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Published in IET Communications
Received on 5th September 2011
Revised on 1st January 2012
doi: 10.1049/iet-com.2011.0641

In Special Issue on Energy Aware Wireless Network

Protocols

ISSN 1751-8628

Jamming in underwater sensor networks: detection

and mitigation
S. Misra1 S. Dash1 M. Khatua1 A.V. Vasilakos2 M.S. Obaidat3
1
School of Information Technology, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, West Bengal, India
2
National Technical University of Athens, Heroon Polytechniou 9, 15780 Zografou, Greece
3
Department of Computer Science, Monmouth University, New Jersey, USA
E-mail: smisra@sit.iitkgp.ernet.in

Abstract: Underwater sensor networks (UWSNs) can be deployed for sensing the environment in oceanographic columns and
other water bodies in which they are deployed. The peculiar characteristic of the underwater medium, coupled with the queer
nature of the sound waves in water, poses an enigmatic problem for UWSN researchers. In this study, the authors focus on
the problem of UWSN jamming, which is a popular type of denial-of-service attack. The existing jamming detection
solutions for sensor networks are primarily targeted towards the terrestrial ones. In this work, the authors study the unique
characteristics of jamming in UWSN, and propose a protocol, known as underwater jamming detection protocol (UWJDP), to
detect and mitigate jamming in underwater environments. The results show that if the packet delivery ratio (PDR) is less
than or equal to 0.8, the authors have the maximum probability of detecting jamming. The jamming detection ratio is around
2 11% more for the said PDR.

1 Introduction paper is on the DoS attacks because of jamming in

Sensor networks are generally resource constrained.
The nodes are small in size, and if the limited resources
in them are not managed properly, they can frequently
run out of these resources, thereby affecting their
functionalities. Battery life is an import factor while
designing solutions for any sensor network. In underwater
sensor network (UWSN), the problem is even more grave,
as it is more difcult than in terrestrial sensor networks to
recharge the node batteries because of the absence of
renewable sources of energy (such as solar). Other issues
such as the presence of limited bandwidth, occurrence of
unreliable channel because of frequent reections and
inter-symbol interference, large propagation delay because
of comparatively slow speed of sound in water as compared
to radio waves in air, and corrosion of the nodes because
of prolonged submergence in water [1] make the problem
even more challenging. The conventional proactive or
reactive strategies that are available for routing in terrestrial
sensor networks cannot be implemented in underwater
environments for reasons attributed to energy constraints, as
long distance communication is affected because of the
attenuation of sound waves. Therefore, geographical routing
protocols [1], which rely on information exchange between
the neighbours to facilitate communication, are better suited
in underwater environments. Further, security problems
added to this can be highly taxing on the nodes. Among the
various security issues of UWSN, denial-of-service (DoS)
attack is of a very serious type, considering the resource-
constrained underwater sensor nodes. Our focus in this
UWSN. A jammer is a device that intentionally disrupts
the communication between nodes in the network. It can
disrupt a node from sending data or can inject malicious
packets into the network to be processed by the legitimate
nodes. Since data transfer occurs from bottom to top in an
underwater column, a jammer located very deep in the
ocean can compromise the source of the information, and
thus the whole network.
The prime motivation underlying the work reported in this
paper arises because of the fact that UWSN are a relatively
marginally explored area of research as compared to
terrestrial sensor networks. Limited number of works
depicting an extensive study of underwater sensor networks
exist in the literature. Furthermore, to the best of the
authors knowledge, there are no signicant contributions
available on jamming attack detection and mitigation in
UWSN. Underwater jamming is a serious issue considering
the physical properties of the channel it prohibits
information to be sent quickly and in a reliable manner.
Architectures similar to those used in military jammers such
as spot, sweep and barrage jammers [2] can be used to
effectively jam the underwater channel because of its
narrow bandwidth. Furthermore, most of the common
terrestrial solutions to jamming are inefcient in UWSN.
Hence, it is necessary to nd an effective solution to the
underwater jamming problem. This paper discusses a
UWSN jamming detection and mitigation approach, which
bases on different pieces of existing works [3 7] available
in this area, integrates the ideas, modies them wherever
relevant and provides a holistic solution for the purpose.

