1. Blas Ople vs. Exec. Sec. Ruben Torres etc.
; National Administrative power is concerned with the work of
Computer Center (NCC); COA Chair (1998)
FACTS:
On 1996, Pres. Fidel Ramos issued AO 308 for the National
Computerized Identification Reference System which
would identify persons seeking basic social services. By
using the Population Reference Number (PRN) generated
by the National Statistics Office (NSO), it would reduce and
avoid fraudulent transactions.
AO 308 also provides that the funds necessary for the
implementation of its system would come from the budget
of the members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) such as the NEDA, DILG, DOH, GSIS, NSO
and NCC.
Petitioner Sen. Ople filed for a TRO enjoining its
implementation saying that it is unconstitutional for
usurpation by the president of legislative powers of
congress to make laws.
The provision in appropriating public funds and the PRN
system should be in a law as within the exclusive right of
congress and not in a mere adminsitrative order since it
confers right and imposes duties to citizens. Lastly, it
violates the right to privacy of the people.
Respondents contend that it is within the administrative
power of the President in merely implementing the
Administrative Code of 1987 and that AO 308 actually
protects a persons right to privacy. It confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no
office
ISSUE:
1) Whether AO 308 was a law beyond the power of the
President
2) Whether AO 308 violates the right to privacy
HELD:
Yes. AO 308 was a law since it redefines the parameters of
basic rights of citizens in a state which should be covered
by a law and not an administrative order. Since citizens
cannot transact without the PRN, they would have
difficulty exercising rights and enjoy privileges in the state.
The defense that it gives no right and imposes no duty
cannot stand.
2) Yes, it violates the right to privacy. AO 308 not only aims
to implement the PRN, it also aims to apply biometrics to
all citizens by finger-scanning and others. This shows that
it is not merely for identification but for generation of
other data which may be subject to misuse under A0 308
by several government agency.
RATIO:
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Sec. 3. Chapter 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of
1987.
Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose
of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy.
2. BLAQUERA vs. ALCALA
G.R. No. 109406, September, 11, 1998
Facts:
These are consolidated cases challenging the
constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order Nos
29 and 268.
Administrative Order 268, which was then issued by
President Corazon Aquino on February 21, 1992, grants
each official and employees of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in an amount equivalent to
thirty percent of the employees one month basic salary
but which amount not be less than two thousand pesos.
Such Administrative Order provides that the productivity
incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991.
Moreover, all heads of government agencies, including
government owned and controlled corporations and
financial institutions are strictly prohibited from granting
or availing such benefits for the year 1992 and the future
years pending the result of comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the President.
Petitioners who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992. However, on January
19, 1993, then President Fidel Ramos issued
Administrative Order 29 authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the
maximum amount of one thousand pesos and reiterating
the prohibition under Section 7 of Administrative Order
268 enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits
without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of
Administrative Order 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of productivity
incentive bonus for the year 1192 in excess of one
thousand to immediately cause refund of the excess.
Accordingly, compliance for such caused the deduction
from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts
needed to cover overpayments as alleged by the
petitioners.

Issue: WON the issuance of Administrative Orders 29 and
268 were valid exercise of presidential control?
Ruling:
YES. The court held that the President issued subject
Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government
for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The
President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President,
thereby resulting to uneven distribution of
government resources.
The duty of the President to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of
his confidence. Neither can it be said that the President
encroached upon the authority of the Commission on Civil
Service to grant benefits to governmental personnel.
Administrative Orders 29 and 268 did not revoke the
privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The
same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each
department or agency who is authorized to incur the
necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition
of subordinate officers and employees of the government.
It is not the duty of Commission to fix the amount of the
incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his
duly empowered alter ego.
3. VILLAFLOR V. CA
GR NO. 95694, OCTOBER 9, 1997
FACTS:
In 1940, Villaflor acquired through Deed of Absolute Sales,
parcel of agricultural landsfrom different owners. The
deed states that the land was sold to Villaflor but no formal
document was then executed, and since then until the
present time, Villaflor has been in possession and
occupation of the same.
