ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL
respondents reinstatement, petitioner still
JUSTICE and HUMAN
RIGHTS
Section 2. Social Justice:
Islriz Trading vs. Capada, G.R. No.
168501, Jan. 31, 2011
Facts: Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup,
Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye were
drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel
Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye
and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz
Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and
operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming
that they were illegally dismissed, respondents
filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day
pay, allowances and separation pay against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. On his
part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work
against respondents. Labor Arbiter Gan,
declared Islriz Trading guilty of illegal
dismissal. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
NLRC which granted the appeal. The NLRC set
aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Gan. Finding that respondents failure to
continue working for petitioner was neither
caused by termination nor abandonment of
work, the NLRC ordered respondents
reinstatement but without back wages.
Respondents averred therein that since the
Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan ordered
their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution was
already issued for the enforcement of its
reinstatement aspect as same is immediately
executory even pending appeal. But this
notwithstanding and despite the
issuance and subsequent finality
of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered
reinstatement. In the face of the grim
refused to reinstate them. Thus, respondents
prayed that in view of the orders of
reinstatement, a computation of the award of
back wages be made. The office of the
Labor Arbiter issued an undated Computation of
respondents accrued salaries. Upon appeal, CA
dismissed the petition of the petitioners.
Issue: Do the social justice principles of labor
law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law
doctrine of unjust enrichment?
Ruling: Yes. The Court then stressed that as
opposed to Genuino v. National Labor Relations
Commission (It has thus been advanced that
there is no point in releasing the wages to
petitioners since their dismissal was found to be
valid, and to do so would constitute unjust
enrichment.), the social justice principles of
labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the
civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. It then
went on to examine the precarious implication of
the "refund doctrine" as enunciated in Genuino,
thus: The "refund doctrine" easily demonstrates
how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter
could harm, more than help, a dismissed
employee. The employee, to make both ends
meet, would necessarily have to use up the
salaries received during the pendency of the
appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum
in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is
mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a
risky cliff of insolvency. Advisably, the sum is
better left unspent. It becomes more logical and
practical for the employee to refuse payroll
reinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in
the interim, if any is available. Notably, the
option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer, even if the employee is able and
raring to return to work. Prior to Genuino, it is
unthinkable for one to refuse payroll
possibilities, the rise of concerned employees
declining payroll reinstatement is on the horizon.
Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards
the social justice principles behind the rule, but
also institutes a scheme unduly favorable to
management. Under such scheme, the salaries
dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond
posted in installment by the employer. For in
the event of a reversal of the Labor Arbiter's
decision ordering reinstatement, the employer
gets back the same amount without having to
spend ordinarily for bond premiums. This
circumvents, if not directly contradicts, the
proscription that the "posting of a bond [even a
cash bond] by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement.
Section 3. Labor:
Yrasuegui vs. PAL, G.R. No. 168081, Oct.
17, 2008 569 SCRA 467
FACTS: This case portrays the peculiar story of
an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company. It is
now before this court via a review on certiorari
claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To
buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his
dismissal does not fall under 282(e) on the
Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the
weight standards of the company is not a bona
fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was
discriminated against because other overweight
employees were promoted instead of being
disciplined.
Issue: Will the obesity justify employment
termination? What is Meiorin Test? Is it valid
and constitutional?
Ruling: a reading of weight standards of PAL
would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an
employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put,
an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. The test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid
"provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
** In British Columbia Public Service Employee
Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British
Columbia Government and Service Employee's
Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of
Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in
determining whether an employment policy is
justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must
show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the
job; (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose;
and (3) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,
this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ,
the employer must prove that (1) the
employment qualification is reasonably related
to the essential operation of the job involved;
and (2) that there is factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.**
2011 BAR:
In the valid exercise of management
prerogative consistent with the company's right
to protect its economic interest, it may prohibit
its employees from:
(A) joining rallies during their work shift.
(B) marrying employees of competitor
companies.
(C) publicly converging with patrons of
competitor companies.
(D) patronizing the product of competitor
companies.
Section 4. Agrarian Reform:
RC Archbishop of Caceres vs. DAR, G.R.
139285, Dec. 21, 2007
Facts: Archbishop is the registered owner of
several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total
area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land,
249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and
corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are
planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop
filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
District Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines
Sur several petitions for exemption of certain
properties located in various towns of Camarines
Sur from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 27.
ISSUE: Can an agricultural land conditionally
donated to the archbishop and held in trust and
in behalf of the millions of the Filipino faithful
be exempted from CARP?
RULING: Archbishop cannot claim exemption
in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as
the lands are clearly not exempt under the law.
He should not fear that his followers are simply
being deprived of land, as under both PD 27 and
RA 6657, he is entitled to just compensation,
which he may then use for the benefit of his
followers. His situation is no different from
other landowners affected by agrarian reform
they are somewhat deprived of their land, but it
is all for a greater good. As religious leader,
Archbishop can take solace in the fact that his
lands are going to be awarded to those who need
and can utilize them to the fullest.
Apo Fruits vs. LBP, GR 164195, APRIL
5, 2011
FACTS: We resolve Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBPs) 2nd motion for
reconsideration of December 14, 2010 that
addresses one resolution of October 12, 2010
and November 23, 2010. This motion prays as
well for the holding of oral arguments. We
likewise resolve the office of the Solicitor
Generals motion for leave to intervene and to
