It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1)
determined and identifiable, though not technically described, year period for bringing the action be considered to have
or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same already prescribed. Petitioner must prove his allegation,
certificate of title does make said portions less determinable or however, there is no competent proof.
identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that In Civil Cases, the party having burden of proof must establish
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a
























































fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
1.
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
39 evidence.
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of
debts of the deceased.


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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Austria-Magat vs. CA (BELLO)
G.R. No. 106755|February 1, 2002|De Leon Jr., J
Petitioner/s: Apolinaria Austria Magat
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals & Florentino Lumubos, Domingo
Comia, Teodora Carampot, Ernesto Apolo, Segunda Sumpelo,
Mamerto Sumpelo and Ricardo Sumpelo.
FACTS:
Basilisa Comerciante was a mother of 5 children, namely,
Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner
Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of herein
respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a
Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II.
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land, with an
area of 150 sqm, located in San Antonio, Cavite City. In 1975,
Basilisa executed Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation) in favor
of her 4 children. The document was notarized and signed by
Atty, Viniegra.
Basilisa and her children executed another notarized
document as Kasulatan tastasin ng madla, which was
attached to the deed of donation.
On 1979, Basilisa executed a DOAS of the subject house and
lot in favor of Austria Magat for P5,000.
On 1983 the heirs of the deceased children of Basilisa and
Florentino lumubos filed before RTC, for annulment of the TCT
and other relevant documents, and for reconveyance and
damages.
RTC rendered decision in favor of Austria-Magat. The donation
is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New
Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor; that the
provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the
donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must
comply with the formalities of a will. Hence, the sale by the
donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be
the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said
transaction
CA reversed the decision. The deed is a donation inter vivos.
There is a clear expression in the deed of the irrevocability of
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
the conveyance. The irrevocability of the donation is a
characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
ISSUE: WON the Deed is considered Donation Inter Vivos?
HELD: YES
In the case at bar, the decisive proof that the deed is a
donation inter vivos is in the provision that :
Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa
naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang
aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik
doon xxx.
The express irrevocability of the same (hindi na mababawi) is
the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a
donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein which
seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against
the irrevocable character of the subject donation.
In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation that
the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor
just goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of
ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus
utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated
property.
In Cuevas v. Cuevas we ruled that when the deed of donation
provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the
property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he
in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with
his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives.
It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express
provision that the donor continues to be in possession and
enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive.
In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter
vivos character of the donation.
ISSUE: WON the irrevocability provision was intended to protect the
property from encumbrance, alienation or being sold?
HELD: NO
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
It is clear that both the donor and the donees were prohibited
from alienating and encumbering the property during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said
property until her death, she could have expressly stated
therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The
prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during
her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has
been transferred to the donees.
It also supports the irrevocable nature of the donation
considering that the donor has already divested herself of the
right to dispose of the donated property.
The prohibition on the donees only meant that they may not
mortgage or dispose the donated property while the donor
enjoys and possesses the property during her lifetime. However,
it is clear that the donees were already the owners of the
subject property due to the irrevocable character of the
donation.
ISSUE: WON the donor validly revoked the donation when one of her
daughters and donnees, violated the prohibition to encumber the
property?
HELD: NO
When Consolacion Austria mortgaged the subject property to
a certain Baby Santos, the donor, Basilisa Comerciante, asked
one of the respondents herein, Domingo Comia, to redeem
the property, which the latter did. Basilisa, sold the property to
the petitioner who is one of the donees.
The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein
cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation of the
deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke
the donation must be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil
Code which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period
of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition
stated in the deed of donation.
The rule that there can be automatic revocation without
benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar for
the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
provision providing for automatic revocation in event of non-
compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein.
Thus, a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the condition violated.
ISSUE: WON the annulment on the ground of fraud and/or implied trust
has already prescribed?
HELD: NO
The records do not show that the donor, Basilisa, and the
petitioner ever intended to defraud the respondents herein
with respect to the sale and ownership of the said property.
The four-year prescriptive period is not applicable to the case
at bar for the reason that there is no fraud in this case.
The sale was grounded upon their honest but erroneous
interpretation of the deed of donation that it is mortis causa,
not inter vivos; and that the donor still had the rights to sell or
dispose of the donated property and to revoke the donation.
When ones property is registered in anothers name without the
formers consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of
the true owner. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
There being no fraud in the trust relationship between the
donor and the donees including the herein petitioner, the
action for reconveyance prescribes in ten (10) years.
F. Protection of Ownership
F.1 Registry of Deeds
*Vencilao vs. CA (BELLO)
G.R. No. 123713|April 1, 1998| Bellosillo, J
96
PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr.; represented by their
administrator Elipidio Vencilao
Respondent/s: CA, Spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago and
Domiciano Gepalago
FACTS:
The heirs of Vencilao Sr filed a complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and/or ownership, accounting and
damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the spouses
Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago and an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title and to implead
defendant Domiciano Gepalago.
The heirs of Vencilao were the absolute owner of a parcel of
land situated in Cambansag San Isidro. Bohol, with an area of
3, 625 sq. inherited from their father.
Their father, Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., declared the property for
taxation and religiously paid the real estate taxes. He also
declared as his own in other documents such as the CARP.
After his death, his heirs continued to possess and enjoys the
property.
The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied the
allegations because they were the registered owners of a
5,970sq. property located in Candungao Calapo San Isidro,
Bohol.
The entire parcel of land was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for a loan. Since
Luspo failed to pay the obligation upon maturity the mortgage
was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale, conveyed the whole property to fifty-six (56)
vendees among whom were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta
Gepalago who acquired the 5,970 square-meter portion
thereof. They had been the owner and possessor of the land
until they donated the same in 1988 to their son Domiciano
Gepalago.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated
property and determine the areas claimed by both parties.
The trial court found the following:
(a) The property claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970 square meters,
while that of the Vencilaos covered an area of 22,401.58 square meters as
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr. Jesus H. Sarmiento, the court
appointed commissioner;
(b) Insofar as the survey plan and report submitted by Engr. Sarmiento were
concerned, these indubitably established the fact that the Vencilaos owned
the excess area of 16,431.58 square meters which was clearly outside the area
claimed by the Gepalagos;
(c) The lot in question had been titled to defendant Sabas Gepalago and
subsequently titled to his son, defendant Domiciano Gepalago, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 18621 by virtue of a deed of donation executed on 25
October 1988 by Sabas Gepalago in favor of Domiciano Gepalago; and,
(d) As stated in the commissioners report, "If the titled lot of Domiciano
Gepalago is plotted in accordance with the technical description appearing
in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219 kilometers eastward away from
its supposed actual location. This amounts to its non-existence."
The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the Vencilaos.
They had been in possession and cultivation and enjoyment of
the litigated property for more than 30 years. While CA
reversed the trial court decision because Spouses Gepalago
were purchasers in good faith and for value.
ISSUE: WON the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries
before they purchase the property?
HELD: NO!
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of
the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the
right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is
under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the
certificate.
Exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary
inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property.
The exception contemplates a situation wherein there exists a
flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge
or at least ought to have known of such flaw at the time he
acquired the property, in which case, he is not considered as
an innocent purchaser for value.
The records showing that the title of PNB, the vendor, was
flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their claim of
acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also
failed to allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
there was a defect in the title of PNB. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption leans towards the validity of the
vendors title.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are estopped from asserting their rights of
the title of the litigated property?
HELD: YES!
There were at least three (3) transactions on record involving
the property:
o First, the contract of mortgage between Luspo and PNB
whereby the property was used as security for the loan
contracted by Luspo;
o Second, the foreclosure of mortgage upon the failure
of Luspo to pay the loan and the subsequent sale of
the property at public auction; and,
o Third, the sale of the property to fifty-six (56) vendees,
among whom were the Gepalago spouses. Each of
these transactions was registered and a corresponding
transfer certificate issued in favor of the new owner.
Yet in all these, petitioners never instituted any action
contesting the same nor registered any objection thereto;
instead, they remained silent. Thus, they are now estopped
from denying the title of the present owner. Having failed to
assert their rights, if any, over the property warrants the
presumption that they have either abandoned them or
declined to assert them.
Cheng vs Genato (BELLO)
G.R. No. 129760 |December 29, 1998| Martinez, J
Petitioner/s: Ricardo Cheng
Respondent/s: Ramon Genato & Ernesto Da Jose & Socorro Da Jose
FACTS:
Genato (Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located
at Paradise Farms, Bulacan, with an area of 35, 821sqm.
Genato entered into an agreement with spouses Ernesto R. Da
Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose spouses) over two
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parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the execution of
a contract to sell for which the purchase price was P80.00 per
square meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was
duly annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on
the same day. Clauses 1and 3 thereof provide:
1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency per square meter, of which
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS shall
be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down
payment at the time of execution of this Contract to
Sell.
3. That the VENDEE, Thirty (30) DAYS after the execution
of this contract, and only after having satisfactorily
verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of
documents, and that no restrictions, limitations, and
developments imposed on and/or affecting the
property subject of this contract shall be detrimental to
his interest, the VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P950,00.00) PESOS.
Philippine Currency, representing the full payment of
the agreed Down Payment, after which complete
possession of the property shall be given to the VENDEE
to enable him to prepare the premises and any
development therein.
In 1989, the Da Jose spouses, asked for 30 days extension and
was granted by Genato. However, according to Genato, the
extension was granted on condition that a new set of
documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. This
was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and
without due notice to the Da Jose spouses, Genato executed
an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, because of breach
of contract for not having complied with the obligation as
provided in the Contract to Sell.
Cheng went to Genato's residence and expressed interest in
buying the subject properties. Genato showed to Ricardo
Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the
annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the
Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the
aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which
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has not been annotated at the back of the titles. Then, Check
issues a check for 50,000 upon assurance by Genato that the
previous contract with Da Jose Spouses will be annulled which
issued a handwritten receipt.
Genato and Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry
of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan on October 27, 1989, they
met by coincidence. It was only then that the Da Jose spouses
discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The
latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against
the rescission of their contract.
After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da
Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their
verification of his titles, that the period was still in effect, and
that they were willing and able to pay the balance of the
agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided
to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to
continue with their contract was formalized in a letter dated
October 27, 1989.
Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to
continue his contract with the Da Jose spouses and the return
of Cheng's P50,000.00 check. Cheng, however, returned the
said check to the former via RCPI telegram 14 dated November
6, 1989, reiterating, "our contract to sell your property had
already been perfected." Meanwhile, also on November 2,
1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse claim
RTC rendered decision in favor of Cheng, because the receipt
issued by Genato to Cheng unerringly meant a sale and not
just a priority or an option to buy. CA reversed the decision,
because the prior contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose
spouses was not validly rescinded
ISSUE: WON the contract to sell has been validly rescinded?
HELD: NO
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an
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obligatory force. 22 It is one where the happening of the event
gives rise to an obligation. Thus, for its non-fulfillment there will
be no contract to speak of, the obligor having failed to
perform the suspensive condition, which enforces a juridical
relation.
The Da Jose spouses' contention that no further condition was
agreed when they were granted the 30-days extension period
from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their
contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be upheld for
the following reason, to wit;
Firstly, If this were not true, Genato could not have
been persuaded to continue his contract with them
and later on agree to accept the full settlement of the
purchase price knowing fully well that he himself
imposed such sine qua non condition in order for the
extension to be valid;
Secondly, Genato could have immediately annotated
his affidavit to annul the contract to sell on his title
when it was executed on October 13, 1989 and not
only on October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of
the annotation;
Thirdly, Genato could have sent at least a notice of
such fact, there being no stipulation authorizing him for
automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the
encumbrance on his titles and make it available to
other would be buyers. It likewise settles the holding of
the trial court that Genato "needed money urgently."
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses
defaulted, as claimed by Genato, in their Contract to Sell, the
execution by Genato of the affidavit to annul the contract is
not even called for. When a contract is subject to a suspensive
condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and
when the event, which constitutes the condition, happens or is
fulfilled. If the suspensive condition does not take place, the
parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed.
Even though we upheld the validity of a stipulation in a
contract to sell authorizing automatic rescission for a violation
of its terms and conditions, at least a written notice must be
sent to the defaulter informing him of the same. The act of a
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party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made
known to the other. For such act is always provisional. It is
always subject to scrutiny and review by the courts in case the
alleged defaulter brings the matter to the proper courts.
Hence, Genato is not relieved from the giving a notice, verbal
or written, to the Da Jose spouses.
Thus, Ricardo Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or
resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support
in this case.
ISSUE: WON Ricardo Cheng's own contract with Genato was not just a
contract to sell but one of conditional contract of sale, which gave
him better rights?
HELD: NO
This Court notes that Cheng was inconsistent in characterizing
the contract he allegedly entered into. In his complaint.
Cheng alleged that the P50,000.00 down payment was
earnest money. And next, his testimony was offered to prove
that the transaction between him and Genato on October 24,
1989 was actually a perfected contract to sell.
Settled is the rule that an issue, which was not raised during the
trial in the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
But even if we are to assume that the receipt, Exh. "D," is to be
treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any
obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition
that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da
Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded, a Good faith, or lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but
condition never met.
In fact, a careful reading of the receipt, alone would not even
show that a conditional contract of sale has been entered by
Genato and Cheng. When the requisites of a valid contract of
sale are lacking in said receipt, therefore the "sale" is neither
valid nor enforceable.
Article 1544 of the NCC contemplates the ownership of
immovable property shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
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The contract to be binding upon the obligee or the vendor
depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an event.
Notwithstanding this contrary finding with the appellate court,
we are of the view that the governing principle of Article 1544,
Civil Code, should apply in this situation. Jurisprudence 38
teaches us that the governing principle is PRIMUS TEMPORE,
PORTIOR JURE (first in time, stronger in right). For not only was
the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was
also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second
buyer. This principle only applies when the special rules
provided in the aforcited article of the Civil Code do not apply
or fit the specific circumstances mandated under said law or
by jurisprudence interpreting the article.
Thus, in the case at bar, the knowledge gained by the Da Jose
spouses, as first buyers, of the new agreement between Cheng
and Genato will not defeat their rights as first buyers except
where Cheng, as second buyer, registers or annotates his
transaction or agreement on the title of the subject properties
in good faith ahead of the Da Jose spouses.
"Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any
entry made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even marginal notes
However, registration alone in such cases without good faith is
not sufficient. Good faith must concur with registration for such
prior right to be enforceable. In the annotation made by the
Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their "Contract To
Sell" more than satisfies this requirement.
In the case of Leung Yee vs. F.L Strong Machinery Co, the court
held that,
in ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given
occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the
conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may
with safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of intention," "the
honest lawful intent," which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom
from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry," and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the
presumption of good faith in which the courts always indulge in the
absence of the proof to the contrary. "Good faith, or the want of it, is
not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a
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state or condition of mind which can only be judge of by actual or
fancied tokens or signs."
ISSUE: WON Cheng is liable for damages?
HELD: YES!
Damages were awarded by the appellate court on the basis
of its finding that petitioner "was in bad faith when he filed the
suit for specific performance knowing fully well that his
agreement with Genato did not push through.
Such bad faith, coupled with his wrongful interference with the
contractual relations between Genato and the Da Jose
spouses, which culminated in his filing of the present suit and
thereby creating what the counsel for the respondents
describes as "a prolonged and economically unhealthy
gridlock
*Almirol vs. Register of Deeds (BELLO)
G.R. No. L-22486|March 20, 1968| Castro, J
Petitioner/s: Teodoro Almirol
Respondent/s: The Register of Deeds of Agusan
FACTS:
In 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
parcel of land situated in the province of Agusan. The Original
Certificate of title was in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married
to Nicolas Abalo.
In 1962, Almirol went of Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan
City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title.
The registration refused upon the following grounds:
1. The property is considered conjugal,
2. The NCC requires that both spouses sign in the
document.
3. In the case, the wife has already died, when the sale
was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of
the whole property without violating the existing law.
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To effect the registration, it was necessary that the property be
first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of
extrajudicial settlement or partition and the consent of such
other heir/s must be procured by means of another document
ratifying the sale executed by their father.
Almirol went to the Court of First Instance on a petition of
manadumus to compel the register of deeds to register and
transfer the certificate of title.
ISSUE: WON mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register
the deed of sale in question?
HELD: No!
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of
deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court
of competent jurisdiction. Hence, whether the document is
invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction
In the case of Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and
Tantoco ,the court ruled that If the purpose of registration is
merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not
before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence
that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards
The register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and
discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For
under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper
step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is
to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
Section 4 of R.A. 1151.
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*Heirs of Valientes vs. Ramas (BELLO)
G.R. No. 157852|December 15, 2010 |Leonardo-De Castro J
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Domingo Valientes
Respondent/s: Hon. Reinerio B. Ramas, Presiding Judge, RTC San
Miguel Zamboanga del Sur and Vilma V. Minor
FACTS:
In 1939, Domingo Valientes mortgaged the a parcel of land in
Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur to secure his loan
to the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen).
However, Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed,
to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen.
Through an allegedly forged document captioned VENTA
DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject
property between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen,
the spouses obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
The legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had
their Affidavit of Adverse Claim duly entered in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of TCT. Upon the
death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida Sescon
Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an extra-judicial
settlement with partition and sale in favor of private
respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the
subject property.
1979, Minor filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Pagadian City a "PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TCT OF THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,". Then, on the
year 2000, RTC granted Minors prayer to allow the Register of
Deeds to have the title to the subject property transferred to
her name.
However, the heirs of Valientes filed a complaint before the
RTC for the "CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING,
RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES.
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Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
forum shopping and litis pendentia. RTC denied the motion
and Minor filed for reconsideration. The RTC granted the
motion. While the CA ruled in favor of petitioners on the issue
that the civil case was already barred by forum shopping, res
judicata or litis pendetia. However, the CA affirmed the
dismissal on the grounds of prescription and laches.
ISSUE: WON the claim of the heirs of Valientes already prescribed?
HELD: YES!
In the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of
Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, wherein we held:
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de
Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe
In the case at bar, Minors predecessor-in-interest acquired the
subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that
of enforcing an implied trust. In particular, Article 1456 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when
the plaintiff in such action is not in possession of the subject
property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. When the plaintiff is in
possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect
that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe. In
the case at bar, the heirs (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property. Civil
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Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of
enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed
within ten years from the issuance of TCT on December 22,
1969. Civil Case was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which
was way beyond the prescriptive period.
Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are
general rules on prescription which should give way to the
special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of entry of the decree of registration, without
prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or
any person responsible for the fraud.
We have allowed actions for reconveyance based on implied
trusts even beyond such one-year period, for such actions
respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible. We
explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.
The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property.
The Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the
issuance of TCT. This period is unreasonably long for a party
seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus,
petitioners claim that they had not slept on their rights is
patently unconvincing.
F.2 Quieting of Title
*Secuya vs Vda. De Selma (BELLO)
G.R. No. 136021|February 22, 2000| Vitug, J
Petitioner/s: Benigna Secuya, Miguel Secuya, Marcelino Secuya,
Corazon Secuya, Rufina Secuya, Bernardino Secuya, Natividad
Secuya, Glicera Secuya & Purita Secuya
Respondent/s: Gerard M. VDa De Selma
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FACTS:
The property was originally sold, and the covering patent
issued, to Maxima Caballero Vda. de Cario Lot 5679 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate and has an area of 12,750
square meters, more or less.
During the lifetime of Maxima Caballero, vendee and
patentee of Lot 5679, she entered into that AGREEMENT OF
PARTITION dated January 5, 1938 with Paciencia Sabellona,
whereby the former bound herself and parted (1/3) portion of
Lot 5679 in favor of the. Among others it was stipulated in said
agreement of partition that the said portion of one-third so
ceded will be located adjoining the municipal road.
Paciencia Sabellona took possession and occupation of that
one-third portion of Lot 5679 adjudicated to her. Later, she sold
the three thousand square meter portion thereof to Dalmacio
Secuya for P1,850.00, by means of a private document which
was lost. Such sale was admitted and confirmed by Ramon
Sabellona, only heir of Paciencia Sabellona.
Ramon Sabellona was the only heir of Paciencia Sabellona,
hence, pursuant to such will, Ramon Sabellona inherited all the
properties left by Paciencia Sabellona
Dalmacio Secuya purchased the property in litigation on
October 20, 1953, Dalmacio, together with his brothers and
sisters he being single took physical possession of the land
and cultivated the same.
In 1967, Edilberto Superales married Rufina Secuya, niece of
Dalmacio Secuya. With the permission and tolerance of the
Secuyas, Edilberto Superales constructed his house on the lot in
question in January 1974 and lived thereon continuously up to
the present
Dalmacio Secuya died on November 20, 1961. Thus his heirs
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces are the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. CEB-4247 and now the petitioners.
However, Selma argued that she is the registered owner of Lot
5679-C-120 consisting of 9,302 square meters as evidenced by
TCT. She bought the same sometime in February 1975 from
Cesaria Caballero as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale
and have been in possession of the same since then. Cesaria
Caballero was the widow of Silvestre Aro, registered owner of
