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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.118978May23,1997

PHILIPPINETELEGRAPHANDTELEPHONECOMPANY,*petitioner,
vs.
NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSIONandGRACEDEGUZMAN,respondents.

REGALADO,J.:

Seekingreliefthroughtheextraordinarywritofcertiorari,petitionerPhilippineTelegraphandTelephoneCompany
(hereafter,PT&T)invokestheallegedconcealmentofcivilstatusanddefalcationofcompanyfundsasgrounds
toterminatetheservicesofanemployee.Thatemployee,hereinprivaterespondentGracedeGuzman,contrarily
arguesthatwhatreallymotivatedPT&Ttoterminateherserviceswasherhavingcontractedmarriageduringher
employment,whichisprohibitedbypetitionerinitscompanypolicies.Shethusclaimsthatshewasdiscriminated
againstingrossviolationoflaw,suchaproscriptionbyanemployerbeingoutlawedbyArticle136oftheLabor
Code.

GracedeGuzmanwasinitiallyhiredbypetitionerasareliever,specificallyasa"SupernumeraryProjectWorker,"
forafixedperiodfromNovember21,1990untilApril20,1991viceoneC.F.Tenoriowhowentonmaternityleave.
1 Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminateduponexpirationoftheagreedperiod.Thereafter,fromJune10,1991toJuly1,1991,andfromJuly19,1991to
August8,1991,privaterespondent'sservicesasrelieverwereagainengagedbypetitioner,thistimeinreplacementofone
ErlindaF.Dizonwhowentonleaveduringbothperiods.2AfterAugust8,1991,andpursuanttotheirRelieverAgreement,
herserviceswereterminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be
filledupforthepurpose,sheindicatedintheportionforcivilstatusthereinthatshewassinglealthoughshehad
contractedmarriageafewmonthsearlier,thatis,onMay26,1991.3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever
agreementswhichshesignedonJune10,1991andJuly8,1991.Whenpetitionersupposedlylearnedaboutthe
samelater,itsbranchsupervisorinBaguioCity,DeliaM.Oficial,senttoprivaterespondentamemorandumdated
January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the
company'spolicyofnotacceptingmarriedwomenforemployment.4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effectiveJanuary29,1992,6whichshereadilycontestedbyinitiatingacomplaintforillegaldismissal,coupledwithaclaim
fornonpaymentofcostoflivingallowances(COLA),beforetheRegionalArbitrationBranchoftheNationalLaborRelations
CommissioninBaguioCity.

Atthepreliminaryconferenceconductedinconnectiontherewith,privaterespondentvolunteeredtheinformation,
andthiswasincorporatedinthestipulationoffactsbetweentheparties,thatshehadfailedtoremittheamountof
P2,380.75ofhercollections.Shethenexecutedapromissorynoteforthatamountinfavorofpetitioner7. All of
thesetookplaceinaformalproceedingandwiththeagreementofthepartiesand/ortheircounsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent,whohadalreadygainedthestatusofaregularemployee,wasillegallydismissedbypetitioner.Her
reinstatement,pluspaymentofthecorrespondingbackwagesandCOLA,wascorrespondinglyordered,thelabor
arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private
respondentwasclearlyinsufficient,andthatitwasapparentthatshehadbeendiscriminatedagainstonaccount
ofherhavingcontractedmarriageinviolationofcompanyrules.

OnappealtotheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC),saidpublicrespondentupheldthelaborarbiter
and,initsdecisiondatedApril29,1994,itruledthatprivaterespondenthadindeedbeenthesubjectofanunjust
andunlawfuldiscriminationbyheremployer,PT&T.However,thedecisionofthelaborarbiterwasmodifiedwith
the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest
nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the
laborarbiter,includingtheorderforthereinstatementofprivaterespondentinheremploymentwithPT&T.

ThesubsequentmotionforreconsiderationfiledbypetitionerwasrebuffedbyrespondentNLRCinitsresolution
of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and
respondentNLRC,aswellasthedenialresolutionofthelatter.