In 1946, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel
of land, containing an area of 2 has, together with all the
improvements existing thereon, for a period of 5 years at a
rental of P200.00 per annum to cover the annual rental of
house and building sites for 33 houses or buildings.
In 1948, in an Agreement to Sell Villaflor conveyed to
Nasipit Lumber, 2 parcels of land.From said day, the
parties agreed that Nasipit Lumber shall continue to
occupy the property not anymore in concept of lessee but
as prospective owners. On 7 December 1948, Villaflor and
Nasipit Lumber executed an Agreement, confirming an
Agreement to Sell, but with reference to the Sales
Application filed with the Bureau of Land. Sales
Application of Villaflor were rejected for having leased the
property to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto.
In August 1950, Villaflor executed a document,
denominated as a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights, in
favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the amount of
P5,000 that was to be reimbursed to the former
representing part of the purchase price of the land, the
value of the improvements Villaflor introduced thereon,
and the expenses incurred in the publication of the Notice
of Sale; in light of his difficulty to develop the same as
Villaflor has moved to Manila. Pursuant thereto Nasipit
Lumber filed a Sales Application over the 2 parcels of land.
Order of Award was then issued in favor of Nasipit
Lumber. In 1973, Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit Lumber,
reminding the latter of their verbal agreement in 1955; but
the new set of corporate officers refused to recognize
Villaflors claim. In a formal protest dated 31 January 1974
which Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested
the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the
company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the
Deed of Relinquishment of Rights dated 16 August 1950.
The Director of Lands found that the payment P5,000.00 in
the Deed and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell
were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflors
protest. In 1978, Villaflor filed a complaint in the trial court
for Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two
parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages. In
1983, he died. The trial court ordered his widow, Lourdes
D. Villaflor, to be substituted as petitioner. RTC dismissed
the complaint. The heirs of petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, however, rendered judgment
against them. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings of the CA conclusive and binding
upon the SC. (Whether the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
was observed)
RULING:
Yes. Since the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction was
observed and applied, the findings of RTC and CA are
conclusive and binding upon the SC.
Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and
Finality of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend
to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies
even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process
is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an
agrarian dispute over the payment of back rentals under a
leasehold contract. In Concerned Officials of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs.
Vasquez,the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the
best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a
waterworks project was compatible with its development
plan.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the
questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the
factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee
of a sales application require a technical determination by
the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the
expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues
preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the
courts to stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies
is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts
Petitioner initiated his action with a protest before
the Bureau of Lands and followed it through in the
Ministry of Natural Resources and thereafter in the Office
of the President. Consistent with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the trial and the appellate courts had reason
to rely on the findings of these specialized administrative
bodies.
The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and
the minister of natural resources over the issues regarding
the identity of the disputed land and the qualification of an
awardee of a sales patent is established by Sections 3 and
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public
Land Act:
Section 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
(now Secretary of Natural Resources) shall be the
executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions
of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act
under his immediate control.
Section 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands
shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain, and his decision as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce.
Thus, the Director of Lands, in his decision, said:
It is merely whether or not Villaflor has been paid the Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos stipulated consideration of
the deed of relinquishment made by him without touching
on the nature of the deed of relinquishment. The
administration and disposition of public lands is primarily
vested in the Director of Lands and ultimately with the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of Natural Resources), and to this end--
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Director of
Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on issues of
mixed facts and law (Ortua vs. Bingson Encarnacion, 59
Phil 440). Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law thus
mean that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall be the final arbiter on questions of fact in
public land conflicts (Heirs of Varela vs. Aquino, 71 Phil 69;
Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil 442).
The ruling of this Office in its order dated September 10,
1975, is worth reiterating, thus:
it is our opinion that in the exercise of his power of
executive control, administrative disposition and
allegation of public land, the Director of Lands should
entertain the protest of Villaflor and conduct formal
investigation xxx to determine the following points: (a)
whether or not the Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. paid or
reimbursed to Villaflor the consideration of the rights in
the amount of P5,000.00 and what evidence the company
has to prove payment, the relinquishment of rights being
part of the administrative process in the disposition of the
land in question.
