516 history of philosophy

see his arcane system as containing real solutions. In this latter vein, I
want to suggest that Proclus is addressing in a new way the old problem
PROCLUS ELABORATE DEFENCE OF PLATONIC IDEAS [341] of participation, by responding to the Aristotelian objection that the Ideas
do not serve as effficient causes.5

In the third book of his Commentary on Platos Parmenides, we find Proclus

I. The Problematic of Platos Parmenides
defending Platonic Ideas against the criticism that is implicit in Parmenides
questioning of the young Socrates. Naturally enough, Proclus interprets this
At the beginning of Book 3 of his commentary, Proclus emphasises the
criticism as maieutic1 since he does not want to believe that Plato would
maieutic function of Parmenides questioning of the young Socrates.6 Accord-
put into the mouth of Parmenides such objections as would undermine his
ing to Proclus, the purpose of this questioning is to establish whether Socrates
own doctrines. But, as I hope to show, it is Proclus rather than Plato who
remains on the lower level of opinion about Ideas or whether his intelligence
dogmatically defends the Theory of Ideas by situating it within the context
rises to the higher level of the transcendent monads themselves. Assuming
of the whole Neoplatonic hierarchy of reality.2 It is probable that Proclus had
that the latter is the case, Proclus argues that it must be through question-
in mind Aristotles criticisms of Platonic Ideas, and that he wanted to show
ing that the Socratic intellect is able to catch sight of the intelligibles. Here
that these were fundamentally mistaken.3 In any case, I think it is clear that
(In Parm. 784.1) Proclus | explicitly rejects Aristotles reports (Met. 987b14, [343]
Proclus defends the existence of Ideas by drawing on Neoplatonic resources,
1078b2730) that Socrates did not separate Ideas. Without providing any
which he regards as essential for solving the metaphysical problem originally
supporting historical evidence, however, Proclus insists that Socrates had
raised by Plato.
grasped separate Ideas through his divine instinct because, as a young man,
In this short paper, however, I will confine myself to asking about the
he was roused to see these Ideas by his own effforts. I think we can be reason-
[342] rationale for Proclus philosophical4 defence of Ideas | by expanding the
ably certain that Proclus is not reporting on the historical Socrates but rather
reach of Platonic theory both at the higher and lower levels of reality. In other
idealising the Socratic persona as presented in Platos Parmenides.
words, I want to consider whether there is a philosophical problem that is
Another possible motivation for his maieutic interpretation of the aporias
being addressed by Proclus or whether he is simply elaborating on his system
about Ideas may be found in Proclus report (In Parm. 971.2932) on the
for its own sake. If the latter were the case, then we might feel less sympathy
typical Neoplatonic response to Aristotles objections, namely, that these had
for his project, which would look more like barren scholasticism than living
already been anticipated and rejected by Plato. Thus for the Neoplatonists,
philosophy. On the other hand, if we could identify a live philosophical
the puzzles about Ideas can only have been intended by Plato to clarify the
problem with which Proclus was grappling, we might be more willing to
status and function of Ideas (cf. In Parm. 971.1622, 951.3336). For those
Neoplatonists who tried to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, the objections to
1 According to the middle-Platonic classification of Platonic dialogues, the maieutic
Ideas made by Aristotle must be seen to have the same maieutic function.
and the peirastic are sub-divisions of gymnastic dialogues. Typically, in a maieutic dialogue, Yet this can hardly be the interpretive strategy of Syrianus and Proclus, since
the conversation-partner is helped to make explicit some implicit ideas. However, middle- both felt the need to defend Plato against Aristotles objections.
Platonists like Diogenes and Albinus classified the Parmenides dialogue as logical; cf. DL 111.49
& Albinus, Prologus 111.148.19 fff., Did. 159.79.
2 On the other hand, Proclus also opposes those interpreters who took the Parmenides to 5 As an illustration, perhaps one could point to Met. XIII, 5, 1079b13fff. where Aristotle

