FOSTER Johanna - An Invitation To Dialogue Clarifying The Position of Feminist Gender Theory in Relation To

An Invitation to Dialogue: Clarifying the Position of Feminist Gender Theory in Relation to
Sexual Difference Theory

Author(s): Johanna Foster
Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Aug., 1999), pp. 431-456
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AN INVITATIONTODIALOGUE
Clarifying the Position of Feminist Gender
Theory in Relation to Sexual Difference Theory
JOHANNAFOSTER
Rutgers,The State Universityof New Jersey
Thecentralargumentof this article is twofold.First,contemporaryfeministgender theory,particularly

as it has been used byfeministsociologists in recentyears, has been misinterpretedby sexual difference
theoryin ways thatmaypreventscholarsfromfully appreciatingcurrentfeministworkin the social sci-
ences. Second,gender theoryand sexualdifferencetheoryrelyon differentconceptualizationsoffunda-
mental concepts in feminist theory, including notions of "gender,""sexuality,"and "symbolic."An
analysis of threekeytextsthatcritiquethe turnto "gender"infavor of an allegorical notion of "sexual
difference"suggests thatfeminist gender theory is a more useful perspectivefor feminist theory and
research. The article concludes that gender theory allows feminist scholars to ask a wider range of
empirical questions that are more readily of use for political action than does a sexual difference
paradigm.
A tension betweenfeministswho advocate"gender"as a useful analyticcategory

and feminists who advocatethe usefulness of the notionof "sexualdifference"has
surfacedin recentyears in scholarlydebatesin the social sciences andthe humani-
ties. I suggest thatthis persistenttensionin women's studies andfeminist theoryis
notjust an inconsequentialconflationof termsbuttheresultof a lack of attentionon
the partof sexual differencetheoristsand gendertheoriststo ways in which each
position makes differentuse of some fundamentalconceptsin feminist theory.The
purposeof this article,however,is not to addto this confusionbutto move towarda
dialogue between feminist gender theorists and sexual difference theorists. By
clarifying the position of recent feminist gendertheoryin the social sciences, and
making more explicit some underlying assumptions of a sexual difference
AUTHOR'S NOTE:I would like to thankGender& Society editor Beth E. Schneider,reviewerSarah

Fenstermaker,and an anonymousreviewerforthemanyhelpfulsuggestionsfor revisionI receivedon an
earlier draft of this article. I have also benefitedgreatlyfrom the commentsand suggestions of Judy
Gerson, Leslie McCall, TomRudel, Mary Gatta, Sylvia Fuller, and TaraJethwani. I am particularly
gratefulto CourtneyBangertJackson,PatriciaMcDaniel,and KeumjaeParkforgraciously takingtime
awayfrom their own work to read and commenton mine.
REPRINT REQUESTS: Johanna Foster, 7627 Westwind Lane, Houston, TX 77071; e-mail:
JohanFost@aol.com.
GENDER& SOCIETY, Vol.13No. 4, August1999 431-456
? 1999SociologistsforWomenin Society
431
432 GENDER & SOCIETY / August 1999
perspectivefor feminist sociologists, I hope to contributeto more informed and

productivedebatesin feminist theory.
The centralargumentis twofold.First,some of the obstaclesto moremeaningful
discussion take the form of misguidedcritiquesof currentfeminist gender theory
by sexual differencetheorists.These critiquesare misguidedin partbecause such
claims do not considerrecentworkin the social sciences. I respondto threemajor
critiquesof gender theorists;namely,that gender theoryreifies a sex/gender dis-
tinction,thatgendertheoryseeks to erasethe category"woman"andthereforeren-
dersgenderpoliticallymeaningless,andthatgendertheoryis overlyfocused on the
materialand thus fails to be as useful as sexual differencetheoryin understanding
women's experiences.Addressingthese misunderstandingsof recentfeministgen-
der theoryis an importanttask given thatsuch misconceptionsmay preventfemi-
nist scholars from fully appreciatingthe contributionsof currenttheoreticaland
empiricalworkconductedby social scientistsand,thus,miss importantopportuni-
ties for interdisciplinarywork. Second, it is notjust some sexual difference theo-
rists' misconceptionsof gender scholarshipthat should be of interestto sociolo-
gists. Even when the misconceptionsof gendertheoryareclarified,those who find
feminist social science useful should also be interestedin the ways that a "sexual
difference"perspectiveand a "gender"perspectiverely on differentfundamental
definitions of the symbolic and subjectivity,as well as gender,sex, sexuality,and
the role of the imaginaryin liberation.I suggest thatsome of these majorassump-
tions of sexual differencetheoristsnot only divergefromthe assumptionsof gender
theorybutareproblematicin andof themselves.Despiteclaims to be antiessential-
ist, sexual differencetheoristsimply thatmen do not havegendersbutinsteadcarry
the Phallus (which is thoughtto be differentfrom gender), that biological sex is
fixed and binary,and thatsexualityshouldbe privilegedover othertypes of differ-
ences as central to women's subjectivity.Sexual difference theory implies that
sexuality should be the primaryfocus in dismantlingpatriarchy(and not, say, the
compoundingeffects of sexuality,gender,race, and/ornation)and that liberation
depends on mobilizing women on the basis of a shared-sexedidentityratherthan
politics. For feminist sociologists to betterarticulatethe contributions,both theo-
retical and empirical,thatsociology can make to feminist studies, we ought to be
clear about these implicit and sometimes explicit positions of sexual difference
theorists vis-a-vis gender theory. I conclude by summarizingsome preliminary
suggestionsfor how an approachto the studyof women andgenderthatuses "gen-
dertheory"ratherthan"sexualdifference"opensmoredoorsforempiricalresearch
and political action.
My analysisexaggeratesfor heuristicpurposesthedistinctivenessof genderthe-
ory and sexual differencetheoryas they are presentedprimarilyin threeprovoca-
tive feminist texts; namely, philosopher Rosi Braidotti's Nomadic Subjects:
Embodimentand Sexual Difference in FeministTheory(1994), philosopherand
legal scholar Drucilla Cornell's Transformations:Recollective Imaginationand
Sexual Difference (1994), and literarycritic TaniaModleski's Feminismwithout
Women:Cultureand Criticismin a "PostfeministAge" (1991). Although quite
Foster / INVITATION TO DIALOGUE 433
differenton many accounts,the texts aretied togetherby common argumentsfor a

sexual differenceparadigm.In no way do I suppose that these works exhaust the
scholarshipby sexual differencetheorists.Instead,I admitto selecting these par-
ticular texts because they were introducedto me duringa course of study as key
worksof feministtheorypublishedin the 1990s and,thus,werefamiliarto me as an
analyst.This granted,I purposelyselected these threetexts and not othersbecause
in each of these texts either an explicit or implicit critiqueof "gendertheory"and
"genderstudies"is carriedout in favor of "sexualdifference."Before I detail the
ways in which these three texts, taken together,make several erroneous claims
against gender theory as partof largertheorizing,I briefly map each position.
FEMINIST GENDER THEORY
As many readerswill know, the term "gender,"althoughregularlyused today,

was coined in the 1970s as a resultof the path-breakingworkof academicfeminists
contesting the black-boxtheorizingof genderin the social sciences (Acker 1992,
565). Critiquingthe dominantconceptualizationof "sex"for conflatingthe biologi-
cal with the socially produced,feminists insteadinsistedthatdifferencesbased on
reproductivebiology be demarcatedfromthose constructedwithina social context,
terming the latterdifferences "gender."The result was a general acceptanceof a
conceptualsplit betweenbiological sex, or one's ascribedstatusas male or female,
and gender, one's achieved status as masculine or feminine/manor woman. This
turntoward"genderrole"theorywas also an importantpolitical parryto biodeter-
ministjustificationsfor genderinequality.Yet,althoughthe term"gender"success-
fully enteredpopularand scientific lexicons in Americaover two decades ago, its
exact meaningremainsuncertain.Supposedlyshed of the biodeterminisminherent
in the term"sex,"genderhas since beenexplainedby feministscholarsas a role, as a
social category,as a social practice,as performance,as social structure,and some-
times a combinationof these.
Since the second-wavefeministmovementandthe successful pushto recognize
"gender"as conceptuallydistinctfrom "sex,"therehave been significanttheoreti-
cal challenges to this understandingof gender from feminists across disciplines.
These challenges include charges that genderrole theory relies on fixed dichoto-
mies, fails to account for power relations, and is insensitive to historical change
(Lopata and Thorne 1978). By contrast,radical,Marxist, and socialist feminists
argueimplicitly or explicitly thatgendershouldbe understoodas a social category.
Ratherthan viewing genderas an individualattribute,or as complementaryroles,
such theoristsconceptualizegenderas a majorsocial organizingprinciplethatsorts
people into two separatebut unequalgroups.However,such reconceptualizations
of gender have also met with criticisms for either lacking historical analysis or
being deterministic,essentializing genderdichotomies,failing to attendto micro-
interactions,and offering a less than adequateframeworkfor understandingthe
compoundingeffects of sexism and racism (Connell 1987, 54-60; King 1988).
Whetherinformed by social interactionism(Gerson and Piess 1985), ethno-

