MIKKOLA, Mari. Beyond Speech Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy

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BeyondSpeech
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BeyondSpeech
Pornography and Analytic
Feminist Philosophy
Editedby Mari Mikkola
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v
CONTENTS
List of Contributors vii
CHAPTER1 Feminist Philosophy and Pornography:The Past,

The Present, and The Future 1
Hilkje Charlotte Hnel and Mari Mikkola
PART I | Speech Act Approaches to Pornography

CHAPTER2 Is Pornography Like The Law? 23
Rae Langton
CHAPTER3 On Multiple Types of Silencing 39
Mary Kate McGowan
CHAPTER4 Be What ISay:Authority Versus Power
inPornography 59
LouiseAntony
PART II | Pornography and Social Ontology

CHAPTER5 What Women are For:Pornography and Social
Ontology 91
Katharine Jenkins
CHAPTER6 Pornographic Artifacts:Makers Intentions Model 113
Mari Mikkola
vi
PART III | Objectification as Harm of Pornography

CHAPTER7 Treating Pornography as a Woman and Womens
Objectification 137
Lina Papadaki
CHAPTER8 Getting Naked in the Colonial/Modern Gender
System:APreliminary Trans Feminist Analysis
of Pornography 157
Talia Mae Bettcher
CHAPTER9 Race and Pornography:The Dilemma of the
(Un)Desirable 177
RobinZheng
PART IV | Feminist Pornography:An Oxymoron?

CHAPTER10 Falling in Lust:Sexiness, Feminism, and
Pornography 199
HansMaes
CHAPTER11 In/Egalitarian Pornography:ASimplistic View
of Pornography 221
Petra van Brabandt
CHAPTER12 Feminist Pornography 243
A. W.Eaton
Index 259
vi | Contents
vii
LIST OFCONTRIBUTORS
Louise Antony (B.A. Syracuse University, Ph.D. Harvard University) is

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. She
has published many articles in the areas of philosophy of mind, philosophy
of language, feminist theory, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion.
She has edited or co-edited three volumes, most recently Philosophers
Without Gods:Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. She has served
as president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and as presi-
dent of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.
Talia Mae Bettcher is a professor of philosophy at California State
University, Los Angeles and she serves as the department head. Some of
her articles include Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: Transphobic
Violence and the Politics of Illusion (Hypatia, 2007), Trapped in
the Wrong Theory: Re- thinking Trans Oppression and Resistance
(Signs, 2014), and When Selves Have Sex: What the Phenomenology
of Trans Sexuality Can Teach about Sexual Orientation (Journal of
Homosexuality, 2014). With Ann Garry, she co-edited the Hypatia special
issue Transgender Studies and Feminism:Theory, Politics, and Gender
Realities (2009). With Susan Stryker, she co-edited the Transgender
Studies Quarterly special issue Trans/Feminisms (2016). She is cur-
rently at work on a monograph entitled Personhood as Intimacy:ATrans
Feminist Philosophy. Talia has also been involved in Los Angeles trans
community organizing for over fifteen years and now serves on the newly
established Transgender Advisory Council for the City of Los Angeles.
A. W. Eaton is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department
at the University of Illinois-Chicago. She received her Ph.D. from the
viii
University of Chicago in both philosophy and art history and works on

topics in feminism, aesthetics and philosophy of art, value theory, ethics,
and Italian Renaissance painting. Eaton was a Laurance Rockefeller
Fellow at Princetons Center for Human Values in 200506, and is cur-
rently a Trustee of the American Society of Aesthetics and the editor of the
Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art section of Philosophy Compass.
Hilkje Charlotte Hnel is finishing her Ph.D.at the Humboldt-University
of Berlin, Germany. She held a fellowship at the Carl and Max Schneider
Stiftung and was a scholar at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for two years.
Her research is in feminist analytic philosophy and social philosophy.
Her thesis is on the concept of rape and how we should methodologi-
cally understand it. Further research concerns Wittgensteins theories of
language and family resemblance, the relation between friendship and
romantic relationships, methodological problems and Haslangers ame-
liorative analyses, Critical Theory and questions of ideology, and the
situation of women in philosophy. She is an executive board member of
SWIP Germany.
Katharine Jenkins is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Nottingham. She received her Ph.D.from the University of Sheffield in
2016, before which she studied philosophy at the University of Cambridge.
Her research spans the fields of social ontology, feminist philosophy, and
the critical philosophy of race. She is particularly interested in using ana-
lytic social ontology to illuminate the nature of race and gender categories
and the dynamics of racial and gender-based oppression. Her publications
include Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept
of Woman (Ethics) and Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as
Hermeneutical Injustices (Journal of Applied Philosophy).
Rae Langton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and
Fellow of Newnham College. She is the author of Kantian Humility:Our
Ignorance of Things in Themselves, and Sexual Solipsism:Philosophical
Essays on Pornography and Objectification. She was elected to the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2013, and the British
Academy in 2014. Some themes of her contribution to this volume are
further developed in her John Locke Lectures (Oxford 2015), forthcoming
as Accommodating Injustice (Oxford University Press2017).
Hans Maes is Senior Lecturer in History and Philosophy of Art and
Director of the Aesthetics Research Centre at the University of Kent at
Canterbury. He has authored papers on a variety of topics in ethics and
viii | List of Contributors

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aesthetics, including the relation between modesty and hypocrisy, the role
of intention in the interpretation of art, the notion of free beauty, the art
of portraiture, and the difference between erotic art and pornography. He
is editor of the essay collections Art and Pornography (Oxford University
Press, 2012) and Pornographic Art and The Aesthetics of Pornography
(Palgrave MacMillan,2013).
Mary Kate McGowan is the Luella LaMer Professor of Womens Studies
and Professor of Philosophy at Wellesley College. She works at the inter-
section of the philosophy of language, philosophy of law, and feminism,
and she has written several other articles on silencing. She can be reached
at:mmcgowan@wellesley.edu
Mari Mikkola is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-
Universitt zu Berlin. Her work is mainly on feminist philosophy and,
in particular, on feminist metaphysics and feminist engagements with
pornography. Additionally, she has research interests in social ontology,
broadly conceived. Mikkola has published papers on these topics in vari-
ous journals and edited collections (for instance, in Analysis, Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, Inquiry, and Hypatia). Her latest work includes a
monograph on feminist philosophy and social injustice titled The Wrong
of Injustice: Dehumanization and Its Role in Feminist Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 2016) and various papers on feminist and mainstream
metaphysics. She is also an editor of the open-access philosophy journal,
Journal of Social Ontology.
Lina Papadaki has been an assistant professor in philosophy at the
Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete
(Greece), since 2009. She completed her Ph.D.thesis at Sheffield in 2006
and worked as a lecturer in the School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College,
University of London, between 2007 and 2009. Papadakis research in-
terests are in moral philosophy, bioethics, and feminist philosophy. Her
research currently focuses on the phenomenon of womens sexual objec-
tification and on the application of Kants moral philosophy to bioethical
issues like abortion, euthanasia, and organ donation. Some of her recent
and forthcoming publications include Abortion and Kants Formula of
Humanity, Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies (2012),
Treating Others Merely as Means:AReply to Kerstein, Utilitas (2015),
What is Wrong About Objectification?, Current Controversies in
Political Philosophy, ed. Thom Brooks, London:Routledge (2015), and
Sexual Objectification, The Philosophy of Sex:Contemporary Readings
List of Contributors |ix

x
(7th edition), eds. Alan Soble, Raja Halwani, and Sarah Hoffman, Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (forthcoming).
Petra van Brabandt teaches aesthetics, semiotics, art theory, and cultural
criticism at St. Lucas School of Arts, Antwerp, Belgium. She is member
of the research group Art & Narrativity. Her research focuses on sociopo-
litical dimensions of art. She writes and lectures about art and feminism,
queer art, art and pornography, art and postcolonialism, and art and labor.
Her current research concerns wet aesthetics in art and pornography.
Robin Zheng is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Yale-NUS College,
Singapore. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University
of Michigan and was a Visiting Junior Research Fellow in 201516 at
Newnham College, Cambridge. She specializes in ethics, moral psychol-
ogy, and feminist and social philosophy.
x | List of Contributors
xi
BeyondSpeech
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1
CHAPTER1 Feminist Philosophy

and Pornography
The Past, The Present, and TheFuture
Hilkje Charlotte Hnel and Mari Mikkola
1.1.ThePast
The heir of Playboy, Cooper Hefner, stated in a recent newspaper arti-

cle that the magazine is not pornographyrather, Playboy is art and it
empowers women.1 This claim is in stark contrast with most prominent
conceptions of pornography. In 1964, Justice Potter Stewart famously
claimed that, although he cannot provide a clear definition of pornogra-
phy, he knows pornography when he sees it. During the 1960s and 1970s,
pornography in the United States and the United Kingdom was understood
on the model of obscenity: a work is obscene if an average, reasonable
person applying community standards would find the work as a whole
to lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and the
work describes or depicts in an obvious way offensive sexual conduct
(Dwyer 1995, 242, 245; Itzin 1992b). In short, the work is sexually ex-
plicit, primarily intended to produce sexual arousal in viewers, and (in
some sense) badit has a morally corrupting influence, and it is indecent
or causes indecency. Conservative opponents of pornography echo such
an understanding:pornography is morally corrupting in promoting sexual
promiscuity and sexual practices that are outside of the norm (cf. Berger
1977). To prevent such damaging effects, the state is permitted to prohibit
pornography even for consenting adults (cf. Baird and Rosenbaum1991).
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/playboy-is-art-not-porn-says-hefner-heir-
1.
8439849.html. Accessed October 15,2015.

2
However, even those who wish to distance themselves from conservative

views probably disagree with Cooper Hefner. Furthermore, feminists typi-
cally reject Hefners claim, along with that of Justice Stewart. They com-
monly renounce the obscenity standard, regardless of whether they oppose
pornography or not. Many feminist theorists and activists welcome ruptures
to community standards and have found the talk of reasonable persons to be
about reasonable men in disguise. Further, feminists do not oppose pornog-
raphy because of its sexual content or putative offensiveness. Championing
the antipornography stance, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
advanced a well-known view of pornography as the violation of womens
civil rights (A. Dworkin 1981; MacKinnon 1987, 1989, 1993). Specifically,
pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures and words that also includes women, for example, dehumanized as
sexual objects, enjoying humiliation or pain, physically hurt, presented in
positions of sexual submission or degradation, or reduced to body parts. On
such feminist views, pornography is about sexually explicit materials that
harm women insofar as they play a crucial role in the exploitation and op-
pression of women (e.g., Itzin 1992b; Lederer 1980; Saul 2003, Chapter3).
Sexually explicit materials count as pornography when they depict the abuse
and degradation of women in endorsing, condoning, or encouraging ways
(Longino 1995; Russell 1993). If men, transpeople, or children are used in
the place of and treated as if they were women, the work also counts as por-
nography. Materials that are premised on equality count as erotica, which is
about passionate love and involves a positive, free choice (MacKinnon 1987;
see also Steinem 1995). And since MacKinnon and Dworkin hold that por-
nography should be understood as the subordination of women (and not only
to cause subordination), there cannot be putatively egalitarian pornography.
Some liberal philosophers (R. Dworkin 1985; Feinberg 1984, 1985)have
found the MacKinnonDworkin elucidation wanting and have defended
pornography, even while denying that pornography is somehow valuable.
To begin with, pornography should not be censored, as this would restrict
some persons choices on the basis that others find those choices offensive.
The state should not be allowed to restrict someones freedom on the basis
of others moral convictions, if this does not harm others. Furthermore,
even if we accept that pornography might cause some harms, the objection
goes, to claim that pornography is by definition womens subordination
is philosophically confused, unwarranted, and dangerous (R. Dworkin
1991, 1993; Parent 1990).2
2.
For more on these critiques, see West (2013).
2 | BeyondSpeech
3
The former objection, however, seems to rest on a misunderstand-

ing. At the request of the Minneapolis Council in 1983, MacKinnon and
A. Dworkin drafted antipornography ordinances that were premised on
civil rights, using the definition of pornography above. In so doing, they
aimed to challenge the prevalent obscenity-based antipornography legisla-
tion. The ordinances did not advocate censorship or criminalizing the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of pornographic materials. Rather,
they aimed to give those trafficked into or coerced to perform in pornog-
raphy, those who have had pornography forced on them, and those who
are survivors of assaults caused by pornography consumption the oppor-
tunity to seek legal recourse for the harms done to them (cf. A.Dworkin
2000; Itzin 1992b; MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997). Contra conservatives,
feminist opponents of pornography reject the moralist stance. And contra
R. Dworkin, they argue precisely that pornography does harm others,
rather than being a harmless private pursuit.
The latter liberal objection has also been challenged, and Rae Langton
(1993) defends the philosophical cogency of MacKinnons position in her
classic article Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. Because U.S. leg-
islation seemingly takes pornography to be a form of speech (insofar as
free speech legislation protects its manufacture and distribution), Langton
uses J.L. Austins (1962) speech act theory to argue that pornographic
speech subordinates and silences women. Austin argued that our state-
ments can (and do) do more than simply make true or false claims about
the worldsometimes we perform actions other than just speaking with
our utterances. With this in mind, Austin divides speech acts into (a)lo-
cutions, (b)perlocutions, and (c)illocutions:the speakers locution (the
words uttered) can perform some illocutionary action (in uttering some-
thing the speakers locution can count as ing), and the locution can have
some perlocutionary effects (by uttering something the speakers locution
can cause further extralinguistic effects). Langton famously argued that
pornographic expressions (broadly conceived) have the authority illocu-
tionarily to subordinate and silence women. In saying something about
women, pornographic speech does something: it performs harmful ac-
tions. Specifically, it subordinates women in ranking them as inferior,
in legitimating discrimination against them, and in depriving women of
important rights to do with free speech (Langton 1993, 305313). This
last point connects to illocutionary silencing. Pornographic speech does
not prevent women from making utterances, but it may create communi-
cative conditions that otherwise disable womens speech:for instance, if
pornographic speech in particular instances prevents a womans No!
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |3

4
from being taken to be a refusal and sex is forced on her, she has not suc-
cessfully performed the illocutionary act of refusing the unwanted sex. In
so doing, pornography is the (illocutionary) subordination and silencing
ofwomen.
1.2. The Present
Langtons speech act theoretic analysis has dominated Anglo-American

feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography over the past 20years,
and most subsequent philosophical discussions draw on her approach.
Numerous philosophers from various feminist and nonfeminist back-
grounds have either critiqued or defended Langtons position, and this has
generated considerable disagreements about the topic. These disagree-
ments are the starting point for this collection of previously unpublished
papers. The included contributions have different aims and perspectives,
and they offer various ways to understand pornography and its relation to
gendered oppression. Nevertheless, the subsequent papers are united by
feminist political commitments and by taking pornography as a central
feminist philosophical topic. But first, let us briefly outline some central
controversies in order to understand the debate better.
1.2.a. Does theSubordination Claim Stand Up toScrutiny?

One might accept that some pornography harms some individual women.3
But Langtons antipornography position makes a stronger claim:that por-
nographic materials harm women as a group. The idea is that pornography
creates and reproduces views about women and their sexual behavior that
are false (see also Longino 1995). Such sexual lies then play a role in
how men view women and they teach men (as well as women) falsehoods
about sex (cf. Baker 1992; Cameron and Frazer 1992; Sweet 1992). Such
views about women and sex extend to gender oppression in general inso-
far as pornography is a tool in reproducing a culture of systematic sexual
violence against women (MacKinnon 1987, 1989,1995).
As part of civil rights hearings, MacKinnon and Dworkin (1997) collected a catalog of first-
3.
hand stories of how the production of pornography has harmed individual performers:some were
sexually abused and/or threatened to take part; others had no other economic choices. Furthermore,
nonperformers have being attacked by perpetrators trying to reenact pornographic scenes or have
been abused by men who were taught by pornography that a womans No means Yes. This,
of course, does not imply that there are no positive stories from performers who have entered the
pornography industry despite other meaningful choices.
4 | BeyondSpeech
5
Whether this more controversial claim stands up to scrutiny has gener-

ated heated debate. Some object to such an antipornography position be-
cause it singles out pornography as the central patriarchal tool of womens
oppression. This supposedly ignores other ways in which (e.g.) labor and
family relations and discriminatory forces more broadly enact gender op-
pression (Valverde 1995; Willis 1995). Others have claimed that antipor-
nography positions ignore oppression that is due to intersections of race,
class, nationality, ability, ethnicity, and religion. In defining pornography
as they do, the argument goes, white U.S.antipornography feminists fail to
see the world outside of North America and fail to see how racism (and not
just sexism) is an integral part of the harms of pornography (Collins 1993;
Loots 2000; Mercer 2000). Still others argue that in failing to theorize and
recognize queer pornography, antipornography feminism is blinkered in
focus and actually represses already-repressed queer sexualities (Green
2000). In line with this, Jennifer Saul (2006) and Mari Mikkola (2008)
have expressed worries about the scope of Langtons ideas. Saul argues that
Langtons position is too broad and that a narrower one is warranted:fol-
lowing Langton, Saul claims, we should say that pornographic viewings
are sometimes the subordination of women (2006, 79; see Bianchi 2008
for an opposing view and De Gaynesford 2009 for a reply). This opens
up the possibility, for example, for contexts of feminist critical viewings.
Furthermore, establishing a reliable systematic causal connection be-
tween pornography and sexualized violence is hard, and there is signifi-
cant disagreement among social scientists and philosophers about this.
Some countries (like Japan) that appear to have low sexual assault figures
have high pornography consumption figures (e.g., Segal 1993; Strossen
1995). Furthermore, it is far from easy to tell whether pornography is re-
sponsible for the fact that some men sexually attack women:perhaps these
men have a predisposition to sexualized violence, which simply correlates
with their consumption of pornography. And although child abusers tend
to use pornography to educate their victims about sex, this does not
demonstrate that pornography is the cause of such abuse. Liberal defend-
ers of pornography consider the idea that some decent chaps will be
turned into rapists after they have watched pornography to be highly im-
plausible and laughable (Feinberg 1985), and critics often take the lack of
reliable empirical evidence that proves a systematic causal connection to
undermine antipornography positions (e.g., R.Dworkin 1993).4 Finally, it
Some have stressed the vast amount of research that supports the causal connection (cf.
4.
Donnerstein etal. 1987; Einsiedel 1992; Hald etal. 2010; Itzin 1992b; Mappes and Zembaty

6
might be said that because pornography is fantasy, it cannot have subordi-

nating effects in the realworld.
These views have not gone unchallenged. Langton and West (1999)
have argued that even fictional works can say derogatory things and that
pornography may well say derogatory things about women, even when
it does not do so explicitly and even when pornography is mere fantasy.
After all, pornography can say things about women implicitly and even
fictional works can appear to tell harmful truths about the worldjust
think of historical fiction, which makes use of actual events and persons,
and thereby muddies the distinction between fact and fiction.5
Anne Eaton (2007), then again, has provided an account of pornogra-
phys putative harms on the model of probabilistic harm in order to vindi-
cate the causal connection:if pornography is likely to increase the prob-
ability of sexual violence against women, the causal connection holds and
there may still be a case for legally restricting it. Take smoking:many non-
smokers develop lung cancer and many smokers do not. Nevertheless, we
accept that smoking causes cancer because it increases the likelihood of
cancer, which is enough to justify legal interventions (e.g., prevent smok-
ing in public places). The same could be true of pornography. (For a simi-
lar argument, see also Russell [2000].) Eaton is careful to stress that there
is no conclusive proof that makes good this proposal. Still, she holds, the
subordination claim per se is not absurd.
1.2.b. How Plausible Is theSilencingClaim?

Since writing her seminal paper, Langton has developed the claim that
pornography causes and is the silencing of women in more detail with
Jennifer Hornsby (1998). (Hornsby [1995] also develops this view inde-
pendently of Langton.) The HornsbyLangton approach to silencing has,
nonetheless, also been critiqued as philosophically untenable. Alexander
1997; Russell 2000; Weaver 1992; Wyre 1992). Also note that a 1985 report by the U.S. Attorney
Generals Commission on Pornography found a unanimous causal link between pornography and
sexual violence. Apowerful attack orchestrated by a Washington D.C.public relations company
ensued to discredit its findings (or as the company put it in a leaked letter:to deal with the
problems the report raised [cf. Itzin 1992a]). This campaign was successful in misrepresenting
and discrediting the commissions findings. Furthermore, it managed to distribute misinformation
rather effectively because the report was initially published in an obscure Tennessee-based press and
was at the time largely unavailable to the wider public (Itzin 1992a, 11; see also Russell 1993a).
For more on the fictional character of pornography, see Cooke (2012), Eaton (2007), and Liao and
5.
Protasi (2013).
6 | BeyondSpeech
7
Bird (2002) has attacked it on the very grounds that justify it: on the
grounds of speech act theory. Bird does not take issue with any empirical
claims about the effects of pornographic speech. Instead, he argues that
the HornsbyLangton approach is philosophically indefensible because it
takes uptake as one of the success conditions for the illocution of refusals.
For Hornsby and Langton, if and when pornography prevents womens lo-
cution No! from securing the required uptake (being taken as a refusal),
the locution will fail to count as a refusal, which amounts to an illocution-
ary disablement of the refusal. Bird rejects this, though, because (for him)
uptake is not part of the success conditions for illocutions in general or
for illocutionary refusals in particular (Jacobson [1995] makes a similar
claim). In response, others have defended the philosophical cogency of the
HornsbyLangton approach (Maitra and McGowan 2009; Mikkola 2011).
Even though uptake may not be necessary for all illocutionary speech acts,
contra Bird and Jacobson, it is necessary for refusals because refusing is
a communicative act. And uptake for communicative acts like refusals is
part of their success conditions: if I intend to refuse your invitation, but
you interpret me to be accepting, I have not refusedI have merely at-
tempted to do so.
However, those critical of the silencing claim hold that we should reject
it on practical grounds too:it allegedly diminishes rapists responsibility.
Bird holds that if womens refusals are silenced, rapists wont be culpable
because they would not have committed rape. Birds view is akin to that of
Jacobson (1995), who takes the phenomenon of illocutionary disablement
to have the purportedly odd and problematic consequence that if women
fail to illocute refusals and sex is forced on them, we cannot call this
rape. And this is said to render the HornsbyLangton view practically
indefensible. (For another variant of this argument, see Wieland [2007].)
Independently of one another, Mikkola (2011), Maitra and McGowan
(2009), and McGowan etal. (2011) have argued that the HornsbyLangton
model does not diminish rapists culpability. The HornsbyLangton view
is in trouble only if the lack of refusal entails consent. But this is false, and
we should not confuse consent with nonrefusal. Just think of cases where
someone has been drugged and is thus unable to refuse sex or show any
signs of resistance. Contra views critical of the silencing claim, Maitra
(2009) argues that there are different ways to understand the claim by
drawing on Paul Grices work rather than Austin. And there may be still
other ways in which pornography silences women even on the Austinian
model (McGowan2009).

8
Nancy Bauer puts forward a more thoroughgoing challenge by ques-

tioning the focus and attention on speakers illocutionary acts. Instead, she
asks:why is it that pornography seemingly makes people see the world in
a certain way and, thus, has significant perlocutionary effects in the world?
Why is it that consumers acquiesce to the pornographers point of view
(Bauer 2015, 80)? Amore fruitful feminist analysis of pornography (for
Bauer) requires that we refocus our attention to pornographys consumers,
rather than speakers illocutionary intentions, bearing in mind the bigger
picture in which pornographic expressions take place.6
1.2.c. Does Pornography Objectify?

The above debates mainly focus on physical harms against women (like
sexualized violence). There might, however, be other senses in which por-
nography harms women as a group. MacKinnon and Dworkin claim that
pornography creates and reproduces the objectification of women by men
(MacKinnon 1987; see Haslanger [1993] for a discussion of MacKinnons
view). Most basically, objectification is about seeing and/or treating a
person as a thing or an object (Nussbaum [1995] offers a comprehensive
account of objectification). Several feminist scholars have argued that
pornography causes men to view and treat women as objects to be used,
which makes pornography particularly problematic from a feminist per-
spective (cf. Assiter 1988; Langton 1995; Russell 1993; Vadas 2005; for
an overview, see Papadaki [2015]). Moreover, Langton has more recently
argued that pornography produces a distinctive kind of makers knowl-
edge about women (2009, Chapter 13). What is distinctive about such
knowledge is that it not only aims at truth, but makes its truth (Langton
2009, 292). Further, pornographic knowledge is in itself a kind of harm.
Pornography functions like a blueprint that benefits those with social
powernamely, men. It involves a certain kind of self-fulfilling projection
with objectification of women as its mechanism. This makes pornogra-
phy a source of certain kinds of harmful knowledge about women, which
There are many further questions about what legally follows from the silencing claim. Some hold
6.
that even if pornography illocutionarily silences women, this is not the sort of harm that justifies
legally restricting pornography (R. Dworkin 1993; Jacobson 1995). Free speech does not extend
to our freedom to make illocutionary speech acts. Since pornographic speech does not literally
render womens speech inaudible, there is no free speech case against pornography. In response,
some argue that free speech considerations may still demand restrictions on pornographic speech,
although they may not justify full censorship (Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton 2009;
West2003).
8 | BeyondSpeech
9
destroys womens sexual autonomy (for similar claims, see Dyzenhaus

[1992] and Easton [1994]).
Whether pornography objectifies and whether objectification is harmful
are live issues, though. For instance, Cameron and Frazer (1992) disagree
with the view that men are incapable of critically interpreting pornogra-
phy. Moreover, some argue that not all objectification is bad (cf. Green
2000; Soble 2002). Following Nussbaum (1995), the moral status of ob-
jectification is context-dependent. If the context is one of equality and re-
spect, objectification is morally benign. This is in line with some BDSM
practitioners claims. BDSM practices, although apparently objectifying,
have strict rules that render the contexts of such practices premised on
equality and respect (cf. Califia 1994; Rubin 1993). Unsurprisingly, some
disagree (Raymond 1992). If objectification can be morally benign, argu-
ably so can pornographic makers knowledge.
1.2.d. Pornography asSubordinating Speech?

Langtons entire approach hinges on a particular presupposition: that
pornography is speech (broadly conceived). But there are live questions
about what it means for pornography or instances of pornography con-
sumption to count as speech acts in the relevant sense (Antony 2011;
Saul 2006). Furthermore, if some pornography fails to be speech in the
appropriate sense, the speech act theoretic approach does not get off the
ground. Finally, in order for the speech act approach to succeed, pornog-
raphy and pornographers must have the required sort of authority to enact
illocutionary silencing and subordination. But some have questioned this
move (e.g., Bauer 2015; Butler 1997; Green 1998). Whether pornogra-
phers are authoritative or not hinges on many empirical issues. There is
nevertheless evidence that younger consumers see pornography as an
educational tool and do consider pornographers to be experts about sex
(cf. Paul 2005). Langton has responded to this point (2009, Chapters4
and 5), along with McGowan (2003), in arguing that the sort of porno-
graphic authority required to defend the speech act approach is actually
of a fairly modestkind.
Moreover, although the feminist move away from the obscenity
standard of public morality has been welcomed, whether it is help-
ful to understand pornography as a moralized notion is controversial.
Some (maybe many) ordinary speakers find the MacKinnonDworkin/
Langton accounts counterintuitive, and it seemingly stipulates what
pornography is in a prescriptive manner. Michael Rea, thus, argues for

10
a nonstipulative, real definition that respects commonly held views

and widely shared intuitions and attempts to capture these in a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions in a nonevaluative manner (2001,
119). Now, if we define pornography as MacKinnon and Langton do,
there simply cannot be egalitarian pornography. Antipornography femi-
nists are often skeptical of the idea that women choose to perform in
pornographic films. Anumber of performers and ex-performers report
having been sexually abused as children or groomed for sex work (cf.
MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997; Russell 1993). Performers from un-
derprivileged socioeconomic backgrounds have fewer occupational al-
ternatives, which raises doubts about the genuineness of their choices.
Still, other performers claim that they genuinely chose a career in the
industry, that they would have other meaningful economic choices open
to them, and that they are proud of their occupation (see Arrowsmith
2013; Gruen and Panichas 1997; McElroy 1995, Chapter 7; Royalle
2000; Strossen 1995, Chapter9).
Be that as it may, a staunch antipornography stance holds that certain
representations of women just are degrading and that they assault womens
right to equality:even if performers chose to participate in pornography, in
endorsing womens subordination, the depicted images are morally prob-
lematic. However, many feminists opposing restrictions on pornography
also agree (cf. Rubin 1993). In fact, self-proclaimed feminist pornogra-
phers typically hold that much of mainstream industrial pornography is
sexist (cf. Arrowsmith 2013). But (they contend) we should not therefore
oppose pornography per se; rather, we should oppose ethically bad and ex-
ploitative pornography and aim to undermine the force of such mainstream
industrial porn. With this in mind, feminist pornography has been described
as a genre that uses sexually explicit imagery to contest and complicate
dominant representations of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, ability,
age, body type, and other identity markers (Taormino etal. 2013,9).
So, a simple divide between harmful pornographic speech and harm-
less erotica is insufficient. Self-proclaimed feminist pornographers take
themselves explicitly to be producing egalitarian pornography (not erot-
ica) and to be creating alternatives to mainstream pornographys vision
of female sexuality. (A number of concrete examples will be discussed
in the pages to come.) This pushes us towards a nonevaluative definition
of pornography that is applied to all sexually explicit materials, some of
which endorse the abuse and degradation of women. In this way, we could
distinguish nonegalitarian and egalitarian pornography as well as erotica.
10 | BeyondSpeech
11
1.3.TheFuture
Since Langtons seminal paper, a rich literature on feminist philosophy

and pornography has emerged. Nevertheless, as the above attests, little
agreement exists on many key issues:What is pornography? Does pornog-
raphy in fact subordinate and silence women? Does pornography objec-
tify women in harmful ways? Is pornography authoritative in the requisite
sense to make good the speech act approach? How (if at all) is pornogra-
phy speech? Given the deep disagreements over these questions, the first
goal of this collection is to take stock of extant debates in order to clarify
feminist conceptual and political terrains. Feminist philosophers often op-
erate with diverged conceptual and political frameworks, which compli-
cates meaningful dialog and debate. Interlocutors may end up talking past
one another, and this hinders real progress in the debate. The collection
thus seeks to clarify some key feminist conceptual commitments when
discussing pornography. However, in so doing, it aims to go beyond the
prevalent speech act approach to pornography.
This brings us to the collections second goal:to highlight some novel
issues in feminist pornography debates. We will examine some newer lines
of inquiry and investigate what they can tell us about still-unsettled con-
ceptual and political questions. In so doing, the collection opens a space
for themes and debates that have to date received surprisingly little atten-
tion. We will also ask how these more recent debates interact with one
other and with more established discussions. How can newer lines of in-
quiry help with some of the older problems? And how can we make prog-
ress philosophically analyzing pornography without simply rehashing old
debates, but still acknowledging the value of earlier feminist work? Thus,
the leading idea of the anthology is to go beyond speech, but without
changing the terms of the debate wholesale.
The papers in this collection are divided into four parts, and they cluster
around certain themes and methodological frameworks that are to do with
harm, epistemology, and aesthetics.
1.3.a.Harm
Although much has already been written about harm, many open questions
remain. This is particularly so when we take seriously the aforementioned
putatively feminist pornography. Furthermore, very little has been written
in recent analytic feminism about racism and the racialization of sexuality

12
in pornography. With these in mind, a feminist analysis of pornography

must still ask the following:
1. Which definitions of harm and pornography would be most fitting

when we go beyond simple mainstream examples (like Playboy or
Hustler)?
2. Is feminist pornography ever possible, or might putatively female-
friendly pornography still involve harmful objectification
ofwomen?
3. Is objectification really one of pornographysharms?
4. Are queer pornography and trans-pornography structurally similar to
heteronormative pornography, and do they have parallelharms?
5. How are racialized genres of pornography harmful? Do such genres
involve objectification in the same sense that some feminists have
claimed women are objectified in and by pornography?
1.3.b.Epistemology
As outlined above, Langton argues in her recent work that pornography
produces a distinctive kind of harmful makers knowledge. She further
holds that objectification is one mechanism that projects such pornographic
knowledge and that undermines womens sexual autonomy. It is still an
open question, though, whether pornography involves this kind of mak-
ers knowledge, some other kind of knowledge, or any knowledge at all.
Moreover, do pornographers have the authority to create makers knowl-
edge or enact some other norm-governed activities? This relates back to
harm:if pornography involves makers knowledge, is it of a harmful kind?
And does its harmfulness consist in womens objectification? Might dif-
ferent kinds of pornography produce different kinds of knowledgesome
harmful, but othersnot?
1.3.c.Aesthetics
Although philosophers of art and cultural theorists have extensively de-
bated the relationship between art and pornography (cf. Maes and Levinson
2012), very few of these discussions intersect with those in analytic femi-
nist philosophy. This being the case, the collection aims to bring debates
about pornography and art together with those in feminist philosophy.
Subsequently, we shouldask:
12 | BeyondSpeech
13
1. What kind(s) of representation does pornography involve?

2. Is the representation of gender, sexuality, and/or race in pornography
harmful; if so, in whatsense?
3. If pornography involves a kind of fantasy, can it generate knowledge
claims aboutwomen?
4. Does feminist pornography (as its self- proclaimed champions
hold) embody emancipatory potential partly due to its aesthetic and
artisticvalue?
5. Do queer pornography and trans- pornography escape putatively
harmful objectification?
With these themes and questions in mind, the collection starts by

considering the much-discussed speech act theoretic approach (Part I,
Speech Act Approaches to Pornography). Rae Langtons chapter (Is
Pornography like the Law?) draws an analogy between pornography
and the law when thinking about the subordination claim. The chapter
examines the seemingly outrageous radical feminist view that pornogra-
phy subordinates in the same sense that the law could subordinate: for
instance, in that they both may authoritatively say someone is inferior.
Langton defends the analogy as well as the authoritativeness of pornogra-
phy to subordinate. Mary Kate McGowans chapter (On Multiple Types
of Silencing) is also concerned with the more traditional approach to por-
nography via speech act theory. It investigates different forms of silencing
and argues that there are many ways in which speech acts can go wrong
(and thus be silenced). This becomes especially relevant when focusing
on systematic interferences with speaker authority. In the sections final
chapter, Be What ISay:Authority Versus Power in Pornography, Louise
Antony argues that there is an internal tension in Langtons speech act
analysis. Langton claims that pornography is both a verdictive/exercitive
speech act and a statement that purports to describe the worldit tells
lies about women. But on Austins theory, this is impossible:verdictive
and exercitive speech acts do not describe the state of affairs they bring
about. If pornography says that women are inferior, it cannot at the same
time make it the case that women are inferior.
Part II, Pornography and Social Ontology, is concerned with ways
in which feminist philosophers can go beyond the speech act approach to
pornography. The section starts with Katharine Jenkins chapter (What
Women Are For: Pornography and Social Ontology), which argues
that John Searles account of institutional reality offers fruitful ways to

14
understand the harms of pornography. Instead of relying on speech act

theory, she puts forward social ontological interpretations of MacKinnons
claims that pornography subordinates women (the subordination claim)
and that it constructs womens natures in a way that is somehow defective
(the constructionist claim). Mari Mikkola then tackles the question of what
makes something a pornographic artifact in her chapter, Pornographic
Artifacts:Makers Intentions Model. Like Jenkins, Mikkola argues that
social ontological models offer more promising ways to conceptualize and
understand pornography than the prevalent speech act approach. For one
thing, the proposed makers intentions model helps to create much-needed
conceptual common ground for interlocutors in the debate and provides a
way to understand the plurality of pornographic makers and subsequent
pornographic knowledges.
The previous part provided alternative ways of conceiving what por-
nography is and what it does more generally. Part III, Objectification
as Harm of Pornography, examines one specific way in which pornog-
raphy is thought to be harmful:in that it is objectifying. Lina Papadaki
starts the section by examining the alleged causal relationship between
the objectification of women and the personification of pornography
and argues against the existence of such a causal relationship (Treating
Pornography as a Woman and Womens Objectification). Papadaki also
considers what role pornographic knowledge plays in this causal story, if
any at all. Next, in her chapter Getting Naked in the Colonial/Modern
Gender System:APreliminary Trans Feminist Analysis of Pornography,
Talia Mae Bettcher explores the idea of nakedness relative to (what she
calls) a sex-representational system of interpersonal spatiality. In this
system, racist, sexist, and transphobic oppressions converge, and they
construct differentially racialized and gendered forms of nakedness.
This (Bettcher holds) provides tools with which we can begin to cri-
tique pornography from a trans/feminist perspective. The part closes
with Robin Zhengs discussion of objectification and racialization in
pornography. In her chapter Race and Pornography:The Dilemma of
the (Un)Desirable, Zheng discusses an apparent dilemma:pornography
produced by members of marginalized groups can work in a positive
fashion to extend our conceptions of sexiness and desirability. At the
same time, racialization in and of pornography also harms people of
colorthus the dilemma.
Some earlier chapters in this collection discussed pornography criti-
cally from an explicitly antipornographic stance. However, a number of
the contributions also consider the possibility that some pornography
14 | BeyondSpeech
15
may not be harmful (see, e.g., Mikkola, Zheng). Moreover, self-

proclaimed feminist pornographers take their work not to be harmful
in that it involves representations of women and sexuality that embody
emancipatory potential. This is said to be (in part) due to the aesthetic
and artistic values that feminist pornography allegedly involves. Part
IV, Feminist Pornography: An Oxymoron?, discusses more explic-
itly the vexing issue of feminist pornography. The chapters in this
final part do so with a special focus on the aesthetics of pornography,
which connects pornography debates in aesthetics to those in feminist
philosophy. The final section, then, affords still further alternatives to
the speech act approach with which the collection started. Hans Maes
chapter, Falling in Lust:Sexiness, Feminism, and Pornography, pro-
vides a bridge to discussions about objectification. Maes considers the
putatively harmful role that sexiness plays in womens objectifica-
tion and in pornography. He goes on to consider whether some radically
egalitarian pornography might undermine that harmful role by promot-
ing an alternative aesthetics of sexiness. Petra van Brabandt continues
discussing the aesthetics of contemporary pornographies in her chapter,
In/Egalitarian Pornography:ASimplistic View of Pornography. Van
Brabandt discusses whether apparently feminist egalitarian pornogra-
phy truly offers an alternative to mainstream pornographys inegali-
tarian depictions of women. She argues that a proper assessment of
this requires taking issue with the aesthetics of the images represented
and that this yields a more complicated picture about which depictions
are acceptable. Finally, she suggests that queer pornography in fact
offers a better emancipatory alternative to purportedly egalitarian por-
nography in going beyond what is truly harmful in much of pornogra-
phy:its highly gendered depictions of sexuality. A.W. Eatons chapter,
Feminist Pornography, rounds up the final part (and the collection)
by considering more generally whether feminist pornography is pos-
sible at all and, if so, what it would look like. Eaton further considers
the role that pornography (both feminist and inegalitarian) can play in
shaping our erotic tastes: explicitly feminist pornography may direct
our erotic tastes in gender-just directions, Eaton suggests.
The chapters in this collection are unlikely to discuss definitively the
themes and questions we raised above. Rather, our hope and expectation
is that the discussions to follow create new lines of inquiry that push the
older, more established debates further. In so doing, the collection dem-
onstrates that there is still much to say about pornography from a feminist
philosophical perspective.

16
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Soble, Alan. 2002. Pornography, Sex, and Feminism. Amherst, NY:PrometheusBooks.
Steinem, Gloria. 1995. Erotica and Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference.
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Wadsworth.
Strossen, Nadine. 1995. Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for
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PARTI Speech Act Approaches

toPornography
22
23
CHAPTER2 Is Pornography Like TheLaw?

Rae Langton
2.1.Introduction
When pornography consists of words, it is not only words, as Catharine

MacKinnon reminds us in the ironic title of one of her works (MacKinnon
1993). To regard pornography as only words would be to miss the force of
pornography as a speech act (Austin 1962; Langton 1993,2009).
In a civil rights ordinance drafted by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
pornography was taken to be the graphic, sexually explicit subordination
of women in pictures or words, that includedwomen
dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; enjoying pain or

humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically
hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; reduced to
body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of
degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised
or hurt in a context which makes these conditions sexual. (MacKinnon
1987,176)
(The drafters had no quarrel with graphic material that does not subordi-
nate, setting that aside as erotica.) Pornography was said to do some-
thing with its pictures or words:to constitute the subordination of women,
as well as causeit.
How could pornography subordinate, in this sense? Answer:in the way
the law could subordinate, or so the radical feminists argued. The analogy
will seem outrageous, if pornography is viewed as the laws victim, a voice
of individual liberty and self-expression, threatened by the laws heavy
24
hand. But pornography and the law are alike, in that the law itself is not
only words. In law and pornography alike, authoritatively saying some-
one is inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment
are demarcated and actualized, said MacKinnon (1993, 31). Pornography
is the law on what you do to a woman, said Dworkin (2007,143).
It is 30 years since that ordinance was found unconstitutional, when
Judge Easterbrook damned it, while generously agreeing, as he thought,
with itspoint:
We accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend

to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women in turn leads
to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape
on the streets but this simply demonstrates the power of pornography
as speech. (Easterbrook 1985,329)
Perhaps Easterbrook agreed with part of its point, but he missed the most
central one. He talked about the content of pornography: depictions
of subordination. He talked about the effects of pornography: a ten-
dency to perpetuate subordination. But the ordinance was about what
pornographyis.
It was about a harm enacted by pornography as a speech act, an illocu-
tionary act, in terms introduced by J.L. Austina harm distinct from its
content, as locutionary act, and its effects, as perlocutionary act. The
claim was that pornography can enact harmjust as an oppressive law can
enactharm.
This way of thinking draws on a threefold distinction from Austin. As
we speak, we perform locutionary acts, when we utter words that have
meaning and reference. We perform perlocutionary acts, when our utter-
ance has certain effects. And we perform illocutionary acts, when we do
things in saying those words: we perform actions constituted by the
utteranceordering, promising, naming, asserting, warning, and more.
One might hesitate to apply Austins framework to pornography. Perhaps
pornography is not even words. Perhaps it is not speech in the relevant
sense (Hornsby 1996, 2014; Schauer 2004). And isnt it images mostly,
rather than words? Ishall set aside, for the moment, those hesitations.
Despite the courts negative verdict, the speech act perspective on por-
nography has received increasing attention over subsequent years. Iwant
to consider here its strongest expression, in this startling analogy between
pornography and the law. Let us begin, though, with the analogys limits.
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2.2. How Pornography Is Unlike theLaw
To state the obvious, pornography is unlike the law, in ways too numerous
to count. Volumes have been written about what is special to the law, how
its directives supply us with distinctive reasons for action, and what justi-
fies its unique sanctions (e.g., Enoch 2014; Green 1989; Raz 1979). But
Ihave other asymmetries inmind.
Pornography is an artifact that gets used for sex. There is no account-
ing for tastes, but it is a fair bet this is never true of legal speech. Writing
several decades ago, Anthony Burgess said that a pornographic book
is, in a sense, a substitute for a sexual partner (Burgess 1970). Whatever
else it might be, a law book is never that. This feature of pornography,
needless to say, spells limits for speech act theory, and for the analogy with
law. And it has led some theorists to conclude that pornography should
be regarded as a sex aid, not as speech at all (cf. Schauer 1979, 1981,
1982,2004).
Pornography shapes desire, eroticizing hierarchy (MacKinnon 1987,
1993; Langton and West 1999). It works in part by harnessing the power
of sexual desire, arousal, and orgasm. It has certain effects, perlocu-
tionary effects, in Austins terms, as (for example) a shaping of erotic
taste (see Eaton in this volume), or brute conditioning (MacKinnon 1993,
16). The law does nothing comparable. The mind boggles at the thought.
Imagine the law making its directives sexy, even the law as it pertains to
sex. Imagine the surreptitious online searches for the UK 2003 Sexual
Offences Act when no one is looking. Imagine readers who unconsciously
allow the laws perspective on consent to shape their erotic taste. Unlike
the law, pornography is a Trojan horse, eagerly sought, and willingly
brought through the gates of the psyche. This magnetic power, this shap-
ing of desire, goes beyond pornographys illocutionary force, and beyond
the scope of speech act theory.
The law is words, while pornography is mostly images. Being images
rather than words gives pornography a different epistemological role, since
images seem closer to perception. Unmediated by words, we seem ac-
quainted more directly with the reality we see (Bauer 2015). Awoman
forced into pornography is not believed, when what people remember is
the smile seen on her face (MacKinnon 1987, 181). How images func-
tion in speech acts, their special standing as apparent testimonythese
neglected questions bear closely on our topic. But at first sight, they spell
limits for the analogy with law, and for the power of speech act theory to
illuminate.
IS PORNOGRAPHY LIKE THELAW? |25

26
Pornographic speech is informal, rather than formal. There is no

Austinian performative, exploiting acknowledged convention, on the
model of explicit legal enactment:I hereby declare that women are sub-
ordinate, and are to be treated thus and so. Alaw is often formally enacted
on a specific occasion, and comes fully into force on that occasionor
at any rate that is the pattern for statute law. The identity conditions of
pornographic speech acts are less clear. It is not always obvious who is
the speaker, what exactly is the occasion of utterance, or who may be the
diverse hearers and potential jurisdictions of its authority, if it has au-
thority. Pornographys law-like features, if it has them, are more implicit;
they do not exploit official conventions or performative tags. And in their
cumulative force over time, they are more comparable, perhaps, to the
speech acts of common law, rather than statute law, if comparisons with
law are to bemade.
These are just a few of the analogys prima facie limits. But let us turn
now to itsscope.
2.3. How Pornography Is Like theLaw
MacKinnon compares pornography with a quasi-legal enactment of in-

equality. Her words again, with more context:
Together with all its material supports, authoritatively saying someone is

inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment are de-
marcated and actualized. Words and images are how people are placed in
hierarchies, how social stratification is made to seem inevitable and right,
how feelings of inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how indif-
ference to violence against those on the bottom is rationalized and normal-
ized. (MacKinnon 1993,31)
Pornography, on this view, is like a racist law:an authoritative saying that

someone is inferior, which shapes the social world, creating hierarchy, and
legitimating certain modes of treatment. Andrea Dworkin drew a similar
comparison. Here are her words again, with more context:
[W]hen people ask me why Im such a hard-ass on pornography its because

pornography is the bible of sexual abuse; it is chapter and verse; pornogra-
phy is the law on what you do to a woman when you want to have mean fun
on her body and shes no one at all. (Dworkin 2007,143)
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The guiding thought is simple:pornography is a more salient source of

norms than the law itself, in the sexual lives of a great many people, and
in many contexts it supplants the norms embodied in the law. As Jeremy
Waldron has written more recently:
The visibly pornographic aspect of our society has a pedagogical function

that dwarfs in its scale and intensity the attitudes that racist hate speech tries
to inculcate. Not only does pornography present itself as undermining soci-
etys assurance to women of equal respect and equal citizenship, but it does
so effectively by intimating that this is how men are taught, around here, on
the streets and on the screen, if not in school, about how women are to be
treated. (Waldron 2012,91)
If pornography sets the rules about how women are to be treated, it contra-
dicts and supplants the supposed assurance to women of equal respect and
citizenship in the law (Langton2014).
What features of pornography would make it comparable to the law,
in this way? The law can subordinate, when it is an oppressive law that
enacts inferior social status. Apartheid law, or slave law, is a speech act
that subordinates: it ranks certain people as inferior, and makes them
count as inferior; it legitimates discrimination against them, and deprives
them of powers and rights (Langton 1993, 2009). And when a law sub-
ordinates a group of people, it exploits three features possessed by legal
speech more generally. The law can set norms, whose fulfillment is re-
warded and whose violation is penalized. That is how it can legitimate
discrimination, setting norms that make discrimination appropriate. By
penalizing and disabling the speech of some, the law can silence. That
is how it can deprive people of powers and rights. And the law can do
these things with words, because it has authority, relative to a certain
domain or jurisdiction. That is how it can authoritatively rank a group as
inferior, legitimate discrimination against its members, and deprive them
of powers and rights.
To unpack the analogy, then, pornography is like the law, if it has four
interrelated features shared with oppressive legal enactments:it can sub-
ordinate, set norms, and silence, because it has authority.
Pornography could subordinate, if it can rank women as inferior, as
mere sex objects; if it can legitimate harassment and sexual violence
toward women; if it can deprive women of certain powers, rights, or au-
thority, including, perhaps, those involved in the exercise of speech itself
(Langton 1993, 2009, 2011a, 2011b).

