TAADA v.

TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
BY: Kin

Facts:
A motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability

and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.

HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

DIspositive: it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

REPUBLIC v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 173918 April 8, 2008
By: Kin

FACTS:

The Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that
respondent's contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period
December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total
underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the
underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said
surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by
Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94.

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The
Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE. Respondent filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of
the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as
amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR.

It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of
Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of
Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three months from the
date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons. Hence this petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
 whether or not the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for
failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes
effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular
should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987 - filing with the ONAR in the University of the
Philippines Law Center - for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative
Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in
place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and,
therefore, require strict compliance.

In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 200425 and 9 February
200426 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule,
DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was
unable to controvert respondent's allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars
were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative
issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.
Dispositive: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.

GIL G. CAWAD v. FLORENCIO B. ABAD

G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015
By: Kin (mahaba po talaga. Hehe)

FACTS:
Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social and economic well-
being of health workers. Accordingly, public health workers (PHWs) were granted the
public health workers shall receive the following allowances: hazard allowance,
subsistence allowance, longevity pay, laundry allowance and remote assignment
allowance.
Respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-
CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step
Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of
service.7 Specifically, it provided that "an official or employee authorized to be granted
Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to
length of service."8 Shortly thereafter, on November29, 2012, respondents DBM and
DOH then circulated the other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series
of 2012, In a letter9 dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of
Budget and Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their
opposition to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the
benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.
Petitioners assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard
Pay only if the nature of the PHWs' duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305
does not make any qualification. petitioners posit that the same was wrongfully granted
only to PHWs holding regular plantilla positions. Petitioners likewise criticize the DBM-
CSC Joint Circular insofar as it withheld the Step Increment due to length of service
from those who are already being granted Longevity Pay. As a result, petitioners claim
that the subject circulars are void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by
administrative bodies.
Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for
its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing that its implementing
rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the University of the
Philippines Law Center-Office of the National Administrative Register (UP Law Center-
ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the circumstances of this case dictate otherwise.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent issuance of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and
void for its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305
HELD:
Publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in
order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective.24 There are, however,
several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing
further than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed."25 These regulations need not be published for they
add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence
more than what the law itself had already prescribed. As previously discussed, the
qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the
rates of 50 and 25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on
the basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already prescribed
and authorized by pre-existing law. There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by
the subject circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its
Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR,
the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and
filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in
view of the pronouncements above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH
circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR in order
to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.
Nevertheless, it bears stressing that in spite of the immateriality of the publication
requirement in this case, and even assuming the necessity of the same, its basic
objective in informing the public of the contents of the law was sufficiently accomplished
when the DBM-DOH Joint Circular was published in the Philippine Star, a newspaper of
general circulation, on December 29, 2012
Dispositive: The instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular,
insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21
of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The
DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to
be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step
Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity,
however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual exposure to
danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of 50 and 25 subsistence
allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW' s status in the
plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.
COJUANGCO vs.REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 180705 November 27, 2012
By; Kin

FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
Investment Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"), which,
under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every
100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was
PCA. Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions
scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy. And per
Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for
the 72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440
shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the
stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to
him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b)
the increase in FUBs capital stock (the equivalent of 158,840 and 649,800 shares,
respectively). In all, from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of
95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840
shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.1

ISSUE: whether or not the agreement between Cojuanco and PCA can be accorded
with the status of the law without publication
HELD: NO
 It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to
above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the
same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact,
publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. Taada v.
Tuvera37 said as much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case. Laws must
come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn. The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the
law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law.
Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its
supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,

Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the
decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot,
therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, We join the
Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the
Civil Code.

Dispositive:The instant petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner Cojuangco.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
By: Kin

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing

Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing
a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the

ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function
is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue: Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to
the President.

HELD:
R .A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the
following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and equity, public
convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare.33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted
pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in
all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it
may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective
because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and
powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.63

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.

Dispositive: the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335

creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335
is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in
force and effect.

VILLANUEVA VS JBC
GR 211833 APRIL 7, 2015
By: Kin

Facts:

After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva
applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC
however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level
courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he
assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the
policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published
because it will affect all applying judges.

On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR

HELD: No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of
the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.

Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published

HELD: Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, and the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not
an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members
of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who
meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that potential applicants be
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.

Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by
analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the
judiciary.

Dispositive: Premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,

however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication
requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2)
other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

G.R. No. 192117 : September 18, 2012

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC.