methodology (Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Fenstermaker1995-1996;
West andZimmerman1987), feministpoststructuralism(Weedon1987), practice-
basedtheory(Connell 1987), or feministtheoriesof biology (Fausto-Sterling1985,
1993), otherscholarshave contestedthe very dividebetweenthe gendercategories
of man and woman/masculineand feminine, as well as deconstructedthe binary
classification of biological sex (see also Laqueur1990) and sexual desire (Weeks
1977, 1986). The workof some of these same scholarsfurthersuggests thatthereis
no fixed correspondencebetween sexed bodies, genderedidentities, and sexual
identities (see also Butler 1990; Rubin 1984), nor is there a fixed correspondence
between sexual practicesand identity(Blumsteinand Schwartz1974, 1976, 1977,
1990; McIntosh 1981; Plummer 1975; Richardsonand Hart 1981). Such chal-
lenges to conventionalcategoriesof sex, gender,andsexualityhaveoccurredalong-
side of or are indebted to the long-articulatedand interdisciplinarycritiques by
feminists of color and lesbian feministsof the racist,heterosexist,and class biases
inherentin mainstreamfeminism's conceptualizationsof "woman"and "gender"
(Anzaldua 1987; Baca Zinn et al. 1986; Davis 1983; Gunn Allen 1986; Higgin-
botham 1986; Hill Collins 1986; hooks 1989; King 1988; Lorde 1984; Moraga
1983;MoragaandAnzaldua1981;NakanoGlenn 1985;Rich 1980;Zavella 1988).
Taken together,these scholars and others have been critical in shaping feminist
social scientists' understandingof gender as changing processes of naturalizing
inequalitythatarecreatedandrecreatedalong with othersocial inequalities-such
as class, race, nation,or sexuality-via everydaysocial practices.
I arguethatthis enormousbody of theoreticalandempiricalresearch,although
well beyond the scope of this article to review, has been either central to or has
informed currentfeminist social science theory and researchsuch that there is
arguablya theoreticalperspectivein feminist social science that can be termed
"gendertheory."Those who might call themselvesfeminist gendertheoristsreject
the notionthatgenderis an attribute,a variable,a role assignedto individualsbased
on one's "natural"sex category,or a binaryandstaticentity.Instead,such theorists
understandgender,not to mentionotheridentitiessuch as sexualityandrace, to be
social andhistoricalprocessesthatcreatemultiplemeaningsin multiplesites, ones
thatoccur on manylevels of social interaction-from microrelationsto macrorela-
tions. Whether these macro or gendered structures are called patriarchies
(Hondagneu-Sotelo1994) or genderorders(Connell 1987), they are theorizedas
constitutiveof a hierarchyof masculinitiesand femininities whereby some men
hold power and privilege over all women, as well as marginalizedgroupsof men,
due to the intersections of heterosexism,racism, nationalism,and/or economic
exploitation.Inthis model, some groupsof womenarein a dominantsocial location
vis-a-vis other groups of women and some subordinatedgroups of men but are
themselvessubordinatedto thosemen practicingformsof "hegemonicmasculinity"
(Connell 1987). Moreover,gender theory neither takes for grantedas fixed the
boundariesandmeaningof identitiesnorpositsa necessaryrelationshipbetweensex,
gender, and sexuality (Blackwood 1984; Nicholson 1994; Pringle 1993; Rust
1993). Lastly,for this discussion, gendertheoristsdo not privilegegenderrelations

as more critical in understandingsocial inequalitythanothertypes of relations.In
other words, there is no one central, ahistorical,or universal system of power.
Instead,the processesof genderingmustbe conceptualizedas one of manyvariable
forms of dominationand subordination,not as the primaryoperationof inequality
(see, among others, Hess 1990; Hewitt 1992; Jones 1982).' Ultimately,for many
"gendertheorists,"theorizinggenderis not antitheticalto feministpractice;rather,
it is one kind of political action. Here, practicalfeminist actionis based on neither
the denial nor the affirmationof bodily differencesbut the understandingthatcol-
lective notions of such differences are produced in changing social, economic,
political, andhistoricalcontexts.In otherwords,progressivesocial changeis better
promotednot by ignoringor valorizingbodily differencesbutby creatingpolitical
solidaritiesrootedin a sharedconsciousnessof such social processesandtheirvari-
ous consequences (see Fuss 1989).
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE THEORY
In contrast,sexualdifferencetheorists,as representedprimarilyin the threetexts

above, arguethata sexual differenceparadigmis bothan epistemologicalapproach
and a creativeprocess. Such an approach/processseeks to develop an alternative
form of female subjectivity,one thatis constructedvia assertingsexual difference
as a positive force. For sexual differencetheorists,a liberatoryfemale subjectivity
comes through imaginative processes such as a returnto a female voice, or to
"woman'sspeech,"or to an affirmationof the feminine. As Cornell explains, "If
thereis to be a feminism at all, as a political movementthatadequatelychallenges
the genderhierarchywhich necessarilyrepudiatesthe value of the feminine sexual
difference, we must rely on a feminine voice and a feminine 'reality'that can be
identified as such and in some way correlatedwith the lives of actual women"
(1994, 58). Modleski echoes a similarposition when she says that it is "precisely
the performative,rhetoricaleffects of woman's speech that express the utopian
aspirationsof feminism and the utopian dimension of the term 'women' within
feminism" (1991, 22). Braidottiis perhapsmost explicit when she says, "I have
opted for the extremeaffirmationof a sexed identityas a way of reversingthe attri-
butionof differencein a hierarchicalmode. This extremeaffirmationof sexual dif-
ferencemay lead to repetition,butthe crucialfactorhereis thatit empowerswomen
to act" (1994, 169). Perhapsas a way to distinguishsexual differencetheoryfrom
whatI would call culturalfeministtheory,sexualdifferencetheoristsposit thatsuch
imaginativeprocesses of returningto a female voice are necessarilyconnected to
the female body and to women's lived experiencesin ways that are said to be alle-
gorical or mythicalratherthanbiological or material.
More specifically, and unlike gendertheorists,sexual differencetheory places
the key to women's liberationin this transformationof women's subjectivityas it is
constitutedin relationto sexuality.Theorizingthe relationshipbetween women's
436 GENDER& SOCIETY/ August1999
sexuality,language,the symbolic, andthe psyche, sexualdifferencefeministsposit

a new form of materialismthat"emphasiz[es]the embodiedandthereforesexually
differentiatedstructureof the speakingsubject.Consequently,rethinkingthe bod-
ily roots of subjectivityis the startingpoint for [such an] epistemologicalproject"
(Braidotti1994, 3). Sexual differencetheory,as articulatedhere,does this rethink-
ing of the bodilyrootsof women'ssubjectivityby deconstructingLacanianpsycho-
analysis. In my interpretationof Lacan,2individualsgain subjectivityas they move
from the presymbolicto the Symbolic realm, which is understoodto be a phallo-
centric or masculine symbolic order given in language. It is precisely in this
entranceinto the Symbolic thatindividualsalso acquirethe markof sexual differ-
ence. The logic of this patriarchalsymbolic order3demandsthat the feminine is
always repudiated,or neverrepresented.As such, thena returnto women's speech,
or to an affirmationof the feminine,is a feministnegationof the phallic negationof
the feminine.This affirmationof the femininemight also be understoodas a return
to a presymbolic realm that is not given in phallocentriclanguage but can be
accessed throughimaginaryor creativeprocesses. Accordingto sexual difference
theory,such a negationof the negationbecomes a way to dismantlenot only gender
butracialhierarchiesby calling on thatwhichis alwaysoutsidethe patriarchalsym-
bolic order.Althoughacknowledgingdifferencesamongwomen, sexualdifference
theoryassertsan allegoricalor mythicalaffirmationof sexual differenceas the best
paradigm for understandingdifferences among women as well as differences
betweenwomen andmen. Like gendertheory,sexualdifferencetheoryrelies on the
insights of some versions of poststructuralism.4 Yet, unlike gendertheory,sexual
difference theory relies on the insights of poststructuralistthought as it overlaps
with psychoanalysis. Ultimately,sexual difference theory remains suspicious of
deconstructionat the same time thatit sharesan affinitywithfeministpsychoanaly-
sis5as a way of valuingthe femininenot as biology butas allegoryunderminingthe
phallic logic of identity.
It is importantto note thatsome conceptualdivides between such paradigmsas
feministpsychoanalysis,feministpoststructuralism, Frenchfeministtheory,sexual
differencetheory,and gendertheoryare not always easily mappedout in the three
texts I have selected. To be sure, in the largerfield of feminist theorizing,some of
these paradigmsshare some overlapsand each is far from monolithic itself. The
interpretationsof feminist psychoanalytictheory and Frenchfeminist theory,for
example, have been multiple and sometimes contradictory,as in debates on
whether psychoanalysis ignores the social (see Abel 1990) or how to interpret
Lacan'snotionofjouissance, or debateson the essentialism(or not) of the concept
of ecriturefeminine. Nonetheless,it is sometimesunclearhow these texts position
themselves in relation to Frenchfeminist theory,or Lacanianpsychoanalysis,or
poststructuralism.At times, they eitherseemingly standin oppositionto a particu-
larinterpretationor implicitlyor explicitlyembraceit. Forexample,Braidottisug-
gests thatthe contemporarydebatebetweensexual differencetheoristsand gender
theoristsstems from a 1980s intellectualstalematebetweenAnglo-Americangen-
der theoristsand Frenchecriturefeminists (1994, 258). Yet, it is often difficult to
assess how Braidotti's 1990s version of sexual difference theory is distinct from
earlierarticulationsof Frenchfeministtheory.Tobe fair,sexualdifferencetheorists
may arguethatit is exactly this inabilityto locate these particulartexts of sexualdif-
ference squarelyin theirrelationto key theoreticaltraditionsthatis theirtheoretical
strength.Regardless,it is importantto note thatthe interpretationsof eitherpsycho-
analysis, poststructuralism,or the insights of Frenchfeminism as they appearin
these three texts may not be characteristicof sexual differencetheory in general.
Perhapsone of the most importantcharacteristicsof sexual difference theory for
feminist sociologists, however,is sexual differencetheory'sexplicit critiqueof the
notion of "gender"(Braidotti1994, 152).
GENDER THEORY THROUGH THE