Besides, the authority of the Director of Lands to pass
upon and determine questions considered inherent in or
essential to the efficient exercise of his powers like the
incident at issue, i.e., whether Villaflor had been paid or
not, is conceded by law.
 Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the
factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of
Natural Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they
are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus,
their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts. The findings of
fact of an administrative agency must be respected as long
as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency
of evidence.
However, the rule that factual findings of an
administrative agency are accorded respect and even
finality by courts admits of exceptions. This is true also in
assessing factual findings of lower courts. It is incumbent
on the petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual
issues by the administrative agency and/or by the trial
court falls under any of the exceptions. Otherwise, this
Court will not disturb such findings.
We mention and quote extensively from the rulings of
the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources
because the points, questions and issues raised by
petitioner before the trial court, the appellate court and
now before this Court are basically the same as those
brought up before the aforesaid specialized administrative
agencies. As held by the Court of Appeals:
We find that the contentious points raised by appellant in
this action, are substantially the same matters he raised in
BL Claim No. 873 (N). In both actions, he claimed private
ownership over the land in question, assailed the validity
and effectiveness of the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights
he executed in August 16, 1950, that he had not been paid
the P5,000.00 consideration, the value of the
improvements he introduced on the land and other
expenses incurred by him.
In this instance, both the principle of primary
jurisdiction of administrative agencies and the doctrine of
finality of factual findings of the trial courts, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case,
militate against petitioners cause. Indeed, petitioner has
not given us sufficient reason to deviate from them.
4. LEONARDO A. PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997
Facts: The truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman, while on its way to Bulacan was seized by the
DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit. The Regional
Executive Director of DENR sustained Layugans action of
confiscation invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended.Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration which was, denied. The case was brought
by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was
filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial
Court which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents. A petition for certiorari was filed
by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals
which sustained the trial courts order ruling.
Issue: Whether the suit of replevin filed by the private
respondents be prosper
Ruling:
No. Before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. If a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies.This doctrine is disregarded: (1) when there
is a violation of due process,(2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action
is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR
when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private
respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. By
appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them
in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now,
without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing
an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
5. CARALE VS. ABARINTOS
FACTS:
Private Respondent Pontejos was appointed as Labor
Arbitration Associate. However, petitioner Chairman of the
NLRC (Carale), issued Administrative Order No. 10-03
series of 1994, detailing/reassigning private respondent to
the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City.
For this reason, Pontejos filed a complaint before the RTC
of Cebu City against herein petitioners for Illegal Transfer
(R.A. 6715).
On the other hand, Motions to Dismiss were filed by Carale,
arguing that it is the CSC which has exclusive jurisdiction
over any question concerning personnel movement.
Pontejos alleged that there is no other available and
speedy remedy in order to protect his interest than to
resort to this Honorable Court; that the urgency of judicial
intervention is an exception to the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The RTC dismiss the Motions to Dismiss ruling that the
only effect of non-compliance with the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action; it does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether administrative remedies must first be exhausted
before filing a complaint in the court.
HELD:
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of
administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain
a case unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.
In the instant case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek
administrative relief, which was both available and
sufficient. Initially, he could have asked for reconsideration
of the detail order, failing which, he could have gone
directly to the CSC, through the MSPB.
The accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies are the following:
1. where the question is purely legal;
2. where judicial intervention is urgent;
3. when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage;
4. where the controverted acts violate due process;
5. failure of a high government official from whom
relief is sought to act on the matter; and
6. when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
6. SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, vs. CA
Facts:
On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381
was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of
land Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3 and Lot 4.
On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by
Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana,
Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale which
was inscribed as Entry No. 9115 OCT No. 0-381 on August
10, 1960.
On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land
Registration Case No. N-361 (LRC Record No. N-14012)
entitled Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al.,
Parties-In-Interest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant
declaring OCT No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez,
null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof.
On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4, with
the deed being entered in TCT NO. 4314 as entry No.
12381. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5710 was thus
issued in favor of the petitioner which starting since then
exercised proprietary rights over Lots No. 1 and 4.