28
Pornography, like the law, could set norms, if it can enact rules of dif-
ferential treatment (as MacKinnon put it), as a bible of sexual abuse (as
Dworkin put it). That is part of what subordination involves, as described
(the legitimating discrimination part). Like the law, pornography could
be directive speech, setting norms about what is permitted, recommended,
or required. It could also back up those norms with rewards for fulfillment,
and penalties for nonconformity. If pornography were to legitimize harass-
ment, rape, and sexual abuse, it could legitimize behavior that is harm, and
also discrimination.
Pornography, like the law, could silence. The law can silence in (at
least) two ways: in its most familiar guise, by prohibiting or penalizing
certain speech acts, through censorship of dissent; or, in a less familiar
guise, by making certain speech acts literally impossible, through illo-
cutionary disablement (Langton 1993, 2009; cf. Hornsby 1995; Tirrell
1999). Blacks were literally unable to vote, under apartheid, and under
slave law, slaves were literally unable to testify against their masters. In
such a predicament, speakers can in principle say the right words, but what
they say does not count as the illocutionary speech acts of voting or testi-
mony. Pornography likewise could silence in these two ways, if it makes
comparable conditions hold. Suppose a woman says No, intending to
perform the speech act of refusing sex. That might be penalized, or it may
sometimes be literally impossible. Perhaps No sometimes fails to be
recognized as a refusal, fails to achieve uptake, and fails to count as a re-
fusal. If pornography silences women in these ways, there could be a free
speech argument against it: as MacKinnon puts it, the free speech of men
silences the free speech of women: it is the same social goal, just other
people (MacKinnon 1987, 156; see also Hornsby and Langton 1998;
Langton 1993, 2009; McConnell-Ginet 2011, 2012; West 2003).
Pornography, like the law, could have authority. When the law subor-
dinates, or enacts norms, it does so in part because of its authority, since
authority is (it seems) a felicity condition for such speech acts. This draws
on a familiar point from Austin, that exercitive and directive speech acts
in general require authority: the speaker with authority is able to name
the ship, or marry the couple, or enact the law. Pornography would fulfill
a comparable felicity condition, if it is an authoritative saying about
gender hierarchy, or a bible of sexualabuse.
The comparison between pornography and law, however implausible
at first sight, finds confirmation in evidence that pornography appears to
have these features, whether from social science (Donnerstein etal. 1987;
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Malamuth etal. 2000)or from testimony (Paul 2005). Ishall not review
the range of data here (but see, e.g., Langton 2012), but Iwould like to
draw attention to some distinctive voices that are too often leftout.
2.4. The 2013 Report ofthe Childrens Commissioner
The UK Office of the Childrens Commissioner published a report in 2013

based on interviews with, and surveys of, high school students aged 14 to
18, from diverse backgrounds, entitled Sex without consent:Isuppose
that is rape:How young people in England understand sexual consent
(Coy etal. 2013). The report thus offers a new opportunity to include the
voices of young people themselves, reflecting on norms that inform their
lives. The students were asked about a range of sexual encounters, drama-
tized in fictional film vignettes. In nearly all, the encounter fitted a legal
definition of rape, but not the real rape stereotype of attack by a stranger.
According to the reports authors,
[t]he victim, usually a girl (but boys are victims too), is invariably blamed
for their own assault. They should not have gone to visit the boy; should not
have worn a tight top; should not have had the drink; have done it before
so have no right to say no. (Coy etal. 2013,7).
In one vignette, a 14-year-old girl is gang-raped by three boys while

visiting the home of a boy she had liked (he is one of the three). The nar-
rative is presented from the point of view of the girl and of one of the boys
who had felt pressured to join in. Respondents were frank in their verdicts.
(Quotations here and later are verbatim selections, leaving out certain de-
tails, such as the high school year group of respondent.)
It was a bit her fault for wearing that top. It is a bit her fault. (Youngwoman)
Maybe because she dressed like that, maybe she wants it in a way.
(Youngman)
I think she would be more responsible because she had that top on
Because it started off with that top saying (Youngman)
Its like a door saying Fire Exit, youre going to go through that if theres
a fire. (Youngman)
Yes, big flashing sign saying come to me. Its like a sign on your head
saying shag me. (Young man) (Coy etal. 2013,29)

30
Respondents were also frank about pornography. They said that ex-
pectations about sexual behavior, particularly those of young men, were
guided by pornography. When asked what they sought from pornography,
young men said entertainment, but also seeing how to havesex.
You learn how to have sex, youre learning new moves. (Youngman)
You get to see the way its done, and the way people do it you have a
kind of idea of how you might be able to do it. (Youngman)
You go on there for obviously entertainment but as youre watching you
pick up different things, things you dont really know about. You just pick
up things and you learn more things. (Youngman)
The main reason Ithink people look at pornography is for information,
whats doing, how to do stuff. (Young man) (Coy etal. 2013,43)
They were sometimes aware of pornographys artifice:
You know its not realistic. (Youngman)

[W]ith sex, its normally associated with people loving each other but
with porn theyre getting paid to do it, it doesnt actually mean anything,
theyre just doing it for the money. (Young man) (Coy etal. 2013,44)
But they still saw pornography as aguide:
I think young people expect sex to be like porn. Theres that standard where
if its not like that, then sex isnt good. (Youngwoman)
It might give people the wrong idea, because if you watch porn it gives
you the idea that girls are easy. (Youngman)
It sort of makes boys fantasies become like real because its real people.
And then they will assume [thats] what its always like and it can be a
bit aggressive, a bit forceful. (Youngwoman)
It gives them [boys] a worse opinion, like image of a girl. Like all girls
should be like that, all girls want to have sex. (Youngwoman)
I think at this age boys are really quite naive and its about who [you] can
trust and you know if theyre watching this kind of stuff, youre not really
sure how they will treat you. (Youngwoman)
Its not realistic, they have very high expectations of what people should
look like and what their experiences should be like, and its very degrading
towards women, so it can make people a little bit sexist towards women.
(Young man) (Coy etal. 2013,4455)
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The study reveals a profound mismatch between the rules these young
people have to live with and the law itself. There is some awareness of the
law, mostly as relating to legal age of consent. But the most salient sign
of a young womans sexual availability and invitation is her supposed
communication through her clothes, drinking, and visiting young mens
homes. These cultural norms are far more important in young peoples
lives and perspectives than legal formulations of consent (Coy etal. 2013,
69). According to the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003, someone consents
only if he or she agrees by choice and has the freedom and capacity to
make that choice. With this in mind, the authorssaid:
The biggest gap between their knowledge of the law and conceptualisation
of consent is in relation to freedom to consent. Very few young people are
familiar with the legal formulation that involves capacity and freedom, and
many do not recognise the range of non-consensual activity that constitutes
rape. (Coy etal. 2013,69)
The report indicates that pornography is a substantial source of these

norms, if not the only one; for many young respondents, pornography may
well count as an authoritative saying (as MacKinnon put it)perhaps
even a bible of sexual abuse (as Dworkin put it)which in many ways
contradicts the legal assurance of equal respect and citizenship owed
to women (as Waldron described). If we understand the notion of subor-
dination as Isuggested, then pornography may well subordinate:it ranks
women as inferior (a worse opinion, like, image of a girl, degrading,
sexist), legitimates discriminatory harassment and violence against them
(aggressive, forceful), and deprives them of certain powers, especially
regarding sexual speech. This brings us to the topic of silencing:pornog-
raphy silences women, disabling their speech through rape myths that
undermine refusal:a womans no doesnt mean no; women who dress a
certain way are asking for it; and a womans clothes, not her voice, give
her consent (like a sign on your head saying Shag me!).
The findings of the 2013 report may also shed light on the question
of authority. This has been a longstanding challenge for the speech act
approach, and a challenge for the analogy with law that is our topic. The
law has a unique and distinctive authority, but pornography, it has been
argued, has none (Bauer 2015; Butler 1997; Green 1998; Harel 2011).
But if pornography lacks authority comparable to the law, this casts doubt
on the other points of supposed comparison:lacking authority, how could

32
pornography subordinate, or set norms, or silence? So the topic of author-

ity deserves more serious attention.
2.5. Pornographys Authority
We have been assuming that if pornography is like the law, this means it has
authority. That would enable it to subordinate, to set norms, or to silence. It
is worth bearing in mind, though, that comparable speech acts may be done
without authority, according to some philosophers. Mary Kate McGowan
has argued that everyday speech enacts conversational exercitives, which
alter permissibility facts within local conversations, which in turn can build
oppressive social norms much wider in their scope (McGowan 2003, 2004,
2009; see also Maitra and McGowan 2007). Her argument has plausibility
and is backed up by wider considerations about the emergence of social
norms (Langton forthcoming). We need to investigate the ways that speech
can enact norms without authority: for example, simply by making certain
behavior seem normal (Langton, forthcoming). Norms can be enacted in
ways more subtle than those of the law. Nevertheless the presence of au-
thority will surely make a difference: when speakers are authoritative, they
can do more, for good or ill, with their words.
So there is a point to the claim that pornography may have authority.
That claim may seem implausible at first sight, but it is defensible, if we
keep three features of authority in mind: authority is relative; it can be
epistemic as well as practical; it can be informal as well as formal. Let us
take these inturn.
First, authority is relativeto a domain, a jurisdiction, and a compari-
son class. Pornography, even if despised in some circles, could have au-
thority relative to the domain of sex. It could have authority relative to
certain consumers, who form its jurisdiction (Green 1998; Langton 1998).
And it could have authority in comparison to other authorities, for ex-
ample if it is more visible and credible than other authorities.
The conversations recorded in the 2013 Report of the Childrens
Commissioner illustrate these three aspects of relativity:pornography is
an authority, relative to the domain of sex; relative to those young people,
who form its jurisdiction; and relative to a comparison class, being more
visible than other norms, including those of the law. Respondents said,
you learn how to have sex, you get to see the way its done, you
learn more things. They saw pornography as setting norms and standards
about sex:I think young people expect sex to be like porn. Theres that
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standard where if its not like that, then sex isnt good (Coy etal. 2013,
44). Such norms, according to the report, are far more important in young
peoples lives and perspectives than legal formulations of consent (Coy
etal. 2013,69).
Second, authority can be epistemic as well as practical. (This distinction
was neglected in my own earlier work on authority.) Practical authority
is usually a felicity condition for the issuing of exercitive and directive
speech acts (e.g., a parent says Lights out at 10 oclock!). Epistemic
authority, sometimes labeled theoretical authority, is a matter of exper-
tise, or supposed expertise. It is usually a felicity condition for the issuing
of authoritative statements of fact, or verdictives as Austin called them
(e.g., an umpire says The ball is out!). The laws authority is primarily
practical, rather than epistemic. But epistemic authority needs to be taken
seriously, especially because, as Joseph Raz observes, practical and epis-
temic authority may interact (Raz 1979). Suppose a doctor diagnoses a
condition and prescribes a medication. Her epistemic authority on the sub-
ject of health is at the same time a source of practical authority, enabling
her speech acts to have directive force as well as verdictive. Moreover,
epistemic and practical authority coincide when a speaker enacts a rule
by credibly reporting that it is a rule (e.g., in our house, lights out is at
10p.m.):norms can be brought into existence by someone saying or pre-
supposing they are already inplace.
Again, the remarks of those interviewed in the 2013 report illustrate the
interaction of epistemic and practical authority. Pornographys epistemic
authority is implied in the description of pornography as information,
a matter of learning how the world is, but also of learning what to do.
Respondents said, The main reason Ithink people look at pornography
is for information, a pursuit of supposed knowledge, but there is a prac-
tical orientation to itinformation, whats doing, how to do stuff (cf.
Schauer ms.). Pornography is an epistemic authority as supplier of infor-
mation, but also a practical authority, as supplier of a standard where if
its not like that, then sex isntgood.
Third, authority can be informal as well as formal. In Austins illustra-
tions, authority is often a formal matter:it is the authorized official who
can name the ship, conduct the wedding, issue the sentence. But the work-
ings of informal authority are more subtle. We can draw here on work
by Ishani Maitra (2012), who argues that speech can acquire informal
practical authority in two different ways. First, derived authority can be
gained from what authoritative participants do, or fail to do, in a particular
context:a pupil may gain authority when she is delegated by the teacher;

34
or when she bossily assumes authority, and the teacher turns a blind eye.
Second, licensed authority can be gained from what nonauthoritative
participants do, or fail to do, in a particular context:at a traffic accident,
someone starts directing traffic, assuming authority, and gaining it if others
go along with it. Maitra shows how authority can emerge informally, and
her argument can be extended to epistemic authority, as well as practical
(Langton forthcoming).
Pornography acquires informal authority for the young people whose
views were recorded in the report, and perhaps in both of the ways de-
scribed by Maitra. Pornography functions as de facto sex ed: without
official imprimatur, its authority is licensed through the informal ac-
ceptance of its consumers, being given credit as an epistemic and practi-
cal authority:information, how to do stuff, setting a standard. That
informal acceptance enables a default process of adjustment, or accom-
modation as David Lewis called it (Lewis 1979, Langton 2017, forthcom-
ing). In this respect, it is comparable to Maitras example of a motorist,
whose authority to direct traffic is acquired through the cooperative at-
titudes of others, and in the absence of a better alternative.
Furthermore, pornographys authority could be derived from the
omissions of another authoritative party, including perhaps the tolerance of
the state itself. This would be comparable to Maitras example of the bossy
pupil, who gains authority when the teacher turns a blind eye (Langton
forthcoming; Maitra 2012). This is a striking thought, which requires more
defense than Ican give it here. But on this suggestion, the states blind eye
toward pornography and the apparent invisibility to many young people of
the laws account of consent themselves contribute to the dynamics of por-
nographys authority. Waldrons concern is compelling in this context:that
the pornographic aspect of our society intimates that this is how men are
taught, around here, on the streets and on the screen, if not in school, about
how women are to be treated (Waldron 2012,91).
2.6.Conclusion
Is pornography like the law? Ihave argued that the analogy drawn by radi-
cal feminists is defensible. Pornography is like the law, because it shares
several interrelated features with oppressive legal enactments:it can subor-
dinate, set norms, and silence, because it has authority. Pornographys au-
thority is relative to a domain, a jurisdiction, and a contrast class; it is both
epistemic and practical; and it can emerge informally, in a context-sensitive
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way, given the attitudes, actions, and omissions of its consumers, and of
other speakers (Saul 2006). This explains how, for the young people de-
scribed in the report, it can have verdictive force (degrading and sexist
towards women), exercitive force (setting that standard), and directive
force (how to do stuff).
I also said that pornography is unlike the law:for example, in the way
it is used in sex, and in the way it hijacks and shapes sexual desire. The
features Idescribed under that heading place limits on the analogy with
law. But those limits are likely to make pornography more effective rather
than less:more effective as a creator of sexual norms, building not just the
norms themselves, but also the motivation to pursuethem.
This brings us to wider issues in politics, about how and whether bad
speech can be fought with good (Langton 2017). It might depend, in this
context, on whether pornographys authority could be reduced by practical
measures: the prospects for competing speech, in the shape of sex edu-
cation, more adequately taught; for zoning restrictions, a traditional but
neglected liberal strategy; for an alternative feminist pornography, as
some have urged; for legal avenues of the kind pursued by MacKinnon and
Dworkin; or for state intervention as an epistemic authority, rather than
practical (Langton forthcoming). Those measures are a topic for another
occasion. Meanwhile, we face the uncomfortable conclusion that pornog-
raphy is in a real sense the law for some, including these young people,
who deserve much better. And, having reflected, let us think constructively
about some solutions.
References
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Bauer, Nancy. 2015. How to Do Things with Pornography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
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Burgess, Anthony. 1970. What is Pornography? In Perspectives on Pornography,
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Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York and
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Donnerstein, Edward, Daniel Linz, and Steven Penrod. 1987. The Question of
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Langton, Rae. 2009. Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and
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39
CHAPTER3 On Multiple Types ofSilencing

Mary Kate McGowan
3.1.Introduction
Some pornography is alleged to silence women, to (systematically) in-

terfere with womens communicative capabilities. Jennifer Hornsby and
Rae Langton have identified one type of silencing. Here, Iidentify several
additional types. Ialso distinguish between causing silencing and consti-
tuting it and, for each of the types of silencing discussed here, Iidentify
several ways in which pornography (or its consumption) might cause that
type of silencing or constitute that type of silencing.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, several issues are dis-
tinguished and, in Section 3.3, pornography is defined for current purposes.
Then, in Section 3.4, the distinction between causing harm and constitut-
ing harm is defined. The speech act of refusal is the topic of Section 3.5
and, in Section 3.6, several ways for refusals to go wrong are identified. In
Section 3.7, four types of silencing are identified, and in Section 3.8 ways
that pornography (or its consumption) may cause or constitute those types
of silencing are identified.
3.2.SeparatingIssues
Before proceeding, it is prudent to separate issues as clearly as possible.

One issue concerns the alleged relationship between pornography and si-
lencing. How exactly does pornography (or its consumption) bring such si-
lencing about? On the standard (i.e., most discussed) account, pornography
40
consumption causes silencing by causing beliefs that lead to the recogni-

tion failure central to silencing. As we shall see in Section 3.8.a, though,
there are plenty of other plausible causal routes between pornography
and silencing. Another type of possibility is that pornography constitutes
(rather than merely causes) silencing. As we shall see, constituting silenc-
ing would involve enacting norms where (some type of) silencing results
from abiding by those norms. Since there are different ways for speech to
enact norms (and there are different norms the following of which would
lead to silencing) there are a variety of options heretoo.
Another issue concerns the phenomenon of silencing itself. What ex-
actly is it? In short, it is some kind of interference with the successful per-
forming (or the successful communicating) of speech acts. By identifying
various ways that a speech act (or its communication) can go wrong, we
shall be able to identify various types of interference and hence various
types of silencing.
Finally, there is an issue concerning the alleged connection between
(some particular type of) silencing and the free speech right. In virtue of
what exactly does this type of silencing constitute a violation of that right?
Although this is a complex and controversial set of issues that fall clearly
outside the scope of the present chapter, a few comments are warranted.
First, the right to free speech is plausibly regarded as a right to be free
from systematic communicative interference. Thus, to the extent that some
form of silencing interferes with communication, that form of silencing is
relevant to the free speechright.
3.3. Background onPornography
Since we are primarily interested in connections between silencing and

pornography, we need to first specify what we mean by pornography. It
is notoriously difficult to define. This is, in part, because there are distinct
sources of disagreement regarding pornography and its proper definition.
One issue concerns which particular objects are instances of pornography.
This is a problem about the extension (or referent) of the term pornog-
raphy. Another issue concerns the definition or defining characteristics
of pornography. Some people think that pornography must be sexually
explicit, while others think that material with an implicit sexual message
of a certain type can be pornographic. Some people think that pornography
is essentially hierarchical so that there must be a power difference both
presented and endorsed. Others disagree.
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41
Some disagreements over pornography arise because theorists have dif-

ferent materials in mind, but not all disagreements about the nature of
pornography (and whether or not it is harmful) arise in this way. People
can and indeed do disagree about the nature and harmfulness of pornog-
raphy even when they agree about which particular things are instances of
it. Consider, for example, a particular issue of Playboy magazine. Leslie,
who grew up before the sexual revolution of the 1960s, for example, might
view this material as liberating (for women) because it celebrates nonproc-
reative sex. Recalling a time when social norms dictated that sex was ap-
propriate only if sex was an act of procreation, Leslie views pornography
as liberating because it questions this (arguably) oppressive assumption.
Helga, on the other hand, views pornography as oppressive (to women)
because it portrays them as mere sexual objects that enjoy being brutalized
and raped. So there is considerable controversy over the (social) mean-
ing of pornography, and not all of this controversy arises from disagree-
ments about which particular things are instancesofit.
As one can see, any definition of pornography will be controversial. The
best one can do, therefore, is to be as explicit as possible about the defini-
tion and to justify ones choices with respect to ones purposes. Since Iam
primarily interested in those (pornographic) materials that may silence,
I here focus on that subset of pornography that presents, endorses, and
even eroticizes a hierarchical sexual relationship. (This general approach
owes much to MacKinnon [1987].) Depictions of mutually respectful and
consensual sexual acts, therefore, do not count as pornography in this
sense. Such erotica does not depict, and thus does not endorse, a sexualized
hierarchy. In addition, documentaries about the sexual slave trade, for in-
stance, which depict abusive, degrading, and hierarchical sexual relations,
are not pornographic either; although such hierarchical sexual scenarios
are depicted, they are neither endorsed nor eroticized in this context. In
what follows, Iam primarily interested in the subset of pornography that
endorses and/or eroticizes a sexual hierarchy in thisway.
As we shall see, how pornographic materials function is highly depen-
dent on context and how the materials are interpreted and used in that
context. On some occasions of use, a particular film may eroticize a sexual
hierarchy and thus count as pornography on this definition, but on another
occasion the very same film may not. That pornographic status is relative
to occasions of use is true of BDSM materials too. Although we are here
interested in what pornography does (and not with the potential legal re-
percussions of what it does), it is nevertheless useful to situate these claims
within the context of arguments for the regulation of pornography. Ihere
ON MULTIPLE TYPES OF SILENCING |41

42
focus on the legal context of the United States, where the production, pur-
chase, or possession of child pornography is a crime. Since it involves sex
with a minor, its production necessarily involves the crime of (child) rape.
It is even illegal to buy what one falsely believes is child pornography.
Another illegal category of pornography is so-called snuff films that (al-
legedly) document an actual rape and murder. Some, for example, contend
that the existence of such films is a complete myth (Kipnis 1996,10).
Although there is some simplification involved, there are roughly three
sorts of arguments given for the regulation of further types of pornogra-
phy. First, some have argued that some (currently protected) pornography
ought to be regulated because it violates certain shared community stan-
dards of decency and thus constitutes obscenity. Over time, however, what
counts as legally obscene has narrowed considerably (and what counts as
within the scope of a free speech principle has broadened considerably)
so that currently only so-called hard-core pornography can be regulated
in this manner (Greenawalt 1987, 303). Feminist arguments for the regu-
lation of pornography have typically focused on an alleged connection
between pornography and harm. The second argumentative strategy main-
tains that pornography ought to be regulated because of the harm it causes.
According to this strategy, pornography ought to be regulated because the
harm it causes women outweighs the reasons against regulating it. (Of
course, there are further conditions required to justify regulation when a
free speech principle is operative.) The third approach maintains that por-
nography actually constitutes harm. According to this radical approach,
due originally to the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
(some) pornography ought to be regulated not because it depicts harm (as
it obviously does) and not because it causes harm (as most acknowledge)
but because it isharm.
3.4. On Causing and ConstitutingHarm
This distinction between causing and constituting harm requires elucida-

tion. To say that speech causes harm is to say that it causes harm but it
does not also constitute it. In other words, the speech in question merely
causes harm. To say that speech constitutes harm, by contrast, is to say
that it brings the harm in question about via the enacting of a norm (or
norms) that prescribes the harm in question. (Clearly, the norms in ques-
tion are prescriptive, but Ihappily leave all other ontological questions to
the metaphysician.)
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43
An example will help to illustrate this difference. Suppose that Icon-

vince all of my many friends that redheaded people are genetically infe-
rior; they are disposed to evil and a threat to all things decent. Suppose
further that, as a direct result of my persuasion, my many friends dis-
criminate against redheaded persons. In this case, my utterances cause dis-
crimination against those redheaded persons. My persuasive words cause
my friends beliefs to change and those beliefs in turn cause my friends
harmful discriminatory behavior. The connection between the speech and
the harm in this case is (merely) causal.
Contrast that with a different case. Suppose instead that Iam a chief ex-
ecutive officer and Iimplement a new company hiring policy when Isay,
From now on, we no longer hire anyone with red hair. This utterance
will no doubt cause discriminatory conduct on the part of my employees,
so there is a sense in which my utterance causes the harm of discrimina-
tion. Despite this, since that discriminatory conduct is brought about my
employees adherence to a policy that Iput into place with my utterance,
my utterance enacts the norm (i.e., the policy) that prescribes the harmful
discriminatory practice in question. As a result, my utterance constitutes
(and does not merely cause) the harm of discrimination. Constituting harm
in this way is actually just a very specific way of causing it (namely, caus-
ing it via adherence to a norm enacted).
In the CEO case, the speaker enacts the policy via a conscious exer-
cise of speaker authority, but, as we shall see, this is not the only way for
speech to enact a norm. Moreover, if pornography can enact norms of the
right sort (namely, norms whose adherence silences), then pornography
can constitute silencing. As we shall see, there are also a variety of ways
in which pornography might (merely) cause silencing.
3.5. On Refusals
The silencing literature has thus far focused on the silencing of a particular
kind of speech act:the speech act of sexual refusal. The basic idea is that
pornography (or its consumption) somehow interferes with womens abil-
ity to successfully perform or to communicate sexual refusals. Although
the various sorts of silencing to be identified here can apply to any sort of
speech act, in what follows, Itoo focus on sexual refusals.
There are two reasons for this. First, concentrating on sexual refusals
focuses discussion. Second, sexual refusals are performed in sexual con-
texts and are thus contexts in which pornography or its consumption is

44
especially likely to have an effect. After all, the point is to identify the
distinct speech-related harm of silencing (of various types) that are plau-
sibly brought about by pornography. Afocus on sexual refusals therefore
makes sense. It would be a mistake to assume (as some theorists have)
that the point (of the silencing literature) is to explain why rape happens
(Finlayson2014).
Before proceeding, we must first offer a speech act account of (sexual)
refusals. What sort of speech act is it and what are the felicity conditions
for its successful performance? Although it may seem that sexual refusal
is a mere matter of communicating a certain proposition (namely, that
the speaker is not willing to have sex with the addressee), this cannot
be correct. To see this, suppose that Sally successfully communicates to
Carl that Cindy is not willing to have sex with him. Even supposing that
the circumstances are such that Sallys utterance rightly convinces Carl
that Cindy is not willing to have sex with him, Sallys utterance is not a
sexual refusal. Although Sallys utterance may constitute sufficient evi-
dence that Cindy would refuse, nothing that Sally communicates to Carl
can constitute Cindys refusal. (I recognize that it is sometimes possible
for one to refuse on behalf of another but only when authorized to do
so by that person.) Furthermore, even if Cindy successfully communi-
cates to Carl that she (Cindy) is unwilling to have sex with him (Carl),
this communicative act alone is, strictly speaking, insufficient for sexual
refusal. More is required.1 The speaker must have and be exercising the
authority to refuse.
It is intuitively clear (perhaps even obvious) that refusals concern per-
mission. Since either granting or denying permission requires authority,
refusals are authoritative speech acts.2 When Cindy says No in response
to Carls sexual advances, Cindy sexually refuses exactly because she
thereby denies Carl permission to proceed. (This consent model of sexual-
ity is problematic since it seems to presuppose that one person [typically
a male] is the initiator or proposer of sexual activity and the other person
[typically a female] accepts or declines that proposal [Anderson 2005,
1406; MacKinnon 2005, 243]. Since the consent model dominates the
law and the literature on silencing, I here work within it.) Having author-
ity over who has sexual access to her body, Cindy is here exercising that
This account is more fully motivated and defended in McGowan (2009a).

1.
Ishani Maitra disagrees. She says:All that is needed for a successful performance of refusal is
2.
that the audience recognize the speakers intention to refuse (2009, 322). Although Maitra (2009)
qualifies this claim, she does not require a speaker authority condition.
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authority when she sexually refuses him. Sally cannot refuse on Cindys
behalf exactly because Sally lacks the requisite authority (over who has
sexual access to Cindys body).
3.6. On Various Ways forRefusals toGoWrong
Refusals are fairly complex speech acts, and a perfectly successful refusal
requires the satisfaction of a variety of conditions. As a result, there are
several different ways for refusals to fall short of the ideal. Whether a
failure to satisfy some particular condition disqualifies the speech act from
being a refusal at all is here left open. In what follows, Iconsider (just)
some of those ways that attempted refusals can be nonideal.
First, a refusal can go awry if, for whatever reason, the addressee fails
to realize that the speaker is intending to refuse. Suppose, for example,
that Deirdre says, May Iuse your hairdryer? and Isay, No, intending
to thereby refuse her request. If Deirdre is so used to getting her own way
that it is utterly inconceivable to her that anyone would ever refuse her,
then she will fail to recognize my intention to refuse. When this happens,
the refusal in question goes awry. My uttering of No is a nonideal refusal
(if it is a refusal at all) exactly because the addressee fails to recognize my
intention to refuse.
Austin, Langton, and Hornsby regard uptake (i.e., the hearers recogni-
tion of the speakers illocutionary intention) to be a necessary condition
for illocution (Austin 1973, 22, 116, 139; Hornsby 1993; Hornsby 1995;
Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton 1993). In the above case, I have
failed to refuse exactly because Deirdre failed to recognize my intention
to refuse. Ido not regard uptake as necessary for illocution, but it is neces-
sary for communication. Exactly because Deirdre did not recognize my
intention to refuse her request, Ithereby failed to communicate that refusal
to her. Furthermore, since silencing is communicative interference, a focus
on communication (as opposed to illocution) is warranted.
A second way for a refusal to be nonideal is when the addressee fails to
realize that the speaker authority condition is met. There are at least two
ways for this to happen. First, the addressee may fail to realize that the
speaker has the requisite authority to refuse. Suppose, for instance, that
my department chair tells me that Icannot have a professional leave, but
Ifalsely believe that only the dean can do this. In this case, Ifail to real-
ize that the speaker (in this case, the department chair) is in a position to
refuse my leave request. Second, the addressee may fail to realize that the

46
speaker, who may or may not be known to have the requisite authority, is
actually exercising that authority on that occasion. So, for example, sup-
pose that the department chair says, The meetings over! but Ifalsely
believe that she is just kidding. Thus, although Irealize that she has the
authority to end the meeting, Ifail to realize that she is using her authority
on this occasion to do justthat.
A third way for refusals to go wrong is for the addressee to fail to rec-
ognize that the speaker is sincere. If I say No, sincerely intending to
refuse, but the addressee, for some reason, falsely believes that Iam doing
so insincerely, then my refusal will go awry. Although it may be a refusal,
it is falsely believed by the addressee to be an insincere one. As one can
see, the recognition of the sincerity intention matterstoo.
Fourth, a refusal will be nonideal if the addressee falsely believes that
the refusal does not accurately reflect the speakers true feelings. Suppose,
for example, that a husband knows (or thinks he knows) that his wife is
just confused or that she is soon going to change her mind anyway so al-
though she is refusing (and he realizes that the various conditions for a sin-
cere refusal are met), he nevertheless dismisses her refusal on the grounds
that it does not reflect what he thinks she really wants. If this happens, then
the wifes refusal is nonideal.
By focusing on this case, Iam by no means suggesting that this is the
most likely explanation for why someone might fail to respect a refusal.3
Indeed it is not. A far more common explanation is that the addressee
privileges his or her own desires over those of the one who refuses. The
reasons for doing this are all too familiar and depressing. Ifocus on this
case, though, because, as we shall see, it involves a potential type of
silencing.
3.7. On Four Types ofSilencing
Although I have here identified four distinct ways that refusals can go
awry, there are plenty of others. (To identify just a few more:a refusal will
also be defective if the addressee fails to correctly identify the content of
the utterance, if the addressee is wrong about the speakers perlocutionary
Failing to respect a refusal is a temporally extended action. Complex at any moment, things also
3.
change crucially through time, since a refusal can be retracted by consent at any moment and
consent can be retracted by refusal at any moment. The normative facts can shift in an instant.
Arefusal at first ignored can coerce and thus cause merely apparent consent. Genuine consent must
be distinguished from giving up resistance and from merely apparent consent.
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47
intentions, or if the addressee is wrong about the speakers reasons for re-
fusing. Davies [2015] discusses an interesting silencing phenomenon that
occurs during the cross-examination of a rape claimant.) We have here but
a mere sampling. As we shall see, though, each of these ways corresponds
to a potential type of silencing.
3.7.a. Type 1:Failure toRecognize theIntention toRefuse

Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (henceforth H&L) have offered the
first (and the most widely discussed) account of silencing (Hornsby 1993,
1995; Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton 1993, 1998). Silencing, in
their sense, is a certain kind of linguistic interference constituted by uptake
failure (i.e., the addressees failure to recognize the speakers intention to
refuse).4 It is important to note that not every instance of uptake failure is
silencing according to H&L; it is silencing only when it is brought about
in a systematic manner.
This systematicity condition is underspecified in the literature. It is
clear that some such condition is required because one-off idiosyncratic
cases of uptake failure should not count as silencing. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that my son fails to recognize my intention to order him to clean his
room because he is distracted by an amazing racecar that happens to drive
by. In this case, Sheas failure to recognize my intention to order him does
not and should not count as an instance of H&L silencing. Only cases of
uptake failure that are brought about in a systematic manner count as si-
lencing. Whether this systematicity condition requires that the recognition
failure be widespread, caused by widespread beliefs, likely to be made
by others under similar circumstances, brought about by following pre-
scriptive norms, or implicated in oppressive social structures is unclear.5
In what follows, Ileave this open but take the systematicity condition to
do the requisitework.
Returning to the H&L account of silencing, suppose that a woman says
No intending to refuse sex but the addressee fails to realize that she in-
tends to refuse. In such a case (and so long as this uptake failure is brought
4.
The H&L account has faced two important objections in the literature. See Jacobson (1995) and
Bird (2002) for the objection that H&L are wrong about the role of uptake. For responses, see
Maitra (2004), McGowan et al. (2011) and Mikkola (2011). For various versions of the objection
that H&L silencing undermines the responsibility of rapists, see Jacobson (1995), Bird (2002),
and Wieland (2007). For responses, see Maitra and McGowan (2009), McGowan et al. (2011), and
Mikkola (2011).
5.
For an exploration of this, see McGowan etal. (2016).

48
about in a systematic manner), the woman is silenced. H&L maintain that

the silenced speaker fails to refuse (precisely because the addressee fails
to recognize the speakers intention to refuse). Again, Ido not take uptake
to be necessary for illocution, but this is a case of communicative failure
since uptake is necessary for communication. Because this phenomenon
involves communicative failure, it is a type of silencing.
3.7.b.Type 2:Failure toRecognize theSpeaker

Authority Condition
Elsewhere, Ihave identified a different type of silencing, constituted by
systematic interference with the recognition of the speaker authority con-
dition (McGowan 2009a). Suppose that a woman says No intending
thereby to refuse sex; the addressee recognizes her intention to refuse but
falsely believes that she does not have the authority to do so. As a result,
the addressee falsely believes that the attempted refusal fails. When this
happens for systematic reasons, the woman is silenced in a different sense.
She is silenced because her refusal is not communicated. This happens
because the addressee takes it to be a failed refusal, and this recognition
failure is caused by the addressees false belief that she does not have au-
thority over who has sexual access to her body. Since type 2 also involves
communicative failure, it too is a type of silencing. Since the recogni-
tion failure with type 2 silencing is different from the recognition failure
with type 1 silencing, the communicative failure is also different. Distinct
communicative failures mean distinct types of silencing. With type 1, the
speech act is not even taken as an attempted refusal. With type 2, by con-
trast, it is taken as an attempted but failed refusal.
Notice that type 2 silencing can occur when the distribution of social
power is extremely unjust. Suppose, for example, that a female slave tries
to sexually refuse her male master. Although the master may recognize her
intention to refuse him, she will be silenced in this way if he nevertheless
fails to realize that she has the authority to refuse him. (If all authority is
socially constructed, then one might deny that the slave has the requisite
authority. When the law failed to recognize marital rape, for instance, a
wife lacked the legal authority to refuse her husband.) If the master be-
lieves that his female slave is his property, then he may well also believe
that it is he (and not she) who has authority over who has sexual access to
her body. Similar silencing can occur when a husband, for example, be-
lieves that his wife cannot refuse him or when a paying customer believes
that sex workers cannot refuse.
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3.7.c. Type 3:Failure toRecognize theSincerity Condition

Elsewhere Ihave argued for a third type of silencing that is constituted
by systematic interference with the recognition of the sincerity condi-
tion (McGowan 2014). To see this, consider a case in which a woman
says No intending to refuse sex but, although the addressee recognizes
her intention to refuse, he mistakenly believes that she is doing so insin-
cerely.6 Since the addressee recognizes her intention to refuse, there is
no uptake failure in this case. It is thus not an instance of type 1 (H&L)
silencing. Moreover, since the addressee recognizes that the speaker is
exercising her authority to refuse, it is not authority silencing either. The
problem here is that the addressee mistakenly believes that she is refus-
ing insincerely. In cases where the speaker intends to communicate her
sincerity (as is the case with most refusals), the addressees failure to
recognize the speakers sincerity means that speaker has failed to com-
municate her sincerity (even if she manages to communicate her refusal).
Since type 3 involves a distinct communicative failure, it is a distinct third
type of silencing.
3.7.d. Type 4:Failing toRecognize theSpeakers True Feelings

A fourth type of silencing involves the addressee failing to recognize that
a refusal reflects the speakers true feelings. Suppose that a woman says
No, sincerely intending to refuse sex, but although the addressee recog-
nizes her sincere refusal, the addressee nevertheless falsely believes that
refusing is not what the speakers deep self really wants. Suppose, for
example, that the addressee believes that the woman will change her mind
as soon as she realizes how amazing he is or as soon as he talks her out
of her Catholic guilt. In a case like this, the addressee realizes that the
speaker sincerely intends to refuse when she says No but the addressee
falsely believes that the speaker is herself mistaken about her true and
innermost desires. If the addressees mistake about the speakers true feel-
ings is brought about systematically, then this is yet another type of silenc-
ing. Since the illocutionary intention to refuse is recognized in this case, it
is not type 1 silencing. Since the speakers exercise of authority is recog-
nized in this case, it is not an instance of type 2 silencing. Finally, since the
speakers sincerity is recognized, it is not an example of type 3 silencing.
West (2003) considers this case and distinguishes it from H&L silencing but does not treat it as a
6.
type of silencing.

50
As one can see, the recognition failure in this case is distinct from the
recognition failures involved in each of the other three types of silencing.
This recognition failure also constitutes communicative failure. After
all, speech acts pragmatically presuppose that speakers are credible testi-
fiers about their own internal states. Thus, if a speaker intends to com-
municate that her refusal reflects her true feelings (as speakers who refuse
typically do), then the addressees failure to recognize this constitutes
a communicative failure. Since the recognition failure and hence the
communicative failure is distinct, this constitutes another fourth type of
silencing.
3.8.On Various Connections Between Pornography

andSilencing
Having identified four different types of silencing that undermine the

speech act of sexual refusal, it is now time to consider how pornogra-
phy (or its consumption) might contribute to these types of silencing. We
turn first to a consideration of mere causal (as opposed to constitutive)
connections.
3.8.a. Causal Connections

There are many possible ways in which pornography (or its consumption)
might cause silencing, and here Iwill consider a mere sampling. On the
standard way of understanding the connection, pornography consumption
causes beliefs in its consumers that then cause interpretive mistakes that
silence. For each of the four types of silencing, it is certainly possible for
pornography to cause beliefs that would cause that kind of silencing. If,
for example, consuming certain types of pornography caused consumers
to believe that women say No in order to excite (and not in order to
refuse), then those consumers might fail to recognize a womans intention
to refuse. Such a belief would then cause type 1 silencing. Of course, it
might also cause other types of silencing too. Suppose, instead, that con-
suming certain sorts of pornography causes some to believe that women
are mere sexual playthings and the property of men. This belief might
cause an addressee to fail to recognize that women have the authority to
sexually refuse and so would cause type 2 silencing. It might also cause
other types of silencing. Consuming certain sorts of pornography might
lead to the belief that women routinely insincerely refuse sex, and this
belief might lead to type 3 silencing. Of course, it too might lead to other
50 | BeyondSpeech
51
types of silencing. Finally, consuming rape-myth pornography (where

a woman is depicted sincerely refusing, being raped, and then enjoying
the rape) might lead one to believe that women want sex even when the
women really think they do not. Such a belief could lead to type 4 silenc-
ing. Again, this belief too might also lead to other types of silencing.
False beliefs about meaning conventions can also lead to silencing. In
some pornographic contexts, No means Yes. Supposing that consuming
this type of pornography causes some to falsely believe that this (No
means Yes) meaning convention is operative in real-life sexual contexts;
such consumers might well fail to recognize a womans intention to
refuse.7 After all, if that consumer believes that her utterance in that con-
text actually means Yes, then he may well fail to recognize her intention
to refuse. If this happens, then consuming this type of pornography causes
type 1 silencing. It could lead to other types of silencingtoo.
False beliefs about second-order meaning conventions can also lead to
silencing.8 In some pornographic contexts, women are depicted as merely
following certain scripts and not as communicating their own thoughts,
feelings, and desires. Much like an actor on a stage, she is perceived to
be playing a role and not trying to express herself. If consuming this type
of pornography causes some to falsely believe that real women in real-
life sexual contexts are merely role-playing, then they are likely to make
interpretive mistakes that silence in any of the four ways identifiedhere.
Causing interfering false beliefs is not the only way for pornography to
cause silencing. Causing the failure to hold certain beliefs (or causing the
failure to recognize that certain beliefs are relevant in a particular interpre-
tive context) can also lead to interpretive mistakes that silence. There are
also other (less conscious) ways in which pornography might cause silenc-
ing. In particular, pornography may condition its consumers (MacKinnon
1993, 16; Scoccia 1996; West and Nolan 2004). Consuming pornogra-
phy involves sexual climax coinciding with viewing pornographic images
of women. Repeated consumption can cause these sort of images to be
sexually arousing so that sexual desire is unconsciously shaped (i.e., con-
ditioned) by pornography consumption. The resulting change in sexual
desire can directly interfere with interpretive capacities by, say, distracting
the interpreter into making mistakes. It could also indirectly interfere with
7.
Wieland (2007) incorrectly takes H&L silencing to require that pornography enact this (No
means Yes) meaning convention in nonpornographic contexts. Maitra and McGowan (2009)
respond.
8.
Wyatt (2009) discusses second-order meaning conventions and their possible role in pornography
causing H&L silencing.

52
interpretation by changing beliefs involved in interpreting womens speech

in sexual contexts. If the conditioning caused by pornography causes the
interpretive mistakes, then pornography causes the silencing. Yet another
possibility is that pornography consumption triggers unconscious imita-
tion mechanisms that then (either directly or indirectly) lead to silencing.9
Clearly there are a variety of ways for the consumption of pornography
to cause these different types of silencing, and some of these ways are
sneaky in virtue of being less than fully conscious. Iturn now to a con-
sideration of potential constitutive connections between pornography and
these various types of silencing.
3.8.b. Constitutive Connections

Let us now consider potential constitutive connections between pornog-
raphy (or its consumption) and these various types of silencing. Recall
that constituting the harm of silencing is really just a very specific way of
causing it; it would involve causing silencing by enacting a norm where
the silencing results from adhering to (i.e., following) that norm. There are
roughly two ways for pornography to dothis.
3.8.b.i. Pornography asAuthoritativeSpeech
Consider again the CEO case. When the CEO enacts a new hiring policy
by saying From now on, we no longer hire anyone with red hair, he
enacts a norm (i.e., the hiring policy) with his utterance. The CEO is able
to enact that norm because he is here exercising his authority; he is exer-
cising his ability to enact company policy. Since adhering to this policy
(norm) is discriminatory, this utterance constitutes, rather than merely
causes, discrimination.
Perhaps pornography enacts norms (via an exercise of its authority), and
adherence to these norms causes silencing.10 Before exploring which sorts
of norms (that pornography might enact) would cause the various types of
silencing, Ifirst focus on the authoritative nature of norm enactment.
Clearly, pornography does not have the official institutional sort of au-
thority that the CEO has. (Many argue against the claim that pornography
subordinates on the grounds that it lacks the authority to do so. See, e.g.,
9.
For a discussion of this imitation hypothesis in relation to the potentially subordinating force of
hate speech and pornography, see Langton (2012). Hurley (2004) concentrates on media violence.
10.
This hypothesis appears to require that pornography is a speech act; the causal version of the
silencing claim does not require this. Hornsby (1993) explicitly denies that pornography is speech.
52 | BeyondSpeech
53
Bauer 2006; Butler 1997; Golding 2000; Green 1998; Sumner 2004.) It is
simply not the case that pornography occupies an official office explicitly
empowered to enact social norms. That said, pornography may be authori-
tative in some other less official way and it may enact the relevant (silenc-
ing) social norms via an exercise of this other less official sort of authority.
But what might this less official authority or power consist in? One might
argue that (some) pornography has derivative but effective authority in
virtue of having the entire history of institutionalized sexism behind it.
(Matsuda [1993] suggests a parallel claim about racist hate speech and
racism.) One might argue that pornography has authority through what
Maitra (2012) calls licensing, a type of omission that confers authority
by failing to object. One might argue that, because so many young men
learn about the norms of heterosexual sexual relations from pornography,
educating the masses about the norms is tantamount to enacting them
(Langton 1993; MacKinnon 1987). Finally, one might argue that since the
U.S.government protects pornography under the rubric of free speech, it
thereby has the authority of the government behind it.11 Of course, each
of these lines of response requires much more development than is of-
fered here. For fuller explorations of this issue, see Maitra (2012) and
Langton (Chapter2 in this volume). Since the authority of the speaker is
strictly necessary for authoritative speech acts, establishing that pornog-
raphy actually has the requisite authority is crucial work yet undone. For
this reason, it poses a serious challenge to the hypothesis that pornography
is authoritative speech able to enact norms (that silence). In fact, this chal-
lenge is widely regarded as the most important one (Langton 1993, 1998,
2009, 2012; Maitra 2012), but future work may well settle the issue in
favor of this hypothesis.12
3.8.b.ii. Pornography asNorm-Enacting but Nonauthoritative
Elsewhere (2003, 2004)Ihave argued that the exercise of authority is not

the only way for speech to enact norms. Conversational contributions, for
example, routinely enact conversation-specific norms. Asserting that my
dog enjoys playing Frisbee, for instance, enacts several changes to the
conversational score (e.g., it introduces the presupposition that I have a
dog, it makes my dog the most salient dog in the context of this particular
conversation, and it introduces the proposition that my dog loves playing
11.
This sort of response is also suggested in Matsuda (1993).
12.
There are other problems with this hypothesis (McGowan 2003; Saul2006).

54
Frisbee). Such score changes, in turn, enact highly localized prescriptive

norms for this very conversation. Exactly because my dog is now the most
salient dog in the context of this conversation, it would be conversationally
improper to try to refer to any other dog with the expression the dog. My
assertion enacts conversation-specificnorms.
I have also argued that this phenomenon generalizes (2009b, 2012).
Conversational contributions enact conversation-specific norms because
conversational contributions are moves in a norm-governed activity; they
are moves in the norm-governed activity of conversation. (Adding to a
conversation enacts changes to what has happened in that conversation,
and since what is permissible in a conversation is a function of the norms
governing it and what has happened thus far, changing what has hap-
pened thus far thereby changes what is permissible.) Thus, whenever
an utterance constitutes a move in a norm-governed activity other than
conversation (e.g., a game, a social interaction, office politics), that ut-
terance will enact activity-specific norms for that particular instance of
that norm-governed activity. Saying something polite to an acquaintance
subtly changes what ought to happen next in that social interaction, and
such changes are not limited to speech. This norm-enacting feature of
speech illuminates a different mechanism (distinct from the exercise of
speaker authority) by which speech enacts norms and thus may constitute
silencing.
Lets apply this to pornography. If a certain action involving a piece of
pornography (say, the action of viewing a particular piece of pornogra-
phy on a particular occasion) is a move in some norm-governed activity
(say, a social interaction or gender relations), then that action will trig-
ger the (general) norms of that norm-governed activity, thereby enacting
highly localized (specific) norms for that particular instance of that norm-
governed activity. Some actions involving pornography are moves in the
norm-governed activity of social interaction, the norm-governed activity
of gender relations, and even the norm-governed activity of sexism. If it
turns out that some such actions involving pornography enact specific
highly localized norms that silence, then so does the pornography involv-
ing action that enacts thosenorms.
3.8.b.iii. Norms that Silence
We have identified two ways that pornography (or actions involving it)
might enact norms. In what follows, for each of the four types of silencing,
a norm is identified that prescribes that type of silencing. In other words,
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55
adhering to that norm causes that type of silencing. As a result, enacting

that norm constitutes (and does not merely cause) that type of silencing.
Furthermore, the norm in question is plausibly enacted by pornography
(or by an action involving pornography). As a result, we have identified
multiple means by which pornography constitutes each of the four types
of silencing.
Consider a pornographic scenario in which the uttering of No counts
merely as a way to sexually excite the addressee. In such scenarios, the
perlocutionary effect of sexually exciting the addressee is portrayed as all
that matters. (Any illocutionary or communicative intentions are utterly
beside the point.) Suppose that this type of pornography (or actions involv-
ing it) enacts a norm such that uttering No counts merely as an attempt
to sexually excite the addressee (but it does not count as a refusal). Such a
norm prescribes type 1 silencing. That is, following that norm will cause
type 1 silencing. After all, if the illocutionary intention to refuse is made
irrelevant in this way, then abiding by this norm will involve systematic
failure to recognize the intention to refuse, thereby constituting type 1
silencing. This is one norm (plausibly enacted by pornography or actions
involving it) that constitutes type 1 silencing.
Consider now type 2 silencing, which is constituted by systematic in-
terference with the recognition of the speaker authority condition. What
types of pornography might constitute this type of silencing? Here is one
possibility. Some pornography depicts women as sexual objects to be used
and not as autonomous agents with wills to be respected. Suppose that
such pornography (or actions involving it) enacts a norm to the effect that
(some) women (or some women sometimes) do not have the authority to
sexually refuse. If such a norm were in place, this would bring about sys-
tematic interference with the recognition of the speaker authority condi-
tion, thereby constituting this second type of silencing.
Recall that type 3 silencing is constituted by systematic interference
with the recognition of the speaker sincerity condition. With an eye toward
identifying a sort of pornography that might enact this sort of silencing,
consider a pornographic scenario where the woman says No but in which
she is depicted as clearly communicating her sexual consent. This type
of pornography (or actions involving it) might, in some contexts, enact
a norm such that saying No counts as an insincere refusal (and cannot
count as a sincere one). Since abiding by this norm would systematically
prevent the recognition of the speakers sincerity, enacting this norm con-
stitutes this third type of silencing.