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The primary components of the solution discussed in this
paper are as follows:
The development of a distributed approach to underwater
jamming detection in UWSN. As mentioned before, though
many novel approaches exist for jamming detection in the
sensor network literature, they are solely designed to
function in terrestrial sensor networks. In this paper, we
emphasise the various shortcomings of different jamming
detection algorithms in the context of underwater
environments, and discuss an algorithm which can work
well within the constraints of the underwater channels.
Mitigating the effects of jamming by mapping the jammed
area, so that data transmission can be undertaken through non-
jammed areas effectively. Only the data in the jammed area
are temporarily lost. Thus, the entire network is not affected
because of the presence of an underwater jammer at a
particular position, as the ow of packets from the jammer
is limited to the jammed area only. It is worth mentioning
here that the problem of mapping the jammed area for
terrestrial sensor networks was addressed by Misra et al. [2].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,
we summarise the works reported in some of the relevant
pieces of literature. Since, there is a lack of work on a
UWSN jamming to the best of our knowledge, we discuss
about the jamming, detection algorithm for terrestrial
wireless sensor networks (WSN) highlighting the merits
and demerits of each. Section 3 provides insight into the
general problems with UWSN, and in Section 3.1, we focus
on the security threats that are plausible in these networks.
In Section 4, we discuss the underwater architecture used in
our work. We present the jamming detection and mitigation
solution, underwater jamming detection protocol (UWJDP),
in Section 5 and present different results of simulations and
performance evaluation in Section 6. In Section 7, we
analyse the time complexity of our algorithm and nally,
we conclude the paper in Section 8 with few suggestions
for future work.
2 Related work
Currently, there are no specic solutions for detecting and
mitigating jamming in UWSN, to the best of our
knowledge. Owing to the unique problems of underwater
environment, many existing solutions for jamming detection
in terrestrial sensor networks are not ideal for use in
UWSN. We now briey present the different solutions
proposed for detecting and mitigating the effects of
jamming in terrestrial sensor networks.
2.1 Method by Muraleedharan and Osadciw
Muraleedharan and Osadciw [8] proposed a method for
avoiding jamming attack in WSN using an ant colony
optimisation-based algorithm. This method suggested
transition probabilities for optimising route selections. The
authors used Single-tone, Multi-tone and Pulsed-tone known by the receiver. If the XOR result is true, then the
jammers as the jamming models for their algorithm. The
jammers differed on the basis of their ability to block
particular frequencies, and the pulsed-tone jammer switched
on and off to jam the channel intermittently. The ants or
agents are used to traverse from node to node and the route
is selected by obtaining certain information from the sensor
nodes. Energy depletion causes the agents to alter their
paths so that the network can performs even without
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jammed nodes. This idea is unrealistic in underwater
environments because: (i) some of the formulae involved in
calculating the probabilities need a lot of node energy, and
(ii) the performance of the evolutionary algorithm depends
on the situation, and the complexities are generally not in
polynomial time [2].
2.2 Method by Cakiroglu and Ozcerit
Cakiroglu and Ozcerit [9] suggested a method which could
distinguish jamming scenarios from the ones for normal
network congestion, hardware failures and other scenarios.
Their algorithm needs three parameters: packet delivery
ratio (PDR), bad packet ratio (BPR) and energy consumption
amount (ECA), and based on certain comparisons with
predened thresholds the algorithm can infer the presence
of jamming. They also proposed a second algorithm which
use the information of other nodes along with their own
through QUERY and REPLY packets to determine
jamming. However, in underwater environments, poor and
erroneous links can often lead to the absence of reply
packets and, thus, should not be a case of jamming which
the algorithm would normally indicate. Therefore, although
the algorithm is highly efcient in terrestrial sensor network
system, it does not work well in underwater system.
2.3 Method by Reese et al.
The method proposed in [10] is based on the measurement of
standard deviation of signals to determine jamming. In this
protocol the signals are classied as clean and jammed
signal, and the deviation of the signal strength from the
normal mean of clean signal is calculated. If the received
signal deviates from the calculated standard deviation by a
certain threshold amount, then the signal is interpreted as
coming from a jammer. Although it is computationally light
weight, this cannot be used predominantly, as the
computation is needed almost all the time while it receives
signals. Further, it does not give any information about the
location of the jammer.
2.4 Method by Strasser et al.
The method proposed in [11] mainly focuses on identifying
the reactive jammer. The metrics used in this method are
received signal strength (RSS) and bit error rate (BER). The
main idea is to identify jamming from the BERs. The RSS
is also recorded for each bit. In case of bit error, depending
on the value of RSS, they classify the situation as external
interference, weak link or jamming.
The above-method involves three steps error sample
acquisition, interference detection and sequential jamming
test. In the rst step of the algorithm, the packet is received
initially and the RSS value is recorded. Then any error is
examined by three methods suggested by them: (1) The
received instant bit is subjected to a XOR operation along
with the given value of the bit which is assumed to be
bit has errors. This limits the information conveyed by the
packets as the content is already known. (2) Use of error
detecting/error correcting codes: the received and recovered
data are compared for the purpose. (3) Using wired node
chains (n-tuple), they compare the RSS values and the
received packet sent through wired and wireless links. Then
the values are passed through a XOR gate and the error
samples are prepared.
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In interference detection, if a packet contains errors, then
the RSS is used to determine the reason. The RSS value is
compared to a threshold and if the value is greater than the
threshold value, a counter for packet error is increased. In
the sequential jamming test, likelihood ratio, probability of
false alarm being true and false alarm being not true is
taken into account. Then the decision is made if the node is
jammed or not.
This method, although mathematically sound, can be
energy consuming in UWSN. A common problem in the
underwater networks is high error rates because of dynamic
characteristics of the underwater environment; thus,
checking bit errors every time to determine jamming can be
cumbersome for energy constrained nodes. Also, storing the
values of RSS in a situation of high error rates can
consume more space.
2.5 Other methods
None of the algorithms described above map the jammed area
to mitigate the effects of jamming. Methods proposed by Xu
et al. [3] were quite effective, but those too suffer from the
limitations of not mapping the exact jammed area. Xu et al.
proposed four types of jammers: Constant, Deceptive,
Random and Reactive. Constant jammers have a xed 3.1
data rate and do not obey any MAC protocol. Deceptive
jammer obeys the MAC protocols, but it sends data at a
very high rate that consume energy unnecessarily from the
legitimate nodes. Random jammer switches between the
above two, and the Reactive jammers only transmit when it