admit motion for reconsideration-in-intervention
dated February 15, 2011 in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Issue: Should just compensation under the
agrarian reform program be differently from the
just compensation in any other case of
expropriation?
RULING: the constitutional basis of the
Agrarian Reform Program is Section 4, Article
XIII of the constitution. This provision expressly
provides that the taking of the land for use in the
governments agrarian reform program is
conditioned on the payment of just
compensation. Nothing in the wording of this
provision even remotely suggests that the just
compensation required from the taking of land
for the agrarian reform program should be
treated any differently from the just
compensation required in any other case of
expropriation. The term "just compensation" is
used in several parts of the Constitution, and,
therefore, it must have a uniform meaning.
Hda. Luisita vs. PARC, GR 171101, July
5, 2011
FACTS: In 1957, the Spanish owners of
Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as
well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill
within the Hacienda, the central Azucarera de
Tarlac as an inadmissible transaction. The Tarlac
Development Corporation then owned and/or
controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Jr. Group,
was willing to buy as agreed upon. Tadeco
undertook to pay the purchase price for
Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the
controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars. As of
March 31, 1980, the Martial Law administration
filed a suit before Manila RTC against Tadeco,
et al, for them to surrender the Hacienda Luisita.
ISSUE: Is Sec 31 f RA 6657, which permits stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land
transfer inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec4, Art XIII of
the Constitution?
RULING: Likewise, Sec4 of Art XIII of the
Constitution makes mention of a commitment on
the part of the site to pursue, by law, an agrarian
reform program founded on the policy of land
for the landless, but subject to such priorities as
Congress may prescribe, taking into account
such abstract variable as equity
considerations. The textual reference to a law
and Congress necessarily implies that the above
constitutional provision is not self-executory and
that legislation is needed to implement the
urgently needed program of agrarian reform, and
RA 6657 has been enacted pursuant to and as a
mechanism to carry out the constitutional
directives.
Land Bank vs. Obias, G.R. 184406,
March 14, 2012
Facts: Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Decision dated 31 January
2008 and Resolution dated 8 September 2008 of
the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA), vacating the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City.
Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27,
three parcels of agricultural land located at
Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur owned by Perfecto,
Nellie, OFe, Gil, Edmundo and Nelly, all
surnamed Obias, (landowners) were distributed
to farmers-beneficiaries (farmers). As a result,
the owners had to be paid just compensation for
the property taken. The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), using the formula under P.D. 27
and Executive Order (E.O.) 228, came up with a
computation of the value of the acquired
property. However, the amount was contested
by the landowners as an inadequate
compensation for the land. Thus they filed a
complaint for determination of just
compensation before the RTC of Naga City.
Issues: a.) Whether or not the provisions of
DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 13,
as amended are mandatory insofar as the
computation of interest for P.D. 27 acquired
properties is concerned? b.) How should just
compensation be treated viewed against the
Bill of Rights and agrarian reform?
Ruling:
a.)Yes, they are mandatory. In their
petition, LBP does not contest the valuation of
the property and the amount to be paid as just
compensation. It raised only the issue of
Whether or not the provisions of DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 13, series of
1994, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 2, series of
2004, as further amended by DAR A.O. No. 6,
series of 2008, are mandatory insofar as the
computation of interest for P.D. 27-acquired
properties is concerned.
b.) The landowner's right to just
compensation should be balanced with agrarian
reform. The purpose of agrarian laws
particularly P.D. No. 27, is to emancipate the
tiller of the soil from his bondage; to be lord and
owner of the land he tills. Section 4, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State
shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands subject to
the payment of just compensation. Further, the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on this subject reveal that just
compensation should not do violence to the Bill
of Rights, but should also not make an
insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian
reform program.
Section 11 to 13. Health:
2007 BAR:
The City Mayor issues an Executive
Order declaring that the city promotes
responsible parenthood and upholds natural
family planning. He prohibits all hospitals
operated by the city from prescribing the use
of artificial methods of contraception,
including condoms, pills, intrauterine devices
and surgicalsterilization. As a result, poor
women in his city lost their access to
affordable family planning programs. Private
clinics, however, continue to render family
planning counsel and devices to paying
clients.
(a) Is the Executive Order in any way
constitutionally infirm? Explain.
The Executive Order is
constitutionally infirm. Under the 1987
Constitution, the State shall defend the right
of spouses to establish a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood. (Art. XV,
Sec. 3[1]). By upholding natural family
planning and prohibiting city hospitals from
prescribing artificial methods
of contraception, the Mayor is imposing his
religious beliefs on spouses who rely on the
services of city hospitals. This clearly violates
the above section of the Constitution.
Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states
that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Art. III, Sec. 1). The
Constitution also provides that the state shall
promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living and an improved quality of
life for all. (Art. II, Section 9). The loss of
access of poor city women to family planning
programs is discriminatory and creates
suspect classification. It also goes against the
demands of social justice as enshrined in the
immediately preceding provision.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. It constitutes an invalid exercise
of police power and violates substantive due
process by depriving people of the means to
control their reproductive processes.
Moreover, since the national government has
not outlawed the use of artificial methods
of contraception, then it would be against
national policies. In addition, the Mayor
cannot issue such Executive Order without an
underlying ordinance. (Moday v, Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997)
Besides, the action of the Mayor may be in
violation of a persons right to privacy.
(b) Is the Philippines in breach of any
obligation under international law?
Explain.
The Philippines might be in breach of
its obligations under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) of which the
country is a signatory. Under the CEDAW,
State Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in the field of health care in order to
ensure, on basis of equality of men and
women, access to health care services,
including those related to family planning
(Article 12, Section 1) Women shall likewise
have access to adequate health care facilities,
including information, counseling and
services in family planning. (Article 14,
Section 2[b]).
(c.) May the Commission on Human
Rights order the Mayor to stop the
implementation of the Executive
Order? Explain.
Alternative Answer:
No, the power of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) is limited to fact-finding
investigations. Thus, it cannot issue an order
to desist against the mayor, inasmuch as the
order prescinds from an adjudicatory power
that CHR does not possess. (Simon v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
100150, January 5, 1994; Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
96681, December 2, 1991.)
Section 17. Commission on Human
Rights:
2005 BAR:
Squatters and vendors have put up