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the mother lot, Lot. No. 5679 with an area of 12,750 square
meters of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, as shown by
TCT. Upon Silvestre Aro's demise, his heirs executed an
"Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale" wherein one-
half plus one-fifth of Lot No. 5679 was adjudicated to the
widow, Cesaria Caballero, from whom defendant-appellee
derives her title.
ISSUE: WON this is an action for quieting title?
HELD: NO!
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must
demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in,
the subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly
casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
This point is clear from Article 476 of the Civil Code
Petitioners anchor their claim of ownership on two documents:
the Agreement of Partition executed by Maxima Caballero
and Paciencia Sabellona and the Deed of Confirmation of
Sale executed by Ramon Sabellona. We will now examine
these two documents. However the Agreement of Partition is
not one of partition but an express trust. While the Deed of
Confirmation of Sale had been lost.
ISSUE: WON the agreement of Partition is an express trust?
HELD: YES!
This Agreement is not one of partition, because there was no
property to partition and the parties were not co-owners.
Rather, it is in the nature of a trust agreement. An express trust
is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An
implied trust comes into being by operation of law.
The present Agreement of Partition involves an express trust.
Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "no particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended." That Maxima Caballero bound
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herself to give one third of Lot No. 5629 to Paciencia Sabellona
upon the approval of the former's application is clear from the
terms of the Agreement. Likewise, it is evident that Paciencia
acquiesced to the covenant and is thus bound to fulfill her
obligation therein.
As a result of the Agreement, Maxima Caballero held the
portion specified therein as belonging to Paciencia Sabellona
when the application was eventually approved and a sale
certificate was issued in her name. Thus, she should have
transferred the same to the latter, but she never did so during
her lifetime. Instead, her heirs sold the entire Lot No. 5679 to
Silvestre Aro in 1955.
Paciencia and her successors-in-interest did not do anything to
enforce their proprietary rights over the disputed property or to
consolidate their ownership over the same. In fact, they did not
even register the said Agreement with the Registry of Property
or pay the requisite land taxes.
ISSUE: WON the purported sale to Dalmacio Secuya happened?
HELD: NO!
Petitioners insist that Paciencia sold the disputed property to
Dalmacio Secuya on October 20, 1953, and that the sale was
embodied in a private document.
However, such document, which would have been the best
evidence of the transaction, was never presented in court,
allegedly because it had been lost.
While a sale of a piece of land appearing in a private deed is
binding between the parties, it cannot be considered binding
on third persons, if it is not embodied in a public instrument and
recorded in the Registry of Property.
Dalmacio, petitioners instead presented the testimony of
Miguel Secuya, one of the petitioners; and a Deed confirming
the sale executed by Ramon Sabellona, Paciencia's alleged
heir. However, His testimony is only in probative value is
doubtful. His status as heir of Paciencia was not affirmatively
established. Moreover, he was not presented in court and was
thus not quizzed on his knowledge or lack thereof of the
1953 transaction.
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ISSUE: WON Selmas title is valid?
HELD: YES!
Petitioners debunk Private Respondent Selma's title to the
disputed property, alleging that she was aware of their
possession of the disputed properties. Thus, they insist that she
could not be regarded as a purchaser in good faith who is
entitled to the protection of the Torrens system.
In the case of Sandoval v. CA, the court held:
It is settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered
under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has
to rely on the title except when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry, or when the purchaser has knowledge of
a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of title of
the property in litigation
Assuming arguendo, the vendor, Cesaria Caballero, assured
her that petitioners were just tenants on the said lot. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for believing this representation,
considering that petitioners' claim was not noted in the
certificate of the title covering Lot No. 5679.
Moreover, the lot, including the disputed portion, had been
the subject of several sales transactions. The title thereto had
been transferred several times, without any protestation or
complaint from the petitioners.
Maestrado vs CA (BELLO)
G.R. No. 133345|March 9, 2000|De Leon, Jr., J
Petitioner/s: Josefa Maestrada, as substituted by her daughter Lourdes
Maetrada-Lavia and Carmen Abaya
Respondent/s: Cam Jesus Roa Jr., Ramon Chaves & Natividad Santos
FACTS:
The litigated property, has an area of 57.601 square meters,
however, is still registered in the name of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and
Rosario died. They were survived by the following heirs, namely:
Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel
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Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
Angel Chaves initiated intestate proceedings and appointed
as administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of
the estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a
project of partition. The court appointed Hernando Roa,
husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956,
the court rendered a decision approving the project of
partition. However, the records of said case are missing and
although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to
present a copy of said decision.
The estate all located in Cagayan de Oro City was actually
divided in this wise:
(1) 44 hectares of coconut land was distributed equally among 4
heirs, namely: (a) Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel
Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while
(2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, and consisting of an
aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally between
petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-
Abaya.
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had
already died. His share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is
the namesake of Salvadors father.
In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected,
receiver Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said
heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently,
Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his
share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to
Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the
following documents:
(1) The inventory of properties of the estate.
(2) The project of partition.
(3) The properties receiver Hernando Roa had taken possession
(4) The court order approving the partition.
Decedent Ramon Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from
Felomino Bautista, Sr. but he subsequently delivered it to the
spouses Hernando Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa It was
thereafter delivered to petitioners during the actual partition in
1956, and petitioners have been in possession of the same
since then.
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In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim
to confirm the alleged oral agreement. On August 16, 1977,
Angel, Concepcion and Ramon signed a notarized quitclaim
in favor of petitioners. Amparo was unable to sign because she
had an accident and had passed away on the following day.
It was her heirs who signed a similarly worded and notarized
quitclaim on September 8, 1977.
Respondent dispute the voluntariness of their consent of their
predecessors in interest to the quitclaims.
(1) Ramon betrayed by his lawyer
(2) Angel out of respect
(3) Concepcion misled by alleged misrepresentations in the whereas clauses
6 years after the execution of the quitclaims, that Lot No. 5872
is still in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves. Thus Ramon Chaves, the sole heir of Salvador Chaves,
and respondent Jesus Roa, the son of Amparo Chaves-Roa,
wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to inform him that
said property, which they claim to belong to the estate of their
deceased grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the
concerned heirs. Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to
distribute and deliver it to the heirs. Natividad Santos, daughter
and attorney-in-fact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also
wrote a similar letter to Angel Chaves. On December 1, 1983,
Angel Chaves transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen
Abaya and requested her to respond.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for
quieting title?
HELD: YES!
Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a
real property may bring such action and "title" here does not
necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the
person filing the suit. Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for
quieting of title is in possession of the property being litigated,
such action is imprescriptible. One who is in actual possession
of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain
the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
The doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was
filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Laches
does not apply in this case because petitioners possession of
the subject lot has rendered their right to bring an action for
quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by
laches.
In this case at bench, the cloud on petitioners title to the
subject property came about only on December 1, 1983 when
Angel Chaves transmitted respondents letters to petitioners,
while petitioners action was filed on December 22, 1983.
Clearly, no laches could set in under the circumstances since
petitioners were prompt and vigilant in protecting their rights.
ISSUE: WON petitioners acquired ownership by reason of the oral
partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses heirs sometime
before 1956?
HELD: YES!
The actual partition of the estate conformed to the alleged
oral partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of
private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered
to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years from 1983.
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral
agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is
the only way we can make sense out of the actual partition of
the properties of the estate despite claims that a court order
provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners
were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or
another, it was delivered to them.
Plus, no one among the heirs questioned petitioners possession
of or ownership over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are
convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of
partition among the said heirs and the distribution of the
properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In any
event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but
no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title
thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right.
In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of
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Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto by
virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
In fact, it has been recently held and reiterated by this Court
that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan
is essential to the validity of an oral partition.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the
existence of the oral partition is the fact that the terms of the
actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical to
the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one among the
heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.
ISSUE: WON the notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs are vititated
by fraud?
HELD: NO!
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the
notarized quitclaims confirmed such prior oral agreement as
well as the petitioners title of ownership over the subject Lot
No. 5872. More importantly, independent of such oral partition,
the quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of waiver
of property rights.
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in
the instant case, is protected by law and the courts are not
quick to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the
relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their existence and
intent to relinquish the. The intent to waive rights must be
clearly and convincingly shown.
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated
August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs
signatures thereon have no other significance but their
conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of property rights.
In other words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized and
acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full credence
and are valid and enforceable in the absence of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In the case at bench,
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
it is our view and we hold that the execution of the said
quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Robles vs CA (BELLO)
G.R. No. 123509|March 14, 2000 | Panganiban, J
Petitioner/s: Lucio Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia Robles & Emilio
Robles
Respondent/s: CA, Spouses Santos and Baby Ruth Cruz et al.
FACTS:
Leon Robles, owned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi,
Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters.
He also declared the same in his name for taxation purposes
as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration and paid the
corresponding taxes. When Leon Robles died, his son Silvino
Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land,
declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes.
Upon the death of Silvino Robles in, his widow Maria de la Cruz
and his children inherited the property. They took adverse
possession of said property and paid taxes thereon.
The task of cultivating the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio
Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa
hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the
land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel
of land in the, name of Silvino Robles was canceled and
transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles
who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo
Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the
tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural
Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant
Hilario Robles and his wife.
Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax
declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The
latter then mortgaged the property to private respondent
Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said
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bank acquired by public bidding the property, which was then
sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the
mortgage only in 1987. The Petitioners tried to redeem the
property but was unsuccessful.
1988, the spouses Santos took possession of the property in
question and was able to secure Free Patent in their names.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring null the patent,
declaring the heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject
land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer
had title to the property.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an
action for quieting of title (relevant issue) and whether title claimed by
respondents is valid?
HELD: YES
An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the
removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to
real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to
have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
In the case at bench, The petitioners allege that they inherited
it from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it from his
father, Leon. They maintain that after their father's death, they
agreed among themselves that Petitioner Lucio Robles would
be tending and cultivating it for everyone, and that their half-
brother Hilario would be paying the land taxes.
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been
occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax
declarations issued in their names. Also undisputed is the fact
that the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the
land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly
ousted therefrom in 1988.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
In 1962, the subject property was declared in the name of
Exequiel for taxation purposes. On September 30, 1965, it was
again declared in the same name; on October 28, 1965, in the
name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in
the name of Hilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name
of the Rural Bank of Cardona and, finally, in the name of the
Santos spouses.
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities
in the transactions involving the disputed property.
1. While it was declared in the name of Exequiel in 1962, there was
no instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer
from the heirs of Silvino to him.
2. Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario, to whom petitioners had
entrusted the payment of the land taxes.
3. Considering that the subject property had been mortgaged by
Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed
and in fact declared in the bank's name in 1965, why was he
able to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966?
4. Lastly, inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due diligence in
determining Hilario's title thereto.
The Title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed
invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title and
appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have prejudiced the
rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate. He must
have first repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA
failed to consider the irregularities in the transactions involving
the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was
presented to show any transaction between petitioners and
Ballane or even Hilario.
ISSUE: WON the Real Estate Mortgage is valid?
HELD: YES
Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is
concerned there being co-ownership between the heirs.
In the present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not
the absolute owner of the entire subject property; and that the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title
thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a
mortgagee in bad faith.
First, the bank utterly remiss in its duty to establish who the true
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owners and possessors of the subject property were. Had it
been more circumspect and assiduous, it would have
discovered that the said property was in fact being occupied
by the petitioners, who were tending and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the Deed of
Sale purportedly showing that the ownership of the disputed
property had been transferred from Exequiel Ballena to the
Robles spouses, or that it had subsequently been declared in
the name of Hilario. Hence, the bank had not been in good
faith. (BANK = Extra due diligence; more care and prudence).
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding
the bank's insistence that it had become the owner of the
subject property and had paid the land taxes thereon, the
petitioners continued occupying it and harvesting the fruits
therefrom.
*Calacala vs Republic (Trias)
GR 1534415 |July 28, 2005 | J. Garcia
Petitioner/s: Gaspar, Baltazar, Melchor, Solomon, Felicidad, Petronila
and Salome Calacala
Respondent/s: Republic of the PH and Sherriff Juan Marquez
Topic: Quieting of Title
FACTS:
Camilo and Conchita Calacala (predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners) are registered owners of a parcel of land in
Rosales, Pampanga
Spouses Calacala used the parcel of land as a property bond
to secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal
case pending in the CFI of Pangasinan
For failure of accused to appear in his arraignment, the
property was foreclosed in favor of the government at the
amount of P3,500.00
September, 1982: Property was sold in a public auction and
was awarded to the Republic was the winning bidder at P3,500
December, 1982: Certificate of Sale was registered and
spouses Calacala were given 1 year to redeem their property
Spouses died and were not able to redeem said property
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Quieting of Title
and Cancellation of Encumbrance against respondents
Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez claiming ownership of
the land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, and prayed
that the entries to the TCT be null and void
Defendants plead for a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of
cause of action and prescription
Petitioners argue that respondents did not secure:
o Certificate of Final Sale
o Writ of Possession
and failed to execute:
o Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
Petitioners further argue that the Republics rights over the land in
question had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived citing
Article 1142 of Civil Code
Defendants argue that title of ownership has been perfected by
mere failure of spouses Calacala to redeem within 1 year
RTC: in favor of Republic
MR: denied; in favor of Republic
ISSUE: WON the trial courts dismissal of petitioners complaint for
Quieting of Title was proper?
WON the petitioners stated sufficient cause of action?
HELD: NO
NO
An action of quieting the title is essentially a common law
remedy based on equity
Quieting of title: action for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property; an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property,
adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever
afterward free from any danger of hostile claim
In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make
the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb
the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right
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would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best
Article 476 of the Civil Code: Quieting of title can only be
availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding appears valid but is
invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is casts
on the complainants title to real property or any interest therein
Article 477 of the Civil Code: The party who may bring action
to quiet the title are those who have legal or equitable title or
interest in the property
2 requisites to quiet title:
o legal standing (Article 477)
o cloud on title is in fact invalid (Article 476)
Petitioners in this case lack:
o legal standing because their predecessors-in-interest
already lost ownership upon failure to redeem
(therefore, petitioners neither have legal or equitable
title nor interest)
o cloud on title is not invalid for mere failure of Republic
to secure some documents (mere formality and
confirmation; does not affect ownership; Section 33,
Rule 39 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that
purchaser will automatically acquire all rights, title,
interest and claim when right to redemption is not
exercised)
Petition is DENIED
Aznar vs Aying (Trias)
GR 144773 |May 16, 2005 | J. Austria-Martinez
Petitioner/s: Aznar Brothers Realty Company
Respondent/s: Laurencio Aying, In His Own Behalf And In Behalf Of The
Other Heirs Of Emiliano Aying, Paulino Aying, In His Own Behalf And In
Behalf Of The Other Heirs Of Simeon Aying, And Wenceslao
Sumalinog, In His Own Behalf And In Behalf Of The Other Heirs Of
Roberta Aying (mainly only heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta)
Topic: Quieting of Title
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari
Crisanta Maloloy-on owned 34,325 square meters of parcel of
land in Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City
1930: Crisanta died; Title was names after Crisantas 8 children:
Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe,
Roberta and Fausta Aying
Title was lost during war
1964: Heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying
the parcel of land to petitioners Aznar Brothers
1964: Petitioners registered land under Act 3344 and has been
paying real property taxes for subject property
1988: Respondents Aying filed a Petition for Reconstitution of
the Original Title as the original title over the subject property
had been lost during the war
1988: RTC granted petition and ordered the reconstitution of
the title in the name of Aying siblings
1991: Petitioner Aznar sent Notices to vacate addressed to
persons occupying the subject property
Petitioners also filed a Complaint for Ejectment in the MTC
1994: MTC granted ejectment case
2000: Aznar v. CA and Aying siblings (SC granted Aznar as
rightful owners of subject property)
1993: Around 220 respondents (descendants of Aying) filed a
Complaint for Cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Absolute Sale, Recovery of Ownership, Injunction and
Damages in the RTC
Respondents argue that they have been in A(2)P(2)OC(2)U
actual, adverse, physical, peaceful, open, continuous and in
the concept of an owner and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property (being only disturbed in 1991 when Notices to
Vacate were given to give way to Sta. Lucia Realty
Developments)
Respondents argue that the Deed of Absolute Sale is null and
void for being executed in bad faith (not all parties signed and
some who affixed their signatures were already dead)
Petitioners argue that they have been religiously paying real
property taxes, have tolerated 6 persons eventually ejected
and action has prescribed (27 years, 10 months and 27 days
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passed when they only had 4 years after discovery of fraud to
file an action to recover property based on implied trust)
Respondents argue that an action for declaration of an
inexistent contract does not prescribe (Article 1410 of Civil
Code)
RTC: in favor of petitioners (if action for reconveyance,
prescribes in 10 years and if action for annulment of contract,
prescribes in 4 years)
CA: in favor of respondents (an action for reconveyance of
registered land never prescribes and if it was an action for
annulment of contract, no repudiation of contract yet)
ISSUE: WON the respondents cause of action is imprescriptible?
WON if their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may
the principle of laches apply?
HELD: NO
NO
Extra-judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
is valid and binding only as to the heirs who participated in the
execution (heirs of Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon cannot be
bound by the document)
Petitioner mistakenly acquired the entire parcel of land
Article 1456: Property obtained through mistake or fraud is held
by implied trust by operation of law
Expressed Trust v. Implied Trust (constructive or resulting)
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment; they arise contrary to intention against one who,
by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the
legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold; repudiation is not necessary for
prescription to run when there is constructive trust
An action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive
trust prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property or from the date of registration of the deed
If the person seeking for an action of reconveyance is in actual
possession of the subject property, the action in effect is that of
quieting the title and does not prescribe
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
The 3 Ayings all admitted that they never occupied the subject
property so 10 year prescription period will apply
If Deed of Sale is registered depending under what law it was
exectuted:
o Act 3344 deemed not registered
o Act 496 (Land Registration Act)
Knowledge of Extra-Judicial Partition with Deed of Sale as
reckoning point for prescription:
o Roberta 3 years after 1964 (1967)
o Emiliano upon receipt of notice to vacate (1991)
o Simeon upon receipt of notice to vacate (1991)
Robertas action has been barred by prescription
Emiliano and Simeon was able to initiate action before the
prescription of 10 years from receipt of notice to vacate
Aznar held 2/8 portion of land as trustee for Emiliano and
Simeon
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
o Roberta Aying: Dismissed
o Emiliano and Simeon Aying: Granted (2/8 parcel of
land of subject property)
*Valientes vs Ramas (Trias)
GR No 157852|December 15, 2010 | J. Leonardo De Castro
Petitioner/s: Heirs Of Domingo Valientes
Respondent/s: Hon. Abraham Ramas and Vilma Minor
Topic: Quieting of Title
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari
Domingo Valientes owned a parcel of land in Gabay,
Zamboanga del Sur
1939: Valientes mortgaged subject property to secure his loan
from spouses Leon and Brigida Belen
1950s: Valientes failed to retrieve property from spouses Belen
An alleged forged document Venta Definitiva which was a
deed of sale was executed between Valientes and spouses
Belen
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1970: heirs of Valientes had an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
entered in Memorandum of Encumbrances of the TCT of
subject property
Heirs of spouses Belen executed an Extra-judicial settlement
with partition and sale in favor of present possessor, Vilma
Minor
1979: Minor filed a Petition for Cancellation of Memorandum of
Encumbrance appearing on TCT of subject property
2000: RTC in favor of Minor
1998: Petitioners Valientes filed a Cancellation of TCT,
Reconveyance, with accounting receivership and application
for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction plus damages
CA: in favor of Minor
Petitioners insist that although the complaint is captioned as a
cancellation, reconveyance, etc., it is substantially an action
to quiet title therefore should not prescribe
ISSUE: WON CA committed GADALEJ when it applied prescription in
present petition?
WON CA commited GADALEJ in dismissing the complaint on the
ground of prescription, although captioned as cancellation of TCT, is
substantially for quieting of title hence prescription should not lie?
are only general rules which should give way to special
statutes on registered land PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree)
PD 1529, Sec. 31-32: the decree of registration of certificate of
title issued becomes inconvertible upon the expiration of one
year from the date of entry of the decree of registration
without prejudice to an action for damages against the
applicant or any person responsible for fraud
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible
What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this
case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name (Minor), to its rightful and
legal owner (Valientes), or to one with a better right
But the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible; it
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property
Petition is DIMISSED for having been 28 years late in issuing the
civil case against Minor

HELD: NO
NO

CA did not commit GADALEJ in ruling that petitioners

complaint is barred by prescription and/or laches
Minor did not waive her defense of prescription
Laches can also be applied in the present case even if it is not
specifically pleaded
SC holds that the cause of action, considering that they are
accusing forgery, is one of implied trust under Article 1456
SC made it clear that when the complainant is not in
possession of the subject property, the action will prescribe in
10 years (please refer to the graphics on the last page)
Although petitioners contend that it should be 30 years under
Article 1141 in relation to 1134 and 1137 (ordinary and
extraordinary prescription), SC held that the following articles
112
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

G. Prescription of Ownership

COMPLAINANT
G.1 Acquisitive/Extinctive Prescription

*Calicdan vs Cendana (Trias)

GR No 155080|February 5, 2004 | J. Ynares-Santiago

NOT in Petitioner/s: Soledad Calicdan, Represented By Her Guardian

possession In possession
Guadalupe Castillo
Respondent/s: Silverio Cendana, Substituted By His Legal Heir Celsa
Cendana-Alaras

Topic: Acquisitive/ Extinctive Prescription

Action for Action for
reconveyanc Quieting Title FACTS:
Petition for review
Sixto Calicdan owns an unregistered land of 760 square meters
in Mangaldan, Pangasinan
1941: died with surviving spouse Fermina and 3 children:
Prescribes in Does not Soledad, Jose and Benigno Calicdan
10 years prescribe 1947: Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos in favor
of Silverio Cendana
1947, 1949, 1998: Cendana immediately entered in possession,
built a fence around the land, constructed a 2-storey
residential house where he resided until death
1992: Petitioner filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
from date of from date of Possession and Damages against respondent claiming the
registration issuance of title
donation was void and merely tolerated the possession and
construction of respondent
Respondent argues that he has been A(2)P(2)OC(2)U [actual,
adverse, physical, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted, in a concept of an
owner] possession of the land for 45 years
RTC: in favor of petitioners Calicdan with order to vacate to
Cedana
CA: in favor of defendants Cendana

ISSUE: WON the donation inter vivos is valid?