56
Finally, consider type 4 silencing, which is constituted by systematic

failure to recognize the speakers true feelings of refusal. What sort of
pornography might constitute this type of silencing? Consider rape-myth
pornography. It depicts women who sincerely refuse but who then enjoy
being raped. Perhaps rape-myth pornography (or actions involving it)
enacts a norm to the effect that one ought to operate on the assumption
that women want sex even when the women think they dont. Abiding by
this norm will systematically prevent the recognition of the speakers true
feelings of refusal, thus constituting type 4 silencing.
As one can see, there are certainly candidate norms for each of the four
types of silencing. Moreover, there are probably plenty of other norms that
prescribe each type. Thus, if pornography (or actions involving it) enacts
any one of these norms, then pornography constitutes, rather than merely
causes, (some type of) silencing.
3.9.Conclusion
Some claim that talk of silencing is metaphorical, hyperbolic, or just plain

confused. The possibility that pornography might interfere with commu-
nication, though, is real and, as we have seen, the possible ways that this
might happen are multiple and varied. We have here identified four types
of silencing. We have also identified a variety of ways in which pornogra-
phy (or its consumption) could cause each of these four types of silencing.
Finally, we have also identified two mechanisms by which pornography
might enact norms and, for each type of silencing, we have identified a
norm that prescribes that type, thereby illuminating ways in which por-
nography might constitute (as opposed to merely cause) that type of si-
lencing. As the number of possibilities identified goes up, so does the epis-
temic chance that some such possibility is realized. In short, pornography
silences.
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CHAPTER4 Be WhatISay
Authority Versus Power in Pornography
LouiseAntony
4.1.Introduction
In a series of influential articles, Rae Langton has argued that Austinian

speech act theory can illuminate the way in which pornography con-
tributes to the subordination of women. Langton, following Catharine
MacKinnon, criticizes the commonly held (and legally enshrined) view
that pornography, because it is a form of speech, properly falls under the
protection of the First Amendment and therefore cannot be proscribed.
On this mainstream view, pornography must be tolerated in a free soci-
ety even if its production and promulgation have serious negative conse-
quences for the welfare of women. Langton and MacKinnon both concede
to the mainstream view the point that pornography is speech, but they
claim to depart from the mainstream in holding that pornography is not
only speech. Pornography, on their view, is also action, action that violates
the civil rights of women. And whereas the mainstream view presumes
there to be at most a contingent, causal relationship between pornography
and sexist oppression, Langton and MacKinnon insist that the relationship
is more intimate. Pornography, according to them, does not merely cause
the subordination of women, it is in itself the subordinating of women.
Langtons novel idea is that speech act theory can explain what all this
means, and how it could betrue.
Langton argues that Austins notion of an illocutionary act can explain
all of the aspects of pornography that the mainstream view gets wrong.
Illocutionary acts are acts in which a speaker brings something about
simply in speakingthey involve what Austin calls a performative use
60
of language. Using Austins framework, Langton claims, we can see how

pornography could be simultaneously speech and action, and we can also
see how an act of speech can be constitutively (and not merely causally)
related to the state of affairs it brings about. Most importantly, though,
Langton thinks that the notion of a performative speech act can illuminate
what we might call the self-verifying character of pornographic material.
According to Langton (again taking up a theme from MacKinnon), por-
nography carries an invidious message about women that somehow makes
itself true. Pornographers characterize women in a certain way, and thereby
create a social reality for women that conforms to this characterization
women come to be what the pornographers say theyare.1
Langton argues that Austin provides the models for pornographys self-
verifying character in the speech act types he calls verdictive and exerci-
tive. In each of these speech act types, a properly situated speaker can
bring about a certain state of affairs, p, simply by saying something
something that means, roughly, p. An umpire can make it the case that a
certain pitched ball is a strike just by saying Strike! in the appropriate
circumstances (this would be a verdictive speech act), and an employer
can make it the case that a certain applicant is hired just by saying Youre
hired (an exercitive speech act). Langton believes that pornography af-
fects the status of women in one or the other of these two ways. The por-
nographer, she argues, is authoritative about the value and the function of
women. When the pornographer says, therefore, that women exist for the
pleasure of men, or that women deserve to be treated with contempt, there
is an important sense in which it becomes true that women have this func-
tion or deserve this treatment. The pornographer, in creating or promulgat-
ing pornographic materials, can be therefore seen as issuing an effective
verdict about the value of women:they are found to be inferior, in the way
a jury finds a defendant to be guilty. Alternatively, the pornographer can
be seen as issuing a kind of executive order; he says, authoritatively, that
women are to be inferior, in the way a judge says, authoritatively, that a
defendant is to serve a certain sentence. Either way, the pornographers
say-so is enough for women to be taken to be inferior, or to be taken to
exist for the pleasure ofmen.
I will argue that Langtons application of Austin is incorrect. In earlier
work, I have argued against Langtons view on the grounds that being
Aslightly different approach would be to treat the pornographer as having makers knowledge
1.
of the inferiority of women. (See Hnel and Mikkola; and Mikkola in this volume for details.) Iam
quite skeptical of this notion, but Iwill not rehearse my objections to ithere.
60 | BeyondSpeech
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subordinated is not the sort of condition that can be brought about through
an illocutionary act. In this chapter, however, Iwill set aside that objection
and focus instead on Langtons claims about the type of illocutionary act
pornography might be. Iwill argue, first, that Langton cannot say what she
wants to say about the content of pornography and still have it that pornog-
raphy is a verdictive or exercitive speech act, in Austins sense. Verdictive
and exercitive speech acts do not, and cannot, describe the states of affairs
they bring about. Second, Iwill argue that pornography does not in any
case satisfy the conditions necessary for a speech act to be verdictive or
exercitive. Specifically, there do not exist accepted background conven-
tions that would give the pornographer authority to render verdicts or to
take executive action. This objection to Langtons view has been made
before; Iwill show that her response to the objection betrays a confusion
of authority withpower.
I want to emphasize that none of my arguments will involve challeng-
ing Langtons material assumption that pornography is responsible for the
harms that she and MacKinnon attribute to it. This is largely an empiri-
cal question, and although Idisagree with Langtons reading of the evi-
dence, Iwill accept her view on this for purposes of this chapter. Iwill
focus the dispute on the mode by which pornography might effect these
harms. Neither will Ichallenge Langtons contention that pornography in-
volves some kind of effective fiat about what women are like and what
they are for. Ithink that Langton has real insight here and that there is
profit in exploring the circumstances that makes these fiats effective.
What Ido want to challenge, however, is the idea that speech act theory
offers us any special insight into this phenomenon. How plausible, in the
end, is Langtons theory, when we compare it to a more familiar causal
looping account of social construction?2 Assuming that pornography de-
grades women, what is the most likely mechanism by which it does so?
Can pornographers really render women subordinate in the way umpires
can render a pitched ball a strike? Or is the mechanism by which pornog-
raphy produces its subordinating effects the more familiar one by which
most cultural productions do their work: by affecting first the cognitive
and affective states, and then the behavior, of the individuals who experi-
ence them? If the latter, then we can look to existing accounts of social
construction to better illuminate the role pornography plays in maintaining
gender oppression.
2.
The term looping kind is due to Ian Hacking (1995). Ill have more to say about thisbelow.
AUTHORITY VERSUS POWER IN PORNOGRAPHY |61

62
In the first section of the chapter, I will discuss the internal tension
within Langtons speech act analysis, between the expositive character of
pornography and its supposed verdictive/exercitive character. In the second
section, Iwill explain why Ithink Langton is conflating authority, in the
sense important to Austin, with power, and why this makes a difference to
Langtons main thesis. Finally, Iwill sketch a social constructionist alter-
native to Langtons theory for explaining the power of pornography.
4.2. Verdictives, Exercitives, Expositives, and

theFirst Amendment
As Iexplained above, Langton first introduced the idea that pornography

is a speech act in order to clarify and defend a controversial move in legal
analysis made by Catharine MacKinnon. But what was the move, and how
exactly was speech act theory supposed to help? Lets look back at the his-
tory of the MacKinnonDworkin ordinance.
From the beginning of her legal career, MacKinnon was a pioneer in the
prosecution of sexual harassment. In her early article Sexual Harassment
of Working Women (MacKinnon 1979), she developed the legal theory
that an employers sexual harassment of an employee constituted sexual dis-
crimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This theory became the basis
for the first successful lawsuits brought by women against their harassing
employers, and it is still now the bedrock of antiharassment civillaw.
MacKinnon was also a pioneer in being one of the earliest feminist crit-
ics of pornography. In her theoretic work, she argued as follows. Sexist
oppression is rooted in the sexual objectification of women by men.
Pornography produces and sustains this objectification by training men
to view women as desirous and deserving of sexual subordination. The
pornographic narrative, by constructing women as beings who exist pri-
marily for men, not only encourages sexual violence against women but
also creates a climate in which such violence is likely to be tolerated. More
broadly, pornography normalizes and thereby legitimates the domination
of women by menin short, it subordinates women (MacKinnon1987).
At the practical level, MacKinnon sought an avenue of legal redress
for women who had been harmed by pornography in the past, and one
that would deter the production and promulgation of pornography in the
future. Her bold move was to extend to pornography the legal analysis she
had developed so successfully in connection with sexual harassmentthat
is, she sought to show that pornography, like sexual harassment, could be
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63
conceptualized as a discriminatory practice. In 1983, MacKinnon collabo-

rated with writer Andrea Dworkin to draft model legislation incorporating
this analysis, and the language was incorporated into an amendment to
the Code of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis Code
16-3(q)).
In the end, MacKinnons strategy did not work. The Indianapolis ordi-
nance came under immediate challenge. It was declared unconstitutional
in district court, and the ruling was upheld on appeal at the Seventh Circuit
Court. In his now-famous (or infamous) opinion, Judge Frank Easterbrook
cited several reasons for his decision. Some had to do with the vagueness
and subjectivity of the definition of pornography in the ordinance, but
the most important reason, Easterbrook said, was that the ordinance vio-
lated the First Amendment.
Easterbrooks ruling, though it decisively defeated MacKinnons legal
strategy, did nothing to quell the controversy she had aroused. In the ear-
lier, district court decision, Judge Sarah Barker had derided as a sleight of
hand MacKinnons assertion that pornography was regulable, discrimina-
tory behavior. Some of MacKinnons critics went further and claimed that
her view was not just tricky but downright incoherent.3 It was at this point
that Langton came to MacKinnons defense by imputing Austins notion
of a performative speech act into MacKinnons theory of pornography
(Langton 2009c). Pornography was speech; so said the courts. But maybe,
Langton suggested, pornography was performative speechspeech that
actually did things, speech that, in the case of this particular kind of perfor-
mative speech, subordinated women. If that were so, Langton argued, then
we can make good sense of MacKinnons claim that pornography consti-
tutes harm to women and does not merely cause it. Langton writes: Like
Austin, MacKinnon wants to undermine the dichotomy between word and
action. Which is saying kill to a trained guard dog, a word or an act?
[MacKinnon] asks, in a passage that echoes Austins example (Langton
2009c, 28). Austins answer to such a question, Langton presumed, would
be that the dog handlers saying, in this case, is both word and act; there
is no dichotomy between the two.
But it is commitment to this false dichotomy, Langton continued, that
accounts for MacKinnons critics inability to understand the true nature
of the relationship between pornography and the harm it does to women.
Those who think the relationship could only be causal, she contends, are
3.
For example, Parent (1990), quoted in Langton (2009d,26).

64
thinking that the harm that results from pornography must be distinct from,
and only contingently connected to, it. But to think this way is to neglect
the fact that a single action can be truly characterized in multiple ways,
some of which incorporate reference to the actions effects.
Langton asks us to consider again MacKinnons example. When a dog
handler says kill to a dog he know is trained to attack, he is doing at least
three things at once:he is saying something, he is commanding something,
andif his command is successfulhe is provoking something (in this
case, he is provoking the dog to attack). Now if one neglects the middle,
command aspect of the act and focuses only on the saying and the prov-
ocation, one might see these as two separate actions. There is, after all, a
merely contingent connection between the handlers saying kill and the
dogs actually attacking. If the dog had not heard the handler, or if the dog
was not as well trained as the handler assumed, then the attack might not
have occurred, and in that case, it would not have been true that the handler
provoked the dog to attack.
But now, Langton says, focus on the middle aspect of the actthe com-
mand. What shall we say about this? The command is not happily treated
as a mere effect of the saying, because it is not contingently connected
to the saying. The handler need do nothing beyond saying what he says
in order to be issuing a command. Of course certain circumstances must
obtainthe handler must understand what he is saying, and he must be-
lieve the dog to be sensitive to what he is sayingbut as long as these fac-
tors are in place, the handlers saying kill constitutes a command. Now,
once we appreciate this constitutive connection between saying and com-
manding, we are in a position to see, too, that the logical space between
the sayings being a command and its being a provocation is not due to
these two being separate actions. Rather, the logical space between these
two descriptions of the same action is due to the contingency of the further
conditions that would make the command into a provocation. These condi-
tions go beyond the general conditions necessary for a saying to count as
a command and involve the reaction of the dog to the command. But the
handler does everything that it is open to him to do (with respect to provo-
cation) once he issues the command. If it turns out that the dog responds
to the command and attacks, this is not because the handler has performed
some new action; it is simply that, in such a case, a new description of the
command in terms of the dogs reaction becomes trueofit.
Langton pointed out that Austin provided a vocabulary for character-
izing this layering of correct descriptions of acts of speech. What we have
been calling simply the saying, Austin called the locutionary act. The
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commanding is the illocutionary act, and the provoking (if the command
does provoke the dog), the perlocutionary act. The difference between
the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act is that successful performance
of the latter depends upon the occurrence of certain events independent of,
and (typically) subsequent to, those that constitute the former. This is not
to say that the perlocutionary act is an event outside the speaker. The dogs
attacking is a distinct event from the handlers saying kill. But the act
of provocation, which is distinct from the attack itself, is still a speech act
performed by the handler.
Austin observed that when we choose to characterize speech acts in
terms of their contingent effectsthat is, when we characterize a speech
act as a perlocutionary actwe use a characteristic linguistic construc-
tion: we say by saying [such-and-such] we do [this-or-that]] (Austin
1972, 122132). So this is how Austin would describe our example:the
handler, by saying kill to the dog, provoked the dog to attack. The by
construction, Austin claimed, is also common when we want to high-
light the relationship between the perlocutionary act and the illocutionary
act:the handler provoked the dog to attack by commanding it to kill. To
express the relationship between the locutionary act and the illocutionary
act, however, we tend to use a different construction:we say, in saying
kill, the handler commanded the dog to attack. Arguably, the in saying
construction serves to express or at least signal the fact that the saying
constitutes the illocutionary actthe saying, in the right context, is all that
is needed for the illocutionary act to have occurred.
With these distinctions and this terminology at hand, we can render
Langtons diagnosis of the mistakes made by MacKinnons criticsthe
separation of the saying (pornography) from the social effect (subordi-
nation) in Austinian terms. Langton would hold that, for example,
Easterbrook makes this mistake when he observes that depictions of sub-
ordination tend to perpetuate subordination. Langton writes:
Pornography depicts subordination and causes it. Thatin Austins terms

is to describe its locutionary and perlocutionary dimensions.4 What is miss-
ing is a description of the actions constituted by pornographic utterances:
in Austins terms, pornographys illocutionary force. MacKinnon supplies
such a description when she says that pornography is an act of subordina-
tion. (Langton 2009c, 28; emphasis original)
Langton here seems to imply that subordination is a perlocutionary act rather than an illocutionary
4.
act. Itake it that this is just a verbalslip.

66
Thus, Langton argues, subordination stands to the pornographic saying

in the way that the issuing of a command stands to the handlers saying
kill; pornography is a speech act that subordinates.
For Langton, then, the original point of the appeal to Austin is to
make intelligible MacKinnons view that pornography is simultaneously
speech and action. There are two problems, however, with this strategy.
The first is that the analysis has no clear implications for the probity of
Easterbrooks ruling against the MacKinnonDworkin ordinance. As we
will see, the only way for Austins theory to be relevant to the ruling
is if we appeal to it to show that pornography is conduct and there-
fore not speech. But this is a way of thinking of pornography that both
MacKinnon and Dworkin explicitly reject. The second problem is that
the analysis depends on a serious misreading of Austin. Iwill start with
the first problem.
Whatever MacKinnons philosophical critics had in mind in challeng-
ing the idea that speech could also be action, it is clear from the court
documents that nothing depended on the judges denying this possibil-
ity. Rather, the overarching consideration in the findings in both district
and circuit courts was the determination that pornography, considered as
speech, expressed a distinctive point of view and was therefore protected
under the First Amendment. As Easterbrook observed, this point is explicit
in the language of the ordinance itself, where pornography is defined
partly in terms of the way it presents women:for example, as sexual
objects who enjoy pain or humiliation. Easterbrook agreed that the point
of view expressed was repugnant, but pointed out that this does not change
the fact that [t]he ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of
the speech (MacKinnon, supra, at 22; American Booksellers v.Hudnut).
Easterbrook also accepted MacKinnons contention that pornography
harmed women; indeed, he went out of his way to record his agreement on
this point (American Booksellers,329).
More pertinently, Easterbrook even accepted MacKinnon and Dworkins
characterization of the nature of the relation between pornography and
harm it does to women. He quoted with approval the following language
from the legislation:
[P]ornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of

discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and
subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. (American
Booksellers, 329; my emphasis)
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Perhaps, as some feminist writers allege, Easterbrook was striking a

cynical pose in these passages. But whether or not these words were sin-
cere, his choice of rhetoric at least makes clear that his ruling was based
on the manner in which pornography produced its effects, namely by pro-
mulgating a distinctive point ofview:
The subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay
at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the streets Yet
this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech. All of these
unhappy effects depend on mental intermediation. Pornography affects
how people see the world, their fellows, and social relations. (American
Booksellers, 329; my emphasis)
So Langton has Easterbrooks logic wrong. Easterbrook is not arguing,

as Langton alleges, that because pornography is speech, it is not action.
Rather, he is pointing out that pornography is at least speech. What would
have been necessary to take pornography out from under the protection
of the First Amendment was a demonstration that pornography was an
action that was not also speech. As long as pornography works through
the mechanisms by which assertoric speech generally produces action
affecting the mental states of the people who hear itit is functioning in a
way that the U.S. Constitution protects.
However, this is not to say that all speech is protected; this is where the
conduct/speech distinction becomes apposite. There are acts that involve
speech but do not serve to express a point of view. Consider again the
racist employer who writes blacks need not apply in a job posting. Such
an employer commits an act of illegal discrimination, but she does not
express a racist opinion in making that post. Her post certainly gives evi-
dence that she holds racist opinions, but the ad does not say that blacks are
incompetent or that they are inferior to whites. The distinction is crucial.
Were this employer to write and publish an essay asserting, in explicit and
offensive terms, that no black person could possibly be qualified for the
position she is trying to fill, her essay would be protected speech.
This, then, suggests a legal strategy for attacking pornography that shows
some promise: show that pornography is discriminatory conductconduct
that, while it involves speech, does not express a point of view. To say that
pornography is conduct in this legal sense would be to put it in the same
category as the discriminatory job advertisement and the discriminatory
refusal to serve, mentioned above. Ironically, however, this is a strategy

68
that MacKinnon explicitly disavows. She writes: To state the obvious, [?]
I do not argue that pornography is conduct in the First Amendment doc-
trinal sense. Langton follows suit (Langton 2009c, 2829). This is doubly
ironic in Langtons case, since, as I am about to demonstrate, speech act
theory really would be a help in carrying this outthat is, Austins theory
does give a principle for distinguishing expressive speech (speech in the
First Amendment sense) from conduct merely involving speech. As it hap-
pens, Langtons insistence that pornography is expressive speech creates
an internal tension in her analysis.
So we come to the second problem with Langtons defense of
MacKinnon. Langton is wrong about Austin; she attributes to him a goal
that he did not have and neglects the main goal that he did have. So con-
sider this passage:here Langton says that if MacKinnon had merely been
relying on a speech/conduct distinction,
Austins approach would give it no support, for it does not help us to distin-
guish conduct from speech. If there is a line that divides speech from conduct
in the law, it does not divide speech from action in Austins philosophy. On
his view, all speech acts are actions. (Langton 2009c, 28; emphasis original)
But Austin was not merely making the anodyne point that an act of speaking
is an act. Neither was he trying to completely undermine the distinction
between word and action, as Langton claims. Rather, Austin was making
a distinction within the realm of speech, a distinction between two different
functions speech could serve, one descriptive and the other performative. This,
of course, is precisely the distinction that could have served MacKinnons
purposes had she wanted to block a First Amendment challenge.
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin wanted to single out and charac-
terize a distinctive way in which an act of speech could constitute an actiona
way that did not involve stating, describing, or reporting some state of affairs.
Those latter functions were typical of what Ihave been calling descriptive
statements, or what Austin preferred to call constative statements.5 Austin
wanted to investigate uses of language that, in contrast to constative uses,
have the function of performing certain actions without reporting or describ-
ing anything. These were the statements he called performatives.
The contrast between constative uses of language, which report or de-
scribe, and performatives, which do not, is central to Austins exposition
Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason Iprefer to use the word
5.
Constative (Austin 1972,3).
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69
of his theory of speech acts. He offers four illustrative examplesthe

taking of a marriage vow, the christening of a ship, the bequeathing of a
piece of property, and the making of a betall of which involve, typically,
the utterance of a certain sentence.
In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the
appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what Ishould be
said in so uttering to be doing. When Isay, before the magistrate or altar,
&c., I do, I am not reporting on a marriage:Iam indulging in it. (Austin
1972, 6; my emphasis)
Even when the conventional performative language sounds like a descrip-

tion of a state of affairs, it is not. So with regard to an utterance of a sen-
tence like I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife, Austin
remarks: Here we should say that in saying these words we are doing
somethingnamely, marryingrather than reporting something, namely
that we are marrying (Austin 1972, 13; emphasis original).
The persons who say I do in the proper context bring about a change
in the state of thingsin this case, a change in their own marital statuses
and the change occurs in virtue of their saying what they say in the proper
context. Once the words are said (in the proper context), it becomes true
that the two are married. At that point, the new fact can be reported by
saying they are now married. But the marrying and the report that mar-
rying occurred remain two separate thingsthe saying of I do creates
the state of affairs that the sentence they are now married subsequently
describes or asserts to be thecase.
Austin further drives the point home by endorsing (what he believes to
be) an American rule of evidence that distinguishes speech acts that are
performative from ones that are constative:
a report of what someone else said is admitted as evidence if what he said

is an utterance of our performative kind:because this is regarded as a report
not so much of something he said, as which it would be hearsay and not
admissible as evidence, but rather as something he did, an action of his. This
coincides very well with our initial feelings about performatives. (Austin
1972, 13; emphasis original)
In short:a performative speech act brings about a state of affairs, but not by
reporting on or describing the state of affairs it bringsabout.

70
It may appear that Austin softened the contrast between the constative and
performative uses of language when he allowed, in Lecture XI (Austin 1972,
133147), that the issuance of descriptions and reports also counted as speech
acts of a type. He coined the term expositives to cover speech acts like asser-
tions, affirmations, descriptions, denials, and objections. But there are three
points to note. First, Austin never backtracked on his earlier, general distinc-
tion between constative and performative uses of language. Second, he is
careful to distinguish the fact that an expositive speech act, like an assertion,
has occurred from the state of affairs one might be attempting to describe
by means of such an expositive act. When one says, expositively, snow is
white, one performs an act of describing. The words snow is white are
not functioning performatively; rather, they are functioning in a constative
way. The third pointperhaps the most important for present purposesis
that Austin is perfectly explicit that the specific categories of verdictive and
exercitive speech acts (the types that Langton says pornography falls into) do
not describe the state of affairs that they bringabout.
This is particularly important to remember in the case of verdictives, for
it is usually part of their felicity conditions that they be issued only when
certain antecedent facts obtain. But even if the language in the verdictive
is the same as the language naturally used to describe such a fact, the ver-
dictive does not itself describe the state of affairs its issuance is meant to
track. This can make it difficult to determine whether a speech act involves
a performative or a constative use of language, especially when viewed out
of context. The important point, for our purposes, is this:while a sentence
like I find the defendant not guilty could, depending on the circum-
stances of its utterance, serve either as the expression of a constative judg-
ment that the defendant is, as a matter of fact, the perpetrator of the crime
or as the commission of a verdictive act of altering the defendants legal
status,6 it cannot do both at the same time. Sentences that are functioning
verdictively or exercitively cannot simultaneously function constatively.
We can see this from the following example. Consider a casual remark
made by a bystander in court:I find the defendant not guilty. In saying
this in this circumstance, the bystander performs the expositive speech act
of expressing her opinion. Since she is merely a spectator, she lacks the
authority to legally acquit the defendant, and so when she performs her
(expositive) speech act, nothing about the defendants legal status changes.
The jury foreperson, on the other hand, does have the authority to issue
6.
See item (2)(Austin 1972,78ff).
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71
a binding verdict:the defendant is acquitted in virtue of the forepersons

saying (on behalf of the jury, and at the appropriate time and place) We
find the defendant not guilty. The foreperson is not thereby expressing
her personal opinion about the innocence of the defendant. Indeed, the
forepersonand every member of the jury, for that mattermay believe
that the defendant is guilty. They might, despite their sharing this empiri-
cal belief, all still agree that the prosecution did not make its case, so that
they were, accordingly, duty-bound to find the defendant not guilty. In
such a circumstance, there would be no contradiction between the foreper-
sons verdictively saying We find the defendant not guilty and her saying
expositively We find the defendant guilty (although her saying this, de-
pending on timing, would probably cause astir).
The two speech acts in this examplethe forepersons verdictive act
and the bystanders expositive actconcern the same objective condi-
tions, but they are related to those conditions in very different ways. Both
speech acts are, in some sense, governed by the defendants actual guilt or
innocence, but they are not equally about that. Although verdictive acts are
supposed to track objective guilt or innocence, they concern (and indeed
determine) something differentlegal status. Ajury system is usually de-
signed with the hope that it will keep the latter in phase with the former,
but even in the best of such systems, and without any defect in the legal
proceedings, the two things can come apart. Thus, if asked relative to the
verdictive, the question Is the defendant guilty or not guilty? turns on
facts about what the jury said. If asked relative to the expositive, however,
it turns on facts about what the defendant did. No single speech act can
verdictively determine the condition that the correlative expositive claims
to describe.
My example also confirms my earlier point that Austins introduction
of the category of expositives was not meant to replace, or to obviate,
the notion of a constative use of language. The category of expositives
allowed Austin to say that every (serious) use of language constituted an
actiona performance of some sortwhile yet preserving the distinc-
tion between constative and performative uses of language. When Iassert
something, Iperform the expositive act of asserting, but the language Iuse
to express the content of my assertion is language used constatively. So,
for example, if my husband asks me the identity of an actor we are watch-
ing in a movie, Imight say, His name is Andrew Lincoln. In so replying,
Iperform the expositive act of asserting (or answering or declaring). But
in so acting, Ido not create or change any of the facts about Lincoln or his
name. My assertion is meant to conform to an antecedently existing fact.

72
The same words, in contrast, could have been used by Lincolns parents
(or his agent) to establish the fact about Lincoln that I am claiming to
report. That is, they could have used the same words to perform the act
of naming. And when those words are uttered in the course of an act of
naming, they do not report or describe. There is, in that case, no anteced-
ent reality to be reported or described; there is no question of Lincolns
parents being correct about what his name is; rather, their act of naming
creates the fact that, later on, Imean to report.
Lets now consider the racist employers discriminatory advertisement
in light of Austins distinction between performative and constative uses
of language. It seems reasonable to regard the act of advertising as a per-
formative speech actmost likely, an exercitive speech act (i.e., an exer-
cising of powers, rights, or influence) (Austin 1972, 151). If this is right,
then the employer, in posting the text Assistant wantedblacks need not
apply on a sign is doing something in contrast to what she would be
doing if she asserted or expressed the proposition Blacks are unqualified
for my job. This is so, even if, as is likely, it was her racist belief in this
latter proposition that led her to post the discriminatoryad.
The exercitive speech act performed by the racist employer is a case of
conduct in the sense pertinent to First Amendment law. It is because the
advertisement is an act of discrimination as opposed to the expression of
a point of view that the employer has no First Amendment right to post it.
Thus, if Langton had availed herself of the distinction between speech
and conduct, she would have succeeded in describing a legal strategy
that would have addressed the First Amendment challenge. This is not to
say, of course, that the challenge would have been legally effective, but it
would have been at least pertinent.
Adopting this strategy would have carried a second legal benefit as
well: had the argument been that pornography was discriminatory con-
duct, that would have obviated the need for a demonstration that pornog-
raphy is harmful in a way and to the extent that that harm warranted a
content-based exception to the First Amendment. Because nonexpressive
discriminatory acts are not subject to the First Amendment, a black person
who sues a potential employer for discrimination does not bear the burden
of proving that she has been harmed in some other way, beyond being
discriminated against, by the employers behavior. The employers act is
legally proscribed, whether the plaintiff suffers any separable damages,
material or psychological, in consequence. The plaintiff need not have
suffered from not getting the jobshe may have found a better-paying
position with excellent work conditions, and she may be so exceptionally
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73
psychologically robust that the run-in with a bigoted employer did not
touch her self- esteem; such a person in such circumstances still has
grounds to sue. If the language of harm has any place at all in the analy-
sis, we would have to say that the crucial harm is constituted by the viola-
tion of the black persons civil rights.7
Austins theory appears, for these reasons, to be eminently suited to
MacKinnons purpose, if the aim of her reconceptualization of pornog-
raphy was to remove it from the protection of the First Amendment. If
pornography verdictively or exercitively renders women subordinate, then
pornography violates womens civil rights, and it is therefore subject to
the Civil Rights Act. But of course, applying Austins theory in the way
Isuggest would also have carried a significant cost:on the analysis Iam
suggesting, Langton would have to drop that the pornographic speech act
is also an expositive act of describing women as inferior. For no speech act
can be both verdictive and expositive, relative to the same content.
The loss of expressive content is a cost that neither Langton nor
MacKinnon would be willing to pay. It is very important to both theo-
rists to say that pornography tells lies about women. But to lie, one must
assert somethingone must purport to be characterizing an antecedently
existing state of affairs. If pornography says that women enjoy violent
sex, its saying so can only be a lie if there is an antecedent reality that the
pornographic speech act purports to (but does not) accurately describe.
But speech used descriptivelyspeech involving language in its consta-
tive use, as Austin would put itis speech used to express a point of view,
and such speech is protected.
Now there is one more possibility to consider. Note that, while Langton
agrees with MacKinnon that pornography tells lies about women, she
does not actually say that lying is the illocutionary act that pornography
consists in. Rather, she says that pornography is an illocutionary act of
subordination. Perhaps, then, there are two different speech acts one can
perform, using the language of pornography:one can perform the ex-
positive speech act of telling lies about women, but one can also perform
the exercitive speech act of subordinating women. On this way of thinking,
pornographic language can be used either constatively or performatively,
Leslie Green comes to the same conclusion:that if it could be established that pornography was
7.
an illocutionary act of subordination, then there would be no need to make the case that it resulted
in other, contingently related harms to women. He writes:if saying simply is doing, there is no
need to worry about the contingent causal connection [with harm] and the problematic evidence
for it. The evidence for the harm is the evidence for the saying (Green 1998, 291)(quoted, with
paraphrastic interpolation, by Langton [2009a,91]).

74
along the lines of the example given earlier:the words I find the defen-
dant guilty can be used either to express an opinion (an expositive speech
act) or to render a verdict (a verdictive speechact).
But how plausible is it that there is some kind of verdictive/exercitive
pornographic speech act that does not involve language used constatively,
and that thus does not tell lies about women, but that still somehow
functions to render women subordinate? It is very hard to understand how,
absent the false message, such a speech act is supposed to work. The most
plausible story about the way in which pornography could lead to the sub-
ordination of women is the one outlined by Judge Easterbrook:men read
or view pornography, and thereby acquire a host of false beliefs and absurd
expectations about women. These beliefs and expectations lead them to
treat women in reprehensible ways, or at least to condone such treatment
when done by others, and to rationalize such treatment as simply what
women want. But if pornography makes no claims about women, why
would men who consume pornography acquire such beliefs and expecta-
tions in the firstplace?
However, it might be replied, on Langtons behalf, that I (like
Easterbrook) am begging the crucial question. Easterbrook presumes that
the ill effects of pornography all depend upon mental intermediation, but
to characterize the operation of pornography in that way is simply to pre-
suppose that those ill effects are perlocutionary effects. That is, to insist
that pornography can only bring about the subordination of women by
first affecting the mental states of its audience is to take it for granted that
pornography cannot be what Langton argues it isan illocutionary act of
subordination. It is, after all, Langtons position that pornography is more
like an act of legislation than an act of description. Pornography subordi-
nates women, she argues, by dint of the authority of the pornographer:the
pornographer is socially situated in such a way that he can effectively de-
clare, or find, women to be inferior, in the same way a judge can declare
or find a defendant guilty.
If Langton is right that the pornographer can make it the case that
women are subordinated simply by issuing a finding that women are in-
ferior to men, or a fiat that they are to be inferior to men, then Langton
neednt worry about whether pornography can function expositively.
Whether or not pornography tells lies about women, if pornography can
also function as a verdictive or exercitive speech act, then the pornogra-
phers ability to render women subordinate to men should be independent
of pornographys contingent effects on the beliefs and desires of its audi-
ence. The members of a jury, in announcing their verdict, do not need to
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persuade anyone that their reasoning is correct in order to confer a particu-

lar legal status on the defendantthey have the authority to make things
be a certain way, simply by saying so. Similarly, the pornographer should
not need to rely on mental intermediation in order to effect the subordi-
nation of womenit should be enough that the pornographic speech act
is performed.
Let us turn, then, to the question whether pornography could be a ver-
dictive or exercitive speech act, according to Austins specifications. Iwill
argue that it cannot.
4.3.Authority and Convention inAustins Account

ofPerformatives
As Ihave explained, Austins main aim in How to Do Things with Words

was to characterize a neglected function of ordinary language, one in which
language was not being used to describe or report some antecedently exist-
ing state of affairs but rather to bring about a new state of affairs. These
performative utterances were not, as constative utterances were, subject
to assessibility in terms of truth or falsity. Aperson christening a ship, for
example, was not reporting that the ship had a certain name; rather, she
was creating the fact that the ship had a certain name. There could be no
question of the christeners utterance being true or false, because there was
no prior state of affairs to which the christeners words had to conform.
But even though performative utterances could not be assessed for truth
or falsity, Austin argued that they could be assessed in a different way
we could ask whether the speaker was successful in performing the act he
or she was aiming to perform. Thus, we can ask of a vow whether it has
been validly taken, or of a christening whether it followed the proper form.
Viewed at the right level of abstraction, Austin continued, these sorts of
assessments of performative speech acts can be seen to be parallel to the
assessment of constative utterances for truth or falsity. At the most general
level, constatives and performatives could be either happy or unhappy
or, equivalently, felicitous or unfelicitous. Falsity was one of the main
ways in which constatives could be unhappy, and while performatives
could not be unhappy in that way, they could be unhappy in otherways.
The characterization of felicity conditions was also to serve another
purpose for Austin, and that was to answer the question (which headed a
subsection in Lecture I), Can Saying Make It So? Austin remarks that
it might sound odd or even flippant to say something like to marry is

76
to say a few words, as if merely pronouncing a set of words was all there
was to performing the act of marrying. And yet, Austin did want to say
that in the right circumstances, saying the right words would be sufficient
for the marriage to occur. That made it crucial for him to say how things
would have to be for circumstances to be the right ones, how things could
be set up so that a marriage could be effected simply by someones saying
a few words. This project could be furthered, Austin suggested, by keep-
ing in mind the ways in which performative utterances could go wrong, or
be unhappy.
Austins subsequent presentation of felicity conditions for performa-
tives is thus organized by a structured typology of infelicities. To begin,
Austin distinguishes two basic kinds of infelicities. The first kind com-
prises factors that produce misfirescases where the attempted perfor-
mance does not come off, where the speech act is purported but void.
The second kind, which Austin labels abuses, are factors that do not
prevent the performance from occurring but that do make the performance
defective in some serious way (Austin 1972, 1224).
The difference between the two kinds can be brought out by consider-
ing promises. There are circumstances in which saying I promise to
does not amount to actually making a promisefor example, saying those
words as an actor speaking lines in a play. That the obtaining of such
a circumstance vitiates the making of a promise tells us about some of
the felicity conditions essential to the making of a promise:the speaker
must be speaking seriously. On the other hand, there are other circum-
stances in which someones saying I promise to does count as having
made a promise, but in a defective way. Two such circumstances are as
follows:(a)the speaker does not intend to keep her promise and (b)the
speaker promises something that it is not in her power to provide. The first
case is an insincere promise, and the second is an ill-considered promise.
In either case, though, the promise has been made, as is shown by our
holding the promiser responsible if the promise isnt kept. This tells us
that sincerity and appropriate knowledge are also felicity conditions for
promising, but that they are conditions of the second, nondisablingtype.
In general, then, we have a division of felicity conditions into two
typeswhat we might call (although Austin did not use these terms) con-
stitutive and nonconstitutive felicity conditions. Some of these con-
stitutive felicity conditions are quite general and are necessary for any
speech act whatsoever to be performed. Others are particular to specific
speech act types. But all of the constitutive felicity conditions are subsumed
under two ur-conditions for a speech act to be performed felicitouslythe
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(A)conditions and the (B)conditions. The (A)conditions set the back-

ground against which a speech act can be performed:
(A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a

certain conventional effecct, that procedure to include the utter-
ing of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances,
and further,
(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must
be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure in-
voked. (Austin 1972,1415)
The (B)conditions then state that the (A)conditions must be fulfilled:
(B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both

correctlyand
(B. 2) completely. (Austin 1972,15)
Violations of either (A)conditions or (B)conditions mean that no speech

act has been successfully performed.
The (A/B) conditions become especially important in the cases that
Austin later goes on to classify as verdictive and exercitive speech acts. As
Austin indicates through his discussion of examples, attempts to perform
speech acts of one of these types fail if there exists no accepted background
convention (an A-type failure), but they also fail if, while there does exist
an appropriate convention, the speaker is not properly authorized by that
convention to execute the specified procedure (a kind of B-type failure).
Austin allows that there is some fungibility between (A)-type and (B)-type
failuresa given misfiring, some latitude about how to explain why an
attempted speech act fails to come off. In particular, there is some fungi-
bility between the requirement that the speaker be a proper person as
specified by the conventional practice and the requirement that the prac-
tice be accepted by the audience to whom it is directed. For example,
orders given on a desert island by the captain of a wrecked ship might be
rejected by the marooned passengers. We can say this is because either the
captain is no longer in the position that authorizes him to give orders or
because the conventions that used to authorize him are no longer accepted
(Austin 1972, 28). Acceptance and authority are, in Austins framework,
interdependent.
There are two important things to notice about Austins notion of ac-
ceptance. The first is that it is a normative, not a descriptive notion:

78
[F]or a procedure to be accepted involves more than for it merely to be the

case that it is in fact generally used; it must remain in principle open
to anyone to reject any procedure, even one that he has already hitherto ac-
cepted. (Austin 1972, 29; emphasis original)
We cannot, therefore, conclude that some attempted command is authori-

tative for a group of individuals simply because those individuals are fall-
ing in with the content of an orderthat is, behaving in a way that ac-
cords with the command (Austin 1972, 28). On the question whether a
practice is accepted, Austin writes:Above all all must not be put into flat
factual circumstances; for this is subject to the old objection to deriving
an ought from an is. (Being accepted is not a circumstance in the right
sense.) (Austin 1972, 29; emphasis original).
The second important point about acceptance, in Austins sense, is that
it is voluntary. One cannot be forced to accept a conventionnot even if
one had accepted it hitherto. Austin says:[I]t must remain in principle
open to anyone to reject any procedure (Austin 1972,29).
Now, one might question whether Austin is completely serious about
this. After all, many of his examples of (especially) verdictive and exerci-
tive speech acts are drawn from the arena of criminal law, where it is not at
all clear that everyone involved accepts the conventions that constitute
the law. When a jury finds a defendant guilty, must the defendant accept
the verdict in order for it to be binding on him? Must he accept the au-
thority of the judge who sentences him to a term in prison? Perhaps some
defendants do accept the authority that puts them awayplausibly this is
so in cases of civil disobediencebut it seems unlikely to be true across
theboard.
Yet Ido think that Austin means what he says. In the first place, it is pos-
sible to accept a convention without concurring with every determination
made by an authorized individual within that convention. When the batter
argues with the umpire about a particular pitch, the batter is not thereby
rejecting the conventions that define the sport of baseball, nor even chal-
lenging the authority of that particular umpire. The batter simply is trying
to persuade the umpire to change her call. Similarly, it is possible for one
to disagree with a jurys verdict against one without thereby rejecting the
entire framework of the law. So at least some of the cases that might seem
problematic here arenot.
On the other hand, there undoubtedly are still cases in which, say, a con-
victed person does reject the legitimacy of the whole of the legal system.
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This might happen, for example, in the case of a political prisoner, or in

the case of someone who because of poverty or racism feels voiceless in
her social position. Suppose that we take Austin at his word, and, follow-
ing him, say that the prisoners in either of these cases do not accept the
conventions that define the legal system. What difference would that make
to the prisoners? They still are in such situations, firmly in the grip of those
legal systems:they can be forcibly imprisoned or worse, whether or not
they view their punishments as legitimate.
This is where Austin makes another important distinction. After saying
that it must remain in principle open for anyone to reject any procedure,
he writes: One who does so is, of course, liable to sanctions (Austin
1972, 29; my emphasis). That is to say, one need not accept a practice,
but there may be consequences for those who do not. And importantly,
whether one is liable to such sanctions is one of the flat, factual circum-
stances that must be distinguished from the normative condition of some-
ones accepting a procedure. We can simply look and see what happens
to those who violate certain practices to know what kind of behavior car-
ries sanctions; we do not need to know what is in the heart of the person
against whom the sanctions are imposed.
The key distinction, Icontend, is between authority and power. These
are independent notions. The former, but not the latter, depends on social
agreement.8 Authority is connected with conventions that are, in Austins
sense, accepted, although there are certainly types of authority that do not
require the kinds of conventions Austin makes necessary for speech acts.
Power, on the other hand, is a matter of being able to arrange contingen-
cies, to make things be the way you want. Authority often brings with it a
certain type or amount of power, of course, but once conferred, the power
can outstrip the authority. If social practice authorizes certain individuals
to carry weapons, those weapons will then be available for use in unau-
thorized as well as authorized ways. This is the message of the Black Lives
Matter movement in the United States:it is the power of armed police of-
ficers, rather than their authority, that structures the lives of young black
menand that should notbeso.
The distinction between power and authority, although clear in concept,
can be difficult to apply in practice. In particular, it can be difficult to
apply in the case of social norms. In the first place, it is not always easy
to specify the contents of social norms. The whole of our social lives is
8.
Rebecca Hanrahan and Ioffer a detailed account of authority (Hanrahan and Antony2005).

80
structured by various customs, and practices, some of which can be easily

articulated and scrutinized, others of which we simply feel and would
struggle to make explicit. The question, then, of whether we accept any
of these implicit norms can be very hard to answer.
Still, there are clear casescases in which we can say what the norm
is, and whether we accept it. Consider the norm for female appearance that
requires removing or disguising ones bodily and facial hair. Some women
who follow this norm do so because they accept it, but there are others who
simply fall in with it (as Austin would say). One reason they may do so
is that women who revolt against the normwomen who do not shave
their underarms or who leave their moustaches unbleachedare, to put it
mildly, liable to sanctions. Such women are subject to ridicule, expres-
sions of disdain, and, in recent years, Internet shaming.9 Women have lost
their jobs over such matters (cf. Landers 1994). This makes the cost of
open rejection pretty highunacceptably high, for women in certain mi-
lieux. Thus, while an individual woman may reject the norm of appearance
that says a womans body and face should be smooth and hairless, she can
do nothing (at least not in the short run) about the consequences attached
to violations. Social norms of this sort are embedded in structures of social
power, whether or not the authority of those in power is accepted.
With all this in mind, let us return to Langtons suggestion that pornogra-
phy is a verdictive or exercitive illocutionary act of subordinatingwomen.
Lets first consider the question whether there is, as required by the
A-type conditions on performative speech acts, any conventional proce-
dure stipulating what must be done to effect a state of subordination.10
What would be the elements of this procedure, and where might they be
found in the production of pornography? Some people have pointed out,
in response to this question, that there are indeed certain conventions that
are observed in (at least some kinds of) pornography: a variety of cli-
chd plots, stock characters, conventional poses, and so forth. Could these
tropes constitute the conventional procedure for performing the illocu-
tionary act of subordinatingwomen?
Not on their own. Stylistic conventions of this sort might be part of a
grounding conventionthey might be regarded as specifying the analogs
9.
For example, consider these recent cases involving Sikh women who do not shave their facial
hair:https://storify.com/cbccommunity/bearded-sikh-woman-teaches-reddit-a-lesson-in-tole and
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2560795/Teaching-assistant-Harnaam-Kaur-condition-
causing-excessive-hair-grows-beard.html.
10.
Again, Iam waiving my objections to the idea that subordination, in the sense with which
Langton is concerned, is or could be a conventional effect.
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of the conventional formulas associated with other sorts of speech acts:I

now pronounce you spouses for life or I solemnly swear to tell the truth.
That is, the conventions of pornography might tell us what to say in order
to perform the pornographic speech act. But knowing what to say is not
enough:we would still need to know who is authorized to use these formulas
and under which circumstances. As Austin points out, a random passerby
cannot christen a ship (shes not the right person) and an off-duty ship captain
cannot order anyone to drop anchor (these are not the right circumstances).
Presumably, then, if there is a backing convention that constitutes the
pornographic speech act of subordination, this convention will say that
it is pornographers who are authorized to perform it. (Theres a hint of
circularity here, but Iwill trust it can be removed.) And in what circum-
stances? There is very little to go on here, either in Langtons account or
in the known facts about the pornography industry. The most plausible
thing to say, perhaps, is that the circumstances in which a pornographer
is authorized by the conventions to subordinate women are very minimal,
that really all that is required is for the pornographer to say, in produc-
ing images or texts of the conventional sort, that he subordinates women.
In this respect the speech act of subordinating women would be like the
speech act of promising, which can be done by anyone, in virtually any
circumstances, just by saying I promise.
But of course we now must face the question of whether or not this
conventional practice of subordinating women is accepted, and if so, by
whom? Who, if anyone, grants pornographers the authority to subordinate
women? It surely is not womenor, any rate, it is not all the women who,
according to Langton, are subordinated by the producers of pornography.
If it is not women who authorize pornographers to subordinate women,
perhaps it is menthe men who consume pornography. There is a great
deal to suggest that this is Langtons view:that it is the men who view
and read pornography who accord to the producers of pornography the
authority to say verdictively how women are. For example, in her response
to Judith Butler, Langton points to empirical evidence that some mens be-
liefs, including their normative beliefs, are altered when they are exposed
to pornography. Such men, she reports, are more likely to view women as
inferior and more likely to accept rape myths as true (Langton 2009b,
110). These facts about the changes in mens view of women are, shesays,
poorly explained by an assumption that pornography has no authority; they

are better explained by an assumption that pornography does have authority,
in a certain domain. (Langton 2009b, 110111)

82
But what is the notion of authority involved here? Ithink that Langton
is imagining that the men who are affected in these ways by pornography
are, in effect, treating pornographers as epistemic authoritiesin a cer-
tain domain. Such men regard pornography, either implicitly or explicitly,
as a reliable source of information about women, about their characteris-
tics, and about theirvalue.
Epistemic authority, however, is not the right sort of authority to ground
a verdictive or exercitive speech act. Epistemic authority, in fact, is neither
necessary nor sufficient for that purpose. When a jury is empowered to
render a verdict in a criminal case, it is not necessary for the members to
be in a better epistemic position to judge the matters of fact than anyone
else; there is not even a presumption that that is the case. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for the jurors to be epistemically disadvantaged, relative to
others, as happens when some piece of (epistemically pertinent) evidence
is disallowed in a pretrial motion. In some cases, as with judges in compe-
titions, the conventions are accepted against a background assumption that
any person empowered to judge will be someone with great knowledge
and discernment. But even in those cases, it is not the actual qualifications
that empower the judge; it is the convention that made her the judge.
And when and if a properly authorized judge fails to possess knowledge
and discernment, the verdictives and exercitives he or she issues, while
being unhappy, will still be valid. It is a sad but not uncommon situation
for individuals to lack or to lose epistemic authority while retaining their
conventionaland even legalauthority.
I submit that epistemic authority is not the kind of authority that is
or can be engendered by the acceptance of a convention. It is, rather, a
matter of the flat circumstances. And in this respect, the term epis-
temic authority is a misnomer. We can tell whether someone is an epis-
temic authority simply by seeing who, or how many people, rely upon
that person for information or advice. The verdicts issued by someone
who is an epistemic authority are not binding on anyone; they are simply
believed by those who believe them and rejected or ignored by those who
donot.
This point is connected to the point made earlier about the disjunction
between performative and constative uses of language. A jury, when it
issues its verdict, is using language performatively; the jurys act of speech
determines the defendants legal status. In contrast, when an epistemic
authority speaks, she is using language constatively. She is saying what is
the case. Her authority, if she has it, consists in her being taken to know
what she is talking about. Thus, the situation that Langton describes is one
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in which the pornographer is making expositive claims that are regarded

as true by the men who are exposed tothem.
It could be otherwise. We can imagine there being some sad society of
men who, in implicit cooperation with producers of pornography, all agree
to accept as legitimate the pornographers ranking of women as inferior
creatures, suitable for rape and other forms of mistreatment. In this situa-
tion, the pornographers would be performing genuinely verdictive speech
acts. But of course such speech acts would have no significanceno
authorityoutside of the small club that accepts these verdicts.
But what if this small group was not so small? And what if it hap-
pened to possess a great deal of power? In that case, it would certainly
become a matter of public concern what members of this group believed.
If the members believed false and pernicious stereotypes, they might dom-
inate or mistreat others, and if they were powerful enough, they could do
so without fear of sanction. If their power gave them hegemonic control
over sources of information, they might control what others believe, as
well. At the very least, they might be able to force others to act as if they
believed what the powerful were saying. (Remember the fable of the em-
perors new clothes.)
So, it is highly problematic when powerful elements in society accord
epistemic authority to liars. But the problem lies not with the liars pefor-
mance of verdictive speech acts; it lies with the conjunction of their power
and their mendacity. If Langton is right about how certain types of pornog-
raphy shape the values and beliefs of men, then the ubiquity of pornogra-
phy is indeed cause for concern. But the problem lies in the mens believ-
ing what pornography is saying, in their taking pornographers words and
images in a constative way. The power of social opinion is not something
that requires a theory of performatives to understand. If all we had to work
with was language in its constative use, we could still understand perfectly
well how the powerful are able to make things so by sayingso.
We can clearly see Langtons conflation of authority and power in her
response to Leslie Green (Langton 2009a). Green wants to explore the
difference it makes to ones life whether or not one accepts certain au-
thorities. He bids us to consider the situations of two gay man, Mick and
Max. Both live in a liberal, constitutionally governed state. But Mick is
Roman Catholic and Max is Jewish. Insofar as Mick wishes to be part of
the Catholic community, he is bound by the Churchs proclamations and
subject to its sanctions. If the Church teaches that homosexuality is sinful
or sick, then Mick will have to accept that verdict and, accordingly, view
himself as afflicted. Mick will have to contend with the disapproval of his

84
fellow Catholics and may come even to internalize a cripplingly negative

self-image. He will be effectively subordinated. Max, on the other hand,
need not be and is not troubled at all by the Catholic doctrine. He does
not regard himself as a member of the community, does not regard the
Churchs proclamations as authoritative for him, and is unaffected socially
by the disapproval of the Catholics.
In reply, Langton concedes that there may be circumstances in which a
member of some social group Ais immune from the attitudes or actions of
members of some other social group B, and so may fail to be subordinated
by proclamations or practices that in fact serve to subordinate members
of B.But Langton contends that whether such immunity exists is a matter
of the degree of hegemony enjoyed by group B. On Greens view, she
argues, everything depends on whether group Aenjoys perceived legiti-
macy (Langton 2009a, 97). But this, Langton argues, is wrong:whether
or not group As practices can constitute the subordination of nonmembers
really depends on something elseon what she calls efficacy (Langton
2009a, 98). So, whether or not Max accepts the authority of the Church,
he can still be subordinated by its ruling on homosexuality if the Catholic
members of Maxs society have enough clout to make their disapproving
view of homosexual behavior efficacious. If the Catholics dominate local
governance, or if they can manipulate public opinion, then the fact that
Max does not regard the Church as authoritative does not immunize him
against the social effects of the Churchs determinations.
I quite agree with Langton that one can be disabled by social practices
that one does not accept. Austin would agree as well. But in the context
of speech act theory, this fact is a red herring. Greens case is meant to
contrast cases that vary only with respect to the acceptance of Catholic au-
thority. Of course if one changes the case in the way Langton has in mind,
if one stipulates that the Church has power that does not derive from its
authority (epistemic or otherwise), then Church members can subordinate
whoever they want to. The Church need not have made any ruling; there
would be the same result for Max if they were simply bigoted, as individu-
als. There is a particular kind of vulnerability, however, for Mike in virtue
of his accepting the authority of the Church; Green is right aboutthat.
In short: pornography fails to satisfy the constitutive condition ex-
pressed in A.1:with respect to pornogaphy, there is no procedure accepted
by women that constructs a subordinating speech act, and thus no proce-
dure that grants pornographers the authority to subordinate anyone. The
question of what pornographers have the power to do is separate from and
irrelevant to the question of what authority they have to create social facts
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merely by saying certain things. If there is a kind of subordinating that

can be done simply by speaking, it is a kind that has nothing to do with me,
for Ido not accept any practice that would make a pornographers words
sovereign over my socialbeing.
4.4.ConclusionA Social Constructionist Model

ofSexual Objectification
I said at the beginning of this chapter that I thought causal, social con-
structionist accounts did better than Langtons speech act account in ex-
plaining the role of pornography in the subordination of women. Suppose
that Langton was correctthat pornographers could (and did) subordinate
women simply by declaring, exercitively or verdictively, that women were
inferior, in just the same way as an umpire can make a pitched ball a
strike just by declaring it to be so. The subordination of women would be
complete once the declaration was made. In particular, no perlocutionary
effects would be requiredno one would have to come to believe that
women were inferior, and no one would have to actually treat women as
inferior. Indeed, the term inferior would acquire the kind of ambiguity
that guilty acquires when the conventional status of legal guilt is con-
ferred on someone by the authorized activity of a jury, so that we would
have, on the one hand, the conventionally conferred status of inferiority,
and on the other the more ordinary sort of inferiority, the kind that involves
vulnerability and loss of rights.
But, in fact, Ido not think that Langton thinks pornography operates in
this way. From everything she says about how pornography subordinates
women, Iconclude that she actually agrees with Judge Easterbrook about
the mechanisms. Let us assume that pornography is expressive, and that
the view it expresses is that women are or should be subordinate to men.
We can then trace a clear and plausible causal path from mens consum-
ing pornography to their coming to treat women in ways that subordi-
nate them, aided by our general understanding of the processes of social
construction.
Consider the peculiar self-verifying character of pornographic ma-
terials. Ian Hackings account of what he calls the looping nature of
social kinds offers an explanation. As he points out, the description of
a syndrome, together with its denomination as a type, can, in various
ways, affect perception and behavior in such a way as to produce addi-
tional confirming instances of generalizations involving the newly named

86
syndrome. Marilyn Frye and Sandra Bartky, similarly, have explained how
the promulgation of gender normsfor example, the promotion of ideals
of smooth, hairless bodies for womencreate incentives for women to
conform to such ideals and disincentives to ignore them. As more women
conform, the original observations appear increasingly to be confirmed,
while the stigmatization and excoriation of those who fail to conform in-
tensifies. As has been noted by many feminist theorists, such as Frye, Sally
Haslanger, and indeed MacKinnon herself, the product of this sanctioning
and shaping is a social reality that conforms to the original message. The
invisibility of the intermediate, body-disciplining steps serves to obscure
the intentionality and artifice behind the conformity, enhancing the false
view that women are naturally or essentially the way they have been
depicted asbeing.
Assuming, then, that pornography does what Langton says it does, the
question for her is why the social constructionist, causal account just sum-
marized is inadequate for explaining how pornography does what it does.
Let us suppose, as both MacKinnon and Langton do, that pornography
promulgates various false views of womenfor example, that they are
sexually insatiable, that they enjoy violent treatment, or that they take sa-
distic pleasure in stimulating desire they have no intention of satisfying.
Men who have internalized these views will approach women with certain
expectations and demands. Women who feel pressured to meet those de-
mands, as well as women who resist them, will all seem to confirm the
pornographic message. The result:women appear to male consumers of
porn to be just the way pornography says they are. The pornographic mes-
sage is further confirmed, the male attitudes are strengthened, andsoon.
Another strong argument for the social constructionist model is that
it agrees closely with MacKinnons own general picture of the processes
that construct masculinity and femininity as we know them. The sexual
hierarchy is established when dominance (for men) and submission (for
women) are eroticized. Feminist work on pornography has paid a lot of at-
tention to the first process, but the second has been undertheorized. Yet it is
obvious when we consider it that everything in our culture serves to shape
womens desire toward the gratification of pleasing others. In particular,
we are discouraged from seeking sexual pleasure. Sex, we are taught, is
for men; power to produce sexual arousal in men is a valuable asset, not
be squandered. Thus, what should be, for us, a source of autonomous plea-
sure and generative power, is transformed into an alienable material good,
to be exchanged (if we are prudent!) for economic and social security.
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Perhaps part of the problem of pornography, then, is the consonance be-

tween what men and women are both taught about the structure of female
desire. Perhaps if women were empowered to seek sexual pleasure for its
own sake, this consonance could be disrupted. Maybe the development of
good pornography for women can be an important part of the struggle
to end gender injustice.
References
American Booksellers v. Hudnut (1985). Opinion of the Court. [online] Available
at: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/American_Booksellers_v._Hudnut/Opinion_of_
the_Court
Austin, J.L. 1972. How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. Edited by J.O. Urmson and
Marina Sbis. Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress.
Green, L. 1998. Pornographizing, Subordinating, Silencing. In Censorship and
Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation, edited by Robert Post, 285311. Los
Angeles:Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the HumanitiesPost.
Hacking, Ian. 1995. The Looping Effects of Human Kinds. Causal Cognition:
AMultidisciplinary Debate 351394.
Hanrahan, Rebecca, and Louise Antony. 2005. Because ISaid So:Toward a Feminist
Theory of Authority. Hypatia 20(4):5979.
Landers, Ann. 1994. Lady Donning Moustache Gets Fired. [online]. Available at:
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19940701&id=lqhAAAAAIB
AJ&sjid=_gcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4698,499241&hl=en
Langton, Rae. 2009a. Pornographys Authority? Response to Leslie Green. In Sexual
Solipsism:Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, edited by Rae
Langton, 89102. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.
Langton, Rae. 2009b. Pornographys Divine Command? Response to Judith Butler. In
Sexual Solipsism:Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, edited
by Rae Langton, 103116. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.
Langton, Rae. 2009c. Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. In Sexual Solipsism:
Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, edited by Rae Langton,
2563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1979. Sexual Harassment of Working Women. In her Sexual
Harassment of Working Women:ACase of Sex Discrimination. New Haven, CT:Yale
UniversityPress.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1987. Not a Moral Issue. In her Feminism UnModified:
Discourse on Life and Law. Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress.
Parent, W.A. 1990. A Second Look at Pornography and the Subordination of Women.

88
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PARTII Pornography
and Social Ontology
90
91
CHAPTER5 What Women areFor

Pornography and Social Ontology
Katharine Jenkins
5.1.Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to introduce the idea of analyzing the harms of

pornography in terms of social ontology and to recommend this approach
as a fruitful avenue for future research.1I focus on two claims made by
Catharine MacKinnon that have often been viewed as puzzling:(1)por-
nography subordinates women (the subordination claim) and (2)pornog-
raphy constructs womens natures in a way that is somehow defective (the
constructionist claim). These claims are typically treated separately and
have most often been explored in terms of speech act theory, especially
that of J.L. Austin. By contrast, Ioffer a unified analysis of both claims
that draws upon John Searles account of social ontology.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, Iset out the subordi-
nation and constructionist claims, together with some brief background
on MacKinnons antipornography work. In Section 5.3, Iexplain Searles
account of social ontology. In Section 5.4, Iuse this ontology to construct
an argument for the subordination and constructionist claims. In Section
5.5, I develop modified versions of these claims that are, I argue, more
plausible than the originals. Finally, in Section 5.6, Iexplore some issues
concerning the way the claims are characterized.
Iwould like to thank Beatrice Balfour, Lorna Finlayson, Mari Mikkola, and Jennifer Saul
1.
for insightful and constructive comments on versions of this chapter. Iam also indebted to
the audience of the conference on Feminist Philosophy and Pornography held at Humboldt
University, Berlin, in September2013.
92
5.2. The Subordination and ConstructionistClaims
The subordination and constructionist claims are made by Catharine

MacKinnon in a body of work leading up to and surrounding the
Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, jointly authored by MacKinnon
and Andrea Dworkin, which aimed to make pornography actionable as a
civil rights violation. Under the ordinance, people harmed by some piece
of pornography would have been able to bring a civil suit against the
producers and distributors of the pornography (A. Dworkin 1981, 2006;
MacKinnon 1989, 1996; MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988). The ordinance
was passed in 1984 in Indianapolis but was later struck down on First
Amendment grounds.
In the ordinance and in other work, MacKinnon defines pornography
in a distinctive way as [T]he graphic, sexually explicit subordination of
women in pictures or words (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988).2 On this
definition, graphic sexually explicit material that does not subordinate
women would not constitute pornography. This is clearly a departure from
ordinary use of the term, although MacKinnon seems to think that the vast
majority of pornography in the colloquial sense also constitutes pornog-
raphy in her specialist sense. This definition is problematic for my pur-
poses, however:Iam aiming in part to assess the claim that pornography
does subordinate women, and this claim would be rendered tautological if
pornography were defined as that which subordinates. Ialso believe that
MacKinnons definition of pornography is so far removed from standard
usage of the term as to be unhelpful and confusing in most ordinary con-
texts. For these reasons, Iwill adopt Mari Mikkolas artifactual definition
of pornography, as she states in Chapter6 of this volume:
Some object x (film, book, picture) is of the kind pornographic artifact only
if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create pornography,
where the maker intends that the artifact is an instance of pornography onlyif
(a) they have a substantive concept of pornography that largely matches

the substantive concept held by some group of prior makers (provided
some exist),and
(b) the maker intends to realize that concept by imposing pornography-
relevant features on the object.
The definition also requires that the material instantiate one of a list of features that Ishall not
2.
detailhere.
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Mikkolas definition treats pornography as a deliberately produced social

artifact, thereby keeping us in close contact both with the material reality
of pornography as it currently exists and with ordinary users of language.
Drawing on Helen Longinos (1995) characterization of pornography,
Iwill further understand misogynistic pornography as pornography (in
the above sense) that represents the abuse or degradation of women in
such a way as to endorse, condone, or encourage it. For the purposes
of this chapter I will interpret MacKinnons arguments as concerning
misogynistic pornography, which I will abbreviate to m-pornography.3
Accordingly, the arguments considered in this chapter will be more inter-
esting and urgent if one thinks that m-pornography makes up a substantial
proportion of pornography as such, though Iwill not undertake to show
that itdoes.4
MacKinnon argues that m-pornography subordinates women and that it
constructs womens nature in a way that is, in some sense, wrong.5 Call the
claim that m-pornography subordinates women the subordination claim.
Itake it that to subordinate some group is to rank that group as inferior and/
or to mark them as legitimate targets for discriminatory disadvantages (in-
cluding violence). The subordination claim can be found in MacKinnons
work in two forms. In one form, the claim is that m-pornography causes
people who watch it to behave in ways that are subordinating to women,
for example by causing them to commit acts of sexual violence against
women (1989, 196). In its other form, the claim is rather that subordi-
nating women is what pornography itself does, not simply what it en-
courages other people to do (MacKinnon 1996, 2931; see also her defi-
nition of pornography cited above). The second version, the claim that
pornography itself subordinates, has been seen as conceptually puzzling
(R. Dworkin 1993, 1995)and hence as standing in need of philosophical
explanation before its veracity can be assessed (for one such explanation,
see Langton 1993). It is this second form of the subordination claim that
will concern me in the discussion that follows. The distinction between the
two forms of the subordination claim is typically glossed as a distinction
between a causal and a constitutive claim; however, Ihave reserva-
tions about this characterization of the contrast between the two claims,
3.
My arguments about the harms of m-pornography are compatible with the claim that some other
forms of pornography have positive implications.
4.
For some evidence that suggests that it does, see Bridges etal. (2010) and Dines (2011).
5.
She also argues that m-pornography silences women, and this claim has also been interpreted in
terms of speech acts, but Ido not discuss this element of her arguments. See, for example, Langton
(1993) and Langton and Hornsby (1998).
PORNOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGY |93

94
to be discussed in Section 6, and so will not be using these terms in the

analysis that follows.
The constructionist claim, which has received considerably less phil-
osophical attention than the subordination claim, is the claim that m-
pornography constructs womens natures in a way that is, in some sense,
wrong. The constructionist claim has two parts. The first part asserts that
m-pornography constructs womens natures. As MacKinnon putsit:
Pornography makes the world a pornographic place through its making and
use, establishing what women are said to exist as, are seen as, are treated
as, constructing the social reality of what a woman is and can be in terms of
what can be done to her, and what a man is in terms of doing it. (1996,25)
The second part asserts that the way that pornography constructs wom-
ens natures is somehow defective or wrong. At times, MacKinnon ap-
pears to suggest that the construction is actually false, a lie (1987, 154).
This, however, seems to conflict with the idea that m-pornography is suc-
cessful in constructing womens natures, placing the second part of the
constructionist claim in tension with the first. As Mary Kate McGowan
notes, then, a plausible reading of the constructionist claim will not inter-
pret the wrongness in question as straightforward falsity, but will instead
offer some account of the way in which this construction is defective in a
manner that is akin to falsity (2005,34).
We therefore have two questions that need answering. First, concerning
the subordination claim:what exactly does it mean to say that women are
subordinated by m-pornography itself, rather than by people acting under
the influence of m-pornography? Second, concerning the construction-
ist claim:what exactly does it mean to say that pornography succeeds in
constructing women, but that it does so in a defective way? Approaching
these questions via social ontology, as Ishall be doing, is in contrast to the
substantial body of work that explores the same questions using speech
act theory. Ishall have little to say about this body of work, for the simple
reason that the appeal of my own analysis does not depend on the rejec-
tion of speech act analyses. Rather, I take as my point of departure the
observation that the strategy of analyzing the harm of m-pornography in
terms of speech acts owes much to the specific context in which it was
developed, namely the wake of the striking down of the Indianapolis or-
dinance on free speech grounds. In legal debates about the ordinance, m-
pornography was framed as speech, and hence as protected by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution even if it caused harm. The aim of
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showing that m-pornography can constitute harm as speech, thus violat-

ing civil rights and forfeiting its constitutional protection, was crucial in
motivating speech act analyses of the subordination and constructionist
claims. However, passing the ordinance is no longer a live project, and the
debate surrounding it was always extremely U.S.-centric. Stepping away
from the details of U.S.law and acknowledging that the advent of Internet
pornography has significantly changed the context of the debate opens up
space for pursuing alternative analyses that are less closely geared around
free speech considerations.
5.3. Searles Account ofSocial Ontology
Having set out the subordination and constructionist claims, I will now
introduce the social ontology upon which Iwill draw in interpreting them.
In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle offers an account of the
ontology of social entitiesthat is, of entities that cannot be explained
merely by referring to their intrinsic physical properties (Searle 1996).6
Examples of social entities include money, courts of law, and husbands.
That a piece of paper is money, or that a room full of people is a court of
law, or that a person is a husband, are facts about these entities. However,
unlike some facts, such as the fact that hydrogen atoms have one electron,
or that Mount Everest has snow and ice at the top, they are not true simply
in virtue of the physical features of the objects in question. Specifically,
the examples given abovemoney, courts of law, and husbandsbelong
to a particular kind of social reality that Searle calls institutional reality. In
what follows, Iexplain Searles theory of social reality with reference to
institutional reality in particular.
Human beings, and some animals, can impose functions on objects.
Searle takes pains to stress that functions are never intrinsic to the physics
of any phenomenon but are assigned from outside by conscious observ-
ers and users (1996, 14). Whenever we impose a function on an entity
that refers to some use to which we wish to put it, we are assigning what
Searle calls an agentive function:for instance, hammers are for hammer-
ing things with, screwdrivers are for screwing and unscrewing screws with,
and bathtubs are for taking baths in. When we collectively impose agen-
tive functions on objects through shared representational mental states, or
Searle actually talks about social objects, but Iwant to avoid confusion concerning
6.
objectification as discussed in relation to m-pornography and so will be using entities instead.

96
intentional states, we construct social entities. This shared intentional state

is termed collective intentionality. Through this collective intentionality,
lumps of metal become hammers, enameled concavities become bathtubs,
and pieces of paper becomemoney.
Turning to the specific type of social reality that Searle calls institutional
reality, we can note that hammers, screwdrivers, and bathtubs are suited
for fulfilling their respective functions in virtue of their physical proper-
ties, such as their shape. There are, however, some other objects on which
agentive functions are imposed that cannot fulfill their purpose simply in
virtue of their physical properties. For instance, money is for paying for
things withit is a medium of exchange; but the physical constitution of
money (whether paper bills or electromagnetic markings) is not sufficient
to explain how it is able to perform this function. Rather, money is able to
function as a medium of exchange only in virtue of our collectively recog-
nizing it as such. If we all stopped thinking about money as a medium of
exchange, it would no longer be possible for me to use a ten-pound note to
pay for my shopping, however hard Itried. Compare this to screwdrivers:if
we all stopped thinking of screwdrivers as implements for screwing and un-
screwing screws, it would still be possible for someone to pick up a screw-
driver and successfully use it for that purpose if they had a mind todoso.
Searle terms the social entities that are constructed in this manner insti-
tutional entities because it is only within the context of human institutions
that they are able to perform their functions. He calls the special kind of
function involved in constructing institutional entities a status function
because the entity fulfills its function in virtue of being recognized as having
a certain status. This status can be articulated through a counts as formula.
For instance, the status function of sterling money can be articulated:<pieces
of paper with certain special features and histories [these could be speci-
fied, given sufficient space] count as a medium of exchange in the United
Kingdom>. More generally, status functions typically take the form, <enti-
ties of type X count as Y in context C>.7 The X term names the entity on
which the status function is imposed, and the Y term gives the content of that
status function. It is worth noting that status functions can be imposed on en-
tities, which are already institutional entities. For instance, <saying certain
words in front of the celebrant (X term) counts as getting married (Y term)
Searle (1996) gives this as the template of a status function; however, Searle (2010) offers a more
7.
basic formulation that allows for freestanding status functions (where the Y term is not imposed on
a prior object). Since the case Iwill be considering does include an X term, Iuse the original status
function formulation. The use of angle brackets to identify status functions is my own convention,
not Searles.
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in the United Kingdom (context)>; obviously, celebrants are institutional

entities too. So in looking for the X term, we need not be looking for a brute
physical entity. The context, the C term, is sometimes very apparent, as is
the case with financial currencies and state borders, but sometimes it is hard
to say precisely what the relevant context is, either because its borders are
not clearly defined or because it is very pervasive and so appears to apply
universally. In such a case, and pending further investigation, we can fill in
C with a placeholder such as around here. Institutional entities come into
being when enough people recognize that <entities of type X count as Y in
context C>. This collective recognition involves the representation of Xs as
beingY.
According to Searle, then, institutional entities are created by the im-
position of status functions through collective intentionality, where status
functions take the form <X counts as YinC>.
5.4. Institutional Reality, Subordination, and Construction
In this section, I will show how Searles account of institutional reality

can illuminate the subordination and constructionist claims. In order to do
this Imust begin by drawing attention to MacKinnons account of gender.
MacKinnon (1989) understands gender as a product of social relations,
not a brute physical factin other words, she claims that our existence
as men and women is not determined by the physical configuration of our
bodies, but depends on human activity and attitudes. This suggests that
women and men are institutional entities in the sense defined by Searle.
Applying Searles social ontology to this broad view of gender implies
that the existence of women depends on there being collective intentional
recognition of some status function that is imposed on some more basic
entity (the same goes for a man, but Iwill focus on women here). Recall
the form of this imposition:<X counts as Y in context C>. To understand
what defines women as institutional entities, we must identify the relevant
status function. In order to do this, we will need to locate both the X term
(the entity onto which the status function is imposed) and the Y term (the
function that is being attributed to that entity).
Now let us call to mind some key features of MacKinnons assessment
of the content of m-pornography. MacKinnon argues that m-pornography
represents women as lacking in human worth, dignity, and subjectivity; as
beings whose pain is unimportant, who have no desires of their own; as
objects, in other words, whose sole reason for existing is to be used sexually

98
by men (MacKinnon 1989, 211212). In this sense, m-pornography can

be said to have a very definite idea of what women are for, which is sig-
nified through language as well as through visual depictions and actions.
M-pornography, according to MacKinnon, represents women as objects for
male sexual use. This is where the idea of construction comes in; consider,
for example, MacKinnons assertion that, [p]ornography constructs women
and sex, defines what woman means and what sexuality is, in terms of each
other (MacKinnon 1987, 161; italics in original). The claim here, Ibelieve,
is that m-pornographic representations of women as existing for the sexual
use of men are what determine (or define) womens social reality.
My proposal is that Searles account of status functions offers a helpful
way of understanding how this relationship between m-pornography and
womens social reality is supposed to work. Searle stresses that impositions
of status functions are always accomplished through representation:the X
term is represented as being for the function specified by the Y term, and
this is crucial for maintaining the collective intentionality that imposes the
status function. When MacKinnon talks of the power of pornography to
create women in its image of their use (1989, 212), Ipropose that we think
of this as the claim that m-pornography has the power to generate collec-
tive intentional recognition of a status function that defines certain people
as being for the sexual use of menthereby making them into women.
This is to say that the Y term in the status function that defines women (as
institutional entities) is to be understood as object for male sexualuse.
What, though, of the X term? In other words, which people are so de-
fined? No direct answer to this question is to be found in MacKinnons
work, and Isuspect that the X term is likely to be specified quite differently
in different contexts. One very dominant way of approaching the issue takes
a persons gender to be determined by what is colloquially termed their
biological sextheir genitals, karyotype, hormonal balance, and so on
(Bettcher 2013; cf. Haslanger 2012a).8 Some empirical research supports
this view; for example, Kessler and McKennas (1978) research suggests
that genital endowment is particularly decisive when people make attribu-
tions of gender (see also Bettcher 2007). Given the emphasis within por-
nography on bodies, it seems likely that this will also be a prevalent way of
treating gender in pornography.9 Although the emphasis on different bodily
8.
The notion of biological sex is of course contested (Fausto-Sterling2000).
9.
An obvious exception is some explicitly trans-positive pornography. However, mainstream
pornography often takes an extremely fetishizing approach to trans people, most commonly to
trans women, which does not respect their gender identities.
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features will vary in different contexts, capturing this dominant view of

gender would mean defining the X term as something like the following:an
adult person with most of the following bodily features:[a vagina, a uterus,
ovaries, breasts, XX chromosomes, etc.]. Iwill use female (with scare
quotes) as shorthand for a person with these features, although it should be
stressed that this is merely a convenient abbreviation, and in using it Ido
not intend to commit myself to the existence of biological sex categories
that are ontologically prior to gender.10
This approach to defining the X term suggests a conception of gender
that struggles to properly accommodate trans people within the appropri-
ate gender categories. The reason for this is that Iam basing the definition
on currently dominant social practices for using these categories, within
our cis-sexist/transphobic society.11 Let me stress that in identifying the X
term in this way Iam seeking simply to describe what Iperceive as a very
dominant social conception of gender (and one that we are particularly
likely to find in m-pornography). Iwish to make it completely clear that
Iam in no way endorsing this conception of gender:it is deeply harmful
and seriously unjust. Moreover, I believe that its grip is loosening, and
Iwould be very happy to be shown that it is less prevalent than Ibelieve it
to be. However, its current dominance makes this conception relevanthere.
My suggestion, then, is that, drawing on Searle, we can read MacKinnon
as claiming that m-pornography determines the status function that defines
women as institutional entities, and that this status function is something
like <females count as objects for male sexual use [around here]>.
The next task is to show precisely how this interpretation of MacKinnon
grounds the subordination and constructionist claims. If women are insti-
tutional entities defined by the status function <females count as objects
for male sexual use around here>, then we can argue for the subordination
and constructionist claims by way of the followingsteps:
(1) Institutional entities are constructed through the collective inten-

tional recognition of status functions.
(2) Gendered individuals (e.g., women and men) are institutional
entities.
10.
Though note that given that the X term can itself be an institutional or a social entity, the
Searlean model would permit us to appeal to sex in explaining our social understandings of gender
even if sex is itself socially constructed.
11.
See Bettcher (2007, 2009, 2013)for useful discussion of dominant ways of thinking about
gender as they relate to trans identities.

100
(3) The representation of women in m-pornography generates col-

lective intentional recognition of the status function that defines
women as institutional entities thus: <females count as objects
for male use aroundhere>.
(4) (From 13) M-pornography constructs women as objects for male
sexualuse.
This is the core of the argument for both the subordination and construc-
tionist claims. In order to get from (4) to the subordination claim, we
canadd:
(5) When a person is constructed as an object for the use of others they
are thereby subordinated.
(6) (From 4, 5) Subordination claim: M- pornography subordinates
women.
The claim made in (6)is the second version of the subordination claim
that is, the claim that pornography itself subordinates women, without
being mediated by peoples actions.12 We now have a more detailed grasp
on what this means:pornography, it is claimed, subordinates women by
bringing into being an institutional reality in which they count as objects
for male sexualuse.
Turning to the constructionist claim, (4)establishes the first element of
the claim, which is the assertion that m-pornography constructs womens
natures via the collective intentional imposition of a status function. What
about the second element, the assertion that this construction is wrong
or defective? As previously established, the challenge with the construc-
tionist claim is to spell out a way in which the construction is wrong or
defective that is compatible with the claim that the construction is success-
ful (i.e., that m-pornography really does construct women rather than just
misrepresentthem).
There are (at least) two ways in which this second part of the construc-
tionist claim could be understood. The first emerges from MacKinnons
work, particularly her discussion of the feminist technique of conscious-
ness raising. This is the idea that we can criticize the subordinating status
function based on an affirmation by women of our own humanity. This
Recall that Iam refraining from using the terminology of causal and constitutive; this will be
12.
discussed further in Section5.6.
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approach does not claim a particular epistemic privilege for womens ex-
perience, in any objective sense; rather, the claim is that a feminist con-
sciousness is one that carries out an act of resistance in rejecting dominant
(i.e., male-centered) perspectives. Faced with an institutional reality that
reduces women to objects for the sexual use of men, we simply insist on
a different institutional reality, one in which women are accorded full per-
sonhood. This is to say that we collectively refuse to accept the subordinat-
ing status function, and, in doing so, we begin to weaken the grip of that
institutional reality. As MacKinnon writes, The point [of consciousness
raising] was, and is, that this process moved the reference point for truth
and thereby the definition of reality as such (1989, 87). On this interpre-
tation of the constructionist claim, describing the dominant misogynistic
construction of women as wrong or even false is simply an expression
of our collective refusal to accept it, our insistence on crafting a different
social reality.
The second way of framing a critique of the subordinating status func-
tion is by means of what Sally Haslanger (2012b) has called a debunking
move. Taking this approach, we can say that the wrongness of the con-
struction consists in the fact that the status of women as objects for male
sexual use is presented as a brute fact, when in fact it is an institutional
fact. In other words, women are falsely viewed as naturally subordinate,
when in fact what is happening is that we are being subordinated through
the operations of social institutions. Correctly recognizing the institutional
reality of womens situation for what it isa social construction main-
tained through male poweralerts one to this wrongness.
Both of these interpretations show how the construction of women as
objects for male sexual use is, in an important sense, wrong, despite being
successful. For the purposes of this argument only one of the two interpre-
tations need be accepted, since either is sufficient to uphold the construc-
tionist claim. It is worth noting, however, that the two interpretations are
compatible with one another:in describing the misogynistic construction
of women as objects for male sexual use as wrong, we can intend both to
express our rejection of that construction and to assert that it is not natural
in the way it presents itself asbeing.
A social ontological interpretation of the subordination and construc-
tionist claims thus answers both the question of how m-pornography can
subordinate women directly (rather than via the actions of people influ-
enced by it) and the question of how m-pornographys construction of
women can be both successful andwrong.

102
5.5. Defending theClaims
The argument set out in the previous section offers a way of understanding
the subordination and constructionist claims that renders them perfectly
intelligible. What, though, of their plausibility? In the previous section,
I gave a rather rough-and-ready formulation of the status function that
MacKinnon takes to define womens social reality, namely: <females
count as objects for male sexual use around here>. Inow want to reex-
amine this in more detail. Formulating the status function as Idid implies
(a)that the mode of use relevant to womens oppression is a purely sexual
one and (b)that women are fully reduced to object status in society. There
is a difficult exegetical question here:as Ishall show, although MacKinnon
does at times appear to endorse this strong version of the status function,
there are also moments in her writing that would tell in favor of a more
subtle formulation. However, my main aim here is not to settle the exegeti-
cal issue but to show that the subordination and constructionist claims are
more plausible if (a)and (b)are rejected.
Let us begin with (a)the claim that the mode of use that is relevant to
womens oppression is a purely sexual one. It is not clear to what extent
MacKinnon is committed to this claim. She undoubtedly believes that
sexual subordination is crucial to womens oppression. For example, to-
gether with Andrea Dworkin, she states that [womens] social definition
as inferior is a sexual one (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988). It is some-
what harder to establish whether she thinks that womens subordination
can be wholly explained in terms of sexual use. There are certainly mo-
ments in her writing where she seems to allow that other modes of use are
also significant (MacKinnon 1989, 9394). Whatever MacKinnons own
view may be, however, many feminists have argued that men derive vari-
ous different advantages from gendered social arrangements. Moreover,
each of these advantages can be cast in terms of the social function of
women. In being socially pressured to perform unequal amounts of unpaid
and low-paid domestic and caring labor both within and outside of the
home, for example, women can be said to have been socially conceived
of as beings whose function is to support mens comfort and economic
advantage (Dalla Costa and James 1973; Delphy 1984; Saul 2006). When
the caring labor in question is for children, and when this is coupled with
the systematic denial of womens right to control our reproductive capa-
bilities, we can also consider women as serving a reproductive function
for men. Insofar as women are socialized to offer men a disproportional
amount of emotional care (or even to function as an Other in contrast to
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103
which a man can define his Self) it might also be the case that women
serve a psychological function for men (de Beauvoir 2011; Firestone
1971; Jnasdttir 1994). Now, Icannot here consider these feminist argu-
ments in any detail, but the point Iwish to make is that it seems simplistic
to insist that womens oppression can be explained solely in terms of one
kind of use when women have been shown to perform so many important
functions formen.13
I now turn to (b), the claim that women are fully reduced to object
status in society. The notion of objectification undoubtedly plays a very
central role in MacKinnons work (see, for example, MacKinnon 1989,
especially Chapter6). It does not follow from this, however, that womens
institutional position is best understood as literally being that of an object.
In the cases of some of the modes of use highlighted above, we may ques-
tion whether the functions that women are meant to serve for men are
aptly captured by the idea of women being reduced to objects. In some
cases it seems like women have to be precisely more than objects in order
to fulfill the function:for example, reproductive use requires that women
undertake the complex task of raising children; emotional or psychologi-
cal use requires that women show concern and other human emotions.
Auseful notion here is Charles Mills (1999) concept of a subperson.
To be a subperson is to be socially designated as less than a full person in
a moral sense. This is to say that while a subperson may be acknowledged
to have some distinctively human capacities (usually ones that allow them
to be useful in certain ways), they are not accorded the full moral status
associated with personhood. Mills develops the idea of subpersonhood
specifically in connection with racial oppression. It is not my intention to
imply that racial subpersonhood can be directly equated with gendered
subpersonhood; indeed, Iam sure that there are a number of important
differences, and Ifurther anticipate that there is much to be learned from
considering the intersection of race and gender in this regard. Imerely
want to suggest that the concept of subpersonhood nicely brings across
the idea of women being socially constructed as less than full persons,
in a moral sense, without necessarily being absolutely reduced to object
status. Of course, we can say that in general women are constructed as
subpersons without denying that women are at times treated literally like
objects.
One thing of which we can be confident, however, is that all of these modes of use are heavily
13.
inflected by the intersections of, among other factors, class-and race-based oppressions, including
relations of oppression and exploitation betweenwomen.

104
The rejection of (a)and (b)suggests that the status function that defines
women as institutional entities is best conceived of as follows:<females
count as subpersons for male use [around here]>. There is, however, a
further modification that Iwish to make to the argument presented in the
previous section. This concerns the role played by m-pornography in gen-
erating the collective intentional acceptance of this status function. Does
m-pornography generate acceptance of this status function by itself, or
does it operate in conjunction with other forms of misogynistic represen-
tation? This is, in essence, an issue of the scope of the subordination and
constructionist claims: do they apply to m-pornography alone (narrow
scope) or to other forms of material as well (wide scope)?
Again, MacKinnons own views on this point are rather difficult to es-
tablish, but Ibelieve that there are compelling reasons to interpret the sub-
ordination and constructionist claims as wide rather than narrow in scope.
For one thing, if womens subordinate social status is not defined solely by
sexual use, but by other forms of use too, then representations of women as
subpersons or objects being used in nonsexual ways are surely also relevant.
Moreover, even within the sexual context, Icannot see any reason why m-
pornography, and m-pornography alone, would be thought to generate col-
lective intentional acceptance of the subordinating status function. Plenty of
nonpornographic representationsmany romance novels aimed at women
and girls, for examplealso approvingly depict women as lacking in sexual
agency, as having a sexuality that consists only of a desire to please men, and
as appropriate targets of nonconsensual sexual violence. It seems arbitrary
to suppose that only sexually graphic misogynistic depictions of women as
being for male sexual use have the power to feed into institutional reality.
The interpretation of the subordination and constructionist claims
that Ifavor, therefore, is one that charges m-pornography in conjunction
with other misogynistic representations with defining the social reality of
women by generating collective intentional acceptance of the status func-
tion females count as subpersons for male use [around here]. Although
this interpretation may not be compatible with MacKinnons own views,
Icontend that it is the most plausible one, all things considered.
This brings me to a restatement of the argument set out in the previous
section, aimed at the modified claims:
(1) Institutional entities are constructed through the collective inten-

tional recognition of status functions.
(2) Gendered individuals (e.g., women and men) are institutional
entities.
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105
(3) The representation of women in m-pornography contributes sub-

stantially to the collective intentional recognition of the status func-
tion that defines women as institutional entities thus: <females
count as subpersons for male use aroundhere>.
(4) (From 13) M-pornography, in conjunction with other misogynis-
tic representations, constructs women as subpersons for maleuse.
(5) When a person is constructed as a subperson for the use of others
they are thereby subordinated.
(6) (From 4, 5)M-pornography, in conjunction with other misogynistic
representations, subordinateswomen.
The account of the wrongness of the construction (which completes the

constructionist claim) remains the same as in the previous version of the
argument.
I believe that the modified subordination and constructionist claims, as
analyzed here, are not only intelligible but also plausible. Offering a full
defense of them is, of course, a task for another day, and Isuggest one well
worth undertaking.
5.6. Constitution and Causation
In this final section, Iwish to return briefly to the issue of how the two
versions of the subordination claim introduced in Section 1 are to be un-
derstood. To recap, the first version concerns the effect pornography has
on peoples actions, and the second version concerns what pornography
itself does. It is, of course, the second version with which I have been
concerned in this chapter. The standard interpretation of the distinction
between the first and second versions of the claims is to distinguish be-
tween a causal claim, on the one hand, and a constitutive claim on the
other. On this view, the causal claim is that pornography causes people to
behave toward women in ways that subordinate them, and the constitutive
claim is that pornography itself constitutes the subordination of women.
How, then, does the analysis developed in this chapter fit with this charac-
terization of the distinction? Does the argument Ihave offered show that
m-pornography constitutes the subordination ofwomen?
Some support for reading the argument Ihave given as yielding a con-
stitutive claim can be drawn from Searles remarks concerning the role of
representations in maintaining institutional reality. Searle claims that the in-
stitutional entities are often created through a particular kind of speech act,

106
called a Status Function (SF) Declaration, whereby an X is represented as

Y in such a way as to generate collective recognition of the status function
<X counts as Y (in C)>.14 SF Declarations have what is called a double
direction of fit:they both represent the world and change the world (by
creating new institutional facts). An example of a SF Declaration is the
creation of a country through the signing of a constitution. Sometimes SF
Declarations take the form of standing rules, such as when the law states
that any two individuals who go through a certain ceremony and meet cer-
tain conditions count as being a married couple. In some cases, however, no
explicit declaration is ever made, but instead Xs are simply represented as if
they already are Y.These representations have the same double direction of
fit as do SF Declarations (Searle 2010, 13). Interestingly, ongoing represen-
tations of this kind are necessary even if an initial SF Declaration didoccur:
[T]he continued existence of status functions requires representations that

work like SF Declarations. Why? The institution and the institutional facts
within the institution require continued recognition or acceptance because
they exist only as long as they are so recognized or accepted. One mark of
recognition or acceptance is continued usage of the institution and institu-
tional facts, and this requires the usage of the corresponding vocabulary.
(Searle 2010,103)
In other words, the institutional reality will only endure for as long as it
is recognized, and representations play a crucial role in supporting this
recognition. The key point here is that these representations work like SF
Declarations, where SF Declarations bring institutional reality into exis-
tence. Now, it seems plausible to say that bringing into existence an insti-
tutional reality in which Xs count for less constitutes the subordination of
Xs. Can we then say that the representations that maintain this institutional
reality also constitute subordination?
There are a few potential problems with this. First, there seems to be
something a little odd about saying that a certain representation constitutes
subordination when that subordination was already in place prior to the
creation of that representation. However, this seems to be a problem that
will arise for any attempt to uphold a constitutive subordination claim,
This fits with MacKinnons claim:Together with all its material supports, authoritatively saying
14.
someone is inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment are demarcated
and actualized (1996, 31; italics in original). It also provides an interesting point of contact with
speech act theoretic interpretations of the subordination and constructionist claims (see especially
McGowan2005).
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107
since it seems deeply implausible to suppose that women were not subor-
dinated before the advent of m-pornography. Relatedly, there might be a
problem with saying that m-pornography constitutes subordination while
allowing many other forms of representation do so as wellsince this
seems to suggest that women would be subordinated (in virtue of other
representations) even if there were no m-pornography at all. If this is so,
then it might turn out that the original version of the subordination claim
is constitutive, but the modified version put forward in Section 4 isnot.
The second problem is that a representation (or indeed a SF Declaration)
will not succeed in maintaining (or creating) institutional reality if it does
not generate collective recognition. The representations power to subor-
dinate thus depends on affecting peoples attitudes.15 This invites the ques-
tion of whether the maintenance of the institutional reality consists in the
representation itself or in the collective recognition on the part of individu-
als participating in that reality. If the former, then the representation may
well be said to constitute institutional reality, given appropriate recogni-
tion. If the latter, however, then this starts to look like a causal claim after
all:m-pornography causes people to adopt a certain attitude of recognition
toward a status function, and that collective recognition constitutes an in-
stitutional reality within which women are subordinated.
I cannot here settle the question of whether it is the representation or the
collective recognition that constitutes institutional reality. The point Iwish
to make, however, is that regardless of the direction in which this question is
eventually decided, the claim that m-pornography subordinates women by
maintaining an institutional reality in which women count as less than fully
human is importantly different from the claim that m-pornography causes
people to act toward women in ways that are subordinating. This difference
between the second and first versions of the subordination claimis impor-
tant and interesting regardless of whether it can be glossed as a distinction
between constituting subordination on the one hand and causing subordina-
tion on the other. My thinking on this point is in line with Lorna Finlaysons
contention that the sharpness of the distinction between causal and constitu-
tive subordination has been much exaggerated. She argues that we should
understand the distinction in light of the followingpoint:
[B]y identifying porn with subordination (rather than following the more
usual practice of identifying it as a cause of subordination), MacKinnon
There is a parallel here with the role of uptake in speech act interpretations of the subordination
15.
and constructionist claims.

108
is making a claim about the intimacy, immediacy, and systematicity of the

relationship she sees between pornography, on the one hand, and violence
and discrimination against women, on the other. (2014,784)
The link between m-pornography and subordination that is posited in my

social ontological analysis is much more intimate, immediate, and system-
atic than the link suggested by the claim that pornography causes people
to behave toward women in ways that are discriminatory (and hence sub-
ordinating). Icontend that it is this difference that matters, not the question
of whether the relationship is constitutive or causal.
This move away from emphasizing the constitutive/causal distinction
might strike some as unwise. One major reason for placing importance on
this distinction has been that some liberals contend that the principle of
free speech is so important that a limitation on speech can only be justi-
fied if that speech is shown to constitute harm (or discrimination) rather
than merely to cause it (R. Dworkin 1993, 1995). Committing ourselves
to establishing that m-pornography constitutes harm rather than merely
causes it, however, is not the only response that feminists concerned about
m-pornography and harm can make. Alternatively, we can challenge the
view that prioritizes the free speech of (mainly) men over the human dig-
nity and equality of women, regardless of whether the subordination and
wrongful construction of women is causally or constitutively actualized.
The absolute prioritization of free speech is presented by some as a main-
stay of liberalism. Ido not have space here to assess whether or not this
presentation is accurate, but let me say the following. If liberalism leaves
us with nothing to do in the face of this level of injusticeif liberalisms
response to half of the members of society being socially constructed as
subpersons for the use of the other half is a regretful shrug (sorry, nothing
to be doneits only causal, not constitutive, you see)then so much the
worse for liberalism. On the other hand, if liberalism does not require that
the harms of m-pornography be shown to be strictly constitutive before
anything can be done by the state to ameliorate them, then there is, after
all, no real problem if the harms of m-pornography do turn out to be causal
after all.16
Note that Iam not saying that remedies would necessarily have to take the form of legal
16.
measures aimed at restricting access to misogynist material; indeed, Ithink that there are practical
reasons why this would be the wrong approach to take. My claim is simply that the liberal position
under consideration is too quick to rule out entirely the possibility of restrictions on speech that
subordinates and constructs.
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109
5.7.Conclusion
I have demonstrated that the subordination and constructionist claims about

the harms of m-pornography can profitably be understood in terms of the
collective intentional imposition of a status function that defines females
as subpersons for male use. Ihave advocated a broad interpretation of the
subordination and constructionist claims that applies to a range of media
besides m-pornography, both sexual and nonsexual. One major attraction
of the social ontological analysis developed here is that it brings greater on-
tological detail to the claims while avoiding the need to assert that anything
unusual is going on in the case of m-pornography. The process by means of
which m-pornography is said to subordinate and wrongly construct women
is just one instance of a very general phenomenon, the phenomenon of
institutional reality. Furthermore, Searles account of institutional reality
was developed independently of antim-pornography commitments, which
means that there is additional argumentative force in showing that it can be
used to support anti-m-pornography claims. These factors grant the social
ontological analysis considerable appeal as an interpretation of and argu-
ment for the subordination and constructionist claims. This argument may
turn out to yield a version of the subordination claim that is not strictly
constitutive. Ihave argued that, liberal free speech considerations notwith-
standing, this is not a problem:if the promise of redress from a liberal state
is so easily forfeited, then it was not worth having in the firstplace.
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113
CHAPTER6 Pornographic Artifacts

Makers IntentionsModel
Mari Mikkola
6.1.Introduction
Pornography is typically discussed within two philosophical camps.1 For

feminist philosophers, pornography is about sexually explicit materials
that harm women insofar as they play a crucial role in the exploitation
and oppression of women (Itzin 1992; Lederer 1980; MacKinnon 1987).
Sexually explicit materials count as pornography when they depict the
abuse and degradation of women in endorsing, condoning, or encouraging
ways (Longino 1995; Russell 1993). They hence not only cause subordi-
nation and silencing; pornography is these things. As Rae Langton (2009)
famously claims, pornography is the illocutionary subordination and si-
lencing of womenthis is what pornography isabout.
Philosophers of art take pornography to be about something else:it is
about sexual arousal, which undergirds the difference between pornogra-
phy and art (cf. Maes and Levinson 2012). Pornography is said to have
the function or intention of sexually arousing its audiences, while art does
not. Sexual arousal need not be the sole intent of pornography, but it is
considered to be its central (necessary) or ultimate (final) intent. In the
current debates, this is seen as the big stumbling block for any artistic
redemption of pornography (Maes 2011b, 392). And that being centrally
Ihave discussed earlier versions of this paper at various conferences and workshops at Hamburg,
1.
Groningen, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Oxford, Chicago, Berlin, and Rotterdam. Iam extremely grateful
to all of those (too numerous, unfortunately, to thank in person) who were present for their helpful
comments and critiques.
114
aimed at sexual arousal is a necessary condition of pornography is some-

thing that almost all theorists agree on (Maes 2011a, 60). Here are some
representative examples: Jerrold Levinson (who takes pornography and
art to be by definition mutually exclusive) claims that pornography has a
paramount aim of the sexual satisfaction of the viewer (2005, 229)and
that pornographys central aim [is] to facilitate sexual arousal in the name
of sexual release (2005, 236). Christy Mag Uidhir, who also endorses an
exclusivist view, holds that a necessary condition for somethings being
pornography is the purpose of sexual arousal[sexually arousing its au-
dience is] what pornography does and what it is supposed to do (2009,
195). Even Matthew Kieran, who critiques Levinsons view, takes por-
nography as such to seek to elicit arousal via the explicit representation
of sexual behaviour and attributes (2001, 32). Though pornography may
have other aims too (like artistic ones), pornographys primary goal is to
elicit sexual arousal. Therefore, nothing can be both pornography and art
since they are about different things (cf. Levinson2005).
My contention is that both positions are unsatisfying because the original
questionwhat pornography is aboutis somewhat misguided. Or rather,
this question is secondary to a prior one: what makes something a porno-
graphic artifact? After all, pornography does not pick out some abstract
entity, but rather an array of artifactssomething that our philosophical ex-
amination of pornography should bear in mind. Paradigm everyday exam-
ples of pornographic artifacts include films made in San Fernando Valley
with sexually explicit content usually sold in specific outlets and accessible
via Internet portals like youporn.com or various adult cable channels;
top-shelf magazines like Hustler; pictures we can find on the Internet with
ease; and books with sexual scenes not (usually) sold in the Literature
sections of bookshops.2 With such examples in mind, I aim to provide a
descriptive elucidation of what makes something a pornographic artifact by
proposing a makers intentions model of pornography. This model draws
on Amie Thomassons (2003) account of what individuates noninstitutional
ordinary objects. Briefly put, on my Thomasson-inspired view:
Some object x (film, book, picture) is of the kind pornographic arti-

fact only if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create
Note that contra Rea (2001) Ido not take peep shows and sex shows to be paradigm examples of
2.
pornography. As Isee it, one can undertake many different types of sex work, where performing
in pornography and (say) being a stripper are two more specific kinds. Iwont be able to argue for
this position here, though, and simply note this by way of background.
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115
pornography, where the maker intends that the artifact is an instance of por-
nography onlyif
(a) they have a substantive concept of pornography that largely matches

the substantive concept held by some group of prior makers (provided
some exist),and
relevant features on the object.3
My elucidation is motivated by certain pragmatic considerations. Different

philosophers grasp the notion of pornography differently and subsequently
may end up talking past one another. But (I contend) my descriptive elu-
cidation clarifies and settles some common conceptual ground instead of
further proliferating pornography conceptions. It also explicates pornog-
raphy from a social ontological rather than a speech act theoretic perspec-
tive. Thus we can avoid getting bogged down by worries about whether
pornography is or is not speech in the sense relevant for speech act theory
(e.g. see Antony, Chapter 4 in this volume). Whatever else pornography
may be or do, that the term pornography tracks an artifactual kind is
indisputable.
Pursuing this strategy has four distinct benefits, as Iwill argue shortly in
more detail. First, my proposal fixes what makes x a pornographic artifact,
after which we can discuss whether these artifacts have some particular
central use (sexual stimulation) or meaning (subordination). This creates
much-needed common conceptual ground. Second, my proposal provides
a more nuanced picture of pornography. My contention is that there is no
central thing that pornography is aboutan insight that is captured by
my elucidation of pornographic artifacts. Third, the proposal deals with
our muddled intuitions about the necessary and sufficient conditions that
the concept pornography supposedly encodes. On my view, we may be
unable to provide such conditions, but we can still say what makes x a
pornographic artifact by appealing to makers intentions. Finally, under-
standing pornography with the help of makers intentions improves Rae
Langtons recent suggestion that pornography produces a distinctive kind
My class of pornographic artifacts does not cover child pornography or snuff movies. Although
3.
Icannot offer a full defense of this here, my contention is that these fall outside of the category
of even putative pornographic artifacts. Child pornography is a documentation of child abuse
and inaptly termed pornography. And snuff movies are documentations of torture, violence,
and killing. Nevertheless, Itake the class of pornographic artifacts to include both (the so-called)
egalitarian and inegalitarian pornography. Whether the latter amounts to documentations of abuse
and rape (as is sometimes held) is a huge point of contention and not immediately obvious.
MAKERS INTENTIONSMODEL |115

116
of makers knowledge:thinking about pornography on my model affords a

more fine-grained picture of putative pornographic knowledge. Iwill start
by outlining the makers intentions model (Section 6.2) and then consider
the four benefits in detail (Sections 6.36.6).
6.2. Makers IntentionsModel
My proposal is that we individuate pornographic artifacts on the basis of

makers intentions. Amie Thomassons work on artifactual kinds is particu-
larly helpful for this task. She accounts for the ontology of noninstitutional
and necessarily artifactual kinds, like tables, chairs, screwdrivers, and com-
puters. First, noninstitutional artifacts are ones that do not require some spe-
cial human institution (e.g., the Houses of Parliament) to create and sustain
them. Institutional artifactual kinds do and they include 1 coins and drivers
licenses. We do at times speak of pornography as an institution, which
would rule out appropriating Thomassons account from the start. But there
is no institution of pornography that is akin to (say) the institutions required
to create money (like the Royal Mint). Pornography may be an institution
in a broad metaphorical sense. But since it is not an institution in the former
narrower sense, pornographic artifacts are noninstitutional. Second, some-
thing is an artifact only if it is intentionally produced with some identity
conditions fixing description of the object in mind (Thomasson 2003, 592).
Again, this fits pornographic artifacts: they are intentionally (and not un-
wittingly or accidentally) produced by human agents under some descrip-
tion that provides criteria for distinguishing such artifacts from others. We
may be unable to articulate the criteria, but nevertheless (I contend) people
can fairly easily distinguish pornographic artifacts from tables and chairs
even in the absence of a clearly articulated sortal concept of pornography
(more about this shortly). Third, necessarily artifactual terms have in their
extension all and only artifacts (Thomasson 2003, 593)understood as in-
tended products of human action. Again, this is true of the expression por-
nographic artifact.
For Thomasson, artifactual kinds are fixed by the following principle:4
Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is the

product of a largely successful intention that (Kx), where one intends (Kx)
In fact, Thomasson proposes two ontological principles to cover strict and loose artifactual kinds.
4.
Iwill here focus on the latter. This is because the principle covering loose artifactual kinds can
116 | BeyondSpeech
117
only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of Ks that largely matches
that of some group of prior makers of Ks (if there are any) and one in-
tends to realize that concept by imposing K-relevant features on the object.
(Thomasson 2003,600)
Consider an everyday example, like a chair.5 Following this principle,

the maker must intend that some object x is a chair, and they have this
intention onlyif
(a) they have a substantive concept of chairs (they have some con-
tentful concept that involves (perhaps vague) success criteria
[Thomasson 2003, 598] for creating a chair) and this concept
largely matches that held by some extant prior chair-makers,and
(b) the maker intends to realize that substantive concept by imposing
chair-relevant features on the object (e.g., ensuring that the object
has a surface suitable for sitting).
For x to count as a chair this intention must be largely successful:the mak-

ers creative activities sufficiently succeed in realizing the intention (e.g.,
the object can be used as a chair, it has some usual chair-like features, is
recognized as a chair). Chair-makers may have some other intentions, too,
like to make money or create design pieces. But these are additional to
fixing the artifactual kind:the conditions Thomasson sets out are neces-
sary for something to be a chairnot for it to be an expensive or an aes-
thetically pleasingchair.
What about pornographic artifacts? Following Thomasson, we would
say that some x (film, book, picture) is of the kind pornographic artifact
only if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create pornog-
raphy. And the maker of the artifact intends that the artifact is an instance
of pornography onlyif:
(a) they have some contentful concept of pornography that

largely matches the concept held by some extant prior
pornography-makers,and
relevant features on the object.
better account for changes and developments in the nature of an artifact.

