MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Ought Implies Can: This statement means that if you ought to have done
something then you could have done it. In other words, if you are a moral
agent, someone who can be held morally responsible, then you have to be able
to do what you should do. If you are not able to do something then you cannot
be held responsible.
It should be clear that determinism would say that because you couldn’t have
done otherwise, we can not speak of ‘ought’. Therefore you are not morally
responsible. Libertarians, on the other hand, believe that in most situations
(not all- not when you are physically prevented from doing something) you
have done other wise, therefore in most situations you will be held morally
responsible.
The problem is more complex for compatibilists as they try and argue people
can be morally responsible despite being determined.

Determinism and Moral responsibility

A. Overview
Determinism argues that a person commits a crime because of a variety of causes:
genetic inheritance, mental state, social conditioning, introjected values, and economic
factors.
B. Does determinism undermine responsibility?
1. Yes. To be held responsible you need to be a moral agent. If you can be blamed
for something you did or didn’t do, then this means you could have acted
differently. But determinism says you could not have acted differently.
Therefore it seems impossible to blame or praise someone who couldn’t have
acted differently. No one is responsible for natural events so there is no difference
for a human action as humans are part of the chain of cause and effect.
• Dysfunction inhibits autonomy
A parent’s attitude to their children can shape their emotional development to create
characteristics which will determine their personality and choices they make throughout
their life. Early social conditioning can cause dysfunction in later life, and dysfunction is
something that doesn’t behave in a normal way. E.G If a child was beaten or neglected;
they’d care less for others.
• They should have known better
Determinists wouldn’t agree with the above statement they would say that they can’t
know better, human beings are subject to past conditions that lead them to this
situation, once arrived at that situation they have no other choice! It may be due to their
biological conditions. For example, someone who smokes could have known better due
to the information around them, but if they’re peer pressured into it their choice wasn’t
ultimately their own. And, it is determined whether or not they are the kind of person
who can be peer pressured.
• Ought implies can
If we say a person ought to do something this implies that they can, equally if somebody
can’t physically do something they can’t ‘ought’ to do it, therefore they can’t be held
morally responsible, it undermines moral responsibility because we can’t expect people
to do something they couldn’t do. Determinists argue that they are determined to have
the ability to do something or not to do something. Therefore, there is nothing that a
person can be held responsible for, they can’t be held responsible because they could
not have done otherwise! For example, two policemen were once criticised for not
jumping in a lake to save a drowning boy. When presented with just this information
most people would think that the two policemen were responsible and should have
jumped in however, if the objective conditions changed E.G the policemen couldn’t swim
then they could not be held morally responsible for their actions! In addition,
determinists would argue that even if the policemen could swim they would not be held
responsible because their past history would mean that they could not have done
otherwise.
Praise, Blame and Punishment
However, determinists would still argue that people can change but there needs to be
new ‘causes’ introduced that would push the person in a different direction. So
determinists would still blame, reward and punish. This same argument is relevant
for compatibilism.
Example- a student may be determined to fail because of genetic inheritance, family
background etc, but schools can take steps to try and change the student e.g. detention,
prizes, extra lessons, peer pressure, loss of EMA.

Libertarianism and the Implications for moral responsibility

A. Overview
1. A person is the sole author of their actions and therefore morally responsible.
2. To not hold a person responsible for their actions is to deny them dignity
(Sartre). Otherwise, they are just machines who can be programmed, potential
products of social engineering. (Minority report).
B. Events and actions
There are opposing definitions of events and actions and they need to be distinguished.
Events can be described as neural changes in the brain and are physical stimuli to causal
chains and lead to movements in the body. Actions, on the other hand, are meaningful
and hold importance of an event. Now we are focusing on reasons rather than causes
behind an action and why they did it. We differentiate between bodily movements and
their meaning, to illustrate winking, it can be a twitch or it could be a sign of playfulness.
We judge the intention of our action against the utopia we have idealised in our
imagination. Once the purposes are articulated, responsibility can begin.
To really have free will we have to have a second order desire as this allows us to be
reflective and convey attitudes against our wants. This process helps us decide between
Kleptomaniac and the thief. The thief has a second order desire, because he wants to
want to steal however the kleptomaniac isn’t aware of a second order desire and just has
a first order.