EYES OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE THEORY
Each text containsmajor,and sometimes contradictory,critiquesof those who

rely on the notion of "gender"as an analytictool. One of the most easily rejectedof
these claims by sexual differencetheoryis the notionthatthose advocating"gender
theory" are ultimatelyjust reinscribinga long traditionof liberal feminism that
relies on the conceptualdistinctionbetween sex as biological and genderas social.
As I suggested above, such a way of looking at genderwas employedby early gen-
derrole theoryin sociology. Yet,sexualdifferencetheoristsarguethatthisproblem-
atic approachto genderhas merely resurfacedin the guise of "gendertheory"and
"genderstudies."For example, Cornelldismisses the notion of "gender"because,
among otherthings, "gender"supposedlyassumes a reified split between sex and
gender and, thus, is "too limited a conceptionof our lives as sexuate [sic] beings"
(Corell 1994, 4). Although it is unclearto me what precisely Cornell means by
"sexuate,"she conflates gendertheorywith genderrole theoryif she assumes that
gendertheoryleaves no roomfor an adequateexplanationof eithersexual desire or
the experience of living in a biologically sexed body. I certainlyagree that tradi-
tional gender role theory takes sexual desire for granted,more particularlyas a
fixed component of biological sex. Genderrole theory also takes for grantedthe
categories of biological sex themselves. However,currentgendertheory,as I sug-
gested above, in no way assumes that there is a fixed relationshipbetween sexed
bodies, desire, or identities.In otherwords, one's sexed body does not necessarily
determineone's genderedidentity or one's sexual identity.One's sexual identity
and practices of desire may or may not correspond,and one's genderedidentity
might not "match"one's genderedpractices.Contemporaryfeminist sociological
researchsuggests thatthe meaningsgiven to experiencesof living in a sexed body,
as well as the meaningsof sexualidentitiesandpractices,aremeaningsproducedin
social interaction,neitherconstantnor singular.For example, Rust's (1993) work
on the constructionof identityamong lesbian and bisexual women illustratesthat
"coming out" is not a linear process, that identities and sexual practices are not
always congruent,andthatsexual identityis not fixed overthe life course.Rustalso
investigatesthe ways in which individualsimputemeaningto theirsexual practices

given the rangeof availablediscourseson identitypresentwithina particularsocio-
historicalcontext.Withworksuch as this, to finddangerin the focus on "gender"as
a resurfacingof liberalfeminismandthusa resurfacingof a theoretical"blindspot"
on women as "sexuate"beings is to underemphasizea critical body of feminist
social scientific theory and research.6
There is a good deal of currentgender scholarshipthat conceptualizesgender
not as functionalinterdependentroles based on heterosexistnotions of biological
sex butas social processesorpracticesthatareshifting,historical,andproducedon
multiple levels of social organization.Moreover,unlike sexual difference theory,
such a perspectivehas generatedempiricalresearchon the ways in which social
structuresof genderareinseparablefrom otheraxes of dominationand subordina-
tion. Forexample,the workof Lamphereandhercolleagues (1993) on the relation-
ship between gender,class, and ethnicity in the lives of Sunbelt working women
illustratessuch scholarshipin the social sciences; they use whatthey call "practice
anthropology"as a theoreticalperspectivethat allows for an analysis of both the
differences and commonalities among women without taking the category
"women"as eithera homogenizedor decontextualizedanalytic.Such a conceptu-
alization, they argue, allows them to understandthe connections between social
practicesof identity,structure,andconstraintand the force of historyin the every-
day lives of this group of working women. Hondagneu-Sotelo(1994) employs a
similar conceptualizationof gender in her empiricalinvestigationof the ways in
which the genderedpracticesof Mexican women and men have transformedand
been transformedby experiencesof immigrationto the UnitedStatesduringdiffer-
ent historicalperiods.Hondagneu-Sotelodescribeshow changinggenderedprac-
tices and meanings were both constrainedand enabledin Mexico and the United
States by largerprocesses of global economic restructuring.Ultimately,her work
encouragesa fundamentalshiftin scholars'understandingof bothmacrotrendsand
microprocessesof immigrationas inseparablefrom genderrelations.Given these
illustrations,perhapsit becomes more evidentthatcontemporarygendertheoryin
the social sciences is not akin to traditionalsocializationor genderrole theory.
This slip into assumptionsthatcurrentgendertheoryis synonymouswith gender
role theoryhas also led sexualdifferencetheoriststo equatescholarshipin this vein
with politically negative institutionalconsequences; namely, the co-optation of
women's studiesprograms/departments by men andwomen who arenot criticalof
patriarchy.Embeddedin this concernthatgendertheoryis reallya "resurfacing"of
liberalfeminism aretwo quitedifferentissues; namely,the importanceof feminist
studies of masculinities and the importance of men in feminist movements.
Braidottiillustratesthe first concernwhen she says, "I thinkthe main assumption
behind 'gender studies' is a new symmetrybetween the sexes, which practically
resultsin a renewalof interestfor men andmen's studies"(1994, 150). Moreover,
Braidottiarguesthatthe success of genderstudiesprogramshas "resultedin a shift
of focus away fromthe feminist agendatowarda more generalizedattentionto the
social constructionof differencesbetweenthe sexes. It is a broadeningout that is
also a thinningdown of the politicalagenda"(1994, 151). Both BraidottiandMod-

leski equate the rise of gender studies, as well as the increase in men conducting
men's studies,with a threatto feministpractice.Accordingto Braidotti,"Although
the male critiquesof masculinityareextremelyimportantandnecessary,... I think
this institutionalcompetition... to includemenas a presence and as a topic-and
the keepingup of the feministagendais regrettable"(Braidotti1994, 151;emphasis
added). Similarly, on the idea of men in feminism, Braidottisays, "Somewhere
along the line I am viscerally opposedto the whole idea:Men aren'tand shouldn't
be in feminism:The feminist space is not theirsand not for them to see. They have
not inheriteda world of oppressionand exclusion based on their sexed corporeal
being"(1994, 137-38). These kindsof claims by sexual differencetheoristsfalsely
assume thatwith the exceptionof some gay male scholarsstudyinggay male sexu-
ality, men's scholarshiparoundmasculinityis rarelyfeminist, andthatthereare no
feministwomen conductinguseful analysesof masculinity.Yet,to say thatbecause
some male scholarsconductantifeministworkin the name of gender,genderstud-
ies and gendertheory must be suspect, is akin to saying that because antifeminist
women conduct researchon women, women's studies itself is not useful.
Perhapssexual differencetheory blurs institutionalcritiquesof gender studies
departments/programs with a critique of the intellectual investigationor decon-
structionof gender.7In otherwords,it is possible thatsuch a turnto genderstudies
does not necessarily mean thatthe study of genderis, in and of itself, misguided.
Quite the contrary,many gender theoristsargue that it is imperativeto study the
constructionof all identitiesas multiple,includingdominantidentitiessuch as mas-
culinities, to fully understandbothmicropracticesandmacrostructuresof inequal-
ity.8For example, in his researchon the Westerninstitutionof sports and its rela-
tionship to various kinds of masculinity,Messner (1994) finds that the rise of
institutionalizedathleticswas inseparablefrom the constructionand maintenance
of Europeancolonialism. Throughthe use of violent andcompetitivesport,agents
of the Europeanempirelegitimateda particularkindof violent, competitivemascu-
linity seen as necessaryin the administrationof a colonial regime.Messnerillumi-
nates the ways in which such meanings and practicesof masculinityas organized
by sportwere also centralto the rise of the United States as a world power.More-
over,he arguesthatinstitutionalizedsportsservedto reasserthegemonicmasculin-
ity withinnationalbordersin the face of feministthreatsto Americanmale suprem-
acy during the 19th century.Aside from situatingpatternsof masculinity within
largerstructuralandhistoricalcontexts,Messner'sworkdemonstrateshow individ-
ual athletes and coaches in contemporaryAmerican society deploy gender and
sexualityin the practiceof sportin ways thatsimultaneouslycreateandmaintaina
race- andclass-basedstructureof advantage.In this way, Messner'sexplorationof
men as social actorsandof the variableconstructsof masculinityis a feministproj-
ect that seeks to betterunderstandhow shifting patternsof masculinityoperatein
relation to other patternsof inequality,not to depoliticize masculinity (see also
Brod 1987; Connell 1995; Kimmel and Messner 1992; McDaniel 1997).
Given sexual differencetheory'sassumptionthatgendertheorycan be equated

