G.R. Nos.

94929-30 March 18, 1992

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,

ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS
UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA)
and PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal Private Respondents,
respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents
Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire
on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the
next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng
Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent
signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26,
1990, or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition
for intervention.

Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and
Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990,
or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. On April 26, 1990,
APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the
requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as
follows:

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the
incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate
labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret
ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement
and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees
in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be
dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing
of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25%
consent signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an
order dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions. 1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor
Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for
certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed
PWUP's appeal. 2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement,
which was concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority
of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently
registered with the DOLE.

PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent
in the application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized
establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day
period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the
written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit
to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order
election by secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the
bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they submitted
the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition. The petitioner complains
that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition for
intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.

Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor
Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above.
Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the
Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and unappealable.

ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v. Inciong: 3

We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of
TUPAS for a certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers
of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a clear
majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working
force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement concluded between UMI
and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is no more need for
holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)

For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these proceedings in view of the lack of
consent signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to
represent SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent also invokes
Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an
affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.

In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that there has been
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be
liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as follows:

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds
for the petitioner.

We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to
self-organization and collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court"
has been "to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor
organization should be the collective bargaining representative." 4

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers
can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja,
6 the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and
General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano: 7

. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding
of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice
of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to
said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of
sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico
Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])

In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous
submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of
the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks
to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a
directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election
within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable
period from such filing.

This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of
Labor Relations, 9 where we declared:

. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a
certification election had not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered
to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor
organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative. (National Mines and
Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)

It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so
held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10

It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the
workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to
motions for intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and
timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be
denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate
in the Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had already met the 20%
requirement.
The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had
not appealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election
is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of
procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules and objections should not hamper the
correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of
the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election
although it was initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the
circumstance that the other petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their
petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The petition
for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied
with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its
intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of
SAMADA and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be
deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical
rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the
workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified that
decision in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:

Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and
academic."

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the
holding of certification elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the
holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is
clearly shown to be imperative. 13 Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the
identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a
more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of Free
Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace
contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real
representative.

The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation
of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and
academic and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election thereon. That
conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA by the
majority of the workers signified their affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That
case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the
negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the
record does not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also
formally affiliated with APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the
representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before
or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the
representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case
was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the
ICTSI and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on certification election is final and
inappealable, this Court held in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative

power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S.
506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v.
Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59
Phil. 440).
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because
the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of
majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-
quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding
of a certification election.

It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new
CBA it concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union
will be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may
result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is
necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the workers with the management.
For this reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall
remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification
election to be called.

The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial
question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective
bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there
be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a union
covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be
not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and
support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the
workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the
suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will
exalt procedure over substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold
certification election among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.,
this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.

G.R. No. L-48007 December 15, 1982

PLUM FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN WORKERS, petitioner,

vs.

DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, of the Bureau of Labor Relations; MANILA JOCKEY CLUB RACE
DAY OPERATION EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO and MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC.,
respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Pedro A. Lopez for respondent MJCRDOELU-PTGWO.

Armando V. Ampil for respondent Manila Jockey Club.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner seeks to set aside the Order and Resolutions dated May 6, 1977, September 17, 1977
and March 14, 1978 of the Bureau of Labor Relations for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. It, likewise, prays for an order directing
respondent director to hold a certification election so that the employees in the company can
elect a union representative to negotiate an improved connective bargaining agreement to
replace the agreement which has expired on February 1, 1976.

On May 5, 1976, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers filed a petition, praying that
it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila
Jockey Club, Inc.

On June 18, 1976, the Manila Jockey Club Race Day Operation Employees Labor Union-PTGWO
filed a motion to intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged among other things, that
it is the recognized collective bargaining representative of all the employees of the company and
that it is in the process of negotiating a modification of the collective bargaining agreement.

On August 30, 1976, another supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by intervenor PTGWO,
this time invoking the "No Union Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the
members of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (T.U.C.P.) wherein both petitioner and
intervenor are members, and claiming that the petition failed to satisfy the 30% requirement of
the law. The entire record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the President of the T.U.C.P.
for the purpose of submitting the matter to the Congress for decision.