be a doctrinal dialogue On the Forms, by showing why it is necessary to go beyond the Forms
to the highest principles of reality; cf. In Parm. 626.14, 636.2122.
3 I think this suggestion is confirmed by the ad hominem character of some of Proclus
arguments, where he tries to show that Aristotles objections against Platonic Ideas are not
well founded.
4 Accepting Steels distinction (1984) between epistemological and metaphysical argu-
ments made by Proclus, I take the metaphysical arguments to be most important because
they dictate his epistemological arguments, as is typical for most Greek thinkers.
objects to separate Platonic Forms by asking: What do the Forms contribute to the eternal
beings among the sensibles, or to those which are generated and destroyed? An implied
negative answer to this rhetorical question is justified as follows: For they are not the causes
of motion or of change in them.
6 In Platonic Theology I.8, Proclus outlines two competing interpretations of the Par-
menides as (a) logical gymnastics, (b) an inquiry into principles but not theology. By contrast,
Proclus defends what he calls a real interpretation of the dialogue as elucidating diffferent
classes of the divine.
 proclus elaborate defence of platonic ideas 517
In fact, Proclus outlines the four problems7 he takes to be central to Platos
Parmenides: (1) Do Ideas exist? (2) Of what things are there Ideas? (3) What
sort of realities are Ideas, and what is their peculiar property? (4) How do
things in the world participate in them, and what is the manner of that
participation? Given that the first problem is not addressed by Plato, Proclus
finds it necessary to provide arguments to establish the hypothesis of Ideas. I
think it is significant that Proclus mentions this lacuna several times, and
also explicitly undertakes the task of filling it (cf. In Parm. 784.25785.4,
838.1012, 891.78). He gives a clear indication that this digression in the
commentary reflects his own special interests, and he claims it as his own
original contribution (cf. In Parm. 784.2728, 805.12).
[344] II. Neoplatonic Metaphysics
However, the initial argument about the self-constitution of the cosmos only
makes sense within a Neoplatonic schema, given that his intention is to
establish the inferior position of the visible cosmos within that hierarchy,
and thereby establish the necessity of higher explanatory principles such as
Forms and Intellect.8 The argument has the typical structure of a reductio
ad absurdum: If this cosmos is self-constituted, many absurd results follow.
For whatever is self-constituted must be without parts, since everything
that creates and everything that generates is altogether incorporeal. Proclus
claims that even bodies themselves produce their efffects by means of
incorporeal powers, e.g. fire produces heat (by hotness). Assuming that
whatever creates must be incorporeal, and since in a self-constituted thing it
is the same thing that creates and is created, then the self-constituted must
be altogether without parts.9 But the physical cosmos does not have such a
character, since every body is divisible in every way; and so the cosmos is not
self-constituted.
Proclus goes on to argue that the cosmos is not self-activating, in contrast
to self-constituting things which are self-generating and so naturally able
to act on themselves. In efffect, the argument is that the cosmos is not self-
moving, since it is corporeal. Thus the cosmos derives its being from some
other cause which is higher. But this leads Proclus to raise a related question
7 Compare the slightly diffferent list of questions about Ideas given by Syrianus, In Met.
108.31109.4.
8 Presumably, Proclus emphasises the primacy of this argument because it establishes
the necessity of going beyond the physical cosmos to its intelligible principles.
9 See Elements of Theology (ET) Props. 4051 for propositions concerning self-constitution.
518 history of philosophy
about whether this cause acts by rational choice, or whether it produces the
universe by its very being. If it acts by deliberate choice, its action will be
unstable and variable, so that the resulting cosmos would be perishable.
Judging from Platos account of the creative activity of the demiurge in
the Timaeus, one might think that he accepted this implication about the
[345] perishability of the cosmos, even if it never actually | perishes (cf. esp. Tim.
41ab). But Proclus claims that, since the cosmos is eternal in a way, what
creates it must be so by its very being or essence ( ).10 In fact,
Proclus says (In Parm. 787.1), everything which acts by deliberate choice
necessarily has some creative activity that it exercises by its very being, e.g.
our soul does many things by choice but it gives life to the body by virtue
of its very essence. In this argument he is appealing to a general principle
of Procline metaphysics (ET 57), namely, if the power of creating by its very
essence extends more widely than creating by deliberate choice, then it
flows from some higher cause. Proclus explains that such creative activity is
efffortless, and is also characteristic of the divine.11
The crucial point of this argument with reference to Proclus hierarchy
is that since the cause of the whole cosmos creates by its very being, then
this creator is primarily what its product is derivatively, and gives to it in a
lesser degree the character that it has primarily, just as the soul both gives
life and has life. Thus (In Parm. 788.1) the cause that creates the cosmos by
its very being is primarily what the cosmos is derivatively. Given that the
cosmos is a plenum of Forms of all sorts, it follows that these Forms will exist
also primarily in the cause of the cosmos. For instance, Sun, Moon, Man,
Horse, and generally all the Forms in the universe exist paradigmatically
in the cause of the universe, namely, another Sun besides the one we see,
another Man, and so on for all Forms. Consequently, the Forms that exist
prior to sensible things as their demiurgic causes also pre-exist in the single
cause of the entire cosmos. In efffect, the Forms exist paradigmatically in the
demiurgic Intellect, which is the place of the Forms though in a diffferent
sense than Aristotle | had in mind. The divine Intellect produces everything [346]
10 Cf. J. Trouillard 1958 for a classic elucidation of this Neoplatonic notion of causality.
11 A corollary of ET 34 states that all things proceed from Intelligence () since it is an
object of desire for all things. Thus, according to Proclus, it is from Intelligence that the whole
world-order () is derived, even though the latter is sempiternal. Perhaps this represents
an attempt to reconcile Platos talk of the generation of a cosmos in the Timaeus with the
Academic tradition that the world-order is eternal. If the procession is logical rather than
temporal, Intelligence can proceed eternally and be eternally reverted, while still remaining
steadfast in its own place in the cosmos.
 proclus elaborate defence of platonic ideas 519 520 history of philosophy

