Republic of the Philippines xxx xxx xxx

SUPREME COURT
Manila B. Criminal Cases:

EN BANC 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992 2. Violations of rental law;

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial 4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six
Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
CRUZ, J.:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
3
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to
4
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be
either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination
or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such
cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the
offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not
included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing
the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts,
or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the
text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the
revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,"
which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases"
appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
 (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a
prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor
from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on
May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-
089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial and Bellosillo, JJ., concur
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that
we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription
in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1,
Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Republic of the Philippines Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his
SUPREME COURT services, he was
Manila
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
SECOND DIVISION filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and
pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had
vs. claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
DECISION dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case
against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for

TINGA, J.: Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
1
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2 Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

The facts, as culled from the records, follow. On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall

Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January

the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the

18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from

formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged

avail. 3 violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-
affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the
16
offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3
April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the
offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3)
separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
22
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,
ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special
acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide
for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code
which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein
the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one
before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-
forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals
added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules
of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not
provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the
long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the
verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the
verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules
in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent
verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a
certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before
the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which was
attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that
the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case
36
is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since
38
the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do
not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at
a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace.
Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the
offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the
complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and
Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which
suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be
interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that
the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation
and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
 purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now
be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the
four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the
charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated
the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions
and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a
definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of
the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET SECOND DIVISION

ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 152662

No costs.
Petitioner,
Present:
SO ORDERED.
 CARPIO,
- versus - Chairperson, On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity
BRION, of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This
PEREZ, was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Promulgated: RTC of Valenzuela City.
Respondent.
June 13, 2012
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
PEREZ, J.:
ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust
Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the
[2] totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in
Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153
[3]
against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the
MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the
latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet
prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quoconsidering the appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
[4]
a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the
petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace
period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as
amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the
petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly
prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the
proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of
Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws,
finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.[10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by
private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case
of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent
jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations
with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the
criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the
required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied
upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that
the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No.
3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special
laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of
such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of
the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that
attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the
petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running
of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription
of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This
ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when it held that the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is
no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City
Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and FIRST DIVISION
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed. vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the
MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by x-----------------------x
a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised
before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on
vs.
her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
DECISION
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
BERSAMIN, J.:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

SO ORDERED.
The Case

Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to
quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to
Republic of the Philippines quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
SUPREME COURT of jurisdiction.
Manila
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of
public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and
with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E.
Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, consisting of accused DISINIs ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial
and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then
a book value of P100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and
controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and
obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or
cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos,
being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family,
taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at
Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen
Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as
accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power
Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and
controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as
material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct
intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and
that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayans favorable action on his
motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to
quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his
motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4,
PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT
HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE
A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONERSCONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF
INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES
CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND
28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH
THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS
EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v.
Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No.
0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against
Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-
defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nations
wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of
Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from
the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing
participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and
influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices,
schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants received,
kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations like the
Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country
for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendants staggering commissions defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for
HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 9231992320)
dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case
which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the
causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the
herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of the
Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGGs letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors
alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with
the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioners properties, it was on the basis of a prima
facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the
Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said
preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same
should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation on the
criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disinis motion to quash
in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved
sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private
individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts
instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that
both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the
Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer
the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its
finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos
in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal
Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute
the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of
E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered
President Marcos immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public
status.
Contrary to Disinis argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers
and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and
Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the
ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring
the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan
properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disinis being a private individual, and
despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the
offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense
charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E.
Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that
President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts
constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal
Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods
and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe
in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador,28 however,
that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable
to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime
charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2
of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto is also 30
enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to
an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the
prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has
no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on
the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman
Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the
special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e.,
discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its
discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years
have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known
these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have
dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for
the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission
of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the
PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGGs exhaustive investigation,
resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before
the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been
regularly done in the course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on
April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office
of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose
of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another
special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a
special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed
from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a
motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence
aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be
any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a)
of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period
from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position
as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and
given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the
PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will
make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a
public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS
under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39 petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not SO ORDERED.
absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos
received or accepted Disinis offers, promises and gifts an essential element in direct bribery the allegation that President LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being Associate Justice
liable for direct bribery.
Republic of the Philippines
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The SUPREME COURT
elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: Manila

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business
transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of
First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and
intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal
relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having
business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer
with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma
Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
D E C I S I O N LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed
Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking
spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render
any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing
of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S.
Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996
Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed
with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid
by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey
Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging
to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away
depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the
2
declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the respondents.
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against
respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang.
The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary
investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president,
Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia
denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that
the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but
to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp
with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario
Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery
against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery,
specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime. x x x
x
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in
these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which
prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into
their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan
(who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car)
for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them
in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003,
stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of
action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell
Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell
Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to
8
Quash and/or Manifestation on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information
to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the
crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances
shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen
from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost
five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case,
if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
11
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order to argue among
other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed
only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the
prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The
Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which
is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case
is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH
PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to
Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses
charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-
Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the
prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action
shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information
before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.x
xxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by
the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal
cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure,
these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The
offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in
court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935
are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the
two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
19
In their Comment, respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
20
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to
judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7,
2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2,
2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva,
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be
commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution
dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15,
2005 Order. Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter
Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because
respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that
the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period
of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint
shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription.
Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged
constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil
liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held
that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, since the
Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the
grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No.
3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a
verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of
the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and
the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for
the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City
Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions
effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established
in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities
shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An independent
component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined
by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the
Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the
crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the
present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a
prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor
from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that
we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription
in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in
court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia
v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of
Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information
and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period
within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the
discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus,
respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor,
and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was
committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense
charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the
period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman;
or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its
merits.
Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San
Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information within the two-
month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the
private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds
the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its
ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of
the complaint or information in court.x x x x

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the
violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff and established Regional State
Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations
will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes