Emotion: History of the Concept

Katharina Scherke, University of Graz, Graz, Austria

2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This article is a revision of the previous edition article by G. Mandler, volume 7, pp. 44374440, 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

In the past decades, in several scientic disciplines we observe growing interest in emotion from neurobiology, philosophy,
history, and anthropology to as far as sociology. In the course of the twentieth century, under the inuence of a rationalist
concept of man pushing through, the value of emotions had declined in the social sciences. Contrasting rationality and
emotionality as mutually excluding attitudes looks back to a long history and has only recently increasingly been questioned.
The development of this rationalist attitude is sketched in this article. In addition, the relationship between physiological
aspects, cognitive appraisal, and emotion is described (most of all in reference to psychological literature and those of the
neurosciences) and an overview of current sociology of emotions is given.

In the past decades, in several scientic disciplines we observe
a growing interest in emotion. This covers a whole range from
neurobiology, philosophy, history, anthropology, as far as to
sociology. If we consider the history of emotion research, it is
conspicuous that over long periods emotions were considered
the realm of individual disciplines (such as psychology) and
were, thus, in tendency neglected by other disciplines (Scherke,
2009: 1115). Only recently, an attitude has become more
prevailing, which assumes that for the understanding of human
emotions we need an interdisciplinary approach. In this article,
we present some important steps of the historical development
of emotion being a concept in the social sciences (sociology, in
particular) with a special focus also on the changing impor-
tance of this concept for various disciplines.
Already, the classical authors of sociology pay attention to
human emotions, as has been shown in recent years by refer-
ring to the works of people such as Max Weber (18641920),
Emile Durkheim (18581917), or Georg Simmel (18581918)
(Kemper, 1990: 5; Williams and Bendelow, 1998: XV; Flam,
2000: 154). However, the analyses of the classical authors of
sociology concerning the topic of emotions were not imme-
diately continued. In the course of the twentieth century,
emotions were gradually excluded from the sociological
debate, which continued into the 1970s (Scherke, 2009:
291294). Only after that time one can speak of sociology
rediscovering the topic most of all in the English-speaking
countries (on the various trends of the special eld of the
sociology of emotions see Turner and Stets, 2005).
In the course of the twentieth century, under the inuence
of a rationalist concept of man pushing through, the value of
emotions declined in debates of the social sciences. The
development of this rationalist attitude shall be sketched here
briey. Contrasting rationality and emotionality as mutually
excluding attitudes looks back into a long history and has only
recently been questioned increasingly. For a structuring of the
debate on rationality and emotionality, the division into three
of the possible attitudes as suggested by Barbalet (Barbalet,
1998: 29) proves to be very useful: the conventional approach,
which in the past few years has increasingly been questioned;
the critical approach which since most recently is characterized,
most of all, by the inclusion of neuroscientic insights and
postulates a close connection of rationality and emotionality;
and the radical approach which completely gives up on any
distinction between emotionality and rationality.
Rationality and Emotionality
From a conventional point of view, rationality and emotionality
are two separate elds of human being-in-the-world. Accord-
ing to this approach, emotions are in most cases an obstacle for
rational action. First roots of such a way of understanding
emotions are found already in antiquity. The negative judgment
of the Pre-Socratics, advised to avoid the stimulation of
emotions, is also supported by Plato (fth/fourth century BC),
for example, although already he draws a differentiated, not
exclusively negative, image of emotions and considers pleasure
together with reason, an essential part of happiness in life. Also
Aristotle (fourth century BC) does not strive for being
completely liberated from emotions but considers the right
measure a desirable virtue (Lanz, 1971: 8995). Then, the rather
negative view of emotions as unreasonable impulses that are to
be avoided is found most of all among the representatives of the
Stoa. While, for example, Zenon (fourth/third century BC)
considers wrong judgments of reason the starting point for
emotions which, however, he considers phenomena that must
basically be distinguished from reason, for Chrysippos (third
century BC) emotions cannot be separated from reason but
must be judged on as exercising them in the wrong way. In the
Middle Ages, this attitude is taken up again and sharpened, as
far as asking in how far emotions are capable of inuencing
conscious decisions. Thomas Aquinas (122574) emphasizes
the physical dimensions of emotion. As such, he says, emotions
are neither good nor bad; if they are controlled by reason, they
count among the virtues, if not, then they lead toward sin.