WON petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription?

113

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
HELD: NO
YES
CA erred in ruling that the donation is valid based on hearsay
testimony (since the property was not conjugal property,
Fermina only acquired right of usufruct and not entire
ownership)
Despite invalidity of donation, respondent Cendana has
become the rightful owner of subject property through
extraordinary acquisitive prescription
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership of other
real rights over immovable property; through lapse of time
Prescription through A(2)P(2)OC(2)U
Ordinary acquisitive prescription: 10 years, in good faith, with
just title
o good faith: possessor is with reasonable belief that (1)
the person who transferred property was the owner
and (2) had the capacity to transmit property
o just title: claimant came into possession of property
through any of the modes recognized by law for
acquisition of ownership
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription: 30 years even without
good faith or just title
Respondent showed several acts of dominion over the
property for 45 years:
o fenced the property
o built a residential house
o declared land for real property taxes
Tax declarations and payment of real property taxes are not
conclusive evidence of ownership but are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner
The deed of donation, despite void for being donated by one
who is not the sole owner, is also sufficient evidence to show
the exclusive and adverse character of respondents
possession
Petition is DENIED.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Delfina vs Zoroaster (Trias)
GR No 159571|July 15, 2005| J. Panginiban
Petitioner/s: Delfina Vda. De Rigonan And Spouses Valerio Laude And
Visminda Laude
Respondent/s: Zoroaster Derecho Representing The Heirs Of Ruben
Derecho, Abel Derecho, Hilarion Derecho, Nunela D. Pasaol, Efraim
Derecho, Noel Derecho, Corazon D. Ocariza Representing The Heirs Of
Marcial Derecho, Landilino D. Prieto Representing The Heirs Of Pilar D.
Prieto, Justa D. Bueno, Ada D. Mapa, Emmanuel Derecho, Pomposo
Derecho Representing The Heirs Of Apolinar Derecho, Vicente D.
Rigonan, Rufa D. Jayme Representing The Heirs Of Gerardo Derecho,
Mardonio D. Hermosilla Representing The Heirs Of Oliva D. Hermosilla
Topic: Acquisitive/ Extinctive Prescription
FACTS:
Petition for review under Rule 45
Hilarion Derecho owned a parcel of land in Tuburan Sur,
Danao City
Hilarion died, his 8 children became pro invdiviso co-owners
1921: 5/8 co-owners sold the inherited property to Francisco
Lacambra subject to a 5-year redemption clause
1928: Dolores and Leandro Rigonan purchased the land from
Lacambra
1980: Leandro Rigona filed an Affidavit of Adjudication in favor
of his son Teodoro (deceased husband of Petitioner Delfina)
and declared himself as sole owner of subject property
Teodoro mortgaged subject property to Rural Bank of
Compostela in Cebu
Teodoro settled credit with the help of spouses Laude
1984: Teodoro executed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Lang in favor of Laude
He obtained tax declarations under the spouses Laude
1993: Respondents, as heirs of Hilarion and pro-indiviso co-
owners of subject property, filed an action to recover property
and to annul the Deed of Sale in favor of Laude
Petitioners argue that the co-ownership over the property
ended when the period for redemption lapsed without any
action on the part of the co-owners
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Therefore the Rigonan spouses bought the property as
legitimate vendees for value and in good faith, not in the
capacity of redeeming co-owner
Petitioners also argue that they have been in continuous
possession of the subject property for 72 years and so
acquisitive prescription had set in
RTC: in favor of petitioners
CA: in favor of respondents (noting that the Affidavit and Deed
of Sale were both void for being fraudulently executed)
o Deed of Sale was void ab initio because Teodoro did
not have capacity to dispose of subject property
(Article 1409 of the Civil Code)
o Defense of prescription is inapplicable because
declaration of inexistence of contracts do not prescribe
(Article 1410 of the Civil Code)
o The repurchase is only an implied trust in favor of other
co-owners
o Laude were not buyers in good faith
o An action for recovery and reconveyance prescribes in
10 years there for prescription had set in already
ISSUE: WON at the time of the purchase in 1928, co-ownership still
subsisted among the heirs of Hilarion Derecho?
WON an implied trust was created?
WON the action in the RTC was barred by prescription and
laches?
HELD: NO
YES
YES
CA erred in ruling that the co-onwership still subsisted despite
the repurchase of Dolores Derecho with husband Leandro
Rigonan
SC has held that when the vendor fails to redeem property
within the stipulated period, irrevocable title shall be vested in
the vendee by operation of law
Dolores purchased the property 2 years after the period of
redemption has expired in her personal capacity
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Dolores and her husband Leandro entered into an entirely new
and independent contract of sale (and not a contract of
repurchase)
SC ruled that after the expiration of the period of redemption,
parties could either:
o enter into an entirely new contract involving same
property
o if did not expressly state the period, can extend the
period up to the maximum of 10 years
CA did not err in ruling that implied trust arose but erred in
defining the date when implied trust applied
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the
parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands
of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or
downright fraud
Article 1456 of Civil Code: "if property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes."
Implied trust arose in 1921 when only 5/8 of the co-owners sold
the property to Lacambra thereby defrauding the 3/8
Lacambra therefore only held the property in trust for the
benefit of the 3/8
CA is correct in ruling that the petitioners are correct for
theorizing that acquisitive prescription is applicable
Petitioners argue that they obtained absolute ownership of the
subject property through acquisitive prescription considering
the action was only brought after 72 years of continuous and
adverse possession of the property
Prescription and laches supervenes in the enforcement of
implied trust
Prescription of Action: prescribes after 10 years from the time
the cause of action accrues (Section 40 of Code of Civil
Procedure)
Cause of action accrued in 1928 when they lost possession of
the property to the petitioners who purchased the subject
property from Lacambra
Acquisitive Prescription: ordinary (10 years, good faith and just
title) or extraordinary (30 years); both with A(2)P(2)OC(2)U
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o adverse possession ripens to ownership when
prescription sets in
o possession of Rigonan spouses were A(2)P(2)OC(2)U:
obtained the cancellation of Tax Declarations
Affidavit of Adjudication
petitioners did not share the enjoyment of
subject property to the respondents
Teodoro sold property to Laude
Recovery of subject property v. Annulment of contract
o action to recover prescribes
o annulment of contract is imprescriptible
o but SC ruled that the ultimately, the goal of
respondents is the recovery of property and not
annulment of contract
Prescription of action v. Acquisitive prescription
o Imprescriptibility of an action to annul a contract does
not mean that the present respondents are perpetually
allowed to recover the property, the subject of the void
contract
o They may file the action to annul, but their right to
recover based on ownership is contingent on the
premise that they still own the property
o Ownership may have been lost in the interval during
which they remained inactive
Assuming arguendo that prescription did not lie, laches would
still be applied to bar respondents from asserting their claim
belatedly
Laches v. Prescription
o Laches: which is a question of inequity in permitting a
claim to be enforced; based on equity
o Prescription: which is a question of time; statutory
(based on law)
4 elements to use laches as a defense:
o conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for
which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought;
o delay in asserting the rights of the complainant, who
has knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct
and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit;
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
o lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant will assert the right on
which the latter has based the suit; and
o injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that
the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not
deemed barred
Petition is GRANTED.
*Spouses Ragudo vs Fabella Estate (Trias)
GR No 146823|August 9, 2005| J. Garcia
Petitioner/s: Spouses Ramon And Estrella Ragudo
Respondent/s: Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.
Topic: Acquisitive/ Extinctive Prescription
FACTS:
Petition for review under Rule 45
Don Dionision Fabella owns a parcel of land of 6,825 square
meters in Mandaluyong City
Tenants of the estate formed FETA (Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc.) for the purpose of acquiring the property and
distributing it among themselves
FETA obtained a loan from National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) through the Community Mortgage
Program
NHMFC required all tenants of the subject property to become
members of the FETA
Petitioners Ragudo, occupying 105 square meters of the
property, refuse to join FETA
Their occupied space was awarded to one Miriam de
Guzman, a member of FETA
FETA owned the entire Fabella Estate
FETA filed a Complaint of for Unlawful Detainer against
petitioners Ragudo
1990: MTC dismissed case based on improper remedy; should
be Action for Recovery of Possession (since spouses Ragudo
have been in possession over 1 year)
FETA filed an Action for Recovery of Possession
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Petitioners argue that they have been in possession in the
concept of an owner for over 40 years, title is fake and FETAs
right to recover has been barred by laches
RTC: in favor of FETA
CA: in favor of FETA
RTC: refused to admit certain documents in addition to the
present case as basis for evidence
ISSUE: WON acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in to
warrant the continued possession of the subject lot by Ragudo and
whether the same principles had created a vested right in favor of
Ragudo to continue to possess and own the subject lot
HELD: NO
Petitioners contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable
laches had set in, thereby vesting them with a right to a
continued possession of the subject lot
SC had held that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession (such as the subject
property)
A claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land (Article 1126 of the Civil Code in
relation to Section 47 of PD 1529, the Land Registration Act)
o ARTICLE 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of
Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall
not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in
virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin
to run from the recording of the latter.
As to land registered under the Land Registration Act, the
provisions of that special law shall govern.
o SECTION 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. No
title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property; right is imprescriptible
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners
occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the
return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all; right is never
barred by laches
Verbal claim for a long period of time of petitioners v. Validly
documented claim of ownership by respondents (latter
prevails)
Petition is DENIED.
*Bautista vs Poblete (Trias)
GR No 141007|September 13, 2005| J. Corona
Petitioner/s: Adoracion Reyes Bautista, Librada Reyes Vda. De
Ponciano, Estela Reyes Quiambao, Marcelo Reyes, Jr., Jose Sino,
Leonila Sino And Dominador Sino
Respondent/s: Celia Reyes Poblete, Melencio Reyes Poblete, Elvira
Reyes Poblete, Julia Reyes Poblete, And Remedios Poblete Torio
Topic: Prescription of Action
FACTS:
Petitioners are heirs of Marcelo Sr. from his second marriage
Respondents are heirs of Marcelo Sr. from his third marriage
and some 3 are his illegitimate children with surname Sino
The subject property in controversy is 6.2556 hectare parcel of
land identified as Lot 1243
Respondents claim that the subject property was effectively
donated by Marcelo Sr. to Socorro Reyes (predecessors of
respondents) but they do not have a copy of the Deed of
Donation because it was burnt together with a fire incident
3 testified as to the ownership of the subject property:
o SOCORRO REYES VDA. DE POBLETE, an octogenarian,
testified that Lot No. 1243 was given to her by her
father, Marcelo Reyes, Sr. in 1932, by way of a deed of
donation which was destroyed when her house was
burned.
she used Lot 1243 as a sugar and palay
plantation
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
she had the land surveyed under the Bureau of
Lands in her name
she had it tax declared in her name
she has religiously paid for real property taxes
she sold Lot 1243 to her children
first marriage: Candida and Carmen were given
a land of 6 hectares
second marriage: Socorro and Henerosa
(Henerosa is already dead)
third marriage: respondents + Sino were given 5
carabaos and financial support
o PANTALEON GARCIA ANCERO testified that he was
working in Lot No. 1243 since 1942 or 1943 first as a
tenant of Socorro Reyes and thereafter of petitioner
Celia Poblete. The latter sold the property two years
ago to a Chinaman, and he was paid P700,000.00
o CELIA POBLETE testified that on August 10, 1983, she
and her sisters bought Lot No. 1243 for P39,000.00 from
her mother, who acquired it more than fifty years
before from her father Marcelo Reyes, Sr.
She brought the deed of sale to the Provincial
Capitol
She had the tax declaration transferred to her
and her and her sisters names
They have been paying the real estate tax since
then
Their mother and they have been in possession
of the property for 60 years already
Said that petitioners only live 150 meters away
from Lot 1243 and would sometimes ask for
harvest but never claimed it from them
They sold the property to Winthrop Corporation
for P20 million, of which P3 million has been
paid, and the balance to be paid upon
registration of the land
RTC: in favor of petitioners
CA: in favor of respondents
ISSUE: WON respondents have lawful right over the subject property
Lot 1423?
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
HELD: YES
1941: Socorros claim in Cad. 285, Carmona Cadastre, Case 2
was approved
1942: she had the land tenanted by a certain Pantaleon
Ancero
1948: Socorro registered Lot 1243 in her name under tax
declaration no. 1430 and religiously paid the real estate tax on
the property
1983: Socorro sold Lot 1243 to her children (respondents)
October 1983: respondents obtained a Declaration of Real
Property in their favor under PD 464 otherwise known as The
Real Property Tax Code
1991: respondents filed a Petition for Registration of Title to Lot
1243 before the lower court in order to perfect the sale of the
lot to Winthrop Realty Corporation for P20,694,600
Pensader v. Pensader: the origin of said possession is adverse
to such community, namely, the donation, which although it is
not established by a sufficient documentary evidence, stands
in this case as a circumstance explaining the exclusive
character of the possession of Maria Revelar and Alejandra
Pensader and that of their common successor in interest
Silverio P. Revelar.
Espique v. Espique: There is no question that the donation in
question is invalid because it involves an immovable property
and the donation was not made in a public document as
required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection
with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter
nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not
serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength
thereof the donee has taken possession of the property
adversely and in the concept of owner.
Respondents possession is A(2)P(2)OC(2)U
o acts of dominion were exhibited:
she used Lot 1243 as a sugar and palay
plantation
she had the land surveyed under the Bureau of
Lands in her name
she had it tax declared in her name
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
she has religiously paid for real property taxes
she sold Lot 1243 to her children
she took possession of the lot immediately after
it was donated to her by Marcelo Sr.
Code of Civil Procedure (which was then in force): 10 years of
adverse possession by the person claiming to be the owner, in
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced, shall
vest in the actual possessor of the land a full and complete title
Petition is DENIED.
*Heirs of Restar vs Cichon (Trias)
GR No 161720|November 22, 2005| J. Carpio-Morales
Petitioner/s: Heirs Of Flores Restar Namely: Esmenia R. Restar,
Bernardita R. Rentino, Lucia Restar, Rodolfo Restar, Janet R. Relojero,
Lorna R. Ramos, Manuel Restar, Nenita R. Belleza, Mirasol R. Dela Cruz,
Roselle R. Matorre, Policarpio Restar And Adolfo Restar
Respondent/s: Heirs Of Dolores R. Cichon, Namely: Rudy R. Cichon,
Norma C. Lachica, Nilda C. Jumayao, Lydia C. Santos, And Nelson R.
Cichon; Heirs Of Perpetua R. Sta. Maria, Namely George Sta. Maria,
Lilia M. Maniago, Derly M. Concepcion, Gervy Sta. Maria, Dory M.
Indulo; Heirs Of Maria R. Rose, Namely: Teresita R. Maloco, Rolando
Rose, Edelyn R. Palacio And Minerva R. Pastrana, Dominica Restar-
Relojero And Paciencia Restar Manares
Topic: Acquisitive/ Extinctive Prescription
FACTS:
Emilio Restar owns a parcel of land at 5,918 square meters in
Lezo Aklan and several other properties
1935: Emilio Restar died leaving subject properties to his 8
children as compulsory heirs
1959: Flores (eldest) executed a Joint Affidavit with Helen
Restar
1960: Flores caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration of
Aklan property and issued a new one in his name
1989: Flores died
1998: Heirs of Flores found the renaming of the Tax Declaration
under his name
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
1999: Respondents (Floress sisters named Cichon) filed a
Complaint against Petitioners (heirs of Flores) for Partition and
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Ownership with Damages
and Preliminary Injuction
Respondents stated that they were given palay produce as
share for the lot and that Esmenia (wife of Flores) appealed to
siblings of Flores to let them hold the lot in order to finance the
education of their children
Petitioners deny these statements of respondents and added
that they have been in continuous and open possession of the
lot for more than 30 years and have been religiously paying
real property tax
RTC: in favor of petitioners (acquired property by prescription)
CA: in favor of respondents (Heirs of Flores failed to prove that
their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they
derived title to it from a separate conveyance to them by
Restar; lack of notice to co-owners so no repudiation)
ISSUE: WON erred in reversing the ruling of the lower court that the
petitioners as heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by
adverse possession of the land in question?
WON erred in not ruling that there was acquisitive prescription on
the land in question notwithstanding that the land in question has
been declared in the name of Flores Restar, father of petitioners, as
early as 1960 and that petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the land in question in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30)
years?
HELD: YES
YES
The action to demand partition of a co-owned property does
not prescribe but a co-owner may acquire ownership by
prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership and the co-owners are aware of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership
Acquisitive prescription: ordinary (10 years, good faith, just title)
or extraordinary (30 years)
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

CA erred in ruling that there was no prescription o continued enjoyment of the property and its produce
The subject property was acquired through extraordinary to the exclusion of respondents
prescription Petition is GRANTED.
o 1935: heirs of Restar acquired property when Emilio
died
o 1935: Flores immediately used the subject property
(tilling, cultivating, introducing improvements, enjoying G.2 Precription of Action
fruits)
o 1960: Reckoning point when prescription started to run;
Flores secured a tax declaration in his name; *Vda. De Gualberto vs Go (Trias)
respondents aware of such claim; first concrete act of
GR No 139843|July 21, 2005| J. Garcia
repudiation made by Flores of co-ownership over the
subject property
Petitioner/s: Consuelo N. Vda. De Gualberto, Fe Gualberto-Chavez,
o 1999: Respondents filed for partition of the subject Amador Gualberto, Cesar Gualberto, Rodolfo Gualberto, Luzviminda
property
Gualberto Mirana, And Virginia Gualberto
o Flores has been in open, adverse and continuous Respondent/s: Francisco H. Go, Raymundo J. Go, Miriam J. Go, Miriam
possession in the concept of owner for more than 38
G. Son, Vicente J. Go, Belen Go, And Rosa Javier Go
years
Topic: Prescription of Action
Floress possession thus ripened into ownership through
acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 30 years (Article 1137 FACTS:
of the Civil Code)
Petition for review through Rule 45 on certiorari
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription
Generoso Gualberto is the registered owner of a parcel of land
of the action for partition should be considered in favor of
oh 170 square meters in Siniloan, Laguna
Flores Restar and his heirs
1965: subject property was sold by Generoso and his wife
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
Consuelo (petitioner) to respondents father Go S. Kiang for
evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
P9,000 through a deed Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan which
when coupled with actual possession, they constitute
was notarized
evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of
1973: Petitioner Consuelo executed a Kasulatan attesting to
ownership through prescription
the fact that subject property has been indeed sold to spouses
Acts of Flores (and continued by his heirs) that show possession
Go
adverse to his co-heirs:
December 1973: Garcia (a third party) filed a case of Unlawful
o the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in
Detainer against petitioners
the name of Restar and securing another in his name;
Petitioners state that the Garcia does not have an interest
o the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the
hence no legal capacity; the real parties in interest are
owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of
Gualberto and Go
respondents;
A case of Forcible Entry was filed by Go against petitioners
o payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without
MTC: in favor of respondents
respondents having ever contributed any share therein;
RTC: in favor of respondents
and
CA: in favor of respondents

