China's Navy: A Turn to Corbett?

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Home > Magazines > Proceedings Magazine - December 2010 Vol. 136/12/1,294 > China's Navy: A Turn to Corbett?

China's Navy: A Turn to Corbett?

By Anonymous
Created 2010-12-01 09:06
Chinese navalists have been mixing some Sir Julian Corbett into their Mahanian cocktails
lately. That is wise on their part, and something that bears American scrutiny.

Some years ago, as China cast about for sea-power theories to guide its naval rise, its
attention alighted on the works of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the second president of
the U.S. Naval War College and the author of influential works such as The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and The Problem of Asia. Mahan exhorted nations to
amass international commerce, forward bases, and merchant and naval fleets in order to
gain commercial, political, and military access to key theaters like East Asia.

Mahans overarching logic of sea power remains compelling for many Chinese naval
advocates. But in Asia as in the West, his strategic grammar of armadas battling for
command of the sea has an antiquarian feel to it.1 [1] Progress in naval technology has
overtaken much of his theory of naval strategy and defense, predicated as it was on
armored dreadnoughts and other fin de sicle armaments.2 [1]

Concepts from land warfare, most notably Mao Zedongs doctrine of active defense, can
infuse contemporary meaning into Mahans logic of commerce, bases, and ships. Staying
close to base areas, seizing opportunities for local tactical engagements, and wearying a
superior foe over time were staples of Maoist warfighting doctrine. A vast nation like
China, rich in manpower and resources, could play for time to tap its material superiority.
And another Western maritime theorists writings fit ideally with Chinas largely defensive
operational needs: British historian Sir Julian Corbett, Mahans nemesis and the author of
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. This renowned treatise appeared precisely 100
years ago, during the waning days of the British Empire and its Royal Navy.

A Star is (Re)born

Corbett is poised to make a comeback in Asia a century hence. Indeed, while Mahans
writings still dominate Chinese academic and strategic discourses on sea power,
mounting evidence suggests that Chinas thinkers are widening their gaze to incorporate
the Englishmans works. In-depth assessments of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,
historiographies of Corbett, and comparisons with Mahan have appeared in Chinese
military literature with growing frequency since 2008. Analysts find Corbett highly relevant
to Chinas seafaring project. Fu Zhengnan of the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA)
Foreign Language Institute concludes an exhaustive survey of Some Principles by

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prophesying that absorbing and drawing lessons from the essence of Corbetts theories
would have tremendous theoretical meaning for our nations naval development.3 [1]

While crediting Mahan for providing a guide and a basic framework for Chinese sea
power, Shi Xiaoqin, a researcher at the prestigious Academy of Military Science, bluntly
warns that only knowing Mahan is dangerous. Concurring with Fu, she asserts that
learning Corbetts sea power theory not only advances our understanding of the strategic
thought of the great maritime powers, but it can also help us discern the basic themes of
sea power theory, thus providing a rich academic foundation for Chinas research on sea
power theory.4 [1]

High praise, indeed. If Chinas voluminous reflections on Mahan are any indication,
industrious Chinese scholars will pore over Corbetts theories, composing imaginative,
analytically sophisticated works that apply directly to Chinese naval strategy. What such
commentators learn may tell us a great deal about the future employment of the Chinese
navy and its sister services. Beijings foray into Western strategic thought may yield insight
into Chinas high-seas future.

Corbett will supplementnot replaceMahan among Chinas pantheon of strategic

theorists. At the Naval War College we often ask students whether they consider
themselves Mahanian or Corbettian. While this makes for lively debate, one without the
other is a dubious choice. By taking the best from each thinkerand by acknowledging
that their works are compatible on many questionsstrategists can fuse Mahanian and
Corbettian precepts into a grand theory of sea power and naval warfare. Should the
Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) embrace Corbett, its operations and tactics could
take on a different complexion than one would expect from a navy beguiled by Mahan.
This warrants American scrutiny.