In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for
reconsideration against the order issued by the trial court
declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was
denied on January 25, 1965. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in
a Resolution promulgated on August 14, 1973 in CA-G. R.
No. 36061-R.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of
Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August 14,
1973 became final and executory on October 23, 1973.
On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L. R. C. Case No. N-361
issued a writ of execution of the judgment which was
served on the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union
on April 29, 1974.
Twenty four long years thereafter, on January 14, 1999,
the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated
January 11, 1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-
President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the
trial court in L. R. C. No. N-361 have not been executed by
the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite
receipt of the writ of execution.
On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles
before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region
(Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 6346
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, the Solicitor
General argued that since the trial court in LRC Case No.
361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0-381 to be null and
void, which ruling was subsequently affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael
Galvez have no valid title over the property covered by
OCT No. 0-381, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in
their names should be consequently cancelled.
On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion
to Dismiss, based on the following grounds: (1) the
complaint stated no cause of action because only final and
executory judgments may be subject of an action for
revival of judgment; (2) the plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest because the real property covered by the
Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of
Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the
ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No.
7227; (3) plaintiffs cause of action is barred by
prescription; (4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the
issuance of the writ of execution, no action for revival of
judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought
only within ten (10) years from the time the judgment had
been rendered.
An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the
Solicitor General on August 23, 1999, alleging among
others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is the Republic of
the Philippines;and (2) prescription does not run against
the State.
On August 31, 1999, the trial court denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and on October 14, 1999, its motion for
reconsideration was likewise turned down.
On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535, on the ground
that the orders of the trial court denying its motion to
dismiss and its subsequent motion for reconsideration
were issued in excess of jurisdiction.
On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on the ground that the
verification and certification in the petition, under the
signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was made without
authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was
authorized to institute the petition for and in behalf and of
petitioner.
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) a
complaint filed on behalf of a corporation can be made
only if authorized by its Board of Directors, and in the
absence thereof, the petition cannot prosper and be
granted due course;and (2) petitioner was unable to show
that it had substantially complied with the rule requiring
proof of authority to institute an action or proceeding.
Issue:
1. whether the petition under the signature of
Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., should be dismissed for it was
made without authority? (Admin Issue)
2. whether the Republic of the Philippines can
maintain the action for revival of judgment?
(Procedural Issue)
Held:
1. No, The Court has consistently held that the
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of the
pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
On the other hand, the failure of the petitioner to
submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a
 person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the
corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the
Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification.in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirement as
to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With
more reason should we allow the instant petition
since petitioner herein did submit a certification
on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof
that the signatory was authorized to do so. That
petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to
file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise
mitigates this oversight.
2. No, the Republic of the Philippines cannot
maintain the action for revival of judgment.
The Solicitor General, argues that the States cause
of action in the cancellation of the land title issued
to petitioners predecessor-in-interest is
imprescriptible because it is included in Camp
Wallace, which belongs to the government.This is
misleading.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA,
the government no longer has a right or interest to
protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real
party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only
in cases where the government is a party in
interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real
party in interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party
in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
The BCDA is an entity invested with a personality
separate and distinct from the government.
7. BEJA vs. CA
Facts: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports
authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975 and later
on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October
21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed
administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave
dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently
they were preventively suspended for the charges. After
preliminary investigation conducted by the district
attorney for region X, administrative case was considered
closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another
administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA
manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case
was redocketed and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the
AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear
the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence.
However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed
with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
hearing of administrative case on account of the pendency
of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied
the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the
dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file
before the Court for a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of
DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of
the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining
authority who may, by himself and without the approval of
the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His
disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD
no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the
heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions against
officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the
issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner.
The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974.
Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were
vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the
Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same
decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline
and remove, and determine the composition of the
technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no.
857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports
Authority which would be attached to the then
Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated
January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA
retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987
classified PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision,
Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of
independence from the Department to which it is attached
than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by
the lateral relationship between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and
program coordination. With respect to administrative
matters, the independence of an attached agency from the
department control and supervision is furthermore
reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Departments administrative supervision is free from
Departmental interference with respect to appointments
and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the
administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the
general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of
Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the
rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA
General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec.