overhears that any communication is going on. Therefore,
energy-wise, constant jammer is the worst whereas the
random jammer is better of the lot.
Other methods, such as direct sequence spread spectrum
(DSSS), which require more bandwidth than necessary to
decrease the interception and interference, are so effective
in terrestrial networks, but cannot be used in UWSN
because of low bandwidth. Frequency hop spread spectrum
(FHSS) technique also cannot be used in UWSN because of
frequent switching from one frequency to another to
transfer data [12]. Any centralised approach of jamming
detection, where the base station (BS) processes the
information received from different nodes to calculate the
effect of jamming in the network, are quite effective for
terrestrial sensor networks, but are unsuitable in UWSNs
[13, 14]. This is because of large propagation delay in
UWSNs. Furthermore, high error rates and presence of
temporary loss of connectivity between links may lead to
faulty information. So, a distributed approach, in which the
neighbouring nodes of the jammed area share information
for jamming detection, and choosing alternatives to mitigate
the effect of jamming, is a better and viable option.
3 General problems in UWSN
Solutions designed for UWSN should take into account the
extreme nature of the underwater channel [15 17]. The
major problems in underwater environments are
summarised below.
The bandwidth of channels that are used for
communication underwater is very less as compared to that
of radio frequency. Secondly, as suggested in [18], the
attainable range rate product is less underwater, which networks, whereas [29] includes the wormhole attack in
results in lower bit rates compared to terrestrial networks.
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The velocity of sound in water is around 1500 m/s, which
is less by ve orders of magnitude than the speed of radio
waves in air. This accounts for a large propagation delay
and a low transmission delay in water, whereas it is the
opposite in terrestrial sensor networks.
BERs are high and the links are broken frequently because
of loss of connectivity between the nodes, which may be due
to geometric spreading of sound waves and/or man made or
oceanic noise [19].
Lack of solar energy to replenish the batteries of the
sensors.
Corrosion of nodes because of prolonged exposure in
water.
Other effects such as reection of waves, inter symbol
interference and fading.
Since radio waves are quickly absorbed in water, they are
not preferred. This leads to the lack of availability of GPS
services, and thus, the nodes have to use distributed
approach for localisation and synchronisation [20].
The ocean currents enforce the nodes to move passively;
thus, we have different topologies at different intervals of
time, whereas, in general the nodes in terrestrial networks
are stationary [21].
Different types of security attacks in UWSN
Many of the attacks do not require knowledge of
cryptographic keys. The adversary in many cases simply
has to know when a packet is being sent in the network.
The different terrestrial attacks, as suggested in [22], are
applicable to underwater communications. The following is
a list of such attacks:
Jamming attacks: Jamming is one type of DoS attack. This
attack occurs when an adversary intentionally tries to disrupt
communication either corrupting the valid packets by sending
illegitimate packets to the nodes or sending excess amounts of
packets to drain out the batteries of their energy. Jammers
may be idle when there is no transmission taking place in
the network, but as soon as they overhear transmission, they
can start disrupting data-ow in the network. It is a crucial
issue in underwater environments also because of high
energy constraints on the nodes. Further, high propagation
delay prohibits a node from communicating with the control
centre or a surface sink. Thus, a node has to optimally use
its scarce resources to mitigate the attack.
Wormhole attacks: In case of wormhole attack, a pair of
attackers can lure the neighbouring nodes into believing
about the presence of better routing paths in terms of
transmission delay in the network. Such pair of attackers
can form a virtual path known as a wormhole. The
wormholes are connected through a better link that provides
less delay. When the legitimate nodes send data through the
better path, the attacker can then cause packet collisions,
packet modication and packet corruption. The attacker
does not need to know about the cryptographic protection
and keys to disrupt the network, but it just needs to
overhear when the packets are being sent. Control packets
can be easily distinguished from data packets as the control
packets are shorter in size, thereby the attacker gets an
advantage from it. Certain methods like packet leaches,
measuring time of ight and angle of arrival (AoA) of
packets [23 28] can control wormhole attack in terrestrial
UWSNs as well. In an environment with high propagation
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delays, the attackers sharing a wired link can easily lure the
trafc towards its wormhole link, and hence can disrupt it.
Spoong attacks: This is one of the common modes of
attack where an attacker can use an identity of a legitimate
node undetected, and thus, can have access to vital
information or can change routing information to regulate
trafc. An adversary can also ood the network with
broadcast and acknowledgement packets by spoong an ID
of a legitimate node. Once it has authenticated itself, it can
start disrupting the network by causing other nodes to
believe that it is a legitimate node exists within the
communication range, and thus, the data can be in insecure
hands without the other nodes even getting any information
about it. Same as in the rst case, there is no control centre
nearby to facilitate quick detection of the adversary.
Sybil attacks: In this type of attacks, a faulty node can
present multiple identities, that is a node can be appeared at
different positions at a particular time instant. This can
degrade performance of many fault-tolerant routing
protocols, topology maintenance protocols and geographical
routing protocols. Some solutions for these sorts of attacks
include issuing certicates to a node from more than one
trusted nodes before communication [31]. As the nodes in
underwater only depend on communication between
neighbours, a large number of spoofed nodes in a particular
area can disrupt transmission without being noticed.
3.2 Different metrics used for jamming attack
detection
Different jamming attack detection metrics, as observed from
various jamming algorithms in literature, mentioned earlier
are used to counter jamming. Most notable of them are
carrier sensing time (CST), which is dened as the time
between a node ready to send a packet and it actually able
to send the packet into the channel; packet send ratio
(PSR), which is the ratio between the number of packets it
actually sends and the number of packets a node wants to
send; and packet delivery ratio (PDR), which is dened as
the ratio between the number of packets that have been
successfully delivered to the number of packets successfully
sent by the sender. Other metrics that are found in jamming
detection and prevention methods include energy
consumption amount (ECA), standard deviation in
received signal strength (SDRSS), BER, received signal
strength (RSS) and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
4 Underwater architecture
Different architectures exist for deploying nodes in UWSN.
The initial works in this eld proposed the anchoring of
nodes to the ocean bottom. Such architectures are used for
deploying nodes for a particular period in order to record
the necessary data and then recovering the instruments after
the completion of the work [31]. The limitations with such
kind of solutions include the absence of real-time monitoring,
online system reconguration, failure detection and limited
storage capacity. Architectures that consider the chaining of