On March 16, 1977, the entire record of the case was returned by the T.U.C.P. President to the
Office of then Secretary of Labor which in turn transmitted the same to the Bureau of Labor
Relations Office with a forwarding letter signed by the late Roberto S. Oca in his capacity as
President of the Congress, stating, among other things, the following: 1

In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang Manggagawang Pilipino (TUCP) held
last March 7, 1977 at the Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the above-captioned case
be referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO be declared as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent, thus dismissing the petition of PLUM.

On March 22, 1977, the BLR endorsed the case to Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of
Region IV for appropriate action.

On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section of Region IV, Department of
Labor, promulgated an order 2 dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the
T.U.C.P.

Petitioner PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations predicated on the ground that
TUCP has no authority in law to grant or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated
the secret ballot to elect the true union representative.

On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution' dismissing the appeal.
Pertinent portions 3 of said resolution read thus:
While it may be true that the facts of the case may warrant the holding of a certification election
in the bargaining unit concerned, to sustain first the decision arrived at by the National Executive
Board of TUCP appears of indispensable importance. Contenders in the case at bar are both
members of TUCP. Undeniably, there are internal rules including their Code of Ethics to keep
them intact, to govern their actions and finally to preserve the Congress. It is therefore, a matter
of utmost necessity that a decision arrived at by the National Executive Board be respected and
enforced not only by the members of the Congress themselves but also by this Bureau and the
Department if necessity arises,

The appealed order has the letter of Roberto Oca as its basis. It is worthy to note that the letter
sent said communication in his capacity as President of the TUCP and nothing else. Whether or
not he happens also to be the president of intervenor union is of no legal significance since the
decision of the TUCP was handed down by its National Executive Board and not by him alone.

Other recourse could have been taken by appellant. Very much aware of the Decision of the
National Executive Board on March 7, 1977, it could have asked for a reconsideration of the
same. As shown by the records, the first decision of the National Board was for the holding of a
certification election. But intervenor asked for a reconsideration hence the March 7, decision.
Appellant's failure however could unequivocably be interpreted as satisfaction of the Decision.
For this Office now, to sustain appellant's stand and re-open the case again by giving due course
to the instant appeal is not only an open manifestation of non-recognition of the existence of
TUCP but a further obstruction to the goal of the Department to establish one-union in one
industry; thus at the end, to attain industrial peace.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by public respondent for being pro-
forma, hence the present recourse by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

It was asserted by petition that nowhere in the Labor Code or in the new Constitution has TUCP
been granted any authority to supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny
the majority employees of their right to elect their own union; that public respondent and the
PTGWO acted without jurisdiction in defiance of the rule of law and popular democracy, that it,
is not within the Code of Ethics to suppress the employees' freedom to choose their own union;
and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for
conference, to submit evidence or to make a fair judicious and rational evaluation of the dispute.

The Solicitor General in his manifestation and motion prayed that he be relieved from filing the
required answer to the instant petition for the reason that he was unable to sustain respondent
bureau director's questioned orders and resolution. The records of the case were returned to
said public respondent and he was granted an extension of time within which to submit his own
answer to the petition.

Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is not opposed to the conduct
of a certification election, and in fact he is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to
the jurisdiction of his office. However, he stressed that the TUCP Code of Ethics and General
Council Resolution No. 76-2 are clear expressions of consent by the signatory members,
including their locals or affiliates, to settle their disputes among themselves in accordance with
the decision of the National Executive Board and the decision he made was made pursuant to
such an agreement.

On the other hand, private respondent union maintained its stand that no certification election
should be held because the petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 30% of
all the employees in the bargaining unit, and that this requirement is mandatory.

A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of affairs of the
employees wherein they are deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for
management refused to bargain with the union. If this situation continues, the employees would
stand to lose a long-line of cases that the workers' welfare can be promoted through the
bargaining process. Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of determining
which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that
the win of the majrity if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the
voters to make their choice, is controlling. 4 Protection to labor and freedom of peaceful
assembly and association are guaranteed by the Constitution.