120

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
1978: OCT was issued in the name of respondent Rosa Go
1995: Petitioners filed a complaint for Conveyance, Accion
Publiciana and Quieting of Title with Damages against
respondents
1997: RTC: in favor of respondents
1999: CA: in favor of respondents
ISSUE: WON a registered owners right to assail the validity of his
defendants title and to thereafter seek reconveyance thereof, may
be lost by prescription or laches
HELD: YES
Salvatierra v CA clarifies the rule on prescription of actions for
reconveyance of real property
o An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very
recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is
now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
Legal basis of action for reconveyance and its prescription
o Section 53, paragraph 3 of PD 1529 (Land Registration
Act) and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1444
(2) of the Civil Code
Section 53, par 3: In all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder of
the decree of registration on the original
petition or application, x x x.
Article 1456: If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Article 1444 (2): The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:
xxx
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
xxx
General rule: The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned
from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title
Exception: The action for reconveyance, when complainant is
in possession, is in effect an action for quieting the title and
therefore, is imprescriptible
o Reason: The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession.
In this case, there was no showing that petitioners were in
actual possession of the subject property
The action is one for reconveyance and has prescribed within
10 years from the moment the cause of action arose
Solid Homes vs Tan (Trias)
GR No 145156|July 29, 2005| J. Garcia
Petitioner/s: Solid Homes, Inc.
Respondent/s: Spouses Ancheta K. Tan And Corazon De Jesus Tan
Topic: Prescription of Action
Note: same case in Oblicon but different topic/issue to be discussed
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
1980: Solid Homes sold a subdivision lot of 1,069 square meters
in Loyola Grand Villas to Spouses Uy; registered the title under
the Uys
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
1985: Spouses Uy sold same lot to respondents Spouses Tan
Respondents visited the property several times and found the
property in a state of disorder in striking contrast to their
promise in their advertisments
o no infrastructure
o no utility systems for water, sewerage, electricity and
telephone
o squatters were occupying the lot and the surrounding
areas
1995: Respondents demanded petitioner through a letter to
comply with their obligations by 1996 for petitioners to be able
to construct their house
Petitioners did not respond so respondents filed a complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages with the HLURB-NCR
HLURB: in favor of respondents
Office of the President: affirmed with modification (ordered
petitioners to replace the lot)
Petitioners argue that respondents right to bring the action
against it has already prescribed (10 years as per Article 1144
of the Civil Code)
They argue that the 10-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned from 1980 when petitioner originally sold the lot in
question to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy, or, at the latest
from 1985, when respondents acquired the same lot from the
Uy spouses
ISSUE: WON respondents right to bring the instant case against
petitioner has already prescribed?
HELD: NO
SC ruled against the respondents because a cause of action
accrues from the time an act is performed or an omission
incurred which is violative of plaintiffs right
The period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from
the date the cause of action accrued
A cause of action arises when that which should have been
done is not done, or that which should not have been done is
done.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites
concur:
o a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
o an obligation on the part on the defendant to respect
such right; and
o an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff
Article 1169 of Civil Code states that a party who is under
obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time the
obligee demands either judicially or extra judicially for the
fulfillment of obligation
It was only in December 1995 when respondent made a
written demand and complaint upon petitioner to perform
what was incumbent upon them
Reckoning date should then be on 1995 (prescription starts to
run from this day)
Petition is DENIED.
Tumol vs Esguerra (Trias)
GR No 150646|July 15, 2005| J. Carpio-Morales
Petitioner/s: Rolando de Tumol
Respondent/s: Juliana De Tumol Esguerra, The Department Of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board And The Honorable Court Of
Appeals
Topic: Prescription of Action
FACTS:
Dionisio de Tumol is a farmer beneficiary of a land of 2.7
hectares in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija
1979: died weaving his wife Monica and his 4 children: Juliana
(eldest), Francisca, Alejandro and Rolando (petitioner)
1990: DAR issued CARP Beneficiary Certificate to petitioner
Rolando
1992: DARAB received a petition from Monica, represented by
Juliana, alleging that Rolando fraudulently took the subject
property through deceit, strategy and with intent to gain;
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
claiming that Rolando is also a usurper; claims that the law
states that priority of succession should be observed
November 1992: Monica executed a Kasunduan Pag-aayos o
Kahilingan where she declared that she was withdrawing her
petition considering her old age and lack of interest at 80 years
old
December 1992: Juliana filed against petitioner with DARAB
again for the same reasons
Julianas legal basis: Memorandum Circular No 19, Series of
1978 which states that priority shall be determined among the
heirs according to age
1993: She executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that her
other siblings had no knowledge of the Transfer action filed by
Rolando
Petitioner submitted his Affidavit stating that:
o Ownership of subject property has been settled
o Juliana already received her share which she
apparently sold to one Magsakay
1993: Provincial Adjudicator in favor of respondent
o ordered the cancellation of emancipation patent of
Rolando and to issue new ones in proper share with
other heirs
1998: DARAB in favor of respondent
2000: CA dismissed based on technical grounds
ISSUE: WON Rolando should be rewarded as the sole-owner-cultivator?
HELD: YES
Following Article 1141 of the Civil Code, real actions over
immovable property, like respondents petition to enforce her
claim as successor to her fathers farmholding, prescribe after
30 years
o ARTICLE 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe
after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established
for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription.
Respondents cause of action accrued from her fathers death
in 1979 (she has until 2009 to claim)
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But in 1988, CARL (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) was
enacted
o Section 38: Statute of Limitations. An action to enforce
any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if
not commenced within three years after such cause of
action accrued.
Respondent filed her petition in 1992 therefore being covered
by Section 38 of the CARL
The 3 year period should then be reckoned from 1988 when
the CARL was passed into law (respondent only had until 1991
to file the case)
Respondent filed her case in DARAB on December 1992 (her
action has prescribed
Estoppel by laches has already set in as well since her case
was filed 13 years after her fathers death
Petition GRANTED.
*Mariano vs. Petron (De Luis)
G.R. No. 169438|Jan. 21, 2010 | J. Carpio
Petitioner/s: Romeo Mariano
Respondent/s: Petron Corporation
FACTS:
Pacita V. Aure, Nicomedes Aure Bundac, and Zeny Abundo
(Aure Group), owners of a 2,064 square meter parcel of land in
Tagaytay City, leased the Property to ESSO Standard Eastern,
Inc., a foreign corporation doing business in the country
through its subsidiary ESSO Standard Philippines, Inc.
The lease period is 90 years and the rent is payable monthly for
the first 10 years, and annually for the remaining period. The
lease contract contained an assignment veto clause barring
the parties from assigning the lease without prior consent of the
other.
On Dec. 23, 1977, ESSO Eastern sold ESSO Philippines to the
Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC). The Aure Group
was not informed of the sale. ESSO Philippines, whose
corporate name was changed to Petrophil Corporation then
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
to Petron Corporation (Petron), took possession of the property
in Tagaytay.
On Nov. 18 1993, petitioner Romeo D. Mariano bought the
property from the Aure Group and obtained title to the
property. The title contains an annotation of ESSO Easterns
lease.
On Dec. 17 1998, Mariano sent to Petron a notice to vacate
the property. He informed Petron that P.D. 471 reduced the
duration of the contract between Aure Group and ESSO Easter
from 90 to 25 years, thus, ending on Nov. 13 1993.
Petron received the notice of Dec. 21 1998, but they remained
in the property.
Mariano sued Petron to rescind the contract and recover
possession of the property. He contended that the contract
was terminated when ESSO eastern sold ESSO Philippines to
PNOC, thus assigning to PNOC its lease on the property,
without seeking Aure Groups prior consent.
Petron countered and claimed that Marianos suit was barred
by prescription under Article 1389 and Article 1146 (1) o the
Civil code, as Mariano should have sought rescission of the
contract within four years from PNOCs purchase of ESSO
Philippines.
ISSUE: WON Marianos suit is barred by prescription?
HELD: YES
Mariano filed his complaint nearly 22 years after PNOC
acquired the leasehold rights to the property and almost 6
years after he bought the property from Aure Group. The more
than two decades lapse puts this case well within the territory
of the 10 year prescriptive bar to suits based upon a written
contract under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
H. Special Properties/Special Laws and Theory
H.1 Airspace
*NPC vs. Ibrahim (De Luis)
G.R. No. 168732|June 29, 2007|J. Azcuna
Petitioner/s: National Power Corporation
Respondent/s: Lucman G. Ibrahim, Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G.
Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G.
Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G.
Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G.
Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim, and Caironesa M. Ibrahim
FACTS:
Respondent Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were
owners of several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP
(VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into
three (3) lots, Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and
23,191 square meters each respectively.
In 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without
respondents knowledge and prior consent, took possession of
the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed
underground tunnels in it. The respondents only discovered the
tunnels in July 1992. NAPOCOR later confirmed it on November
13, 1992 through a memorandum issued by its Acting Assistant
Project Manager.
The tunnels were being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the
water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs Agus
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom
requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct a motorized deep well in Lot 3 of the property, but his
request was denied because would cause danger to lives and
property.
On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR
pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands
but the latter refused to do so.
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On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his
personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an
action against petitioner National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages
before the RTC of Lanao del Sur.
Respondents averred that the construction of the underground
tunnels has endangered their lives and properties, as Marawi
City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. They
also claimed that the illegally constructed tunnels caused
them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock, entitling them
to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the
public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary
damages.
NAPOCOR denied the allegations of the complaint and
claimed that the respondents do not have a cause of action
because they failed to prove that they were owners of the
property, they do not own and possess the sub-terrain portion
of the lands, and the tunnels are a government project for the
benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such
easement as may be necessary.
ISSUE:
1. WON the respondents own and possess the sub-terrain portion
of the lands?
2. WON NAPOCOR has deprived the respondents the use of their
lands, and thus, the latter is entitled to just compensation?
HELD:
1. YES
The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to the
respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the
Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations,
which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes
and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
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Rights over lands are indivisible; the owner of a piece of land
has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. The classification of lands must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral (underneath) or completely
agricultural (surface). (Republic of the Philippines vs. CA)
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and
possession of their properties in the event the lands are
reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in
appropriate expropriation proceedings.
2. YES
As mentioned in the resolution of the RTC, it has been shown
that the underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs of
the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value.
On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan
with the Amanah Islamic Bank for the expansion of the
operation of the Ameer Construction and Integrated Services
to be secured by the property concerned, but the application
was disapproved by the bank because there were tunnels
underneath the land, hence an encumbrance. Just
compensation of P1,000 per sq. meter is due to the
respondents.
*Preysler, Jr. vs. CA (De Luis)
G.R. No. 158141| July 11, 2006|J. Quisumbing
Petitioner/s: Fausto Preysler Jr.
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Far East Enterprises, Inc.
FACTS:
Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., (FEEI) owns Tali
Beach Subdivision.
Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots in Tali
Beach Subdivision and also two parcels of land adjacent to
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
the subdivision. These two parcels were bounded on the North
and West by the China Sea and on the East and South by the
subdivision. To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to
pass through Tali Beach subdivision.
Preysler offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but
Far East Enterprises, Inc. refused it for being grossly inadequate.
Far East Enterprises, Inc. then barricaded the front gate of
Preyslers property to prevent petitioner and his family from
using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.
Preysler filed a complaint for Right of Way with prayer for
preliminary injunction against Far East Enterprises, Inc.
RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas held that barricading the property
deprived Preysler of his ownership rights and caused
irreparable damage and injuries.
The writ of preliminary injunction was issued on Dec. 12, 1996.
The writ contained orders to FEEI to remove the barricades on
the property of Preysler and to refrain from obstructing Preysler
and his households entry and exit from his property, pending
termination of the litigation on the merits of the case.
On July 8, 1998, Preysler used the subdivision road to transport
heavy equipment and construction materials to develop his
property.
FEEI moved to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction
claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful
possession and occupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when
petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction
materials. It also alleged that there is an alternate route
available to Preysler, particularly the barangay road leading to
Balaytigue and the Calabarzon Road.
Preysler moved to clarify the writ of preliminary injunction and
asked the court to clearly define the action required of FEEI. He
also requested that his contractors, visitors, and other
representatives be allowed access and persons he has
authorized be allowed to install power lines over Tali Beach
Subdivision.
The RTC amended the original writ by including Preyslers
request.
FEEI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which set aside
the amended writ and reinstated the original writ.
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
ISSUE: WON the right of passage allowed for Preysler also applies to his
visitors, contractors, construction workers, authorized persons, heavy
equipment machinery, and construction materials as well as the
installation of power lines?
HELD: NO
Note that what was granted by the trial court was the
preliminary injunction, and that the main case for right of way
has not yet been settled.
The CA properly set aside the amended writ and reinstated the
original writ. The last actual, peaceful and uncontested
situation that preceded the controversy was solely the access
of petitioner and his household to his property outside the
subdivision for visits and inspections. At the time the writ was
applied for in 1995, there was still no construction going on in
the property. It was merely raw land. The use of the subdivision
roads for ingress and egress of construction workers, heavy
equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation
of power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the
original writ.
However, the Court agreed that Preysler may be granted a
temporary easement. Under Article 656 of the New Civil Code,
if the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair,
improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a
temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for
the damage caused to the servient estate. In the present
case, irrespective of which route Preysler used in gaining
access to his property, he has to pass private respondents
subdivision, thus, there is a great inconvenience on his part.
Note that this temporary easement in the original writ differs
from the permanent easement of right of way now being tried
in the main case.
The electric power lines cannot be installed. The installation of
electric power lines is a permanent easement not covered by
Article 656. Article 656 deals only with the temporary easement
of passage. Neither can installation of electric power lines be
subject to a preliminary injunction for it is not part of the status
quo. Besides, more damage would be done to both parties if
the power lines are installed only to be removed later upon a
contrary judgment of the court in the main case.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in

acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the respondents
NPC vs Tiangco (Ong) property and that ownership of that area shall remain with the
G.R. 170846 |February 6, 2007 | Garcia respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in
addition to the adjudged value of the improvements only an
easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the
Petitioner/s: National Power Corporation
property as declared by the respondents or by the municipal
Respondent/s: Aurellano Tiangco, Lourdes Tiangco, and Nestor
assessor, whichever is lower.
Tiangco
The trial court made a determination that the market value of
the property is P2.09 per sqm or P40,594.07 and it also found as
FACTS:
reasonable the amount of P324,750 offered by NPC for the
Respondents are the owners of a parcel of land with an area
improvements.
of 152,187 sq. meters at Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
Neither did the trial court consider NPCs reliance on Section
NPC is a GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the
3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential
development and generation of power from whatever source.
Decree 938, the court placing more weight on the
NPCs charter authorizes the corporation to acquire private
respondents argument that expropriation would result in the
property and exercise the right of eminent domain.
substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even
NPC requires 19,423 sq. meters of respondents property for its
though what is sought is a mere aerial right-of-way.
Kalayaan San Jose Transmission Line Project.
The CA disregarded the P2.09 per sqm valuation of the trial
NPCs Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired
court which was based on a 1984 tax declaration and placed
right-ofway will cut through the respondents land, in such a
reliance upon a 1993.
manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be left
The CA increased the compensation for the land to P116,538
separated from 99,372 square meters of the property. Within
and improvements to P325,025.
the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing trees.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents,
ISSUE/S:
NPC filed with the RTC of Tanay a complaint for expropriation
against them.
3. WON value of the land should be based on the 1993 valuation.
The trial court granted NPC the right to take possession of the
- NO
area sought to be expropriated.
4. WON NPC should be limited to paying 10% of the market value
The RTC ordered the parties to nominate their respective
of the land considering that the purpose is merely for the
commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation.
establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead
The trial court directed NPC to pay and deposit P81,204 as
transmission lines. - NO
temporary provisional value of the area.
According to the municipal assessor, the value of the
respondents property is P21,000 per hectare. HELD:
Commissioner for the respondents pegged the price of the
area at P30 per sqm or P582,690 in the aggregate and 3. NO
P2,093,950 for the improvements. The respondents valued the In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the
area at P600,600 and P4,935,500 for the improvements. complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence,
NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 sqm in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of
of the original 20,220 sqm.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in
determining the just compensation due the respondents.
The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value,
while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two
determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation,
the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of
the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be
the time of taking the property.
4. NO
In several cases, the Court struck down NPCs consistent
reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended
by Presidential Decree 938.18 True, an easement of a
right-ofway transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
the respondents would retain full ownership of the property
taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not
gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an
indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use
thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a
just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than
the monetary equivalent of the land taken.
If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely
deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the
imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions
and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the
attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures
or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the
probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and
property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should
be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.
The evidence suggests that NPCs transmission line project that
traverses the respondents property is perpetual, or at least
indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact
that the high-tension current to be conveyed through said
transmission lines evidently poses a danger to life and limb;
injury, death or destruction to life and property within the
vicinity.
Finally, if NPC were to have its way, respondents will continue
to pay the realty taxes due on the affected portion of their
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
property, an imposition that, among others, merits the rejection
of NPCs thesis of payment of a mere percentage of the
propertys actual value.
H.2 Water
*Amistoso vs. Ong (De Luis)
L-60219| June 29, 1984 |J. Cuevas
Petitioner/s: Dr. Bienvenido Amistoso
Respondent/s: Senecio Ong, Epifania Neri & Hon. Presiding Judge,
Esteban M. Lising of the CFI of Camarines Sur, Branch VI
FACTS:
Amistoso and Neri are the owners of adjoining parcels
agricultural land in Cauayanan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
An irrigation canal traverses the land of Neri through which
irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and flows to the
land of the Amistoso for his beneficial use.
Amistoso has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. He also claims that this Grant is for the
beneficial use to irrigate their land from the Silmod River.
Amistoso also claims to have executed a written contract for
the easement of aqueduct with Abundio Barallas, Neri and
Ongs predecessors-in-interest.
Amistoso demanded that Neri and Ong, the cultivator of Neris
property, recognize his rights and title to the beneficial use of
the water passing through the irrigation canal in Neris
property. He also demanded o have his rights and/or claims
annotated on the Certificate of Title of respondent Neri.
However, Neri and Ong, refused to heed Amistosos demands.
They contest Amisotosos water grant/ permit and they
question the legality of the contract between Amistoso and
Barallas. They also closed the irrigation canal.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
As a result, on July 27, 1978, Amistoso filed a complaint for
Recognition of Easement with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages.
Judge Lising of the CFI of CamSur dismissed Amistosos
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that since the case is a
water rights dispute, the provisions of P.D.s 427 and 1067 (the
Water Code) shall govern and that Amistoso should ventilate
his grievance with the National Water Resources Council,
pursuant to the said laws.
Judge Lising also ruled that the right over irrigation water has
not been established as vested to Amistoso, and it has not
been alleged to be registered in accordance with the Water
Code.
Amistoso appealed his case to the SC, contending that his
case calls purely for determination of his right to an easement
of aqueduct and not of water; thus, the courts can take
cognizance of the case.
He also claims that the case was filed on July 26, 1972, which
was before the effectivity of P.D. 424, hence, even if Neri and
Ong are correctthat the case involved a water rights
disputeold law on water applies. According to the old law
on water, the courts have jurisdiction of water rights disputes.
ISSUE:
1. WON the case is a water rights dispute?
2. WON the Water Rights Grant of Amistoso is still valid even after
the promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code)?
3. WON Amistoso should file the case to the National Water
Resources Council?
HELD:
1. NO
The case is not a water rights dispute because Amistoso
already had a vested right for the beneficial use of irrigation
water from Silmod River.
It is apparent in the stipulation of facts entered into by the
parties, which was approved on Feb. 20, 1975, that Amistoso
has an approved Water Rights Grant. Through the stipulation
of facts, Neri and Ong admit that Amistoso has an approved
Water Rights Grant. However, Neri and Ong, content that the
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water
from Silmod River. The records do not show any other irrigation
water going to Amistosos property aside from that coming
from Silmod River. Neri and Ongs contention is undoubtedly a
lame denial.
The record discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor
of Amistoso, which was approved on Nov. 13, 1973 by the
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications, David
Consuji. The Grant was made 3 years before the promulgation
of the Water Code.
2. YES
Amistosos Water Rights Grant is still valid. The basis for this is the
Transitory and Final Provisions of the Water Code.
Article 97. Acts and contracts under the regime of old laws, if
they are valid in accordance therewith, shall be respected,
subject to the limitations established in this Code. Any
modification or extension of these acts and contracts after the
promulgation of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions
hereof.
3. NO
Amistosos right is already a vested one and may no longer be
litigated anew so as to bring his case within the jurisdiction of
the National Water Resources Council. (Res Judicata)
Court ordered respondents to:
Recognize Amistosos easement of water
Have Amistosos right annotated in the TCT of the property
Separate Opinion, J. Abad Santos
Before the easement of aqueduct can be formally established
certain requirements must be observed under Articles 642 and
643 of the Civil Code.
Amistoso must show that the situation of the aqueduct is the
most convenient and the least onerous to third persons and he
should pay indemnity to the owners of the servient estates.
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The case should be remanded to the trial court, which should o It was also certified by the office of the Municipal
adjudicate on these matters before the petitioners easement Mayor that the municipal government needs the whole
of aqueduct is annotated on the certificates of title. area for future public improvements.
On May 21, 1991, Cachopero filed another MSA with the DENR
Regional Office of Cotabato involving the same lot. This time
Celestial vs. Cachopero (De Luis) the MSA was supported by a certification issued by the Office
G.R. No. 142595|October 15, 2003 |J. Carpio-Morales of the Mayor of Midsayap and an Endorsement by the District
Engineer of the DPWH stating that the land is suitable for
residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal
Petitioner/s: Rachel C. Celestial
government.
Respondent/s: Jesse Cachopero
Celestial, again, filed a protest alleging preferential right over
the land citing the same reasons as she did before, but adding
FACTS:
that she is the adjacent and riparian owner of the property.
Jesse Cachopero, brother of Rachel Celestial, filed a
After another invesitigation of the land, DENR Regional
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands for a
Executive Director Macorro Macumbal issued an order stating
415 sq. meter parcel of land in Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, in
that the land is suitable for residential purposes, however is
which he has been occupying since 1968. He had built a
must be sold at public auction due to the conflicting interest of
house and other improvements in the said land.
the parties.
The land was a dried up part of the Salunayan Creek.
Cachopero appealed to the courts, RTC denied, CA reversed
Celestial filed a protest against Cachoperos MSA. She
and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of Cachopero.
claimed to have preferential right over the land since it is
Hence this petition by Celestial.
adjacent to, and is the only outlet from her residential house to
the public highway.
ISSUE: WON Celestial can claim ownership over the property through
She also claims ownership of the land because of her long
adverse possession and/or accession?
term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-
interest, Marcelina Basadre, to whom she purchased the
adjoining property on Oct. 22, 1966. HELD:
1. NO (adverse possession)
Celestial also based her ownership to her right of accession
The Salunayan Creek, even if it has dried up, is part of public
under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code and/or Article 461 of
domain and is not alienable. Adverse possession only applies
the Civil Code.
to alienable or disposable portions of public domain.
The Bureau of Lands conducted an ocular inspection of the
The Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, under Articles
area and found that the land is outside the commerce of man
420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, is property of the public
and not susceptible of private acquisition under the Public
domain, which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
Land Act, for the ff. reasons:
acquisitive prescription. Absent any declaration by the
o There was a certification of the local office of the
government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not,
District Engineer for Public Works and Highways that the
by itself, alter its inalienable character.
government may need the areawhere Cachoperos
The adverse possession, which may be the basis of a grant of
house standsfor expansion in the future.
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title, applies only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only
after the Government has declared the land to be alienable
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
and disposable that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive
and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title. It is only after the District Engineer and the
Office of the Municipal Mayor certified the land as suitable for
residential purposes and no longer needed by the
government, that the land became alienable and disposable.
2. NO (accession)
She failed to allege, when the portion of Salunayan Creek
dried up. It is a fact essential to determine whether the
applicable law is Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which
states that,
river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipseo facto belong
to the riparian owners
or Art. 461 of the Civil Code, which states that,
river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong
to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course,
If the portion of the creek dried up after the present Civil Code
took effect it would not belong to Celestial or to her
predecessor-in-interest because the former alleged that she is
a riparian owner and not an owner of a land occupied by the
new course of the water.
Besides, both the provisions mentioned pertains to situations
where there has been a change in the course of a river, not
where the river simply dries up. It is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation
commentators are of the opinion that the dry riverbed remains
property of public domain.
Also, both provisions apply only when riverbeds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters. The subject land became dry as a result of the
construction of an irrigation canal. The rule does not apply to
man-made accretions to lands.
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NOTE: CELESTIAL IS ESTOPPED because she offered to purchase the
land from the government. Through her actions she is deemed to
have acknowledged that the land is public land, the subject land is
public land, for it would be absurd for her to have applied for its
purchase if she believed it was hers.
*Collado vs. CA (De Luis)
G.R. No. 107764| October 4, 2002 |J. Carpio
Petitioner/s: Edna Collado, Bernardina Tawas, Joreto C. Torres, Jose
Amo, Sergio L. Montealegre, Vicente C. Torres, Joseph L. Nuez, Gloria
Serrano, Danilo Fabregas, Fernando T. Torres, Luz G. Tubungbanua,
Caridad T. Tutana, Jose C. Torres, Jr., Imelda Caylaluad, Rosalie
Tutana, Norma Astorias, Myrna M. Lancion, Norberto Camilote, Cecilia
Macaranas, Pedro Briones, Remedios Bantigue, Dante L. Montealegre,
Aida T. Gadon, Armando T. Torres and Fidelito Eco
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, thru
the Director of Lands
FACTS:
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or
120.0766 hectares. The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro
(formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal.
Attached to the application was the technical description of
the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Bureau of Lands,
which stated, [t]his survey is inside Marikina Watershed. This is
pursuant to EO 33, an order establishing the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an
Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
The Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through
its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners application.
Petitioners alleged that their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. They content that their
claim of ownership goes all the way back to March 22, 1902,
when their predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim
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and ownership over the lot. They also allege that private rights
were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus
excluding the lot from the Marikina Watershed.
The land registration court rendered a decision confirming the
imperfect title of the petitioners. Consequently, on May 7, 1991,
the land registration court issued an order directing the Land
Regulation Authority to issue the decree of registration in favor
of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground
that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable, making it
subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association,
Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship
issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program
(ISF) filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They opposed
the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated
inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They
claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot
pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR
under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
CA granted the petition of the Solicitor General and the
Municipality of Antipolo, and declared null and void the
decision of the land registration court.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the lot
in question?
HELD: NO
They do not have the right to claim ownership of the lot
question, because it is a natural resource, which belongs to the
State, and even if the said land is alienable they failed to
comply with the acquisitive prescription for ownership
prescribed by law.
According to the Regalian Doctrine described in Sec. 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution, all natural resources except
agricultural lands of public domain are inalienable.
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The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil,
coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the
well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes. In Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corp. vs. CA, the Court likened watersheds to
natural resources.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1067) also
subjects to the jurisdiction of the DENR the declaration of
watersheds as protected area and to control activities in it.
Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act 141 as amended by P.D. No.
1073, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for
registration was filed, provides for at least 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, in order for one to
be entitled to a Government grant for the land being
occupied.
The circumstances of the case show that the petitioners have
not occupied the land for 30 years. There is no proof that prior
to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired
ownership or title to the lot by any mode of acquisition from
the State. As of 1904 Leyva had only been in possession for two
years. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in
1904 could no longer be counted because when EO 33
declared the land as a watershed reservation, is was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation.
Also, Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Watershed
reservations are excluded and remain to be inalienable public
lands, which cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription
because prescription does not run against the State.
Petitioners contention that the land became alienable when
President Marcos segregated the land from public domain
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when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, is still
bereft of merit because According to then DENR Secretary
Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded the lot for
townsite purposes and reverted it to Marikina Watershed
Reservation coverage, thus making it inalienable again after
April 18, 1977when Proc. 1637 was issued.
These facts considered, the petitioners were only in possession
of the land for 3 years. Even if the two-year occupation of
Leyva is tacked, petitioners still fall short of the 30-year
requirement.
H.3 Mineral Land
*Republic vs. Rosemoor (De Luis)
G.R. No. 149927| March 30, 2004 |J. Panganiban
Petitioner/s: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR
under then Minister Ernesto Maceda; and former government officials
Catalino Macaraig, Fulgencio S. Factoran, Angel C. Alcala, Ben
Malayang, Roberto Pagdanganan, Mariano Z. Valera and Romulo
San Juan
Respondent/s: Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation,
Pedro Del Concha, and Alejandro and Rufo de Guzman
FACTS:
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corp., after having been
granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the
mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, discovered
marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in
Mount Mabio.
Rosemoor applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of a quarry license to
exploit said marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued to Rosemoor.
Shortly after the appointment of then DENR Minister Ernesto
Maceda, he cancelled the license issued to Rosemoor for
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being violative of Sec. 69 of P.D. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974).
Rosemoor assailed the said cancellation.
The trial court ruled for Rosemoor and the Court of Appeals
sustained in totality the trial courts ruling.
Rosemoors defense is the mootness of the issue because P.D.
463 has been repealed.
ISSUE: WON or not Rosemoors Quarry License Permit No. 33 was issued
in blatant contravention of Sec. 69 P.D. 463?
HELD: YES,
Because, Rosemoor violated the maximum area of a quarry
license which is 100 hectares in one province and 1,000
hectares in the entire Philippines.
Even if P.D. 463 was declared unconstitutional in Miners
Association of the Philippine v. Factoran Jr. and has been
consequently repealed by R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of
1995), Section 2 of Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply retroactively to a license, concession, or lease granted
by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. Hence,
to determine the validity of Rosemoors license P.D. 463 must
be the parameter, as it is the governing law when the license
was granted.
Also, while RA 7942 respects previously issued valid and existing
licenses. Section 3(p) of the said law defines an existing
mining/quarrying right as a valid and subsisting mining claim
or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or
agreement covering a mineralized area granted/issued under
pertinent mining laws.
Rosemoors contention that the license was validly granted;
because it was covered by four separate applications for
areas of 81 hectares each is untenable. The language of Sec.
69 P.D. 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory
terms that a quarry license, like that of respondents, should
cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province. This
law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference
to the number of applications for a license.
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Clearly, ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the
maximum by the mere expediency of filing several
applications would brazenly circumvent the intent of the law.
Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly
prohibited by the law.
*Miners Association vs. Factoran Jr. (De Luis)
G.R. No. 98332 | January 16, 1995 |J. Romero
Petitioner/s: Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.
Respondent/s: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, and Joel D. Muyco, Director of
Mines and Geosciences Bureau
FACTS:
Article XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution changed the system
of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
natural resources. The utilization of inalienable lands of public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed.
Pursuant to the mandate of Article XII Sec. 2, the President, in
the exercise of her legislative power, successively issued EO 211
and EO 279.
Executive Order No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant
to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of
mining operations and activities and to hasten the
development of mineral resources.
Executive Order No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources, and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial assistance by
foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals.
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To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
turn promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82.
Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, that all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering
an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.
Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the
persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2)
years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57
or until July 17, 199.1. Failure to do so within the prescribed
period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and
sand and gravel claims.
Petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality of
Administrative Order Nos. and 57 and 82 as the former unduly
pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining
agreements and - automatically converts them into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its
effectivity date and the latter declares that failure to submit
Letters of Intent and Mineral Production- Sharing Agreements
within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said
guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of
their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
These, according to them contravene EO Nos. 211 and 279, as
both AOs operate to repeal or abrogate P.D. 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974), as amended, and
other mining laws allegedly acknowledged by EOs 211 and
279 as the principal law.
ISSUE: WON P.D. 463 is the governing law on the acceptance and
approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications
for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources,
pursuant to EO 211?
HELD: NO, the governing law is EO 279
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through license, concession or lease which is
unconstitutional, pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
By virtue of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution and its
implementing law Executive Order No. 279, the provisions
dealing on license, concession, or lease of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore,
ceased to operate as the governing law.
However, in all other areas of administration and management
of mineral, lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern.
The provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on
lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on
privately-owned lands or quarry license on public lands under
Chapter XIII, and other related provisions on lease, license and
permits are not only inconsistent with the raison dtre for
which Executive Order No. 279 was passed, but they also
contravene the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
PNOC vs. Veneracion (De Luis)
G.R. No. 129820| November 30, 2006 |J. Chico-Nazario
Petitioner/s: PNOC-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC)
Respondent/s: Emiliano G. Veneracion, Jr.
FACTS:
On 31 January 1989, Veneracion applied with the Mines and
Geo-Sciences Development Services, DENR, Region IX,
Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location (DOL) over
Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation in Barangays
Payongan and Kauswagan, Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.
On 18 May 1989, the Office of the Regional Executive Director
(RED) of the DENR informed the Veneracion that his DOL
ISSUE: WON PNOC acquired preferential mining rights over Block 159?
cannot be registered since Block 159 was part of the Malangas
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Coal Reservation, as provided under Proclamation No. 284,
issued by the President.
With the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and
the DENR Secretary, Veneracion petitioned the Office of the
President to exclude Block 159 from the coal reservation and its
conversion into a mineral reservation.
PNOC applied for a mineral prospecting permit over Block 159
with the OEA, which the latter granted on 4 September 1989.
However, when it had initially applied for a mineral prospecting
permit over lands within the Malangas Coal Reservation, the
OEA advised it to obtain an Exploration Permit with the Bureau
of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS).
On 18 October 1991, petitioner submitted to the DENR an
application/proposal for a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) over Blocks 120, 159 and 160 of the
Malangas Coal Reservation.
On 21 February 1992, the Officer-In-Charge Regional Technical
Director Dario R. Mioza of the Mines and Geo- Sciences
Developmental Service (MGDS) advised PNOC to exclude
Block 159 in its application as the same is covered by the
application of Veneracion.
Nevertheless, PNOC did not exclude Block 159 from its MPSA.
Records also show that it had not applied for nor was it able to
obtain an Exploration Permit from the BMGS over Block 159.
On 13 April 1992, Presidential Proclamation No. 890 was issued,
which declared Block 159 as government mineral reservation
open for disposition to qualified mining applicants, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 279.
On 26 May 1992, PNOCs application for MPSA covering Coal
Block Nos. 120, 159 and 160 was accepted for filing.
Veneracion immediately filed, a protest to the PNOCs
inclusion of Block 159 in its application for MPSA.
Regional Exec. Dir. Of the DENR Zamboanga City ruled for
Veneraccion, then DENR Secretary Angel Alcala ruled for
PNOC, now DENR Secretary Victor Ramos ruled for
Veneracion, and the Mines Adjudication Board ruled for
Veneracion
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
HELD: NO
PNOC does not have acquired preferential mining rights over
Block 159 because it failed to comply with the legal
requirements set by P.D. 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974) and the Consolidated Mines Administrative
Order (CMAO) and it failed to appeal its case during the
prescribed period of five days, pursuant to P.D. 463.
The CMAO enumerates the following requirements for mineral
prospecting applications:
o (1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has
jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the OEA;
o (2) an exploration permit from the BMGS;
o (3) if the exploration reveals the presence of
commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the
BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation;
o (4) Granting by the president of the application to
exclude the area from the reservation; and
o (5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR
Secretary.
In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and
obtained a prospecting permit from the OEA. The OEA,
however, advised the petitioner on two separate occasions to
obtain an exploration permit from the BMGS. PNOC failed to
follow this advice.
Even if the PNOC followed the advice, the BMGS would not
have granted petitioner an exploration permit because when
petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its intention
to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS
informed the petitioner that Veneracions claim over Block 159
had already preceded their claim.
Also, PNOC filed its MPSA application, without complying with
the second, third and fourth requisites. Since it ignored the
sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, petitioner cannot
complain now that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply
with the legal requirements.
In contrast, the Veneracion applied for a DOL as early as Jan.
30, 1989. The DENR Regional Office refused to register his DOL
since Block 159 was still part of the Malangas Coal Reservation,
however it advised Veneracion to apply for the exclusion of
the area from the reservation. Veneracion followed this
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advice. The BMGS then treated his application for a DOL as an
application for an exploration permit. Upon his application, the
OEA and the DENR Secretary endorsed it for the exclusion of
the area from the reservation. This application was granted by
the President, through Proclamation No. 890, which provided
that the mining rights to Block 159 will be disposed of in
accordance with Executive Order No. 279. On 30 July 1992,
Veneracion filed his MPSA. On 12 April 1993, the RED of
Zamboanga City ordered that his MPSA be given due course.
Although his applications may not follow the strict letter of the
law, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law. Hence, the respondent was able to acquire a
preferential right on the mining claims over Block 159, as
provided under Section 101 of the CMAO.
*Southeast Mindanao vs Balite (Reyes)
380 SCRA 145 |April 3, 2002 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioner/s: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
Respondent/s: Balite Portal Mining Cooperative and other similarly
situatd; and the Hon. Antionio Cerilles, in his capacity as Secretary of
the DENR, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao (PMRB-Davao)
FACTS: (facts in bold are the ones useful for recit)
The point of controversy here is Memorandum Order No. 97-03
issued by the DENR on June 24, 1997.
This case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area.
On March 10, 1988 Marcopper Mining Corporation was
granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP 133) over 4,491 hectares
of land, which included the Diwalwal area.
o It was previously contested in a case entitled Apex
Mining Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al.
which was won by Marcopper.
On June 27, 1991, Congress enacted R.A. 7076 or the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act
o it was followed by the creation of the Provincial Mining
and Regulatory Board (PMRB)
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
o RA 7076 authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside
small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR
Secretary
On December 21, 1991, following the provisions of RA 7076,
DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran issued Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of
the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale
mining.
Subsequently, a case was filed before the DENR Regional
Executive Director (RED) entitled Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v.
Marcopper Mining Corporation
o A petition for the cancellation of Marcoppers EP 133
and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA)
On February 16, 1994, while the RED case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP 133 to petitioner Southeast
Mindanao, which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over
the land covered by the permit.
o The application for an integrated MPSA was granted;
several oppositions followed.
On March 3, 1995, R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was
enacted.
A Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) was created and was
tasked to resolve mining rights disputes.
o It took cognizance of the RED cases.
The RPA resolved the consolidated RED cases and decreed an
Omnibus Resolution resolving that EP 133 is valid.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03, which provided among others, that:
o The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the
option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources
in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studying and
weighing the feasibility of entering into management
agreements or operating agreements, or both, xxx such
agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing
between the state and the said parties, including profit-
sharing arrangements with small-scale miners
On July 16, 1997, Southeast Mindanao filed a case praying for
the nullification of MO 97-03.
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o Southeast averred that the direct state utilization
espoused in the Memorandum would impair its vested
rights under EP No. 133.
CA dismissed the petition; voting 3-2
ISSUE: WON Southeast has a vested right over the Diwalwal Area by
virtue of E.P. 133
HELD: NO
Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act states:
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources.Mineral Resources
are owned by the State and the exploration, development,
utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control
and supervision. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with
contractors.
As correctly held by the CA, EP 133 merely evidences a
privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires.
Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in
the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process
clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-
encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the
same, in accordance with the demands of the general
welfare. (Remember Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution)
Moreover, the validity of EP 133 is still pending over the
consolidated mining cases. There is still the issue of whether or
not the validity of EP 133 is transferred from Marcopper to
Southeast.
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos (De Luis)
G.R. No. 127882 | Jan. 27, 2004 |J. Carpio-Morales
Petitioner/s: La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
Respondent/s: Victor Ramos, Secretary of the DENR; Horacio Ramos,
Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau; Ruben Torres, Executive
Secretary; WMC Philippines, Inc.
FACTS:
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
But, before the effectivity of the said law, the President signed
on March 30, 1995, a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation Philippines
(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100, 000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, the latter served
as the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. 7942.
La Bugal Blaan Tribal Assoc., Inc. assails RA 7942, its
implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government
and WMCP for being unconstitutional on the ground that they
allow fully foreign owned corporations (WMCP) to exploit,
explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in
contravention of Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
In January 2001, Melbourne Mining Club (MMC), a publicly
listed Australian mining and exploration company, sold its
whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, another Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name,
pursuant to its mandate laid down in EO 279, which was issued
by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987.
EO 279 authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors
for contracts or agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the president may
execute with foreign proponent.
In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA, WMCP invokes
the Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments between the Philippine and Australian
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Governments, which provides for the protection of Australian
investments.
ISSUE: WON is a service contract, which permits foreign owned
companies to exploit mineral resources in the Philippines?
HELD: YES
Provisions of the FTAA explicitly gives WMCP the right to exploit
the countrys mineral resources
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area.
Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall
provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
The above contractual stipulations and related provisions in
the FTAA, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural
resources, which belongs to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens.
These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They
are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.
Ruling: Unconstitutional:
R.A. 7942
o Sec. 3 (aq)
o Sec. 23
o Sec. 33-41
o Sec. 56
o Sec. 81 par. 2 and 3
o Sec. 90
All provisions of AO 96-40 which are not in conformity
with the decision
FTAA
2nd case: REVERSAL OF THE FIRST, R.A. 792, AO 96-40, and the FTAA are
no longer unconstitutional
G.R. No. 127882 | Dec. 1, 2004 |J. Panganiban
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HELD:
1. R.A. 7942 and AO 96-40 vest sufficient control over mining
operations in the State.
Provisions in the R.A. and AO establish the mechanism of
inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and
institute reportorial requirements. Moreover, RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 also provide various stipulations confirming the
government's control over mining enterprises
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the
State to the role of a "passive regulator" dependent on
submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government
agencies concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the
various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
Overall, considering the provisions of the statute and the
regulations just discussed, we believe that the State definitely
possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in
the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives,
and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to
impose sanctions, should the occasion arise.
2. Section 3(aq) or R.A. 7942 is constitutional
For the petitioners, Sec. 3(aq), in permitting foreign- owned
corporations to hold exploration permits, is unconstitutional;
because, for them, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution
does not allow foreign-owned corporations to undertake
mining operations directly. They may act only as contractors of
the State under an FTAA; and the State, as the party directly
undertaking exploitation of its natural resources, must hold
through the government all exploration permits and similar
authorizations.
The objection above is not well founded. The Constitution does
not require the government to hold all exploration permits and
similar authorizations. In fact, there is no prohibition at all
against foreign or local corporations or contractors holding
exploration permits.
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The State risks nothing and loses nothing by granting
exploration permits to local or foreign firms; in fact, it stands to
gain in the form of data generated by the exploration
activities.
Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7942, an exploration permit merely
grants to a qualified person the right to conduct exploration for
all minerals in specified areas. Such a permit does not amount
to an authorization to extract and carry off the mineral
resources that may be discovered. This phase involves nothing
but expenditures for exploring the contract area and locating
the mineral bodies.
3. The provisions of the FTAA do not have an effect of
surrendering State control over mining operations to foreign-
owned companies like WMCP.
Petitioners complain that the contractor has full discretion to
select the parts of the contract area, and the government has
no say whatsoever as to the parts of the contract area to be
relinquished pursuant to Clause 4.6 of the WMCP FTAA.
Clause 4.6, however, does not constitute abdication of control.
Rather, it is a mere acknowledgment of the fact that the
contractor will have determined, after appropriate exploration
works, which portions of the contract area do not contain
minerals in commercial quantities sufficient to justify
developing the same and ought therefore to be relinquished.
The Court is certain that the contractors self-interest will propel
proper and efficient relinquishment because according the
private respondents, a mining company tries to relinquish as
much non- mineral areas as soon as possible, because the
annual occupation fees paid to the government are based on
the total hectarage of the contract area net of the areas
relinquished. Thus, the larger the remaining area, the heftier the
amount of occupation fees to be paid by the contractor.
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H.4 Trademark/Tradename
*Asia Brewery vs CA (Reyes)
224 SCRA 437 |July 5, 1993 | Grio-Aquino, J.
Petitioner/s: Asia Brewery Inc.
Respondent/s: CA and San Miguel Corporation
FACTS:
On September 15, 1988, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) filed a
complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for infringement of
trademark and unfair competition.
The products in dispute are SMCs San Miguel Pale Pilsen and
ABIs Beer Pale Pilsen or Beer na Beer.
Trial court: dismissed SMCs complaint
CA: reversed the trial court
Sec. 22 of R.A. 166, otherwise known as the Trademark Law,
defines that only registered trademarks, trade names, and
service marks are protected against infringement or
unauthorized use by another or others. The use of someone
else s registered trademark, trade name or service mark is
unauthorized, hence, actionable, if it is done without the
consent of the registrant.
By the test of dominancy, rather than by difference or
variationas of details of one trademark or another, the
Supereme Court ruled that ABIs Beer Pale Pilsen did not
infringe upon San Miguels Pale Pilsen.
The test of dominancy:
o If the competing trademark contains the main or
essential or dominant features of another, and
confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement
takes place. Duplication or imitation is not necessary;
nor is it necessary that the infringing label should
suggest an effort to imitate.
o The question at issue in cases of infringement of
trademarks is whether the use of the marks involved
would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the
mind of the public or deceive purchasers.