1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but,
through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women
constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of
labor,especiallyonthematterofequalemploymentopportunitiesandstandards.InthePhilippinesetting,women
have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be
safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in
hiring,training,benefits,promotionandretention.

TheConstitution,cognizantofthedisparityinrightsbetweenmenandwomeninalmostallphasesofsocialand
politicallife,providesagamutofprotectiveprovisions.Tociteafewoftheprimordialones,Section14,ArticleII8
on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding and
commandstheStatetoensure,atalltimes,thefundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomenandmen.Corollarythereto,
Section3ofArticleXIII9(theprogenitorwhereofdatesbacktoboththe1935and1973Constitution)pointedlyrequiresthe
State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII 10 mandates
that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full
potential.

2.Correctivelaborandsociallawsongenderinequalityhaveemergedwithmorefrequencyintheyearssincethe
Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's
commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
AgainstWomen(CEDAW).11

PrincipalamongtheselawsareRepublicActNo.6727 12whichexplicitlyprohibitsdiscriminationagainstwomenwith
respecttotermsandconditionsofemployment,promotion,andtrainingopportunitiesRepublicActNo.6955 13whichbans
the "mailorderbride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the
rightsofwomenworkersRepublicActNo.7192 14 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act,"
which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission,
training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private
sectorRepublicActNo.7877 16whichoutlawsandpunishessexualharassmentintheworkplaceandintheeducationand
training environment and Republic Act No. 8042, 17 or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which
prescribesasamatterofpolicy,interalia,thedeploymentofmigrantworkers,withemphasisonwomen,onlyincountries
wheretheirrightsaresecure.Likewise,itwouldnotbeamisstopointoutthatintheFamilyCode, 18women'srightsinthe
fieldofcivillawhavebeengreatlyenhancedandexpanded.

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof.
Article130involvestherightagainstparticularkindsofnightworkwhileArticle132ensurestherightofwomento
be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and
safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage
clinic,barorothersimilarestablishmentsshallbeconsideredasanemployeeunderArticle138.Article135,on
the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly
prohibitsdiscriminationmerelybyreasonofthemarriageofafemaleemployee.

3.Acknowledgedasparamountinthedueprocessschemeistheconstitutionalguaranteeofprotectiontolabor
and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the
employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the
existenceofavalidandjustcauseindispensingwiththeservicesofsuchemployee,one'slaborbeingregarded
asconstitutionallyprotectedproperty.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the socalled
management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work
assignments,workingmethodsandassignments,aswellasregulationsonthetransferofemployees,layoffof
workers,andthediscipline,dismissal,andrecallofemployees. 19Asputinacase,anemployerisfreetoregulate,
accordingtohisdiscretionandbestbusinessjudgment,allaspectsofemployment,"fromhiringtofiring,"exceptincases
ofunlawfuldiscriminationorthosewhichmaybeprovidedbylaw.20

Inthecaseatbar,petitioner'spolicyofnotacceptingorconsideringasdisqualifiedfromworkanywomanworker
whocontractsmarriagerunsafoulofthetestof,andtherightagainst,discrimination,affordedallwomenworkers
byourlaborlawsandbynolessthantheConstitution.Contrarytopetitioner'sassertionthatitdismissedprivate
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for
employmentinPT&T,andnotmerelybecauseofhersupposedactsofdishonesty.

That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the
branchsupervisorofthecompany,withthereminder,inthewordsofthelatter,that"you'refullyawarethatthe
company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the
termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severancefromtheservicewasnotonlybyreasonofherconcealmentofhermarriedstatusbut,overandontopofthat,
was her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not
applicable[sic]oracceptedinourcompany.") 22Parenthetically,thisseemstobethecuriousreasonwhyitwasmadeto
appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its
highestrankingofficerswhowouldotherwisebesolidarilyliablewiththecorporation.23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly
characterizedaswillfulorinbadfaithasshewasmovedtoactthewayshedidmainlybecauseshewantedto
retainapermanentjobinastablecompany.Inotherwords,shewaspracticallyforcedbythatverysameillegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of
confidenceisajustcauseforterminationofemployment,itshouldnotbesimulated. 24 It must rest on an actual
breachofdutycommittedbytheemployeeandnotontheemployer'scaprices. 25Furthermore,itshouldneverbeusedas
asubterfugeforcauseswhichareimproper,illegal,orunjustified.26

Inthepresentcontroversy,petitioner'sexpostulationsthatitdismissedprivaterespondent,notbecausethelatter
got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed,
bespeaksdishonestyhencetheconsequentlossofconfidenceinherwhichjustifiedherdismissal.