nodes to the bottom of the ocean [32] tend to restrict the
node mobility and create hindrance for aquatic life movement.
In our work, we use the concept of pressure nodes [4].
According to [4], pressure nodes are those which can
control their depth under water through bladder apparatus
and pressure gauge. These sensor nodes are deployed at
various levels of sea according to their depth support and
they move along with the direction of water currents
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Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of an underwater architecture used in
our problem
passively like a swarm [33, 34] (see Fig. 1). Each sensor
node consists of an acoustic transceiver for underwater
communication. There are surface sinks which oat on the
surface of the sea water. These sinks have both acoustic and
RF communication capabilities. The RF links are helpful
for long-distance satellite communication. They are also
presumed to have GPS connectivity. Furthermore, multi-
hop data transmissions are preferable than single-hop
transmissions, as multi-hop transmission consumes less
energy, and supports less delay and more reliability by
reducing the error rates.
Such an architecture has many advantages. The system can
help in constant monitoring of the entire oceanographic
column in both space and time, and thus, it can provide
time-critical data. The network can also be easily
recongured, whenever necessary, as the nodes can adjust
their own depths. Thus, data redundancy can be achieved as
and when some nodes are faulty; other nodes can adjust
their level to replace the faulty nodes logically.
5 Underwater jamming detection protocol
We now propose a novel approach, known as UWJDP, to
detect underwater jamming. The metrics used for detecting
jamming are PSR, PDR and ECA. Our approach is
motivated from the work of Xu et al. [3] designed for
WSN. The reasons for choosing these metrics are primarily
because of the simplicity of measuring values in each node.
We assume that the jamming attack is done by the injection
of malicious packets into the network at high rate. This
prevents the legitimate packets from being processed and
sent by the node.
5.1 Protocol description
UWJDP consists of three phases: neighbour discovery,
jamming detection and jammed area mapping. We discuss
the three phases below in detail.
5.1.1 Neighbour discovery: The aim of this phase is to
determine the neighbours of a node by sending hello
packets periodically. Upon receiving a broadcast message,
the node replies by sending some acknowledgement signal.
Then the sender can determine the neighbour list using out-
of-range information [5] obtained in this phase. This stage
is similar to the latency detection phase in R-MAC [6],
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Fig. 2 Pseudo-code for jamming detection for the sender
Fig. 3 Pseudo-Code for jamming detection for the receiver
where each node randomly selects a time to broadcast
neighbour discovery (ND) packets. In R-MAC, upon
receiving the ND and then saving the arrival time of it, a
node randomly selects a time to respond through sending an
Fig. 4 Pseudo-Code for the jammed area mapping
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Table 1 High priority packet format
Location Node Id Timestamp Jammed bit(0/1)
(X, Y, Z coordinates)
acknowledgement (ACK-ND) packet containing the
duration between ND receive and ACK-ND send. After
receiving the ACK-ND, the node can compute the
propagation latency between two nodes.
5.1.2 Jamming detection: If a node gets any abnormality
in values of PSR, PDR or ECA, the nodes undergo the
jamming detection phase as shown in Algorithms 1 and 2
(see Figs. 2 and 3). These algorithms will run on every
node. The pseudo-code for jamming detection in the sender
side is shown in Algorithm 1 of Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, SendEmergencyPacket() function sends a high
priority packet to its neighbours to indicate the occurrence
of jamming and increases the Sleep-Wake ratio to conserve
energy. The Wait() function keeps waiting for the links to
be normal. The function BetterRoutingRoutes() infers the
network congestion and requests the node to nd an
alternate route. NormalService() instructs a node to continue
its scheduled function. The high priority packet format is
diagrammatically shown in Table 1.
The pseudo-code for jamming detection in the receiver
side is shown in Algorithm 2 of Fig. 3. If a node detects
jamming attack, it informs the occurrence of jamming to its
neighbours through a high priority packet sent by the
SendEmergencyPacket() function. Upon receiving the
packet the neighbouring nodes determine their own
jamming status, and if jammed, append similar information
to a list and forward it to their own neighbours. If the
neighbour nodes are not jammed, they continue sending
periodic acknowledgements to the sender and carry on with
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the data transmission. Other functions perform similarly as
described in Fig. 2.
5.1.3 Jammed area mapping: Finally, the nodes in the
boundary of the jammed area receive the list, and then
distribute it among themselves to form a common list. This
is done by using a variant of the algorithm proposed by
Wood et al. [7]. Each non-jammed neighbour of a jammed
area executes a convex hull algorithm (such as Graham
Scan [36]) to map the jammed area. It only chooses the
entries of the list having the same Z-coordinate as itself.
Thus, nodes neighbouring the jammed region have the
convex hull of jammed area in that particular level, and also
the list containing entries of all jammed nodes in that area.
The pseudo-code for mapping the jammed region is
presented in Algorithms 3 of Fig. 4.
The reason for using the distributed approach to detect
jamming is to avoid the long propagation delay taken by
the packet to reach the BS, and vice versa; and to avoid
other problems such as fading, attenuation and high BERs.
Lemma 1: The number of entries in the jammed list
determines the density of nodes in the jammed area and/or
the intensity of jamming. (The proof of this lemma is in the
Appendix.)
5.2 Localisation algorithm
For mapping the jammed region, we need the geographical
locations of the nodes. In terrestrial localisation, the
availability of GPS helps a node to instantly receive its
localisation information. However, in UWSN, the GPS
facility is not available because the radio waves are quickly
absorbed in the water medium. Thus, the need for
alternative localisation schemes led to many efcient and
innovative ideas [20, 37 40]. Localisation can be done by
measuring AoA, received signal strength indicator (RSSI)
or time difference of arrival (TDoA). For example, in the
localisation approach proposed by Tian et al. [21], three
phases are involved. In the rst phase, it obtains location
information either using the value of AoA, RSSI or TDoA.
The position estimation is done in second phase where
some mathematical techniques are used to estimate the
position. In the renement phase, the accuracy of the
position is improved by multiple iterations. This approach
comes under the category of range-based localisation. Few
other approaches of localisation do not use such kind of
distance measurement, and hence, can be brought under
range-free localisation schemes.
In our algorithm, we use the localisation scheme proposed
by Erol et al. [39]. They proposed the idea of dive-N-rise
(DNR). They suggested the use of DNR beacons which are
capable of using GPS when present on water surface. Then
the DNR beacons dive into the water and broadcast the
Fig. 5 Forces acting on a DNR beacon
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location information. Any node that comes under the
broadcast range of a DNR beacon will get the broadcasted
location information. This information will be used to
calculate its own position. The model and the principle of
working, as suggested by them, are given below.
According to classical physics, the motion of a body is
given by