with the notionof symmetryreminiscentof genderrole theory,it appearscontradic-
torythatsexual differencetheoryalso understands,andcritiques,the rise of gender
studiesas connectedto poststructuralist analysesthatchallengetraditionalhuman-
ist notionsof a unifiedsubject.Moreover,sexualdifferencetheoristsposition them-
selves as antiessentialistwhile simultaneouslycritiquinggendertheoristsfor tak-
ing the same line. Forexample,in one place, Braidottidefendssexualdifferenceby
expressing"concernfor the ways in which 'radical'feministshave [dismissedsex-
ual difference]as a hopelessly 'essentialist'notion"(1994, 148). Braidottiexplains
that since sexual differencefeminism views the body "orthe embodiment,of the
subject... as neithera biological or a sociological categorybutratheras a point of
overlappingbetweenthe physical,the symbolic,andthe sociological,"9theposition
of sexual differencefeminismis notessentialistat all, but"goeshandin handwith a
radicalrejectionof essentialism"(1994, 4). Yet,in anotherplace, Braidottiequates
the turnto genderas a threatto erase the category"woman"when she claims that
"nowadays,the anti-sexualdifferencefeminist line has evolved into an argument
for a 'beyond gender'or a 'post gender'kind of subjectivity.This line of thought
argues for the overcomingof sexual dualism and gender polarities,in favor of a
new, sexually undifferentiated,subjectivity"(1994, 149). Furthermore,Braidotti
argues, "The argumentthat one needs to redefine the female feminist subject,
which is reiteratedby sexual differencetheorists,is echoed by the contradictory
claims of gendertheorists,thatthe feminine is a morassof metaphysicalnonsense
andthatone is betteroff rejectingit altogether,in favorof a new androgyny"(1994,
153). Similarly,Modleski rejectsgenderstudiesas associatedwith what she finds
to be a troublesomeemergenceof a feministpostmodernism:"Theonce exhilarat-
ing propositionthatthereis no 'essential'female naturehas been elaboratedto the
point whereit is now often used to scare 'women'away frommakingany generali-
zations aboutor political claims on behalf of a groupcalled 'women' " (1991, 15).
In critiquessuch as these, it seems as if sexualdifferencetheoristsaresuspiciousof
gendertheoryas botha perspectivethatdeconstructsgenderto thepointthatgender
is no longer currentlymeaningful,and thus politically devastatingto the feminist
movement, and a paradigmthat advocatesa futureworld in which gender differ-
ences would be eliminated.
In response, it seems to me that sexual differencetheory assumes that gender
theory's challenge to the "essence"of gender,or to gender,sex, and sexual dual-
isms, is equivalentto an erasureof "woman,"a claim certainly recognizable as
echoing the much writtenaboutand importantdebatebetweenfeminist poststruc-
turalistsandessentialistfeminists.Here,sexualdifferencetheoristsmay be conflat-
ing gendertheorists'deconstructionof identitycategorieswith the notionthatgen-
der categories, as social productions,are inconsequential.Using this logic, the
effects of gender oppressionare minimized by gender scholars as they erase the
very category "woman."Moreover,with the category"woman"erasedby decon-
struction,any effortsto mobilize againstthe effects of sexism, then,arealso erased
given thatthe very identitiesof the social actorsthemselvesareseen as illusoryand
not legitimate. I cannot stress enough that this interpretationof feminist decon-
structionsof genderas they areconductedin the social sciences is inaccurate:When
gendertheoristsarguethatthe category"woman"is socially produced,they are in
no way arguingthat such social constructionsdo not have very real consequences
for people's lives. In fact, the projectof manyfeministgendertheoristsin the social
sciences is to understandpreciselyhow identitycategoriesareproducedandrepro-
duced withinparticularsociohistoricalandpolitical contextsas partof the produc-
tion andreproductionof inequality.Manyof these scholarsarecommittedto under-
standing the operationof identity categories precisely because they understand
such classification systems as social processes that have materialimpact on peo-
ple's lived experiences (see West and Fenstermaker1995).
Manyscholarsadvocatethe use of "gender"as opposedto "sexualdifference"as
a result of long-standingcritiquesby feminists of color that sexism is not the sole
process of inequalityshapingwomen's lives. As such, the move to look at genderas
one of manysystems of operationis not at all a move to erasethe category"woman"
butinsteadis a move to shiftthe primaryfocus of feministtheoryandresearchoff of
Anglo-American, middle-class, heterosexual women as those constituting
"women."Such critiqueshavetaughtfeministtheorythata single-mindedfocus on
the category "woman"to understandall women's experiences not only reifies
"woman"as a monolithic social categorybut masks the ways in which gendered
processes are used to subordinatemen of marginalizedgroups as well. In other
words,a conceptualfocus on "women"insteadof "gender"runsthe riskof ignoring
the ways in which femininitiesandmasculinitiesaresimultaneouslyembeddedin,
for instance,racializedandsexualizedpractices,as well as class structureandrelig-
ious or nationalidentities.Butleralso makesthis point'?when she notes thattheo-
rists have turnedto the concept of gender "as a way of insisting that feminism
expand its political concernsbeyond gender symmetry,to underscorethe cultural
specificity ... [and]interrelationswith otherpoliticallyinvestedcategories,such as
nationandrace"(Braidottiwith Butler1994, 36)." In otherwords,the social scien-
tific work I detailed above, althoughnot alone, suggests thatif "a stable notion of
gender no longer proves to be the foundationalpremise of feminist politics,"it is
betterto understandsuch contributionsas suggesting a "new sort of feminist poli-
tics ... to contest the very reificationof gender and identity"(Butler 1994, 5).
These clarificationssuggest thatantiessentialistgenderscholarshipattemptsto
demonstratethe very instabilityof categoriesof identitynot to preventclaims mak-
ing on the partof feministsbutto bettercomprehendthe particularsystems of domi-
nationandsubordinationandthusbetterstrategizeto changethem.Giventhis, pro-
moting a strategy that women unite by the political necessity to challenge the
creation and deployment of these categories and their consequences, as gender
theoristsdo, is in no way to deny the existence of gender,to rejectwomen, or to live
in a "postgender"world. Even if genderscholarswere actively advocatingan era-
sureof gendercategoriesin some utopianworld,it is unclearto me why it is danger-
ous to lose genderin such a place. If feminists areultimatelylooking for a world in
which genderdoes not organizepeople into hierarchiesor createdifferentialpower
positions, thenit is unclearto me why the eliminationof genderwould be problem-

atic. I arguethat sexual differencetheoristsare seemingly willing to concede that
gender as a social category should lose its relevancein organizinginequality,but
they arecuriouslynot willing to say thatgendermay not haveto exist at all in some
futureworld.This apparentpuzzle makesmore sense once the underlyingassump-
tions of a sexual differenceperspectiveare made more explicit.
Lastly,given the attentionthatmanygenderscholarscurrentlygive to the ways
in which identity categoriesare constructedand maintainedin the service of ine-
quality, it may strike some sociologists as odd that gender scholarship is also
implicitly andexplicitly critiquedby sexualdifferencetheoryfor failing to investi-
gate the importanceof "thesymbolic"in understandingwomen's oppression.For
example, Braidottiarguesthat
thesexualdifferencefeminists[give]newimpetusto thefeministdebateby drawing
attentionto thesocialrelevanceof thetheoretical
andlinguisticstructuresof differ-
encesbetweenthesexes.... Thisschoolof feministthoughtarguesthatanadequate
analysisof women'soppression musttakeintoaccountbothlanguageandmaterial-
ismandnotbe reducedto eitherone.Theyareverycriticalof thenotion"gender" as
beingundulyfocusedon socialandmaterialfactors,to thedetriment of thesemiotic
andsymbolicaspects.(1994,152)
Perhapsdisturbingto sociologists andothersocial scientistsis Braidotti'sinterpre-

tationthatthe workof genderscholarsis too concernedwith materialconditionsat
the expense of the symbolic. It is importantfor feminist sociologists to be aware,
however,thatwhen sexual differencetheorychargesgendertheory with ignoring
the symbolic, such scholarsuse a very particular,andrelativelynarrow,idea of the
symbolic;namely,one understoodprimarilyin termsof semiotics.Here,"theSym-
bolic" is a referenceto thatwhich is given in languageand, as I suggested above,
distinguishedfrom "thepresymbolic."When sexual differencetheoristsclaim that
gender scholarshipis "unduly"materialor social, they are also arguingthat such
workundertheorizestherole of languageandmeaningin maintainingdomination.
By contrast,for many social scientists not informedby semiotics or feminist
psychoanalysis,a symbol is anyactionor objectrepresentingsomethingelse (Mar-
shall 1994, 524-25). Symbolic interactionism,for example,as a majorparadigmin
sociology, is concernedpreciselywith the ways in which individualactorsproduce
meaning in everyday interaction.Although there is some affinity, in general,
between some versionsof semiotics and symbolic interactionism(Marshall1994,
525), the latterdoes not locate meaningsprimarilyin the structureof languagebut
ratheras they emergein social interaction.Giventhis, it is unfairto claim thatgen-
der scholars,as informedby suchperspectivesin the social sciences, reducegender
relationsto materialrelations.Perhapsit is moreaccurateto claim thatgenderthe-
ory andsexual differencetheorytakethe role of the symbolic/theSymbolic to refer
to differentsocial processes. Gendertheoristsunderstandthe importanceof mean-
ing andrepresentationbutdo not conceptualizea Lacaniannotionof the Symbolic
as centralto eitherinequalityorliberationfrominequality.Instead,gendertheorists
have a muchbroaderunderstandingof the symbolicthansexualdifferencetheorists