structures in an area intended for a Peoples
Park, which are impeding the flow of traffic in
the adjoining highway. Mayor Cruz gave notice
for the structures to be removed, and the area
vacated within a month, or else, face demolition
and ejectment. The occupants filed a case with
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to
stop the Mayors move. The CHR then issued an
order to desist against Mayor Cruz with
warning that he would be held in contempt
should he fail to comply with the desistance
order. When the allotted time lapsed, Mayor
Cruz caused the demolition and removal of the
structures. Accordingly, the CHR cited him for
contempt.
(a) What is your concept of Human
Rights? Does this case involve violations
of human rights within the scope of the
CHRs jurisdiction?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the scope of human rights includes
those that relate to an individuals social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations
along with what is generally considered to be his
inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
In the case at bar, the land adjoins a busy
national highway and the construction of the
squatter shanties impedes the flow of traffic. The
consequent danger to life and limb cannot be
ignored. It is paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot,
in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact,
extant. Based on the circumstances obtaining in
this instance, the CHR order for demolition do
not fall within the compartment of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights
intended by the Constitution. (Simon v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
100150, January 5, 1994)
(b) Can the CHR issue an order to desist
or restraining order?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The CHR may not issue an order to desist or
restraining order. The constitutional provision
directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures to those whose human rights have
been violated or need protection may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ
of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. (Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
101476, April 14, 1992)
(c) Is the CHR empowered to declare
Mayor Cruz in contempt? Does it have
contempt powers at all?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The CHR does not possess adjudicative
functions and therefore, on its own, is not
empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt
for issuing the order to desist. However, under
the 1987 Constitution, the CHR
constitutionally authorized, in the exercise of its
investigative functions, to adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CHR,
in the course of an investigation, may only cite
or hold any person in contempt and impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court. (Carino v. Commission on
Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2,
1991).
2011 BAR:
Since the Constitution is silent as to
who can appoint the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, the President
appointed W to that position
without submitting his appointment to the
Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. Is Ws appointment by the
President valid? The answer is B.
A. No, since the position of Chairman of the
Commission was created by statute,
the appointment of its holder requires the
consent of Congress.
B. Yes, since the power to appoint in the
government, if not lodged elsewhere,
belongs to the President as Chief Executive.
C. Yes, since the power to fill up all
government positions mentioned in the
Constitution has been lodged in the President.
D. No, because absent any express authority
under the Constitution, the power
to appoint does not exist.
is
Article XIV. EDUCATION
Section 2. Availability of Quality
Education:
Superintendent vs Azarcon, G.R. No.
166435, February 11, 2008
Facts: On September 20, 1990, then DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario filed various charged
against those teachers who participated in the
aforementioned mass action. The respondents
were one of them and were later found guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and were consequently dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed their dismissal
to the MSPB which, however, dismissed their
appeal for lack of merit. Respondents elevated
the MSPB decision to the CSC.
Issue: Does the accessibility to quality
education justify teachers re-assignment?
Ruling: Yes. One of the requisites for a transfer
or re-assignment of public school teacher to be
valid, that the transfer or re-assignment has
undertaken pursuant to the exigencies of service.
With regard to this requisite, in Department of
Education vs. CA, we held that the appointment
of teachers does not refer to any particular
station or school. They are not entitled to stay
permanently in one station because their
assignments are subject to the exigencies of the
service. The exigencies of the service, as
mentioned in Section 6 of RA 4670 should be
viewed in the light of Section 1, Article XIV of
the Constitution. The accessibility of quality
education determines the exigencies of the
service. Thus, assignments undertaken for
purposes of improving the educational system
and/or making education more accessible are
valid.
PTA of SMCA vs. MBTC, G.R. No.
176518, March 2, 2010
Facts: Sometime in 2001, the spouses Denivin
Ilagan and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan)
applied for and were granted a loan by the
[Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.] in the
amount of (P4,790,000.00) secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over the parcels of land. Upon
default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was
conducted with [Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co.] being the highest bidder and for which a
Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.
During the period of redemption, the respondent
Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a
Writ of Possession. On June 30, 2005, the St.
Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. filed
a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for
Restraining Order against the respondent Bank
and the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac.
Issue: against whom is the constitutional
mandate to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels
directed? Were petitioners right to quality
education violated?
Ruling: The trial courts Order did not violate
the petitioner-students right to quality education
and academic freedom. The court disagrees with
petitioners assertion that the students right to
quality education and academic freedom was
violated. The constitutional mandate to protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels is directed to the State and
not to the school. On this basis, the petitioner-
students cannot prevent the MBTC from
acquiring possession of the school premises by
virtue of a validly issued writ of possession.
In this case, except for their bare
allegation that if the school will be ejected
because of the writ of possession, the students
will necessarily be ejected also and thereby
their learning process and other educational
activities shall have been disrupted, petitioners
miserably failed to show the relevance of the
right to quality education and academic freedom
to their case or how they were violated by the
Order granting the writ of possession to the
winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale.
2007 BAR:
The Department of Education
(DepEd) requires that any school applying for
a tuition fee increase must, as a condition for
the increase, offer full tuition scholarships to
students from low-income families. The
Sagrada Familia Elementary School is a
Catholic school and has applied for a tuition
fee increase. Under this regulation by the
DepEd, it will end up giving tuition
scholarships to a total of 21 students next year.
At a cost of P50,OOO per student, the school
will lose a total of P1.05 million for next year.
a.) Is this DepEd requirement valid?
No. It constitutes deprivation of property
without due process of law. The law is
confiscatory as it unduly shifts the burden of
providing for the welfare of the poor to the
private sector. The objective may be laudable
but the means would be arbitrary and
unreasonable. (Quezon City v. Judge Ericta,
G.R. No. 34195, June 24, 1983).
b.) If instead the DepEd requires a full tuition
scholarship for the highest ranking students in
each grade, determined solely on the basis of
academic grades and rank, will the DepEd
requirement be valid?