Basically, they are not completely subject to the human will. The
comprehensive way of understanding emotions, which in
antiquity and the Middle Ages is still found to a certain degree
emotions both as suddenly triggered or long-time states of the
soul and efforts by the soul gradually becomes more differ-
entiated in the debate of Modern Age, by more clearly dis-
tinguishing between the rather lasting desires of man and his
spontaneous emotions. Also, the idea of body and soul being
mostly one, which is still found in the writings of some ancient

472 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03080-4

authors and also in Thomas Aquinas, is then replaced by the
idea of the two being strictly separated.
Thus, Barbalet describes the conventional understanding of
the relation of rationality and emotionality by reaching back to
Ren Descartes (15961650). Descartes cogito ergo sum
makes reason the center of human existence, whereas now
emotions are considered most of all by their relation to reason
and by their possible destructive effects on it. The will, he states,
must master the passionate impulses coming from the body. In
this point of view emotions and reason are understood to be
contradicting phenomena, in the context of which the realm
which is associated with mans free will that is, reason is
appreciated, whereas emotions must be suppressed as bodily
phenomena that are obstacles for reason. However, when
explaining Descartes view of emotions it may not be over-
looked that he dealt in very much detail with the physical
processes of emotion. Thus, appreciating reason was not con-
nected to neglecting (or lacking interest in) emotion. Also, we
must note that the soul is capable, by imagining situations
which contradict currently existing passions, of starting
appropriate physical mechanisms, and thus of controlling
unwanted passions. Often the perception of Descartes over-
looked this fundamental connection of body and soul (which
only allowed also for mastering the passions), thus one-sidedly
emphasizing his explanation of the passions as phenomena
that contradict reason. In the past centuries conventional view
proved to be the predominant understanding of the relation of
rationality and emotionality (despite the existence of other
views) (Barbalet, 1998: 5461).
In contrast to the conventional concept, the critical view of
the relation of rationality and emotionality emphasizes that
only emotions make cognition, that is, rational consideration,
purposeful. Also this view considers emotion and reason as two
different phenomena; however, one assumes a closer interac-
tion of both. Also for this concept we nd predecessors already
in antiquity and the Middle Ages. In the eighteenth century, the
Cartesian concept of man was criticized most of all by the
Scottish moral philosophers who strived for a rehabilitation of
mans senses and passions. David Hume (171176) assumed
that passions control the will, thus directing human behavior
toward a goal. Furthermore, already in Hume we nd the basic
idea of the radical approach, which is presented in the
following, according to which rationality itself may be
considered a certain kind of emotion. Thus, from the point of
view of the critical approach emotions are necessary to direct
reason, which may be of signicance most of all in respect to
a revision of modern Rational-Choice theories. By a kind of
division of labor between the emotional and the rational
components of human being-in-the-world it becomes
possible to dene goals and then to try to achieve them by way
of reasonable action. Often, humans are confronted with
contradicting goals between which a rational decision is hardly
possible. Furthermore, in many situations they have only
insufcient information, which makes reasonable action even
more difcult. In such cases emotions may contribute signi-
cantly to decision making, by allowing for a clear judgment on
the various goals and for selecting one of them, despite lacking
background information. This way they also guarantee long-
term social cooperation by avoiding egotistic, short-term
goals. Most recently, most of all insights of the biosciences
Emotion: History of the Concept 473
have produced evidence for the critical approach which have
meanwhile also found response in the eld of economics
(Damasio, 1994; Barbalet, 1998: 39; Elster, 1998: 4774; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004). In contrast to the conventional
understanding, which considers too much emotion an obstacle
for rational decision making, lack of emotions is now seen as
counterproductive for rational behavior.
The radical view assumes that rationality and emotionality
are basically not different from each other, but that rationality
itself may be considered a conglomerate of particular emotions.