do. Forthese scholars,the investigationof the symbolic as it relatesto materialcon-
ditions has certainlybeen an importantfocus of their work.
Threeexamples areuseful here. In her historicalwork on the many uses of gen-
der to facilitatethe Ku Klux Klan's campaignfor white supremacyand Christian
nationalism,Blee (1991) articulatesthe multipleand often contradictoryways that
gender was deployed as a political symbol by both Klansmenand Klanswomenat
various stages in the life of the Klan organization.Blee finds, for instance, that
althoughwhite women as social actorswere excludedfromthe firstKlanfraternity,
it was the very use of the symbolof vulnerablewhite Protestantwomanhoodin need
of protectionfrom Black male sexuality thatjustified practices of violent white
masculinity.Yet, while Klansmenused rape and miscegenation symbolically to
garnersupportagainst the loss of racial, economic, religious, and even regional
privilege at thisjuncturein U.S. history,they simultaneouslypracticedrapethem-
selves as part of their reign of terror.Similarly,Blee's work shows the ways in
which the second Klan fraternitydeployedcontradictoryand symbolic notions of
"woman"as both morally superiorto men and untrustworthyin orderto expand
Klanmembershipwithoutfully integratingwomen into the Klanorganization.The
second Klan designatedwomen as symbolic "keepersof the Klan home,"encour-
aging women as leadersof poison squads,slandercampaigns,and consumerboy-
cotts, as well as organizersof churchsocials, neighborhoodparties,weddings, and
after-schoolactivities, to furtherembed Klan practicesinto the fabric of everyday
white, middle-class, Protestantlife. In this way, gender as a political symbol was
centralto the routinizationof Klan culture.
Allison (1994) also illustratesthe importanceof genderas symbol in herethnog-
raphy of a Tokyo hostess club, an establishmentwhere Japanesemen working in
corporatejobs come to drink,smoke, socialize, andflirtwith women hostesses. On
the face of it, these clubs appearto be places wheremen go to "unwind"aftera long
day in the corporateworld. Allison's researchdeconstructsthis divide between
"work"and"play,"or "work"and"leisure,"andarguesthatthe gendered,class, and
sexual practicesin these social spaces create solidaritiesamong white-collarmen
and reinscribea masculineidentitythatultimatelybenefits corporateJapan.More
specifically, the productionof a particulartype of masculine subjectivityis made
possible by symbolic gender"play"or practicethatcongeals hegemonicrelations.
These symbolic recreationsnight afternight in the hostess clubs ensurethatJapa-
nese businessmenof a particularclass remaincommittedto a certainwork culture
and serve to naturalizethe relationshipbetweenmasculinityandcorporatecapital-
ism. As one last illustration,I could suggest MacLeod's (1992) researchon hege-
mony and gender resistance in relation to reinstatedpractices of veiling among
lower-middle-classworking women in Cairo. MacLeod's work demonstratesthe
ways in which gendercan be understoodas symbolic practicesthatareprecipitated
not by a uniformconsciousnessbutby multipleinterpretations.She arguesthatthe
symbolic practicesof veiling are neithermonolithicnor a "reshuffling"of an old
symbol but are insteadan altogethernew set of symbolic practicesemergingfrom
multiplemeanings,some subversive,some not. In each of these examples,then,the

symbolic is understoodneither as inconsequentialnor reduced to the material.
Instead,these investigationsseek to understandthe complexrelationshipsbetween
meaning and social structure.
It is worthponderingthe extentto which these critiquesof gendertheoryby sex-
ual differencetheorystem, in part,fromlargerdisciplinarydifferences.2 I have so
far only implied but perhapsshouldbe explicit in my suggestionthatgendertheo-
rists are more likely than sexual differencetheoriststo be social scientists who do
not make centraluse of psychoanalytictheoryin theirwork.As such, disciplinary
differences, if they are indeed operating,may be shaping how scholars come to
understandnot only a conceptlike "symbolic"butthe verymeaningof the concepts
of "subjectivity"or "identity,"not to mentionthe role of the unconsciousin every-
day life. Below, I suggestthe possibilitythatsuchconceptualdifferences,whethera
resultof disciplinaryboundariesor not, also shapethe problematicway thatsexual
difference theoristsuse the categoriesof "gender,""sex,"and "sexuality"in their
work.
MAPPING KEY POINTS OF DIVERGENCE

BETWEEN GENDER AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE THEORY
Gendertheoristsand sexual differencetheoristspartways not just over a mis-

reading of gender scholarshipas relying on a sex/gender split, or the project of
deconstructinggender categories,but over the very conceptualizationof gender,
sex, sexuality,andthe role of the imaginaryin feministpolitics. First,sexual differ-
ence theoristsdo not theorizegenderto be social processesor practicesin the same
sense thatgendertheoristsdo. Forexample, sexual differencetheoryassumes that
"men,as the empiricalreferentof the masculine,cannotbe said to have a gender:
rather,they are expected to carrythe Phallus-which is somethingdifferent[than
gender]" (Braidottiwith Butler 1994, 38). By contrast,gender theorists would
arguethatgenderis not somethingthateithermen or women have. In otherwords,
neithermen nor women actuallypossess genderas an individualattribute;rather,
they do gender (West and Zimmerman1987; see also Connell 1987). Moreover,
gender theorists posit that gender is produced within all social interactions
(whethersalientor not), andthusthereis no social context,be it on a microlevel or
institutional level, that escapes gendering (Gerson, personal communication,
December 1, 1994). In otherwords,genderis a characteristicof an interaction,not
an individual.Giventhis, all humanbodies areimplicatedin these processesof gen-
dering(Acker 1992; KesslerandMcKenna1978;WestandZimmerman1987). To
theorize men as somehow removedfrom "gender"is to ignore how masculinities
are shaped in various social and historicalcontexts and to gloss over the ways in
which differentgroupsof men "carrythe Phallus"in disparateways andwith what
consequences.Althoughsexualdifferencetheory,as well as some feministpsycho-
analytic theory (see Abel 1990), attemptsto explain gender,race, and economic
inequalityvia a focus on the phallus, I disagreethat this focus alone is enough to

fully understandthe complexities of gender.For example, the empiricalquestions
of how patternsof masculinityhave changedover time, or cross-culturally,or the
multiple meanings of masculinitywithin one social context;how such patternsof
masculinity and femininity are maintainedin day-to-day conscious interaction;
how they shape or are shapedby materialconditions;how they congeal into social
structures;or how politicalchangecan be organizedaroundunconsciousprocesses
are left relatively unaddressed.Understandinggender as social practices that are
variableand ongoing, conductednotjust in the Symbolic realmbut on otherlevels
of social organization,could help explain these patternsmore clearly.
Sexual differencetheoryand gendertheoryalso differ over whetherfemininity
should necessarily be returnedto the female body, whetherliterally or allegori-
cally-an intellectualdisputethatarguablyreflectsdivergentconceptualizationsof
biological sex and its relationshipto genderand sexuality.For example, centralto
Braidotti's notion of feminine sexual difference, as well as Cornell's notion of
"ethical feminism,"are assumptionsabout the interconnectionsbetweenfemale
(read: not woman or feminine or gender) identity,feminist subjectivity,and the
female body. Again, sexual difference theory promotes the development of a
"female subjectivity"by asserting"sexualdifference"as a "positiveforce."This
liberatoryfemale subjectivitycomes throughimaginativeprocesses such as return
to a female voice or woman'sspeech or to an affirmationof the feminine.Concepts
such as "female"and "feminine"are used interchangeably,as well as implicitly
associatedwith "feminist."As I suggest above, unlike many gendertheoristswho
would contestthe fixed relationshipsbetweensex, gender,andsexuality,sexual dif-
ference theory implies, whetherintentionallyor not, precisely this kind of fixed
correspondence.In doing so, suchtheoristsalso risk overlookingthe importanceof
deconstructingthe binarycategoriesof biological sex as partof feminist practice.
For instance, while articulatinga position that equivalentrights does not mean
equal value based on sameness,Cornellsays, "Thehumanspecies is of two genres,
not one species withoutdifferentiation"(1994, 41; emphasisadded).Althoughsex-
ual differencetheory arguesthatsuch attentionto femaleness is not biological but
mythical,it is not fully apparentto me why we need a mythicalreturnto a notion of
sexualbinarism.In otherwords,if this notionof differencedoes notreferto biologi-
cal sex, on what are such differencesbased?If sexual differenceas a positive force
is referringnot to a biological differencethatis neithermythicalnorreal butrather
to a binarynotion of sexual desire, this turnis necessary.Furthermore,if it is the
focus on the imaginaryor the allegoricalthat should be emphasizedas centralto
theory and liberatorypractice, it is also not necessary to posit the imaginary as
"feminine"or a "female"force, particularlywhenthis implies the exclusion of indi-
viduals who are neitherfeminine nor female, regardlessof one's politics. It ulti-
mately reads as if such an "alternative"female subjectivityis indeed not much dif-
ferent from essentialized and binary notions of "the feminine" as they have
appearedin some versions of radicaland culturalfeminist theory.
As one answer,sexual differencetheorywould arguethatits use of "femalesub-