Besides the dissimilarity in their names, the following other

dissimilarities in the trade dress or appearance of the
competing products abound:

(1) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle has a slender tapered
neck. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has a fat, bulging neck.

(2) The words "pale pilsen" on SMC's label are printed in bold
and laced letters along a diagonal band, whereas the
words "pale pilsen" on ABI's bottle are half the size and
SMC ABI printed in slender block letters on a straight horizontal
band. (See Exhibit "8-a".).
ISSUE: WON ABI was guilty of infringement of trademark and unfair
competition (3) The names of the manufacturers are prominently printed
on their respective bottles. SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is
HELD: NO "Bottled by the San Miguel Brewery, Philippines," whereas

140

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
BEER PALE PILSEN is "Especially brewed and bottled by Asia
Brewery Incorporated, Philippines."
(4) On the back of ABI's bottle is printed in big, bold letters,
under a row of flower buds and leaves, its copyrighted
slogan: "BEER NA BEER!" Whereas SMC's bottle carries no
slogan.
(5) The back of the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle carries the
SMC logo, whereas the BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has no
logo.
(6) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with a
coat of arms and the words "San Miguel Brewery
Philippines" encircling the same. The BEER PALE PILSEN
bottle cap is stamped with the name "BEER" in the center,
surrounded by the words "Asia Brewery Incorporated
Philippines."
(7) Finally, there is a substantial price difference between BEER
PALE PILSEN (currently at P4.25 per bottle) and SAN MIGUEL
PALE PILSEN (currently at P7.00 per bottle). One who pays
only P4.25 for a bottle of beer cannot expect to receive
San Miguel Pale Pilsen from the storekeeper or bartender.
On the words pale pilsen
o The fact that the words pale pilsen are part of ABI's
trademark does not constitute an infringement of SMC's
trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, for "pale pilsen"
are generic words descriptive of the color ("pale"), of a
type of beer ("pilsen"), which is a light bohemian beer
with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of
Pilsen in Czechoslovakia and became famous in the
Middle Ages.
o Pilsen" is a "primarily geographically descriptive word,"
hence, non-registerable and not appropriable by any
beer manufacturer, according to the Trademark Law.
On the amber-colored steinie bottles
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
o The use of ABI of the steinie bottle, similar but not
identical to the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle, is not
unlawful. As pointed out by ABI's counsel, SMC did not
invent but merely borrowed the steinie bottle from
abroad and it claims neither patent nor trademark
protection for that bottle shape and design.
o SMC's being the first to use the steinie bottle does not
give SMC a vested right to use it to the exclusion of
everyone else. Being of functional or common use, and
not the exclusive invention of any one, it is available to
all who might need to use it within the industry. Nobody
can acquire any exclusive right to market articles
supplying simple human needs in containers or
wrappers of the general form, size and character
commonly and immediately used in marketing such
articles.
The record does not bear out SMC's apprehension that BEER
PALE PILSEN is being passed off as SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. This
is unlikely to happen for consumers or buyers of beer generally
order their beer by brand.
Note that this decision does not diminish the SCs ruling in Del
Monte Corporation vs CA and Sunshine Mfg. Industries.
o In that case, the Court ruled: to determine whether
a trademark has been infringed, we must consider the
mark as a whole and not as dissected. If the buyer is
deceived, it is attributable to the marks as a totality, not
usually to any part of it
o That ruling may not apply to all kinds of products. The
Court itself cautioned that in resolving cases of
infringement and unfair competition, the courts should
"take into consideration several factors which would
affect its conclusion, to wit: the age, training and
education of the usual purchaser, the nature and cost
of the article, whether the article is bought for
immediate consumption and also the conditions under
which it is usually purchased"
Separate Opinions:
Cruz, J., dissenting
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He/She was the ponente for the Del Monte case. He/She cited the
decision in Del Monte:
o It has been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is
not the final test of similarity. Such comparison requires a
careful scrutiny to determine in what points the labels of
the products differ, as was done by the trial judge. The
ordinary buyer does not usually make such scrutiny nor
does he usually have the time to do so.
o The question is not whether the two articles are
distinguishable by their labels when set aside by side but
whether the general confusion made by the article upon
the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off
his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with
the original.
Pearl v. Shoemart (Bugay)
G.R. No. 114508 |Nov. 19, 1999| Puno, J.
Petitioner/s: PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI
Respondent/s: CA, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and the BARBIZON
CORPORATIONS
FACTS:
Pearl and Dean is a corporation engaged in the manufacture
of advertising display units called light boxes (you see this in the
malls and sometimes along the streets. Theyre like small
billboards lighted from the inside). They secured a Certificate
of Copyright Registration for the lightboxes, and where
marketed to advertisers under the trademark Poster Ads. The
manufacture of the light boxes was contracted to Metro
Industrial Services. While Pearl and Dean secured copyright
and trademark registration, they never did so for patents.
Pearl and Dean was supposed to enter into a contract with SM
for the installation of these lightboxes at SM Makati and SM
Cubao. However, the contract for SM Cubao was not signed
and returned, and while the contract for SM Makati was
signed, SM was later seeking its recission. 2 years later, Metro
Industrial offered to construct light boxes for SM. 10 light boxes
were manufactured by Metro Industrial for SM. SM then
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
engaged the services of EYD Rainbox to construct more
lightboxes.
Later on, North Edsa Marketing (NEMI), a sister company of SM,
was set-up to primarily sell advertising space in lightboxes
located at different SM branches. Upon filing of an
infringement suit, the Court of Appeals eventually ruled that
there was neither any copyright nor trademark infringement.
ISSUE:
WON there was any copyright, trademark or patent infringement.
HELD:
NO. There could not have had been copyright infringement as a light
box is not a proper subject of copyright laws. It was neither a literary
nor an artistic work, but engineering or marketing invention.
Copyright is a statutory right, and thus, protection may only be
obtained for works enumerated by the law. At best, what
copyright laws can protect is the technical drawing of the light
boxes, and there would be infringement if SM had reprinted
these technical drawings for sale to the public without a
license from Pearl and Dean. Only the expression of an idea is
protected by copyright, not the idea itself.
Neither was there patent infringement. Patent requires
registration. There can be no infringement of a patent until a
patent has been issued, since whatever right one has to the
invention covered by the patent arises alone from the grant of
patent. x x x (A)n inventor has no common law right to a
monopoly of his invention. He has the right to make use of and
vend his invention, but if he voluntarily discloses it, such as by
offering it for sale, the world is free to copy and use it with
impunity. A patent, however, gives the inventor the right to
exclude all others.
The patent law has a three-fold purpose: first, patent law
seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes
disclosures of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
seek to ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there for
the free use of the public.
As for trademark infringement, the court said, the certificate
of registration issued by the Director of Patents can confer
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(upon petitioner) the exclusive right to use its own symbol only
to those goods specified in the certificate, subject to any
conditions and limitations specified in the certificate x x x. One
who has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does
not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by
others for products which are of a different description (note:
technical infringement is stricter than unfair competition).
Assuming arguendo that Poster Ads could validly qualify as
a trademark, the failure of P & D to secure a trademark
registration for specific use on the light boxes meant that there
could not have been any trademark infringement since
registration was an essential element thereof.
*Coffee Partners vs San Francisco (Reyes)
G.R. 169504 |March 3, 2010| Carpio, J.
Petitioner/s: Coffee Partners, Inc.
Respondent/s: San Francisco Coffee & Roastery, Inc.
FACTS:
Point of contention is a TRADE NAME
Petitioner Coffee Partners, Inc. is a local corporation engaged
in the business of establishing and maintaining coffee shops in
the country. It registered with the SEC in January 2001. It has a
franchise agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd. (CPL), a business
entity organized and existing under the laws of British Virgin
Islands, for a non-exclusive right to operate coffee shops in the
Philippines using trademarks designed by CPL such as SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE.
Respondent is a local corporation engaged in the wholesale
and retail sale of coffee. It registered with the SEC in May 1995.
It registered the business name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE &
ROASTERY, INC. with the DTI in June 1995.
In 1998, respondent San Francisco formed a joint venture
company with Boyd Coffee USA under the company name
Boyd Coffee Company Philippines, Inc. (BCCPI).
Respondent San Francisco later embarked on a project study
of setting up coffee carts in malls and other commercial
establishments in Metro Manila.
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In June 2001, San Francisco discovered that Coffee Partners
was about to open a coffee shop under the name SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE in Libis, Quezon City. According to
respondent San Francisco, said shop caused confusion in the
minds of the public as it bore a similar name and it also
engaged in the business of selling coffee.
San Francisco sent a letter to Coffee Partners demanding that
the latter stop using the name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. San
Francisco also filed a complaint with the Bureau of Legal
Affairs-Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO) for infringement
and/or unfair competition with claims for damages.
Coffee Partners argued that San Francisco stopped operating
under the trade name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE when it
formed a joint venture with Boyd Coffee USA. Coffee Partners
also contended that respondent did not cite any specific acts
that would lead one to believe that they acted fraudulently
against San Francisco.
Coffee Partners set up San Francisco Coffee in Libis pursuant to
a franchise agreement with CPL, a British Virgin Island
Company owned by Robert Boxwell. Mr. Boxwell attested that
the coffee shop SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE has branches in
Malaysia and Singapore.
Ruling of the BLA-IPO:
o Coffee Partners infringed San Franciscos trade name
however, it did not hold Coffee Partners guilty of unfair
competition. It found that Coffee Partners adopted the
trademark SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE because of the
authority granted to it by its franchisor. The BLA-IPO held
there was no evidence of intent to defraud on the part
of Coffee Partners.
o Both Coffee Partners and San Francisco moved for
partial reconsideration.
Ruling of Office of the Director General-IPO:
o Reversed BLA-IPO. The ODG-IPO found that San
Francisco had stopped using its trade name after it
entered into a joint venture with Boyd Coffee USA in
1998 while petitioner Coffee Partners continuously used
the trademark since June 2001 when it opened its first
coffee shop in Libis, Quezon City.
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CA Ruling: Reversed ODG ruling and reinstated BLA ruling with
regard to infringement of trade name.
ISSUE: WON Coffee Partners committed infringement of trade name of
San Francisco Coffee even if such trade name is not registered with
the IPO.
HELD: YES
Coffee Partners petition is denied.
The Court cited the case of Prosource International, Inc. v.
Horphag Mangament SA, a case that laid down the requisites
on infringement of trade name (there are 5 requisites in all)
o The trademark being infringed is registered in the
Intellectual Property Office; however, in infringement of
trade name, the same need not be registered.
RA 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code, which took effect
on January 1998, has dispensed with the registration
requirement of trade names.
o Section 165.2 of RA 8293 states that trade names shall
be protected, even prior to or without registration with
the IPO, against any unlawful act.
Even if San Francisco did not have coffee shops in the country
when Coffee Partners opened in Libis, San Francisco was still
using its trade name for coffee machinery import and coffee
industry research. Since registering its trade name with DTI in
1995, San Francisco Coffee has the right to be protected
against any infringement.
The Court applied both the dominancy test and holistic test to
determine if the infringement by Coffee Partners
o Dominancy test: If the competing trademark contains
the main, essential, and dominant features of another,
and confusion or deception is likely to result,
infringement occurs. Exact duplication or imitation is
not required.
o Holistic test: entails a consideration of the entirety of the
marks as applied to the products, including the labels
and the packaging, in determining confusing similarity.
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The observer must not only focus on the predominant
words but also on the other features.
o Petitioner Coffee Partners San Francisco Coffee
trademark is a clear infringement of respondents San
Francisco Coffee & Roastery, Inc. trade name. The
descriptive words San Francisco Coffee are precisely
the dominant features of respondents trade name.
Habana vs Robles (Reyes)
G.R. 131522 |July 19, 1999 | Pardo, J.
Petitioner/s: Pacita I. Habana, Alicia L. Cinco, and Jovita N. Fernando
Respondent/s: Felicidad C. Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc.
FACTS:
Point of contention are the English books College English for
Today (CET) and Developing English Proficiency (DEP)
Petitioners Habana, Cinco, and Fernando are authors and
copyright owners of CET.
Respondents Robles and Goodwill Trading are the
author/publisher and distributor/seller respectively of DEP.
In the course of revising their published works, petitioners
looked around various bookstores to check on other textbooks
dealing with the same subject matter.
They chanced upon the book of Robles and were surprised to
see that the book was strikingly similar to the contents, scheme
of presentation, illustrations and illustrative examples of their
own book, CET.
o Petitioners found out that several pages of Robles
book are similar, if not all together a copy of
petitioners book, which is a case of plagiarism and
copyright infringement.
Petitioners made demands for damages from Robles and also
demanded that Robles and Goodwill Trading cease and desist
from further selling and distributing DEP to the general public.
Robles ignored petitioners demands.
Petitioners filed a complaint with the Makati RTC.
Makati trial court: dismissed the petition of Habana, Cinco, and
Fernandez
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
CA: affirmed Makati RTC
ISSUE: WON Robles committed copyright infringement
HELD: Yes
Section 177 (Copy or Economic rights) and Section 184
(Limitations on copyright)
o Sec. 177 Copy or economic rights.- Subject to the
provisions of chapter VIII, copyright or economic rights
shall consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize
or prevent the following acts:
177.1 Reproduction of the work or substantial
portion of the work
o Sec. 184 Limitations on copyright.- Notwithstanding the
provisions of Chapter V, the following acts shall not
constitute infringement of copyright:
c) The making of quotations from a published
work if they are compatible with fair use and
only to the extent justified for the purpose,
including quotations from newspaper articles
and periodicals in the form of press summaries;
Provided, That the source and the name of the
author, if appearing on the work, are
mentioned.
The Court showed similarities between the two works (see pp.
523-524 of the case).
The Court ruled that Robles act of lifting from the book of
petitioners substantial portions of discussions and examples,
and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an
infringement of petitioners copyrights.
To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or
even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so
much is taken that the value of the original work is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially
and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is the
sufficient point of law to constitute piracy.
The act of copying is not only the essential matter for
infringement, but also the injurious effect it has.
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The Court ruled that the injury caused by Robles is her
misrepresentation of petitioners research work as her own and
circulating such work through the published book DEP.
Davide, C.J., Dissenting opinion
Was DEP a substantial reproduction of CET? To constitute a
substantial reproduction, it is not necessary that the entire
copyrighted work, or even a large portion of it, be copied, if so
much is taken that the value of the original is substantially
diminished, or if the labors of the original author are
substantially, and to an injurious extent, appropriated. But the
similarity of the books here does not amount to an
appropriation of a substantial portion of CET. If the existence of
substantial similarities does not of itself establish infringement,
mere similarities (not substantial similarities) in some sections of
the books in question decisively militate against a claim for
infringement where the similarities had been convincingly
established as proceeding from a number of reasons and/or
factors:
1. As both books are grammar books, they inevitably deal
with the same subjects typically and ordinarily treated by
writers of such genre
2. As found by respondent court, CET and DEP had common
sources and materials, such that the particular portions
claimed to have been lifted and literally reproduced also
appeared in earlier works, mostly by foreign authors.
3. Similarity in orientation and style can likewise be attributed
to the exposure of the authors to the APCAS syllabus and
their respective academic experience, teaching
approaches and methodology.
*McDonalds vs MacJoy (Reyes)
G.R. 166115 |February 2, 2007 | Garcia, J.
Petitioner/s: McDonalds Corporation
Respondent/s: MacJoy Fastfood Corporation
FACTS:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
On 14 March 1991, respondent MacJoy Fastfood Corporation,
a domestic corporation engaged in the sale of fast food
products in Cebu City, filed with the then Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTT), now the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO), an application, thereat
identified as Application Serial No. 75274, for the registration of
the trademark MACJOY & DEVICE
Petitioner McDonalds Corporation, a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Delaware, USA, filed a verified Notice of Opposition against the
respondents application claiming that the trademark
MACJOY & DEVICE so resembles its corporate logo and its
other McDonalds marks.
IPO ruling: there is confusing similarity between the MacJoy
and McDonalds trademarks
CA: reversed and set aside IPO ruling
ISSUE: WON there is a confusing similarity between the trademarks of
MacJoy and McDonalds/
HELD: YES
In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion,
jurisprudence has developed two tests, the dominancy test
and the holistic test.
o The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the
prevalent features of the competing trademarks that
might cause confusion or deception
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o In contrast, the holistic test requires the court to
consider the entirety of the marks as applied to the
product including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity.
The IPO used the dominancy test while the CA used the holistic
test but mistakenly identified it as the dominancy test.
The Court ruled that the dominancy test should be the one
applied in the case.
In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one
trademark is confusingly similar to another, no set rules can be
deduced because each case must be decided on its merits.
Citing Societe Des Produits Nestle v. CA, the Court noted that
the totality or holistic test is contrary to the elementary
postulate of the law on trademarks and unfair competition
that confusing similarity is to be determined on the basis of
visual, aural, connotative comparisons and overall impressions
engendered by the marks in controversy as they are
encountered in the marketplace. The totality or holistic test
only relies on visual comparisons between two trademarks
whereas the dominancy test relies not only on the visual but
also on the aural and connotative comparisons and overall
impressions between the two trademarks.
Applying the dominancy test to the instant case, the Court
finds that herein petitioners MCDONALDS and respondents
MACJOY marks are confusingly similar with each other such
that an ordinary purchaser can conclude an association or
relation between the marks.
o both marks use the corporate M design logo and the
prefixes Mc and/or Mac as dominant features.
o the word MACJOY attracts attention the same way
as did McDonalds, MacFries, McSpaghetti,
McDo, Big Mac and the rest of the McDonalds
marks which all use the prefixes Mc and/or Mac.
o It does not matter that MacJoys logo depicts a head
of a chicken head with a cap and bowtie and wings
sprouting on both sides of the chicken head; and its
heart-shaped M in contrast to McDonalds arch-like
M. These minor variations are overshadowed by the
appearance of the predominant features of the Mc
and/or Mac.
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Who has the rightful claim of ownership over the marks?
McDonalds!!!
o A mark is valid if it is distinctive and hence not barred
from registration under the Trademark Law. However,
once registered, not only the marks validity but also
the registrants ownership thereof is prima facie
presumed.
o McDOnalds was able to register its McDonalds marks
successively beginning in October 1974. On the other
hand, MacJoys application for registration was filed
only on March 1991.
H.5 Subdivision/Condominium
Zamora Realty vs OP (Reyes)
G.R. 165724 |November 2, 2006 | Callejo, Sr., J.
Petitioner/s: Zamora Realty and Development Corporation and/or
Ernesto Zamora
Respondent/s: Office of the President of the Philippines and Edilberto
C. Gallado
FACTS:
On October 8, 1985, respondent Edilberto C. Gallardo entered
into a contract to sell with Amlac Development Corporation
(Amlac).
The property subject of the contract is
Lot 1, Block 3 of Amlac-Ville Subdivision.
Under the contract, Gallardo was to pay a downpayment of
P26,058.00, upon execution, the balance to be paid in
installments of P1,987.50 until full settlement of the purchase
price of P130,290.00.
Gallardo delivered the downpayment upon the signing of the
contract, and several months later, on March 11, 1987, the
initial installment.
Gallardo later informed the owner/developer of his intention to
stop further payments due to the latters non-compliance with
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its obligation to complete the development of the subdivision
project.
Thereafter, Zamora Realty and Development Corporation
(Zamora Realty) sent a letter dated January 22, 1990,
addressed to Jaime dela Rosa, copy furnished to all Amlac-
Ville Subdivision buyers, advising them to defer payment of
monthly amortization due to a pending case between it and
Amlac.
The realty firm still made demands on Gallardo to pay his back
arrears which, per its second notice dated January 28, 1992,
amounted to P147,075.00. A final notice of demand was also
sent to Gallardo, stating that his arrears already amounted to
P153,037.50.
Finally, on May 14, 1992, Amlac/Zamora Realty sent Gallardo a
notarial notice of cancellation of the contract.
Gallardo filed a complaint with the HLURB. In his complaint, he
averred that his suspension of the amortization payment was
justified by the non-development of the subdivision project.