As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription requirement was met, it was
held that the Director is still empowered to call for a certification election provided there was no
abuse of discretion. However, in the case at bar, instead of ordering an election, respondent
Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM based on the decision of the TUCP, which the Court
considers an impairment of the freedom of the workers to voice out their choice of the union to
represent them. If there is any doubt as to the required number having met, there would be no
better way than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really commands
the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. 5 If the desired goal is for the execution of a
collective bargaining contract to protect the workers, then certification election is the most
appropriate means to attain said end.

Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified
collective bargaining agreement which should govern the economic and working conditions of
the workers, a certification election should immediately be ordered. This Court had repeatedly
made it clear that in labor controversies, time is of the essence. 6

Accordingly, the questioned order and resolutions dated May 5, 1977, September 17, 1977 and
March 14, 1978 are nullified and set aside. Respondent Director is hereby ordered to hold a
certification election forthwith. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

JISSCOR INDEPENDENT UNION, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES and BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in their capacity as Secretary and
Undersecretary of Labor, respectively; ASSOCIATED LABOR UNI0N (ALU) and SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA NG JISSCOR, respondents.

Romeo B. Igot Law Office for petitioner.

Joji L. Barrios for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corporation
(JISSCOR) before the Med- Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region, Manila.

By agreement of the petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-ALU and the JISSCOR management, the
Med-Arbiter issued an Order on August 29, 1990, setting the certification election on September
4, 1990.

However, on the appointed date, instead of an election, as previously agreed upon by all the
parties, another pre-election conference was held in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Another agreement was entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing that the election
would be conducted on September 6, 1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the
mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived by agreement of the parties" (p. 172, Rollo).

The results of the certification election held on September 6, 1990 were the following:

JISSCOR Independent Union 46

Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU 50

No Union 0

Spoiled 3

Total Votes Cast 99 (p. 21, Rollo.)

The JIU, which obtained only the second highest number of votes, registered a protest in the
minutes of the election stating that: "we file protest on the following grounds using visor,
emblem" (p. 174, Rollo).
On September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest before the Department of Labor, National
Capital Region, on the following grounds:

I. The election was conducted very disorderly and irregular (sic) as there was no
compliance of (sic) mandatory posting of notice of certification election and necessary list of
qualified voters in accordance to (sic) Section 1 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations;

II. The lack of the required posting had mislead (sic) and/or misinformed the
voters/workers of the manner of voting, thus it resulted to some spoiled votes;

III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU officers and members, especially a certain Rene Tan
from their place of work to the election registration;

IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by posting of a very big streamer with printed
words: Vote! Samahang Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU at the entrance front door of the chapel
where the election was held;

V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins with printed
words: Vote! SMJ-ALU before and during voting inside the polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-46,
Rollo.)

On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued an Order declaring the
September 6, 1990 certification election null and void.

On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-ALU appealed to the DOLE Secretary and
prayed that it be declared the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of JISSCOR.

On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
granting the appeal of SMJ-ALU and setting aside the Order dated November 21, 1990 of the
Med-Arbiter. A new order was entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank-and-file workers of JISSCOR pursuant to the results of the certification
election conducted on September 6, 1990.

In due time, the JIU filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in certifying SMJ-ALU as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of JISSCOR.

The petition has no merit.

Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the
grounds of a protest may be filed on the spot or in writing with the representation officer and
shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised are deemed waived.

The minutes of the certification election show, however, that JIU only protested against the use
of emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the posting in the chapel entrance of a
huge streamer with the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU"]not so raised
are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code).

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the non-posting of the notice of the
certification election as prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus Rules
Implementing the labor Code misled and confused the workers regarding the mechanics of the
election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that issue for it signed an agreement with the
private respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days posting of election notices. The doctrine
of estoppel is based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB vs. Court of
Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).