by thinking the Forms that are contained in it, since thinking is identical Proclus insists that the demiurge is not only the final cause but also the efffi-
with being (In Parm. 794.28795.8, 799.522). Thus Proclus goes much further cient cause of the whole cosmos, and thereby resolves to his own satisfaction
than Plato or Aristotle in holding that the Ideas of everything pre-exist in the the diffficulty already noted with reference to Aristotles prime mover.17
divine Intellect (In Parm. 790.510, 792.37793.2).
In the light of this conclusion, Proclus now criticises Aristotle for letting
III. Intellect as Moving Cause
the divine serve only as a final cause of the universe, though he concedes
that Aristotle is right to make the good preside as cause over the cosmos. Yet,
Proclus seems to be deliberately echoing the Aristotelian objection against
Proclus argues, Aristotle fails to say whether the cosmos receives anything
separate Platonic Forms when he considers how it happens that man
from that good or receives nothing from it. If it gets nothing, its striving would
generates man.18 Since the cosmos is ordered, he rules out the possibility that
be in vain.12 But, if it receives something, that cause is surely and eminently
this generation happens by chance. Next (In Parm. 792.1) he considers the
the good which it bestows on the cosmos, especially if it does so by virtue
typical Aristotelian answer that an individual comes from the human seed,
of its essence. Thus Proclus concludes that the cause will not only be the
but rejects this as inadequate because seed possesses the human reason-
final but also the effficient cause of the cosmos.13 This was an inadequacy in
principles only potentially. In this way a typically Neoplatonic view about
Aristotles concept of the prime mover which Proclus tries to exploit here in
the actuality of the reason-principle is smuggled in under the cover of the
support of the Platonic tradition.14
Aristotelian axiom that actuality is prior to potentiality. Proclus concludes
As additional support, Proclus begins with the argument for the exis-
that Nature has the reason-principle of man in actuality and that it is the
tence of Platonic Forms based on the existence of opposites in sensible
cause of individual men. That conclusion is then used to justify the Platonic
things (cf. Rep. 523fff.) and then goes on to claim that the demiurge of
claim that the universal is prior to the particular, and | it is further supported [348]
the cosmos contemplates these Forms in his Intellect. By citing the Neo-
by the Neoplatonic axiom which states that all things which are perfected
platonic principle that the greater power is productive of more perfect
through inferior powers are established more perfectly by more universal
efffects, he postulates this demiurgic Intellect as the cause of order in the
beings. This allows Proclus to infer that there must be some other cause prior
cosmos, while rejecting any account which leaves this ordering to chance
to Nature that contains Ideas, given that Nature typically infuses herself into
[347] or necessity.15 Subsequently, in order to establish the | priority of Intellect
bodies and so belongs to other things and not to itself. Since Nature is non-
over Nature, Proclus appeals to another Neoplatonic principle which gives
rational (), it needs a rational cause to guide it (In Parm. 794.2326).
priority to an ordering cause that knows itself over any cause that does
According to Proclus, Intellect is this rational cause which is higher than
not know itself. By contrast with Aristotles prime mover, the demiurge is
Nature, and which possesses the reason-principles in its own self-reflexive
a providential cause because he also knows those things for which he is
manner.
an object of desire. He is the unmoving cause of all things insofar as he
For my purposes, however, it is revealing to compare Proclus account of
determines their ordering by virtue of his very being or essence, i.e. not
the causative action of Intellect with Aristotles account of the causation of
by rational choice but by virtue of his knowledge of himself.16 In efffect,
the prime mover. By contrast with Aristotle, Proclus assumes that all things
eternal in essence (like Forms) are produced by an unmoving cause. For
12 As Carlos Steel (1984: 20) points out, this first part of the argument trades on Aristotles