Alternative Answer:
No. It would make a difference in my answer
as this would still constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of law. (Balacuit
v. CFI, G.R. no. 38429, June 30, 1988).
Alternative Answer:
Yes. Here, the matter may be considered as a
reasonable regulation exacted from those who
seek some form of accommodation from the
government. (Telebap v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
132922, April 21, 1998). In exchange for what
they get as a concession from the State, these
institutions may be required to shoulder part
of the cost of promoting quality education for
deserving citizens.
Section 3. Desired Educational
Values:
2003 BAR:
Children who are members of a
religious sect have been expelled from their
respective public schools for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing
by a band or singing the national anthem,
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge. The students and their
parents assail the expulsion on the ground
that the school authorities have acted in
violation of their right to free public
education, freedom of speech, and religious
freedom and worship. Decide the case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The students cannot be expelled from school.
As held in Ebralinag v. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. 219 SCRA
256 [1993], to compel students to take part in
the flag ceremony when it is against their
religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom. Their expulsion also violates the
duty of the State under Article XIV, Section 1
of the Constitution to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education and
make such education accessible to all.
Jenosa vs U.S.A, G.R. No. 172138,
September 8, 2010
Facts: On 22 November 2002, some students of
the University of San Agustin (Iloilo), among
them petitioners Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick
Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas,
and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students),
were caught engaging in hazing outside the
school premises. During the 28 November 2002
meeting, the parties agreed that after dialogues
and consultations among the school authorities,
instead of the possibility of being charged and
found guilty of hazing, the students who
participated in the hazing incident as initiators,
including petitioner students, would just transfer
to another school, while those who participated
as neophytes would be suspended for one
month. The parents of the apprehended students
including petitioners affixed their signatures to
signify their conformity. In view of the
agreement, the University did not anymore
convene the Committee on Student Discipline
(COSD) to investigate the hazing incident. The
petitioners sent a letter to the University urging
it not to implement the agreement. Petitioners
filed a complaint for injunction and damages
with the RTC, Branch 29, Iloilo City. Petitioners
assailed the Principal's decision to order the
immediate transfer of petitioner students as a
violation of their right to due process because
the COSD was not convened. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss before the CA, which the
latter granted the petition for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter because of petitioners'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies or for
being premature.
Issues: Is discipline in education specifically
mandated by the 1987 Constitution? Can school
authorities impose discipline on students?
devout Catholic, rejected the request. As
Ruling: Yes. Discipline in education is
specifically mandated by the 1987 Constitution
which provides that all educational institutions
shall "teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, and
develop moral character and personal
discipline." Schools and school administrators
have the authority to maintain school discipline
and the right to impose appropriate and
reasonable disciplinary measures. On the other
hand, students have the duty and the
responsibility to promote and maintain the peace
and tranquility of the school by observing the
rules of discipline.
2008 BAR:
The principal of Jaena High School, a
public school wrote a letter to the parents and
guardians of all the school's pupils, informing
them that the school was willing to provide
religious instruction to its Catholic students
during class hours, through a Catholic priest.
However, students who wished to avail of such
religious instruction needed to secure the
consent of their parents and guardians in
writing.
a.) Does the offer violate the constitutional
prohibition against the establishment of
religion? (3%)
b.) The parents of evangelical Christian
students, upon learning of the offer,
demanded that they too be entitled to have
their children instructed in their own religious
faith during class hours. The principal, a
counsel for the parents of the evangelical
students, how would you argue in support of
their position? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.) No. Optional religious instruction is one of
the exceptions to the non-establishment of
religion recognized under the Constitution
itself. For this exception to be valid, the
following requisites must concur: (1) written
consent of the parents or guardians must be
secured; (2) it must be done within school
hours; and (3) it must be at no additional cost
to the Government. For as long as these
requisites are present, then it is valid (Sec.
3(3), Art. XIV).
b.) As counsel for the parents of the
evangelical students, I would invoke the right
to equal protection under the laws. The act of
the principal in rejecting the request is
unreasonably discriminatory. He has no right
to draw a distinction between Catholics and
Evangelical Christians when it comes to
granting optional religious instruction because
the Constitution itself does not make such
classification. For as long as the requisites for
optional religious instruction to be allowed are
present, then there is no reason not to allow
the same, regardless of the particular religious
denomination involved.
Section 5. Academic Freedom:
Mercado vs. AMA Computer College,
G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010
Facts: Petitioners are professors of AMACC, an
educational institution engaged in computer-
based education in the country, for the school
year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new
faculty screening guidelines, on the
Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla.
Under the new screening guidelines, teachers
were to be hired or maintained based on
extensive teaching experience, capability,
potential, high academic qualifications and
research background. The performance
standards under the new screening guidelines
were also used to determine the present faculty
members entitlement to salary increases. The
petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based
on the performance standards; as a result,
AMACC did not give them any salary increase.
Issue: Does institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to
decide and adopt screening guidelines for its
faculty?
Ruling: A school enjoys academic freedom a
guarantee that enjoys protection from the
Constitution. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. The institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide and adopt its aims
and objectives, and to determine how these
objections can best be attained, free from outside
coercion or interference, save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in
the term academic freedom encompass the
freedom of the school or college to determine
for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be
taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4)
who may be admitted to study.
AMACCs right to academic freedom is
particularly important in the present case,
because of the new screening guidelines for
AMACC faculty put in place for the school year
2000-2001. We agree with the CA that AMACC
has the inherent right to establish high standards
of competency and efficiency for its faculty
members in order to achieve and maintain
academic excellence. The schools prerogative
to provide standards for its teachers and to
determine whether or not these standards have
been met is in accordance with academic
freedom that gives the educational institution the
right to choose who should teach.
2007 BAR:
True or False. Briefly explain your answer:
The 1987 Constitution has increased
the scope of academic freedom recognized
under the previous Constitution.
Alternative Answer:
The statement is true. The 1987