The results of the certification election belie the petitioner's allegation that the workers were
misinformed about the election for the records show that out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were
able to cast their votes and only 3 were spoiled ballots.
On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the posting of a huge streamer, the
Undersecretary found:

. . . nothing in the records shows that the alleged wearing of sunvisors and pins, the posting of
huge streamers, as well as the alleged escorting of voters by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured,
influenced, vitiated, or in any manner affected the choice of the workers of their bargaining
agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)

That finding of fact of the head of an administrative agency is conclusive upon the court (Reyes
vs. Minister of Labor, 170 SCRA 134).

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents, the
Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, in rendering the questioned decision,
the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Undersecretary of
Labor, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, is hereby AFFIRMED.

ACOJE WORKERS' UNION, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION (NAMAWU), ACOJE MINES COMPANY and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Dator, Real and Reyes for petitioner.

Jose C. Espinas and Associates for respondent National Mines and Allied Workers Union.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for respondent Acoje Mines Company.

Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations certifying:

the National Mines and Allied Workers' Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
the workers in the Acoje Mining Company at Santa Cruz, Zambales, excluding supervisors,
confidential employees and security guards, for purposes of collective bargaining under Republic
Act 875 as regards to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

Pursuant to an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated May 19, 1961, and a Resolution
thereof en banc, dated June 8, 1961, the Department of Labor, through the Bureau of Labor
Relations, conducted on June 9, 1961, a "consent election" among the workers of the
aforementioned Company, in which five (5) labor unions participated, namely, the Acoje United
Workers' Union, the Acoje Labor Union (PELTA), the Acoje Labor Union (PLUM), respondent
National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU), and petitioner Acoje Workers' Union. On
June 21, 1961, the Department of Labor certified that the result of the election was as follows:

No. of Valid Votes cast ................................... 874

No. of Spoiled Ballots .................................... 11

No. of Challenged Ballots ................................. 19

Total No. of Votes Cast ...........................................

904

No. of Votes Cast for:

Acoje United Workers Union ................................ 8

Acoje Labor Union-Pelta ................................... 11

Acoje Labor Union-Plum .................................... 5

National Mines & Allied Workers' Union .............560

Acoje Workers' Union .................................. 278

No Union desired ...................................... 12

874

Prior thereto or on June 12, 1961, petitioner Union which had been defeated by respondent
Union by a margin of 282 votes had filed a motion to invalidate said election upon several
grounds. After due hearing, the lower court issued, on July 21, 1961, the order appealed from
holding that said motion was without merit, and certifying respondent Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers of the Company. A reconsideration of said order
having been denied by the Court en banc, petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari,
and now maintains that the lower court should have invalidated the aforementioned election for
the same was "the result of acts of terrorism, force, threat and intimidation employed by" agents
of respondent Union.

More specifically, petitioner alleges that, "if heard or given its day in Court" it could have proven
that: a) not less than 310 workers of the Company were threatened the night immediately
preceding the election by agents of respondent Union individually "to cast their vote for said
Union ... or else;" b) the agents of respondent Union were even aided by the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Cruz, Zambales, and his policemen, and, as a consequence, said Municipal Mayor was
suspended from office; c) the acts performed by said agents of respondent Union "resulted into
unlawful disorder, damaged belongings, and physical injuries suffered by the workers"; d) many
workers were unable to vote for justified causes; and e) many workers, subject of unfair labor
practice case actually pending in Court, were not allowed to vote, contrary to law.

The last two (2) grounds are clearly untenable. It appears that on April 24, 1961, the labor unions
concerned agreed, not only to the holding of the aforementioned election, but, also, to the use
of the Company payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for determining who are qualified to vote
subject to the approval of the lower court. On May 8, 1961, the Company presented its
aforementioned payroll to said court and stated that the labor unions had been furnished copy
thereof, at least three (3) days prior thereto. Said labor unions were given an opportunity to
make their comments and observations on the list of workers contained in the payroll and to ask
or suggest the inclusion or exclusion of names therein or therefrom. Petitioner's representative
then stated that it would abide by whatever ruling the court may make on the matter of
inclusion and exclusion of voters. Indeed, on May 19, 1961, the court issued the corresponding
order for the holding of the election and in made its ruling on the question as to who were
qualified to vote, and petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of said ruling, although two
(2) other Labor Unions and that Company did so, and their motions for reconsideration were
denied by the Court en banc. Hence, petitioner may no longer contest the accuracy of the
aforementioned voters list.