As mentioned above, the idea of an inseparable connection
between reason and emotion is already found in Chrysippos.
Sometimes, this connection of reason and emotion is also
found among the thinkers of Enlightenment, together with
a positive judgment on the knowledge of the world guided
by emotion. Such an idea is found in Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten (171462), for example. For him, insight resulting
from an emotional, aesthetic understanding of the world may
be considered to be in analogy with reasonable insight (Franke
and Oesterle, 1974: 8386). Also, in the debate on so-called
moral emotions, emotion is said to have a cognitive function in
the widest sense. There, emotions become the actual bearer of
human decision making and are thus attributed a degree of
signicance which is sometimes believed to be superior to
reason-based insight, for example as described in the works of
Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (16711713) or in Francis
Hutcheson (16941746). Also in Max Schelers (18741928)
phenomenology some cognitive achievements are based on
such an emotional ground. Emotions are important most of all
for concluding on values, and the thus resulting moral deci-
sions (Scheler, 1954: 260272). This independent relation to
reality by way of emotions or feelings is crucial for Schelers
revaluation of emotion compared to reason.
We nd evidence for the radical position also in David
Hume and William James (18421910). Hume was of the
opinion that spiritual activities carried out prudently and
calmly are called reason. However, he said, this name hides the
work of calm passions which, no less than violent passions,
count among emotions (Barbalet, 1998: 31). Furthermore,
James pointed out to the physical changes happening when
experiencing certain emotions. In his opinion, mans spirit
cannot be considered without these physical states. Insofar as
rationality is characterized by certain physical sensations.
According to James, the emotion of rationality is characterized
most of all by being oriented at the present moment which
does not seem to require further justication or explanation,
thus allowing for focusing thought (James, 1956: 6364). A
feeling of rationality provides security, thus guaranteeing the
continuation of the action, which otherwise would not have
happened. According to this view, rationality is just a special
kind of emotional orientation toward the future (which may be
described as being characterized by composure and calmness);
however it cannot in principle be distinguished from other
emotional orientations toward the future.
Body and Emotion
As sketched above, already philosophy in antiquity and the
thinkers of Enlightenment as well as those of the nineteenth
474 Emotion: History of the Concept
century dealt with emotions. In the course of the differentiation
of the system of sciences, which in the nineteenth century
resulted in psychology being separated from philosophy,
emotions were systematically dealt with in the context of this
newly developing discipline. In the course of the past
150 years psychology has assessed sometimes by way of
experiments a variety of different theories on the question of
how emotions are created. The following overview focuses on
the question of which meaning has been attributed to physi-
ological factors when it comes to emotional processes. Various
points of view shall be sketched by way of some milestones on
the road to todays concept of emotions which is much inu-
enced by the neurosciences, and thus by physiological factors.
However, we have to take into account that this was not at all
a linear process and even in psychology there exist theories that
do not refer to physical aspects in a narrow sense.
There is, for example, the JamesLange theory that
emphasized the signicance of physiological experience for
emotional feeling. At the end of the nineteenth century William
James (like at about the same time as Carl Lange (18341900))
assumed that initially we never judge on a situation in
a cognitive way before there happens an emotional reaction
(we see a bear, recognize the danger, become afraid, and run
away), but that it is our physiological experience that deter-
mines our emotions (we see a bear, run away and are thus
afraid, i.e., we interpret our running away as a reaction of fear).
Thus, the conscious experience of an emotion comes after the
physiological processes. Often this was interpreted as stating
that any emotion is characterized by a specic physiological
signature (LeDoux, 2001: 4851).
In the 1920s this assumption was taken up and modied by
the CannonBard theory. According to this theory, developed
by Walter Cannon (18711945) and Philip Bard (18981977),
it is only general conditions of agitation (due to reactions by
the sympathetic nervous system, which are assumed to be
consistent) which may become subject to a cognitive appraisal.