jectivity"or "affirmationof the feminine"is notat all biologically deterministicbut
rather,I suspect,a way to returnwomen'slived experiencesof theirbodies to analy-
ses of subjectivity.This leads me to suggest thatwhat motivatessexual difference
theory to offer concepts such as "femalesubjectivity"and "woman'sspeech,"and
to valorizesexualdifference,whetherliteralormythical,is theaffinitywitha Lacanian
interpretationof subjectivity.Here, sexual difference theory interpretsLacan in
such a way thatallows it to assertthatit is precisely in such sexual differencethat
subjectivityis thoughtto emerge.Forgendertheorists,this turnto sexualdifference
slips into a reificationof a binarynotionof identity.Even if such a notion of sexual
difference is used entirely as allegory,genderscholarsreject the need to affirma
myth of sexual binarismsat all to understandwomen's subjectivity,and are even
more resistantto the conceptualizationof sexual differenceas the centerpieceof
liberatorypractice.
These dilemmasbringme to perhapsthe cruxof the tensionbetweengenderthe-
ory andsexual differencetheory.One of the biggest obstaclesI see in extendingthe
dialogue between gendertheory and sexual differencetheory,at least as it is pre-
sentedin these texts, is thatthe veryconceptof "sexualdifference"is eithervaguely
definedor difficultto translatefor those of us trainedin social sciences. Contempo-
rarygendertheorists,generallyspeaking,conceptualizesexualityin similarways
as they conceptualize gender. Each concept refers to a set of variable social
processesorpracticesthatgive meaningto bodilydifferencesor social interactions.
The categories of sexual difference,like the categoriesof gender or racial differ-
ence, are understoodas producedonly withinparticularsociohistoricaland politi-
cal contexts. When sexual differencetheoristsdiscuss sexuality,I argue,they talk
about sexuality not broadly,as contemporarygender scholarsdo, but in the very
specific sense of sexual difference.Even then, the precise usage of the concept of
"sexualdifference"is notwell defined.Itdoes seem clearthatsexualdifferencethe-
ory relies on a Lacanian notion of sexual difference as that which individuals
acquireas they enterthe Symbolic order.Given this, an alternativefemale subjec-
tivity is locatedin the presymbolic,or the space "beyond"languageand sexual dif-
ference. Ultimately,understandingsexual differencecarriesthe most explanatory
power for feminist theory.
Perhapsone explanationforwhy the conceptof sexualityis so vaguelydefinedis
precisely because feminine sexuality, as sexual difference feminists define it, is
thoughtto be beyondthe "lawof the Phallus,"orbeyondthe Symbolicorder.Unlike
gendertheory,which locates sexualitysquarelywithinshiftingsocial practicesand
changing institutions, sexual difference theory implies that sexual difference is
given solely in the realmof the Symbolic.Forexample,Cornelladvocatesthe con-
cept of sexualdifferencebecauseit "returnsus to the issue of 'sex,'not as biological
body parts,butas sexualityis as sexualityis [sic], in turn,centralto conceptionsof
how radicalsocial changecan trulytakeplace"(1994, 5). Cornelldoes not explain
furtherwhatit meansto say "sexualityas sexualityis" otherthanthe fact thatthis is
apparentlyirreducible.Cornell argues that this affirmationof sexual difference
escapes charges of essentialism, since "it is precisely because the feminine, as its
lived, can neverbe reducedto its currentdefinitionsthatI can advocatean ethical
affirmationof the femininewithinsexualdifference"(1994, 6). Cornellalso rejects
the more generalsociological positionthatsubjectivitiesareproducedin (not prior
to) social relations.In this respect,Cornellis in oppositionto social theorists,such
as Mead (1934), who posit themind andself as fundamentallysocial. Giventhatfor
sexual difference theorists,subjectivitydevelops in relationto sexual difference,
Cornellalso implies, intentionallyor not,thatsexualdifferenceis producedoutside
of (not within) structuraland institutionalcontexts. Instead,sexuality and sexual
differenceend up being locatedin a particularversionof the unconscious,one that
is somehow ahistoricalandstructuredby sexualdifference(see Weedon1987, 88).
It seems plausiblethatsexual differencetheory'simplicitpostulationof a sexu-
ally based structureof the psyche allows a continualassertionthat there is some
fixed element of femininitythatexists in the unconsciouspriorto invocationinto a
masculine order.According to Cornell, the affirmationof feminine sexual differ-
ence requires a turn towardwhat cannot already exist in our currentmasculine
social order,and the paradigmnecessary to do this is apparentlypsychoanalysis
(1994, 9). Braidottiexplainsthis move towardpsychoanalysisas a way to shift "the
problematicof bodily roots of subjectivityback in to the structureof metaphysical
thoughtwhere it belongs,"or as a way to rethinkthe body as "neitherbiological or
sociological" (1994, 184;emphasisadded).More specifically,she says, "Lacanian
psychoanalysis shows us that there is no such thing as a mothertongue,that all
tongues carrythe nameof the fatherandarestampedby its register.Psychoanalysis
teaches us the irreparableloss of a sense of steady origin that accompanies the
acquisitionof language,of anylanguage"(1994, 8). Giventhatpatriarchynecessar-
ily entailsthe supposedimpossibilityof a full accountof woman,or the suppression
of some form of feminine sexuality unrepresentedin a phallocentricsymbolic
order,then this repressionbecomes definedby sexual differencetheoryas the cen-
tral element of women's subjectivity.
Instead of contending, as sexual difference theory does, that the currentsym-
bolic ordercannotfully capturefeminine subjectivity,perhapsit is more useful to
arguethatit cannotcapturethe rangeof expression,the multiplicity,or the instabil-
ity of meanings of subjectivity.For example, in trying to provide us with a new
vision for exiting phallocentricculturein ways thatpsychoanalysiscannot,Cocks
(1989) has turnedto the use of dramato suggest the possibility for men andwomen
to evadethe normsof phallocentricdesire.Ratherthanrelyingon somethingnot yet
represented,she calls for an understandingof the multiplicity of desire and the
instabilityof meaningas it currentlyoperates;nowheredoes Cocks suggest thatthis
challenge to phallocentricsexuality has to retain the ontological foundations of
sexuality,or genderfor thatmatter.Ultimately,sexualdifferencetheoryclaims that
agency as a political subjecthas to do with the ability to expose the myth of onto-
logical foundations(Braidotti1994), yet ends up implying that sexuality is indeed
an ontological foundation.As sexual differencetheoristsposition a liberatorysub-
jectivity as that which is beyond the phallic order, it reads as if accessing this
mythicalfemale subjectivityor allegoricalsexual differenceor woman's speech is

privileged over other social relationsin theory and practice.Braidottiarguesthat
"froma perspectiveof feministphilosophiesof difference,sexualdifferencecannot
be consideredas one differenceamongmanybutratheras afounding,fundamental
structuraldifference,on which all others rest and thatcannotbe dissolved easily"
(1994, 118; emphasisadded).AlthoughBraidottihas a three-levelschema of how
to understandsexual difference,one of which is the understandingof differences
among women, it is unclearwhy these differencesamong women should be sub-
sumed under"sexualdifference."When, in anotherinstance,Butlercritiquedthis
privileging of sexual differencevis-a-vis racialdifferenceor class difference and
suggested thatgendertheoristsdo not follow suit, Braidottiresponded,"Isuppose
you are right in statingthat I grantto feminism a greaterexplanatorypower than
othercriticaltheories"(BraidottiandButler1994, 43; emphasisadded).Here,Brai-
dottiequatesfeminismwith sexual differencetheoryonly. Yet,Butlerwas not sug-
gesting that all feminism privileges sexual difference;quite the contrary.Recent
theoreticaland empiricalwork of genderscholarsindicatesa traditionin feminist
scholarshipthat does not privilege sexual difference over racial or gender differ-
ence (for an empiricalexample, see Thompson 1994). Braidottiapparentlymis-
takes Butler'scritiqueand in effect leaves unaddressedthis controversialquestion
abouthow to understandandrespondto the compoundingeffects of multiple sys-
tems of inequality.
Whetherto understandwomen as outside of a hegemonicorder,to theorizethe
construction of dualisms, the function of language, or even the unconscious
processes of social life, feminist sociologists do not need to privilege a notion of
sexualdifference.Dubois ([1898] 1903) theorizedthe notionof"doubleconscious-
ness" and the "veil" of invisibility aroundAfrican Americans;Simmel ([1908]
1950) theorizedthe notion of "thestranger";Bergerand Luckmann(1966) theo-
rized the social constructionof realityand the process of reification;Mead (1934)
theorizedthe split between the "I"and the "me"in humanconsciousness and the
centralityof languagein this process;Durkheim(1915) wroteof the irrationalityof
social life in his theoryof religion;andMarx(1978) theorizedthe operationof ide-
ology in relationto controlover the means of production.Incompleteas they may
be for feminist theory,such contributionsto sociological theorycould nonetheless
give feminist theoriststhe same space to ask such questionsaboutthe formalstruc-
ture and meaning of living "outside"the dominantorder,aboutlanguage and the
symbolic, or aboutthe unconsciousas sexualdifferencetheorydoes withoutarticu-
lating that sexual differenceis centralto women's subjectivity,or thatthe "bodily
roots"of subjectivityare outside the realm of the sociological.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
Key assumptions of sexual difference theory pose dilemmas for feminist

researchandpractice.One of the most importantimplicationsof sexual difference
theory for feminist sociologists is the relatively narroweragenda for empirical