(ASTEC), BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), QUEZON I
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO I), and QUEZON II ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO II), Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - x
G.R. No. 192118 : September 18, 2012

CENTRAL LUZON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (CLEA) and

PAMPANGA RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. (PRESCO),
Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.

BY: Kin

FACTS:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), Quezon I Electric

Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO I), Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO II)
and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. (PRESCO) are rural electric
cooperatives established under P.D. No. 269. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and
QUEZELCO II are members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric
Cooperatives, Inc. (ASTEC). PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric
Cooperatives Association, Inc. (CLECA). BATELEC I, et al. are engaged in the
distribution of electricity.

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted. The law imposed a cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to
their consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to
file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30 September 1995, an
application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause
incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its
schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA) was also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created
the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides
that rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the
actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. The ERC also ordered
BATELEC, et al. to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users. In addition, the
ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor mechanism" in the computation of the
over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the
same. On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center and for their retroactivity?
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: publication of laws

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published
in order to be effective. In Tada v. Tuvera, this Court articulated the fundamental
requirement of publication, thus: "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation."

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an

interpretative regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The
applicability of an interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed." It "adds nothing to the law" and "does not affect the
substantial rights of any person." Second, a regulation that is merely internal in
nature does not require publication for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. Third, a letter
of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines
to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties does not
require publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of
the policy guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on
the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed
with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court recognized the basic rule "that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect
unless explicitly stated so." A law is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already
past." The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take away or impair
any vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy guidelines of
the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new
disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it
serves as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural
electric cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up
factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR.It is also not
merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR by
providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied in the
implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in
order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective
and may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of
the over-recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid.
Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA
implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism
invalid for having been applied retroactively.

PARTLY GRANTED.

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
By: Kin

Facts:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the

President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of
public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half
of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication

by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senates internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty
at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by
the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known
as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate
has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can
do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Dispositive: the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R.
No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in
aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

LAPID, vs. HON. LAUREA

G.R. No. 139607. October 28, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents before
(RTC). In their complaint, the Lapid spouses averred that on November 5, 1997, Mrs.
Lapid went to St. Therese and looked for Ms. Norilyn A. Cruz, Christophers classroom
teacher. The directress, Mrs. Esperanza N. Prim, prohibited her from seeing Ms. Cruz
so as not to disrupt ongoing classes. Mrs. Prim advised Mrs. Lapid to return later that
day. On her return, Mrs. Lapid was surprised to see that a letter prepared by Mr.
Binondo, the school principal, was already waiting for her, apprising her of Christophers
suspension for five days effective the following day or on November 6, 1997.
In their answer, respondent school officials stated that as early as June 1997, Ms. Cruz
had been sending them letters regarding Christophers mischief in school, as evidenced
by the letters dated June 20, 1997 and June 25, 1997. According to said respondents,
Christopher had committed serious infractions when he hurt not only his classmates but
also his classroom teacher, Ms. Cruz, and one school employee. They added that at
one time, Christopher stabbed a classmate with a pencil, and at another time, he hit a
teacher with a backpack.These incidents were all recorded by Ms. Cruz and reported to
the Guidance Counselor, Mrs. Flordeliza C. Santos.
Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondent school as in default, which
motion was denied by the trial court. With the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 52970, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to indicate the
material date, particularly the date of filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC,
as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, amending Section 3 of Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[7]Rule 65 of the same rules, also as amended by SC
Circular No. 39-98.[8]Unfazed, on June 15, 1999, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA resolution, but still without indicating the date as to when their
motion for reconsideration of the RTC order was filed.
Issue:
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioners on the ground of formal and procedural deficiency, i.e., the
petitioners failure to state a material date in their petition for certiorari.

Held:
After a careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, particularly their
respective memoranda, we are constrained to agree with the ruling of the respondent
appellate court which dismissed the instant petition for certiorari. We find no reversible
error in the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals because in filing a special civil
action for certiorari without indicating the requisite material date thereon, petitioners
violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was
filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. [16] In the case
before us, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the second date, particularly
the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.[17] As explicitly stated in the
aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
We find unsatisfactory the explanation of petitioners, through counsel, that they have
not come across said Circular No. 39-98 at the time of the filing of the petition in the
CA.[22] On one hand, law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be fully
conversant with the requirements for the institution of certiorari proceedings under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, ignorantia legis non
excusat.[23]Ignorance in this regard encompasses not only substantive but also
procedural laws.

Dispositive: The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated June 1,1999 and August 4, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52970 are
AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.