Rule114

1. MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA
PISON,

Facts: Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for
stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its
violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the
policeAt around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel
where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-
shirt and underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was
filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion
:Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."

the trial court issued an order resolving petitioners Omnibus Motion, as follows: The accused is entitled to bail in all the
above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00. Petitioner on May 22, 1997, filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. the trial court, in separate orders, denied
petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial
courts order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the
conditions set forth in its order of May 16, 1997, respectively.

The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to petitioner
but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of
petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned,
represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." The
Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, the appellate court held that
petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to
reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the
ground that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its
treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to
the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid
because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.

Issue: whether or not petitioner should be granted bail?

In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner
were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the
complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of
petitioners bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can
proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, 14(2) of
the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order
conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should
be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the
court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
 2. GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the respondent judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the
performance of his work in that he granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91, 488-M-91, and 488-M-91 without
the required petition for bail and without conducting any hearing to accord the prosecution an opportunity to establish that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

the respondent judge filed his comment wherein he disclosed that the issue raised was the subject of G.R. Nos. 108478-79
pending before the Second Division of this Court.

Court dismissed the case however the complainant then filed a motion to revive this complaint. The respondent judge filed an
Additional Comment and Observation to stress that what he did was to quash the warrant of arrest, determine probable cause on
the basis of the record and documents available, order the arrest of the accused, and grant bail to those against whom the
evidence of guilt was weak.

Issues having been joined and the revival of this complaint being in order, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they
agree to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have submitted. In their separate manifestations, the
parties responded in the affirmative.

Issue: whether or not respondent Judge committed a gross ignorance of law?

Ruling:

At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence. Gross ignorance of law and incompetence are
characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. 16He should he studious of the
principles of the law, 17 and he must be faithful to the law and must maintain professional competence. 18

The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living personification of justice and the rule of law. 19

In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-753,20 for abuse of discretion, this Court censured the respondent judge for issuing an order
granting bail to an accused without affording the prosecution the opportunity to present evidence to show that the evidence of guilt
was strong.

In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-742,21 for gross ignorance of law and serious misconduct, the respondent judge was
admonished to be more circumspect in the resolution of the cases before him and given a last warning that any form of infraction
cases hereafter would be dealt with severely.

The respondent judge has indisputably failed to comply with the strict and exacting demands of the public-trust character of his
office.

3. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE. V.THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such
gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x
Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison,
though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima
facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

ISSUE :The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail
pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling: No.Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. It cannot be
said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a
case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

4. FELICIANO VS PASICOLAN