Actually, a chair on Thomassons account would be of a strict artifactual kind, but nothing hangs
5.
on this for my purposes.

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This raises some immediate questions. First, what is it to have a substan-

tive concept of pornography? My view presupposes that makers possess
some contentful pornography conception operative in the creative activ-
ity. Everyday paradigm exemplars support this view and tell us something
about such a conception: typically, pornographic artifacts are sexually
explicit; they contain nudity and scenes of sexual nature; they have the
potential to sexually arouse their viewers; and they are often used as mas-
turbation materials. These are not necessary and sufficient conditions but
rather what is descriptively involved in pornography. Nonetheless, these
features give us some contentful identity conditions and vague success
criteria (for instance, red would be nonsubstantive in this sense in not
being a sortal concept). Second, what are the pornography-relevant fea-
tures that aim at realizing this concept? In line with Thomassons general
view, these are flexible and open to change. Again, paradigm everyday
pornographic artifacts suggest that the relevant features include footage,
images, and depiction of sexual acts and scenes of sexual nature (broadly
conceived). There need not be collective acceptance of these features
across the boardsomething that the existence of different pornography
genres attests to. Still, the above strike me as intuitively plausible and not
particularly controversial. We can descriptively account for a typical con-
ception of pornography and for common ways of realizing this by looking
at paradigm pornographic artifacts.
It is more controversial and clearly vague to say that one has created a
pornographic artifact only if one has created something that is a product of
a largely successful intention that x is a pornographic artifact. When is an
intention largely successful? There are no obvious criteria for fixing this
and there may well be borderline cases because our judgments of success
involve indeterminacy. But consider cases where the intention is clearly
successful or unsuccessful. Examples of the former include sexually ex-
plicit materials on which Americans spend billions of dollars a year (more
on this shortly). Examples of the latter include cases like this: imagine
that one intends to create a piece of pornography and one has a contentful
conception of pornography that matches that held by some prior pornog-
raphers (e.g., that the artifact be sexually arousing and used as masturba-
tion material). But imagine that one intends to realize that concept by
not imposing any intuitively pornography-relevant features on the object.
Rather, imagine that one makes (say) a film of a fully clothed person
baking a cake. Despite the intention to create a pornographic artifact, we
would be hard pressed to call this one of that kind precisely because the
maker fails to impose any apparently pornography-relevant features on the
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objectso, the object created would not count as a pornographic artifact

either intuitively or on my application of Thomassons view. Or, let me
clarify:given the current state of pornography, it would not. It might in
the future, though, if footage of fully clothed cake-bakers becomes a way
to impose pornography-relevant features on an object. This flags an im-
portant aspect of my view:the typical pornography-relevant features and
ways of realizing them are sensitive to time and place, which enables us to
account for the kinds continuity as well as its changing nature.
One might at this point ask: what about the first piece of pornogra-
phy? If pornographic artifacts depend on successfully executed intentions
to create something others before me have already done, how could one
ever have created the first pornographic artifact? Itend not to feel the pull
of such prototype worries when dealing with artifactual kinds that clearly
do exist. However the first pornographic artifact was created, this creation
clearly was successful! In response to similar worries, Thomassonholds:
All that is important is that there be some contentful concept that involves
(perhaps vague) success criteria for creating an artifact of kind K, which
can then direct the intention to produce a K via the imposition of certain
K-relevant features. (2003,598)
In the case of pornographic artifacts, then, the proto-maker must have had
some contentful guiding idea, like aiming to create something sexually
stimulating or titillating. In fact, this strikes me as perfectly conceivable:if
no one had ever thought about creating images that were sexually titillat-
ing or explicit, Ican well imagine that pornography simply would never
have come to exist. That said, Iam not convinced that the proverbial first
pornographer actually did produce a pornographic artifactbut this is
entirely compatible with my view that contemporary pornographic arti-
facts be individuated via makers intentions. Artifactual kinds evolve, but
this per se does not undermine our efforts to individuate those kinds via
makers intentions. This is because new makers need not be aiming suc-
cessfully to reproduce something that exactly matches the substantive
concept of prior makers. There must be a match for continuity, but the
idea of pornography and what features are pornography-relevant can
change and evolve considerably over time without breaking the historical
lineage. In short, my way of thinking about pornographic artifacts can deal
with borderline historical cases, and we need not clearly identify some
point in time when proto-pornographic artifacts became fully fledged such
artifacts.

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6.3. Fixing CommonGround
As Inoted above, Itake my suggestion to afford four distinct benefits. To

begin with, it offers an account of pornographic artifacts and thereby fixes
some helpful conceptual common ground. Understanding what pornogra-
phy is on the basis of what it is about yields numerous definitions of por-
nography. For one thing, debates in feminist philosophy and philosophy
of art are largely divorced from one another and these philosophers seldom
talk about the same thing. This hinders efforts to philosophically analyze
pornography. Moreover, feminist philosophers disagree among themselves
over what pornography is about:one crucial point of contention turns on
whether pornography and its viewings can be understood as speech acts
in the sense argued for by Langton (Antony 2011 and Chapter4 in this
volume; Saul 2006). Such conceptual worries easily bog down the debate
and hinder progress. By contrast, my proposal fixes what makes some-
thing a pornographic artifact first. We can subsequently discuss whether
some members of this artifactual class have a particular central use (sexual
stimulation) or meaning (subordination, liberation, education) and whether
they count as speech (broadly conceived) ornot.
One might at this point object that Iam achieving the common ground
by definitional fiat. Perhaps makers intentions just are the wrong phenom-
ena to focus on when fixing the class of pornographic artifacts. Ordinary
artifactual kinds are typically delimited in one of three ways:by focusing
on makers intentions, on artifactual functions, or on how non-makers re-
ceive the artifact. Iwill say more about audience reception and pornogra-
phy shortly. But let me first address a putative counterexample to my view
and why we should not define pornographic artifacts in functionalterms.
Consider the following example:a hapless couple engage in spontane-
ous sex in a parking lot, which gets recorded by the lots CCTV system.
We have a recording that many would probably judge to be pornographic,
and yet there is no maker:the camera simply recorded the event without
any intention to produce pornography. Does this not provide a clear coun-
terexample to my view? Ithink not. There is (and should be) a qualitative
difference between pornographic artifacts and artifacts that contain por-
nographic aspects. If we reject such a distinction, we would have to say
that this artifact is rendered pornography simply by involving nudity or
scenes of sexual nature. However, this would yield the wrong results:there
are pornographic genres that do not contain nudity and sexual acts in more
traditional senses, and many putatively nonpornographic artifacts contain
nudity. The so-called giantess point-of-view pornography is an example
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of the first: voluptuous female performers wearing sexually suggestive

clothing squash small toy soldiers without necessarily being nude. This is
filmed from a perspective that gives the viewer a point-of-view experience
of being smothered or squashed by the giantess. If we focus on nudity,
this fetish genre would not qualify as pornography. Conversely, many ar-
tifacts contain nudity and sexual scenes without being considered pornog-
raphy:just think of anatomy books and safe sex guides. So, the footage
of the hapless couple should not count as pornography simply by virtue
of containing some typical features found in pornographic artifactsthis
would render the kinds boundaries tooloose.
Imagine, however, that the parking lots security guard finds the footage
and posts it on an Internet portal like youporn.com with the intention to
distribute it as pornography. On my view, this would transform the foot-
age into pornography. That is, the maker need not be the direct manufac-
turer of the materials. This is akin to ready-mades in art like Duchamps
Fountain and many Warhol pieces, where ordinary artifacts are used to
create works of arts. So, even though the footage per se does not count as
a pornographic artifact, when the security guard (bluntly put) mixes their
intentional labor with the footage, this transforms it into somethingelse.
Focusing on functions (I hold) would also give us the wrong results.
First, take actual function. Slightly broken chairs might no longer fulfill
their function, but it seems wrongheaded to claim that due to this they are
no longer chairs. Similarly, a very bad pornographic film may utterly fail
to arouse its viewers; so, we might say that it has a deformed actual func-
tion. Nonetheless, it would be odd to conclude that this renders the object
something other than a pornographic artifact, as we would have to if actual
function fixes whether the object is a pornographic artifact or not. There
is a difference between something being x and something being a bad ex-
emplar of x. Abroken chair and a bad porn film are bad exemplars of their
kind, but this surely does not render them exemplars of some other kind.
Second, consider intended functions:one might claim that even though the
bad piece of pornography failed to satisfy its function, it is the intended
function to solicit arousal that makes it pornography. But Iam not con-
vinced. Although Ithink that no pornographic artifacts are made without
some function in mind, fixing the intended pornographic function is actu-
ally tricky. There is no pornographic function simpliciter, Isubmit, due to
which functional analyses of pornographic artifacts are unsatisfying. If we
take the intended function to fix artifactual kinds but cannot spell out what
the clearly intended pornographic function is, we have no resources to fix
the kind of pornographic artifacts.

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6.4. Pornographic Intentions
To see the above point more clearly, consider the second benefit of my
approach: that it provides a more nuanced picture of pornography.
Pornography is undoubtedly partly about subordination and sexual arousal,
as feminist philosophers and philosophers of art hold. But historical and
contemporary examples suggest that neither is the central (necessary) fea-
ture or the clearly intended end of pornography. Articulating some single,
essential, and purely pornographic intention is far from easy. Let me high-
light two complications to illustrate.
(1) Producing sexually arousing materials may be a means to some

other end, rather than the end of producers perse.
(2) The supposed intended pornographic function of soliciting sexual
arousal may be constitutively intertwined with other intended func-
tions in a way that makes it impossible to separate the pornographic
intention from additional nonpornographic intentions (as assumed
by philosophers of art advancing exclusivist positions).
Start by considering a historical example. In her examination of por-

nographys history, Lynn Hunt claims if we take pornography to be the
explicit depiction of sexual organs and sexual practices with the aim of
arousing sexual feelings, then pornography was almost always an ad-
junct to something else until the middle or end of the eighteenth century
(1993, 10). Pornography in this sense was widely used to criticize reli-
gions and political authorities (Hunt 1993, 10), as was the case during
the French Revolution, when pornographic imagery was used to attack
and mock Marie Antoinette and the French Court. This, Icontend, tells
us two things. First, arousing sexual imagery was used as a tool for social
criticismit was not primarily produced for the end of sexual arousal as
such. Second, it is difficult to separate the pornographic sexual intention
from the political revolutionary intention. This is because the sexually
titillating content of the images is essentially tied to the particular fig-
ures depicted (like Marie Antoinette). Sexual arousal has an intentional
component demonstrated by Seiriol Morgans example of fucking the
Police:
When Iwas a young man Ihad a friend who for obvious reasons was popu-
larly known as Johnny Drugs. One summer, to everyones astonishment,
Johnny had a brief sexual relationship with a female police officer. He
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cheerfully told me that his attraction to her was dramatically enhanced by

the fact that she was in the police force, to the extent that he found him-
self repeating the inner mantra Im fucking the Police! Im fucking the
Police!, as he was penetrating her. This activity, Iwas informed, had the
effect of dramatically increasing the intensity of his physical pleasure, in
particular his eventual orgasm. (2003,78)
To hold that we can separate some pure pornographic intention to sexu-

ally arouse from other nonpornographic intentions implicitly buys into
an account of sexual desire that fails to recognize such intentionality of
desire. Putting forward a full account of sexual desire is not possible here,
but Morgans example undermines the idea that the sexual arousal gener-
ated is separable from other aspects of a pornographic work, like it being
a tool for social critique.
Some newer examples are also instructive. Consider contemporary
U.S. mass-produced pornography. This is no fringe industry and of late
generates profits of $5 billion annually (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/04/10/free-pornography_n_3052893.html). According to a 2004
CBS report, Americans then spent around $10 billion a year on porno-
graphic materials (Porn in the USA). Call the makers of such materi-
als the mainstream pornographers. This groups interests were at the
time represented in Washington by their very own lobbyist Bill Lyon, who
noted: [The U.S. porn industry] employs in excess of 12,000 people in
California. And in California alone, we pay over $36million in taxes every
year. So its a very sizeable industry (Porn in the USA). Further com-
ments made by Lyon are illustrative:[When Istarted as the lobbyist for
the industry] Iwas rather shocked to find that [those involved] are pretty
bright business people who are in it to make a profit. And that is what its
about (Porn in the USA, italics mine). When asked about the reactions he
receives in Washington for lobbying for the porn industry, Lyon responds:
Initially, Ithink theres a degree of shock. But when you explain to them
[the politicians] the size and the scope of the business, they realize, as all
politicians do, that its votes and money that were talking about. This
is an extremely large business and theres a great opportunity for profits
in it. (Porn in theUSA)
Profits and money play a huge role in the production of mainstream por-
nographic artifacts. (See also Trinks [2013] who outlines how in medieval

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Spain sexually explicit images were produced for financial gain:churches

along pilgrimage routes would display such images in order to attract
pilgrims and thus generate revenue.) This raises serious questions about
whether eliciting sexual arousal is the central intention or aim of main-
stream pornographers. To clarify: I am in no doubt that pornographers
intend to make sexually arousing artifacts; that they sexually arouse is
not an unintended accident of the production process. But whether this is
the ultimate intention and operative motivation is far from obvious to me.
Instead, it is quite conceivable that making money is the central goal of
mainstream pornographers, and that the use of arousing sexual imagery
is just a very effective means to do so. This is an empirical matter and not
something we can deduce a priori by examining pornographic artifacts.
So, one might claim, Iam wrong to focus on the moneymaking incentive
of pornography. Truebut my opponents (who take pornography essen-
tially to be about sexual arousal without further empirical investigation)
may also be deeply misguided in that they eschew the empirical reality
of pornographys profit-generating potential. For instance, take another
large industry, like car manufacturing. Cars enable us to travel and get
from one place to another. But it strikes me as false to claim that therefore
the automobile industry is about giving people the freedom to travel at
their own convenience. Rather, given the profit-making aim of the indus-
try, it is about making money by the means of giving people the freedom
to travel, creating certain desires, perhaps even blocking the development
of a workable public transport network. It is not inconceivable that the
same is true of the pornography industryjust because pornographic ar-
tifacts may and do arouse their viewers, it does not follow that therefore
such artifacts are centrally about sexual arousal, contra prevalent views
in aesthetics.
Now, industrial pornography is not the only game in town. Recent years
have seen a surge in the number of independent female pornographers
with explicitly feminist beliefs and aims. Call these the grassroots femi-
nist pornographers. In a recent collection of essays, The Feminist Porn
Book, feminist pornography is defined as a genrethat
uses sexually explicit imagery to contest and complicate dominant repre-

sentations of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, ability, age, body type,
and other identity markers. It explores concepts of desire, agency, power,
beauty, and pleasure at their most confounding and difficult, including plea-
sure within and across inequality, in the face of injustice, and against the
limits of gender hierarchy and both heteronormativity and homonormativity
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[It] creates alternative images and develops its own aesthetics and ico-
nography to expand established sexual norms and discourses [Feminist
pornography makers] strive to create a fair, safe, ethical, consensual work
environment and often create imagery through collaboration with their sub-
jects. (Taormino etal. 2013,910)
One of the most famous examples is the film Dirty Diaries, consisting
of 12 short videos of feminist porn (http://www.dirtydiaries.org/). The
film is accompanied by a 10-point manifesto, which is instructive. Out of
these points, only one specifically pertains to the intention to make some-
thing sexually arousing:the call to create an alternative to the mainstream
porn industry by making different kinds of sexy films. Other manifesto
points include fighting against prevalent beauty myths, capitalism and
patriarchy in general and in the mainstream porn industry, and against
censorship that represses images of liberated female sexuality. The points
also include fighting for a change in our conceptions of and judgments
about female sexuality; reproductive and bodily control; and diversity in
expressions of sexuality. That the film is sexually arousing is not a pro-
duction accident, but clearly intentional. Still, the intentions to subvert
mainstream pornography and to bring in female and queer perspectives
are not just additional to the intention to make something sexually arous-
ing:they are part and parcel of that intention in a way that makes it im-
possible to separate some pure pornographic intention from additional
nonpornographic ones. Bluntly put, if we merely focus on the intention
to make a dirty sexually arousing film, we seriously miss the point of
thework.
Looking at their creators intentions suggests that the class of por-
nographic artifacts as a whole cannot be simply analyzed in terms of
(say) sexual arousal. There are a number of intended functions (solic-
iting arousal, making profit, liberating or subordinating women), and
these cannot easily be ranked so that one becomes the class-defining
and final intended function. Thus, we cannot identify some clear-cut
single intention of pornographers. Or, we cannot identify such an inten-
tion over and above the intention to create some x that is a pornographic
artifact. This may sound like a trivial point: obviously pornographers
are in the business of creating pornographic artifacts! And since this
is so blatantly clear, one might claim, we must single out some less
trivial and more fine-grained intention. However, the coarse general in-
tention is not trivial. Given the sheer variety of more specific intentions
that pornographers have, there is no single fine-grained feature that

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pornography is about. Focusing on the coarse intention to produce

pornography provides a fruitful way to grasp the multifaceted kind of
pornographic artifacts, and it recognizes that extant pornography is too
versatile to be successfully analyzed from the philosophers armchair
alone. That said, intended fine-grained intentions of pornographers are
relevant for our further analyses of pornography. For instance, imagine
that one aims to produce a piece of pornography that largely matches
the concept held by some prior pornographers, where this concept in-
volves particularly brutal scenes of womens subordination. Imagine
further that the maker does so with a view to motivating sexualized
violence against women. This intended more fine-grained and specific
function is highly relevant to our moral assessment of the artifact. But
it does not make the artifact a piece of pornographythe prior coarse-
grained makers intentiondoes.
6.5. Muddled Intuitions
The third benefit of my view is that it can deal with our muddled ordinary
and philosophical intuitions about some supposedly necessary and suf-
ficient conditions that the concept pornography encodes. Now, although
there is no agreement about such conditions, it strikes me that ordinary
intuitions about whether something is a pornographic artifact are more
uniform:these include particular films with sexually explicit content, top-
shelf magazines, books with sexual scenes not sold in the Literature sec-
tions of bookshops, and so on. As already mentioned, such pornographic
artifacts typically have following features:they are sexually explicit, they
contain nudity and scenes of sexual nature, they have the potential to sexu-
ally arouse their viewers and they are often used as masturbation materi-
als. These are typical features of pornographic artifacts, even if we cannot
say what the necessary and sufficient conditions of pornography are. Still,
for me this is unproblematic:we may not be able to provide such condi-
tions, but we can nonetheless say what makes x a pornographic artifact. On
my suggestion, we focus on makers intentions to produce pornographic
artifacts by imposing typical pornographic features on the artifact and in
a way that largely matches some contentful pornography conception of
prior makers. We can eschew various and muddled intuitions about por-
nographys defining conditions but are not prevented from fixing the kind
of pornographic artifacts.
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Now, one might object that my account does not deal satisfyingly with
our ordinary intuitions after all. Paraphrasing Justice Stewart, we know
pornography when we see it; but different people see different artifacts as
pornography. So, perhaps my manner of fixing pornographic artifacts is
not that helpful, since Itoo start from some paradigm cases that are hos-
tage to our pretheoretic intuitions. However, there is an important clarifi-
cation that avoids this worry. The I know it when Isee it retort fixes the
class of pornographic artifacts based on the audience receptionmakers
intentions are neither here nor there. Now, although my model crucially
hinges on such intentions, it is not insensitive to audience reception. Recall
that some x is of the kind pornographic artifact only if it is the product of a
largely successful intention to create pornography. And the maker intends
that the artifact is an instance of pornography only if the makers content-
ful pornography conception (substantive concept of pornography) largely
matches that held by some prior makers, and the maker intends to realize
that conception by imposing pornography-relevant features on the object.
The maker must first and foremost intend to produce a pornographic arti-
fact. This intention can, however, go astray, and one way to do so would
be to fail to impose any features taken to be pornography-relevant by
audiences. (Just think of the earlier cake-baking pornography.) In this
sense, my proposal is multifaceted: for something to be a pornographic
artifact, it does not suffice that one has a mere intention to create a piece
of pornographyfollowing Thomasson (and others), the intention must
be successful. So, the maker must produce something that matches the
concept of pornography held by some prior pornographers and impose
some pornography-relevant features on the object in a successful manner.
And one way to measure success is in terms of audience reception:for in-
stance, that the imposed pornography-relevant features are so recognized
by others.
So, audiences are not irrelevant, albeit audience reception is not what
ultimately makes some artifact a piece of pornography. In this sense,
Iaim to accommodate the audience perspective too, but avoid the implau-
sible result that whatever audiences take to be pornography is pornogra-
phy. Relying on audience reception, which trades on muddled intuitions,
would leave fixing the class of pornographic artifacts too much hostage
to fortune. Still, even though ordinary intuitions are rejected as fixing the
artifactual class, I can nevertheless accommodate these intuitions: they
figure in our judgments about whether pornography-relevant features
have been imposed on the object and so adjudicate the successfulness

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of makers intentions. The interplay between audience reception and the

makers intentions is more refined than with some other extant positions
on pornography.6
6.6. Makers Knowledge
This brings me to the fourth benefit:understanding pornography on the

basis of makers intentions improves Rae Langtons recent suggestion
that pornography produces a distinctive kind of makers knowledge.
Following J.S. Mill, there may be a knowledge-based argument for por-
nography. Generation of knowledge is one justification for free speech.
So, if pornography creates knowledge, there is a putative prohibition on
restricting it. Langton (2009, Chapter13) has more recently argued that
pornography does indeed produce a distinctive kind of makers knowl-
edge. It is distinctive in that it not only aims at truth, but makes its truth
(Langton 2009, 292). But this kind of knowledge is harmful, and so the
knowledge defense of pornography is undermined. Pornography func-
tions like a blueprint via the process of social construction that benefits
those with social powernamely, men. Projection makes the world fit the
blueprint, and the beliefs of the powerful become knowledge since the
world arranges itself to assert their views (Langton 2009, 301). The mak-
ers knowledge that pornography involves is akin to the kind of knowl-
edge that (say) architects have of the buildings they have designed. Thus,
pornography involves a certain kind of self-fulfilling projection with ob-
jectification of women as its mechanism. For Langton, in objectifying
women pornography generates knowledge about them by putting forward
a certain map or picture of women, which is enforced and (bluntly put)
made real in the world. This nonetheless makes pornography a source
of harmful knowledge about women. Part of the harm involved is in the
shape of women that is projected (e.g., in the vision of women enjoying
One might think that Michael Reas (2001) account of pornography is akin to mine. Idisagree,
6.
though:Rea attempts first to spell out what it is for some person to use or view x as pornography,
which hinges substantially on that persons desires and beliefs. This is something that my account
opposes. Rea then uses this prior elucidation of using pornography to account for what makes
x pornography:a reasonable belief that x will be used or treated as pornography by most of the
audiences for which it was produced (2001, 134). This may seem closer to what Isay, but (again)
Iam not convinced. First, it is unclear whether the reasonable belief should be had by makers,
non-pornography-consuming bystanders, pornography consumers, or all of the above for x to count
as pornography. If it is the first (makers beliefs), this would make Reas view closer to mine.
However, if Rea had in mind audience and bystander reception, his position departs substantially
frommine.
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rape, being inferior and servile); another part of the harm is the shaping
itself that deprives women the power to shape their own sexualities. In
short: the harm of pornographic makers knowledge is that it destroys
womens sexual autonomy.
In order to assess the plausibility of the connection between porno-
graphic knowledge and objectification, we must consider (at least) two
questions:is objectification always morally problematic? And might some
pornographic knowledge be benign? With respect to the former ques-
tion, some have argued that not all objectification is morally pernicious
(Green 2000; Soble 2002). For instance, Nussbaum holds that context
is all-important when we assess the moral status of objectifying ways to
view and treat others (1995, 271). If objectification takes place in a context
devoid of respect and consent, it will be morally condemnable. If the back-
ground context, however, is characterized by equality, mutual respect, and
consent, objectification is morally benign and can even be positive. This
would make sexual objectification nonproblematic in a context of loving,
equal, and/or respectful relationships. For example, many BDSM practi-
tioners argue that this is precisely what happens in apparently objectifying
BDSM sexual practices (e.g., Califia 1994). Communities of BDSM prac-
titioners have extremely detailed and stringently followed rules that govern
sexual encounters. For instance, participants in BDSM play agree on
certain strictly enforced safe words, which signify the limits of consent.
Those who fail to respect safe words are quickly ousted from BDSM com-
munities. In fact, some BDSM advocates argue that their sexual practices
are among the most consensual to be found:nonpractitioners simply fail
to understand what is going on and therefore find BDSM degrading and
violent (cf. Rubin 1993). Analogously, antipornography feminists may be
wrong to focus on the subordinating depictions of women because whether
pornography involves morally problematic objectification depends on the
context of making pornographic artifacts, rather than on outsiders judg-
ments about the finished products.
Furthermore, Icontend that (a)there may be some pornographic knowl-
edge that is not makers knowledge at all and involves no objectifying
projection and (b)even though some pornography involves makers knowl-
edge, the knowledge generated might not be morally problematic. This is
because who the maker is makes a difference, which Langtons analysis
does not seriously consider. Earlier Imentioned self-proclaimed feminist
pornographers and the film Dirty Diaries. It is not the only example of
this kind. For instance, when asked why she directs pornographic films,
Petra Joy (one of the best-known independent feminist pornographers and

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a former antipornography activist) states that she aims to portray a real-

istic picture of sexuality and to provide an alternative female perspective
to mainstream pornographys male point of view. The main difference Joy
sees between her work and mainstream pornography is that, unlike the
latter, the former is not profit-driven (Feigenblatt 2010, 12).7 Sinnamon
Love, who describes herself as a black feminist pornographer, undertakes
only to work with directors and production companies that portray black
female sexuality in ways that Ifeel are expansive, progressive, and inter-
esting (Love 2013, 103). She strives to provide more positive images of
black men and women in sexual situations that dont require stereotypes
to get the point across (Love 2013, 103104). Candida Royalle (2000),
an ex-performer turned director, recounts that she started directing porno-
graphic films in order to undercut the exploitation and sexist depiction of
women in the mainstream pornography industry. Royalle refuses to use
common mainstream pornography tropes in her films, such as facial ejacu-
lations that are known as money shots in the industry (since without them,
pornographic works are not thought to sell). These pornographers intend
to provide alternatives to and to subvert the mainstream porn industry as
well as to portray a more realistic picture of sexuality in general and of
racialized/gendered sexuality in particular. In fact, feminist pornographers
typically hold that much of mainstream industrial pornography is sexist
(cf. Arrowsmith 2013). But (they hold) we should not therefore oppose
pornography per se; rather, we should oppose exploitative and unethical
pornography. As Annie Sprinkle famously claimed, in order to solve the
problem of bad porn, women and feminists must make betterporn.
The above suggests that some pornographic knowledge might not be
makers knowledge: feminist pornographers aim to show (among other
things) that sexist mainstream pornography gets things wrong. They aim
to represent female sexuality more realistically in order to undercut main-
stream representations. Feminist pornographers intend to create pornogra-
phy in a particular way. They have a substantive (contentful) conception
of pornography, which comes apart from some mainstream conceptions
but largely matches the one held by other prior feminist pornographers.
This conception includes (among other things) the aim to depict a more
authentic and realistic picture of female sexuality and the view that pro-
moting better porn can play a valuable educational role by correcting
See Feigenblatt Die 60 besten Sexfilme fr Anspruchsvolle [The 60 Best Sex-films for the
7.
Discerning], http://www.feigenblatt-magazin.de/das-feigenblatt-filmsonderheft, 2010. Accessed

13 August 2012. Translations from German to English aremine.
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false mainstream depictions of sexuality. Further, feminist pornogra-

phers intend to realize that substantive conception by imposing particular
pornography-relevant features on the object (e.g., by depicting scenes of
sexual nature but avoiding money shots). Relative to these intentions,
feminist pornography might have a claim to telling educationally valuable
truths about women (e.g., not all women enjoy facial ejaculations). Now,
a proper assessment of this suggestion would require us to take a stance
on what is authentic female sexuality:if it is accurately represented in
feminist pornographers works, some pornography has a claim to being
more standard kind of knowledge that mirrors reality. But making good
this move is difficult:an elucidation of authentic sexuality seems to be
impossible, given the extent and influence of socialization, cultural tradi-
tions, even indoctrination and taboos. And settling such authenticity is
not a task for a philosopher. Still, the point is that feminist pornographers
take themselves to be providing more accurate and truthful accounts of
female sexuality than much of the mainstream. If this holds, their works
do not involve makers knowledge in Langtonssense.
There is another option: perhaps feminist pornography involves non-
harmful makers knowledge. This would be possible if (i)the shape (i.e.,
the vision) of women that feminist pornography portrays is not in itself in-
sidious and (ii) the shaping does not undermine womens sexual autonomy.
The former claim cannot be evaluated using a priori philosophical meth-
ods, and much more needs to be said about it than Ican do here. However,
the example of Dirty Diaries (among many others) and its accompany-
ing manifesto points certainly speak against the view that the vision of
women put forward is one of servility and inferiority to the extent that it
counts as the subordination of women. My contention is that this example
also speaks against the second claim about shaping:part of the project of
feminist pornography is to urge women to shape themselves, instead of
patriarchal conceptions of womens sexuality doing the shaping. It aims
to increase options available to women in the shaping process, and this is
an intentional move on the part of the makers. If the makers knowledge
of feminist pornography is autonomy enhancing, it will be harmless. The
crucial point, however, is that we can see how pornographic knowledge
may vary depending on individual makers more fine-grained intentions.
For instance, just consider how differently feminist and mainstream por-
nographers view the nature of pornography, which groups of other prior
pornographers they have in mind, and how the makers intend to realize
their conception of pornography (which pornography-relevant features
they impose on pornographic artifacts). Given their divergent intentions,

132
the resulting pornographic knowledge is bound to differ. If feminist por-

nographers conception of pornography and their way of realizing that
conception do not undermine womens autonomy to shape their own sexu-
ality, which is putatively going on with much of mainstream industrial
porn, feminist and mainstream pornography do not generate comparable
makers knowledge: mainstream pornographic knowledge may well be
and probably is harmful in Langtons sense, but it is not obvious that the
feminist counterpart is also harmful.
Langton has resources to respond to this: elsewhere (cf. 2009, Chapter
10) she argues that one way to treat another as an object involves an
explicit affirmation of autonomy. So, perhaps feminist pornographers
end up destroying womens autonomy after all: they first affirm it via
the alternative vision of sexually autonomous women in control of their
bodies, but this still ends up undermining the power a woman might
otherwise have had to shape herself (Langton 2009, 307). One socially
constructed vision of womens sexuality has been replaced by another,
and this again undermines sexual autonomy. Now, Langtons reliance on
MacKinnons thesis about social construction suggests that merely re-
placing one social construction with another is not per se the problem.
For MacKinnon, there is no unconstructed perspective-independent real-
ity that can be excavated underneath the insidious social constructions.
Rather, a new and improved feminist reality must be constructed in order
to replace the masculinist one (MacKinnon 1989). There cannot be any
shaping that escapes social construction, and so feminist pornographys
shaping process as such cannot be the problem. Instead, we must take
care to replace a bad process of shaping with a good oneprecisely what
feminist pornographers aim to do.
Finally, one might wonder whether putative feminist pornography
really is pornography. If it involves sexually explicit materials premised
on equality, perhaps it really counts as erotica, in which case the antipor-
nography and feminist pornography sides are simply talking past one an-
other. Methodological considerations become pertinent to our philosophi-
cal assessment of this issue. Antipornography feminists define erotica as
passionate love; it is about love making, whereas pornography is about
violence (cf. Steinem 1995). But this distinction romanticizes sex, and it
connects sex and love in a heteronormative way that reflects traditional
gender stereotypes. It also buys into the view that images of domination,
conquest, and submission are morally problematic simpliciter in a con-
text-independent way and that certain sexual practices cannot be freely
consented to. These are views that self-proclaimed feminist pornographers
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typically reject. They are not aiming to depict love making; rather, they
aim to offer exploitative industrial pornography egalitarian pornographic
alternatives. We could of course understand pornography as MacKinnon
and Langton do, and ignore the claims of feminist pornographers. But this
strategy is methodologically problematic: it would provide a definition of
pornography from the armchair that many individuals who are much more
invested in the world of pornography than philosophers simply reject. The
worry is that such a stipulated antipornography definition ignores and si-
lences precisely those pornographers and performers who aim to subvert
the mainstream and who are aiming to go beyond traditional heterosex-
ist gender norms and racial stereotypes. Our philosophical theories then
should do justice to the claims of those involved in the making of pornog-
raphy and not dismiss their claims outright. My account that focuses on
the general coarse intention to produce pornographic artifacts does pre-
cisely that: we can say that feminist and mainstream pornographers are
both in the business of producing such artifacts, but given their individual
and more fine-grained intentions, the resultant artifacts come to diverge
considerably from one another. Thus, the artifacts generate disparate por-
nographic knowledges, which is significant for our further moral, political,
and aesthetic evaluations of pornographic materials.
References
Antony, Louise. 2011. Against Langtons Illocutionary Treatment of Pornography.

Arrowsmith, Anna. 2013. My Pornographic Development. In Pornographic Art
and the Aesthetics of Pornography, edited by Hans Maes, 287297. Basingstoke:
Palgrave-MacMillan.
Califia, Pat. 1994. Public Sex. Pittsburgh, PA:Cleis.
Green, Leslie. 2000. Pornographies. Journal of Political Philosophy 8:2752.
Hunt, Lynn. 1993. Introduction. In The Invention of Pornography, 15001800, edited
by Lynn Hunt, 945. NewYork:ZoneBooks.
Itzin, Catherine. 1992. Legislating Against Pornography Without Censorship. In
Pornography: Women, Violence and Civil Liberties, edited by Catherine Itzin,
Kieran, Matthew. 2001. Pornographic Art. Philosophy and Literature 25:3145.
Lederer, Laura, ed. 1980. Take Back The Night. NewYork:William Morrow.
Levinson, Jerrold. 2005. Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures. Philosophy and
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Longino, Helen. 1995. Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom:ACloser Look. In The

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Love, Sinnamon. 2013. A Question of Feminism. In The Feminist Porn Book: The
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Constance Penley, and Mireille Miller-Young, 97104. NewYork:FeministPress.
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Maes, Hans. 2011a. Art or Porn:Clear Division or False Dilemma? Philosophy and
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Maes, Hans. 2011b. Drawing the Line:Art Versus Pornography. Philosophy Compass
6:385397.
Maes, Hans, and Levinson, Jerrold. 2012. Art and Pornography. Oxford: Oxford
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Mag Uidhir, Christy. 2009. Why Pornography Cant Be Art. Philosophy and Literature
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Morgan, Seiriol. 2003. Sex in the Head. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20:116.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1995. Objectification. Philosophy & Public Affairs 24:249291.
Porn in the USA. CBS 60 Minutes, September 5, 2004. [online]. Available at:http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/21/60minutes/main585049.shtml. [Accessed 17
January2011.]
Rea, M.C. 2001. What is Pornography? Nos 35:118145.
Royalle, Candida. 2000. Porn in the USA. In Feminism and Pornography, edited by
Rubin, Gayle. 1993. Misguided, Dangerous, and Wrong:An Analysis of Antipornography
Politics. In Bad Girls and Dirty Pictures: The Challenge to Reclaim Feminism,
edited by Alison Assiter and Avedon Carol, 1840. London:PlutoPress.
Russell, Diana. 1993. Introduction to her Making Violence Sexy: Feminist Views on
Pornography, 120. Buckingham:Open UniversityPress.
Soble, Alan. 2002. Pornography, Sex, and Feminism. Amherst, NY:PrometheusBooks.
Steinem, Gloria. 1995. Erotica and Pornography:AClear and Present Difference. In The
NewYork:FeministPress.
Thomasson, Amie. 2003. Realism and Human Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 67:580609.
Trinks, Stefan. 2013. Sheela-na-gig Again: The Birth of a New Style from the Spirit
of Pornography. In Pornographic Art and the Aesthetics of Pornography, edited by
Hans Maes, 162182. Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan.
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PARTIII Objectification as Harm

ofPornography
136
137
CHAPTER7 Treating Pornography asa Woman

and Womens Objectification
Lina Papadaki
7.1.Introduction
Perhaps the most puzzling claim put forward by antipornography femi-

nists is that men use pornography as a woman. Catharine MacKinnon be-
lieves that pornography involves sex between people and things, human
beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal women (MacKinnon
1993, 109). Real men have sex with unreal women (pornographic images),
treating them as real human beings. Melinda Vadas defines pornography
as that manufactured object that satisfies sexual desire through its use as a
woman (in the role, function, or capacity of a woman) (Vadas 2005, 178).
According to these feminists, men use pornography to satisfy their sexual
desires, like they would with a real woman (a person). In this way, they
treat pornography as a woman. Throughout this chapter, Iam borrowing
the term personification from Jennifer Saul (2006, 45) to refer to the
use of an object (a pornographic artifact in the case of pornography) as a
person.
Rae Langton explains that personification, or the animation of things
as she calls it (2009b, 313), is not uncommon in our dailylives:
Someone might treat a doll as if it is hungry. Someone might treat a river as

if it is angry, and can be appeased by gifts. Someone might beg help from
a statue. It is a familiar, if mysterious, fact of human experience that we
project human qualities onto the inanimate, whether in games, or fantasy, or
outright mistake. (Langton 2009b,312)
138
Because we owe moral duties to people but not to objects, treating things
as people does not ordinarily strike us as morally suspicious.
There is a worry, however, that treating pornography as a woman is
linked to the objectification of women. When men personify pornogra-
phy, the human [woman] becomes a thing (MacKinnon 1993, 109, 25).
Men who use objects as people, pornography as a woman, use women as
objects. MacKinnon and Vadas argue that there is a strong constitutive
connection between mens use of pornography as a woman and womens
objectification. Personification, in the context of pornography, is (it consti-
tutes) the objectification ofwomen.
Elsewhere, Ihave argued that such a constitutive connection does not
exist (Papadaki 2010). My purpose in this chapter is to explore the more
modest argument that there exists a causal connection between personify-
ing pornography and objectifying women. As Langton puts it, men who
use pornography, at least certain kinds of pornography (e.g., violent or
misogynistic pornography), as a woman tend to objectify women as a
result of that use. In this way, the use of pornography as a woman is
taken to cause womens objectification (Langton 2009b, 349). Drawing
on two particular instances of treating an object as a woman, taken from
the nonpornographic films Lars and the Real Girl (2007)1 and Air Doll
(2009), I argue against the existence of a causal connection between
the personification of pornography and womens objectification. This
does not imply, however, that pornography is not to blame for the ob-
jectification of women. It is possible to argue, as I explain, that there
indeed exists a causal connection between the knowledge generated by
pornography about womens inferior and object-like status and womens
objectification.
7.2. Treating asa Woman:Pornography
This section will explore the feminist claim that men use pornography as
a person (a woman). It should be made clear, here, that the feminists who
support the position that pornography is used as a woman, like MacKinnon
and Vadas, focus on male heterosexual use of pornography. Furthermore,
they conceive pornography in terms of womens inferior status and
subordination. For these antipornography feminists, we live in a world
of gender inequality. A persons gender, MacKinnon takes it, is clearly
1.
Many thanks to Nancy Bauer for suggesting thisfilm.
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distinguished from a persons sex. Gender, being a man or a woman, is

socially constructed, whereas sex, being male or female, is biologically
defined. Within our patriarchal societies, men and women have clearly
defined roles:women (all women) are objectified, whereas men (all men)
are their objectifiers.2
The phenomenon of gender inequality, which is widespread and per-
vasive in our societies, is believed by MacKinnon to be created and
sustained by mens consumption of pornography. MacKinnon defines
pornographyas
the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women though pictures or

words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or
commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up,
mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or
servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals,
or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or
inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions
sexual. (1987,176)
For MacKinnon, the use of pornography involves a real sex act. There is
sex between people and things, human beings and pieces of paper, real
men and unreal women (MacKinnon 1993, 109). The sexual act in ques-
tion is not an imaginary sexual act, but a real one. Men actually satisfy
their sexual desires through using pornography. They have sex with pieces
of paper (pornographic images). This means, for MacKinnon, that these
pieces of paper are treated as real women. Aman can satisfy his sexual
desires through using a real woman. But he can also achieve this purpose
through using pornography as a woman. The purpose, in both cases, is
sexual gratification. And, in both cases, a sexual act takes place and this
purpose is achieved. Use of pornography, then, involves real men having
sex with unreal women, treating the latter as if they were real. The men in
question personify pornography.
The claim that pornography involves personification has received philo-
sophical attention from Vadas. She defines pornography as any object,
whether in appearance male, female, child or transsexual, or part or parts
of these, or variations of these, or combinations of these, that has been
MacKinnon discusses this distinction between sex and gender in her books (1987, 6, 3245,
2.
50; 1989, 113114, 128, 137140). Sally Haslanger has provided an illuminating analysis of
MacKinnons views on sex and gender (1993, 98101).
WOMENS OBJECTIFICATION |139

140
manufactured to satisfy sexual desire through its sexual use or consump-

tion as a woman (Vadas 2005, 187). As a woman, Vadas explains, means
in the role, function, or capacity of a woman. Pornography, according to
Vadass definition, is any manufactured object that satisfies sexual desire
through its use in the role, function, or capacity of a woman (Vadas 2005,
178). She employs the term manufacture-for-use to stress the fact that
pornography is manufactured in order to be sexually used, that it does
not simply waft to earth from the heavens above, as she puts it (Vadas
2005, 177). Men use pornographic artifacts (things) as women (persons).
Pornography consumption, therefore, involves personification. Use of por-
nography, for Vadas too, involves a sex act. Areal sex act and not an
imaginary sex act or a simulacrum of a sex act. [M]en who have sex
with pornography have sex. Mens consumption of pornography is the
process of a mans moving from sexual arousal to sexual satisfaction or
orgasm (Vadas 2005, 178180).
For Vadas, sexual satisfaction and satisfaction of hunger are analogous.
She argues that it is impossible for a photograph or picture or any other
representation of food to satisfy a persons hunger. Representations of food
are not food, but only representations, and the body will not accept rep-
resentations of food as food. If it did, they would, at the point of such
acceptance, cease to be representations and become food proper (Vadas
2005, 180181). In the same way, a representation of a sexual object could
not, according to Vadas, satisfy a persons sexual desire any more than
a representation of an apple could satisfy his hunger. According to her,
then, if men gain sexual gratification through their use of pornography, the
pornographic objects in question are not treated as objects, but as people,
as women. The objects in question cease to be mere representations, and
the sex act that takes place, far from being imaginary, is a real one (Vadas
2005, 181182).
The claim that pornographic objects (e.g., pieces of paper) are used
as (in the role, function, or capacity of) women is far from obvious
and needs clarification. According to Sauls analysis, the intended use
of pornography for Vadas is the production of sexual satisfaction in
men. This appears to commit Vadas to the claim that the role, func-
tion, or capacity of women is that of producing sexual satisfaction in
men (Saul 2006, 4649). Saul rightly argues that the claim that using
pornography involves using pornographic objects to fulfill the func-
tion of women is insulting and instrumentalizing. It suggests that what
womens purpose is, or what women are for, is generating male sexual
satisfaction (Saul 2006, 48). What is more, the claim in question seems
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to be false:womens function is clearly not that of providing men with

sexual satisfaction. This means that even if we take it that men do in
fact use pornography to produce sexual satisfaction, it does not neces-
sarily follow that they are using it as (in the role, function, or capacity
of) awoman.
Saul argues that Vadass claim about womens function could be read
as a claim about a function. That is, one of womens functions is that of
providing sexual satisfaction to men, even though this is not womens sole
function. This reading too, however, as Saul rightly emphasizes, is both
instrumentalizing and false: instrumentalizing because attributing any
function to women as a group fails to attend to the wills of individual
women, and false because women simply do not have the function of
producing sexual gratification in men (Saul 2006, 57). Even if we read
Vadas as making the more limited claim that one of womens functions is
that of providing sexual satisfaction to men, then, we are still left with a
problematicclaim.
This is a serious worry to which I will return in Section 7.5 of this
chapter. The purpose of the current section was to make sense of the fem-
inist claim that men use pornography as a woman, that they personify
pornography. We have seen that personification in pornography involves
using pornographic images as real women. Men use those images like they
would use real flesh-and-blood women. Real womens function, or at least
one of their functions, is taken to be that of providing men with sexual
gratification. Pornography that is used as a woman, then, is used to fulfill
that particular function ofwomen.
7.3.Personifying Pornography and Womens

Objectification:ACausal Connection
What makes the personification of pornography morally problematic,

some feminists claim, is that it is connected to womens objectification.
MacKinnon explains how pornography constructs reality:
Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornography constructs
who that is. Mens power over women means that the way men see women
defines who women can be. Pornography is that way. Pornography is not
imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a dis-
tortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation, or symbol
either. It is sexual reality. (1987, 172173)

142
In personifying pornography, men learn to see women as subordinate;

they learn to see women as objects, which they can use in any way they
like for their sexual gratification. Because men, in patriarchal societies,
have power over women, they can make women mere sexual tools for their
purposes. In this way, personification of pornography causes womens
objectification.
Like MacKinnon, Vadas worries that men who use pornographic objects
as women (for the satisfaction of their sexual desires) will be led to use
real women as things. In personifying pornographic artifacts, Vadas ex-
plains, the objects in question are placed in the same category as women.
This is problematic because
a new category of reality is simultaneously created and populated by por-

nographys manufacture-for-use; it is the category of those individuals who
are both women and non-persons. This category is filled with all the sexual
objects of pornographys manufacture, objects which are formally of the
same sex class as flesh-and-blood women. (Vadas 2005,189)
Vadas claims that the existence of women who are not persons makes it
the case that women as such are not considered to be persons. If women
are not necessarily persons, it follows that their personhood is unrelated to
the sex act. According toher:
Where pornography is manufactured-for-use womens consent thus makes

no sexual difference. Some men might prefer to have sex with women who
consent just as some men might prefer to drive cars that are red, but neither
the consent of the woman nor the redness of the car has anything conceptu-
ally to do with the subsequent sex as sex, or of the subsequent driving as
driving. Just as driving a red or a non-red car is equally driving, so having
sex with a consenting or a non-consenting woman is equally sex. (Vadas
2005,190)
Womens sexual identity is limited to their being rapable for rapabil-

ity is all that is left of the sexuality of those whose consent is conceptu-
ally irrelevant to the occurrence of the sex act (Vadas 2005, 191). When
pornography is manufactured-for-use, according to Vadas, women are
harmed because they are identified as not necessarily persons and there-
fore as rapable. It is for this reason, Vadas concludes, that pornogra-
phys manufacture-for-use harms all women, for all women become not
necessarily persons, identified as rapable when women who are not
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persons are brought into existence (Vadas 2005, 191192).3 Mens use
of pornography as a woman, then, has the consequence that personhood is
not necessary for womanhood and therefore the use of pornography causes
womens objectification.
Langton clearly describes the causal connection that is claimed to exist
between personification and objectification in pornography as follows:
As a matter of human psychology, when men sexually use objects, porno-

graphic artifacts, as women, they tend to use real women as objects.
One weaker variant of this causal claim might be restricted to a subset
of pornography As a matter of human psychology, when men sexually
use objects as women, and those objects are pornographic artifacts, whose
content is violent or misogynistic, then they will tend to use real women as
objects. (Langton 2009b,349)
Men who use pornographic artifacts (at least violent or misogynistic ones)
as women, according to this causal claim, will tend to objectify women. In
this way, pornographys personification causes womens objectification.4
It is not clear, however, why this causal connection should hold between
personification and objectification in pornography. We have men, on the
one side, and on the other side women (people) and pornographic arti-
facts (objects). And we are interested in seeing how men who use things
as women, will use real women. Why would men who personify porno-
graphic artifacts tend to use women as objects?
The causal claim in question could be based on the more general claim
that when Auses X as Y, Awill tend to use Y as X.But this need not be
the case:Imight use a cup as an ashtray, but this does not make me any
more likely to drink my tea from an ashtray, using it as a cup. Or, someone
might use a toy gun as a real gun (use it in a robbery to threaten people),
but certainly this does not mean that the person in question will tend to use
a real gun as a toy gun (e.g., give a real gun to her toddler to play with).
These were examples of someone using one thing as another, without this
causing her to use the latter object as the former (an ashtray as a cup, a real
gun as a toygun).
3.
However, Vadas does not explain how we get from the claim womens consent is irrelevant
to the claim women are only rapable. If women cannot give or withhold consent, it seems that
women cannot be rapable, for only things for which consent is relevant/possible can beraped.
4.
Langtons claim is that this happens as a matter of human psychology. This means that, in order
to have a complete understanding of her claim, she needs to provide us with the empirical evidence
it relies on. Iam grateful to Mari Mikkola for emphasizingthis.