Cannon and Bard assumed that physiological agitation and the
conscious perception of an emotion happen parallel and that
the consciously perceived emotional state is not a consequence
of physical agitation only, as it was still assumed by James and
Lange. The physical reactions, they stated, are most of all
responsible for the intensity and urgency of a perceived
emotion but do not determine its specic nature.
Then, in the course of the predominance of behaviorism in
psychology, as far as into the 1950s, emotions were hardly
discussed. This changed in the course of the cognitive revolu-
tion which paid increasingly more attention to the conscious
processing of information by the human mind. In contrast to
the behaviorist stimulusresponse model, mans mind was
rehabilitated and became once again a matter for psychology.
However, as LeDoux criticizes, this sometimes happened by
neglecting the physical (most of all neuronal) preconditions of
the human information processing (LeDoux, 2001: 29, 58). For
example, in the 1960s Stanley Schachter (192297) and Jer-
ome Singer (19342010) joined the CannonBard theory of
the general state of agitation, however by enriching it by the
thesis that apart from perceiving physical agitation also the
perception of the actual environment inuences the nally
resulting emotion (Schachter and Singer, 1962). Schachter and
Singer described in particular the social environment as being
crucial for the kind of created emotions. According to this view,
cognitive processes are thus responsible for the development of
different emotional states. As Magda Arnold (19032002)
found out in the 1960s, it is also cognitive appraisal that
provides the starting point for the emotional process, after all.
She made the triggers of these physical processes the focus of
her considerations (Arnold, 1960). In the course of a process of
cognitive appraisal, she said, the individual judges on his/her
current (environmental) situation, and that is concerning the
possible damage or benet it may cause.
Arnold and other representatives of the appraisal theory
assumed that those processes as being responsible for triggering
an emotion are basically accessible to consciousness, which is
why reports of patients based on introspection may be used as
sources for the research of emotional processes. In contrast to
this, LeDoux follows Robert Zajoncs (19232008) consider-
ations, who, in the 1980s, had moved away from the long
predominance of cognition and postulated a more complex
relation of cognitive and emotional processes, for which most
of all processes of unconscious information processing play an
important role. Decisive for Zajoncs considerations were
experiments during which test persons had developed prefer-
ences for stimuli that were offered only for a short time (and
were thus not consciously perceived) (Zajonc, 1980). This
unconscious information processing was the starting point for
LeDouxs examinations (LeDoux, 2001: 5869). Already, since
the 1950s certain parts of the brain (the so-called limbic system)
were considered the central switchboard of emotional percep-
tion. From LeDouxs point of view, not those parts of the brain
which are called the limbic system are responsible for emotions,
but there exists a complex process of processing of the incoming
sensual information, in the course of which different physical
(and thus also neuronal) systems are activated. For his work,
LeDoux focuses on fear. The essential result, in short, is that
there is so to speak a double process of information processing
in the brain. Sensual perceptions reach the thalamus in the form
of nerve impulses and from there go to the neocortex (where
there happens cognitive assessment) and also to the amygdala
(which controls physical reactions). In this context, those nerve
impulses reaching the amygdala may sometimes already trigger
physical reactions even before the sensual perceptions have
been cognitively assessed. Thus, this approach enriches the
cognitive appraisal theory, insofar as it offers an explanation
also for the rapid, unconscious assessment of certain situations.
In the context of the debate on the emotional process, the
concept of evolution has played an important role time and
again apart from the question of how physiology and cogni-
tion work together that is, human emotions were analyzed in
view of their functions as adjustment advantages (Turner, 2000:
1921). Closely connected to these evolutionary considerations
is also the idea of emotions nding universal expression. This
assumption, which Charles Darwin (180982) had already
expressed in 1872, was taken up by Paul Ekman in the 1960s. He
gave evidence to it by several culture-comparative studies, in the
course of which, however, it also became clear that there are
culture-specic rules of presentation which demand the open
expression or hiding of certain emotions (Ekman, 1984). Linked
to the debate on the cross-cultural status of emotions and their
evolutionary functions is also the idea of the existence of certain
basic emotions or primary emotions, the opinions concerning

their kind and number being widely apart still today (Ulich and
Mayring, 1992: 3637, 132133).