Petitionerwouldasseverate,therefore,thatwhileithasnothingagainstmarriage,itnonethelesstakesumbrage
overtheconcealmentofthatfact.Thisimprobablereasoning,withinterstitialdistinctions,perturbstheCourtsince
private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way
around.

Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female
employeescontractingmarriage,whatcouldbeanactofinsubordinationwasinconsequential.Whatitsubmitsas
unforgivableisherconcealmentofthatmarriageyet,atthesametime,declaringthatmarriageasatrivialmatter
towhichitsupposedlyhasnoobjection.Inotherwords,PT&Tsaysitgivesitsblessingstoitsfemaleemployees
contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and
whichobviouslyitwouldhavewantedtoavoid.Ifthatemployeeconfessessuchfactofmarriage,therewillbeno
sanction but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be
dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are
beingregaledwithresponsibleadvocacy.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse
throughlessthancandidarguments.Indeed,petitionerglossesoverthefactthatitwasitsunlawfulpolicyagainst
marriedwomen,bothontheaspectsofqualificationandretention,whichcompelledprivaterespondenttoconceal
hersupervenientmarriage.Itwas,however,thatverypolicyalonewhichwasthecauseofprivaterespondent's
secretiveconductnowcomplainedof.Itisthenapropostorecallthefamiliarsayingthathewhoisthecauseof
thecauseisthecauseoftheevilcaused.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly
misappropriatedcompanyfunds,asanadditionalgroundtodismissherfromemployment,issomewhatinsincere
and selfserving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to
remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely
becauseofherconcealmentofhermaritalstatus,andnotonthebasisofthatsupposeddefalcationofcompany
funds.Thatthelaborarbiterwouldthusconsiderpetitioner'ssubmissionsonthissupposeddishonestyasamere
afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases.
For,therewasnoshowingthatprivaterespondentdeliberatelymisappropriatedtheamountorwhetherherfailure
to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In
fact,itwasmerelyagreedthatprivaterespondentexecuteapromissorynotetorefundthesame,whichshedid,
andthematterwasdeemedsettledasaperipheralissueinthelaborcase.

Privaterespondent,itmustbeobserved,hadgainedregularstatusatthetimeofherdismissal.Whenshewas
servedherwalkingpapersonJanuary29,1992,shewasabouttocompletetheprobationaryperiodof150days
asshewascontractedasaprobationaryemployeeonSeptember2,1991.Thatherdismissalwouldbeeffected
just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in
order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as
relieverwereundoubtedlythoseofaregularemployee,evenifthesamewereforfixedperiods,assheperformedactivities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining
regularemploymentisthereasonableconnectionbetweentheactivityperformedbytheemployeeinrelationtothebusiness
ortradeoftheemployer.29

Asanemployeewhohadthereforegainedregularstatus,andasshehadbeendismissedwithoutjustcause,she
isentitledtoreinstatementwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivilegesandtofullbackwages,inclusiveof
allowancesandotherbenefitsortheirmonetaryequivalent. 30However,asshehadundeniablycommittedanactof
dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the threemonth
suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act
which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her
compensationwaswithhelduptothetimeofheractualreinstatement,shallbereducedbydeductingtherefromtheamount
correspondingtoherthreemonthssuspension.

4.Thegovernment,torepeat,abhorsanystipulationorpolicyinthenatureofthatadoptedbypetitionerPT&T.
TheLaborCodestate,innouncertainterms,asfollows:

Art.136.Stipulationagainstmarriage.Itshallbeunlawfulforanemployertorequireasacondition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated,ortoactuallydismiss,discharge,discriminateorotherwiseprejudiceawomanemployee
merelybyreasonofmarriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, 31
betterknownasthe"Womenand
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
EmploymentofWomenandChildren,toProvidePenaltiesforViolationsThereof,andforOtherPurposes."Theforerunnerto
RepublicActNo.679,ontheotherhand,wasActNo.3071whichbecamelawonMarch16,1923andwhichregulatedthe
employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other
placesoflaborinthethenPhilippineIslands.