Pursuant thereto that Company had 1,019 workers, excluding department heads foremen, but
including 48 security guards. Excluding the latter, there were, therefore, only 971 qualified
voters. Of these, 904 had voted, so that only 67 qualified voters had to cast their votes. It is
obvious, that this number plus the 19 ballots challenged in the election are insufficient to offset
the plurality of 282 votes obtained by respondent Union.

In connection with the duress claimed to have been used upon the voters, it should be observed
that in its motion dated June 12, 1961, petitioner maintained that the election should be
invalidated because of alleged: a) insufficiency of the notice of said election; b) failure to furnish
the petitioner with a copy of the list of qualified voters; c) inclusion among those who voted of
confidential employees, supervisors and security or police officers; d) failure of many workers to
vote due to said insufficient notice "as well as the cases of violence that occurred on the eve of
election". None of these grounds is now invoked by petitioner herein. Worthy of notice is the
fact that petitioner did not claim that any voter had been coerced to vote for respondent Union.

In fact, in its supplemental motion of June 22, 1961, petitioner made more specific allegations to
bolster up its pretense "that the election held on June 9, 1961, is inconclusive because of the
alleged "failure of more than 300 workers to vote which, as above indicated, is not a fact. It is
true that the last ground out of the seven (7) relied upon in the aforementioned
supplemental motion was to the effect that "there are many cases where the workers were
threatened, coerced and intimidated to vote for the NAMAWU." But this general allegation,
without anything to indicate the number of workers involved, without the supporting affidavit of
any of them, and without an offer to introduce their testimony or the testimony of any of them
was in the light of the attending circumstances clearly insufficient to warrant the invalidation
of the aforementioned election.

As regards the disorder that had allegedly characterized the election, the minutes thereof suffice
to refute petitioner's pretense. We quote from said minutes:

Balloting went on smoothly up to closing time at 7:00 p.m. There was spirit of comraderie
among the representatives of the contesting unions throughout the proceedings.
Peace and order was maintained by the 18th PC Company at Iba, Zambales, graced by the
presence of the Provincial Commander in person.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner..

ASIAN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

HON. PURA FERRER- CALLEJA, in her capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
and SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), respondents.

Salutario J. Fernandez and Emmanuel O. Sales for petitioner.

Pedro A. Rosito for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the resolution (pp. 21-23,
Rollo) dated November 24, 1986 of respondent Director in BLR Case No. A-10-247-85 which
affirmed the appealed order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's complaint to declare the
certification election of May 21, 1986 as null and void and the resolution (p. 20, Rollo) dated
January 21, 1987 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation (ADMACOR) is a corporation duly

organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture
factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of several labor unions at
ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a
certification election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day.

On May 19,1986, several factory workers of ADMACOR held a strike. No previous notice of strike
was filed by the factory workers with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May
20,1986, ADMACOR filed a petition (pp. 42-44, Rollo) for the indefinite resetting of the
scheduled certification election, which petition was not acted upon by the Labor Relations
Division.

On May 21, 1986, the scheduled certification election was conducted, despite the strike. Of the
423 workers who voted, 413 voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as their
exclusive bargaining agent (p. 82, Rollo), On the same day, ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal
strike (RAB Vll-0136- 88; pp. 37-41, Rollo) and for illegal picketing (RAB-040886; pp. 34-36, Rollo)
with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City.

On May 23, 1986, ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the certification election conducted on
May 21, 1986 as null and void on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the
premises of the factory on the day of the certification election, such day cannot be considered a
regular business day, pursuant to Section 2, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code, to wit:

Section 2. Election conducted during regular business day. - The election shall be set during the
regular business day of the company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.

On August 5, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's complaint to annul the May 21, 1986
certification election and certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of ADMACOR. This dismissal was appealed by ADMACOR to the Bureau of
Labor Relations (Bureau) by way of a motion for reconsideration and docketed as BLR Case No.
A-10- 247-85. On August 14, 1986, the Concerned Workers Association of ADMACOR filed a
motion for intervention in the case appealed to the Bureau.