Since the 1960s, the complexity of the human emotional
process, which includes biological, social, and cultural
components, has also produced systemtheory-oriented theo-
ries of emotion such as in Carroll E. Izard or Silvan S. Tomkins
(Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971) which attempt descriptions of
the interaction of these different components. More recently,
the analysis of neuronal processes has played an important role
also for systemtheory-oriented theories of emotions.
In contrast to the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, which
were characterized by the cognitive sciences, currently the
physical dimension of the emotional process is in the fore of
scientic attention (most of all in the neurosciences) again.
However, since the 1970s also a sociology of emotions has
established as a special eld within sociology, trying to shed
light on the signicance of social factors for the emotional
process and to nd out about their interaction with other
factors (such as physiological ones).
Sociology of Emotions
Two main lines can be distinguished within the sociology of
emotions: one line making the social development of emotions
a topic of discussion, and the other investigating the social
effects of emotions (Scherke, 2009: 5862). This is only a very
rough structure which, however, is suitable for illustrating the
basic direction of studies.
Authors considering them to be characterized or changed by
social structures analyze emotions for the way in which they are
created. In this context, emotions are not only considered
something biologically predetermined, but also as a phenom-
enon that is essentially (co)inuenced by the social and/or
cultural environment (like already Schachter/Singer have
shown). The question about the nature of emotions, that is,
about their fundamental characteristics and ways of appear-
ance, is in the fore for these studies. This is a topic also dealt
with by other disciplines, which is why this eld shows
a number of interdisciplinary interfaces.
However, in the context of the sociology of emotions we also
nd studies analyzing the effect of emotions on social situa-
tions. According to this approach, emotions are assumed to be
mostly given (without any implicit decision about their bio-
logical and/or social nature). Here the question of how
emotions are created is postponed, and instead one discusses
the effects of emotions on the structuring of social contexts.
Basically, this approach also shows interfaces with other
disciplines; however, in terms of research practice they may be
more neglected to a certain degree than it is the case with the
former approach. In other words, new bioscientic insights
concerning the way in which emotions are created do not
necessarily result in a revision of sociological explanations for
the social effects of emotional behavior. The social conse-
quences of emotions may, so to speak, be considered to belong
to tasks of sociology in the stricter sense.
Among the approaches dealing with how emotions are
characterized by social structures and interactions we may
distinguish a positivist and a constructivist approach. Between
these two there was an extensive debate in the Anglo-Saxon
Emotion: History of the Concept 475
countries in the 1970s and 1980s. For both approaches the
macro-level is in the fore. The constructivist approach refers to
the macro-level by way of normative feeling rules regulating the
way in which emotions are expressed, thus serving as a link
between the social or cultural context (as well as its historical
development) and the emotions of the individuals. By way of
interactions between participants there occur negotiations
about which emotions are felt or may be felt in each case.
Aspects of social control play an important role for this
modulation of emotions (in the form of sanctions by others or
of internalized self-control learned in the course of socializa-
tion). It is the individuals who create and redesign emotions
in the sense of emotion work or emotion management
(Hochschild, 1983) adjusted to the respective social context.
As has been shown also by recent ethnological studies, the
respective cultural context is quite decisive for the way in which
emotions are expressed. Furthermore, it must be taken into
consideration that feeling rules change in the course of history.
Quite a number of studies deal with the development or
change of emotional concepts such as the concept of
Romantic love which is mostly a product of the nineteenth
century and has essentially contributed to the way in which
partner relationships have been lived since then (Illouz, 1997).
The positivist approach assumes that emotions are more or
less directly created by socialstructural positions or relations
of interaction partners, without considering processes of
emotion management. Partly, most of all in Theodore D.
Kemper, this idea also implies that socialstructural positions,
physiological mechanisms, and perceived emotions are closely
linked (Kemper, 1978). Also, this approach refers predomi-
nantly to the micro-level, by sketching in a model possible
interaction situations between two individuals or among small
groups concerning their power and status relations and by
analyzing them for their emotional consequences. However,
also for this approach we may state a reference to the meso- or
macro-level, as the social position of social groups (thus also
a model of social segregation) can be included into the analysis.