researchthat sexual differencetheorycan articulate.13 Although sexual difference
feministsunderstandcontemporaryfeministgenderscholarshipto be reflectiveof a
genderrole socializationapproach,one thatdoes not accuratelyattendto the Sym-
bolic and by extension fails to do an appropriatejob of understandingthe role of
language and meanings in relationto political agency, I arguethat gender theory
does have much to offer feminist studies. In the same way that queer theorists in
sociology (see Epstein 1996; Seidman 1996) have recently suggested that queer
theory and sociology have much to teach each other,I sharein theirinsistence that
investigations of meanings, social identities, and embodiment(and in this case,
gender and sexual meanings and identities)be accompaniedby historical,institu-
tional, and structuralanalyses.These analysesinclude investigationsof the conse-
quences of the particularproductionsof meaning and identity for people's lived
experiences.
Although critiquedfor focusing "unduly"on the material,I arguethatcontem-
porarygendertheoryfocuses on a wide rangeof theoreticalandempiricalquestions
thatcan be understoodas bridginga long-standingdivide between "thesymbolic"
and"thematerial"thathas plaguednotjust feministtheorybutsociology. By inves-
tigatingthe linksbetweenidentityandstructure,feministgendertheoryinformsthe
following kinds of generalquestions:How are micropracticesof subversioncon-
strainedby materialand institutionalcontexts?How are macrostructures,such as
the economy and the state, shaped by micropracticesof gender,race, sexuality?
How are boundariesof nationalidentitypoliced by genderedpracticeson both the
micro and macrolevels? How do social actorsdeploy multipleand shifting mean-
ings of gender to participatein social movements, and how do social movement
activitiesthemselves help constructnew identities(see Foster 1998, 1999; see also
Gamson 1996)? How are the institutionsof science, medicine (see Lorber 1997),
education(see Thorne1993), or the militaryconstitutiveof genderedpracticesand
meanings, and with what consequences for people's lives? Gender theory could
also informquestions aboutthe day-to-daypracticesof genderingand production
of genderedmeanings: How exactly are genderedidentities reproducedacross a
range of everydayinteractions?How do social actorsnaturalizegendercategories
as partof routine social behavior?In what multiple and patternedways do social
actors use the body in everyday social interactionto construct,negotiate, and/or
challenge a multiplicity of identities? In what ways are public spaces organized
such that they reflect and constraingenderedpractices?In what differentways do
people deploy gendered,racialized,andsexualizedidentitiesas partof sexualprac-
tice? How are variousoccupationalsettings structuredby genderedpracticesand
meanings,andwith whatconsequencesfor the meaningspeople give to theirwork?
Or gender theory could attend to macroprocessesof gender: How do structural
changes constrainor disruptgenderrelations(Hondagneu-Sotelo1994)? How do
social actors challenge identity classification systems (Foster 1998, 1999)? How
has stateregulationof "thefamily"been informedby genderedpracticesandmean-
ings? How has the U.S. welfare state institutionalizedvarious meanings of race,
class, gender,and sexuality,and with what materialconsequences?Or, how has a

gender and racial division of labor been maintainedin differentways across cul-
tures and historyby shifting and competingmeaningsof sexual, gender,race?
In addition,gendertheorycould informsuch generalquestionsaboutthe histo-
ries of gender:In whatvariousways aregenderedmeaningsandpracticesdeployed
differentlyacross sociohistoricalcontexts?How have changingmeanings of gen-
derbeen coconstructedalong withchangingmeaningsof "family,""race,""sexual-
ity,""citizen,""person"?Whatarethe historiesof varioussocial institutionsas gen-
dered, racialized,and sexualized institutions?How have genderedmeanings and
practices been used across sociohistoricalcontexts to legitimateparticularstruc-
tures of violence? What different kinds of texts or knowledges of gender have
emergedin differentsociohistoricalmoments?For each of these foci, I arguethat
some of the most useful inquiriesarethose thatinvestigatethe processes of gender
as they are embeddedin otheridentitypractices,meanings,and social structures.
Takentogether,these kindsof questionscan betterdemonstratethe naturalnessand
stability of binaryclassificationsof identitywithoutlosing the structuralfeatures
of, say, gender,race, or sexual relations.Ultimately,then,I arguethata genderthe-
ory approachis more likely to generateempiricaldatathat could be more readily
used by activists,policy makers,or programdirectorsas they make claims against
biodeterministicor culturaldeficiency explanationsfor social inequality.
Yet, despite these ways in which genderscholarshipmay be useful for practical
feministaction,one of the majorjustificationsforrejectingthe conceptof "gender"
by sexual differencetheoristsis the perceptionthatsuch a turnto "gender"involves
a politicallydisastrouserasureof the category"woman."Key to a sexualdifference
position is the belief that "theextremeaffirmationof a sexed identity as a way of
reversingthe attributionof differencein a hierarchicalmode... may lead to repeti-
tion, but the crucialfactorhere is thatit empowerswomen to act"(Braidotti1994,
169). Sexual differencetheorydoes not find gendertheorymotivatingfor women
preciselybecausegendertheorydoes notrely on theprimacyof sexualityoverother
formsof differenceanda necessaryreturnto an imaginaryoutsideof the "lawof the
phallus"as a mechanismto reshapegenderidentityandsparkpoliticalchange.Sex-
ual difference feminists imply that creative practices of affirmationare better
equippedto motivatewomen politicallyto makeclaims on theirown behalfthana
perspectivethatseeks to understandthe construction,deployment,and reification
of a multiplicityof identitycategoriesas social practice.Since liberationdepends
on a sexed identity,to paraphraseButler(1990, 148), the deconstructionof identity
is interpretedas a destructionof politics for sexual difference theorists. By this
twist, feminist gendertheorybecomes a threatto feminist practice.
I contend,as do others,thatit is a mistaketo conflatethe theoreticalpositionthat
thereis no identitythatis "beyond"patriarchywith a politicalbelief thatthe trans-
formationof patriarchyis impossible.Butler(1990) takeson this notionthatdecon-
structionis a threatto political agency when she concludes thatthe subversionof
the gender ordercan and must be accomplishedin the compulsoryrepetitionof
identities.AlthoughButlerarguesthatfemininity(like all identity)is only effect, it
is nonetheless in the effect, or-as I see it-in social interaction,where feminists

find the agency to subvertand displace these very identities.14Gendertheory,par-
ticularlyas it has been informedby sociological theory,would also assertthatsuch
possibilities for political agency and transformationare located in the social. For
manyfeministsociologists, this theoreticaldisputeoverwherethe abilityto subvert
identity and transgressthe normativeemerges is reminiscentof the debate over
Mead's (1934) notionof the "I"andthe "me":Wheredoes the "I"find its abilityto
challenge the "me,"or the generalizedother?If the mind is completely social, as
Mead theorized,what social processes shapethe "I"as an agentic social structure
that is on some conceptuallevel distinct from the normativeone, the "me"?The
point is thatit is possible to theorizeimaginaryprocesses andthe role of individual
agency in transformingsocial structureas a sociological process.Aside fromposit-
ing such political possibilities as sociological in nature,it is also possible, using
gendertheory,to posit such possibilitiesas lackingany necessary"origin"or foun-
dationin an imaginary,or the unconscious,particularlyas structuredby sexual dif-
ference.Moreover,to feministsociologists, the critiquethatgendertheoryandgen-
der studies underminepolitical goals may be even more disturbing when the
positing of liberationin the allegorical seems to be an even less fully articulated
political agenda. Although gender theory is rejectedfor failing to give women a
bannerto rallyunder,it is unclearhow womenareto rallyaroundthatwhich is in the
realm of the unrepresented,or the negationof the negation.Whereand how do we
begin to do this? How does one motivate feminist men or transgenderedpeople
based on an affirmationof female subjectivityas rootedin the female body mythi-
cal or literal?Althoughsexual differencetheoristsarguethatusing such a theoreti-
cal perspectiveis, in andof itself, disruptingthe Symbolic order,I disagreethatthis
kind of affirmationof sexual differenceis necessarilymore politically motivating
for women.
CONCLUSION
Braidottisays, "I... thinkthata greatdeal of conflict andpolemic amongfemi-

nists could be avoided, if we could startmakingmore rigorousdistinctionsabout
the categoriesof thoughtthatarein question,andthe formsof politicalpracticethat
is [sic] at stakein them"(1994, 171-72). I could not agreemore. However,I am left
to conclude that the paradigmof sexual differenceas outlinedin these three texts
obscures the categories of thought that might be useful for feminist theory and
research and masks the incompletenessof a political strategythat is rooted in a
sexually based notion of the imaginary.Sexual difference theory fails to see the
necessity of feminist studies of masculinities; implies a fixed correspondence
between sex, gender,andsexuality;seeminglyrelies on fixed categoriesof biologi-
cal sex; defines "thesymbolic,""subjectivity,"and"sexuality"relativelynarrowly;
andcollapses racial,ethnic,andnationaldifferenceinto "sexualdifference."Taken
together,these featuresof sexual differencetheorymay create more problemsfor
feminist sociologists of genderthanthey may solve. Althoughnot a perfect para-