The HLRUB, after conducting an ocular inspection of the Amlac
project, rendered a decision in favor of Gallardo.
Zamora Realty elevated the matter to the Office of the
President, which however, dismissed its appeal.
CA also dismissed Zamora Realtys petition.
ISSUE: WON Gallardo was justified to suspend payment due to
incomplete development of petitioners project
HELD: YES
The subject matter of the contract being a subdivision lot, the
applicable law is P.D. No. 957 or The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. As such, the right of
the seller to consider the contract to sell ineffectual in case of
failure of the prospective buyer to pay the amortization, is
limited.
See Section 20 and 23 of P.D. 957
Since Amlac-Ville was registered in 1985 and the completion of
the development was still ongoing as of 1992, it follows that as
of 1987, petitioner was already guilty of incomplete
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development. (Section 20 provides that development must be
made 1 year from the date of registration)
The only requirement under the law is to give due notice to the
owner or developer of the buyers intention to suspend
payment.
Gallardo gave notice of his intention to suspend payment
o Verbal notice- March 11, 1987 payment
o Written notice- letter dated November 5, 1991
o The law does not specifically provide for a form of
notice to be given to the owner/developer. Verbal
notice is sufficient. It follows with the intent of P.D. 957 to
protect prospective buyers from opportunistic
realtors/developers.
It must be stressed that P.D. No. 957 was enacted with no other
end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and
machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers.
*Palanca vs Guides (Reyes)
452 SCRA 461 |February 28, 2005 | Tinga, J.
Petitioner/s: Simplicio A. Palanca
Respondent/s: Ulyssis Guides joined by her husband Lorenzo Guides
FACTS:
On 23 August 1983, petitioner Simplicio Palanca executed a
Contract to Sell a parcel of land4 on installment with a certain
Josefa A. Jopson5 for P11,250.00.
In accordance with the contract, Jopson paid petitioner
P1,650.00 as her down payment, leaving a balance of
P9,600.00.
Sometime in December 1983, Jopson assigned and transferred
all her rights and interests over the said property in favor of the
respondent Ulyssis Guides.
In the deed of transfer, respondent undertook to assume the
balance of Jopsons account and to pay the same in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract to
Sell.
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Guides paid the stipulated amortizations which were in turn
acknowledged by Palanca through receipts issued in Guides
name.
Thereafter, Guides verified the status of the lot with the Register
of Deeds, only to find out that title thereto was not in her name
as it was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 105742
issued on 26 September 1978 in the name of a certain Carissa
T. de Leon.
Guides went to petitioners office to secure the title to the lot,
but petitioner informed her that she could not as she still had
unpaid accounts.
Palanca ignored Guides demands. On December 16, 1987,
Guides, together with her husband, filed a Complaint for
specific performance with damages.
So the case lasted at pre-trial for almost 6 years. When the
case was called again for pre-trial on March 1995, the
petitioner and his representatives called for its postponement.
On the new date for pre-trial, neither petitioner nor his
representatives were present. The Court thereby assumes that
Palanca waived his right to present evidence.
Trial court ruled in favor of Guides.
CA affirmed trial courts decision.
ISSUE: WON Guides has the right to own said property
HELD: YES
On the procedural issue of due process, the Court ruled that
Palanca was afforded due process. The Court may have
waived his right to present evidence but he was afforded his
day at court. It was through his own fault that his right to
present evidence was waived.
On the substantial issue, the Court ruled when Palanca
accepted Guides installment payments despite the alleged
charges incurred by the latter, and without any showing that
he protested the irregularity of such payment, nor demanded
the payment of the alleged charges, respondents liability, if
any for said charges, is deemed fully satisfied.
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o Since Palanca was unable to present evidence, he
could not show a substantial basis for the irregularity of
Guides payments.
o Art. 1235 (acceptance of incomplete or irregular
performance without objection) of the Civil Code is
applicable to this case.
The Court however, finds that the trial court and the CA erred
in computing the overpayment made by Guides.
o In addition to the remaining P9,600.00, respondent also
had to pay P1,052.90, representing the one percent
(1%) interest on the outstanding balance after every
payment made, for a total of P10,652.90. Considering
that the trial court found respondent to have paid
petitioner P12,180.00,46 respondent overpaid petitioner
P1,527.10, and not P2,580.00 as found by the trial
court.47
Apart from ordering the refund of the overpayment, albeit in
the reduced amount, the transfer of title to respondent may
be accomplished by simply compelling petitioner to execute in
favor of respondent a Deed of Absolute Sale and to deliver the
Owners Copy of the Torrens title covering Lot 16B, Block 23
Pcs5078 of the Bacolod Cadastre, consisting of two hundred
twentyfive (225) square meters, together with all the pertinent
documents needed to effect registration of the deed of sale
and issuance of a new title in the name of respondent.
*White Plains vs Legaspi (Reyes) caveat preemptor guys;
read the whole case
193 SCRA 765 |February 7, 1991 | Gancayco, J.
Petitioner/s: White Plains Association, Inc.
Respondent/s: Hon. Godofredo L. Legaspi, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Q.C., Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (QCDFC), Hon. Fiorello Estuar, in his capacity as Secretary
Public Works and Highways, Hon. Conrado Danganan, in his capacity
as District Engr. of Q.C., Sprague Consturction and M.E. Apo
Construction
FACTS:
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Center of controversy: widening of the Katipunan Road in the
Whie Plains Subddivision in Quezon City.
This is the second time the case reached the Supreme Court.
o The first was entitled White Plains Association, Inc. vs
Court of Appeals and QCDFC.
Flashback to the first case
o QCDFC is the owner and developer of White Plains prior
to the sale of the lots therein to the residents of the
subdivision
o Those residents compose the petitioner White Plains
Association, Inc.
o The disputed area of land was covered by TCT Nos.
156185, 156186, and 156187. This area was set aside for
the proposed Highway 38 of Quezon City.
o QCDFC represented to the lot buyers that there would
be a road development called Katipunan Avenue; the
width of the lot allotted for this was 38 meters
o Of the 38 meters, QCDFC developed only 20 meters.
o In April 1970, QCDFC filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal
for the conversion into a residential lot of a portion of
Road Lot 1, which includes the remaining undeveloped
18 meters width of the Katipunan Avenue project.
o Lower court granted respondent QCDFCs petition.
o Petitioner White Plains Assoc., Inc. however, opposed
the conversion of the disputed property into residential
lots.
o CA ruled for QCDFC, acting on a Motion for
Reconsideration.
o Supreme Court ruled in favor of White Plains Assoc., Inc.
Decision became final and executory in January 1986.
Present case
o Sometime in 1989, the government, through the DPWH
allotted funds to widen Katipunan Road by an
additional 4 to 5 meters.
o Work was started by the winning contractors,
respondents Sprague and M.E. Apo
o QCDFC then filed a complaint for injunction against the
said widening project as the alleged owner of the
same property
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o Tas puro procedural stuff na which ended up with both
parties filing for MRs. and then the government
abandoning the project.
ISSUE: WON public respondents DPWH may be restrained from
proceeding with the widening of Katipunan.
HELD: NO
By the doctrine of res judicata, the decision in White Plains
Assoc., Inc. vs. QCDFC applies to this case
o The issue in that case was WON QCDFC may convert
Road Lot 1 into residential lots
o QCDFC is estopped from converting the disputed lots
into residential lots? Why? Because it prejudices the lot
buyers who bought other lots based on their subdivision
plan that the disputed lots cannot become residential
lots.
o Dissent of Justice Gutierrez
Said Road Lot 1 is withdrawn from the
commerce of man and should be developed
for the use of the general public
o Withdrawn from the commerce of man
QCFDC maintains that by being withdrawn from
the commerce of man, the ownership of the lots
are given back to them (and because it is still
registered in their name) and they can do
whatever they want with it
But NO. Being withdrawn from the commerce of
man means QCDFC can no longer sell or
alienate the property because it is a ROAD LOT
The Road Lots ownership was automatically
vested in the QC government and/or the
Republic of the Philippines although it is
registered in QCDFCs name. The donation by
QCFDC to the government is a mere formality.
In addition, Justice Gutierrez also notes that the
disputed lots constitute only 3% of the total
subdivision area, which is way below the
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mandatory 30% area requirement for residential
lots by the Ministry of Human Settlements.
*Padcom vs Ortigas(Reyes)
G.R. 146807|May 9, 2002 | Ponente
Petitioner/s: Padcom Condominium Corporation
Respondent/s: Ortigas Center Association
FACTS:
Petitioner Padcom owns and manages the Padilla Office
Condominium Building (Padcom Building) located at Emerald
Avenue, Ortigas Center
The land on which the building stands was original acquired
from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by
Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) in 1974
o Among the terms and conditions in the deed of sale
was the requirement that the transferee and its
successor-in-interest must become members of an
association for realty owners and long-term lessees in
Ortigas Center
So from OCLP(T&C: Ortigas Center Association members)
TDC(same T&C) Padcom
Ortigas Center Association was organized in 1982
It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of
P2,724.40 per month from Padcom
Padcom owed the Association P639,961.47 representing
membership dues and interests from April 1983 to June 1993
Letters were exchanged between Padcom and Ortigas Center
showing demands for payments and requests for extensions of
payment
Ortigas Center then filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against Padcom
Trial court dismissed the case
CA reversed and set aside trial court ruling
ISSUE: WON Padcom should pay membership dues to Ortigas Center
Association
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HELD: YES
The Court ruled that the CA correctly decided on the case
The CA found that the said terms and condition of automatic
association membership is stated at the back of the TCT
covering the lot
Padcoms membership was also evident from these facts:
o Padcom was included in the Associations list of bona
fide members as of March 30, 1995
o Narciso Padilla, Padcoms President, was one of the
Associations incorporators
o Padcom not only acknowledged the Associations
demands for payments, but also asked and was
granted repeated extensions; Padcom even proposed
a payment scheme
All these facts estopped Padcom from denying that it was not
a member of Ortigas Center Association
Under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of
whatever character, except those mentioned by law, existing
against the land binds the holder of the title and the whole
world
o When Padcom bought the land from TDC, the said
terms and conditions of automatic association
membership was already present
Any lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be
incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates
of title
o Such lien is inseparable from the property as it is a right
in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner
may be; personality of the owner is disregarded
Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that
contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and
heirs.
The Court is not convinced by Padcoms claim that an
application for membership is needed in order to become a
member
o The by-laws of the Association show that a lot owner is
a regular member of the Association
The Court is also not convinced that the automatic
membership clause violates Padcoms freedom of association
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o Padcom was not forced to join the Association. It could
have avoided membership by choosing not to buy the
land from TDC.
*Maria Luisa Park vs Almendras (Lim)
G.R. No. 171763| June 05, 2009| Quisumbing
Petitioner/s: Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc.
Respondent/s: Samantha Almendras and Pia Alemendras
FACTS:
On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha Marie T.
Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras purchased from MRO
Development Corporation a residential lot located in Maria
Luisa Estate Park, Banilad, Cebu City.
After some time, respondents filed with petitioner Maria Luisa
Park Association, Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to
construct a residential house, which was approved in February
10, 2002. Thus, respondents commenced the construction of
their house.
Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that
respondents violated the prohibition against multi- dwelling
stated in MLPAIs Deed of Restriction. MLPAI sent a letter to the
respondents, demanding that they rectify the structure;
otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit respondents
construction bond and impose stiffer penalties.
Respondents, as represented by their father, Ruben D.
Almendras, denied having violated MLPAIs Deed of
Restriction.
MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents specific violations
of the subdivision rules: (a) installation of a second water meter
and tapping the subdivisions main water pipeline, and (b)
construction of two separate entrances that are mutually
exclusive of each other. It likewise reiterated its warning that
failure to comply with its demand will result in its exercise of
more stringent measures.
MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction and failure to comply with the arbitration
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clause provided for in MLPAIs by-laws. Moreover, by virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC also
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, assumed the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction under
holding that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, to hear and decide
(HLURB) that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the cases involving41
case. Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion Later on, the above-mentioned powers and responsibilities,
was denied. which had been vested in the HIGC with respect to
Petitioner MLPAI contends that the HLURB has exclusive homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB
jurisdiction over the present controversy, it being a dispute pursuant to Republic Act No. 8763, entitled Home Guaranty
between a subdivision lot owner and a subdivision association Corporation Act of 2000.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the case they In the present case, there is no question that respondents are
filed against MLPAI is one for declaratory relief and annulment members of MLPAI as they have even admitted it. Therefore,
of the provisions of the by-laws; hence, it is outside the as correctly ruled by the trial court, the case involves a
competence of the HLURB to resolve. controversy between the homeowners association and some
of its members. Thus, the exclusive and original jurisdiction lies
ISSUE: WON the Court erred in ruling that it was the Trial Court and not with the HLURB.
the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case. Also, the HLURB has the expertise to resolve the basic technical
issue of whether the house built by the respondents violated
HELD: YES the Deed of Restriction, specifically the prohibition against
multi-dwelling.
The instant controversy falls squarely within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC), now HLURB. *Goldcrest vs Cypress (Lim)
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners G.R. No. 171072|May 07, 2009 | Quisumbing
associations was vested by law with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). However, pursuant to Executive Petitioner/s: Goldcrest Realty Corporation
Order No. 535, the HIGC assumed the regulatory and Respondent/s: Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation
adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners
associations. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides that.40 FACTS:
Petitioner, Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest), is the
developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the
40

Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers: at Legaspi Village, Makati City.
On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and
(a) . . . and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners associations, the
provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;
41 b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners among stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the
associations registered in accordance therewith; corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and
x x x x the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

152
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

into a condominium project and incorporated respondent purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied
Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to by it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit
manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the owners.
common areas. Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular
Title to the land on which the condominium stands was inspections were conducted on the condominium project.
transferred to Cypress under a TCT but Goldcrest retained During the first inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and and used the common area fronting the two elevators on the
tenth floors of the condominium under the CCT (Condominium ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that
Certificate Title) of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which
Goldcrest controlled the management and administration of encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common
the Condominium until 1995. area.
Following the turnover of the administration and management During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest
of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in failed to secure an alteration approval for the said permanent
1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining structure.
to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by In his Decision dated December 2, 1999, Arbiter San Vicente
Goldcrest. ruled in favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest, among other
Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against things, to: (1) remove the questioned structures, including all
Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board other structures which inhibit the free ingress to and egress from
(HLURB), seeking to compel Goldcrest to vacate the common the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2)
areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures vacate the roof decks common areas and to pay actual
it built. damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an
Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse and
along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as for making an unauthorized alteration of the condominium
the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the plan.
removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress On review, the HLURB Special Division modified the decision of
likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the award for actual damages
of the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned after finding that the encroached areas were not actually
structures. measured and that there was no evidentiary basis for the rate
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive of compensation fixed by Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held
use of the roof decks limited common area by Section 4(c)42 that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the use of the
of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it roof decks limited common area because only Goldcrest has
constructed the contested doors for privacy and security the right to use the same.
Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It questioned
the deletion of the award for actual damages and argued
Section 4. The Limited Common Areas.Certain parts of the common areas are to be
42 that the HLURB Special Division in effect ruled that Goldcrest
set aside and reserved for the exclusive use of certain units 4. The Limited Common could erect structures on the roof decks limited common area
Areas.Certain parts of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the
exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive
and lease the same to third persons.
easement for the use of such limited areas: The Office of the President dismissed the appeal. It ruled that
xxxx the deletion of the award for actual damages was proper
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex because the exact area encroached by Goldcrest was not
B) by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck.
153
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

determined. (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to
Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the Court of build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the
Appeals, which partly granted its appeal. owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above
The right of Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed constitutes impairment of the easement.
for the exclusive use of the easement covering the portion of A careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a
the roof deck appurtenant to the penthouse did not include number of the aforementioned restrictions.
the unrestricted right to build structures thereon or to lease First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the
such area to third persons. Thus the appellate court ordered office structure were neither necessary for the use or
the removal of the permanent structures constructed on the preservation of the roof decks limited area.
limited common area of the roof deck. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain
ISSUE: WON the Court erred in ruling that the Petitioner impaired the on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks
easement on the portion of the roof deck designated as a limited common limited area, making the easement more
common area. burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the
condominium unit owners.
HELD: NO Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond
the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved
Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the
limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions44.
same.
Not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also
illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section
22 of Presidential Decree No. 95743. H.6 Special Economic Zone
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the
following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient *Estate of Salud vs EPZA (Lim)
estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the G.R. No. 137285| January 16, 2001| De Leon, Jr
use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except
for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it Petitioner/s: Estate of Salud Jimenez
cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that Respondent/s: Philippine Export Processing Zone
previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the FACTS:
easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more
burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its
intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and
44 Section 4. Maintenance, Repairs and Alterations....

xxxx Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the owner, tenant or

SEC. 22. Alteration of Plans.No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads,
43

open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision occupant of a unit may not undertake any structural repairs or alterations, or any other
development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its work which would jeopardize the safety of the Building, or another unit, or impair any
advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or easement, without the prior written approval of the Condominium Corporation and of
consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, the owners of the units directly affected by such work.
by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.