Fnet = ma (1)
where Fnet is the net force acting on a body, m is the mass of
that body, and a is the acceleration of the body.
The different forces acting on a DNR beacon, as shown in
Fig. 5, are:
Fweight: force because of the gravitational force acting on
the body.
Fbuyoant: force because of buoyancy.
Fuidresistance: force which is encountered when a body
moves through a uid.
Fcurrent: force because of the ocean current.
The equations for the forces are given below
Fweight = rdnr Vg (2)
Fbuoyant = rwater Vg (3)
Ffluidresistance = k rwater mAwater V (4)
Fcurrent = C sAc (vc v) (5)
where rdnr is the density of DNR node, rwater is the density of
water, V is the volume of water displaced, k and C are
constants and m, s are shape-dependent parameters. Awater
and Ac are the cross-sectional areas. Subject to resistance
and current respectively, and g is the acceleration due to
gravity. The velocity of the object and current are v and vc
respectively.
The equations dening the coordinates of DNR beacons in
underwater environments are given in [39, 40]. The equation
of motion of the underwater sensor is given in [39]. Then, by
using triangulation techniques nodes can get their own
coordinates if they receive locations of three or more DNR
beacon nodes.
Lemma 2: Diving nodes used in the proposed algorithm for
relaying location information must broadcast the
information at a frequency which can be different from the
frequency in which the receiver is listening. (The proof of
this lemma is in the Appendix.)
Another advantage of localisation in underwater jamming
detection is that it can help to control wormhole attack.
Using the localisation information, a receiver can determine
whether the received information has come through the
wormhole link or normal channel, since it knows the
average speed of the sound wave in acoustic medium.
5.3 Convex hull algorithm
For mapping the jammed region, we use a mapping technique
known as the convex hull algorithm. Bradford et al. [41]
dened the convex hull of a set of points as the smallest
convex set containing the points. Convex hull algorithms
exist for 2D and 3D planes. Two examples for computing
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Table 2 Parameters and their corresponding values used for simulating both the UWSN and the jammer
Parameter
frequency
transmitted power
type of antenna
range
channel model underwater channel
propagation model underwater propagation
filter
position update interval
packet size
ad hoc routing vector-based forwarding
bit rate
encoding efficiency
spherical spreading constant (K )
convex hull of a set of points in 3D are the beneath and
beyond algorithm [42] and the quick hull algorithm [41].
Since our architecture is 3D, we should ideally use 3D
convex hull algorithm. However, because of the large time
complexity it becomes unsuitable for UWSNs. Thus, we
use the convex hull algorithm designed for 2D, such as the
Graham Scan algorithm [35], in 3D environment with some
adaptations which are explained below.
The 2D convex hull algorithm is applied to run at each
level (nodes having xed z-coordinate). So, the neighbour
nodes of a particular level map the jammed area of that
level. We have different mappings at different levels and
there is a node at each level which does the mapping. Since
any data have to pass through the nodes neighbouring the
jammed region before it enters into the jammed region and
these neighbouring nodes already have mapped the jammed
area, so data transmission through the jammed area can be
reduced. This algorithm runs on all nodes which are
immediate neighbours of the jammed region.
6 Simulation results and performance
evaluation
Aqua-Sim [43, 44], an UWSN simulator, was used to perform
the simulation tasks. The results were recorded in both tabular
and graphical forms. The details of the input parameters used
in our simulation and their respective values for both
legitimate nodes and underwater jammer are listed in Table 2.
The nodes were distributed randomly in a 3D space. Two
types of jammers were used for the simulation study:
random jammer and deceptive jammer. They were
Fig. 6 Graphic representation of the variation of energy
consumption with respect to jammers packet length
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UWSN Underwater jammer
25 kHz 25 kHz
2.0 mW variable
omnidirectional omnidirectional
100 m 100 m
underwater channel
underwater propagation
gradient filter gradient filter
0.3 s 0.3 s
50 bytes variable
vector-based forwarding
10 kbps variable
1 1
2.0 2.0
chosen over constant jammer and reactive jammer,
because of their energy efciency. In some cases, we used
the transmission duration of a random jammer similar to
that of a deceptive jammer, though it could pause in
between. We follow two types of pattern for sending data
from each type of jammer: exponential (Exp) and constant
bit rate (CBR). ECA, PSR and PDR were chosen to be the
metrics to detect jamming, as according to the authors, they
could suitably combine to detect underwater jamming.
6.1 Experimental results
The energy consumed by the network was calculated by
varying the jammer parameters, such as packet length and
transmission power of the jammers, as well as the network
parameter, such as number of nodes in the network. The
plots of results derived from the above simulations are
explained in the following experiments. The outputs were
on expected lines, though, few interesting results were also
observed.
Experiment 1: Energy consumed by the network was
measured by varying the packet length of the jammer
whereas the transmission power of the network was kept
constant. The received result is shown in Fig. 6. From the
received results we can conclude that the energy consumed
by the network because of random jammer was less than
the deceptive jammer. This proves the idea on the other
way that random jammer is more energy-efcient.
Secondly, the increase in packet length of the jammer
increases the overall energy consumed by the network for
both types of jammer.
Experiment 2: The transmission power of the jammer was
varied to study the energy consumption in the network and
the plot is shown in Fig. 7 drawn based on the results
obtained. This experiment establishes a clear difference
between deceptive and random jammers for both the
CBR and the exponential data streams. If the transmission
power of the jammer is increased, it can inject more
number of packets into the network to jam, however, the
jammer will consume more energy than earlier. So, there is
a trade-off between energy consumption and jamming
intensity for a jammer.
Experiment 3: In this experiment, the difference in energy
consumption between jammed and normal conditions of a
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doi: 10.1049/iet-com.2011.0641
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Fig. 7 Graphic representation of the energy consumption with the