Constitution provides that academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning. This is more expansive in scope than
the 1973 Constitution which stated that: All
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom. While the 1973 Charter
suggests that academic freedom was
institutional in the sense that it belonged to
the colleges and universities, the present
Charter gives the guaranty to all other
components of the institution, including
faculty and possibly students.
Alternative Answer:
The statement is false. The scope of
academic freedom remains the same. Article
XIV, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution provides
that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. As held in U.P.
Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
134629, August 31, 1999, This (provision) is
nothing new. The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning.
2008 BAR:
As a reaction to the rice shortage and
the dearth of mining engineers, Congress
passed a law requiring graduates of public
science high school henceforth to take up
agriculture or mining engineering as their
college course. Several students protested,
invoking their freedom to choose their
profession. Is the law constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The law unreasonably restricts
free access to education by all citizens. More
specifically, it violates the right of the students
to select a profession or course of study. The
only restriction to this right is fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Such a restriction can only be
raised by the academe exercising its own right
to academic freedom, and not by the
government (Article XIV).
NOTE: Are the provisions under this article
self-executing? As a rule, Constitutional
provisions are deemed self-executing, with
some exceptions like Article II which are mere
declaration of policies and principles. Is the
law a valid exercise of police power by the
State? If so, was there proper observance of
due process, both procedural and substantive?
SEE ALSO: Education Act of 1989.
Section 6 & 7. Language:
2007 BAR:
True or False. Briefly explain your answer:
For purposes of communication
and instruction, the official languages of the
Philippines, until otherwise provided by law,
are Filipino and English.
Alternative Answer:
The statement is false. Article XIV, Section 7
of the 1987 Constitution provides that for
purposes of communication and instruction,
the official languages of the Philippines are
Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law,
English. Thus, while Filipino will always be
an official language, Congress may, by law, Article XV. THE FAMILY
remove English as the other official language.
Hence, the statement is false as the Section 1. Filipino Family:
continuation of English as an official language
is subject to the control and discretion of Antionio vs Reyes, G.R. No. 155800,
Congress. March 10, 2006
Alternative Answer: Facts: Petitioner and respondent met in August
The statement is true. To be more precise, 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
however, what is only to remain as official respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
until otherwise provided by law is English.
after their first meeting, they got married before
a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall,
Filipino will always be an official language
and through a subsequent church wedding at the
under the Charter.
Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of
their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991,
who sadly died five (5) months later. On 8
March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have
his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondents
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or
things. The RTC gave credence to petitioners
evidence and held that respondents propensity
to lying about almost anythingher occupation,
state of health, singing abilities and her income,
among othershad been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondents
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities enabled her to live in a world
of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The CA, however, reversed the decision.
Issue: Had the Constitution establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage , as a
social institution and the foundation of family?
Ruling: No. The Constitution itself does not
establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being
the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment
of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate
to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Section 2. Marriage:
Republic vs Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380,
October 5, 2005
Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros Villanueva at the UCCP in
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left
for the US bringing along their son. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Issue: Given a valid marriage between two
Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?
Ruling: Yes. There is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained
a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Cipriano, the
Divorced Filipino spouse should be allowed to
remarry.
Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, GR 166738,
August 14, 2009
FACTS: The present petition traces its roots to
the petitioners complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage against the respondent before
the RTC, docketed as civil case np. 767. The
petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by
the following circumstances: the respondent
reneged on his promise to be true with her under
one roof after finding work; he failed to extend
financial support to her; he blamed her for his
mothers death; he represented himself as single
in his transactions; and he pretended to be
working in Davao, although he was cohabiting
with another woman.
ISSUE: What are the definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code?
RULING: We laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v.
CA where said:
1.) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
2.) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision.
3.) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
4.) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5.) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
6.) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Article 220, 221, and 225 of the same
code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligations must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7.) Interpretations given by the national
appellate matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
on decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
8.) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition as the case may be
to the petition.
BOLOS VS. BOLOS, G.R. No. 186400,
October 20, 2010
Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia
Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment in a Decision, dated
August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between
petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent
DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14,
1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of both
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences
provided by law.
A copy of said decision was received by
Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. In an
order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied
due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to
file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. On November 23, 2006, a motion to
reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was
likewise denied. On January 16, 2007, the RTC
issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Issue: a.) Does A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC to
marriages before the Family Code took effect?
b.) Does the break-up of families consistent with
the inviolability of marriage?
Ruling: a.) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section
1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.
b.) The 1987 Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family
Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its
permanence and inviolability, This Court is not
unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State finds no care that evidence is not fabricated or
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy suppressed.
families. The break - up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the
family members.