A Maritime Theorist a Land Power Can Love

That Corbett fits with the traditions of a great continental power like Chinadespite hailing
from the British Isles, an epicenter of sea poweris abundantly clear. There is much in a
name. Consider the formal name of Chinas navy: the Peoples Liberation Army Navy is
the navy of a great army. For Mahan it was a fundamental truth, warranted by history
that sea power is chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity
of nations.5 [1] Corbett found little in this claim to quarrel with, but he insisted that

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues
between nations at war have always been decidedexcept in the rarest
caseseither by what your army can do against your enemys territory
and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for
your army to do.6 [1]

Accordingly, maritime strategy was the art of determining the mutual relations of your
army and navy in a plan of war. The navys purpose was to control vital sea routes, not
cover itself in glory. Corbett decried battles fought for their own sake. Such sea heresies
scarcely endeared him to a Royal Navy establishment reared on the lore of Vice Admiral
Lord Horatio Nelson and the Battle of Trafalgar.7 [1]

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Like Mahan, Corbett maintained that proper strategy involved seeking out the opponent
for decisive combat at the outset of war. Or rather, this was sound and applicable nine
times out of ten. But he also beseeched the Royal Navy to restrain its battle faith in the
doctrine of overthrow.8 [1] He dwelt on the remaining one-tenth of cases in Some
Principles. Absolute sea control of the kind extolled by Mahanoverbearing power that
expelled enemy shipping from important waters, more or less permanently, or at most
allowed it to appear as a fugitivewas seldom if ever attainable in Corbetts view.9 [1] An
uncommanded sea was the normal state of things. Nor did command automatically pass
to one belligerent if the other lost it. The British scholar, furthermore, applied his energies
to espousing the naval defensive and the fleet-in-being. A navy resorted to the defensive
as a temporary expedient, postponing a major engagement by strategical or tactical
activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favor.10 [1]

While such concepts were anathema to a Royal Navy that bestrode the world, they will
apply to the PLAN as long as it remains inferior to the combined forces of the U.S. Navy
and its Asian allies. Over the past decade, influential Chinese strategists have conveyed
similar ideas about the ambiguous nature of command of the sea. Rear Admiral Huang
Jiang, the former dean of the Naval Command College and deputy commander of the
PLANs East Sea Fleet, trenchantly counsels:

Seizing command of the sea is not a zero-sum interaction. In sea battle,

the loss of our freedom of movement does not necessarily mean that the
enemy has gained freedom of movement. Similarly, preventing the
enemy from attaining freedom of movement does not mean that we
possess freedom of movement. It is only when one side not only
immobilizes enemy freedom of movement at sea, but also enjoys
unfettered ability to maneuver at sea that command of the sea has been
grasped. Otherwise, command of the sea remains in a contested state,
belonging to neither side.11 [1]

In a similar vein, the official PLAN encyclopedia definition of command of the sea
proclaims that local command is attainable in generally contested waters. Under such
conditions, declare the authors, each side must assume significant risk to operate [at
sea], requiring effective sea control within a limited sea area and limited timeframe to
conduct certain naval operations.12 [1] This is precisely what Corbett meant by command
in dispute, which the Englishman describes as the most important [stage of naval
warfare] for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages
of the war, and frequently all through it.13 [1]

Active Defense = Superior Offense

These soberand very CorbettianChinese pronouncements are a far cry from neo-
Mahanian assertions that China can and should seek absolute command. In practical
terms, this more realistic appraisal conforms to Chinas offshore-defense strategy, which
seeks to assert sea control for a finite time up to several hundred miles off the mainlands
coast. Corbett doubtless would have approved.