ItwouldbeworthwhiletoreflectuponandadoptheretherationalizationinZialcita,etal.vs.PhilippineAirLines,
33 a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that
prospectiveflightattendantsmustbesingleandthattheywillbeautomaticallyseparatedfromtheserviceoncetheymarry
was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination
againstmarriedwomen.Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal
provisionoflaw.RespondentisresoluteinitscontentionthatArticle136oftheLaborCodeapplies
onlytowomenemployedinordinaryoccupationsandthattheprohibitionagainstmarriageofwomen
engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the
pecularitiesoftheirchosenprofession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controvertedpolicyhasalreadymetitsdoomasearlyasMarch13,1973whenPresidentialDecree
No.148,otherwiseknownastheWomenandChildLaborLaw,waspromulgated.Butforthetimidity
ofthoseaffectedortheirlaborunionsinchallengingthevalidityofthepolicy,thesamewasableto
obtainamomentaryreprieve.AcloselookatSection8ofsaiddecree,whichamendedparagraph(c)
of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced
verbatiminArticle136oftheLaborCode,whichwaspromulgatedonMay1,1974totakeeffectsix
(6)monthslater,oronNovember1,1974.
 It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all
policiesandactsagainstitaredeemedillegalandthereforeabrogated.True,Article132enjoinsthe
SecretaryofLabortoestablishstandardsthatwillensurethesafetyandhealthofwomenemployees
and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum
standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is
preciselythefactorthatmilitatesagainstthepolicyofrespondent.Thestandardshavenotyetbeen
establishedassetforthinthefirstparagraph,norhastheSecretaryofLaborissuedanyregulation
affectingflightattendants.

Itislogicaltopresumethat,intheabsenceofsaidstandardsorregulationswhichareasyettobe
established,thepolicyofrespondentagainstmarriageispatentlyillegal.ThisfindssupportinSection
9oftheNewConstitution,whichprovides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self
organization,collectivebargaining,securityoftenure,andjustandhumaneconditionsofwork....

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of
flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health,safety,protectionandwelfare,asnobasishasbeenlaidtherefor.Actually,respondentclaims
that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by
reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriagepregnancy.Respondentdiscussedatlengthintheinstantappealthesupposedilleffectsof
pregnancyonflightattendantsinthecourseoftheiremployment.Wefeelthatthisneedsnofurther
discussionasithadbeenadequatelyexplainedbytheSecretaryofLaborinhisdecisionofMay2,
1976.

Inavainattempttogivemeaningtoitsposition,respondentwentasfarasinvokingtheprovisionsof
Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non
marriage.Inbothinstances,respondentpredicatesabsenceofaflightattendantfromherhomefor
longperiodsoftimeascontributorytoanunhappymarriedlife.Thisispureconjecturenotbasedon
actualconditions,consideringthat,inthismodernworld,sophisticatedtechnologyhasnarrowedthe
distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight
attendantscanprogramtheirlivestoadapttoprevailingcircumstancesandevents.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should
have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non
discriminationontheemploymentofwomen.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation 34
consideredasvoidapolicyofthesamenature.Insaidcase,respondent,indismissingfromtheservicethecomplainant,
invokedapolicyofthefirmtoconsiderfemaleemployeesintheprojectitwasundertakingasseparatedthemomentthey
get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the
projectwithanoralunderstandingthatherserviceswouldbeterminatedwhenshegetsmarried.Brandingthepolicyofthe
employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women
simplyonaccountoftheirsex,theappellatecourtstruckdownsaidemployerpolicyasunlawfulinviewofitsrepugnanceto
theCivilCode,PresidentialDecreeNo.148andtheConstitution.