Those approaches as analyzing the inuence of emotions on
the social plane can be further divided into those discussing
emotional states as general preconditions for human behavior
(and thus also social behavior) and those dealing with the
various social consequences triggered by concrete emotions.
From the point of view of the interpretative approach within
the sociology of emotions, emotions are attributed a considerable
role for the construction of reality. Emotions inuence social
situations in a way as to contributing to a (mostly nonverbal)
structuring of social situations, by reducing the range of
possible meanings in the context of interactions. Thus,
emotions are part of the unquestioned preconditions for social
situations, thus allowing for everyday processes. By way of
facial gestures and emotions are expressed most of all by
facial expressions fundamental attitudes toward the world
and the current situation are communicated, thus reducing the
possible leeway for interpretation, as interactions are always
connected to a certain degree of insecurity. In other words,
a sentence which is said with a smile is attributed a different
meaning than the same sentence expressed in an angry voice
and by the appropriate facial expression. Without analyzing the
content in detail, the respective interaction partner will already
react to the emotional tone of the message, which will steer the
476 Emotion: History of the Concept
course of the interaction further into a certain direction. In so
far, emotions and the emotional way of creating meaning can
contribute to behavioral certainty, and thus to efcient acting
in the context of interaction. Among the concrete emotions
whose effects on social behavior or social structures have
been analyzed there count for example trust (Barbalet, 1998:
8494), fear (Flam, 2000: 5465), and shame (Scheff, 1990:
284289). According to Collins, apart from short-term
emotions (e.g., fear or anger) it is most of all long-term
emotions or emotional moods that inuence social structures
(Collins, 2004: 325). These long-term emotions are created in
the context of rituals. For this, there must be the direct physical
encounter of at least two humans whose attention is directed to
the same object or at a common activity and who nally
become aware of this common direction. By way of directing
their attention at the same object, the actors are capable of
adjusting their emotional moods. Here, Collins refers to the
state of collective effervescence as a result of group rituals which
was already emphasized by Emile Durkheim. Collins speaks of
rhythmic entertainment, by which he means the adjustment of
the participants moods due to physiological processes in the
context of a successful ritual. If this adjustment to a common
mood succeeds, not only the emotions of each individual are
increased but there also results group solidarity. For example at
burials, where the individual actors express emotions of
mourning, the common ritual may not only increase the
individuals emotions of mourning, they may also create or
consolidate solidarity among the mourners. Thus, the long-
term result of the interactions of a ritual is on the one hand
the revaluation of group solidarity (including the positive
charging of group symbols and group-related norms) and on
the other hand an increase of the individuals so-called
emotional energy.
Among the sociology of emotions there exist a number of
rened theoretical concepts and meanwhile a multitude of
empirical studies on a variety of social elds (from social
movements, politics, the Internet, as far as to business enter-
prises; Flam and King, 2005; Wettergren and Sieben, 2010;
Pixley, 2012; Demertzis, 2013; Benski and Fisher, 2014). There
has been a slight tendency to emphasize the social con-
structedness of emotions in order to overcome the predomi-
nance of psychology (or nowadays of the neurosciences) in
emotions research and to make emotions a research topic for
sociology again. This has led to a neglect of bodily aspects in
tendency (with some exceptions like Kemper). This gap has to
be closed by future research, which should also strive for
a stronger connection of theoretical and empirical approaches.
See also: Affect and Emotion, Anthropology of;
Affect-Regulation Motivation; Culture and Emotion; Early
Emotional Development and Cultural Variability; Emotion and
Expression; Emotion in Cognition; Emotion, Evolution of;
Emotion, Neural Basis of; Emotion, Perception and Expression
of; Emotional Development, Effects of Parenting and Family
Structure on; Emotional Regulation; Emotions and Intergroup
Relations; Emotions and Work; Emotions, History of;
Emotions, Psychological Structure of; Emotions, Sociology of;
Emotions: Methods of Assessment; Selfconscious Emotions,
Psychology of.
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