Indeed, Corbetts language of nautical active defense presaged Mao Zedongs famous
works on protracted war years before the Chinese Communist Party chairman wrote them.
For Corbett, offense constituted the essence of active defense. Command of the seaor,

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as he called it with greater precision, permanent general controlremained the

paramount goal. But it need not be the lesser fleets immediate goal if an unfavorable
balance of forces augured disaster. True Defensive, he proclaimed, means waiting for a
chance to strike, whether by launching minor counterattacks with asymmetric means or
at asymmetric sites, inducing the foe to waste his strength, or augmenting ones own
strength at sea.14 [1]

As Corbetts hero Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, the defensive form of warfare is
intrinsically stronger than the offensive.15 [1] An inferior but savvy fleet could play defense,
overextending an antagonists communications, exploiting familiar ground, and harassing
a retreating foe. If commanders were unable to win sequentiallythat is, in an orderly
process by which they cleared the sea of enemy fleets before exercising command
options still remained. Military logic dictated sequential operations, admitted Corbett, but
war

is not conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic prescribes
cannot always be adhered to in practice . . . . owing to the special conditions of
naval warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it
inevitable that operations for exercising command should accompany as well
as follow operations for securing command.16 [1]

An inferior fleet could exercise control before obtaining it. Audacity was the soul of the
naval defensive. Defense could never deliver positive goals, but it could frustrate an
adversary:

That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea goes
without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can prevent an
enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other belligerent to
dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore.17 [1]

Corbett recalled that Lord Torrington had prevented a superior French fleet from landing
forces in Ireland in 1690, despite his fleets inferiority. Unable to win a decisive
engagement, the Royal Navy fleet shadowed the French, posing a threat to French
landing operations. Merely disputing command helped the English commander realize his
chief goal: King William III consummated his land victory without external interference.
Torrington won strategically, despite coming up short tactically.18 [1]

For Mahan, concentrating the fleet for battle was crucial. Only thus could commanders
avoid piecemeal defeat as enemies fell on individual detachments. As in other matters,
Corbett took a more supple view, arguing that the purpose of naval concentration was

to cover the widest possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic
cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or more of the parts
of the organism, and in any part of the area to be covered, at the will of the
controlling mind; and above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at
the strategical center.19 [1]

Elastic cohesion fits with Chinas extended coastline, which lets PLAN commanders mass
forces rapidly from different sites. It also fits with Chinese strategic preferences for attacks
dispersed in space and time.20 [1] So long as the PLA contents itself with fighting in Chinas

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extended neighborhood, keeping forces dispersed along the mainland seaboard and
condensing them for battle only makes sense. It is worth noting that most unresolved
territorial disputes along the Chinese maritime periphery involve islands. The list of
challenges includes not just Taiwan but outlying Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen,
Matsu, and the Penghu Islands. Beijing claims the many islands that dot the South China
Sea. And PLAN egress into the Western Pacific depends on safe passage through the
Ryukyu island chain, which runs from Okinawa through northern Taiwan. Wresting one or
more of the Ryukyus from Japan would guarantee access to vital waters in times of strife.
In short, Corbetts writings could help the PLA yoke naval power to amphibious operations
along the periphery.

Certain things have changed over the past century, but those pose few problems for
Chinese thinkers looking to Corbett. The English writer could scarcely conceive of using
the land to control the sea, or using shore-based aircraft and antiship missiles to hold off
rival navies. In all likelihood, however, his silence on such matters was a function not of
theoretical quibbles but of technological change.21 [1] Shore-based gunnery could reach
only a few miles offshore in the days of Mahan and Corbetta far cry from antiship cruise
missiles boasting ranges measured in scores of miles and, potentially, an antiship ballistic
missile able to strike at targets under way hundreds of miles distant.22 [1]

Living in an age when the torpedo remained a promising but unproven innovation, Corbett
could not imagine land forces boasting todays reach and lethality. But if the purpose of
maritime forces is to influence the outcome on land, land forces ought to help ward off
hostile men-of-war while allowing friendly fleets into important coastal waters to project
power ashore. Corbett would certainly have smiled on close interactions between land and
sea operations.