UnderAmericanjurisprudence,jobrequirementswhichestablishemployerpreferenceorconditionsrelatingtothe
maritalstatusofanemployeearecategorizedasa"sexplus"discriminationwhereitisimposedononesexand
not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or
sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the
employmentofmarriedwomen,butdonotapplytomarriedmen,havebeenheldtoviolateTitleVIIoftheUnited
States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and
applicantsonthebasisof,amongotherthings,sex.35

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women. And,
wheretheemployerdiscriminatesagainstmarriedwomen,butnotagainstmarriedmen,thevariableissexand
the discrimination is unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried
could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would
justifythesame,butnotonthegroundofageneralprinciple,suchasthedesirabilityofspreadingworkintheworkplace.A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a nomarriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as
unlawfulsincetherestrictionwasnotrelatedtothejobperformanceoftheflightattendants.37
5.Petitioner'spolicyisnotonlyinderogationoftheprovisionsofArticle136oftheLaborCodeontherightofa
womantobefreefromanykindofstipulationagainstmarriageinconnectionwithheremployment,butitlikewise
assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem
convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its
logicalconsequences,itmayevenbesaidthatpetitioner'spolicyagainstlegitimatemaritalbondswouldencourageillicitor
commonlawrelationsandsubvertthesacramentofmarriage.

Parenthetically,theCivilCodeprovisionsonthecontractoflaborstatethattherelationsbetweentheparties,that
is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the
same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of
oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger of
justsuchapolicyagainstmarriagefollowedbypetitionerPT&Tisthatitstrikesattheveryessence,idealsandpurposeof
marriageasaninviolablesocialinstitutionand,ultimately,ofthefamilyasthefoundationofthenation. 42Thatitmustbe
effectivelyinterdictedhereinallitsindirect,disguisedordissembledformsasdiscriminatoryconductderogatoryofthelaws
ofthelandisnotonlyinorderbutimperativelyrequired.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby
DISMISSEDforlackofmerit,withdoublecostsagainstpetitioner.

SOORDERED.

Romero,Puno,MendozaandTorres,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

*Thephrase"hereinrepresentedbyDELIAM.OFICIAL",addedheretointhetitleofthiscaseas
statedinthepetition,hasbeendeletedforbeingunnecessaryandviolativeoftherulesonpleadings,
andiscommenteduponinthetextofthisopinion.

1Rollo,42AnnexD.

2Ibid.,4445,AnnexesFandG

3Ibid.,4648AnnexesHandI.

4Ibid.,49AnnexJ.

5Id.,50AnnexK.

6Id.,51AnnexL.

7Id.,53AnnexN.

8TheStaterecognizestheroleofwomeninnationbuilding,andshallensurethefundamental
equalitybeforethelawofwomenandmen(Sec.14,Art.II).

9TheStateshallaffordfullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedorunorganized,and
promotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall.

Itshallguaranteetherightsofallworkerstoselforganization,collectivebargainingandnegotiations,
andpeacefulconcertedactivities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.Theyshallbe
entitledtosecurityoftenure,humaneconditionsofwork,andalivingwage.Theyshallalso
participateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessesaffectingtheirrightsandbenefitsasmaybe
providedbylaw.

TheStateshallpromotetheprincipleofsharedresponsibilitybetweenworkersandemployersand
thepreferentialuseofvoluntarymodesofsettlingdisputes,includingconciliation,andshallenforce
theirmutualcompliancetherewithtofosterindustrialpeace.

TheStateshallregulatetherelationsbetweenworkersandemployers,recognizingtherightoflabor
toitsjustshareinthefruitsofproductionandtherightofenterprisestoreasonablereturnson
investment,andtoexpansionandgrowth(Sec.3,Art.XIII).

10TheStateshallprotectworkingwomenbyprovidingsafeandhealthfulworkingconditions,taking
intoaccounttheirmaternalfunctions,andsuchfacilitiesandopportunitiesthatwillenhancetheir
welfareandenablethemtorealizetheirfullpotentialintheserviceofthenation(Sec.14,Art.XIII).
11Adoptedin1979bytheUNGeneralAssembly,itisregardedasthemostcomprehensive
internationaltreatygoverningtherightsofwomen.ThePhilippinesbecameasignatorytheretoa
yearafteritsadoptionbytheUNandin1981,thecountryratifiedit.