144
From the above examples we realize that an individuals personifying

an object is not sufficient to make him or her objectify people. In the fol-
lowing section, Iwill focus more specifically on two cases of personifica-
tion, in which the men involved treat sex dolls as their partners (as real
women, people). As in the case of pornography, we have men, on the one
side, and on the other side we have objects, which are used as women. My
purpose is to show that personification in these two cases does not cause
objectification in any obvious way. Ultimately, drawing on these two ex-
amples, Iaim to question the feminist claim that mens personification of
pornography causes the objectification ofwomen.
7.4. Treating asa Woman:Lars and Bianca, Hideo

andNozomi
In the 2007 film Lars and the Real Girl, Lars is a 27-year-old man who
lives in the standalone garage of his childhood home. His brother, Gus,
and wife, Karin, who are soon expecting their first child, live in the home
across the garage. Lars keeps refusing the couples invitations to their
house, which makes Karin worried that something is wrong with him.
Larss coworker, Margo, is clearly interested in him, but Lars does not
reciprocate her attempts to get closer to him. One day, Kurt, with whom
Lars shares a cubicle at work, shows Lars a website that sells life-sized,
anatomically correct sex dolls (a real website for that matter:https://www.
realdoll.com/). Lars seems uninterested, and yet, after a few weeks, a
coffin-like box arrives at his garage.
That evening, Lars knocks on Gus and Karins door and tells them that
he has a visitor, a woman he met through the Internet, whom he would
like them to meet. Later on, Lars and Bianca, a life-sized sex doll, pay
the couple a visit for dinner. Gus and Karin are utterly surprised to meet
Larss girlfriend and to realize that Lars genuinely believes that Bianca
is real, whispering in her ear and talking to her. Lars tells the couple that
Biancas clothes and wheelchair were stolen and asks Karin to lend her
some clothes. After dinner, it is agreed that Bianca can stay at Karin and
Guss house. Bianca gets cozy in Karins sweaters and Lars goes back to
his garage.
Gus and Karin are afraid that Lars is mentally ill, so they make a plan
to get him to see a psychologist. They tell him that Bianca needs to see a
doctor for some health problems she has. So they all go to Doctor Dagmar,
who tells Gus and Karin that Lars suffers from a delusion in thinking that
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Bianca is real, and it is as if he is trying to communicate something. Her

advice is for them to go along with his delusionthat is, treat Bianca as
a real woman. Dagmar plans to have Bianca come for regular treatments
and get the chance to talk to Lars while they are both waiting for Bianca to
be done with each treatment. During those waiting times, Dagmar finds
out that Lars is unable to be touched by another person without feeling
burning pain. His fear of being touched goes back to the loss of his mother,
who died when giving birth to him, and the loss of her touch. This makes
Bianca, who is made to be touched but is not capable of touching others
herself, the perfect partner forhim.
Dagmar suggests that everyone plays along with the fantasy that Bianca
is real to help Lars overcome his condition. So, before long, the towns-
people start treating Bianca as a person too. They keep her busyshe
participates in church activities, helps children at the local hospital, and
works part-time in a shop. Larss time with Bianca is limited and she grad-
ually becomes unavailable to him, busy with her new life and activities.
Meanwhile, Margo asks Lars out and, since Bianca is busy, he accepts her
invitation and they go out bowling. For the first time, Lars is able to really
see Margo, and begins to realize that he is attracted toher.
Sometime later, Bianca falls seriously ill. When she is out of the hos-
pital, Lars, Gus, and Karin take her to the local lake. Bianca and Lars sit
next to each other, while Gus and Karin go for a walk. We see him kiss
her (for the first and last time) and he starts weeping into her shoulder.
Lars walks Bianca into the lake and, by the time Karin and Gus are back,
Bianca is dead. Her funeral takes place. She is placed into a casket and is
back to lifelessness.
In Hirokazu Koreedas 2009 film Air Doll, Hideo, a middle-aged man
who works as a waiter in a restaurant, leads a lonely life in Tokyo. He goes
home from work every night, where Nozomi patiently waits for him. But
Nozomi is no ordinary partner:she is an inflatable doll, a sex toy. Arather
cheap model, as we find out lateron.
Hideo treats Nozomi as a real partner in every respect. He has dinner
with her every night and tells her all about his day at work. We see him
answering Nozomis (imaginary) questions. They have a conversation.
While we know his boss humiliated him, Hideo reverses the situation for
Nozomi:far from being the submissive one in this story, Hideo was actu-
ally the person who told another off. In Nozomis eyes he can be impor-
tant, he can be the man he wishes hewere.
Afterwards, they take a bath together. Hideo caresses Nozomi and
washes her hair. Your only flaw is that your body is so cold, he says.

146
The next scene is in bed. The lights are off and they spend some cozy
moments covered in the bedclothes and watching the stars in the ceil-
ing. Then comes the sex act, which is nothing like we would imagine a
man has with a sex toy. In a very intimate setting, Hideo kisses Nozomi
and tells her that she is beautiful. Then we hear the squeaking sound
of Nozomis plastic body as Hideo has sex with her. When he is done,
he goes to the bathroom to wash his semen off Nozomis removable
vagina. Afterwards, he is back in bed, where he sleeps with Nozomi
until the next morning. Before leaving for work, Hideo puts a blanket
on her because it is too cold, kisses her goodbye, and reassures her that
she looks beautiful that morningtoo.
Hideo treats Nozomi (an inflatable doll, an object) as a person (a woman,
his partner). He personifies her. They eat together, talk together, have sex
together, even go out for walks together. Hideo pushes her wheelchair and
gently puts her on a bench, where they both sit in each others arms drink-
ing beer:an ordinary couple.
And then, one morning, Nozomi comes to life. She finds herself with a
heart, as she puts it. With her animation comes the painful realization:I
am an air doll. A substitute for handling sexual desire. The rest of the
film follows Nozomi as she discovers the world and realizes that she is
not the only one who is empty insidein chaotic Tokyo, everyone is.
As Koreeda stated, Air Doll is about the loneliness of urban life and the
question of what it means to be human. The reader has to watch the film
to find out about Nozomis adventures. In this chapter, what concerns me
is Hideos personification of Nozomi, and so Ihave to stop where the film
really begins.
In these films, we have two clear cases of personification. Lars and
Hideo treat Bianca and Nozomi (two sex dolls) as their real partners. They
treat them as persons in every respect. In the case of Lars, we have a non-
sexual case of personificationthat is, Lars treats Bianca as his girlfriend,
but due to his (and, well, hers) religious upbringing, he has no sexual
relations with her. Bianca has her own room in Gus and Karins house.
Ironically, an object made to be sexually used, a sex doll, is used to fulfill
every other function of a real woman but her sexual function.
The case of Hideo and Nozomi, on the other hand, is a sexual case of
personification. Hideo treats Nozomi as his partner, including his sexual
partner. In this case too, however, Nozomi exists in order to fulfill much
more than a mans sexual whims. She waits for Hideo, eats and sleeps with
him, and keeps him company. She adds a romantic touch to his otherwise
mundane life. In addition to these, Nozomi provides Hideo with sexual
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gratification. Above all, however, she exists to ease Hideos loneliness.

She is the only one really available tohim.
It should be made clear, here, that these two examples of personification
are not meant to be perfectly parallel to the personification in pornography.
They are, rather, meant to afford us insights about personification. Lars
and Hideo do not treat their sex dolls as persons in the same way pornog-
raphy consumers treat pornography as a personthat is, they do not treat
Bianca and Nozomi as mere sexual instruments. Iwill explore this point
in detail in Section7.6.
7.5. Sex Dolls, Personification, and Objectification:

ACausal Connection?
In this section, Iam interested in seeing whether Lars and Hideo are led to
treat real people (women) as objects as a consequence of their personifica-
tion of Bianca and Nozomi. In other words, is there a causal connection
between personification and objectification in the cases of these two men
who treat their sex dolls as partners?
First, it is important to examine why Lars and Hideo treat the sex dolls
as real women. They project onto these dolls the human qualities that they
desire and, more specifically, the partner qualities that they desire. This
is something that cannot be done with real women, who have desires of
their own. Moreover, Bianca and Nozomi are perfect at fulfilling the needs
of their partners in a way that flesh-and-blood women could hardly
competewith.
For Lars, who is incapable of being touched without feeling intense
pain, Bianca is the perfect fit. She cannot touch and thus hurt him. Lars
can feel safe around Bianca in a way he cannot around a real partner,
who is bound to touch him. With Bianca by his side, Lars does not feel
vulnerable. Hideo finds a compliant woman in Nozomi, someone who can
patiently wait for him at home, someone who never complains or protests,
someone who completely understands him. Whats more, Nozomi can be
proud of Hideo in a way a real woman could not. She can help him feel
important, needed, desired. Hideo likes the simplicity involved in having a
doll as his partner. With her he can do all the things that a couple does, but
in his own time and in his own way. When Nozomi comes to life in the film
and the two meet, he tells her that he finds human relations annoying. He
wishes she would go back to being a doll. We realize, then, that Hideo is
utterly incapablealmost afraidof relating to a realwoman.

148
Now the crucial question is: does personifying Bianca and Nozomi
make Lars and Hideo more prone to objectify human beings? In the case
of Lars, we get a clear answer from the film. Through personifying Bianca,
not only does Lars not objectify real women, but he isfor the first time
capable of better relating to one. His personification of Bianca has en-
abled Lars to see Margo as a real woman, a potential partner. He can, at
last, be attracted to her, and realizes that he indeed needs and desires her.
Personifying Bianca has somehow made Lars more human and better able
to see others as beings with whom he can have human relationships. In the
case of Lars, then, treating an object as a person has caused him to treat a
real person as a person.
In the case of Hideo, we do not get a straight answer from the film
about how his personification of Nozomi affects his relations with real
women. Hideos next partner is another sex doll; he is afraid of relating to
someone real. Trapped in his loneliness, Hideo is neither willing to look
for a real partner nor capable of doing so. The only human interaction
we see him have is with his boss, and in that interaction Hideo is utterly
submissive. Quite obviously, Hideo is not an objectifier; if anything, he is
the objectified.
The examples of Lars and Hideo show that personifying an object is
not a sufficient condition for making a person an objectifier. In the case
of Lars, treating Bianca as a person has led him to treat a real person as a
person. And in the case of Hideo, treating Nozomi as a person has led him
to personify another sex doll. Neither instance of personification has led
to objectification.
7.6. Is Personifying Pornography What Really

Causes Womens Objectification?
Is there any reason to think that mens personification of pornography is

special in its capacity to make them objectify women? There is an impor-
tant difference between the way Lars and Hideo treat their dolls as women
and the way pornography consumers treat pornography as a woman. This
difference could tempt one to think that the personification of pornography
might, after all, be causally linked to womens objectification.
When men use pornography as a woman, according to antipornography
feminists like Vadas and MacKinnon, they use it for the satisfaction of
their sexual desires only. That is, pornographys use is purely instrumen-
tal. It is used as a mere tool for male sexual gratification. Hideo and Lars,
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on the other hand, have full-blown human relationships with Nozomi and
Bianca. They do not simply use the dolls to satisfy their sexual desires;
in the case of Lars, Bianca is not used for this purpose at all. The dolls
in question are treated as partners, unlike pornography that is treated as
a mere sexual instrument by men. This may suggest that men who use
pornography as a mere tool for sexual gratification can be led to treat real
women in this same way. And if this is so, then it is possible to argue that a
causal connection exists, or at least can exist, between the personification
of pornography and womens objectification.
My initial response to the worry above would be to question the fact
that the way men treat pornography counts as personification at all. It is
hard to see how male consumers of pornography treat pornography as
a person in treating it as a mere sexual tool. This is because persons are
clearly not mere sexual instruments. Looking back to the Lars and Hideo
examples, they treat the dolls as women in many respects (they eat with
them, talk to them, go out with them, do daily things with them). This is
usually the way a real person is used by his partner. Thus, even though
in the case of Lars and Hideo it is obvious that Bianca and Nozomi are
treated as persons, in the case of male consumers of pornography it is
hard to understand what they are doing as a case of personification. As
we have seen earlier, saying that men personify pornography in using it
as a mere tool to gain sexual gratification assumes that womens func-
tion, or at least one of their functions, is that of providing men with
sexual gratification. And we explained, in Section 7.1, why this is in fact
a problematicclaim.
The implausibility of calling merely sexual use of pornography per-
sonification is also revealed when we look at the feminist understandings
of pornographys personification and womens objectification. The per-
sonification of pornography is understood as the treatment of pornography
as a mere tool for mens sexual gratification. And the objectification of
women is understood as the very same thing: treating women as mere
sexual tools for mens satisfaction. So, when men treat pornography as
a mere sexual tool, this is called personification. And when men treat
women as mere sexual tools, this is called objectification. But if the so-
called treatment of pornography as a mere tool were indeed treatment as
a person, then we would have no reason to worry about mens treatment
of real women in this way. This is because men would be treating women
as persons, not as objects, in treating them as mere sexual tools. So, either
mens treatment of women as mere sexual instruments does not count as
objectification, or we need to define personification differently.

150
The above definition of personification appears even more absurd

when we consider the case of masturbation without pornography but
with imagined sexual fantasies. Mens use of such fantasies to satisfy
their sexual desires would also result in them personifying the fantasized
women, according to this feminist definition of personification. This is an
implausible claim and not one that antipornography feminists would want
to commit themselvesto.5
But even if we go along with the feminist definition of pornographys
personification as mens treating pornography in a purely instrumental
way to satisfy their sexual desires, we could still challenge the claim that
the personification of pornography causes womens objectification. This is
because pornographic images are objects and as such there is nothing mor-
ally inappropriate in treating them as mere tools. Men can treat pornog-
raphy in any way they like without hurting it. Because they are aware of
this fact, they have no moral qualms about personifying pornography. Real
women, on the other hand, are persons, and as such they do not exist just
to be used as instruments for mens pleasure. Even if they personify por-
nography, then, it does not follow that men will take it to be equally mor-
ally permissible to objectify real people (women). Iam hopeful that most
fair-minded adult human beings are able to distinguish between things and
people and know that the way we treat things resembles little of the way
that we treator at least we should treatpeople.6
Even if we notice that at least some men who use pornography for the
satisfaction of their sexual desires do objectify the women in their environ-
ment, however, we should not jump to the conclusion that in these cases it
was mens personification of pornography that caused womens objectifi-
cation. It could well be the other way around:men who objectify women
(e.g., men who treat women as mere things to be used and even violated
and abused by them) tend to use and enjoy pornography that includes de-
pictions of such attitudes. It is plausible to think that those men who enjoy
objectifying women around them (e.g., men who rape women) will also
enjoy violent pornographic depictions of rape and other forms of violence
against women. This is no more surprising than thinking that a person who
enjoys playing tennis will tend to buy magazines or books about this sport.
5.
Iam very grateful to Mari Mikkola forthis.
6.
Of course, one might still worry that some men can recognize womens personhood and still go
on to violate it. An example of this is Langtons case of sadistic rape. The sadistic rapist wants
his victim to say no and fight back. His violation of the victim presupposes that the she is an
autonomous subject. That is, the rapist attributes autonomy to his victim in one way so as to violate
it in a different way (Langton 2009a, 234). Ithank Mari Mikkola for pointing this outtome.
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Mens objectifying attitudes toward real women can lead them to consume
the pornography that they consume (like ones love for tennis can make
one consume tennis magazines).
Saul has also defended the claim that womens objectification comes
first, and personification of pornography follows. According to her, men
who personify pornography by treating it as a woman (for the production
of sexual satisfaction) are in fact ones who already objectify women. She
writes:
If we think a particular man takes women to have the function of providing

him with sexual satisfaction, we may think it is true that he uses pornog-
raphy to fulfill (what he takes to be) a womans function, or that he uses
pornography as a woman. But such a man already sees women as mere
means to male sexual satisfaction. This means that objectification is already
present. (Saul 2006,59)
Of course, it is possible to argue that, at least in some cases, men might be

led to objectify women only after consuming pornography (like a person
might start playing tennis after coming across some tennis magazines).
That is, pornography might influence these men, who have not demon-
strated any objectifying attitudes toward women before their consump-
tion of pornography, to start objectifying the women in their environment.
Women in pornography are presented as mere objects for mens use and
abuse. Men might get the idea from pornography, then, that it is permissi-
ble to treat women around them in these ways. This can lead them to treat
women in the same ways they see women as being treated in pornography.
I am not at ease with the idea that men are presented as unable to tell the
difference between pornography and reality, therefore drawing the con-
clusion that real women may be treated in the same ways that women in
pornography are treated. Ido acknowledge, however, that inevitably some
(though certainly not all) men might be influenced by pornography in this
way. This suggests that there might in fact be a causal connection between
some mens consumption of and being influenced by pornography and
women being treated as objects.
This, however, does not imply that there also exists a causal connection
between mens personification of pornography and womens objectifica-
tion. As the examples of personification discussed earlier suggested, an
individual personifying an object is not sufficient to cause them to objec-
tify a person. The fact that some individuals use objects as people does
not make them more likely to objectify real people. There seems to be no

152
reason why we should regard pornography differently. As in the above

cases, when it comes to pornography, it is not these mens use of pornogra-
phy as a woman that can lead them to objectify women. It would be more
plausible to say, rather, that it is the actual content of pornography, the
ideas and messages in pornography, that can influence some men to treat
real women as objects. The prevailing idea in pornography is that women
are object-like, and so it is permissible to treat women as objects to be used
and even abused by men. Some of those men who consume pornography,
then, are likely to be influenced by these ideas and treat women around
them as objects.
That some men might objectify real women as a consequence of being
influenced by the message that women are object-like should of course
worry us. Unfortunately, however, such messages are not confined to the
world of pornography. In patriarchal societies, the idea that women are
objects readily available for mens use is highly popular and is repeat-
edly expressed in various ways throughout the media. Numerous (nonpor-
nographic) magazines and popular advertisements, for instance, present
women as objects for mens use. Pornography, then, is not special in pass-
ing the message that women have the status of objects, and therefore that
it is permissible to treat women as objects.
But feminists excessive focus on pornography becomes less odd
once we see pornography as more than a mere instrument of spreading
misogynistic ideas about women. According to Langton, pornography
produces a certain kind of knowledge, which she calls makers knowl-
edge. Makers knowledge is the special kind of knowledge someone
has of something in virtue of making that thing (Langton 2009a, 289).
Pornographers present women as object-like, submissive, and inferior.
Through their consumption of pornography, then, men learn some puta-
tive facts about women. They gain a certain kind of knowledge about
women. Langton believes that men and boys learn about sex primarily
through pornography, and so pornography has the authority of a mo-
nopoly for its audience (Langton 1993, 312). Therefore, men who con-
sume pornography are led to treat women in an objectifying manner,
in a manner that corresponds to the knowledge they have gained about
women through pornography. Consequently, a causal connection can be
said to exist between mens gaining knowledge about women through
pornography and objectifyingwomen.
And there is more to it, unfortunately:what is distinctive about mak-
ers knowledge is that it does not merely aim at truth, but makes its truth
(Langton 2009a, 292). MacKinnon explains that pornography, far from
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being a fantasy or an illusion, is a process of social construction:women

conform to the beliefs and perceptions of those in power (men). She writes:
If a woman is defined hierarchically so that the male idea of a woman de-

fines womanhood, and if men have power, this idea becomes reality. It is
therefore real. It is not just an illusion or a fantasy or a mistake. It becomes
embodied because it is enforced. (MacKinnon 1987,119)
Under conditions of gender inequality, then, the way men believe women
to be (object-like, submissive, inferior) actually shapes women. Women
conform to the identities pornography assigns them (Langton 2009a, 299
300). This means that pornography gives rise to a number of true beliefs
about women that are self-fulfilling. According to Langton, what is anom-
alous with the kind of true and self-fulfilling beliefs produced by pornog-
raphy is that they have a peculiar direction of fit (Langton 2009a, 302).
That is, in the case of knowledge generated by pornography, instead of
mens beliefs actually conforming to the way the world is, they arrange the
world to conform to the way men want and believe women to be (object-
like, submissive, servile,etc.).
Despite their epistemic faults, however, the beliefs in question are re-
sponsible for womens objectification. Under conditions of oppression,
women actually become mere instruments for mens sexual use. In this
way, these oppressive beliefs are self-fulfilling. Moreover, they are true,
as they correspond to how women are (or, rather, how they have come to
be).7 This means that pornography generates knowledge through shaping
the world and making women object-like and inferior. As Langton putsit:
[W]hen oppression is systematic enough, there is nothing accidental about a

correlation between beliefs that women are servile, and womens servility;
and the connection between beliefs and the truth of those beliefs can be as
reliable as one could wish. (2009a,302)
The harm of pornography lies in the way it objectifies womenthe way

it makes the world arrange itself to match the pornographic vision. That
creates knowledge, and it creates harm. When objectification is going
on, there is a pattern of self-fulfilling projective attitudes, which project
For a further discussion of Langtons ideas about the problematic direction of fit of beliefs
7.
generated under conditions of oppression, see Langton (2000) (see also Langton [2009b]). For a
criticism of Langtons views on the epistemology of objectification, see Papadaki (2008).

154
a certain shape onto women, and alter women to conform to that shape
(2009a, 308309).
Pornography produces the knowledge that women are less than human,
that they are objects to be used by men. Men learn that this is the way
women are. Under conditions of oppression, womens powerlessness
makes them conform to the way men want and believe women to be. They
actually become less than human; they become objects readily available
for mens disposal. Langtons argument about makers knowledge gener-
ated by pornography, then, can give us a way to causally link pornography
consumption to womens objectification.
7.7.Conclusion
We have come to the conclusion that some sort of a causal connection

between mens consumption of pornography and womens objectification
might, after all, exist. However, it is important to note that this is not a
connection between pornographys personification and womens objec-
tification. Rather, as I have suggested, it makes more sense to see it as
a connection between the knowledge gained through pornography about
womens inferior and less-than-human status and mens treating women
accordingly (in an objectifying manner). Furthermore, under conditions
of oppression, it is a connection between the harmful beliefs generated
by pornography about women (like the belief that women are object-like
and submissive) and women actually being shaped to fit these beliefs. The
above conclusions indicate that we should reject the argument that the
personification of pornography is what causes the phenomenon of wom-
ens objectification. Our efforts should be directed, rather, at fighting what
really causes the objectification of women:the harmful knowledge gener-
ated by pornography. Furthermore, we ought to empower women, thus
enabling them to shape their own identities instead of having to conform
to the pornographic vision.
References
Haslanger, Sally. 1993. On Being Objective and Being Objectified. In A Mind of Ones
Own. Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by Louise M. Antony and
Charlotte Witt, 209253. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford:WestviewPress.
22(4):239330.
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Langton, Rae. 2000. Feminism in Epistemology: Exclusion and Objectification. In

Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, edited by Miranda Fricker and
Jennifer Hornsby, 127145. Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress.
Langton, Rae. 2009a. Autonomy- denial and Objectification. In her Sexual
Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, 223240.
Langton, Rae. 2009b. Sexual Solipsism. In her Sexual Solipsism:Philosophical Essays
on Pornography and Objectification, 311356. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.
UniversityPress.
MacKinnon, Catharine. 1989. Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard UniversityPress.
Papadaki, Lina. 2008. Womens Objectification and the Norm of Assumed Objectivity.
Episteme 5(2):239250.
Papadaki, Lina. 2010. Pornography: Is There a Connection Between Treating Things
as People and Treating People as Things? In Sex, Drugs and Rock and Roll:
Psychological, Legal and Cultural Examinations of Sex and Sexuality, edited by
Helen Gavin and Jacquelyn Bent, 229235. Oxford:InterdisciplinaryPress.
Saul, Jennifer. 2006. On Treating Things as People:Objectification, Pornography, and
the History of the Vibrator. Hypatia 21(2):4561.
Use of Pornography and Womens
Inequality. Journal of Political Philosophy 13(2):174193.

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CHAPTER8 Getting Naked in

The Colonial/Modern GenderSystem
A Preliminary Trans Feminist Analysis
of Pornography
Talia Mae Bettcher
8.1.Introduction
In Black Feminist Thought Patricia Hill Collins, pointing to the differ-

ences in contemporary pornographic representations of black and white
women, posits a distinction between sexualized objects (white women)
and sexualized animals (black women).1 Beyond claiming that a generic
notion of sexual objectification is insensitive to important race-inflected
differences with regard to how that objectification operates, Collins also
cites how black females were exposed, naked, on the auction block, avail-
able for public viewing, as well to the public exposure of black women in
exhibitions of racially exotic bodiesfor example, Saartjie Baartman, the
so-called Hottentot Venus. She proposes that such practices provided the
basis for the development of modern pornography. That is, Collins pro-
poses that pornography is grounded in racial/sexual oppression.
My aim is to elucidate Collinss view from a trans feminist perspective.
Idevelop an account that illuminates basic forms of trans oppression while
providing a theoretical framework for understanding Collinss distinction
between objects and animals. I take this to demonstrate the grounded-
ness of transphobic oppression in racialized sexual violence. Although
in this chapter I am content to show how my account may be useful in
1.
Collins draws extensively on the literature of Alice Walker in making her points.
158
underscoring some of Collinss ideas, Iwill also be able to characterize

the pornographic representation of trans women, by contrast, as sexualized
illusions. That, however, is for anotherpaper.
In what follows, I begin by introducing Mara Lugoness idea of the
colonial/modern gender system. Second, I introduce the idea of interper-
sonal spatiality (the capacity characteristic of encounters between people
to admit of closeness and distance). Third, I outline the sex-representa-
tional system of interpersonal spatiality, demonstrating how racist, sexist,
and transphobic oppressions converge therein. Fourth, I examine the in-
terplay between the construction of sex-and race-differentiated forms
of nakedness and sexual desire within this system in order to illuminate
Collinss distinction between sexualized objects and animals. I conclude
with a trans feminist critique of pornography as it is constituted within the
colonial/modern sex-representational system.
8.2. The Colonial/Modern GenderSystem
Following Anibal Quijano, Lugones theorizes global Eurocentric capital-

ism as possessing two axes of powerthe coloniality of power, and moder-
nity. The coloniality of power involves the Eurocentric imposition of racial
categories on the worlds population in such a way that all areas of human
existence become infused with it. Modernity consolidates a view of popula-
tions and history according to which Europeans are culturally advanced
and non-Europeans are primitive, effectively positioning the latter ear-
lier in time relative to the conceived progress of the human species.
Lugones sees gender and sexual relations as not merely infused by
the coloniality of power but also intertwined within the racist ideology
itself:particular sex/gender relations are constituted within the colonial/
modern gender system and then imposed upon non-Europeans. She points
to the intersexual-erasing presumption of sexual dimorphism and the sub-
ordination of females as a joint colonial imposition on some non-European
societies: Not all different traditions correct and normalize intersex
people. So, as with other assumptions, it is important to ask how sexual
dimorphism served and continues to serve global, Eurocentered, capitalist
domination/exploitation (2007, 195196).
Lugones proposes, however, that the gender system imposed in a
Eurocentric colonial capitalist system possessed both a light and a dark
side. On the light side, a heterosexualist system based upon strong
sexual dimorphism and a view of women as the feminine, weaker sex is
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constructed. On the dark side, by contrast, nonwhite, non-European people

are positioned problematically with regard to this arrangement:colonized
people were sometimes constructed as hermaphroditic, their sexuality as
aberrant, and women as sexually aggressive.
Obviously, Collinss distinction between sexualized objects and ani-
mals, as well as her claim that contemporary pornography was built upon
the public exposure of black women, is well accommodated by Lugoness
framework.2 In the following sections, Ibegin to make my own contribu-
tion by introducing the notion of systems of interpersonal spatiality. Ithen
argue that the sex-representational system of interpersonal spatiality can
be understood in terms of Lugonessideas.
8.3. Interpersonal Spatiality
Encounters between people can be characterized in terms of interper-

sonal spatiality3the quality of being close or distant. The very existence
of interpersonal spatiality requires the existence of interpersonal boundar-
ies since intimacy-as-closeness has a normative aspect in addition to an
epistemological one (i.e., one involving mere degree of informational and/
or sensory access to one another). The normative aspect concerns a differ-
ence in type of relation:we say not merely close, but very close. In effect,
intimacy involves more than a high degree of informational or sensory
access; it involves interpersonal boundaries that can be mutually traversed
or unilaterally transgressed.
As boundaries, they require a distinction between a marked social con-
text and a presupposed backdrop:if boundaries are to remain boundaries
rather than well-traveled pathways, any traversal or transgression must be
marked against the backdrop of standard boundary observation. Moreover,
intimacy requires movement from distant interpersonal configurations to
closer ones, and consequently, they require what Icall intimacy tracks.
Different configurations of interpersonal spatiality are ordered stage-wise
in a path to increasing intimacy. That is, intimacy tracks make movement
toward greater intimacy possible by ordering various stages of intimacy
in terms of temporal order and normative force. Often, stages of the track
2.
Lugoness framework includes multiple types of racialized genders. In this chapter Iam
principally concerned with the construction of black women since Iam taking my cue from
Collinsswork.
3.
For earlier versions of this account see Bettcher (2012) and Bettcher (2014).
TRANS FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF PORNOGRAPHY |159

160
will contain communicative resources, gestures of intimacy, for negotiat-

ing that movement.
These ordered boundaries place constraints on informational transmis-
sion and sensory access between people, protecting both the object and
the subject of sensory and informational access. In the philosophical tradi-
tion, of course, the subject is identified with the self and hence with the
person:to treat somebody as a (mere) object would be frowned upon as
an instance of depersonalization. However, in any sensory encounter be-
tween people, there is a trivial structural distinction between the subject
that does the sensing and the object that is sensed. When one sees another,
there is a subject of visual access (the seer) and the object of visual access
(the seen). Similarly, when a speaker is sharing information about herself
to another, she is an object of access as she is making herself known to
another. While my long-term ambition is to demonstrate the relevance of
being an object to being a person, in this chapter Iwill simply employ this
use of object as the starting point for an account of sexual objectification
in terms of sexualized intimization of the object. At present, simply note
that we see each other and share with each other all the time. We are all
objects. There is nothing bad or degrading aboutit.
Violation of the boundary as it protects the object of sensory or infor-
mational access is a privacy violation. In protecting the object of access,
the ordered boundaries guard content (discursive, sensory) that pertains
specifically to that individual. They confer upon the object a dignity within
the system, so that a breach caused by the subject becomes a transgression
against the objects dignity. A sense of being dignified within the order
thereby provides the object with a motive for maintaining these bound-
aries, as well as lays the conditions for the possibilities of indignity as
something that can be experienced by the object. Conferred dignity within
this system and the possibilities of indignity provide a chief motivation for
compliance within theorder.
By contrast, violation of the boundary as it protects the subject of sen-
sory or informational access is a decency offense (e.g., TMI! or Get a
room!). Since motivated compliance within the system can be taken for
granted, transgressions against the subject become secondary, attributable
to a defect in the object. Such an object becomes a threat to the order. To
affirm, as a subject, ones distance from the object is to reaffirm the pre-
supposed backdrop of boundary observation.
While an intimacy breach can be either violating or accidental (as
when one blunders across anothers boundaries by entering an unlocked
bathroom), nontransgressive intimacy involves the consensual traversal
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of boundaries. Some types include instrumental intimacy (as when a

physician or a therapist gains intimate access to a person for medical or
therapeutic purposes). Proper intimacy, however, sets intimacy (sheer
closeness) as an end:it involves a sharing, a making oneself vulnerable to
another, an intimate vulnerability recognized as a positive humangood.
Such intimate sharing is marked. It requires that parts of oneself be
generally held in intimate reserve to be shared only on occasion. This
requires one to be able to make choices about when and how one makes
oneself intimately vulnerable. While cultural boundaries governing a
system of interpersonal spatiality are independent of individual decisions,
there remain personal questions about how much intimate reserve one
maintains (ones personal boundaries). And this affords, in addition to
the cultural dignity conferred by the system, the possibility of a personal
dignity unique to an individual, made possible by holding some of oneself
in intimate reserve.
Insofar as maintaining an intimate reserve is a condition of personal
dignity, the loss of the former will involve a loss of the latter. Personal
dignity and intimate vulnerability are thus bound together through inti-
mate reserve, the loss of which destroys both. People who typically share
deeply intimate information about themselves with everybody maintain
considerably less intimate reserve than others, and thus they undermine
both their personal dignity and their possibilities for intimate vulnerability.
Such decisions and boundaries (or lack thereof) can even be at odds with
the cultural boundaries that govern the order. In such cases, however, we
would deem someone to have a serious defect.
Proper intimacy requires marked contexts in which boundary travers-
als are sanctioned; otherwise, the only contexts marked intimate would
be ones of transgression, and a boundary that could only be transgressed,
never traversed, would have no point. There must be certain contexts in
which specific legitimization conditions are met authorizing proper inti-
macy as a valuable cultural practice (I will call them private sanctioned
contexts). The capacity of being intimately vulnerable in sanctioned con-
texts is necessary to the existence of personal dignity, of course, since the
latter requires an intimate reserve, and if there were no such allocated con-
text in which the relinquishing of reserve were authorized, the notion of a
reserve would not make any sense. I will call the presupposed backdrop of
intimate reserve the public backdrop.
Intimacy tracks, while related to proper intimacy, must be distinguished
from these sanctioned contexts to which proper intimacy is typically al-
located. Tracks may provide ways to move from the public backdrop to

162
private sanctioned contexts. In this case, legitimation conditions will be

built into the track, but this isnt always the case: a track may be neutral
with regard to public backdrop/private context. Hence, it may be made
available within a single private sanctioned context or outside of any sanc-
tioned context; it may start in a sanctioned context and then move beyond.
8.4. The Colonial/Modern Sex-RepresentationalSystem
While interpersonal spatiality requires the existence of track- ordered

boundaries, which boundaries are laid down, how they are laid down, and
in what order is a culturally relative affair. What is considered close in
one culture may not be so considered in another; what is a violation here
may not be one there. Nonetheless, boundaries of such a system possess
a morally binding force. Spying on somebody who is undressed, in our
system, is a privacy violation. Its relativity does not alter its moral impera-
tive. Although Ibelieve that the main reason for this is that interpersonal
spatiality is the necessary medium through which we recognize each other
(I wont explore that now), another reason is that interpersonal spatiality
makes possible intimate vulnerability and dignity as indispensable human
goods. At any rate, we may speak of different systems of interpersonal
spatiality, all of which can possess a morally bindingforce.
What Iwill call the sex-representational system of interpersonal spati-
ality is complex and far-reaching. It includes all boundaries on discursive
and sensory access to each other, basic things such as appropriate physi-
cal distance between people, when and how to touch somebody, as well
as when and how to look at a person. Staring at a stranger in public is a
boundary breach. Grabbing the hand of a new acquaintance is okay, while
grabbing their genitals is not. Iwont focus on all features of the system,
of course. Even though touch is central to physical forms of proper inti-
macy, Iwont be discussing it at all. Ifocus only on boundaries governing
visual access. Since this chapter concerns pornography, this makes sense.
Moreover, while nakedness, as it allows unmediated access to flesh, is not
unrelated to touch, it is also primarily visual:to be naked is to be open to
visual access.
I begin by noting that in one important way, nakedness, like clothed
appearance, is socially constituted.4 In our culture, it is usually a required
practice to conceal oneself with clothing. Indeed, clothedness is generally
4.
For the purposes of this chapter Ido not draw a theoretical distinction between naked andnude.
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presupposed. Thus, appearing without clothes becomes a highly marked

social possibility. In cultures where bodily concealment is not a taken-for-
granted practice, nakedness as a social possibility does not exist:standard
clothedness is a necessary condition for nakedness (at least as Iam un-
derstanding it). That is, nakedness is socially constituted (Bettcher2012).
My claim, then, is that the presumption of clothedness makes nakedness
possible, and not the other way around. To be sure, presumed concealment
is rationalized by appeal to the moral consequences of nakedness: one
wears clothing to avoid embarrassment. In claiming that nakedness is
made possible by clothedness, however, Iam claiming that it is through
such rationales for standard concealment that nakedness as a social pos-
sibility is subsequently imbued with its moral significance. Standard con-
cealment provides the conditions for a cultural dignity, a dignity that is
prior to the indignity that results from nakedness.
Both modes are central in constituting the physical person. The OED
defines person in this sense as The living body or physical appear-
ance of a human being; spec. (a) the body regarded as distinct from the
mind or soul, or from its clothing, etc.; (b) the body regarded together
with its clothes and adornments. In its own way, each appearance is a
primary appearance. To visually access the naked appearance of a person
is to access it as it really is. Yet the clothed appearance of the physical
person has a primacy as it is the default way we think of people: all things
being equal, when we think of a certain individual, we think of them as
clothed (to think of them otherwise is to think of them in an intimate way).
Indeed, clothedness is clearly the appearance requisite to our being taken
seriously at all, the appearance under which we maintain the dignity con-
ferred by the system. One might call clothing the uniform of personhood
itself. I speak of the proper appearance of the person to capture both this
standardization of clothed appearance and its relation to dignity, and the
intimate appearance of the person to capture the fundamentality of the
appearance as it really is and its relation to indignity and intimate vul-
nerability. What I call the physical person is constituted and given by these
two related appearances.
This system of interpersonal spatiality is a site at which sexist, trans-
phobic, and racist oppressions converge. Begin by noting that this
system constitutes two distinct kinds of physical person through differ-
ential sets of proper/intimate appearance. First, there are two kinds of
nakedness insofar as there are two basic kinds of morally structured
bodiesmale and female. Female nakedness, unlike male nakedness, has
two stagespartial and fullwhere the former is assessed in terms of

164
the exposure of breasts (and, in particular, nipples). Moreover, male and

female structures differ through their interactive differences. It is generally
considered a privacy violation for a male to view a females naked body,
while it is a decency violation for a male to show his body to a female.
There is an asymmetry where, regardless of who perceives whom, the
male transgresses the females boundaries. Not only are there two gender-
differentiated forms of nakedness, but these forms are constituted in a pa-
tently sexist way (Bettcher 2012).
Corresponding to this is a gendered distinction in proper appearance
(usually understood as a difference in gender presentation). One of the
main ways the proper appearance of the person is gender-differentiated
is that in most cases (including highly formalized ones) women typically
expose more flesh than do men (e.g., shoulders, chests, ankles, calves).
This suggests a differential distribution of dignity, with women receiving
less. Evidently, there is a corresponding sexism built into the gendered
distinction in proper appearance that mirrors the sexism built into the
gendered forms of intimate appearance. Thus, the system constitutes two
kinds of physical person through differential proper/intimate appearances
in an inherently sexistway.
Not only are both corresponding proper and intimate appearances
gender-differentiated, however, the gendered form of proper appearance
also communicates the gendered form of intimate appearance. While there
is a difference in the gendered form of intimate appearance, intimate ap-
pearance is itself necessarily concealed against the public backdrop. Yet
the gendered form of intimate appearance remains salient even against the
public backdrop if only to ensure that boundaries are properly observed,
but more broadly, since all negotiations of interpersonal spatiality between
individuals are predicated upon knowledge of the gendered form. Hence,
it must be communicated in some way (Bettcher 2012). In light of my
earlier remarks, I will observe that one way the gendered form of intimate
appearance is communicated is precisely through differential exposures in
public. While a proper male appearance typically communicates the male
form of intimate appearance through differentially greater concealment, a
proper female appearance communicates the female form of intimate ap-
pearance through differentially greater exposure.
The sex-representational system thereby provides the basis for an im-
portant form of transphobic oppression: the communicative relation be-
tween gender- differentiated proper and intimate appearances explains
why trans people taken to misalign public gender presentation with inti-
mate appearance are subject to the phenomenon of reality enforcement. In
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particular, it is why trans women are represented as really men disguised

as women and trans men are represented as really women distinguished
as men. The public presentation is taken as a misrepresentation of the
gendered form of their intimate appearance. It is also why failing to dis-
close trans status risks accusations of deception.
Indeed, accurate representation of the gendered form of ones intimate
appearance is a necessary condition of a public gender presentation con-
stituting ones proper appearance. This is why the public gender presen-
tations of trans people are viewed as mere disguises:trans people arent
merely thought to miscommunicate the gendered form of their intimate
appearance through their public gender presentation, but they are also
thought to pass off a gender presentation as their proper appearance. It
is through allegedly pretending that their public gender presentation is
their proper appearance that they thereby pretend that their intimate ap-
pearance has a given genderedform.
The sex-representationally structured physical person can now be un-
derstood within the colonial/modern gender system.5 While this system
of interpersonal spatiality was clearly imposed upon cultures that had en-
tirely different forms of interpersonal spatiality, nonwhite individuals had
their appearances constituted differently within this system. In particular,
they did not possess sex-representational physical personhood. That is,
their appearances did not conform to a sex-representational structure, and
it was by placing them outside of that referential structure that they were
located prior intime.
So-called primitive or savage races were systematically represented as
naked regardless of whether that was the case. Even though diverse sys-
tems of interpersonal spatiality included different forms of attire and/or
adornment, members of such cultures were viewed as sufficiently differ-
ent from the proper gender appearance in this system that they were not
taken as proper appearances at all.6 This was implicated in rationales for
the actual treatment of the primitive races in differential ways. Since
they were viewed as already primitive (naked), privacy violations would
5.
There are different systems of interpersonal spatiality that are sex-representational. What Icall the
sex-representational system is one that is specifically grounded in coloniality and modernity.
6.
This may seem paradoxical, but consider that in our system of interpersonal spatiality,
clothedness is a complex affair. Certain garments are worn under public clothing (underwear), and
these garments are allocated to intimacythat is, these constitute intimate apparel. Analogously
one can be effectively naked and yet still attired. Such a liminal intimate appearance can be viewed
as a weaker form of nakedness, or a clothed stand-in for true nakedness. Analogously we can
understand how it was that non-Western attire/adornment could be viewed as an intimate/naked
appearance, rather than a proper one.

166
necessarily make less sense. And their alleged earliness could mitigate
concerns about their shameless nakedness constituting a threat to the
moralorder.
Consider the view that human beings held as chattel were, in effect,
no different from animals. This was not a merely ideological move that
positioned them as prior to boundaries, but was also enacted, particularly
through the system of chattel slavery itself. Slaves, for example, were kept
naked in slave ships, forced to live in pens naked for purposes of breed-
ing, and forced to work while wearing scant clothing. Indeed, as Collins
notes, they were kept naked alongside animals precisely to reinforce their
animality (2007, 139). This is strongly suggestive of the work that primi-
tivization and outright animalization did in helping to position what
was in fact a socially constituted nakedness itself as somehow prior in
timethat is, in naturalizing socially constituted modes of intimate ap-
pearance, while treating as subsequent and cultural the socially constituted
modes of proper appearance.
However, unlike actual animals, who possess neither proper nor inti-
mate appearance within this system (nakedness is not a social possibility
for them), savages were viewed as naked, where nakedness is a socially
constituted appearance. Since it was against the presupposition of modern
clothedness, however, that the savage races could themselves be repre-
sented as naked in the first place, neither their intimate nor their proper
appearances were those of white Europeans. First, under the presumption
of nakedness, the function of proper appearance in communicating gen-
dered forms of intimate appearance becomes irrelevant. Consequently, any
public gender presentation afforded primitive peoples has its capacity
to constitute a proper appearance suitably undermined:to the extent that
individuals on the dark side of gender were afforded a proper appearance
at all, it was a borrowedone.
Second, intimate appearance on the dark side of gender is less differ-
entiated. As a differentiation in proper appearance is necessary for dif-
ferentiation in intimate appearance, the displacement of those on the dark
side of gender from access to proper appearance yields socially constituted
forms of nakedness with less differentiated structures, less interactive dif-
ferences. In particular, on the light side of gender, intimate appearances
are constituted as informational insofar as they possess a gendered form
communicated through proper appearance. On the dark side of gender, by
contrast, intimate appearances lack this informational quality and are not
constituted as the referents of gendered proper appearance.
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Consequently, the possibility of hermaphroditism arises, here under-

stood as a moral possibility. On the dark side of gender there is a failure
of intimate appearances to possess sharply differential moral structures as
a consequence of their failing to be structured sex-representationally. In
placing those on the dark side of gender outside of the sex-representational
structure of the physical person, their intimate appearance bore the mark,
written onto the color of their bodies, of the primordial, precultural, and
prehuman that stood in striking dissonance with any proper appearance
(qua subsequent cultural development) into which they were supposed to
be cultured.
With this in mind, I propose to examine the gendered nature of this
positioning more thoroughly by examining the communicative relation
between public and intimate female appearances specifically and, in par-
ticular, the involvement of sexual desire in the constitution of that rela-
tion in order to understand contrasting sexualizations of female-assigned
individuals on the light and dark side of gender. This will afford a way to
frame the distinction between objects and animals.
8.5. Racialized Nakedness and SexualDesire
As nakedness is socially constituted within the sex- representational

system, so too is any sexual desire taking naked people for its content.
In this view, sexual desire for another involves a culturally specific, well-
defined and structured content involving the eroticization of increased
closenessthat is, interpersonal motion down an intimacy track. What
is arousing, in this view, is not merely sensory access to a body part, for
example, but to an intimate body part that is part of a larger ordering
of boundaries. What is erotic is the significance of that intimate access
within the larger context (actual or implied) of continuously increasing
sensory access. The building excitement tracks the growing intimacy.
That is, the eroticism derives its erotic force, in part, from where this
stage is located in the track and hence from the history of the movement,
regardless of whether it has been arrived at through stage-wise progress
or through leaping ahead. And although one need not explicitly desire
to increase intimacy in some specific way, arousal is characterized by
erotic anticipation: part of the eroticism is the potential that this is leading
somewhere, since an intimate configuration is a stage of intimacy that can
lead to closer stages (Bettcher 2014).