Sir Julian Lands in Asia

A Corbettian PLAN acting on Mahanian logic would prove more nimble, more resilient,
and more formidable than a Mahanian fleet obsessed with absolute sea control.
Consequently, it behooves the U.S. Navy to monitor Chinese strategic commentary for
further signs of a turn to Corbett, and to foresee the likely composition and practices of
such a fleet should one take to the Asian seas. A logical next step for Chinese strategists
would be to explore the writings of British Army Colonel Charles E. Callwell, another
contemporary of Corbett and a fellow enthusiast for naval support to land operations.23 [1]
Callwell too appears to fit with Chinese needs and interests.

U.S. naval officers and leaders should strive to be as intellectually curious and innovative
as the Chinese, lest they one day find themselves caught flat-footed. They must also
rethink the long-standing assumption that command of the commons belongs to the U.S.
military. It does not. To their credit, the framers of the nascent AirSea Battle Doctrine
seem to be of a Corbettian frame of mind. They understand that access is something that
could be lostand for which the armed forces must fight. Corbett is leaving his mark not
only on Asian thinkers but also, apparently, on their counterparts in the West.

1. For a rundown on Mahanian logic and grammar, see James R. Holmes and Toshi

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China's Navy: A Turn to Corbett? Page 6 of 7

Yoshihara, Mahans Lingering Ghost, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 12
(December 2009), pp. 4045.

2. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1939), pp. 203, 217222.

3. Fu Zhengnan, On the Maritime Strategic Perspective of Julian Corbett, International

Politics Quarterly, No. 4 (2008), p. 130.

4. Shi Xiaoqin, Another Path to Understanding Sea Power: On Julian Corbetts Sea
Power Theory and Its Practical Meaning, Peace and Development, No. 1 (February
2010), p. 62.

5. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), pp. 5152.

6. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, intro. Eric J. Grove (1911;
repr., Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 16.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 323-324, 164.

9. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890;
repr., New York: Dover, 1987), p. 138.

10. Corbett, Some Principles, p. 211.

11. Huang Jiang, On Modern Command of the Sea, China Military Science, Vol. 16, No.
2 (2003), p. 25.

12. Editorial Board of the Chinese Navy Encyclopedia, Chinese Navy Encyclopedia
(Beijing: Haichao Publishers, 1999), p. 1929.

13. Corbett, Some Principles, p. 319.

14. Ibid., p. 165, pp. 310311.

15. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 357358.

16. Corbett, Some Principles, p. 234.

17. Ibid., p. 209.

18. Ibid., pp. 212219.

19. Ibid., p. 132.

20. James R. Holmes, Chinas Way of Naval War: Mahans Logic, Maos Grammar,
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2009), pp. 217243.

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21. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese
Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile, Naval War College Review, Vol 62, No. 4
(Autumn 2009), pp. 5386.

22. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, On the Verge of a Game-Changer, U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 5 (May 2009), pp. 2632.

23. Charles E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations
and Interdependence (1905; repr., Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

Dr. Holmes and Dr. Yoshihara are associate professors of strategy at the Naval War
College and coauthors, most recently, of Red Star over the Pacific: Chinas Rise and the
Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2010).
Article Information
Magazine Volume:
Proceedings Magazine - December 2010 Vol. 136/12/1,294 [2]
Author:
By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
Story Summary:
<p> Chinese navalists are augmenting their reading lists with the works of &ldquo;a
maritime theorist a land power can love.&rdquo;</p>
Story Volume Sort:
-39

Story Assets
While Mahan, with his vision of naval strength as the key to "the power and
prosperity of nations," thus far has guided China's emergence as a sea force to be
reckoned with, Chinese naval thinkers such as Shi Xiaoqin have come around to the
realization that "only knowing Mahan is dangerous." [3]
Corbett recognized that the successful application of sea power ultimately was
integrated into "the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war." Many of
his pronouncements fit well with China's offshore-defense strategy. [4]

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[2] http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-12
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[4] http://www.usni.org/sites/default/files/magazine_uploads/images/HolmesF3Dec10.jpg

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