notion that natural desires are normally satisfied in the cosmos, otherwise they are in vain.
13 Cf. In Parm. 842.2635, In Tim. I.266.29267.14.
14 Elsewhere, In Tim. I.267.4, Proclus castigates Aristotle for departing from Platonic 17 In his Commentary on the Timaeus, In Tim. II.122.1316, Proclus cites a physical work

teaching on this point when he traces the so-called upward tension towards the unmoved
mover, without tracing any downward chain of causal dependence. Against Aristotle, Proclus
argues that the conception of deity as the goal of desire is unintelligible when divorced from
the corresponding conception of god as the source of being.
15 Cf. In Parm. 790.5791.28, 798.21799.5.
16 Cf. In Parm. 844.12, 791.21; In Tim. I.421.29422.1.
of Theophrastus (De Caelo) which argues that the heavens must be ensouled and therefore
divine. Even if this were not a correction of Aristotle by Theophrastus, it would represent at
least a clarification of how the prime mover can act on the heavens, given that it is not an
effficient cause; cf. Theophr., Metaph. 5b710.
18 See Met. VII, 8, 1033b26, where Aristotle rejects the need for Platonic Ideas in explaining
how man generates man.
 proclus elaborate defence of platonic ideas 521
instance, Man Himself and all other Forms must derive from an unmoving
cause on which the whole cosmos depends. But this cause cannot be
located primarily in Nature because the latter is nonrational. Therefore,
the productive cause of the cosmos must be located primarily in Intellect,
secondarily in Soul, thirdly in Nature and lastly in bodies. This neatly
encapsulates the metaphysical hierarchy of Neoplatonism, which is foreign to
the thinking of both Plato and Aristotle. Yet one might concede that Proclus
is exploring a profound philosophical puzzle about the very existence of
Forms, which may have been neglected even by Plato.
In a masterly dialectical stroke, Proclus invokes the Aristotelian theory
of demonstration to show that it presupposes Platonic Forms, even though
Aristotle had explicitly denied this (An. Post. I, 11, 77a5). The crucial point
in the Procline argument is that demonstration depends on universals
that correspond to more authoritative causes, i.e. Forms which are more
substantial than particulars. In fact, one can find some basis for this argument
in Posterior Analytics I, 24 where Aristotle says that the universal is better
() than the particular because it reveals the cause. Using a slightly ad Proclus appeals (In Parm. 799800) to theologians like Plato, Pythagoras and
[349] hominem argument, Proclus claims that demonstration requires Ideas rather |
than mere universals because the premises contain the causes that are prior
by nature to the efffects contained in the conclusions (cf. In Parm. 980.1724,
789.614, 796.1637, 894.2935). In this light, Proclus rejects Aristotles theory
of abstraction on the grounds that universals produced by the mind are
later-born () and so cannot provide foundations for knowledge all particular things. Thus, according to Proclus, Platos Timaeus places the
of reality. These later-born universals are sharply distinguished by Proclus
from the logoi in the soul, which he calls Ideas (In Parm. 892.40895.1). In
support of his own view, Proclus rejects the Aristotelian interpretation of
the historical Socrates by insisting that Socrates reached his conception of
separate Forms through reversion to Intellect. This is obviously a Neoplatonic
notion but, in support of it, Proclus draws on the Platonic portrait of Socrates
in the Phaedo to claim that he was separating himself from his bodily nature.
In this way, Proclus rather implausibly attributes to Socrates the Neoplatonic
distinctions between the bodily substrate, the participated form, and the
transcendent and imparticipable Form.
At In Parm. 790.2fff. Proclus provides us with another argument for
adopting the hypothesis of Ideas, namely, that all visible things, both heavenly
and sublunary, exist either by chance or by a cause. But it is impossible
for them to exist by chance because that would mean that superiors and
inferiors will be mixed together, i.e. intellection, reason-principles, and
cause will be classed with things derived from causes. But this would mean
that products would be superior to principles, which is obviously absurd.
522 history of philosophy
In support of his own argument, Proclus later (In Parm. 798799) cites
Aristotles argument that essential causes must be prior to accidental causes,
since the accidental cause is a by-product of essential causes. So what comes
about causally would be prior to the accidental, even if the most divine parts
of the visible were to have come about by accident (In Parm. 799.1 fff.). And if
there are causes of all things, they will be either many and unconnected or
one. But if they are many, we cannot say what makes the universe one; and
yet the one is superior to the many, and the whole to the parts. But if there
is one cause of order in the universe, it would be absurd if it were without
reason, | since the rational is superior to the irrational. But if this cause has [350]
reason and knows itself, it knows itself as the cause of all things; otherwise
it would be ignorant of its own nature. Yet if it knows itself as the cause of
the universe, it also knows its efffects. So it is by knowing the immaterial
reason-principles and forms in itself that it knows the reason-principles in
the cosmos, and the Ideas of which the universe consists.
As independent confirmation for his defence of the hypothesis of Ideas,
Orpheus, who share a general consensus which is confirmed by the wise men
in such matters. Proclus claims (801.27fff.) that the gods have clearly said that
they themselves are Ideas of the Father (being resident in His thoughts), that
they go forth for the making of the cosmos (for the launching forth is their
procession), and that they have all sorts of forms that contain the causes of
single primary productive cause of all the Ideas among the Intelligibles (for
that is the location of the Living Being Itself),19 while the Oracles say that the
source of the Ideas pre-exists in the demiurge.
Although these two diffferent accounts appear to disagree with one
another, Proclus tries (802803) to reconcile them by arguing that it is not
the same thing to seek the single universal cause of the cosmic ideas and to
contemplate the primary manifestation of the whole series of them. Rather
we should refer the content of the one class to the demiurge, and the content
of the others to the intelligibles in the divine hierarchy, from which both
the demiurge and all the orders of being are filled with ideal substances.
So the demiurge is form-giving in two ways, both by virtue of the source in
himself and by virtue of the intelligible Ideas; for among the latter are the
universal causes of all things, i.e. the four monads. From that intelligible
realm they move downwards through all the divine orders to the last,
19 In Tim. I, 418430 & 324.922 shows this to be the doctrine of Syrianus.
 proclus elaborate defence of platonic ideas 523 524 history of philosophy