Aurelio vs Aurelio, G. R. No. 175367,

June 6, 2011

Facts: Petitioner Danilo Aurelio and respondent

Vda. Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely:
Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9,
2002, respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 94, a petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and
Article XVI. General
complying with their respective essential marital Provisions:
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that
such state of psychological incapacity was
present prior and even during the time of their
marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays
Section 1. The Philippine Flag:
that her marriage be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. 2006 BAR:
Issue: May the appearance of the prosecuting State whether or not the following law is
attorney or fiscal assigned to be waived pursuant constitutional. Explain Briefly.
to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-
11-10? A law changing the design of the flag.

Ruling: This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court The law is invalid considering that
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 has Article XVI, section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
modified the Molina guidelines, particularly the flag of the Philippines shall be red, white,
Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification and blue with a sun and three stars, as
of the Solicitor General required in the Molina consecrated and honored by the people and
case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, recognized by law. Since the Constitution itself
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the prescribes the design, it can also be changed
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal by constitutional amendment.
assigned on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take Alternative Answer:
 The law is valid, provided that the new
design does not change the elements and color
scheme of the flag as stated in the
constitution, and the flag is consecrated and
honored by the people. Since the constitution
itself states that the flag must be recognized by
law, it implies that certain aspects of the flag
are subject through legislative action.
Section 2. State Symbols:
2009 BAR: A law making Bayan Ko the
new national anthem of the Philippines, in
lieu of Lupang Hinirang, is constitutional.
ANSWER:
TRUE. Art XVI Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Congress may do so as long
as the other conditions are met. The new
national anthem shall be "truly reflective and
symbolic of the ideals, history, and
traditions of the people" and "shall take effect
only upon its ratification by the people in
a national referendum"
Section 3. Sovereign Immunity:
Chato v. Fortune Tobacco, GR 141309,
June 19, 2007
FACTS: On June 10, 1993, the legislature
enacted RA 7654, which took effect on July 3,
1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands
champion, Hope, and More were FACTS: December 29, 1999, TESDA and
considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20.45%. However, on
July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took
effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93
reclassifying Champion, Hope, and more this contract agreement, PROVI was to provide
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
RMC 37.93 in effect subjected hope, more, and
champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA
7654 on locally manufacture cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55% and
which imposes an ad valorem tax of 55%
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less
than 5 pesos per pack.
ISSUE: May a public officer be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of
his/her duties?
RULING: On the first issue, the general rule is
that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of
the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another,
as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a
public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the cause of the
performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence or which the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, GR
155504, June 26, 2009
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
PRDVI signed and executed the Contract
Agreement Project PVC ID Card issuance for
the provision of goods and services in the
printing and encoding of the PVC cards under
TESDA with the system and equipment
compliant with the specifications defined in the
Technical Proposal. In return, TESDA would
pay PROVI the amount of P39,475,000.00
within 15days after TESDAs acceptance of the
contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged
that TESDA has still an outstanding balance and
still remains unpaid.
ISSUE: Can TESDA be sued without its
consent?
RULING: TESDA is an unincorporated
instrumentality of the government, directly
attached to the DOLE through the participation
of the secretary of labor as its Chairman, for the
performance of governmental functions as an
unincorporated instrumentality operating under a
specific charter, it is equipped with both express
and implied power and all state immunities fully
apply to it. In the present case, the unit of
attachment was issued against a government
agency carried by its own charter.
Shell Philippines vs. Jalos, G.R. No.
179918, Sept. 8, 2010
FACTS: This case is about a question of
jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum
contractor (Shell Philippines), whose pipeline
operation has allegedly driven the fish away
from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings
among fishermen. On May 19, 2003,
respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang,
Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos,
et al) filed a complaint for damages against Shell
41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al
claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen
from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely
affected by the construction and operation of
Shells natural gas pipeline. Jalos, et al claimed
that their fish catch became few after the
construction of the pipeline. They said that the
pipeline greatly affected the coral reefs and led
to the stress of the marine life in the Mindoro
Sea. Shell said that under Service Contract 38,
it served merely as an agent of the Philippine
government in the development of the
Malampaya gas reserves. Moreover, said Shell,
the complaint failed to state a cause of action
since it did not specify any actionable wrong or
particular act or omission on Shells part that
could have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et
al.
ISSUE: Can shell invoke State immunity, as
agent of the Republic of the Philippines?
RULING: No. To begin with, Shell is not an
agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is
but a service contractor for the exploration and
development of one of the countrys natural gas
reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as
the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
operations in the Camago-Malampayo area
under the States full control and supervision, it
does not follow that Shell has become the
States agent within the meaning of the law.
An agent is a person who binds himself to render
some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. The essence of
an agency is the agents ability to represent his
principal and bring about business relations
between the latter and third persons. An agents
ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts
that would create, modify or extinguish relations
between his principal and third persons.
In sum, while the complaint in this case
sufficiently alleges a cause of action, the same
must be filed with the PAB, which is the
government agency tasked to adjudicate
pollution-related cases. Shell is not an agent of
the State and may thus be sued before that body
for any damages caused by its operations. The
parties may appeal the PABs decision to the
CA. But pending prior determination by the
PAB, courts cannot take cognizance of the
complaint.
Vigilar vs. Aquino, G.R. 180388, January
18, 2011
FACTS: On June 19, 1992, petitioner sent an
invitation to bid to respondent. The bidding was
for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a
part of the Porac River in Pampanga.
Subsequently, on 7 July 1992, the project was
awarded to respondent, and a "Contract of
Agreement" was thereafter executed between
him and concerned petitioners for the amount of
PhP1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost. By 9
July 1992, the project was duly completed by
respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992.
Respondent Aquino, however, claimed that
PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but
petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus
filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of
money.
ISSUE: Was the doctrine of sovereign immunity
properly invoked?
RULING: Neither can petitioners escape the
obligation to compensate respondent for services
rendered and work done by invoking the state's
immunity from suit. This Court has long
established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, and
recently reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,
that the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. To our
mind, it would be the apex of injustice and
highly inequitable to defeat respondent's right to
be duly compensated for actual work performed
and services rendered, where both the
government and the public have for years
received and accepted benefits from the project
and reaped the fruits of respondent's honest toil
and labor.
1997 BAR:
It is said that waiver of immunity by
the State does not mean a concession of
its liability. What are the implications of
this phrase?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The phrase that waiver of immunity
by the State does not mean a concession of
liability means that by consenting to be
sued, the State does not necessarily admit
it is liable. As stated in (Philippine Rock
Industries, Inc. vs. Board of Liquidators, 180
SCRA 171), in such a case the State is merely
giving the plaintiff a chance to prove that
the State is liable but the State retains the
right to raise all lawful defenses.
2009 BAR:
The Municipality of Pinatukdao is sued for
damages arising from injuries sustained by
a pedestrian who was hit by a glass pane that
fell from a dilapidated window frame of
the municipal hall. The municipality files a
motion to dismiss the complaint, invoking
state immunity from suit. Resolve the motion
with reasons.
ANSWER:
Motion to dismiss invoking state
immunity fruit suit is hereby denied. Local
government unit and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property (Sec. 24, RA
7160) hence, liability of the municipality for
injuries due to dilapidated window frame of
the municipal hall attaches as the latter
exercises control over said building.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be
granted...The Civil Code provision and Sec. 24
of the LGC above-mentioned refers to the
liability of the State. It must be remembered
that liability is not the same as suability in the
context that when the state gives its consent to
be sued, it does not mean that it admits
liability. Conversely, when the State can be
held liable, it does not mean that it gives
consent to be sued. The more pertinent
provision in the LGC would be Sec. 22 which
states:
"SEC. 22. Corporate Powers. - (a)
Every local government unit, as a corporation,
shall have the following powers:xxx(2) To sue
and be sued;"
2011 BAR:
A collision occurred involving a
passenger jeepney driven by Leonardo, a
cargo truck driven by Joseph, and a dump
truck driven by Lauro but owned by
the City of Cebu. Lauro was on his way to get a
load of sand for the repair of the
road along Fuente Street, Cebu City. As a
result of the collision, 3 passengers of
the jeepney died. Their families filed a
complaint for damages against Joseph
who in turn filed a third party complaint
against the City of Cebu and Lauro. Is
the City of Cebu liable for the tort committed
by its employee? (The answer is A.)
A. The City of Cebu is not liable because its
employee was engaged in the
discharge of a governmental function.
B. The City of Cebu is liable for the tort
committed by its employee while in the
discharge of a non-governmental function.
C. The City of Cebu is liable in accord with the
precept of respondeat superior.
D. The City of Cebu is not liable as a
consequence of its non-suitability.
Section 6. One Police Force:
Gannapao vs. Civil Service Commission,
et al., G.R. No. 180141, May 31, 2011
Facts: On December 22, 1995, stockholders
and board members of United Workers
Transport Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified
complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division
at Camp Crame, charging petitioner SPO1
Rimando A. Gannapao with Grave Misconduct
and Moonlighting, for allegedly employed as
personal bodyguard of Atty. Roy G. Gironella,
the general manager appointed by the Board of
Directors of UWTC, with compensation coming
from UWTC.
On November 26, 1997, PNP Chief
Sarmiento rendered Decision finding respondent
SPO1 Gannapao guilty of the charge of serious
irregularities in the performance of duties and to
suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension
from the police service without pay. Petitioner
elevated the case to the NAPOLCOM National
Appellate Board. His appeal, however, was
dismissed. Aggrieved, petitioner brought his
case to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where the SILG denied his
appeal and affirmed his suspension for three
months. Petitioner then appealed to the CSC.
On April 3, 2002, the CSC issued Resolution
No. 020487 dismissing petitioners appeal,
affirming the SILGs Order but modifying his
penalty of three months suspension to dismissal.
Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for
Review with an Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction. The CA issued a TRO
on September 4, 2002 and a writ of preliminary
injunction on January 14, 2003. The CA,
however, dissolved the writ in its Decision
dated April 27, 2007 affirming CSC Resolution
No. 020487.
Issue: Being civilian in character, is the
Philippine National Police covered by the Civil
Service?
Ruling: Yes. Section 6, Article XVI of the
Philippine Constitution provides that the State
shall establish and maintain one police force
which shall be civilian in character.
Consequently, the PNP falls under the Civil
Service Pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B,
also of the Constitution. Section 91 of the DILG
Act of 1990 expressly declared that the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department. Pursuant to Section 6
of Memorandum Circular No. 93-024, the
penalty of dismissal, which results in the
separation of the respondent from the service,
shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and the disqualification from
reemployment in the police service. The CSC
thus correctly imposed on him the maximum
penalty of dismissal.