ThePhilippineshadlikewisebeenanactiveparticipantinallthefourU.N.WorldConferenceson
Women,namelythoseheldinMexicoin1975,Copenhagenin1980,Nairobiin1985,andBeijingin
1995.

OtherrelevantinternationallawstowhichthePhilippinesadheresasamemberoftheinternational
communityincludetheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theInternationalCovenantonCivil
andPoliticalRights,andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights.

12Approved,June9,1989.

13Approved,June13,1990.

14Approved,February12,1992.

15Approved,March30,1992.

16Approved,February14,1995.

17Approved,June7,1995.

18EffectiveAugust3,1988.

19CaltexRefineryEmployeesAssociation(CREA)vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,
G.R.No.102993,July14,1995,246SCRA271OrientalMindoroElectricCooperative,Inc.vs.
NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.111905,July31,1995,246SCRA794Nuez
vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.107574,December28,1994,239SCRA
518SanMiguelCorporationvs.Ubaldo,etal.,G.R.No.92859,February1,1993,218SCRA293.

20NAFLUvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.90739,October3,1991,202
SCRA346.

21QuotedintheDecisionoftheThirdDivision,NLRC,inNLRCCaseNo.RABCAR02004292,
AnnexBofpetition,Rollo,35.SeealsoAnnexJ,supra,Fn.4.

22AnnexL,id.,Rollo,51.

23Art.289,LaborCodeseeACRansomLaborUnionACLUvs.NationalLaborRelations
Commission,etal.,G.R.No.69494,June10,1986,142SCRA269Chuavs.NationalLabor
RelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.81450,February15,1990,182SCRA353.

24Mapalovs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.107940,June17,1994,233
SCRA266PNOCEnergyDevelopmentCorporationvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,
G.R.No.79182,September11,1991,201SCRA487.

25SanAntoniovs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.100829,November21,
1995,250SCRA359Laborvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,G.R.No.110388,September
14,1995,248SCRA183.

26HospiciodeSanJosedeBasilivs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.75997,
August18,1988,164SCRA516.

27Cielovs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etalG.R.No.78693,January28,1991,193
SCRA410BrentSchool,Inc.vs.Zamora,etal.,G.R.No.48494,February5,1990,181SCRA702.

28Art.280,LaborCodeseePLDTvs.Montemayor,etal.,G.R.No.88626,October12,1990,190
SCRA427.

29DeLeonvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.70705,August21,1989,176
SCRA615.

30MolaveToursCorp.vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,etal.,G.R.No.112909,November
24,1995,250SCRA325seeArt.279,LaborCode,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.6715.

31PromulgatedonMarch13,1973.
 32ApprovedonApril15,1952.ItwaslateramendedbyRepublicActNo.1131,whichinturnwas
approvedonJune16,1954.

33CaseNo.RO43339876February20,1977.

34CAG.R.No.52753R,June28,1978.

3545AAm.Jur.2d,JobDiscrimination,Sec.506,p.486.

36Ibid.,id.,id.

37Ibid.,id.,Sec.507.

38Tolentino,A.,CivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.III,1979ed.,235seeArt.874,CivilCode.

39Art.1306,CivilCode.

40Art.1700,CivilCodeseeMacleod&.Co.ofthePhilippinesvs.ProgressiveFederationofLabor,
97Phil.205(1955).

41Art.1701,CivilCode.

42The1987Constitutionprovides:

TheStaterecognizesthesanctityoffamilylifeandshallprotectandstrengthenthefamilyasabasic
autonomoussocialinstitution....(Sec.15,Art.II).

TheStaterecognizestheFilipinofamilyasthefoundationofthenation.Accordingly,itshall
strengthenitssolidarityandactivelypromoteitstotaldevelopment(Sec.1,Art.XV).

Marriage,asaninviolablesocialinstitution,isthefoundationofthefamilyandshallbeprotectedby
theState(Sec.2,Art.XV).

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