154
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the
Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court appeal with the Court of Appeals.
of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot
irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. 434 to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of
One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de the lot covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate,
Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008 square Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a Motion to
meters, is registered with TCT in the name of Salud Jimenez. Partially Annul the Order
The Court upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to The trial court annulled the said compromise agreement
expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). entered into between the parties and directed private
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner,
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private PEZA moved for reconsideration.
corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be ISSUE:
utilized for a public purpose.
The trial court reconsidered the Order and released Lot 1406-A WON the CA committed GADALEJ in giving due course to the Special
from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was Civil Action filed by Respondent, PEZA, when it was made a substitute
maintained. for lost appeal in clear contravention of rulings in Sempio v. CA and
Thus, private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Ongsitco v. CA and despite the fact that the Order of the RTC was
Court of Appeals. already final and executory.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent
offering two (2) proposals, namely: HELD: NO
1. Withdrawal of private respondents appeal with respect to
Lot 1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for
damages and loss of income for the possession of said lot

by private respondent. 2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B
2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT
T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same
for the lot. shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
Private respondents Board approved the proposal and the which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate f Salud Jimenez.
compromise agreement was signed by private respondent
through its then administrator Tagumpay Jardiniano assisted by 3. That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT
Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in
compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993 is quoted.45 favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991.
However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said
defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
451. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court
dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings.
On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and 4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in
forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. immediately final and executory.

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for
certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at
law.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal
is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of
judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a
court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its
discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error
committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by
a special civil action of certiorari.
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first
phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the
right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to
which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally
disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the
determination of just compensation to be ascertained by three
(3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be
paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to
be done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To
both orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the
July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final and the
parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement
regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When
respondent failed to abide by the terms of the compromise
agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the
same. Obviously, the trial could only validly order the rescission
of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just
compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise.
However, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it
ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the
Order of Expropriation which was already final and executory.
The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the
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order of expropriation which has long become final and
executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the
petitioner.
A final and executory order can only be annulled by a petition
to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to
that effect was filed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA wrongly interpreted the phrase original demand
contained in Article 2041 of the Civil Code.
HELD: NO
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting original demand to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of
the purpose thereof have been put to rest when the
Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was
duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The
only issue for consideration is the manner and amount of
payment due to petitioner.
Article 2041 provides that, If one of the parties fails or refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the incorporation of the
expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not
subject said order to rescission but instead constituted an
admission by petitioner of respondents authority to
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose
for which it was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph
three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the
swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B
covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud
Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government
based on the Order of the Honorable Court.
It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the
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parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just
compensation to petitioner. Said expropriation order is not
closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure
to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to
expropriate.
Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of
payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and
purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the
originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash
payment, was rescinded.
The respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
purpose.
It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 66
created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial,
industrial and investment area. According to the
comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said
decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the
establishment of an export processing zone but it was also
bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land for the
construction . . . of terminal facilities, structures and
approaches thereto.
Republic Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad
language employed by Presidential Decree No. 66 by
specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote the
condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation of
an industrial estate, an export processing zone, free trade
zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the
purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a
terminal has the purpose of making banking and
transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working
at the industries located in PEZA.
H.7 Reclamation
*Chavez vs PEA (Lim)
G.R. No. 133250| July 09, 2002| Carpio
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
Petitioner/s: Francisco Chavez
Respondent/s: Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Dev.
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay.
The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked
PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands.
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a
memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,
so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which
stated46
46(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of
works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to
price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and
transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to
all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1984 which
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On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila- Cavite Coastal Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters. reached by the Senate Committees.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Petitioner, Frank I. Chavez, contends the government stands to
Municipality of Paraaque issued TCTs n the name of PEA, lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II,
Coastal Road, Paraaque City. and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement the people to information on matters of public concern.
(JVA for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts
Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA of the State that are of public dominion.
through negotiation without public bidding.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda ISSUE: WON the stipulations in the amended Joint Venture Agreement
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced for the transfer to Amari of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result, the reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public HELD: YES, clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil
The Senate Committees reported the results of their Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend
are.47 and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended
JVA null and void ab initio.
have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date,
which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and
(99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and
approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which
Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations, above Mean holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood domain.
Unit.
The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored
principle of land ownership that all lands that were not
47(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are ands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

grant, belong to the public domain. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
the Philippines. Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations
On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
individuals. foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is
Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature still CA No. 141.
approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
government to corporations and individuals. alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual.
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. population. The most effective way to insure faithful
The case mentions and traces the history from the Regalian adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
Doctrine until the 1987 Constitution. alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 constitutional ban.
Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares.
the State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project
public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that48 still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum oF
Title to AMARIs share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5
48Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c)
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of of the Amended JVA provides that49
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. x x x. conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be (Emphasis supplied)
further classified, by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or 49 x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARIs Land share based on the Land
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty- five Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARIs Land Share in the name
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at
thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. Taking into account the requirements of any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%)
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PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or
submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except
lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum, PEA admits when authorized by Congress
that Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the
reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
lands of the public domain.50 No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that51
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the 14, 1979, provides that52
lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and sub merged areas shall not be alienated, 51The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the
unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to
PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and
be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to recognized and respected.
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising
from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands shall be
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. In consideration of
declared open to disposition or concession which have been the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of
officially delimited and classified. the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an
The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and
non-assessable.
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate
disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as
shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public may be necessary to implement the above.
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the
favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the
contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed, to be
reclaimed as provided for in the abovementioned contract. On the basis of such
of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate
patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of
area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled. (Emphasis supplied)
title. (Emphasis supplied)
50 Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: 52Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall
be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means; accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income
that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in
x x x. (Emphasis supplied) accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084.

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There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No.
525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred ownership and administration of lands reclaimed
from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by PEA. EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its
reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop,
improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government.
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its
lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEAs patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain to private individuals since, with the legislative
authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against
such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations
since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals.
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared
no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to
conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA
must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No.
141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public auction.
Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to cause the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying
AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI.
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
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Constitution which provides that private corporations shall not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease. The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly
means that AMARI will hold the reclaimed lands other than
by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a disposition of
the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or
alienation under CA No. 141, the Government Auditing Code,
and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
HUHUHUHU SA LAHAT NG PAGHIHIRAP, SINUMMARIZE RIN PALA
NILA :( (CRIEEEE!!):
We can now summarize the conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified
as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership
of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
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no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to
law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are
inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Ten Forty vs Cruz (Reyes)
G.R. 151212|September 10, 2003 | Panganiban, J.
Petitioner/s: Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp., Represented by
its President, Veronica G. Lorenzana
Respondent/s: Marina Cruz
FACTS:
Point of controversy is ownership over a lot and house situated
in #71 18th Street, E.B.B. Olongapo CIty
On December 5, 1996, petitioner Lorenzana acquired the
property from Barbara Galino by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale
Even after the sale, Galino continued to occupy the property.
She also continued to exercise ownership rights over the realty.
On April 24, 1998, Galino sold the same property to respondent
Cruz, who immediately occupied said property
o According to petitioner, she just tolerated Cruzs
occupation of the property
After several unheeded demands, petitioner filed an
ejectment suit against Cruz
Petitioner also alleges that her case was one for unlawful
detainer.
RTC dismissed the petition
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CA affirmed the RTC; concluded that petitioners case for
unlawful detainer was a belated resort to make her claim,
which should have been a case for forcible entry, which has
already prescribed.
ISSUE: WON Ten Forty is the owner of the property
HELD: NO
According to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private
corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
According to the certification by the City Planning and
Developing Office of Olongapo City, the contested property in
this case is alienable and disposable public land.
In line with this, respondent Cruz filed a miscellaneous sale
application to acquire the property.
On the other hand, petitioner has not presented proof that, at
the time it purchased the property from Galino, the property
had ceased to be of the public domain and was already
private land.
o The rule was for alienable and disposable land of the
public domain held and occupied by a possessor,
personally or through possessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure
converted to private property by the mere lapse of
time.
Respondent Cruz was awarded de facto possession of the
property.
o This determination is only provisional in nature; it does
not constitute res judicata as to the issue of ownership.
*Chavez vs NHA (Lim)
G.R. No. 164527| June 05, 2009| Velasco, Jr.
Petitioner/s: Francisco Chavez
Respondent/s: National Housing Authority, R-II Builders Inc., et al.
FACTS:
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On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161 approving and
directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan
(the Plan). The Metro Manila Commission, in coordination
with various government agencies, was tasked as the lead
agency to implement the Plan as formulated by the
Presidential Task Force on Waste Management created by
Memorandum Circular No. 39.
On March 2, 1988, MO 161-A was issued, containing the
guidelines which prescribed the functions and
responsibilities of fifteen (15) various government
departments and offices tasked to implement the Plan.
Respondent NHA was ordered to conduct
feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at
the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA
resettlement/low-cost housing projects.
At the time MO 161-A was issued by President Aquino,
Smokey Mountain was a wasteland in Balut, Tondo, Manila,
where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman conditions,
collecting items that may have some monetary value from
the garbage.
Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies
of the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which
resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain
Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-
10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the Project).
The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the
reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the
Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the
project. Once finalized, the Plan was submitted to President
Aquino for her approval.
On July 9, 1990, the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law
(Republic Act No. [RA] 6957) was enacted. Its declared
policy under Section 1 is [t]o recognize the indispensable
role of the private sector as the main engine for national
growth and development and provide the most
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appropriate favorable incentives to mobilize private
resources for the purpose. Sec. 3 authorized and
empowered [a]ll government infrastructure agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations
and local government units x x x to enter into contract with
any duly pre-qualified private contractor for the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any
financially viable infrastructure facilities through the
build-operate- transfer or build and transfer scheme.
RA 6957 defined build-and-transfer scheme as [a]
contractual arrangement whereby the contractor
undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given
infrastructure facility, and its turnover after the completion
to the government agency or local government unit
concerned which shall pay the contractor its total
investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate
of return thereon. The last paragraph of Sec. 6 of the BOT
Law provides that the repayment scheme in the case of
land reclamation or the building of industrial estates may
consist of [t]he grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land or industrial estate built, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership
of lands.
On February 10, 1992, Joint Resolution No. 03 was passed
by both houses of Congress. Sec. 1 of this resolution
provided, among other things, that53
53Section 1. There is hereby approved the following national infrastructure projects for
implementation under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6957 and its implementing rules
and regulations:
xxxx
(d) Port infrastructure like piers, wharves, quays, storage handling, ferry service and
related facilities;
xxxx
(k) Land reclamation, dredging and other related development facilities;
(l) Industrial estates, regional industrial centers and export processing zones including
steel mills, iron-making and petrochemical complexes and related infrastructure and
utilities;
xxxx
(p) Environmental and solid waste management-related facilities such as collection
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

This resolution complied with and conformed to Sec. 4 of On March 19, 1993, the NHA and RBI entered into a Joint
the BOT Law requiring the approval of all national Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the
infrastructure projects by the Congress. Smokey Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the
On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO area across R-10 based on Presidential Decree No. (PD) 757
415approving and directing the implementation of the which mandated NHA [t]o undertake the physical and
SMDRP.54 socioeconomic upgrading and development of lands of
On June 30, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos assumed the Office of the the public domain identified for housing, MO 161-A which
President (OP) of the Philippines. required NHA to conduct the feasibility studies and
On August 31, 1992, the TECHCOM submitted its develop a low-cost housing project at the Smokey
recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the R-II Mountain, and MO 415 as amended by MO 415-A which
Builders, Inc. (RBI) proposal which garnered the highest approved the Conceptual Plan for Smokey Mountain and
score of 88.475%. creation of the EXECOM and TECHCOM.
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39 on September Under the JVA, the Project involves the clearing of Smokey
9, 1992, which reads55 Mountain for eventual development into a low cost
On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial
enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI [s]ubject to site with the reclamation of the area directly across [R-10]
final review and approval of the Joint Venture Agreement to act as the enabling component of the Project.
by the Office of the President. ISSUES:

equipment, composting plants, incinerators, landfill and tidal barriers, among others; 1. WON respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power
and and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this
(q) Development of new townsites and communities and related facilities.
power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by Petitioner.

HELD: YES. The Presidents delegation to NHA is legal and valid; the
54Section 3. The National Housing Authority is hereby directed to implement the power is not exclusively vested in the PEA.
Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 through
a private sector joint venture scheme at the least cost to the government.
Such authority is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may
Section 4. The land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is hereby
conveyed to the National Housing Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across be granted or delegated to another government agency or
R-10. (Emphasis supplied.) entity or may even be undertaken by the National
55WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a viable conceptual plan to Government itself, PEA being only an agency and a part of the
convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of National Government.
the reclamation of the area across Road Radial 10 (R-10) adjacent to the Smokey The Presidents delegation to NHA, a national government
Mountain as the enabling component of the project;
agency, to reclaim lands under the SMDRP, is legal and valid,
firmly anchored on PD 3-A buttressed by EO 525
xxxx
notwithstanding the absence of any specific grant of power
These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the administration and under its charter, PD 757.
disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to EO 525 reads56:
qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use
(commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site families and
additional areas for port-related activities. 56 Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

The aforequoted provision points to three (3) requisites for a with such power under the law.
legal and valid reclamation project57 Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, we
Without doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the nevertheless find petitioners position bereft of merit.
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and The DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim
coordinating all reclamation projects. in the Smokey Mountain Project for the following reasons:
Thus, not all reclamation projects fall under PEAs authority of a. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution58
supervision, integration, and coordination. The very charter of o As such, the President can exercise executive power
PEA, PD 1084, does not mention that PEA has the exclusive and motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a
sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. subordinate with the Presidents own. The DENR is a
EO 525 even reveals the exceptionreclamation projects by a department in the executive branch under the
national government agency or entity authorized by its charter President, and it is only an alter ego of the latter.
to reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which authorized the b. Section 14 of the Revised Administrative Code of 198759
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop o The power to order the reclamation of lands of public
submerged areas for port related purposes. domain is reposed first in the Philippine President
ISSUES: It is clear that the DENR, through its acts and issuances, has
ratified and confirmed the reclamation of the subject lands for
2. WON respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and the purposes laid down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.
authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands. ISSUES:

HELD: YES. 3. WON respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and
The NHA is still required to procure DENRs authorization before submerged lands considered as inalienable and outside the
a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of the commerce of man.
Philip-pines can be undertaken. The requirement applies to
PEA, NHA, or any other government agency or office granted HELD: YES, these lands are not inalienable and not outside the
commerce of man.
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and
National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon disposable lands of public domain of the State for the following
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects
of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be

undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President. (Emphasis
58Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all
supplied.) executive departments, bureaus and offices. The President is assigned the task of
seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. Control, in administrative law, means
57 (1) approval by the President; the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
. (2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
. (3) undertaken by any of the following:
a. by PEA 59Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of the
Government.(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public
b. by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of
c. by the National Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject
lands subject to consultation with PEA to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. (Emphasis supplied.)

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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

reasons60 In addition, President Ramos issued on August 31, 1994

ISSUES: Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed
from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79) hectares,
4. WON respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the
was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the publicdeclaring the
public use. power of NHA to dispose of land to be reclaimed.
ISSUES:
HELD: YES, the reclaimed lands were removed from public use.
The presidential proclamations on SMDRP together with the 5. WON there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands.
issuance of the special patents had effectively removed the
reclaimed lands from public use. HELD: YES, NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or
Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration qualified corporation.
that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act (CA)141 to
service, there was however an implicit executive declaration support his view that the NHA is not empowered by any law to
that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for sell reclaimed land62
public use or public service when President Aquino through Reliance on said provision is incorrect as the same applies only
MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
project and related commercial/industrial development Government. The NHA is not a government unit but a
intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain government corporation performing governmental and
beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as proprietary functions.
enabling component to finance the project. In addition, PD 757 is clear that the NHA is empowered by law
President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, to transfer properties acquired by it under the law to other
though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey
Mountain project are no longer required for public use or



































































































































service61 industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas
for port related activities. (Emphasis supplied.)

























































60 First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands 62 Section 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the
across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. (MO 415
case may be, to any person, corporation or association authorized to purchase or lease
issued by President Aquino, and Proclamations No. 39 and 465 issued by President
public lands for agricultural purposes. The area of the land so leased or sold shall be
Ramos)
such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease if requested and shall
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR anchored on in no case exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President Ramos, without doubt, classified the limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, transfers, made to a province,
reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable. municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by
said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted donated or
Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall
declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
The Court however finds that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority except when authorized by Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation,
given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries. association or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural
purposes under the provisions of this Act, may lease land included under this title
61These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the administration suitable for industrial or residential purposes, but the lease granted shall only be valid
and disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to while such land is used for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use (commercial/
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F
parties
Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property rights
and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it
may deem appropriate. The transfer of the reclaimed lands by
the National Government to the NHA for housing, commercial,
and industrial purposes transformed them into patrimonial
lands which are of course owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed
lands to any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.
ISSUES:
6. WON the transfer of reclaimed lands was done by public
bidding.
HELD: YES, NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its
joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project.
The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) on May 18, 1992. On August 31, 1992, the
Inter-Agency Techcom made up of the NHA, PEA, DPWH, PPA,
DBP, and DENR opened the bids and evaluated them, resulting
in the award of the contract to respondent RBI on October 7,
1992.
H.8 Ancestral Domain
*Cruz vs Secretary (Lim)
347 SCRA 128| December 06, 2000| Puno
Petitioner/s: Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
Respondent/s: Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
BANTA|BELLO|BUGAY|CUALOPING|DE LUIS|GO|LIM|ONG|REYES|TRIAS
(Implementing Rules)
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions
of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.63
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an allen
compassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. These provisions are: 64
63(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found
within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over theancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over theancestrallands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter
into agreements with non- indigenous peoples for the development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
(7)
than 25 years; and Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof
which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
64(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority todelineate
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1
of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but *Cataran vs DENR (Lim)
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program G.R. No. 134958| January 31, 2001| Gonzaga-Reyes
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments Petitioner/s: Patricio Cutaran, David Dangwas and Patio Dosil
under Section 17,Article VII of the Constitution. Respondent/s: Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesC
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. FACTS:
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the
Procedure, thepetition is DISMISSED. DENR issued Special Order No. 31 entitled Creation of a
Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation
ISSUE: WON the IPRA is constitutional. and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera
Administrative Region.
HELD: VOTES WERE EQUALLY DIVIDED (7 TO 7); THUS, THE CASE WAS The special task force created thereunder was authorized to
REDELIBERATED UPON. HOWEVER, AFTER REDELIBERATION, THE VOTING accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims
REMAINED THE SAME. THUS, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED. within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to
issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land
The Separate Opinion/s of the Justices could be read in the Claim) in accordance with existing laws.
case. On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of DENR issued Special
Order no. 25 entitled Creation of Special Task Forces
provincial and community environment and natural resources
offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of
ancestral land claims nationwide and Department
ancestraldomainsand ancestral lands; Administrative Order no. 02, containing the Implementing Rules
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25.
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials oversaid area terminates;
certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they
respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation.
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolvedin favorof the indigenous Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among
peoples; the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve assailed administrative issuances the heirs of Apeng Carantes
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and filed an application for certification of ancestral land claim
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and
involving rights of theindigenous peoples. overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the
168
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PROPERTY DIGESTS 2F

petitioners. imminent violation of the petitioners asserted right to possess

Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land
claim has yet been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of
Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents
issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they
applied for, including the portion occupied by herein
petitioners. Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes
removed some of the improvements they introduced.
ISSUE: WON the Court erred in upholding the validity of Special Order
No. 25 and its implementing rules.
the land by reason of the implementation of the questioned
administrative issuances.
This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation
that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of
Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which
directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged
legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked.

HELD: NO, THERE IS LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.

The petitioners main contention is that the assailed

administrative orders were issued beyond the jurisdiction or
power of the DENR secretary under the NIPAS Act of 1992. They
seek to enjoin the respondents from processing the application
for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of Carantes because
if approved, the petitioners may be evicted from the portion of
the land they occupy which overlaps the land applied for by
the Carantes heirs.
From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition
was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as
yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the
petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on
this ground.
We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the
petitioners memorandum that the alleged application for
certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of
Carantes under the assailed DENR Special orders has not been
granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still
processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a
certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or
may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests
involved in this case are the competing claims of the
petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a
common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts
stand there is no justiciable controversy between the
petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or
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