Picart vs.

Smith
G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918

Facts:

Amado Picart was riding his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. But he
was on the wrong side. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about 10-12 MPH. As
Smith approached the bridge, he blew his horn when he saw Picart. Observing that Picart
was not observing the rules of the road, Smith gave 2 more successive blasts. Perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or rapidity of the approach, Picart moved his horse closer
to the railing instead of going to the correct side of the road, which is the left side. Picart
did this as he thought he had no more time to reach the left side. Smith also guided his car
toward the same side where Picarts horse was. At this point, Smith and Picart are in a
direct collision course. In so doing, Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. However, since the Pony had not exhibited fright and the fact that Picart made
no motion to stop, instead of veering away, Smith continued to approach directly towards
Picart without diminution of speed. As he got closer, the possibility of the horse moving
to the other side also grew slim. As a result, Smith guided his car to the right to avoid
hitting the horse. However, as the car passed, the pony became frightened and turned its
body. Consequently, the car struck the left hind leg of the horse. As the horse fell, the
rider was thrown off. The horse died as a result and Picart suffered some contusions and
temporary unconsciousness. It was seen that the space between the horse and the car at
the time of the incident was less than 1.5 meters.

Issue:
Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence.

Ruling:
YES. While Smith had the right to assume that Picart would pass over the
proper side of the bridge, when this eventuality had become an impossibility, it
became Smiths duty to either bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing there
were no other people on the bridge, take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horseman. Instead, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon
the horse. He did not take into consideration the fact that there was an appreciable
risk with regard to the fact that the pony might get excited and/or frightened.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is negligent.
Negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. As to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Lilius, et al vs. Manila Railroad
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934

Facts:

Aleko Lilius was driving with his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old
daughter Brita Marianne Lilius for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first
time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had
no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have
alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and
sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied,
he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he
saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713
of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3
victims were injured and were hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies
each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius,
with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car,
and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. The CFI ruled in favor of Lilius. The
two parties appealed said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is guilty of negligence.

Ruling:

Yes. The railroad company which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing and
does not see to it that its flagman and switchman faithfully complies with his duty of
remaining at the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and is civilly liable
for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line without negligence
on their part. This court is of the opinion that the defendant alone is liable for the accident
by reason of its own negligence and that of its employees, for not having employed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Umali vs. Bacani
G.R. No. L-40570
January 30, 1976

Facts:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along
the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission line of the
Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other
fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.

On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno
of San Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the
people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right
then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio
captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a
small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is
just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was
and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was fixed at about 10:00
o'clock on the same morning by the lineman of the electric plant.

Issue:
Whether or not the employees of Alcala Electric Plant owned by the petitioner
are guilty of negligence.

Ruling:
Yes. A careful examination of the record convinces the court that a series of
negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in
the death of the victim by electrocution. By the very evidence of the defendant, there
were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground
which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting
the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight,
could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be
endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the

employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the
employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct.
Corliss et. al vs. The Manila Railroad Company
G.R. No. L-21291
March 28, 1969

Facts:
In December 1956, Ralph Corliss, a 21 year old air police stationed at Clark
Air Base, and a PC soldier was returning to said base. Ralph was driving the jeep. When
they crossed the railroad tracks to reach the entrance of the base, it collided with a train
operated by respondent. The PC soldier suffered burns and serious physical injuries while
Corliss died of his burns at the hospital days later. Preciolita Corliss, wife of deceased,
filed a complaint for recovery of damages against respondent for negligence.

The lower court, however ruled that based on the evidence presented, Corliss
became a victim of his own miscalculation when he took a risk in his eagerness to beat
the oncoming train. Hence, an appeal was filed to the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable for negligence?

Ruling:

No. Without damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although this
element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from somepersons fault
or negligence.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it
is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. Every case must be dependent on its
facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what
could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be met,
then negligence is ruled out. During the trial all 3 witnesses, one of which was the train
operator, had warned the oncoming traffic that it was approaching by blowing its whistle
repeatedly in accordance with regulations. Despite this, one witness observed that, seeing
that the train was coming, Corliss slowed down his jeep but this was due to the fact that
he put the jeep on first gear in an attempt to give his jeep a boost so it could beat the train.
In fact, the train operator testified that the train was only running between 20-25 KPH
and, despite applying he breaks, the jeep was still caught in its tracks. Despite the
allegation that the crossing bars were not put down and the fact that there was no guard at
the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a
collision. Authorities have many times said that the railroad track is in itself a warning of
danger. Those who ignore such warning do so at their own risk and responsibility. It is
incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing
and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should
look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he
attempts to cross the track. On the knowledge of Corliss and his familiarity with the setup
of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive
had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss,
Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent
upon him to avoid a possible accident. A prudent man under similar circumstances would
have simply stopped his vehicle before crossing and allow the train to move on.
Culion Ice vs. Philippine Motors Corp.
G.R. No. L-32611
November 3, 1930

Facts:
The Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co Inc (CIFECI) and Philippine Motors
Corporation (PMC) are domestic corporations. Cranston was the representative of
CIFECI in the City of Manila and the latter was the registered owner of the motor
schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands.
Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline
consumer to a crude oil burner. He accordingly repaired to the office of the PMC and had
a conference with Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job. As a result of the
aforesaid interview, Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it
lay at anchor in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in the engine was
begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest.

Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the
principal thing necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor.
After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel. The
next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade
of oil mixed with distillate. For this purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was
placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine.
This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently
not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. Owing to this fact the
fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. In the
course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed
that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely
from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quests
attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter.

After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out
into the bay for a trial run. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped,
and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. A moment
later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into
the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass
of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue.

Issue:
Whether or not Quest is negligent.

Ruling:

The loss of the boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of
Quest. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced
or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if
he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the
doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form
the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an
adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of
work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause
him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did
not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing
gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence.
The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for
Quests carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.