168
While sexual desire has the creative capacity to produce idiosyncratic

tracks, specific tracks are already culturally set forth as to which sexual in-
timacy is typically allocated. Contrast sexual intimacy with, for example,
the discursive intimacy involved in opening oneself up to another (baring
ones soul). Sexuality as a form of intimacy requires specific cultural
tracks within which sexual desire will be expected; indeed, the expres-
sion of desire will be one of the ways that further intimacy is communi-
catively negotiated. Crucially, these track-ordered boundaries are prior to
sexual desire itself:sexual desire is not only allocated to such tracks, but it
eroticizes the motion down them. Within a sexual encounter, for example,
different kinds of sensory access occur earlier than others (a womans
breasts are touched before her genitals) as do sexual activities (kissing
comes before intercourse). In such a heterosexual track, coitus is set as the
final stage and telos of the trackits completion. Sexual desire is allocated
to this track and, moreover, eroticizes movement down it (Bettcher2014).
This provides us with an account of generic sexual objectification: a
sexual object can be understood as an object of intimate sensory access
where being an object of sensory access (or, rather, movement toward
greater access) is part of the erotic content. Specifically, a sexual object
is an object of intimate sensory access where that access is structurally
allocated to and eroticized along a sexual intimacy track.7 One of the most
rudimentary kinds of intimacy tracks is one that moves gradually from the
concealment inherent in a proper appearance to the full/intimate exposure
of the physical person. While this track is implicated in far more complex
ones, it is especially important in its close correspondence with the moral
structure of an intimate appearance (first one sees the breasts, then one
sees ). I will call it an intimacy strip. Minimally, then, individuals
can be objectified in having visual access to their intimate appearance al-
located to a sexualized intimacystrip.
Importantly, in this view, what makes something an object is its being
an object of sexualized intimate sensory access, not merely its being an
object of desire (i.e., merely a desired other). To see this, consider that, in
my view, the self is necessarily part of the erotic content (desire is the erot-
icization of an increasing physical closeness between oneself and another)
and, consequently, there are many forms that desire can take (Bettcher
2014). To be sure, desire as typically represented takes the desired other as
Ido not defend my account of sexual objectification against other accounts; Iam content to
7.
merely show the usefulness of it within the context of my current aims. Afurther defense would
require a secondessay.
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intimized object (i.e., the distance between self and other is erotically closed
through increased sensory access of self to other). However, it need not take
this form; desire can also take the self as intimized object (the distance be-
tween self and other can be erotically closed through increased sensory access
of the other to oneself), as when one desires to be touched or seen sexually.
Obviously, desire can often involve boththat is, the eroticization of
mutual access and mutual exposurebut it need not. Consider a case in
which one individual desires another as intimized object. Another individ-
ual may have a complementary desire for the other as intimizing subject.
In the latter case, the other, while desired, is not objectified as part of the
erotic content. On the contrary, the desire is self-objectifying, oriented to a
desired other who is effectively subjectified. What makes sexual objec-
tification possible, then, is not merely being a sexually desired other, but
being an eroticized object of intimate sensory access.
As it stands, however, nothing has been said about the gendered or ra-
cialized nature of sexual objectification, nor does there appear to be any-
thing pernicious to it. On the face of it, there seems nothing wrong with
sexually desiring access to a person intimately (other-objectifying desire),
nor does there seem anything wrong with desiring to be accessed that way
(self-objectifying desire). To understand how such objectification can be
pernicious, we must turn to its gendered quality. And this means, of course,
that we must look to both the light and dark side of genderwhich, in my
account, requires us to examine objectification both within and without the
sex-representationally structured person.
I propose to understand Collinss notion of sexualized object in terms
of the sexualization of a sex-representational female person and her notion
of sexualized animal in terms of the sexualization of a female intimate
appearance or body placed outside of any sex-representational relation.
Collins writes:
Within the mind/ body, culture/nature, male/

female binaries in Western
social thought, objects occupy an uncertain interim position. As objects
white women become creations of culturein this case, the mind of white
menusing the materials of naturein this case, uncontrolled female
sexuality. In contrast, as animals Black women receive no such redeem-
ing dose of culture and remain open to the type of exploitation visited on
nature overall. Black womens portrayal in pornography as caged, chained,
and naked creatures who possess panther-like, savage, and exotic sexual
qualities reinforces this theme of Black womens wildness as symbolic of
an unbridled female sexuality. (1999, 138139)

170
In my view, while objects are eroticized through the symbolic mediation

of a proper (culturized) appearance, animals are eroticized precisely
through the foreclosure of any such symbolic mediation. That is, while ob-
jects are eroticized as naked referents within the modern symbolic order,
animals are eroticized nonreferentially, naked. What is required, therefore,
is an understanding of the relation of proper female appearance to a natu-
ralized heterosexual male sexual desire.
Since nakedness is imbued with a moral significance, in part, through
rationalizations for the presumption of concealment, different forms of
nakedness require different rationalizations. We need only consider typi-
cal rationales for sex segregation. In my experience working to change
the LAPD policies that housed trans women on the basis of genitalia, the
concerns were that trans women (whom they viewed as men) would gain
intimate visual access to (non-trans) women and even the bizarre fear that
trans women would commit indecency offenses again non-trans women
by exposing themselves. The same types of rationale apply in arguments
about trans women with regard to restrooms, public changing rooms, and
domestic violence and homeless shelters.
The worry is framed in terms of male sexuality, of course. Sex segrega-
tion is justified by appeal to the fear that a male will attempt to gain access
or expose himself to a woman for sexual purposes. If the threat of male
sexuality does work in the rationale for sex segregation, it also provides
rationale for covering of the female body itself. That is, the rationales im-
plicit in proper female appearance principally concern the prevention of
unwanted male sexual access. And the consequence of this is that the dig-
nity conferred by proper female appearance is principally bound up with
the prevention of male sexual access (i.e., loss of dignity is understood as
a failure to prevent this access). Indeed, insofar as dignity of the proper
female appearance is constituted in terms of sexual access, it is easy to see
why female personal boundaries and intimate reserve are more generally
allocated to sexuality.
In this Western system, however, proper female appearance is consider-
ably more complex than prevention of male visual/sexual access. Instead
of finding a proper female appearance that differs from a proper male ap-
pearance in covering up more (as one might have expected, and is found in
many Islamic cultures), we find, as Imentioned earlier, a proper female ap-
pearance requiring differentially greater bodily exposure. This, of course,
owes to the fact that the aesthetics governing the attractiveness of a fe-
males proper appearance tend to require it. Thus we get a classic double-
bind:modern female dignity requires both concealment and exposure.
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Here we need to better understand the nature of this public exposure.

The sheer display of flesh as constitutive of some proper appearance does
not, by itself, yield a veritable public exposure. Consider, for example,
that in our culture the displays of hands and face do not themselves consti-
tute exposures of some intimate appearance (or portion thereof) in public.
What makes something an exposure is the situation of some public inter-
personal configuration within an intimacy track, for here, there is always a
kind of implied motion toward greater intimate access.
Notably, then, we can see the structure of intimate female appearance in
terms of a strip with complete female nakedness as the final stage. Each
configuration of exposure gains its significance within the larger track of
implied greater exposure, and each configuration of exposure anticipates
further movement down that track. In light of this, it is clear that when
an appearance in public affords interpersonal configurations that are allo-
cated to an intimacy track, that appearance is an intimate exposure of sorts,
and it is suggestive of further exposure (i.e., movement down the track).
Thus, proper female appearance is, in fact, often liminal. In one way, it is
a proper appearance, while, in another, it is intimate appearance against
the public backdropa partial exposure implying further possibilities of
intimization,
Now it seems fairly obvious that this track is a sexual one: it would
seem to follow from the fact that the dignity afforded through conceal-
ment of ones female person is predicated precisely on the prevention of
male sexual access. Indeed, we now can understand female concealment
as serving the function of preventing further movement down the sexual
track. As such, its function appears communicative in naturea no to
sexualization. Yet given the double-bind, it is also a mixed message. The
concealment of the body says no to sex, but the concealment is also a
differential exposure, the visual access to which is already allocated to
a sexual track leading to full exposure. In this way, there is also a yes.
Indeed, even the differential exposure (merely neck, arms, legs) impli-
cated in formalized instantiations of proper female appearance is situated
on this trackthe implication is always the sexualized possibility of fur-
ther movement down thetrack.
The capacity of proper female appearance to communicate the gendered
form of intimate appearance can now be more thoroughly understood:the
female form of intimate appearance is communicated through a yes-
saying, partial public exposure that is suggestive of a complete public
exposure of her intimate appearance. That is to say, the partial public ex-
posure is symbolically suggestive of a complete exposure. Meanwhile, the

172
partial public concealment likewise communicates the form of her inti-

mate appearance as a no or block to further exposure.
We can then clarify the specific strip running from proper female ap-
pearance to intimate female appearance:in moving from concealment to
exposure, it simultaneously runs from symbolic/partial to actual/complete
exposure across moral boundaries. What makes the objectification perni-
cious in this case is that increased visual access against the public backdrop
is part of the erotic content. After all, the track begins with an eroticization
of partial exposure against the public backdrop, anticipating further move-
ment down that track. And insofar as the legitimization conditions that
yield sanctioned contexts are clearly not part of the erotic content, it fol-
lows that such content presumes continued intimization against the public
backdrop. Thus, loss of female dignity is implicated in the eroticized track
and the eroticization of increased visual access is consequently pernicious.
The inclusion of female in/dignity within the strip provides a plausible
way to understand how the track is ordered in the first place. Ordered stages
slow down movement towards the telos by requiring stage-wise, progressive
movement. The maintenance of female dignity at each stage, then, serves
the function of putting the brakes on jumping to complete exposure. This
slowing down is necessary for the possibilities of erotic anticipation, while
moving ahead, increasing loss of dignity, is necessary for a corresponding
increase in arousal. To be clear, this is not to say that this eroticism needs
to abide by the stage-wise progressjumping ahead is clearly a possibil-
ity. But in such cases, what provides the desire with its content is precisely
that there has been a jumping ahead defined by the stage-order tracks. And
in this context, it must be understood as a speedy decay of female dignity.
Notably, this sexualized strip track plays an important role in constitut-
ing both proper and intimate female appearance as such as well as consti-
tuting and naturalizing a particular form of heterosexual eroticism. Proper
female appearance confers a dignity as prevention of this sexual access
while simultaneously communicating the possibilities of further intimiza-
tion. Intimate female appearance is given its structure and interactive force
precisely through the interplay of (1)resistance to sexualization as a con-
dition of female dignity and (2)sexualization of increased loss of female
dignity. Finally, the sexual desires that eroticize this track are natural-
ized. This is because, as we have seen, the morally structured intimate ap-
pearance is itself naturalized; that is to say, it is treated as prior in time, a
natural state. And insofar as the female person (on the light side of gender)
has an intimate appearance morally structured along an eroticized strip of
increasing visual access, desires that eroticize movement down that track
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are also thereby naturalized. Male heterosexual desire is a desire for perni-
cious objectification of the female other, while female heterosexual desire
is a perniciously self-objectifying desire for the male other as subject. The
latter, of course, stands in opposition to the conditions for female dignity
as such, laying the foundations for the mythological bad girl whose de-
sires overrun any capacity for dignity.8
On the dark side of gender, by contrast, there is no movement from
proper to intimate appearance, since the woman on the dark side of gender
is already positioned as completely exposed against the public backdrop
from the outset. Unlike the object-referent, then, the animal does not have
any redeeming dose of culture (i.e., a compromised proper appearance)
that symbolically represents complete exposure through partial public ex-
posure intimating further movement down the strip track. What was a des-
tination on the light side of gender is now a starting point on the dark. This
has several consequences.
First, the sexualized animal is a noncommunicative being. Since she
is already naked, the possibility of communicating no has been fore-
closed, and thereby the possibility of communicating yes through partial
exposure has also been foreclosed. She is outside of the symbolic order.
Second, the conditions for female dignity through proper appearance have
been denied her. Thus, there is no possible conflict between sexual desire
and the need to maintain dignity. By being positioned temporally prior
to the possibilities of female dignity, there is only a sexual desire that is
unmitigated by any personal demands for reserve. Thus the animal, unlike
the object, is not a fragile being who stands at perpetual risk of dignity
failure against the threat of (heterosexual) male sexuality. She is beyond
allthat.
The characteristics of the eroticism are correspondingly different. First,
there is no eroticized strip, since the starting point is not a proper appear-
ance. Consequently, the intimate female appearance on the dark side of
gender will necessarily have less structure and interactive differences inso-
far as the eroticized strip constituting intimate female appearance as such
(on the light side of gender) is simply not in play. This means that intimate
female appearance on the dark side of gender will also be less imbued
with a naturalized sexuality, written onto its structure and force. It will be
outside the bounds of naturalized heterosexual sexual desire.
My claim is not that these are the only desires possible; on the contrary, sexualities are, in my
8.
view, highly idiosyncratic. My claim, rather, is that specific desires are deemed natural precisely
insofar as they eroticize movement down a naturalizedtrack.

174
To be sure, some intimate motion down sexual tracks must be in play for
eroticism to be in play. Recall, then, that there is far more to sexuality than a
mere strip that is itself implicated in complex tracks. Consider, for example,
the heterosexual track that takes coitus as telos. Since the communicative
capacity to say no to sexuality has been denied in this case, there will be
the expectation of swift movement down this track, unimpeded by any con-
siderations of dignity-motivated restraint. On the dark side of gender, since
there is no proper appearance and hence no capacity for a dignity based on
the prevention of sexual access, any capacity to decline has already been
thoroughly compromised. In this case, then, rather than eroticizing progres-
sive indignity down a track, what must be eroticized is the complete fore-
closure of any possibilities for dignity at all and the capacity to move down
any tracks with complete abandon. After all, what else could have possibly
been the nature of the white male eroticization of the public exposure of
black females in a way that took for granted exposure and access, if not the
eroticization of the absolute foreclosure of dignity?
8.6. Concluding Reflections onPornography
Pornographic magazines or videos are sexualized photographic repre-

sentations of people without clothes. Sometimes these people are shown
having sex, sometimes not. Nakedness is surely the common denominator
in porn, from girlie magazines to the most horrifying representations of
women in degrading sexual acts. And one of the concerns about pornog-
raphy is precisely that it involves making public an intimate appearance
of the person that has been allocated to the private. One objection we have
to revenge porn (the uploading of naked pictures of ones ex-girlfriend
onto the Internet), aside from its being nonconsensual, is that something
private was made publica privacy breach that results in an indignity.
And, no doubt, such concerns underwrite conservative apprehensions.
Ayoung womens parents, for example, might feel concerned about her
getting naked in front of the cameras to have her representation available
to any man on purchase. What is at stake are precisely concerns around in/
dignity. And one of the worries is that by consenting to such involvement,
the woman demonstrates a potential deficiency in character, an incapacity
for shame, becomes a bad girl. Another is that the eroticism for which
the pornography is designed is one that eroticizes female indignity. Aside
from the fact that representations of intimate female appearance are made
public, a case can be made that this is also how women are represented
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in pornography (namely, as displaying themselves, not in private con-

texts, but against the public backdrop). Certainly this is the case when the
women are represented as eroticizing their own objectificationit is diffi-
cult to believe that this objectification is not pernicious in eroticizing expo-
sure against the public backdrop. Indeed, given the consumers sexualized
visual access to intimate female appearances, the line between having a
representation of ones intimate appearance made public and being rep-
resented as publicly exposed is rather blurry. At any rate, it is fairly easy
to see how the eroticization of dignity foreclosure and unfettered access
inherent in the literal exposure of black women in chattel slavery laid the
foundations for contemporary pornographic representations of women that
precisely invite the eroticization of exposure against the public backdrop,
Of course, as trans feminists, we are not interested in merely rehears-
ing conservative arguments against pornography. While they have valid-
ity insofar as the boundaries laid down in the sex-representational system
have a veritable binding force, what is required is a deeper analysis of
the system that makes such concerns come alive. In my account, the sex-
representational female person is constituted as a sexual object. The intimate
appearance is given its structure and interactive force by a corresponding
sexualized strip ordered by the loss of female dignity. The proper appear-
ance communicates the form of the intimate appearance through a double-
bound partial exposure that intimates further movement down a track and a
partial dignity-conferring concealment that says no to sexual access. The
sex-representational constitution of the female person, however, is modern
in that it is predicated upon the constitution of females on the dark side of
gender as historically prior to that sex-representational structure. As such,
women on the dark side become sexualized animals who lack the capacity to
communicate through concealment/exposure, have intimate appearance un-
structured by an in/dignity-ordered track, and have the possibility for dignity
entirely foreclosed. What makes this analysis trans feminist, at least in a pre-
liminary way, is that an account of transphobic reality enforcement has also
been simultaneously afforded:trans people are taken to intervene in the sex-
representational system by misaligning public gender presentation with
the gendered form of intimate appearance and are punished accordingly.
A trans feminist critique of pornography should worry about the ways
in which contemporary pornography draws upon and replicates the erotic
constitution of female persons both on the light and dark side of gender.
Racially differential pornographic representations of women can, for ex-
ample, be seen as sites at which particular forms of eroticism are not only
replayed but constituted, sites at which intimate female appearances have

176
their structures laid down. Here Iwould add that there is work to be done
examining how trans women are represented in pornography in ways that
eroticize inversion of the sex-representational relation by, for example,
constituting a trans womans penis as a hidden surprise. While there is
far more to be said here, a trans feminist analysis would be interested in
how the pornographic representations of trans women trade on and eroti-
cize reality enforcement, thus further contributing to the maintenance of
the sex-representational system.
Finally, as pornography has been situated within a larger system of in-
terpersonal spatiality, any critique thereof must be located within a broader
critique of the system as a whole. Pornography, after all, is hardly the only
site at which sex-representational persons are constituted (consider, for
example, sites at which sex segregation is mandated, such as prison hous-
ing, domestic violence shelters, and so forth). Indeed, even a conservative
critique of pornography would appear to help lay down the very boundar-
ies that constitute the system. So caution is required.
Alternative systems of interpersonal spatiality are necessary. In some
trans subcultures, for example, public gender presentation can count as a
proper appearance without any sex-representational requirement. Not only
does this intervene in the communicative relationship between proper and
intimate female appearance on the light side of gender, it also undermines
sex-representational personhood as such and thereby undermines one
pillar of the colonial/modern gender system within which much of con-
temporary pornography is sustained. Iwill add here that nonhegemonic,
subcultural forms of pornography that lay down the possibilities for other
less oppressive systems of interpersonal spatiality can themselves be
viewed as crucially resistant. In particular, we should expect such forms to
undo the constitution of nakedness as given within a sex-representational
structure that is at once sexist, racist, and transphobic.
References
Bettcher, Talia Mae. 2012. Full-Frontal Morality: The Naked Truth About Gender.
Hypatia 27(2):319337.
Bettcher, Talia Mae. 2014. When Selves Have Sex:What the Phenomenology of Trans
Sexuality Can Teach Us About Sexual Orientation. Journal of Homosexuality
61(5):605620.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1999. Black Feminist Thought:Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment. 2nd ed. NewYork:Routledge.
Lugones, Mara. 2007. Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System.
Hypatia 22(1):186209.
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CHAPTER9 Race and Pornography

The Dilemma of the (Un)Desirable
RobinZheng
9.1.Introduction
Race and pornography have a long history, albeit one that has received
little attention in analytic philosophy. Cogent analyses of racism in por-
nography, including some by the most prominent black feminists of our
time, have served as important arrows in the antipornography feminists
quiver. Alice Walker, for instance, published a short story entitled Porn
(1981) portraying the devastating effects of black mens consumption of
pornography on black women. Patricia Hill Collins (2000) used the case
of the Hottentot Venus to trace black womens historical and ongoing
treatment as pornographic objects exploited for simultaneous sexual and
economic gain. Audre Lorde positioned the erotic and the pornographic
as diametrically opposed, condemning the latter as sensation without
feeling (1984, 54). Similar arguments have been revived by contem-
porary antipornography feminists (cf. Dines 2010). Recently, however,
other scholars have complicated this condemnation of racial represen-
tations in pornography, arguing for greater recognition of the ways in
which women of color in pornography exert agency in contesting and
manipulating the use of their racial identities, and of the racialized plea-
sures available to women of color themselves as performers and viewers.
This goes hand in hand with the ascendance of pornography produced
by feminists, people of color, queer, disabled, and other marginalized
groupsa development that cannot be ignored by theorists and critics
of pornography. However, the proliferation of mainstream pornography on
178
the Internet and its absorption into ordinary contemporary life and cul-
ture merit continued critical scrutiny. In this chapter, I present and crit-
icize three main arguments advanced by academics and pornographers
who have worked to rehabilitate pornographic representations of race,
and I argue that none can fully succeed in allaying the concerns raised by
antipornography feminists. However, I contend, the (perhaps surprising)
upshot of their arguments is that we cannot in a principled way regu-
late or militate against pornography merely on the basis of its racial/ist
representations.
9.2. Racial Stereotypes:Resistance, Capitalization,

and Recapitulation
Feminist scholars of pornography such as Celine Parreas Shimizu (2007)

and Mireille Miller-Young (2014) who engage closely with pornographic
texts and performers have made important interventions in the literature
by bringing to light how women of color exercise agency and resistance
even when they work under exploitative conditions and when their per-
formances may be used in oppressive ways. Their work functions as a
corrective to the ways in which black women appear as evidence
of agencys absence in other analyses of pornography (Nash 2014, 21),
under the assumption that racist representations are so damaging that the
women of color in them can only be understood as victims. Both theorists
recognize that Asian American, black, and other women of color are in-
escapably linked with hypersexualized racial stereotypes, but they reveal
the ways in which these stereotypes can be resisted or can even function
as potential resources that women of color are sometimes able to exploit
for their own ends.
One way that women of color exhibit agency is in their choices and
self-understandings of the roles they are offered. Jeannie Pepper, one
of the earliest and most famous black porn stars, explains in an inter-
view with Miller-Young how she turned down the role of a maid, as
well as a scene involving Ku Klux Klan members, but accepted a role
in the same film as voodoo woman because its elaborate costum-
ing and makeup made her feel glamorous. Another performer, Sasha
Brabuster, asserts, I choose movies that put me in a positive light that
will market me in all positive ways and deliberately chooses not to per-
form in hip-hop porn in favor of Big Beautiful Women and Busty
genres (Miller-Young 2014, 165). Other women negotiate their choice
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of roles differently, viewing them not so much as opportunities to pre-

serve their integrity but as instrumental means to their long-term ends.1
Porn performer Sinnamon Love declares: Im not afraid to be in, you
know, Black Street Hookers. Whatever, I dont care. The title is a title
is a title. But because that is all that there is, and this is what I want to
do. Thats a choice I have to make. It funds my other projects. It allows
me to continue. Outside of performing in porn, Love has appeared on
talk shows and academic panels and participated in activist work around
issues of rape, HIV/AIDS, and sexual health (Miller-Young 2014, 147).
More generally, Miller-Young found that many of the performers she
interviewed self-consciously seek industry fame in order to establish
self-ownership of their sexual labor, direct their own work, or move into
mainstream entertainment. Vanessa Blue, a success story of just this sort,
explains: Im an owner. I run my own business, I run several websites. I
shoot. I do everything, top to bottom. And I want to do it because I want
other girls to see that they can do it too (Miller-Young 2014, 203). Blue
states explicitly that, despite the fact that her fans will not want to hear
this, her work as a performer was a means to an end, and the end was to
direct (Miller-Young 2014, 270).
However, women of color can also demonstrate resistance in the very
performance of hypersexualized racial stereotypes. Even as they are os-
tensibly enacting stereotypes, women of color are sometimes able to
express strength and control in ways that disrupt their sexual objectifi-
cation. Parreas Shimizu, for instance, describes a scene from a gonzo
film on sex tourism in Southeast Asia as follows: [T]he girl in question
dances for [the white male filmmakers] gaze by looking boldly, directly,
and unflinchingly at the camera. It is an intense physical experience to
watch her gaze. For me, her gaze rejects his commodification, as if she
wants not only to witness but reject his eclipse of her person (2007, 204).
Parreas Shimizu (2007, 207) finds further evidence of the performers
authorship in adjusting her visual self-presentation in the way she sticks
out her tongue at the camera, and uses it to fix her hair and examine her
reflection, all the while ignoring the voiceover and actions of the film-
maker during sex (2007, 222). As Parreas Shimizu points out in a dis-
cussion of Miss Saigon (which is not pornography but involves scenes of
sex tourism that critics liken to soft porn), each performance requires
In fact, Peppers stated reasons for refusing to accept the Ku Klux Klan scene included not only
1.
moral objections drawn from her background as a black woman from the South, but also pragmatic
concerns about the impact of such a role on her future career prospects.
RACE AND PORNOGRAPHY |179

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actresses to actively make choices. Actress J. Elaine Marcos describes her

execution of a choreographed crotch grab: I do it vigorously because I
am saying to myself, in a sense, I got balls! I want to show everyone
else up! (Parreas Shimizu 2007, 47). Marcos further contextualizes the
move within her personal interpretation of the characters emotional lives,
ascribing to them the self-empowering narrative that it is a bad life but a
party too (Parreas Shimizu 2007, 47).
In a far less benign example, Miller-Young analyzes a scenethe one
Pepper refused to be inin which a black woman has sex with two men
dressed in the white hoods of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet even in this obses-
sive, fetishistic replaying of a racial trauma, Miller-Young finds that the
performers acting is full of vocalizations, expressions of pleasure, and
gestures that affirm she is in control of the scene (2014, 128129). She
writes:In confidently asserting that she aint afraid of no ghosts, [the
performer] denies their power and undermines the official construction
of the fantasy as one of coerced sex (2014, 128). Because performers
must always exercise imagination, discretion, and skill in order to occupy
their roles and fill them with specific choices (Parreas Shimizu 2007,
47), they are able to author and execute interpretations of their characters
that counter straightforwardly stereotypical narratives. Indeed, perform-
ers own interpretations of their work extend to quite radical forms of fem-
inist contestation. Annabel Chong, for instance, who started performing as
an undergraduate at the University of Southern California, both proposed
and starred in the film The Worlds Biggest Gangbang. Chong identifies
as a feminist who sees her work as empowering women to embrace their
own nonnormative sexual perversities, and who, when asked why she has
sex with so many men answers why not matter-of-factly (Parreas
Shimizu 2007,179).
Parreas Shimizus discussion of Chongs work in particular, however,
exposes the limitations of these strategies of resistance, three of which I
will emphasize here. First, the likelihood that women of colors resistance
will actually lead to improved outcomes is small. As Parreas Shimizu
points out, the central premise of the documentary Sex: The Annabel
Chong Story is the irresolvable ambiguity between interpreting Chong as
a feminist pioneer or an exploited victim. The film exposes not only her
personal history of having survived a gang rape, but also the vast economic
disparities between Chong and the wealthy producers of her film, under-
scored by the fact that she was never even paid for her workwork that
her director boasts was the best-selling video in porn history (Parreas
Shimizu 2007, 178179). This ambiguity is reflected in Chongs own
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performance, which Parreas Shimizu interprets as Chongs being delib-

erately unreliable, such that her facial expression of pain cannot serve as
factual evidence of her oppression when the facial expression of pleasure
looks similar (2007, 178). Parreas Shimizu concludes from this that we
are never in a position to speak for Chong and other women, but only to
speak nearby, and that we must therefore be mindful of their fundamen-
tal unknowability as subjects and the unreliability of representation as
a process (2007, 187).2 I take this to mean that, however frustrating it
may be to scholars (especially philosophers), the unknowability of actual
women of colors choices and experiences sets a hard outer limit on what
we can say with certainty about the moral status of their work. However
(as Parreas Shimizu acknowledges), the unknowability and unreliabil-
ity entail equally that women of colors resistance to racial stereotypes
is likely to go unrecognized. This is particularly so for the overwhelm-
ingly more typical viewers of pornography: viewers who are not scholars
treating pornography as text, are not reading against the grain, and have
no special concern forand indeed may be invested in notdetecting
womens agency in their performances. We therefore still have great rea-
sons to be concerned about the racial meanings taken up by the uncritical
(often white, male, etc.) viewer. Moreover, even critical viewers disagree
about the success of such resistance. Ariane Cruz (2010), for instance,
interprets the remark about ghosts in the Ku Klux Klan scene as an in-
stance of the films persistent portrayal of black women as ignorant and
unintelligent, and her fictional pleasure in the encounter as reinforcing
the stereotype that black women cannot be raped because they are always
sexually willing.
Second, while it is undoubtedly true that women of color exercise
agency in their work as porn performers, that agency remains severely
constrained. One of Miller-Youngs interview subjects, Lola Lane, de-
scribes how her attempts to emulate glamorous porn stars by investing
in her own glittery and fancy tailor-made costumes were undermined
by an industry in which she was regularly consigned to ghetto porn
roles where she was made to undertake degrading roles. Lane narrates
one of these occasions:And the director, he said, You are not coming
[across] ghetto enough, and Isaid well, Im not ghetto! And [he said],
Youre an actress, so act, and Isaid Okay (Miller-Young 2014, 234).
Other interview subjects recounted experiences in which their work was
Cf. Petra van Brabandts discussion of narration, identification, and truthfulness in Chapter11 of
2.
this volume.

182
appropriated without their consent, for example when a performers belly

pendant was digitally altered to show a Ku Klux Klan symbol, or when
scenes were later titled with racist and misogynistic comments (Miller-
Young 2014,248).
A third limitation is that differently positioned women are differentially
able (or unable) to make use of the strategies in question, reflecting still-
dominant hierarchies of racial valorization and devaluation. I find it strik-
ing, for instance, that Parreas Shimizus central exemplars of porn per-
formers who successfully exerted agency both decided eventually to quit
the industry.3 Annabel Chong announced her retirement by declaring that
Annabel is dead and revealing that she had been surreptitiously going
to computer boot camp to pick up some skills for a career in web devel-
opment and design. It is difficult to imagine that other women of color
who do not similarly benefit from the model minority myth attaching to
Asian American women, or who did not come from the same educational
and class backgrounds, would be able to orchestrate exits as smooth as
Chongs. Moreover, roles that are turned down by the likes of Jeannie
Pepper and Sasha Brabuster often get taken up by newer performers with
less leverage and greater need, in ways that undermine the collective bar-
gaining power of black women as a whole (Miller-Young 2014, 238). And
even though Miller-Young ultimately concludes her discussion of women
of colors aspirations for fame in the industry by valorizing their role in
maintaining black womens sense of self-understanding and possibility,
her conclusion seems rather pale in comparison to the analysis that im-
mediately precedes it:
Because of the massive and cyclic disposability of performers in the adult

industry, the reality is that the promise of fame is elusive, if not altogether
an illusion that serves to make workers hyperexploitable The very thing
that these performers hope and strive for undermines their dreams and
makes their desires impossible to fully achieve. (Miller-Young 2014,224)
In short, while it is important not to overlook the agency and resistance

of actual women of color against an industry trading in hypersexualized
racial stereotypes, the fuller and more ambiguous pictures of these wom-
ens lives remain far from unproblematic.
Her other example is Asia Carrera, a member of Mensa, National Merit finalist, and recipient of a
3.
full scholarship to Rutgers University, who self-directed a number of films depicting stories from
her own life. Carrera continues to run a profitable blog and website selling her products.
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9.3. Whose Gaze? Pleasure and Respectability Politics
Another argument advanced by feminist pornographers and porn theo-

rists is that pornography plays a crucial role in what Joan Morgan calls
the politics of pleasurethat is, the project of recovering the history of
black womens pleasure. Morgan says in a 2013 interview:
I believe that pleasure has always existed, it had to have existed, even in the
Middle Passage or we simply could not have survived as a people. What
Ithink though is that those stories get sacrificed to the agendas of racism,
sexism or misogyny. Intellectually, my job as a feminist and a scholar is to
unearth and reframe those stories so that there actually is some attention to
pleasure. (Morgan 2013,2)
Within this framework, pornographyboth alternative and mainstream

can be viewed as having important value in virtue of the pleasures it af-
fords to women of color, both as performers and consumers. Unlike my
earlier examples of performances against the grain that challenge the
straightforward stereotypical meanings of their assigned racialized roles,
Jennifer Nash (2014) provides a reading of a scene from the Golden
Age of pornography in Anthony Spinellis 1978 film Sexworld that goes
with the grain in order to emphasize black womens own pleasure in
performing a racialized sexual identity. In the film, guests at a sex resort
are promised that their deepest sexual fantasies will be identified and
fulfilled. When Roger, a white man, opens his door to find Jill, a black
woman, he initially mistakes her for cleaning staff. Upon realizing that
she has been paired with him by the resort, Roger reacts with revulsion;
however, Jill is able to persuade himin part by emphasizing her racial
difference and by adopting an exaggeratedly stereotypical racial manner
of speakingto have what turns out to be a highly enjoyable sexual en-
counter for both. For evidence of this pleasure, Nash points among other
things to the fact that Jill is portrayed throughout as a paying guest at the
exclusive resort, there for the purpose of achieving her own sexual satis-
faction. She writes:
While Rogers money shot and his pleas for another evening at the resort
become emblematic of his pleasures, Jills suggestive smile reveals her own
pleasureswhich include exposing Roger to the imagined distinctiveness
of the black female body and performing black female hyperlibidinousness
for her own pleasure. Indeed, her knowing glance at the camera (much like

184
her cocked eyebrow4 during their sexual encounter) indicates Jills active
and pleasurable participation in the racialized sexual scene. (Nash 2014,97)
Nash thus argues that the conscious performance of racialized stereotypes

of racial sexual differenceis a source of pleasure to both. She also makes
the bolder claim that racial stereotypes are in some sense necessary for
Jills own pleasure-seeking because they provide her with an essential
lexicon of desire for naming and claiming pleasures without which she
might not be able to access them (Nash 2014, 105106). Jill, for instance,
responds to Rogers query, What are you supposed to do for me?, with
exaggerated black vernacular5:Me, Iprovides entertainment, sir. When
he subsequently commands her, Youre supposed to have such rhythm,
do a little dance! (Nash 2014, 91), she responds in rhyme with a list of
the beautiful and sexually appealing traits of her racialized body:These
thighs, dont these thighs make your peter rise? And this ass, aint this a
class ass? (Nash 2014,94).
As Nash points out, Jill relies on racial stereotypes to affirm her black-
ness, the very property Roger initially rejects: in particular, the beauty
and allure of blackness that despite himself he cannot help but be struck
by. Along similar lines, Miller-Young describes Saharas performance in
the Ku Klux Klan scene as an agentive sexual performance that presents
the possibility of black womens own fantasies of racial-sexual domina-
tion (2014, 129). The idea here is that Black women and their capacities
for pleasure are not detachable from their specific socio-historical con-
texts, so some of the pleasures available to and longed for by black women
are precisely those that depend on racializing structures and meanings.6
While Nash readily acknowledges that pleasure often functions as a tool
by which the oppressed are made to identify with their own oppression,
and hence disavows any attempt to claim that these pleasures are automati-
cally transgressive or good pleasures to have, she insists upon recognizing
their existence, if only as an illustration of how race maintains its hold
on all of our individual and collective imaginations (Nash 2014, 106).
In analyzing these race-pleasures, she aims to challenge the notion that
4.
Nash interprets the cocked eyebrow as follows:The raised eyebrow places Jill and the spectator
in conversationit is the moment when she makes visible to the spectator that her deployment
of the trope of the subservient black woman is deliberate. In fact, in willingly performing the
role for Roger, Jill inhabits it herself; the cocked eyebrow shows her engagement with racialized
stereotypes is a conscious performance (2014,93).
5.
This is when Jill cocks her eyebrow; see previous footnote.
6.
See also van Brabandts discussion of token resistance and virility in Chapter11 in this volume.
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only a false consciousness or pathology of the oppressed could generate

such pleasure, clearing space for the possibility that there could be other
pleasures in blackness thatalthough inextricable from long histories
of domination and painare genuine pleasures (Nash 2014,86).
Nashs excavation of these pleasures in the performance of pornogra-
phy is usefully paired with Parreas Shimizus, who identifies them in the
viewing of pornography. Parreas Shimizu describes her own contradic-
tory experiences as an Asian American woman: seduced and enthralled
by personally viewing images of herself as sexually alluring, but affronted
and threatened when hypersexuality is projected onto her from the outside.
Parreas Shimizu recognizes this same ambivalence during a performance
of Miss Saigon in which she is scolded by another Filipina woman for
laughing and disrupting the show. The latter clearly identifies with the
romantic plotline, despite the problematic meanings it generates for Asian
American women (e.g., their relegation to positions of inferiority relative
to white women). Parreas Shimizu realizes that in so doing, the woman
is not automatically a passive receiver of her own stereotyping; rather,
the woman is taking an active stance in claiming a certain kind of plea-
sure from racial identification. Moreover, there is no single viewpoint of
the Asian American woman that can be assumed to speak for all Asian
American women. Parreas Shimizu thus seeks to validate the pleasures
that Asian American women may experience in their hypersexualization,
dissolving the shame and guilt felt by those with pleasurable responses.
In uncovering and legitimizing these race-pleasures, Nash and Parreas
Shimizu reject conceptions of pornography and pleasure that take the
enjoyment of viewing hypersexualized racial images to be the exclusive
property of the white male gaze. Such analyses of womens pleasures,
Ibelieve, grow increasingly important as the viewership of pornography
increasingly does include of women ofcolor.
These explorations of female pleasure in racialized sexuality are par-
ticularly important when juxtaposed with a respectability politics that
continues to exert a potent effect on the lives of black and other women
of color. Because women of color are hypersexualized as naturally pro-
miscuous and as having excessive or deviant sexualities, they must expend
extra effort in order to appear respectableto conform to traditional nor-
mative expectations of womens sexuality. The deeply problematic impli-
cations of respectability politics have been sharply criticized by the black
feminist tradition that Joan Morgan dubs hip hop feminism (Durham,
Cooper, and Morris 2013). These negative repercussions are obvious in
the case of pornography. First, women who engage in pornography and

186
sex work are stigmatized and rejected, not just by dominant racialized
groups but also within their own racial community, in ways that reinforce
existing class divides. Second, in part due to the fear of such devaluation
from without and within, women of color do not have the freedom to fully
explore their own sexual selves. These pressures of respectability poli-
tics are compounded by the ubiquitousness of hypersexualized control-
ling images of the jezebel, the (ghetto) ho, the lotus blossom, Dragon
Lady, and so on (Miller-Young 2014, 170). In a highly racially segregated
society wherein most people have little to no intimate interracial contact
in actual life, representations of women of colorespecially sexual repre-
sentationsbecome particularly crucial. As has often been noted in other
contexts (e.g. underrepresentation in academia), women of color face what
Miller-Young (2014, 170) calls a constant burden of representation in
which they must always contend with the fact that their individual actions
will be construed as representative of their entire racialized groupthat
is, as potentially vindicating racist stereotypes. This can produce a form
of epistemic violence that Kristie Dotson (2011) calls testimonial smoth-
ering, in which a person must keep certain parts of her testimony silent
from incompetent hearers who will inevitably interpret them in damaging
and stereotypical ways. As Jeannie Pepper puts it, You are not supposed
to talk about liking sex because you are already assumed to be a whore
(Miller-Young 2014, 1).
Pornography, then, is a way for some women to free themselves from a
sexual smothering and throw off the twin weights of respectability poli-
tics and the burden of representation. This is voiced by Sinnamon Love,
who ventured into BDSM and fetish work for the more glamorous oppor-
tunities that were denied to her in the hip-hop, ghetto, and gonzo genres
traditionally populated by black women. Confronted with the accusation
that being submissively tied up was setting black people back 200years,
Love defends her work by claiming that it is about sexual pleasure, and
her performance helps uncover black peoples forbidden desires to be freer
to explore sex without the constant burden of representation (Miller-
Young 2014, 170). As Asian American actress Sandra Oh demands (in a
nonpornographic context):If youre going to have to be the whore to the
left, are you going to be the whore to the left with a good fuckin story?
And if you are, then you tell that story the way you want to do it (Parreas
Shimizu 2007, 45). In other words, women of color are damned if they do
and damned if they donteither they perpetuate hypersexualized stereo-
types or cut off a source of sexual pleasuresand there is no easy way
out of the double-bind. Thus, some choose to perform in, view, and enjoy
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racialized pornography that affords them a chance more fully to develop

their sexual agency.
As in the last section, however, Iam not convinced that such arguments
from womens pleasures can assuage deep-seated concerns about the po-
tentially deformed nature of these desires and pleasures. Miller-Young,
for example, is far more skeptical about the scene from Sexworld (de-
scribed earlier):she claims that Jills own desires remain invisible and
wonders whether it is genuinely possible to create a world of fantasy free
of limits when racism is inevitably sutured to the modern unconscious
(2014, 96). Her reading of the scene is as an enactment of the myth that
white men do not willingly cross racial borders but do so only when
black women tempt and demand it of them, and she questions whether
the actress playing Jill was truly down with the joke, as was claimed by
the white actor playing Roger (Miller-Young 2014, 101). These murkier
possibilities can never be entirely dispelled. Thus, I claim, the negative
feelings that accompany some womens enjoyment of their own hyper-
sexualization may be warranted insofar as these pleasures depend on im-
plicit notions of racial difference that inevitably serve to perpetuate racial
oppression. Let me emphasize that Iam in no sense blaming women for
experiencing such pleasures, nor am I questioning their commitment to
feminist and antiracist politics. Even in the absence of false consciousness,
these may not be morally good pleasures. And even if they arethough
Ihesitate to put too utilitarian a gloss on thisit is likely that these race-
pleasures are few and far between, while the continued damage of hyper-
sexualized racial stereotypes in pornography is much more pervasive and
assured.
9.4. Making theUndesirable Desirable
Perhaps the most promising argument for pornographic racial representa-

tions is the claim that such representations have a special political role to
play in destabilizing narrow, stigmatizing, and otherwise oppressive stan-
dards of beauty and attractiveness (cf. Maes, Chapter10 in this volume).
Anne Eaton (Chapter12 in this volume), for instance, argues that antipor-
nography feminists have failed to recognize that their arguments against
pornography actually constitute a double-edged sword. They argue that
pornography is responsible for the eroticization of violence, dominance,
and inequalitythat is, for the affective, emotional, motivational, and em-
bodied attraction to violence, domination, and inequality experienced by

188
people quite apart from their cognitive beliefs and explicitly endorsed at-
titudes toward others. Because of its particular vivacity and capacity to
evoke erotic responses, pornography powerfully shapes what Eaton calls
erotic tastethat is, the preferences for certain physical traits, person-
ality, manner, and comportment, and so forth that render others sexually
attractive to a given individual. What makes pornography particularly per-
nicious, then, is that it trains peoples erotic tastes and not just their beliefs.
In line with much of contemporary social psychology, Eaton argues that
mere doxastic commitment to feminist, antiracist, and other anti-oppressive
politics is ultimately insufficient for overcoming oppression; instead, what
is required is that peoples erotic tastes are shaped through Aristotelian ha-
bituation so as to fall in line withrather than underminetheir egalitar-
ian commitments. But this, Eaton points out, means that pornography may
actually play a necessary role in retraining peoples erotic tastes. If por-
nography causes the eroticization of violence, dominance, and inequality,
then pornographyat least feminist and alternative pornographyis also
our best hope for the eroticization of consent, mutual respect, and equality.
Analogously, if certain oppressed and marginalized groups have been
deemed aesthetically and sexually unappealing, then pornography depict-
ing members of such groups as erotically desirable performs an especially
important function in destigmatizing and normalizing such bodies in the
way required for genuine social equality. Anumber of self-identified fem-
inist pornographers and consumers of feminist pornography describe their
projects in just these terms. Clinical psychotherapist Keiko Lane (2013),
for instance, describes an Asian American transgender patient who was
struggling with feelings of shame, despair, and doubt about transitioning.
After watching pornography featuring Asian American transgender per-
formers, he expressed astonishment and pleasure at the fact that some-
one like [him] could be found sexually attractive (Lane 2013, 176). In
a society where multiply marginalized subjects hardly find themselves
represented at all, letalone in a positive light (and where Asian men in
particular hold relatively low erotic capital), pornography provides trans-
formative, positive representations of sexuality that may otherwise be dif-
ficult to access. Similarly, Loree Erickson (2013) experiences the perfor-
mance of pornographyher depiction of herself as a sexual, desiring, and
pleasure-seeking personas a powerful antidote to the shame she might
otherwise feel as a disabled woman. Being represented sexually is for her
especially significant in light of prevailing stereotypes that desexualize
people with disabilities, depicting them as unable or unworthy of repro-
ductive, romantic, and recreationalsex.
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Returning to the Sexworld scene, this appears to be an instance in

which pornography is put to the use of transforming racialized standards
of sexual attractiveness. A black woman who is initially deemed sexu-
ally undesirable is subsequently found to be highly desirable, to the point
where Roger is seen at the end of the film trying to bribe the bus driver
into allowing him to return to Sexworld for another encounter with her.
It is particularly worth pointing out here that when Roger initially rejects
Jill as a sexual partner, he attemptsrather unsuccessfullyto claim that
his distaste for her is not grounded in racist attitudes, but mere personal
preference. The films refusal to accept Rogers denial of racism, demon-
strated through Jills explicit challenge for Roger to prove his spigot aint
no bigot (Nash 2014, 90), is thus an endorsement of Eatons point that
overcoming oppression requires eliminating not only explicitly endorsed
oppressive beliefs and attitudes, but also oppressive erotic tastes. As these
examples demonstrate, pornography as a creative medium of representa-
tion has the potential to depict otherwise stigmatized, desexualized, and
undesirable individuals as desirablethrough bodily and erotic inter-
ventions that transcend intellectual argumentation. This potential has al-
ready been harnessed in productive ways by black women pornographers
who have challenged structural inequalities, altered the material con-
ditions of labor, constructed new sites of distribution and spectatorship,
and inspired new audiences while inventing novel images of black female
sexuality in what Cruz (2014, 225) describes simultaneously as a new
pornography (in dual senses: it is both recent and interventionist) but also
as a continuation of black womens long tradition of resistance against
negative representation.
Nevertheless, I think it would be too hasty to conclude that pornogra-
phy representing women of color as sexually desirable is always a good
thing, even in pornography that is not overtly misogynist or racist. My
concerns derive from the way that systems of racial oppression sub-
sume and rely on patterns of erotic taste in order to preserve mecha-
nisms of racial domination. In particular, I contend, these patterns tend
to generate a dilemma in which pornographic representations of racial
difference constantly risk reinforcing patriarchal, racist, and otherwise
oppressive standards of desire along the twin poles of fetishization and
tokenization.
The fetishization of racial difference is the natural upshot of a racist ide-
ology in which whiteness is normalized and valorized over all other races.
Consider, for example, what is popularly called yellow fever, a strong
preference for (usually East and Southeast) Asian American women.