Section 11. Mass Media:

2011 BAR:
Mass media in the Philippines may be owned
and managed by: (answer is A)
Article XVIII. Transitory
A. corporations wholly owned and managed
by Filipinos. Provisions:
B. corporations 60% owned by Filipinos.
C. corporations wholly owned by Filipinos.
Section 2. Synchronization of
Election:

Kida vs. Senate, G.R. 196271 Oct. 18,

2011

FACTS: In June 2011, RA 10153 entitled, An

Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted.
This law, together with the synchronization of
the elections of the ARMM with the national
and local elections, also authorized the President
to appoint Officers in Charge (OICs) for the
offices of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-
Governor, and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly. ARMM was originally
set to have their elections on August 2011;
however, due to the enactment of RA 10152,
COMELEC stopped their election preparations.
This led to various petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the new law. In the
meantime, the Court issued a TRO suspending
the implementation of RA 10153 and ordering
incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on
September 30, 2011.
ISSUE: Does the Synchronization mandated by
the constitution include the regional elections of
ARMM in relation to Article XVIII section 2?
RULING: YES, the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections of the
ARMM. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
Section 3. Prior laws, Etc.:
Alvarez vs. PICOP, G.R. 162243, Dec. 3,
2009
Facts: PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) filed
with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to
have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the
processing of PICOPs application, it, however,
refused to attend further meetings with the
DENR. On 2nd September 2002, instead,
PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T.
Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a
privileged writ of mandamus to compel the
DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an
IFMA to PICOP. The cause of action of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the
government is bound by contract, a 1969
Document signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
ISSUE: Is the presidential warranty, issued to
PICOP on 29 July 1969, beyond the reach of the
1987 constitution?
Ruling: No. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the non-impairment
clause. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran that a timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the non-impairment clause
is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses
are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot
be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot,
in any manner, be construed as a contractual
undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession
areas. Such an interpretation would result in the
complete abdication by the State in favor
of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development
and utilization of the natural resources in
the area.
Section 25. Foreign Military Bases
and Treaties:
1996 BAR:
Under the executive agreement
entered into between the Philippines and the
other members of the ASEAN, the other
members will each send a battalion-size unit
of their respective armed forces to conduct a
combined military exercise in the Subic Bay
Area. A group of concerned citizens sought to
enjoin the entry of foreign troops as violative
of the 1987 Constitution that prohibited the
stationing of foreign troops and the use by
them, of local facilities. As the Judge, decide
the case. Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) As a judge, I shall dismiss the case.
What Section 25, Article XVII of the
Constitution prohibits in the absence of a
treaty is the stationing of troops and facilities
of foreign countries in the Philippines. It does
not include the temporary presence in the
Philippines of foreign troops for the purpose
of a combined military exercise. Besides, the
holding of the combined military exercise is
connected with defense, which is a sovereign
function. In accordance with the ruling in
Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1, the filing of an
action interfering with the defense of the State
amounts to a suit against the State without its
consent.
2003 BAR:
An Executive Agreement was executed
between the Philippines and a neighboring
State. The Senate of the Philippines took it
upon itself to procure a certified true copy of
the Executive Agreement and, after
deliberating on it, declared, by a unanimous
vote, that the agreement was both unwise and
against the best interest of the country. Is the
Executive Agreement binding (a) from the
standpoint of Philippine law and (b) from the
standpoint of international law? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) From the standpoint of Philippine law, the
Executive Agreement is binding. According to
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading. 3 SCRA 351 [1961], the President can
enter into an Executive Agreement without
the necessity of concurrence by the Senate.
(b) The Executive Agreement is also binding
from the standpoint of international law. As
held in Bavan v. Zamora. 342 SCRA 449
[2000], in international law executive
agreements are equally binding as treaties
upon the States who are parties to them.
Additionally, under Article 2{1)(a) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
whatever may be the designation of a written
agreement between States, whether it is
indicated as a Treaty, Convention or Executive
Agreement, is not legally significant. Still it is
considered a treaty and governed by the
international law of treaties.
Section 26. PCGG:
Cocofed vs. Republic G.R. 177857-58
September 17, 2009
FACTS: Before us is the motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the court
dated September 17, 2009, interposed by
oppositors- intervenors Jovito R. Salonga,
Wigberto E. Tanada, Oscar F. Santos, Ana
Theresia Hontiveros, and Teofisto L. Guingona
III. As may be recalled, the court in its
resolution adverted to, approved upon motion of
petitioner Philippine Coconut Producers
Federations Inc. the conversion of the
sequestered 753,848,312 class A and B common
shares of San Miguel Corporation registered in
the name of Coconut Industry Investment Fund,
holding Companies in the total number of
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.
ISSUES: Is the conversion of sequestered shares
from common shares to preferred shares valid
and constitutional? Will the conversion remorse
the shares from PGCC sequestration and
management?
RULING: Moreover, our ruling in San Miguel
Corporation did not per se forbid the conversion
of sequestered common shares into
preferred/treasury shares as we heald threat, the
changes that a are unacceptable are those of any
permanent character that will alter their being
sequestered shares and, therefore, in custodia
legis, that is to say under the control and
disposal of this court, since the subject
sequestered some shares are under custodia
legis the court has certain control over them and
their fruits. Nonetheless the PCGG, having
administrative control over the subject
sequestered shows pending resolution of the
actual ownership, thereof, possesses discretion,
taking into account the greater interest of the
government and the farmers, to decide on which
to deposit or escrow the net dividend earnings
of, and/or redemption proceeds from, the series
1 preferred shares of SMC.
Republic vs. Cojuangco, G.R. No. 166859,
April 12, 2011
Facts: On July 31, 1987, the Republic
commenced Civil Case no. 0033 in the
Sandiganbayan by complaint, impleading as
defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., And 59 individual defendants. On October 2,
1987, the Republic amended the complaint in
Civil Case no. 0033 to include 2 additional
individual defendants. On Dec. 8, 1987, the
Republic further amended the complaint through
its amended complaint albeit dated Oct. 2, 1987.
More than 3 years later, on august 23, 1991, the
republic once more amended the complaint
apparently to avert the nullification of the writs
of sequestration issued against properties of
Cojuangco.
Issue: Were Cojuangcos SMC shares illegally
acquired with coconut-levy funds?
Ruling: Republics burden to establish by
preponderance of evidence of evidences that
respondents SMC shares had been illegally
acquired with coconut-levy funds was not
discharged. The Sandiganbayan could not fairly
find that Cojuangco had committed breach of
any judiciary duties as an officer and member of
the board of directors of the UCPB. For one, the
amended complaint contained no clear factual
allegation or which to predicate the application
of articles 1455 and 1456 of the civil code, and
section 31 of the corporation code. Although the
trust relationship supposedly arose from
Cojuangcos being and officer and member of
the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link
between this alleged fact and the borrowings or
advances was not established. Nor was there
evidence on the loans or borrowings, their
amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial
court, the Sandiganbayan could not presume his
breach of fiduciary duties without evidence
showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never
presumed, but must be alleged and proved.
Republic vs. Marcos, G.R. no. 155832,
December 7, 2010
Facts: on February 28, 1986, immediately after
assuming power, president Cory Aquino issued
E.O. 1, creating the PCGG. She empowered the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth allegedly
amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his family, and close associates during
his 20 year regime. PCGG commissioner Raul
Daza gave lawyers Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben
Abella, PCGG Region VIII task forces head and
co-deputy, respectively, written authority to
sequester any property documents, money, and
other assets in Leyte, belonging to former first
lady Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez,
Alfredo Romualdez and their agents.

Issue: is a sequestration order signed by PCGG

designated agents and issued prior to the
effectivity of the PCGG rules and regulations,
valid?

Ruling: Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the

constitution, an order of sequestration may only
issue upon a showing of a prima facie case
that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under
executive orders 1 and 2. When a court nullifies
an order of sequestration for having been issued
without a prima facie case, the court does not
substitute its judgement for that of the PCGG by
simply applies the law. Here, it is clear that the
PCGG did not make a prior determination of the
existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the sequestration of the rest house. The
republic presented no evidence before the
Sandiganbayan that shows differently nor did
the republic demonstrate that the two PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial
authority to receive and consider evidence that
would warrant such a prima facie finding.