38 of PD no. 807.
8. Republic v. Extelcom
G.R. No. 147096
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its
own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules
of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have
applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office
of the National Administrative Register where the phrase
on its own initiative were deleted and since the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the
UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in granting
provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely
a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and
regulations can take effect.
9. TAADA vs. TUVERA
FACTS: Petitioners filed a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to
publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.
They invoke the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws,
to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the
Official Gazette.
The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court
ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette
all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of
general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are
not. The publication means complete publication, and that
publication must be made in the official gazette.
ISSUES:
(136 SCRA 27; April 24, 1985)
1) Whether all laws shall be published in the official
gazette
2) Whether publication in the official gazette must be in
full
(146 SCRA 446; December 29, 1986)
1) Whether a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication
2) Whether a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation
RULING:
(136 SCRA 27; April 24, 1985)
1) The court held that all statute including those of local
application shall be published as condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
2) The publication must be full or no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws.
(146 SCRA 446; December 29, 1986)
1) All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
2) Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
10. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and
SERVICES CORPORATIONvs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON (2001)
FACTS:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services
Corporation (Philsa) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. In
1985, private respondents were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia each paying placement fees of
P5,000 for Mikin and P6,500 for De Mesa and Leyson.
After being deployed in Saudi, the private respondents
were forced to sign a second and third contract by their
foreign employer Al-Hejailan, increasing their work hours
from 48 hours to 60 hour without additional pay. When
they refused to sign, their work contract was terminated
and were repatriated to the Philippines.
The private respondents filed a case before the POEA for
illegal exaction and contract substitution to the POEA
Hearing Officer for both offices of the Workers' Assistance
and Adjudication Office (POEA-WAAO) for complaints on
money claims of OFWs and the Licensing and Recruitment
Office (POEA-LRO), for cases involving recruitment
violations warranting suspension or cancellation of
license.
POEA ruled in favor of private respondents and granted
the award for damages for illegal exaction in violation of
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 which
enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected
from applicant, and POEA Memorandum Order No. 2,
Series of 1983 providing for the applicable schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies not more than P2,500 in compliance
with Sec. 32 and 34 of the Labor Code.
Philsa appealed to the Sec. of Labor and Employment but
was denied hence this case. They argued that it cannot be
liable for illegal exaction since both POEA Memorandum
were void for lack of publication or filed with the National
Administrative Register, as required in Book VII, Chapter
2, Sec. 3 of the Admin Code of 1987.
Respondent Sec. of Laborend Employment argued through
the Solicitor General that the questioned administrative
circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only
to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
ISSUE:
Whether the POEA Memorandum orders were void for
lack of publication
HELD
Yes, both were void for lack of publication or filed with the
National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 was
declared void for lack of publication since it is not internal
in nature nor merely regulating only the personnel of the
POEA.
Likewise, POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983
was also void for lack of publication or filing with the
National Administrative Register since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The defense of the SG that this memo had basis
other than the POEA memo cannot stand because the
memo itself did not cite the Art. 32 and 34 of the labor
Code.
And since under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, rules in force on the date of
effetivity were not filed within three months shall not
become the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. Hence, the petitioner cannot be liable for damages
under the said POEA memos.
Citing Tanada vs. Tuvera, administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letter of instructions issued by the administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
11. COMELEC vs. Quijano-Padilla
G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
Facts:
Voters Registration Act of 1996 (RA No. 8189) was passed,
pursuant to that the Comelec promulgated a Resolution
approving in the principle the Voters Registration and
Identification System Project (VRIS) which envisions a
computerized database system for May 2004 Elections
with an aim of tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant
voters identification card. Comelec then issued pre-qualify
and bid for the supply and installations of IT equipment
and ancillary services for VRIS Project.
Photokina Corporation pre-qualified and allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After public bidding was
conducted, Photokina garnered the highest score and was
declared the winning bidder, on which a resolution was
issued by Comelec for the approval of such, and was
immediately accepted by Photokina, parties then initially
proceeded to formalize the contract with Comm. Sadain.