On November 24, 1986, the public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja acting as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the appeal of ADMACOR and affirmed the decision of the
Med-Arbiter. The motion for intervention filed by the Concerned Workers Association of
ADMACOR was denied for having been filed after the actual certification election had already
been conducted (pp. 3-4, Resolution dated Nov. 24, 1986, pp. 2223, Rollo). The motion for
reconsideration of the November 24, 1986 resolution was also denied in a resolution dated
January 21, 1987. These two resolutions are assailed in this petition for having been issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (p. 4, Rollo).

Meanwhile, on January 26,1987, a decision (pp. 45-54, Rollo) on the twin complaints for illegal
strike (RAB-0316-86) and illegal picketing (RAB-0408-86) was rendered by Labor Arbiter
Bonifacio B. Tumamak declaring the strike held on May 20, 1986 against ADMACOR as illegal.

In this petition, ADMACOR questions the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau)
to resolve or determine the factual and legal basis of a strike in relation to the question of
representation of employees (p. 9, Rollo). It said:

What is directly in issue is the jurisdiction of the Bureau to rule, as it did, on the protest filed
after the election by the petitioner. Petitioner's protest involves the regularity of the election,
due to the contemporaneous, in fact, even antecedent conduct of an illegal strike. Instead of
holding in abeyance the election protest so that the Labor-Arbiter could properly resolve the
pending complaints, the Bureau rendered its assailed Resolutions in excess of its jurisdiction. The
Bureau had assumed on its own an implied determination of the legality or illegality of the
complained strike (pp. 10-11, Petition; pp. 11-12, Rollo).

Indeed, the question involving the legality of the strike which was conducted against ADMACOR
is an independent issue, the resolution of which pertains to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to No. 5,
Article 217 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the issue of the validity of the certification
election pertains solely to the Bureau of Labor Relations, originally, the Med-Arbiter and by way
of appeal, to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, pursuant to Section 7, Rule V, Book V
of the Rules; to Implement the Labor Code. However, We find no overlapping by the Bureau of
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the question of legality, or illegality of the complained
strike. The allegation that the Bureau assumed on its own an implied determination of said issue
is belied by the fact that the assailed resolutions of respondent Director confined itself to the
issue of the validity of the certification election. There was nothing in the assailed resolutions
which contain any conclusion or ruling by the Bureau that the alleged strike was legal or illegal.

What was resolved was whether or not there was compliance with the procedural requirement
set by Section 2, Rule VI, Book VI of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code that the election
shall be set during a regular business day. In answer to petition's contention that there being a
strike on May 21, 1986, the day the certification election was held, said day cannot be
considered a regular business day, the respondent Director ruled:

Furthermore, anent complainant's contention that the certification election was conducted not
on regular business day, the same is devoid of merit. The records further show that during the
pre- election conference the contending parties agreed that the election should be conducted on
May 21, 1986 winch was, on that time, a determined regular business day of the company. This
was in accordance with Section 2, Rule VI Book V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
which explicitly provides:

The election shall be set during the regular business day of the company unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties.

The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the company's premises which
coincided with the actual conduct of certification election might, perhaps have affected the
actual performance of works by some employees, but did not necessarily make said date an
irregular business day of the company to go against the aforesaid Rule (p. 22, Rollo).

We agree with the said ruling of respondent Director upholding the validity of the certification
election despite the strike. In the first place, since petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the
Bureau when it filed its election protest before the Med-Arbiter, it cannot now be allowed to
repudiate the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain affirmative relief. Moreover, it can not be
denied that an actual election was conducted on said date where, of the 423 workers who voted,
413 voted for SPFL as its exclusive bargaining agent. In the "Minutes of the Certification Election
among the Rank and File Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the representatives
of the contending unions, and of the Ministry of Labor even attested that the election was
peaceful and orderly (pp. 79-83, Rollo) and none of the parties registered any protest on any
matter concerning the election proceedings. There is thus, no valid reason to annul the
certification election.