C. Causes and reasons

Libertarians need to make a distinction between cause and reason as it is vital to their
argument. A cause is something that puts you on a path to a particular decision; reason
however, is a process of thought that led to your choice.
For distinction

Libertarian argument
• Actions are a response to a cause and actions are a response to a reason, however,
the difference between a cause and a reason is that a reason is open to doubts,
questions and opinions. For example, say you went to get a chocolate bar through
instinct, that’d be a cause, but if you chose not to eat through worry of gaining
weight that’d be through reason.
• Reasons are open to debate which makes them different to causes. For example, the
reason(s) for somebody having an abortion.
• A non-voluntary reflex is due to cause for example, being startled by thunder;
however a reasoned response is something you do with thought. A reasoned
response would be to go back home because a storm is most likely coming.

Against distinction

Determinists would argue that there is NO distinction between cause and reason.
• Reason can also be before an effect like causes. An example, somebody being
upset because somebody upset them beforehand. In this case, cause is the same
as reason as the person is upset due to the person making them upset! A mental
cause is the same as a physical cause.
• A future goal is the same as a present desire; somebody has a desire to learn
which is the same as them having a goal to learn. Therefore, the libertarians are
incorrect to make distinctions between desires and purpose.

Conclusion: If we really did have free will as libertarians would argue, then
we would be held responsible for all our actions, even those that appear to
be severely constrained.

Compatibilism and Responsibility: The extent to which praise, blame and

punishment can be meaningfully employed if determinism is true.

There are three options:

A. Why responsibility should be required of individuals.

1. Compatibilism One. This version agrees with ‘ought implies can’. I did it
without coercion; I was not physically constrained in carrying out my desires, even if
they were determined. I wanted to do it, even though I was aware of the alternatives no
matter how impossible (according to reason). E.g. I wanted to steal that fork. I know I
didn’t have to do it. I could have acted differently if I had chosen differently.

As long as our actions are from our character, we are responsible for our actions. Society
does not frown on the person, but on the character. E.g. if you have a basket of apples,
you remove the bad apples for the sake of the rest, without questioning why they are
bad. If they act out of character, then there must have been an external constraint, so
you are more lenient.

Critique: Compatibilism 1
They contradict themselves. They say our desires are determined, i.e. the desire to kill,
however, how can we hold them responsible if they have no other choice than the desire
to kill? In this sense, they lean towards determinism. E.G. Kleptomaniac argument.
Compatibilism makes it hard to differentiate between who should and shouldn’t be held
responsible.

2. Compatibilism 2
Ought does imply can. You are morally responsible if you acted without
psychological or physical constraint. They focus on being constrained rather than
 being determined. In this case you can distinguish between kleptomaniac and thief.
You are morally responsible if you were able to overcome your second order desires.
Frankfurt also uses the example of Jones who has a microchip put in their head by
Smith who wants Jones to make a donation to charity. If it looks as if Jones will not
make the donation then Smith activates the chip. Frankfurt argues that he is morally
responsible when he makes the decision without the microchip being activated. He is
acting voluntarily without psychological or physical constraint. Frankfurt is trying to
make a distinction between causes and reasons and events and actions.

Critique of Compatibilism 2
Determinists would argue that every action is not just constrained but determined by
everything that has come before- all the causes that have led to the decision.
Constrained does not mean determined. So this version of compatibilism sounds more
like a lenient version of libertarianism. But they say that we are determined- so they
contradict themselves!
In addition, Frankfurt’s example does not work. The determinist would argue that there
is no difference between doing something because of a microchip and doing something
because of a chain of past experiences. In other words, there is no distinction between
causes and reasons or events and actions.