digm either,gendertheoryarguesthatit is not necessaryto posit a returnto feminin-
ity (or a move towarda femininity that is not yet one) in orderto contest gender
dualism. Currentgendertheorybetterenables feminist theoristsand practitioners
to produceunderstandingsof, amongotherknowledges,the links betweenidentity,
culture, and social structure;histories of gender; day-to-day social practices
that create and recreate gender; macroprocessesof gendering; and the shifting
embeddednessof genderrelationswithinothercriticalprocessesof dominationand
subordination.Ultimately,I argue that the empiricalresearchgeneratedby such
lines of inquiryholds morepromisefor informinga widerrangeof political action
than that of a sexual differenceperspective.
By respondingto some majormisconceptionsof gendertheoryand by making
explicit some of these fundamentaldivergentassumptionsof sexualdifferenceand
gendertheory,my hope is to assist feministtheorists,in general,andfeminist soci-
ologists, in particular,as we engage each other in meaningfulintellectualdebate
and political strategizing.The discussionhereis offeredto feministsociologists as
a kindof translationof sexualdifferencetheoryin orderto help furthersortout how
much of this particularpolemic is the resultof inconsequentialquibblesovertermi-
nology and how much is a resultof very real conceptualdifferencesin key catego-
ries of analysisthataffect what sortsof knowledgewe can produce,and with what
practicaluse. Perhapsas a resultof more open discussion aboutwhat we mean by
the concepts we use andwhy, we may findthatsexualdifferencetheoryandgender
theory-and thusperhapsfeministworkin the social sciences andhumanities-are
more closely alignedthanI haveinterpretedhere. On the otherhand,if these intel-
lectual divides seem unbridgeable,it is still importantfor us to create spaces in
which we can talk to each other about these importantconceptualdifferences so
that we might challenge each otherto move forwardin ways thatbenefit feminist
scholarshipand action.
NOTES
1. Thanksto reviewerSarahFenstermakerfor suggestingto me thatgender,race, class, and some-

times sexuality are, nonetheless, still privileged over age, physical ability, and other hierarchical
identities.
2. I am gratefulto PatriciaMcDaniel for her insight into feminist interpretationsof Lacan. Any
errorsare mine.
3. Accordingto Weedon,Lacandefines the patriarchalsymbolic orderas "thesocial and cultural
orderin which we live ourlives as conscious,genderedsubjects.Itis structuredby languageandthe laws
and social institutionswhich languageguarantees"(1987, 52).
4. Weedon defines feminist poststructuralismas "a mode of knowledge productionwhich uses
poststructuralisttheoriesof language,subjectivity,social processes andinstitutionsto understand"and
changeexisting powerrelations(1987, 40). Such a theory"decentresthe rational,self-presentsubjectof
humanism,seeing subjectivityandconsciousness,as socially producedin language,as a site of struggle
andpotentialchange.Languageis not transparentas in humanistdiscourse,it is not expressiveand does
not label a 'real'world.Meaningsdo not exist priorto theirarticulationin languageandlanguageis not
an abstractsystem, but always socially and historically located in discourses. Discourses represent
political interestsandin consequenceareconstantlyvying for statusandpower.The site of this battlefor
power is the subjectivityof the individual"(1987, 41).
5. According to Abel (1990), Braidottihas been explicit in a critique of psychoanalysis. Abel
quotes Braidotti as saying, " 'Althoughpsychoanalytictheory has done a great deal to improve our
understandingof sexual difference,it has done little or nothingto changethe concretesocial conditions
of sex-relations and of gender stratification.The latter is precisely the target of feminist practice'"
(1990, 186). This leads me to suggest that at least Braidotti'sturn to psychoanalysis is not without
caution.
6. This lack of familiaritywith currentgenderscholarshipis perhapsa resultof both interdiscipli-
narytrainingand the effects of contemporaneouspublicationdates of key texts. How much access one
has to the work of other scholarspriorto publication,particularlywhen such work is being conducted
outsideof one's discipline,mustcertainlyvarybasedon a numberof factors.Formoreon the theoretical
and political implications of systems of publication and distributionfor feminist theory, see King
(1994).
7. Thanksto Judy Gerson for suggesting this point.
8. Thanksto SarahFenstermakerfor remindingme of the need to study all identities as multiple
accomplishments.
9. Below, I addressthis distinctionsexual differencetheory makes between "the symbolic" and
"the sociological."
10. Thanksto Beth Schneiderfor pointing out that this theoreticalturntowardgender as a way to
challenge "woman"as a monolithicsocial categoryshouldbe creditednot to Butleralone but to a long
history of critiquesby feminists of color and by scholarsgroundedin sociological theory.
11. This citationrefersto aninterview/debatebetweenBraidottiandButler,not a coauthorshipin the
traditionalsense. Nonetheless, Braidotti and Butler do share some importanttheoretical positions,
which I briefly addressbelow.
12. Thanksto bothSarahFenstermakerand Beth Schneiderforsuggestingthis to me. Inthis case, the
differentialattentionto psychoanalytictheory here may arguablybe a result of disciplinarytraining
ratherthana deliberateintellectualdispute,althoughreaderswill be familiarwith the long and conten-
tious debates in feminist theory largely speakingover the usefulness of psychoanalysisfor feminism.
13. Thanksto Leslie McCallfor pointingout the somewhatuniqueempiricalorientationof feminist
social science vis-a-vis feministphilosophy.Similarly,thanksto an anonymousreviewerfor suggesting
that researchis perhapsa projectless readily undertakenby "differencefeminism."
14. Perhapsit will seem odd to some readersto position Butleras alignedwith gendertheoryrather
than sexual differencetheory,since in some instancesButler'sposition seems indistinguishablefrom a
sexual differencestance. Althoughlocating Butler as eithera "gendertheorist"or a "sexualdifference
theorist"would be inaccurate,since she herself makes argumentsthat are useful for each perspective,
both Butlerand Braidotti,for instance,seem to takealmostidenticalpositions with regardto the repeti-
tion of identities.Eitherthroughthe compulsoryreproductionof feminineidentityorthe negationof the
negation, each theorizes some sort of reliance on the productionof identity to somehow disrupt
hegemonic patterns.Each talks about the necessity of some sort of liberatoryforce embedded in the
enactmentof identity that can provide a way out of phallocentricculture.Likewise, each is vague in
operationalizingthe characterof this element of un/consciousness that facilitates the subversion of
hegemonic structuresof identity.
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JohannaFosteris currentlya doctoralcandidatein sociology at Rutgers,TheState Universityof

New Jersey.She holds an M.A. in applied sociology with a concentrationin gender and social
policy from TheAmerican University.Asidefrom policy, her areas of interestincludefeminist
theories, the politics of social identityclassification, and the productionand reproductionof
various systemsof inequalityvia science and medicine.Her dissertationin progress is a com-
parativestudyof the U.S.multiracialmovement,the U.S. intersexmovement,and the U.S. bisex-
ual movementas cases of what she calls "thirdcategory" or "boundary-blurring"identity
movements.Her work seeks to understandin what ways the claims made by activists in these
movementsto challenge social classification do or do not disrupt essentialist beliefs about
racial, gender,and sexual identitiesin America.

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An Invitation to Dialogue: Clarifying the Position of Feminist Gender Theory in Relation to

Sexual Difference Theory

Thecentralargumentof this article is twofold.First,contemporaryfeministgender theory,particularly

A tension betweenfeministswho advocate"gender"as a useful analyticcategory

AUTHOR'S NOTE:I would like to thankGender& Society editor Beth E. Schneider,reviewerSarah

perspectivefor feminist sociologists, I hope to contributeto more informed and

differenton many accounts,the texts aretied togetherby common argumentsfor a

FEMINIST GENDER THEORY

As many readerswill know, the term "gender,"althoughregularlyused today,

Whetherinformed by social interactionism(Gerson and Piess 1985), ethno-

1993). Lastly,for this discussion, gendertheoristsdo not privilegegenderrelations

SEXUAL DIFFERENCE THEORY

In contrast,sexualdifferencetheorists,as representedprimarilyin the threetexts

sexuality,language,the symbolic, andthe psyche, sexualdifferencefeministsposit

GENDER THEORY THROUGH THE

Each text containsmajor,and sometimes contradictory,critiquesof those who

investigatesthe ways in which individualsimputemeaningto theirsexual practices

also a thinningdown of the politicalagenda"(1994, 151). Both BraidottiandMod-

Given sexual differencetheory'sassumptionthatgendertheorycan be equated

positions, thenit is unclearto me why the eliminationof genderwould be problem-

Perhapsdisturbingto sociologists andothersocial scientistsis Braidotti'sinterpre-

have a muchbroaderunderstandingof the symbolicthansexualdifferencetheorists

multiplemeanings,some subversive,some not. In each of these examples,then,the

MAPPING KEY POINTS OF DIVERGENCE

Gendertheoristsand sexual differencetheoristspartways not just over a mis-

inequalityvia a focus on the phallus, I disagreethat this focus alone is enough to

As one answer,sexual differencetheorywould arguethatits use of "femalesub-

mythicalfemale subjectivityor allegoricalsexual differenceor woman's speech is

IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Key assumptions of sexual difference theory pose dilemmas for feminist

theory for feminist sociologists is the relatively narroweragenda for empirical

class, gender,and sexuality,and with what materialconsequences?Or, how has a

is nonetheless in the effect, or-as I see it-in social interaction,where feminists

Braidottisays, "I... thinkthata greatdeal of conflict andpolemic amongfemi-

feminist sociologists of genderthanthey may solve. Althoughnot a perfect para-

1. Thanksto reviewerSarahFenstermakerfor suggestingto me thatgender,race, class, and some-

Abel, Elizabeth. 1990. Race, class, and psychoanalysis?Openingquestions. In Conflictsinfeminism,

Gerson,Judith,andKathyPiess. 1985. Boundaries,negotiation,consciousness:Reconceptualizinggen-

Plummer,Kenneth.1975. Sexualstigma:An interactionistaccount.London:Routledge& KeganPaul.

JohannaFosteris currentlya doctoralcandidatein sociology at Rutgers,TheState Universityof

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