variable jammer power
UWSN was determined. Varying the number of nodes in the
network we received different results that are plotted in Fig. 8.
It shows an increase in energy consumption whereas the
number of nodes increases. It also proves the fact that an
underwater sensor node consumes more energy than normal
when it is under a jamming attack, because for a certain
number of nodes the energy consumption increases because
of the increase of number of packets dropped.
For the mentioned simulation setup, the energy consumed
by the individual nodes were calculated for both normal
condition and jamming condition. The jammer was placed
almost in the middle of the network to cover maximum
number of nodes under jamming range. Thus, in this small
network of 20 nodes all nodes were entirely under the
jammers impact. Table 3 gives the values of this
experiments result where the position of the nodes, the
consumed energy difference between the two conditions,
and the ratio of the consumed energy for both the cases
were shown.
From Table 3, it can be observed that irrespective of the
difference in energy consumption, the ratio of the energy
consumption after and before jamming was within a unit
range (3 4 in this case).This leads to the conclusion that
Fig. 8 Graphic representation of energy consumption by a normal
network and a jammed network whereas the number of nodes in the
network varies
the jammer equally affects the node in its range, no matter
whether the node is actively participating in any routing
policies or not.
Lemma 3: The PDR is the indicator of the lifetime of a
network. (The proof of this lemma is in the Appendix).
Lemma 4: Jamming at least a node of all shortest paths is
necessary but not sufcient condition for jamming the
network completely (The proof of this lemma is in the
Appendix.).
6.2 Performance evaluation
As mentioned earlier, there is no standard benchmark solution
for underwater jamming detection to the best of authors
knowledge. Therefore we aim to set a threshold value for
the PDR (PDRth), which will eventually indicate the
jamming scenario. In this simulation, 600 simulation setups
(or 120 for each PDRth value) were performed. Different