Dissolving the problem.

Debate has been between two alternatives:
1. Human action is part of the causal order, a product of biological and social forces
2. Human action is carried out by self-aware agents who use reason and controlled
emotional response to determine their own path.
Problem of determinism
• We have a clear sense of being free agents and of not being compelled. Human
behaviour is in fact not predictable and we are aware of alternative choices.
Problem of free will
• There is no proof that there is some independent ‘I’ that is completely free from
biology, past experiences and social conditioning.

Alternatives

a. Rachels
Ignore the problem. Accept determinism but live as if we have free will.
b. Ryle
He also doesn’t believe in forming the debate as one between free will and determinism.
He doesn’t agree with libertarians that there is some ‘I’ that wills things to happen.
Descartes’ belief that there is an inner life or immortal soul is greatly flawed. There is no
will that can be identified with an ‘I’. Ryle calls this the ‘myth of volition’. According to
Ryle, free will should not be judged due to the unknown realm of the mind, but how the
action is formed.
Wittgenstein also believes that there is no inner will or volition that wants the act to be
formed. There is merely the thought process, then the action itself.
In order to determine whether the act is free or not Ryle believes we need to establish a
number of competencies (abilities to know or be able to do). These include;
3. They were aware of alternative choices
4. They have performed acts in the past
5. They were mature and knowledgeable enough to choose a number of options.
 6. They exercise some of their knowledge.
7. They were not under duress.

Example: The bad Samaritan

The bad Samaritan is responsible for their actions if: didn’t have to go anywhere, had
the ability to help.
Not responsible- mother is on life support- 10 minutes to get there, didn’t hear the cry,
didn’t have the ability, you yourself are danger.

Despite not being free of causal laws we can still hold people responsible if:
1. You acted according to your desires without coercion or restraint
2. You have the competencies to do otherwise’ but chose to act in the manner
predicted.

c. Strawson: reactive attitudes

He focuses on how the praise and blame system works. This system is part of all our
lives. These ‘reactive’ attitudes include: gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, desire for
revenge, love etc. They are responses to people as moral agents and they distinguish
our interactions with people from our actions with animals, computers and natural
events. (Not sure this is always true! What about when we shout at the computer or the
dog?)
Strawson says determinists are wrong for equating not blaming nature and not blaming
a person. They would hold that the person killing is as determined as a hurricane killing.
Both actions are part of the causal chain- no distinction between causes and reasons or
events and actions. Strawson says that we do treat people differently, unless the person
had a tumour (the Churchland example). It that case we would treat the person like an
object in the natural world and not blame them. We would take an objective attitude
towards them and not have subjective reactive attitudes.
Strawson argues that our experience is such that we live in a community of moral agents
and that we experience people as being responsible for their actions. It is part of a
human being to have reactive attitudes (praise, blame and punishment). We no not need
to argue against determinism; it is irrelevant because this is how humans live and
survive. (This view is a bit similar to Ryle).

Critique

The alternative theories seem to avoid the problem. The are arguing that we live as if we
have free will and are responsible so we do not need to worry about whether we are
actually determined or not. In other words, given that we experience the world as
persons as moral agents living in a moral community, in which it matters what we do
and in which we cannot help but praise, blame and punish, then we need not worry
about whether we are determined or not. The debate then will only be about what
degrees of responsibility we should have. In other words, should we adopt a strong
libertarian view of moral responsibility and expect high standards of action, despite very
strong constraints (e.g. concentration camp situation), should we allow for psychological
constraints (Compatibilism 2) or should we stress just external constraints
(Compatibilism 1).
This is in many ways an unsatisfactory response. If it is truly the case that we could not
have done otherwise, in other words we can’t speak of ‘ought’ because there is no ‘can’,
then it has implications for how we live. Also, intellectually, we may want to actually
know whether we have free will or not. Just accepting it as an unproven part of human
life may not be a wholly satisfactory conclusion.