so that even the lowestthe sensible imageshave some likeness to them, Ideas in the divine intellect which is the productive cause of everything in
in some cases relatively clear, in others obscure. the cosmos. As a result of such an Intellect thinking its own contents, the
Thus Proclus claims (In Parm. 803.3fff.) that anyone capable of following [351] Ideas are produced and they also proceed to lower levels in the hierarchy of
the divine processions can see, if one examines the perceptible forms of being, where they function as spermatikoi logoi in the Soul and in Nature,
enmattered things, that every perceptible form has received properties from which ultimately produce the individual human beings and other animals.
all the ranks of being. For instance, self-motion itself and eternity are present
in sensible forms from no other source than the primary Ideas. These are
what is eternal in the primary sense, and they pass on their properties to the
things in the next and each succeeding rank. In general, Proclus holds (In
Parm. 803804) that, to the extent that a form strives to converge on itself
as a unity, it reflects the likeness of the summit of the intellectual realm of
undivided Forms. But as it goes forth in company with life and subsists within
motion, being presented as a motionless image in moving things, then the
more it participates in the chain of life-generation and expresses the powers
of life-generating forms.
The general thrust of these arguments tends to support my claim that
Proclus own hierarchy of being determines his interpretation and appropri-
ation of Platonic Ideas. For instance, at In Parm. 804805, he concludes his
detailed argumentation as follows: as we proceed downwards from the intel-
ligible Ideas to the lowest orders of being, we shall observe the continuity of
the whole series and can distinguish intelligently what peculiarities sensible
things have drawn from each rank. He appeals to the following axiom: All
secondary things must participate in the beings that precede them, and thus
each of them, according to the rank assigned to it, enjoys each of its prede-
cessors. This is in perfect accord with the divine processions themselves; for
the sequence of the secondaries parallels the particular organisation in each
of the divine series, whether intelligible, intellectual or supra-cosmic; and
again whether functioning as cohesive, or generative, or creative, or as some
other divine attribute.

Conclusion

From our modern perspective it might appear that Proclus is simply engaged
in elaborating on the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being rather than in solving
pressing philosophical problems. | In this paper however, I have tried to show [352]
that he does have a plausible rationale for defending Platos hypothesis of
Ideas against Aristotles objections, since the prime mover is a final cause but
not an effficient cause of things in the universe. Yet Proclus goes much further
than either Plato and Aristotle in positing the existence of paradigmatic