Table 3 Output values regarding the energy consumption by each node in the network under normal and jamming condition

Node Id X Y Z Energy consumed Energy consumed Extra energy consumption Ratio

in normal in jamming because of jamming (E2/E1)
condition (E1 mJ) condition (E2 mJ) (E2 2 E1 mJ)

0 500 20 0 6.72 14.59 7.87 2.17

1 450 20 0 9.75 38.51 28.76 3.95
2 400 40 20 10.91 47.94 37.03 4.39
3 350 20 20 10.89 43.96 33.07 4.03
4 300 40 20 9.06 37.70 28.64 4.16
5 250 20 20 7.88 35.57 27.69 4.51
6 200 40 40 5.6 24.06 18.46 4.30
7 450 20 40 7.85 30.36 22.51 3.86
8 400 40 40 8.98 42.49 33.51 4.73
9 350 20 40 9.00 33.75 24.75 3.75
10 300 40 60 7.88 25.09 17.21 3.18
11 250 20 60 6.75 23.61 16.86 3.49
12 200 40 60 5.6 17.47 11.87 3.12
13 450 20 60 7.85 27.07 19.22 3.45
14 400 40 80 8.98 37.31 28.33 4.15
15 350 20 80 9.00 31.59 22.59 3.51
16 300 40 80 7.88 27.33 19.45 3.46
17 250 20 80 6.75 22.80 16.05 3.37
18 200 40 80 5.61 17.14 11.53 3.05
19 300 20 40 9.78 27.20 17.42 2.78

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Table 4 Relation between PDRth and jamming detection ratio
PDRth Jamming detection ratio
1 87
0.8 98.33
0.6 96.67
0.4 94.16
0.2 90
network scenarios with varying packet length, transmission
range, faults and jammers were implemented to test the
versatility of our algorithm in detecting underwater
jamming. Jamming detection ratio is dened as the number
of correct detections made to the total number of jamming
events. Table 4 illustrates that setting the PDRth too low or
too high may lead to erroneous result.
Thus, a PDRth threshold value around 0.8 proved to be
most successful in detecting jamming. This may be because
of the fact that in cases of very high threshold (nearly equal
to unity), minor faults in the network also will be treated as
jamming by our algorithm if it results to drop packets. On
the other hand, if the PDRth is very low, then only the
jamming attacks of higher intensity are detected. Hence,
PDRth equal to 0.8 gives the minimum number of false
positives and false negatives in UWSN.
7 Complexity analysis
The most time consuming part of the algorithm is the Graham
Scan convex hull algorithm. The time complexity of the
algorithm is O(n log(n)) for a nite set of points in the
plane. Since the algorithm runs in different levels
simultaneously, the complexity for the mapping part of
JammedAreaMapping() algorithm can be more specically
represented as O(NMax log(NMax)), where NMax is dened by
NMax = MAX[Ni |i] (6)
where, Ni represent the number of jammed nodes at level i.
Remaining part of the algorithm is very straightforward
and does not affect the order of complexity. So, the
time complexity of the jammed area mapping algorithm is
O(n log(n)) where n is the maximum number of jammed
nodes exist in the same level of it.
Lemma 5: At the time of list formation if we can form the
jammed nodes list according to the angle of incidence
with respect to the x-axis, then the complexity of our
algorithm will be reduced to O(n). (The proof of this
lemma is in the Appendix).
8 Conclusions
Jamming attack plays a key role in affecting the timely
accessibility of data with less energy consumption in
underwater environments because of its difculty to detect
jamming in these environments. In this paper, we discussed
a jamming detection algorithm, UWJDP, specically
designed for UWSN. In the solution discussed, ECA, PSR
and PDR metrics were considered for determining jamming.
Owing to the peculiarities of underwater environments, it is
inappropriate to apply the existing terrestrial solutions in
such environments. It is revealed from the results of the
simulation studies that the discussed solution works well,
provided the threshold values are selected properly.
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In the future, we aim to study a gradual gradation of
intensity of jamming in the nodes, instead of marking the
nodes in a binary way, as jammed or not jammed. We can
also investigate about the need and implementation an
adaptive threshold policy in future. Furthermore, like
jamming, other security issues and different attack are yet
to be explored in the eld of underwater. Thus, this paper
also encourages research work in the eld of security
breaches in UWSN.
9 Acknowledgments
This work has been partially supported by a grant from the
Department of Information Technology, Government of
India, Grant No. 13(10)/2009-CC-BT, which the authors
gratefully acknowledge. The work of the second author was
done when he was a summer visiting student at IIT
Kharagpur, India. This author is currently with IIM
Shillong, India.
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11 Appendix
Lemma 1: The number of entries in the jammed list
determines the density of nodes in the jammed area and/or
the intensity of jamming.
Proof: The number of entries is directly proportional to the
number of jammed nodes. So, a large number of entries can
either mean that a large number of nodes are concentrated
on a particular area which the jammer has successfully
jammed, or the jammer has been able to block a signicant
number of nodes in the network. The minimum range of
the jammer can be found out. Before that we calculate the
value of Dist
Dist = MAX[Lij |i, j in the jammed list] (7)
where i and j represent the ith and jth underwater sensor node,
and Lij is the distance between them. The Dist variable, thus,
calculates the maximum distance between any two
underwater sensor nodes in the jammed list.
So, the jamming range (Rjam) of the jammer can be given
by the inequality
Rjam (1/2) Dist (8)
This indicates the intensity of jamming. A
Lemma 2: Diving nodes used in UWJDP for relaying location
information must broadcast the information at a frequency
which can be different from the frequency in which the
receiver is listening.
Proof: The proof is pretty straightforward. This happens
because of the Doppler effect [45]. The velocity of the
sound wave in the water medium and the relative velocity
between the source and the destination nodes are much
smaller than the speed of light. So, using the formula for
Doppler effect [45], we obtain
 