On the pretext that the issue deposited in this petition is the lack of jurisdiction of the Bureau in
dismissing its protest against the certification election despite the pendency of the case before
the Labor Arbiter on the validity of the strike, petitioner seeks exception to the rule that an
employer has no standing to question a certification election. We reiterate the rule that such
concern over the validity of certification election must come from the employees themselves.
The case of Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. Trajano, G.R. No.
61153, January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64, 66, is clear on this point. This Court therein held:

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the
employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter the role of the employer in the
certification process ceases. It becomes merely a bystander.

In the instant case, the petitioner for a certification election was filed by a legitimate labor
organization as stipulated by Article 258 of the Labor Code. Such being the case, ROBINA should
not have involved itself in the certification election. That it did gives rise to a well-founded
suspicion that it wanted a company union which is a no, no in this jurisdiction.

The pronouncement of this Court concerning management interference in certification elections

is well worth repeating:

On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves
no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with a purely internal affair of labor. (Consolidated Farms, Inc. vs. Noriel, L-47752,
July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473. See also Filipino Metals Corp. vs. Ople, L-43861, Sept. 4, 1981,
107 SCRA 211)

ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons above-stated, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

HERCULES INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNDERSECRETARY

BIENVENIDO E. LAQUESMA, MED-ARBITER MELCHOR S. LIM AND THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR, Respondents.

Demosthenes S. Baban for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; AS A

GENERAL RULE, EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO; EXCEPTION. In a long line of decisions,
this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party to a certification election
which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186
SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely
an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms,
Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211). The only instance when
the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for
certification election on its workers request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code. After the order for a certification election issues, the employers involvement
ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander.

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the resolution ** dated September 17, 1990 of the
Undersecretary of Labor in the case entitled, "National Federation of Labor v. Hercules
Industries, Inc." denying the herein petitioners appeal from respondent Med-Arbiters Order
dated May 25, 1990 declaring the National Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file workers/employees of Hercules Industries, Inc.

Hercules Industries, Inc., herein petitioner, is a corporation duly registered under Philippine laws
which employs more or less one hundred eighty (180) workers.

On July 30, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
federation, filed a petition for certification election alleging that the existing collective bargaining
agreement would expire in August, 1987 and that it enjoys the support of more than twenty per
cent (20%) of the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit.

On August 21, 1987, by agreement of the parties, the Med-Arbiter issued an order for the
conduct of a certification election with the following choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) National Federation of Labor (NFL);

(2) Hercules Employees Labor Union (HELU); and

(3) No Union.

On September 21, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted. The parties, however, could
not agree on the list of qualified voters who would participate in the election. Specifically,
Hercules Industries, Inc. charged that the list included ninety eight (98) scabs; sixteen (16)
capatazes; eight (8) security guards; and nine (9) managerial employees.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

On October 26, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment should be, as it is hereby promulgated,

ordering the immediate conduct of the Certification Election within fifteen (15) days from date
hereof, at the premises of the Hercules Industries, Inc., Laih, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, with all the
regular rank and file workers appearing in the payroll of July, 1987, and the strikers, who have
not executed Quitclaim and voluntarily accepted separation pay, are eligible participants in the
Certification Election, except those that are hereinbelow expressly and categorically excluded by
virtue of their being classified as managerial employees, legally separated and barred under the
contemplation of law.

"A. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES (Excluded).

"x x x

"B. SECURITY FORCE DEPARTMENT (Excluded).

"x x x

"C. STRIKES EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE EXECUTED DEED OF QUITCLAIM AND VOLUNTARILY
ACCEPTED SEPARATION PAY

(Excluded)

"x x x

"The representation officer-designate is hereby ordered to post immediately within five (5) days
prior to the date of election the notices of Certification Election together with the master list of
eligible voters in conspicuous places at the premises of the Respondent." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)

On November 4, 1987, NFL appealed the order to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR Case No. A-
1-10-88 LRD Case No. 014-87) on the following grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"1. The Med-Arbiter erred in unqualifiedly accepting all the names appearing in the July
1987 payroll as eligible voters and in allowing the 98 contract replacement worker to vote; and
"2. The Med-Arbiter erred in disregarding the fact that an earlier order for certification
election had already been handed down and that the workers were on strike." (p. 29, Rollo.)

