33. Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.

G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.

Facts:
In about 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan
Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire
connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of
Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to
secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Near Intramuros is an electric light pole with the corresponding wires. The pole presumably
was located by the municipal authorities and conforms in height to the requirements of the
franchise of the Manila Electric Company. The feeder wires are of the insulated type, known
as triple braid weather proof, required by the franchise. The pole, with its wires, was
erected in 1920. It was last inspected by the City Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole was
located close enough to the public place here described, so that a person, by reaching his
arm out the full length, would be able to take hold of one of the wires. It would appear,
according to the City Electrician, that even a wire of the triple braid weather proof type, if
touched by a person, would endanger the life of that person by electrocution. Further, no
prohibitory signs have been posted.

Respondents argument: The death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due solely to his
negligence and lack of care, and that the company had employed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the injury. That it fully complied with the provisions of its
franchise and of the ordinances of the City of Manila.

Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for
damages.

Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

The court did not agree with the defense of the Manila Electric Company in the lower court
to the effect that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to his negligence.

It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal
injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers
of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly,
the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at bar, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and
guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole
and wires as to be within proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the
possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly
charged and defectively insulated wire.
The position of the Manila Electric Company on appeal, its principal defense now is that it
has fully complied with the provisions of its franchise and of the ordinances of the City of
Manila. It is undeniable that the violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute might
constitute negligence. But the converse is not necessarily true, and compliance with a
franchise, an ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof that there was no negligence.
The franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the minimum conditions. The fulfillment
of these conditions does not render unnecessary other precautions required by ordinary
care.
34. VICENTE CALALAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor
an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena
and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7,
1989. Her attending physician, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three
months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck.

RTC The driver (Verena) of the Isuzu truck is liable.

It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.

CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi
delict.

Petitioners argument: The ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena
was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise
would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. The
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. (breach of contract or culpa
contractual)

RULING:
Quasi-delict Breach of contract
culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual culpa contractual
the negligence or fault should be clearly the action can be prosecuted merely by
established because it is the basis of the proving the existence of the contract and the
action fact that the obligor

In this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.

2. Overloading of passengers.
Sec. 32(a). Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle
shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered
capacity.