However, under budget appropriation passed by Congress
for the said project was only 1 billion pesos, on which the
actual fund budget for the project was 1.2 bilion. For such
disparity the execution of the contract was of no avail,
irregardless of the expiration of office of then
oppositorComelec Chairman Demetriou and despite
several notifications by Photokina.
Then incumbent Chairman Benipayo, through press
releases and public announcements, announced that the
VRIS Project has been set aside, and plan of re-engineering
the entire modernization program of the Comelec.
Photokina, with the adverse turn of events, filed with RTC
Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and
damages against Comelec and all its Commisioners.
Photokina alleged the refusal of Comelec and the
Commissioners to formalize the contract; that Chairman
Benipayo on his statement committed grave abuse of
discretion; and that Comelec failed to perform its duty
under the contract incurring damages on the part of
Photokina. Respondent Judge Quijano-Padilla issued a
Resolution granting Photokinas application for a writ of
prohibitory injunction. Comelec thru Solicitor General filed
a motion but was denied by respondent Judge. Hence, a
petition for certiorari was elevated directly to Supreme
Court by the OSG in behalf of Comelec.
Issue: WON Photokina can compel Comelec, a government
agency, to formalize a contact notwithstanding that its bid
exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project?
Ruling:
NO. The court reiterated that, No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by any government agency
shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper
accounting official of the agency concerned shall have
a certified to the officer entering into obligation that
funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose
and that the amount cover the proposed contract for
the current calendar year is available for expenditure
on account thereof, subject to verification of the
auditor. (Sec 7, Administrative Code of 1987)
The court ruled that, Photokina cannot accede to its
contention that there is already a perfected contract since
existence of appropriations and availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non
for the execution of government contracts. To hold
otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding
contract that would obligate the government in an amount
in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which
the contract was attempted to be made, which the court
found as a dangerous precedent. Even the draft contract
submitted by Commissioner Sadain that provides for a 1.2
Bilion pesos is unacceptable, of which the court share
sentiment with then Chairman Demetriou that it
circumvents the statutory requirements on government
contracts. Hence, petitioners are justified in refusing to
formalize the contract with Photokina, as prudence
dictates them not to enter into a contract not backed up by
sufficient appropriation and available funds.
12. SIMON JR. VS. CHR
GR NO. 100150, JANUARY 5, 1994
FACTS:
A Demolition Notice was signed by Carlos Quimpoin his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office
of the City Mayor. This Notice was sent to the private
respondents, the members and officers of the North EDSA
Vendors Association, Incorporated. The Notice of
Demolition was for the removal of private respondents
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia to give way to the
Peoples Park.
On July 12, 1990, the group of vendors led by their
President Roque Fermo filed a letter-complaint
(PinagsamangSinumpaangSalaysay) with the CHR against
the petitioners, asking the CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon Jr. of Quezon City to stop the demolition.
CHR in its Resolution ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than 200,000 in favor of
the private respondents and directed the petitioners to
desist from further demolition with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest.
Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of CHR and moved
for the dismissal of the CHR case. CHR cited petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition despite the order
to desist and imposes a fine of 500.00 on each of them.
The motion to dismiss filed by petitioners to CHR was
denied and the motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether CHR has Jurisdiction over the case and whether
they have an adjudicatory power.
RULING:
NO and NO.
CHR has no Jurisdiction to take over the case.
The law provides under Article XIII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution that CHR is empowered to investigate, on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
The term "civil rights, has been defined as referring
to those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a
state or community. Such term may also
refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in
a civil action.
Also, quite often mentioned are the guarantees against
involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the
right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.
In this case, the court are not prepared to conclude that the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of
the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
human rights violations involving civil and political
rights intended by the constitution.
With regard to CHRs Adjudicatory Power:
The Court ruled citing the case of Cario v. CHR through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
and observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in
no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
The Court explained:
. . . The Commission on Human Rights . . .
was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we
now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and,
its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.