v + vr
f = f (9)
v + vs 0
where v is the velocity of sound in water, vr is the velocity of
the receiver node in water, vs is the velocity of the source node
in water, f0 is the frequency emitted by the source, and f the
frequency received by the receiver.
The value of vr is positive if the receiver node moves
towards the source node, and vs is positive if the source
node moves away from the receiver node. Since the
velocity of sensor nodes (i.e. receiver nodes) in the network
is assumed to be far less as compared to the speed of sound
in water, so v + vr can be replaced byv. So, the formula
becomes
 
v
f = f (10)
v + vs 0
Hence, the diving node (i.e. source node) broadcasts the
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messages at a frequency ( f0) which is different from the
received frequency ( f ) of the receiving nodes. A data from source to destination.
Lemma 3: The PDR is the indicator of the lifetime of a
network.
Proof: The low PDR implies that more erroneous packet is
received by the receiver, and thus, either packets are to be
retransmitted again or some error correction approach is to
be followed. Since retransmission is quite costly in UWSNs
in terms of energy, a network having a low PDR value for
more number of nodes tends to die out quickly. Hence, the
lifetime of the network is reduced as all energy of the
member nodes is expended quickly and it is difcult to
replenish in quick time. Therefore the PDR value can be an
indicator of network lifetime. A O(n log(n)) time. To compute the angle with respect to x-
Lemma 4: Jamming at least a node of all shortest paths is
necessary but not sufcient condition for jamming the
network completely.
Proof: UWSN is energy constrained network. Generally, a
shortest path between source and destination is used for
data communication to avoid the large energy consumption.
Additionally, the shorter paths are more preferred to
minimise the hop counts. So, the nodes lying on the
shortest paths have a higher probability of being a part of
the route responsible for data communication. If a jammer
wants to block the network completely then at rst it has to
block those paths. Hence, jamming at least one node of
each shortest path is the necessary condition for jamming
the network. However, this is not the sufcient condition as
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there may exist other paths that may be used for routing the
A
Lemma 5: Inserting the entries into the jammed list according
to the angle of incidence with respect to the x-axis gives a
better performance of the proposed JammedAreaMapping
algorithm.
Proof: Especially in the convex hull algorithm the above
technique will helps us a lot. In the Graham Scan
algorithm, the time complexities of various important steps
are as follows. Choosing the pivot point, that is the point
with the lowest y-coordinate takes O(n) time. Sorting of the
list according to increasing order of angle with x-axis takes
axis, a loop has to run traversing n points which takes O(n)
time. There is another for loop running to calculate the
convex hull, which runs from the 3rd vertex to the last
vertex. Time complexity of this loop is O(n 2 2). Finally,
appending the points to the nal list for convex hull takes
O(n) time. Hence, the sorting is the most time consuming
phase of the algorithm, and it denes the overall time
complexity of the algorithm which turns out to be O(n
log(n)). Now, if we can provide the sorted list to the
Graham Scan algorithm then its time complexity will be
reduced to O(n). In our JammedAreaMapping() algorithm if
we can insert the entries into the jammed nodes list
according to the angle with respect to the x-axis then we
could have a sorted list for applying the convex hull
algorithm. In that case the time complexity of our algorithm
can be reduced to O(n). A
IET Commun., 2012, Vol. 6, Iss. 14, pp. 21782188
doi: 10.1049/iet-com.2011.0641