Pending the resolution of the NFLs appeal, a certification election was conducted on November
7, 1990.

On January 6, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the DOLE rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the certification election
held on 7 November 1987 declared null and void.

"Let a new certification election among the rank and file workers of Hercules Industries, Inc. be
held. The payroll of July 1987 excluding the [ninety eight] 98 scab replacement, shall be the basis
of the voters list." (p. 32, Rollo.)

On April 4, 1990, a pre-election conference attended by the management of Hercules Industries,

Inc. and NFLs representatives was held at the Department of Labor and Employment Regional
Office in Zamboanga City. The NFL asked that a certification election be immediately scheduled
on May 4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. to be held in the Barangay Hall, Bato, Siay, Zamboanga del
Sur.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Accordingly, a certification election was held on May 4, 1990 with the following
results:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR 89 Votes

"2. HERCULES LUMBER & EMPLOYEES

LABOR UNION 0 (Zero)

"3. MANAGEMENT (NO UNION) 0 (Zero)

"4. SPOILED/INVALID VOTES 2 (Votes)

TOTAL VOTES CAST: 91 Votes"

(p. 188, Rollo.)

On May 25, 1990, Med-Arbiter Melchor S. Lim issued a resolution declaring and certifying the
National Federation of Labor as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the petitioner.

On July 5, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with the DOLE. It was
denied on September 17, 1990 by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laquesma on the grounds that
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on protests had
not been followed; that the records disclose that no protest was made before the election, nor
formalized within five (5) days after the election, as provided for by the rules; and the DOLE has
not found any legal obstacle to the proclamation of the NFL as the collective bargaining agent of
petitioners workers.

On September 29, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
on October 26, 1990 by Undersecretary Laquesma.

Hence, the present recourse.

On January 21, 1991, Zamboanga Rubber Workers Union, a duly organized labor union affiliated
with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union, filed a motion for intervention in this
Court alleging that it had requested the petitioner in writing to recognize it as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of its workers. The motion was noted by this Court without action.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner, Hercules Industries, Inc., as
employer, may question the validity of the certification election among its rank-and-file
employees. The answer is no.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party to a
certification election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union
v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement
(Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).

The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file
a petition for certification election on its workers request to bargain collectively pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification election issues, the employers
involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers Union v. Calleja, supra.).

In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the employees themselves never
requested the petitioner to bargain collectively, still, they did not object to the results of the
certification election. Hence, petitioners appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations from the Med-
Arbiters Order certifying the NFL as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file
employees, and its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The employers
intervention in the certification election of its workers is frowned upon by law.

In any event, petitioners challenge against the validity of the certification election of May 4,
1990 is devoid of merit. Its allegations that no notice of the certification election had been
issued, hence, no copies of said notice were given to it, nor posted in conspicuous places within
the companys premises; that the payroll of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the voters
list; and that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight (98) voters signed their names showing that
they actually voted, were belied by the minutes of the pre-election conference (Annex "A" of
Comment of private respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly notified of the
conference and attended the same, and that during said conference the Med-Arbiter set the
certification election on May 4, 1990.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of private respondents Comment) also show
that "the list of the names of the voters were (sic) copied from the payroll of 1987 per order of
the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).

Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The certification election just concluded was conducted
in the most just, honest and freely (sic) manner without untoward happening. Further, we certify
that the result above is true and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby refuting petitioners allegation
that only fifteen (15) out of ninety eight (98) workers signed the master list to show that they
actually voted again.

Besides, neither the records of the case nor the minutes of the certification election show that
petitioner protested the conduct of the certification election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI
(ELECTIONS) of Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot questions. The

Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the
election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer before
the close of the proceedings.

"Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes of
the proceedings." (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On the basis of the election minutes, which are the only relevant and competent evidence on
the conduct of the election, the Med-Arbiter did not err in declaring the NFL as the duly elected
exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioners rank and file workers. That finding should be
accorded not only respect but also finality by this Court for it is supported by substantial
evidence (Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 354).

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision of the NLRC, the
petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.