190
Despite the fact that white people are far more likely to date within than
outside their race, there is no comparable term for white fever. Choosing
to date only nonwhites is a kind of deviation. Being labeled or experi-
encing oneself as deviant, however, is generally very unpleasant. Hence
adopting the moniker of yellow fever, jungle fever, and so forth fur-
nishes a ready-made identity that legitimizes racialized sexual preference.7
Of course, identities can be devised and fashioned by individuals, but they
must be recognized by others in the surrounding community. What I sug-
gest, then, is that pornographyin particular, the unprecedentedly made-
to-order and widely available nature of Internet pornographyplays a
central role in licensing the self-identification with and public recognition
of racialized sexual preferences like yellow fever. And just as consumers
develop particular brand loyalties with which they self-identify, I propose,
consumers of certain kinds of pornography begin to self-identify as having
certain (increasingly exclusive) sexual preferences.
Pornography as a market industry presents a menu of options, a pre-
made set of categories, that provides a vocabulary for conceptualizing and
making sense of ones sexual life. (Indeed, in our culture it is for many
people the only resource available for the exploration and formation of
sexual identity.) Moreover, pornography as an industry has financial in-
centives to encourage its consumers to develop specific erotic tastes that
will translate into discernible and exploitable patterns of consumption.
The more categories of pornography there are, the more profit there is to
be generated by enticing consumers to sample something new and differ-
ent. Cruz writes:[T]he specific designations within pornracial, fetish,
sexual preferencesare all about as [porn performer and director Diana]
Devoe8 notes, selling a fantasy, and the need to categorize (in order to
market and sell) these specific fantasies (2010, 160). This sort of market
pressure is one reason (among others) that women of color in pornog-
raphy are almost inevitably prone to being portrayed in terms of their
racial differencein other words, in a fetishizing manner. As Gail Dines
7.
Note that even when the connotations of the term are largely negative, as in the case of yellow
fever, public contestation over its usefor example by those who seek to justify the preference
or reclaim the termstill serves to further establish the existence of such racialized sexual
preferences in the public imaginary, in ways that can ease the psyches of those who self-identify
that way.
8.
Devoe astutely exposes the contradictions within the industrys ideology and practice as
she asks:[W]hy is there an interracial designation in adult at all if we are all just having sex
and we are all pink on the inside? Why is there interracial? Why is there Black? Why is there
Asian? Theres these categories because it is about attraction. It is about selling a fantasy (Cruz
2010,160).
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writes:In all-white porn, no one ever refers to the mans penis as a white
cock or the womans vagina as white pussy, but introduce a person of
color, and suddenly all players have a racialized sexuality (2010, 123).
This fetishization of racial difference promotes the hypersexualized objec-
tification of women ofcolor.
On the flip side, however, other problems emerge when racial difference
is trivialized as no more than superficial phenotypic difference. A common
defense of yellow feverand racialized sexual preferences more gener-
allyis that they are merely personal or aesthetic preferences. This
defense neglects the effects of such preferences on Asian American women
themselves, who more often than not testify to the offensive, deal-break-
ing, and even traumatizing experiences they are subject to from men with
yellow fever (Zheng 2016).9 It also ignores the fact that racial difference
is organized according to strict hierarchies of valuation. Miller-Youngs
interviews with black women porn performers, for instance, expose a sys-
temic color hierarchy in which dark-skinned black women are excluded
from job opportunities in favor of light-skinned black women, and black
women are paid substantially lesssometimes half as muchas white
women (2014, 246). On this tokenizing view of racial difference, race has
value only insofar as it adds a bitbut not too muchof variety and exoti-
cism to the normative white female body. Says bell hooks: Within com-
modity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the
dull dish that is mainstream white culture (hooks 1992, 21). However,
that spice must not be too overpowering. This is evidenced in the way
that Jennifer Jackson, Playboys first black Playmate of the Month after
12 years of production, was presented with a conspicuous lack of racial
identity or mention of her historic status, thus rendering her race utterly
neutralized and revealing how Playboy was deeply invested in the in-
vention of Jacksons sameness (Cruz 2010, 33).
This is the dilemma of the (un)desirable:women of color whose bodies
deviate too far from narrow standards of idealized white beauty are ut-
terly devalued, while those who conform closely enough are still subject
to standards with respect to which they are inherently disadvantaged. As
Sinnamon Love puts it: African American women on screen were put
into one of two categories:assimilated to appear as close to white as pos-
sible (they are almost one of us) or completely ghettoized to reflect de-
based images of Black culture (it doesnt matter because they are only
9.
For more, see Chang (2006) and Chan (1988), among others.

192
one of them) (2013, 99). Erotic representations of women of color, then,

either fetishize racial difference in debasing ways or else trivialize it in
ways that reinforce rather than transform dominant standards of sexual
attractiveness.10
9.5. If You Cant BeatThem
I hope to have shown in my previous arguments that if there exists a fine

line between resistance and recapitulation, transgressive and regressive
pleasures, fetishization and tokenization, it must be almost impossibly
difficult to walk. At the same time, excluding women of color from por-
nography would be an even more serious problem, since it would stig-
matize such women as not sexually desirable. In short, Icontend, when
it comes to race and pornography, the larger dilemma is that there is no
way to win.11 Where does this leave us with respect to the question of race
and pornography? Faced with this dilemma, there are no easy answers.
My own conclusion is that the arguments I have considered show that
we cannot in a principled way argue against pornography per se on the
grounds of its racism, and that we would do better to focus our criticism
on the specific uses of pornographic tokens in specificworks.
The first point in favor of this conclusion is a simple one, made long
ago by advocates of feminist and alternative pornography:pornography
is not a monolithic entity. The morally relevant features of different por-
nographic works differ so greatly that it is inherently misleading to talk
of pornography rather than pornographies in the context of ethical cri-
tique. Indeed, my examples in the previous section show that feminist and
alternative pornographies have now achieved enough success that we can
no longer ignore their achievements.
My second point relies on close readings of actual pornographic texts
and conversations with women of color who perform in, view, and enjoy
pornography:pornography affords multiple and conflicting interpretations.
There is no single, objective way to walk what Nash (2014, 109)calls the
tightrope that threatens to entrench precisely what it aspires to uproot,
because different viewers draw that line in different places. This is because
of the individual agency involved in the process of accommodation that
is necessarily involved in the act of (pornographic) viewership, which
10.
Cf. Cruzs analysis of black women caught in the ever-shifting representation between nappy
headed ho and girl next door (2010,42).
11.
Iam indebted to Nils-Hennes Stear for discussion of thispoint.
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Jennifer Wicke describes as the shuffling and collating and transcription

of images or words so that they have effectivity within ones own fantasy
universean act of accommodation, as it were [that] will often entail
wholesale elimination of elements of the representation, or changing sa-
lient features within it (2004, 181). Interpretation and accommodation are
ineradicable features of engaging with pornographic representation, and
they produce multiple and conflicting grounds for ethical evaluation even
among critical scholars of pornography like those Ihave presentedhere.
What follows from these two points is that, just as it has not been pos-
sible to find a clear and principled line of demarcation between erotica
and pornography, it is not possible to cleanly separate good and bad
pornography (cf. van Brabandt, Chapter11 in this volume). For even bad
pornography can be queered in ways that provide pleasure to the accom-
modating viewer. For example, Jane Ward, a self-described feminist dyke
and a professor of womens studies, describes her enjoyment of a college
reality porn series in which male students engage in feminizing and homo-
erotic rituals in order to gain entry into fraternities:
It turns out that Idont have only an intellectual interest in these scenarios;
Ithink theyre hot. Iam impressed by the imagination required to manufac-
ture them, the complex rules that structure them, and the performative and
ritualistic way that straight men touch one anothers bodies or order others
to do so. (Ward 2013,136)
I hasten to add that it does not follow from this that there are no grounds for
criticizing particular pornographic works, or that whatever gets you off,
gets you off. But it does mean that different people may engage in the same
work in more or less ethical ways, and we should be prepared for inevitable
disagreement with reasonable others. As the editors of The Feminist Porn
Book write in their introduction: Because [feminist porn] is born out of a
feminism that is not one thing but a living, breathing, moving creation, it is
necessarily contestedan argument, a polemic, and a debate (Taormino
et al. 2013, 18; emphasis mine). We may ground specific critiques in argu-
ments that certain roles, narratives, and tropes have a high likelihood of
being taken up unethically. But we must remain aware of the possibility
that for any given act, scene, or tropeeven those involving racist stereo-
types or historical racial traumasfantasy may be executed more or less
well or badly, in ways that facilitate or hinder this kind of ethical accom-
modation. Rather than argue for or against pornography, then, we would
do better to engage more closely with actual pornographic texts and their

194
producers in order to understand the risks and rewards involved in particular

pornographic elements and works, as well as the conditions under which dif-
ferent viewers may differentially experience those risks and rewards.
9.6.Conclusion
I have argued that potential benefits of racial representations in pornog-

raphy are always accompanied by serious risks. Engaging with hyper-
sexualized stereotypes, even for the purpose of resistance, often further
entrenches those stereotypes. Trying to exploit the exploiters can deepen
ones own exploitation. Race-pleasures might be unavoidably morally
bad pleasures. And even though representations of race in pornography
have the potential to transform conventional standards of desirability, they
always run the risk of either fetishizing or trivializing racial difference. At
this point, one might object that, given all these risks and rewards, the risks
seem to outweigh the rewards. If race-pleasures are always accompanied
by race-trauma, and if our feminist and antiracist interpretations always
require (extensive) accommodation, then why bother? To conclude, let
me attempt a simple reply:it asks too much of usparticularly the most
marginalized, like the women of color in the porn industry whose views
Ihave drawn upon in this chapterto give up pleasures in a world where
far too little (sexual) pleasure is available. In a world so thoroughly and
deeply structured by white supremacy, patriarchy, capitalist exploitation,
ableism, and other oppressions, morally pure pleasures are hard to come
by. To illustrate, consider an analogy with an example from another con-
text: legislation that prohibits families receiving government assistance
from using the funds toward massage and nail salons, video arcades and
movie theaters, swimming pools and theme parks, or that prohibits using
food stamps to purchase shellfish (State of Kansas Legislature 2015, 9;
State of Wisconsin Legislature 2015, 3). The clear message, implicitly
assumed by many even when not codified by law, is that these families
do not deserve pleasure and enjoyment until they have set their own (fi-
nancial) houses in order, as it were. However, the bill utterly ignores the
multiplicity of ways in which these families struggle to do so given signif-
icant structural constraints (e.g., high unemployment in a depressed labor
market) as well as the ways in which such a bill contributes to the cycle of
poverty (e.g., by depriving children of the enjoyable, playful, and loving
upbringing that they need to become healthy, well-adjusted, and produc-
tive adults). Similarly, Icontend, if we must wait until the patriarchy is
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dismantled for morally pure sexual pleasures, then we will be allowed

no pleasures at all. Moreover, we will not be engaged in the sort of ex-
perimentation and playwhich, to be sure, may initially lead to more
mistakes than successesthat will ultimately lead to the transformative
pornography that feminists have so longed for. While we can certainly
critique particular elements and works of pornography, pornographies as
market industries and forms of cultural production will continue to play an
important role in facilitating the development and cultivation of the active
sexual selves that we wish to be, and which we must be, if we are to fully
devote ourselves to the ongoing feminist project.
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PARTIV Feminist Pornography

An Oxymoron?
198
199
CHAPTER10 Falling inLust

Sexiness, Feminism, and Pornography
HansMaes
10.1.Introduction
Caffeine makes you sexy! This absurd slogan can be seen in the shop win-
dows of a popular Brussels coffee chainits bold pink lettering indicat-
ing how they are mainly targeting female customers. It is one of the silli-
est examples of something that is both very common and very worrisome
nowadays, namely, the constant call on women to look hot and conform
to the standards of sexiness as they are projected in the media, entertain-
ment industry, and advertising. But what exactly is wrong with this state
of affairs and what can be done about it? In a recent essay entitled Sex
Objects and Sexy Subjects Sheila Lintott and Sherri Irvin (2016) take
up this pressing issue and make an elaborate case for what they call a
feminist reclamation of sexiness. In what follows, we will investigate
the merits and shortcomings of their proposal (Sections 10.2 and 10.3),
present an alternative account (Section 10.4), and conclude by considering
how pornography may be part of the problem but also part of the solution
in this matter (Sections 10.5 and10.6).
10.2. ACritique ofSexiness
According to Lintott and Irvin (L&I) there are two problems with sexi-
ness today. The first is that women are considered sexy in accordance
with an externally dictated conception of sexiness. Sexiness is not
something a woman can secure for herself (L&I 2016, 299). If a woman
200
wishes to be sexy she will need to conform to the standards laid out by
men, so that in the end what she wants and enjoys is what he wants
and enjoys (Dines 2010, 107). The second problem is that women are
considered sexy in accordance with an unduly narrow conception of
sexiness, one that excludes large portions of the female population from
being considered sexy. This is especially felt by, for instance, elderly
and disabled women who systematically fall short of the current stan-
dards of sexiness.
So, what are the current standards of sexiness? This is a question that
L&I never address in any detail, possibly because they assume we are all
too familiar with these standards. Ahalf-joking, half-serious comment by
American comedian Tina Fey gives us an idea of what may be involved:
Now every girl is expected to have Caucasian blue eyes, full Spanish lips,
a classic button nose, hairless Asian skin with a California tan, a Jamaican
dance hall ass, long Swedish legs, small Japanese feet, the abs of a lesbian
gym owner, the hips of a nine-year-old boy, the arms of Michelle Obama,
and doll tits. (Fey 2011,23)
This brief summary not only highlights how impossibly demanding the
standards of sexiness can be, but also how emphasis is placed exclusively
on bodily features. Our idea of sexiness, L&I argue, completely ignores
the agency, subjectivity, and autonomy of the person being judged sexy
so that we have, in effect, an equation of sexiness with objecthood (L&I
2016, 299300).
One obvious but radical solution would be to give up on sexiness alto-
gether. As the Women Against Sex movement of the late 1980s used to
put it:Theres no way out of the practice of sexuality except out (Mottier
2008, 69). L&I, however, firmly reject this option. Giving up on sexiness
would mean giving up on a basic element of selfhood. As Ann Cahill has
argued, and as elderly and disabled women may attest to, to never be the
focus of a sexualizing gaze is to be rendered sexually invisible by society
at large and to have your full personhood denied (Cahill 2011, 84). So, in-
stead of giving up on sexiness altogether, L&I suggest that we reclaim and
redefine sexiness in such a way that it makes room for women, and men,
as sexy subjects rather than as mere sex objects. Here is how they conceive
of this:To say appropriately of someone that he is sexy is to say that
Irecognize that he possesses physical features that are magnificent in their
particularity (), and that Irecognize his body as infused with his sexual
subjectivity (L&I 2016,309).
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Two aspects are crucial in considering someone sexy. First of all, a

magnificent body. Here L&I take their cue from Mia Mingus, a writer
and blogger who identifies as a queer physically disabled Korean woman,
transracial and transnational adoptee, born in Korea, raised in the
Caribbean, nurtured in the South, and who is the author of the influential
blog Leaving Evidence. In an inspirational keynote speech for the 2011
Femmes of Color Symposium in Oakland, Mingus introduced the term
magnificence to refer and pay homage to bodies that are not conven-
tionally attractive. Likewise, L&I use the term magnificence to refer to
the nowhere-else-but-here-ness of a body that we can learn to admire.
Admittedly, this remains rather vague. But the purpose of introducing the
term is clear: they want us to resist imposing preexisting standards on
bodies and instead to take bodies on their own termsthus making pos-
sible the aesthetic appreciation of the sexual particularity of a wide variety
of bodytypes.
But this is only half the story:the second thing we should do is ensure
that our judgments of sexiness take into account not just bodies, but em-
bodied subjects. The proper target of such a judgment is always a body
infused with an authentic sexual expressionthat is, a sexual expression
that really comes from the person herself rather than originating in or
aiming at some external ideal. Evidence of such authenticity will be found
in the persons confidence, comfort, and sense of improvisation, whereas
discomfort, insecurity, and a strict adherence to norms as rules will indi-
cate a lack of genuineness in sexual expression. Or, as Belle de Jour writes
in her famous diary:Sexy is the result of being pulled together and com-
fortable in your skin. Holding your stomach in when your clothes are off
is not fuckable. Slapping your ample behind and inviting him to ride the
wobble is (de Jour2010).
L&Is revisionary proposal is that we consider sexy as no longer
synonymous with sexually attractive but rather as meaning sexu-
ally authentic. In other words, we should no longer treat sexiness as a
response-dependent property since ascribing sexiness to a woman should
not depend on the responses of men. So, instead of thinking that a woman
is sexy if men experience her as sexually attractive, it should be the other
way around:if a woman is sexy (because she has a magnificent body in-
fused with sexual subjectivity), then men should try to experience her as
sexually attractive. With the revised notion of sexiness comes an ethical
imperative to make our desires match our judgmentssomething we can
help bring about through what L&I call an aesthetic practice. For sexi-
ness is an aesthetic property, and just as we can and should always seek to
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broaden our aesthetic horizons, we can and should broaden the horizons
of what and whom we find sexy, primarily by increasing exposure to a
diversity of bodies and decreasing exposure to perfect sex symbols. The
result of this will be that the twofold problem disappears:women will no
longer be considered sexy in accordance with an externally dictated or
unduly narrow conception of sexiness.
10.3. ACritique ofthe Critique
Is L&Is diagnosis of the problem accurate? And is the remedy they pro-
pose as effective as they want it to be? These are the main concerns
we want to address in this section. But we will begin by taking stock
of some potentially unwelcome implications of L&Is proposal. First,
if we were to adopt their revised notion of sexiness, we would have to
accept that Marilyn Monroe, often considered the ultimate 20th-century
icon of sexiness, was really not sexy at all. This is because the actress
was very insecure most of her life as a result of trying to conform to all
the externally imposed expectations that came with her being a celeb-
rity sex symbol. So one could not say that her body was infused with
an authentic sexual expression. By contrast, imagine a guy who really
does not care about how he is perceived by others and lets himself go
completely (think:zero body hygiene, terrible BO, greasy hair, burping,
snorting, farting, and leering at each passerby that catches his fancy).
The confidence, comfort, and sense of improvisation he displays count
as evidence of genuineness on L&Is account, and hence it would appear
entirely appropriate to consider him sexy. Both these cases are deeply
and worryingly counterintuitive.
However, L&I might be willing to bite the bullet here; after all, they are
very upfront about the revisionary nature of their proposal. So lets move
on to a more serious objection. One of the wrongs that L&I seek to correct
is the fact that large portions of the female population, and in particular el-
derly and disabled women, are excluded from being considered sexy. But
there is reason to think that adopting their proposal would actually do very
little to remedy that situation and that many elderly and disabled women
would fare no better as a result. Consider the following scenario:X desper-
ately wants to retain a fresh and youthful look but feels increasingly miser-
able now that she has passed 60 and is stuck with a rapidly ageing body.
X may not be considered sexy according to current standards of sexiness,
but X would also not be considered sexy under L&Is revised account of
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sexinessalong with all other women who are not comfortable with their
looks andbody.
In defense of their view, L&I could point out that at least now it is
up to X herself to achieve sexiness; all she needs to do is stop trying to
conform to an external ideal and confidently express her own sexuality.
But is that as easy as it sounds? For many people like X it will simply
be impossible to make that change without help and guidance. Once
you have lost confidence, and this is certainly true for sexual confi-
dence, it is extremely difficult to regain it. In that light, L&Is proposal
could turn out to be strikingly counterproductive. For if they manage to
convince readers that it is all up to them to achieve sexual authenticity,
and if many of their female readers consequently fail to confidently
express their sexuality (which is to be expected given common societal
pressures), then these women will not only fail to be sexy but it will be
their own fault to boot. After all, it was up to them now. This is not an
improvement but is in fact worse than how things are under the existing
regime.
Revising the notion of sexiness along the lines that L&I suggest does
not prove a cure-all and may not even be an improvement upon the current
state of affairs. Furthermore, their original diagnosis of the twofold prob-
lem of sexiness is itself not without problems. Take the claim that women
are considered sexy in accordance with an externally dictated conception
of sexiness. With some indignation L&I mention how the ultimate arbiter
of sexiness is not the woman herself and not even her loving partners (L&I
2016, 299). But, one may ask, does the same not hold true for almost any
other desirable quality? Sure, what is considered sexy and whether X is
considered sexy are not decided by X.But what is considered courageous
or honest and whether X is considered courageous or honest are also not
decided by X.Likewise, it is not X (nor her loving partners) who is the
ultimate arbiter of whether she is considered witty or friendly.
Admittedly, this may not be the most charitable interpretation of L&Is
claim. What they seem to object to most of all is the fact that what is
considered sexy, and whether X is considered sexy, is entirely decided
by a group of people of which X is not a member. To be more specific, it
is mostly men who determine what counts as sexy for a woman in such
a way that a womans desire to be sexy is a desire for qualities that men
find sexually attractive:what she wants and enjoys is what he wants and
enjoys. However, the question arises whether this only affects women.
Isnt it the case that a mans desire to be sexy is ultimately a desire for
qualities that women find attractive, and hence should we not say that it is

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mostly women who determine what counts as sexy for a man? If so, then
we are no longer to treat this a purely feminist concern.
Of course, it could be thought that the real problem lies with the sort of
qualities that men find sexually attractive, which brings us to the second
part of L&Is diagnosis. According to L&I, women are considered sexy in
accordance with an all-too-narrow conception of sexiness. If you do not
have long legs, glossy hair, smooth skin, full lips, and firm breasts, you do
not count as sexy. Now, while it is easy to find some confirmation of this
thesisjust google sexy women and see which images come upone
may query again whether this is an exclusively feminist issue. What hap-
pens if one does an Internet search for sexy men? Going by the pictures
that Google brings up, an equally narrow ideal of male sexiness emerges.
Besides showcasing the obligatory six-pack, all the men in those pictures
are slim, toned and muscular; they are usually clean-shaven with the ex-
ception of a little designer stubble [ ] strong jaw, large lips and eyes,
soft-looking, clear skin (Gill etal. 2003). Areply could be that women
are able to find men sexy even if they do not have a stereotypically sexy
body. This is true. But then again, men might say the same thing. Men do
not reserve their sexual interest for those few supermodels who have a
body like Elle The Body Macpherson. The much-maligned male gaze
tends to be far more indiscriminate.
At this stage it will help to introduce a distinction that is largely ignored
by L&I, between appearing sexy to someone and being generally consid-
ered sexy (or, from the viewers perspective, between finding someone sexy
and judging someone to be sexy). It is a distinction that may seem trivial
but that is commonly made. You may know that someone is generally re-
garded as sexy, and yet you may not find her sexy yourself. Conversely,
you may find someone very sexy and at the same time acknowledge that
she is not generally considered sexy. The two are also related in an obvi-
ous way, for someone will be generally considered sexy only if there are
enough people who find her sexy. The relevance of this distinction should
be clear:while many if not most women have appeared sexy to someone
at some point, only a small minority of women are generally considered
to be sexy. This is a pretty uncontroversial observation, but one that helps
us see how L&Is feminist critique is somewhat misdirected, for the same
observation could be made about men. Many men have appeared sexy to
someone at some point, but only very few are considered sexy tout court.
Moreover, it would be an exaggeration of sorts to claim that ones full
personhood is denied if one is not generally considered sexy. This is not in
any way a dehumanizing situation that calls for urgent action.
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With this in mind, let us summarize the grounds for challenging L&Is
diagnosis that focuses on the externally dictated and unduly narrow stan-
dards of sexiness for women. Yes, what is considered sexy for a woman is
not simply determined by women, but the same is true mutatis mutandis
for men. And, yes, only a minority of women are generally considered to
be sexy, but the same is arguably true for men; what is more, it is not im-
mediately apparent whether this is a situation that needs to be remedied.
That said, even if L&I have proposed the wrong diagnosis, it does not yet
follow that there is nothing wrong with sexiness. On the contrary, as we
will argue in the next section, the problems with sexiness are numerous
and various.
10.4. An Alternative Diagnosis
L&Is revised notion of sexiness will make it possible for elderly and dis-
abled women to be generally regarded as sexy. However, being so regarded
is arguably not the main concern of these specific groups. After all, most
of us are not generally considered sexy in the way that Angelina Jolie and
Scarlett Johansson are, and most of us are not inclined to see this as a grave
injustice. The real issue for elderly and disabled women, and the reason
why they may feel marginalized compared not just to A-list actresses but
to the average woman in the street, is that their sexuality is all too often
ignored. They are not perceived as people with sexual needs and desires
and with a sexual identity that deserves respect and acknowledgment. To
the extent that this is the case, there is ground for saying that their full
personhood is being ignored or denied. In addition, disabled and elderly
women will less frequently appear sexy to people they encounter (which
is different from being generally considered sexy). Although this is linked
to the fact that their sexuality is often ignored to begin with, it constitutes
a separate wrong. For here the issue is not so much that a crucial aspect of
selfhood is denied, but rather that they are systematically missing out on a
valuable experience, namely the experience of being wanted or being the
target of someones sexual interest. And insofar as finding someone sexy
is regarded as prelude to, and for some even a prerequisite for, a romantic
relationship, they run an increased risk of losing out on another valuable
good, romanticlove.
All this is of course also true for elderly and disabled men. Indeed,
the stereotype of the disabled person as asexual or sexually abnormal is
sometimes referred to as the Chatterley syndrome, after the male disabled

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character in D.H. Lawrences novel Lady Chatterleys Lover (the affair

between Lady Chatterley and the gamekeeper Meadows is presented by
Lawrence as the almost inevitable outcome of the sexual impotence and
inactivity of her disabled husband; see Battye 1966, 8). So, what are the
problems that women in particular face? These are best revealed when
we ask two further questions:How does one appear sexy in present-day
society? And how important is it to appearsexy?
Before we begin to formulate an answer to these questions, some caveats
are in order. First, the dichotomies we will discuss below are quite rough
and general in nature, meaning that they will allow for exceptions and need
to be further refined in subsequent psychological and sociological research.
Second, the list below is by no means intended to be exhaustive (one of the
interesting issues that we will skip over is discussed by Robin Zheng in
Chapter9 of this volume). Third, while there is strong anecdotal evidence
for the overall thesis we will develop, it awaits full and proper scientific
testing and will have to remain speculative until then. Finally, an important
terminological clarification: finding someone sexy is not the same thing
as desiring to have sex with someone. One can desire to have sex with
a person without finding that person particularly sexy (if one desperately
wants to have a child, for instance). Conversely, one can find some people
very sexy without ever wanting to have sex with them. Finding someone
sexy should not be thought of as a type of desire or as a type of behavior
but rather as an emotional responsein the way that Jenefer Robinson
(2005) has characterized such responses. For Robinson, an emotion is a
process that begins with a rough-and-ready affective appraisal that draws
attention automatically and insistently by bodily means to whatever in the
environment is of vital importance to the subject (in this case a potential
sexual partner). This noncognitive appraisal then causes physiological re-
sponses, motor changes, and action tendencies, which are eventually suc-
ceeded by cognitive monitoring. But since we are never fully in control of
our emotionsonce an affective appraisal occurs, the response occurs
we experience emotions as passive phenomena. This also holds true for
when we find someone sexy (hence the title of this chapter).
How does one appear sexy if one does not have a stereotypically sexy
body? The answer will differ greatly depending on whether you are a man
or a woman. Personality traits like assertiveness, self-assurance, authority,
independence, boldness, and ambition are often cited as contributing to a
mans sex appeal, whereas this is less so for women. The same behavior
that makes a man seem persuasive, ambitious, and self-assured is, in a
woman, often seen as pushy, selfish, and bossy and so as not particularly
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attractive (Valian 1999, 131).1 What many men still find attractive in
women are traits like tenderness, shyness, delicacy, demureness, and pas-
sivity, at least if recent Hollywood hits like Twilight (2008) or Drive (2011)
are anything to go by. Besides personality traits there are (what Aristotle
called) external goods, such as power and wealth, that may help to make
a man sexy. Again, this seems less often and less decisively a contributing
factor for women. As a commentator of The Nation observes about women
in politics:
Unlike for their male counterparts, competence in a woman is a necessity,

but often not very sexy. While this might explain (and this is not always a
bad thing) why there are almost no scandals involving women politicians, it
also means that to be successful in politics, women have to deliberately play
down or inhibit those charismatic qualitiescall it swagger or a win-
ning smileupon which many of their ambitious male counterparts thrive.
(Tillet2012)
Physical prowess and dexterity are also markers of sexiness for men, but
not necessarily for women. In fact, women who run or throw a ball in
clumsy waylike a girl, as some would say (Young 2005)are fre-
quently perceived as cute becauseofit.
These differences between men and women are far from innocuous:the
traits and properties listed above are all associated with specific heteronor-
mative gender roles in a society that still bears the marks of a long history
of gender inequality. Men used to occupy almost all positions of power
and authority, whereas women were excluded from those positions. Men
were active in the world, while women were tied to the home and depen-
dent in a myriad of ways on their husbands or male family members. This
unfair inequality has still not disappeared. And, we now want to argue, to
accept or even promote traits and properties like assertiveness and power
(for men) and shyness and bashfulness (for women) as markers of sexi-
ness is a particularly effective mechanism for sustaining gender inequal-
ity. It is effective because it makes the respective traits appealing to both
men and women and makes gender inequality infect our sentiments, which
are rarely amenable to rational control and argument (see Eaton 2008). It
helps to sustain gender inequality because assertiveness and confidence
As studies using actors trained to behave identically have demonstrated, women in positions of
1.
leadership are judged far more negatively than men areas bossy and dominating and less
competent (Valian 1999,131).

208
are traits that help men get ahead in the world, so that for them the desire
to be sexy is perfectly compatible with other ambitions. In contrast, shy-
ness, passivity, and clumsiness are far less advantageous and useful traits
to have, so for women the desire to be sexy is often at odds with other
ambitions they mayhave.
We are now in position to revisit L&Is original diagnosis and look
beyond any flaws to the substantial grain of truth it does contain. In target-
ing what they regard as an externally dictated and unduly narrow concep-
tion of sexiness, L&I got something very right. For one thing, the traits and
properties that make men look sexy are traits and properties that are desir-
able for many different reasons and not just because they make a man sexy.
By comparison, many of the traits and properties that make women look
sexy (e.g., shyness, clumsiness) are only desirable insofar as men find them
attractive. As a consequence, this particular kind of external approvalthe
admiration of the opposite sexwill carry much more weight in womens
pursuit of sexy-making features. For men, the wish to appear sexy may not
be the only or even the main reason why they want to become more inde-
pendent, develop skills, or accrue more power. Thus, appearing sexy may
well be, and often is, the byproduct of another ambitionan added bonus,
so to speak. For women, it is almost never that easy. In addition, while a
man can achieve sexiness in a great variety of ways (power, fame, wealth,
as well as exceptional skills, talents, abilities) and so is not bound to focus
on his physical appearance, the latter is much more crucial for women. In
this sense, the path to sexiness is much narrower forwomen.
So far, we have focused on the question How does one appear sexy?
in order to address relevant differences between men and women. But
there is another question worth asking in this regard:How important is
it to appear sexy? Even in modern and enlightened Western societies,
women are still socialized to believe that sexiness is essential to their value
as persons, as this testimony of a young girl on the Everyday Sexism
blog (http://www.everydaysexism.com/) painfully illustrates:
I always feel like if Idont look a certain way, if boys dont think Im sexy
or hot then Ive failed and it doesnt even matter if Iam a doctor or writer,
Ill still feel like nothing successful women are only considered a suc-
cess if they are successful AND hot, and Iworry constantly that Iwontbe.
All too often, sexiness is viewed as a womans only or most important

quality. An incident that happened in the summer of 2013 can serve as a
case in point. When Marion Bartoli won Wimbledon in July of that year
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and embraced her father in the players box, BBC commentator John
Inverdale told Radio 5 Live listeners:
I just wonder if her dad, because he has obviously been the most influential
person in her life, did say to her when she was 12, 13, 14 maybe, listen,
you are never going to be, you know, a looker. You are never going to be
somebody like a Sharapova, youre never going to be 5-ft-11, youre never
going to be somebody with long legs, so you have to compensate for that.2
This is just the tip of the icebergthe iceberg being the massive pressure
on women to accept and believe that sexiness is their most desirable qual-
ity and is basically indispensable if you want to feel like a real woman.
This is probably the most objectionable difference between the genders.
And here we take a view that is diametrically opposed to that of L&I. L&I
basically agree that sexiness is essential to someones value as a person;
that is why they suggest a revised notion according to which everyone
could in principle be considered sexy. We, on the other hand, wish to em-
phasize that sexiness is not essential to a womans value as a person, just
as it is not essential to a mans value. Granted, it can be valuable and
desirable to at least appear sexy to some people on some occasions. But
this does not mean that sexiness as such should be seen as indispensable
for ones self-esteem or the esteem of others. There is something deeply
wrong with a society that allows and even encourages half of the popula-
tion into believing that that is thecase.
10.5. Pornography:Part Problem, Part Solution
For L&I, considering someone sexy is, or should be, a matter of making
the correct judgment:you ask yourself whether the person under consid-
eration has a magnificent body infused with sexual subjectivity and if the
answer is no, they are not sexy; if the answer is yes, they are sexy. This
then is followed by an ethical imperative:you have to make your feelings
and desires match your judgment. So, in suggesting a way forward, L&I
mainly place emphasis on the individual responsibility that every one of
us has in making a correct assessment and doing the right thing. One can,
however, have serious doubts about the effectiveness and feasibility of such
The clip (and transcription) are available on the BBC website:http://www.bbc.com/news/

2.
uk-23214821.

210
a proposal. To begin with, feelings of sexual attraction often go against our

better judgment and are very hard to steer or control. We typically do not
choose whom we fall in or out of lust with. Biology plays an important part
in this, naturally, but is by no means the only factor in play. Ones upbring-
ing and education, as well as the images and stories one is confronted with
on a daily basis, in advertising, in the media, in the arts, in the many forms
of entertainment:all of this has a tremendous influence. It is these culturally
specific and ultimately changeable processes of socialization that we think
should be the main focus of any attempt to address contemporary issues
with sexiness. Granted, if all of us were to simultaneously adopt L&Is
revisionary account of sexiness and were able to manage our feelings and
desires accordingly, then the problem would disappear. But how this could
ever come about in reality is something L&I do not explain. Simply relying
on the moral compass of people, or on the effectiveness of a philosophical
argument in convincing people, wont get us veryfar.
Instead of revising the very concept of sexiness and placing the onus on
the individual, we think it is crucial to look to the social level and revise
the way we actually raise and educate our children, along with the manner
in which models of sexiness operate in the media and advertising, in the
arts and the entertainment industry. Evidently, there is not enough scope
to investigate in detail how the continuous promotion of gender inequality
through these different channels takes place and can be countered (Lorber
[2012] provides a good starting point). However, we do want to complete
our critique of sexiness with a critique of one area of representation that
we have left unmentioned so far but that has had a huge impact on what
and whom we find sexy:pornography.
By eroticizing certain actions, bodily features, and personality traits,
pornography not only reflects but also helps to shape what and whom we
find sexy. If that is so, and one can find an elaborate and compelling argu-
ment for this in Eaton (2007), it is reasonable to assume that pornography
is partly responsible for what has gone wrong with the standards of sexi-
ness in our society. But it also follows that pornography, given its potential
impact on our sexual likes and dislikes, can become part of the solution.
Hence, before taking a wholesale stance for or against pornography, it is
important to know what kind of pornography is being considered.
Inegalitarian pornographythat is, pornography that eroticizes the
mechanisms, norms, myths, and trappings of gender inequality (Eaton
2007)is likely to contribute to all of the problems highlighted in
Section 10.3 and should therefore be opposed. (Similar problems arise
with pornography that eroticizes aspects of racial inequality; see Zheng
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in Chapter9 of this volume.) Avery large part of 20th-century main-

stream pornography falls in this category. All too often in these films,
photographs, and stories, men are portrayed as confident, active and in
charge, whereas women are shown as passive and subordinate in a va-
riety of ways. All too often one will encounter forms of objectification,
from the subtle to the very blatant, being made into markers of sexiness.
Moreover, most mainstream porn of that era seems to convey the idea
that you can only be sexy as a woman if you have a stereotypically sexy
body. The actresses of 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s mainstream pornog-
raphy are young, tall, thin, and fit, with glossy hair, smooth skin, full
lips, and firm breasts. Male actors did not have to fit a similarly narrow
stereotype (just think of the most famous male porn star, Ron Jeremy,
also known as The Hedgehog). As such, this kind of pornography did
indeed project and endorse a very narrow conception of what is sexy for
awoman.
Other authors have written about censorship, boycotts, and other ways
in which the pernicious influence of this kind of pornography can be
stopped or curbed (see, for instance, Dwyer [1995] and Eaton [2007]). In
the remainder of this chapter, however, we want to address how pornog-
raphy itself has a role to play here and how it can be part of the remedial
process. The basic idea is simple:if inegalitarian pornography is a serious
issue of concern, then egalitarian pornography may actually help to ad-
dress thisissue.
Egalitarian pornography is pornography that is premised on the full
equality between sexual partners and hence does not eroticize any acts of
violence, humiliation, or objectification or any of the gender stereotypes
that help to sustain gender inequality. Production companies like Puzzy
Power, a subdivision of Lars von Trier and Peter Aalbaek Jensens pro-
duction company Zentropa, were founded in the late 1990s with the aim
to produce and market precisely this sort of pornography. Excerpts of the
Puzzy Power Manifesto (http://www.puzzypower.dk/UK/index.php/om-
os/manifest), which served as a guide for the production of films, attest
tothis:
women must not be subjected to violence or coercion against their will.

() What we hate is the oral sex scene where the woman is coerced to
perform fellatio, her hair pulled hard, and come is squirted into her face.
() The films must be based on womans pleasure and desire. () We
must see the beauty of the body, of the male body, too, and he is welcome
to offer his body uptous.

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This resulted in aesthetically appealing films like Constance (1998),

Pink Prison (1999), and All About Anna (2005), which were directed by
women, aimed at women, and featured strong, confident female leads who
are not just consenting to certain sexual acts but actively taking control of
their own fantasies.3
Directors such as Anna Span, Erika Lust, and Muriel Scherre (to name
just a few) have since taken over the baton and continue to make work in
this vein, clearly inspired by the shared thought that is formulated so well
by the performer and filmmaker Gala Vanting:
You cant really sit around complaining about womens representation in

porn and expect that to change, so you need to actually wrangle the means
of production yourself and get out there with a camera, and make what you
want tosee.4
In addition, and perhaps instigated by these new voices and directions in

pornography, the new millennium has seen more and more mainstream
pornographic films being made on an egalitarian basis, although it is pretty
evident that this positive evolution is not driven by any high-minded ideals
but rather by blunt economic calculation (the idea being that an increase
in female consumers will lead to an increase in profits). However that may
be, by not making the gender stereotypes and objectification into markers
of sexiness, with a camera lingering not just on the naked female body
but also on male bodies, and with a narrative that gives equal weighting
to male and female pleasure, egalitarian pornography is one of the forces
that may help counter the influence of inegalitarian pornography and have
a more beneficial impact on what and whom is regarded assexy.
10.6. Radical Egalitarian Pornography
Our pro-egalitarian porn stance comes with two important provisos. First,
pornographic films with confident female characters who seem to be in
charge do not ipso facto qualify as egalitarian pornography, for female
performers can be (and frequently are) shown as actively desiring and
3.
Puzzy Power was not the only, nor the first, production company to depart from the mainstream.
For instance, Candida Royalle founded her Femme Productions company in 1984 with the express
aim of making so-called couples porn and films based on female desire.
4.
Gala Vanting speaking in the short film Something Better:Performers Talk Feminism and Porn
(directed by Ms. Naughty), Australia:Bright Desire,2014.
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consenting to degrading acts. As former porn star Patrice Roldan (aka

Nadia Styles) recalls:
I would say Treat me like a little slut or Fuck me like a whore.

I would say the most degrading things I could say about myself because
Ithought this was what it meant to be sexy and what people wanted to hear.
(Cited in Hedges 2009,62)
Given the existence of what in the philosophical literature is referred to as

adaptive preferencesthat is, preferences that are inconsistent with basic
human flourishing and formed under conditions that are nonconductive
to human flourishing (Khader 2011)it is abundantly clear that it is not
enough for a film to show a woman positively wanting to look or act or be
treated in a certain way for it to qualify as egalitarian pornography.
It is key to keep this in mind even when considering films distrib-
uted under the label of female-friendly pornography. Take Erika Lusts
breakthrough short film The Good Girl (2004) that tells the story of Alex,
a successful businesswoman who often thinks about sex but usually does
not find the time or courage to act upon it. After a phone call with a
friend who challenges her to be more sexually adventurous, she takes a
shower, orders pizza, andlo and beholdthe goods are delivered by
a tall, handsome delivery guy. This is an opportunity that Alex will not
let go by. In many ways this film offers a refreshing alternative to (and
parody of) mainstream pornography. But in other respects, it falls sig-
nificantly short. For instance, when Alex drops her towel in an attempt to
seduce the pizza delivery guy she appears shy, clumsy, and insecure. It is
a very erotically charged moment, but that is precisely the problem:much
like mainstream pornography, the film eroticizes the gender stereotype of
a vulnerable woman versus a confident man. Moreover, at the end of their
tenderly and beautifully filmed lovemaking, Alex asks the delivery guy
to cum on my face like they do in porn movies, which he then happily
does. Thus, the film continues and even celebrates this most prevalent
trope of inegalitarian pornography rather than subverting it. While this
may be female-friendly pornography, it is not egalitarian pornography
(being friendly toward someone and treating her as an equal are two dif-
ferent things).
Second, just because something qualifies as egalitarian pornography
this does not mean it is therefore above criticism. Films like Constance,
Pink Prison, or All About Anna, for example, still fall short in addressing
some of the problems highlighted in Section 10.3. In particular, they seem

214
to subscribe to and project the view that only one type of body is truly
sexy. The actresses and actors all appear to fit the same mold, and a real
diversity of bodies is lacking. Furthermore, they are very heteronormative
in outlook (there is no gay male sex, and the lesbian scenes function only
as a prelude or interlude to the main act of heterosexual sex) and seem to
build on a rather essentialist view of female sexuality as being emotional,
soft, and sensitive. As it says in the Puzzy Power Manifesto (http://www.
puzzypower.dk/UK/index.php/om-os/manifest):
Feelings, passions, sensuality, intimacy, and the lead-up must be empha-

sised. The woman must be turned on, and her anticipation be built up
into insurmountable lust, as the joys of anticipation are and will always be
the greatest.
It is here that the need for what is commonly termed feminist pornogra-
phy becomes apparent. Feminist pornography is deliberately not aimed
at a singular female viewer (the woman) but at a multiplicity of viewers
with different sexual preferences and identities. And while it can include
touchy-feely scenes and stories, there is no need for it to be vanilla.
According to the Feminist Porn Book, feminist porn uses sexually explicit
imagery to contest and complicate dominant representations of gender,
sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, disability, age, body type, and other iden-
tity markers (Taormino etal. 2013, 9). Or as Carlyle Jansen, founder of
the Feminist Porn Awards in Toronto, putsit:
Women and/or traditionally marginalized people must be involved in the

direction, production, and/or conception of the work; the work must depict
genuine pleasure, agency, and desire for all performers; and the work must
expand the boundaries of sexual representation on film, challenge stereo-
types, and presents a vision that sets the content apart from most main-
stream pornography. (cited in Vasquez2014)
Because the aim is to reach and involve not just women but also other tra-
ditionally marginalized groups and to include queer, transgender, and gay
porn, some have preferred to use the term alternative pornography/ies
(sometimes shortened to alt porn; see Biasin etal. 2014; Janssen 2014).
But while this term may indeed be more inclusive, it runs the risk of being
too inclusive. After all, some niche pornographies provide an alternative to
the mainstream but in a bad way (e.g., crush or rape pornography). Other
pornographic works may be alternative but not sufficiently egalitarian (cf.
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The Good Girl). That is why we propose to use the term radical egali-
tarian porn for the kind of work described in the two quotes abovea
label that is more inclusive than feminist pornography but less vague
than alternative pornography. So, pornography that is radically egalitar-
ian is pornography that militates against the perpetuation of any harmful
stereotype in such a way that exposure to this kind of pornography will no
longer have a detrimental impact on our responses of sexual attraction but,
on the contrary, might help to bring them in line with our ideas of gender
equality.
In closing, we briefly want to discuss what we see as two natural
allies of radical egalitarian pornography: art and the Internet. Firstly,
some antipornography feminists consider the Internet a great threat be-
cause it has made the production, distribution, and consumption of por-
nography so much easier, which has opened the door to the deplorable
pornification of culture and of sex (see, for instance, Paul 2005). But
if you take into account the great variety of pornographies out there,
and in particular the positively subversive potential of radical egalitar-
ian pornography, it becomes clear that this is a one-sided view. Take
the group of people that L&I have rightly drawn attention to as being
marginalized under the current sexiness regime: disabled and elderly
women. One of the problems they face in contemporary society, as was
argued in Section 10.3, is that they will less frequently appear sexy to
other peopleno doubt due in part to the fact that they rarely feature as
sex symbols in the mainstream media. Internet pornography can help to
counterbalancethis.
That Internet pornography can be liberating for people with unusual
sexual preferences has often been commented on. Turner Prize winner
Grayson Perry, for instance, attests:
what the internet did was tell you that you werent alone. And it was
shocking. When I was young, when I was about ten years old, I used
to have this fantasy, which used to turn me on greatly, of being in a
body castlying in hospital, motionless, unable to move. And then when
the internet came along, one day I just thought, I wonder, and then
I just googled plaster casts and likeeugh! Theres websites called
things like Cast Your Enthusiasm. Its an offshoot of bondage. (Eno and
Perry2013)
The flipside of this, if you want, is that the Internet can have an equally lib-
erating effect on people who in the pre-Internet age would find no external

216
confirmation for the thought that they, too, might be experienced as sexy
by other people. Porn director Anna Span said in an interview:
I always say to women, if theres something you dont like about your body,
put it into a search engine, add the word porn and you will find a load of
sites where that is the most attractive thing about youwhether you are
very hairy, or very fat or an amputee. There is [a kind of porn] for every
preference. (Cited in Gardner2013)
Likewise, while the sexuality of disabled or elderly people is still all

too often ignored in the everyday world, this is not the case in the world
of (radical egalitarian) pornography. There is porn made by and featur-
ing elderly and disabled men and women. Aparticularly powerful exam-
ple is Breaking Barriers starring Encarna Conde, a wheelchair user who
has a muscle control disorder called ataxia and is also president of the
Association of Andalusian Ataxia Groups (see Tremlett 2006). Thanks to
the Internet (and Internet communities), this is now easily and globally ac-
cessible. (Again, this is not to say that pornographic films and photographs
involving disabled and elderly people cannot be objectifying and exploit-
ative; too many of them still are, unfortunately.)
Secondly, art. More often than not, pornography and art are thought
of as fundamentally incompatible. The former merely panders to peo-
ples tastes, some have argued, while the latter tries to educate our tastes
(Scruton 2009). Art, says Gordon Graham, aims to stimulate new interest
and value in its readers, and not merely to accept and exploit their pre-
existent interests and values. Its hope is not simply to serve but to create its
audience (Graham 2008, 159). By contrast, the goal of mainstream com-
mercial pornography is first and foremost to serve and gratify its audience.
Its formulaic and conformist character is a direct consequence:storylines
and role plays that have proven effective are repeated over and over again,
sex always proceeds along the same well-trodden path (from oral sex to
various forms of penetration culminating in the obligatory money shot),
and any real deviation from the heterosexual norm is taboo lest it might be
offensive to some consumers tastes.
However, things are different with radical egalitarian pornography.
Because works of this kind set out to challenge the existing sexiness regime
and its underlying prejudices, and because their aim is precisely to expand
and educate viewers sexual tastesunder the motto informed sex is
better sex (Carlyle Jansen, quoted in Vasquez 2014)they are compelled
to seek out innovative and thought-provoking ways of representing (the
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217
role of gender, race, ethnicity, class, disability, age, and body type in) sex
and sexiness. Acase in point is Skin.Like.Sun (2010; Jennifer Lyon Bell
and Murielle Scherre), a stylish pornographic documentary about a real-
life couple filmed in real time so as to convey the unscripted progression of
a genuine sexual encounter. Or One Night Stand (2006; Emilie Jouvet), a
collection of five vignettes exploring a variety of sex acts, body types, and
gender expressions in a dark underground lesbian and queer club, filmed
in situ with a handheld camera and with a raw DIY punk aesthetic as a
result.5 It is their radical egalitarian agenda that motivated these filmmak-
ers to experiment with both content and form in such a way that their cre-
ations have at least as much in common with art films as with mainstream
commercial porn films. And while they may not be able to compete with
the latter in production value, they far exceed their mainstream counter-
parts in cognitive value, originality, and general artistic quality.
Indeed, if we accept, as we have argued elsewhere (Maes 2011, 2012,
2013), that the distinction between art and pornography is not an absolute
one, and that there is in fact a middle ground between these two domains of
representation, it is only to be expected that most works of radical egalitar-
ian pornography will be situated in or very near this middle ground and may
legitimately lay claim to the status of pornographic art or artistic pornog-
raphy. This easy confluence of radical egalitarian and artistic ambitions is
only to be encouraged, we believe. For one thing, achieving art status would
grant these films prestige and a special sort of authority that would help to
undermine the influence and authority that inegalitarian porn still has in mat-
ters of sex. Moreover, it will help to pave the way for an open discussion of
such works in the public domain and for a proper art critical analysis of this
specific genre. (The fact that there is no public porn criticismin the way
that there is film criticism or art criticismis probably one of the reasons
why prejudice and misinformation can so easily spread and thrivehere.)
In sum, and to conclude, we have made the case, starting from our re-
flections on sexiness, that a sensible anti-inegalitarian porn feminism is to
be complemented with a forceful and feminist pro-egalitarian porn stance
and that in particular the production and online distribution of radical egal-
itarian pornographic art deserves to be supported and promoted. This is
one way of getting at the truth of, and lending further substance to, Annie
Sprinkles often-cited quip:The answer to bad porn is not no porn, but to
make betterporn.
5.
Thanks to Sara Janssen for pointing me in the direction of thesefilms.

218
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CHAPTER11 In/Egalitarian Pornography

A Simplistic View of Pornography
Petra van Brabandt
11.1.Introduction
For more than four decades feminist theorists have criticized pornography.
The most forceful objection concerns its subordination of women. Some
scholars argue that egalitarian pornography (Eaton 2007)is exempt from
this criticism. Because it offers a genuine pornographic experience with-
out representing and endorsing the subordination of women, it seems the
perfect compromise between feminist philosophy and pornography.
However sensible this may sound, Ihave some reasons to be skeptical.
On the one hand, while it is true that feminist philosophers criticism pri-
marily concerns inegalitarian pornography, a closer look reveals a progres-
sive suspicion of all pornographic images. This impression is enhanced by
the fact that there is no dialog or exchange on what exactly makes specific
images inegalitarian. Some feminist philosophers go even further and dis-
approve of the use of pornography in general, whatever the content of its
images. If this is the case, then, feminism is incompatible with all porno-
graphic images, including putatively egalitarian ones. On the other hand,
Ihave reservations about egalitarian pornography. Dividing pornogra-
phy into egalitarian and inegalitarian materials is a half-hearted attempt to
open up the notion of pornography in feminist philosophy, based on lim-
ited familiarity with pornography. An analysis of the content and aesthet-
ics of contemporary pornography shows that its meaning is more complex
and less stable than the opposition inegalitarian/egalitarian pornography
can account for. What at first sight could seem inegalitarian might prove
more dynamic and contested.
222
This said, I do not contest that some trends in mainstream hetero-

sexual pornography are problematic, not in the least the social script of
male sexual activity and female sexual passivity. Yet (as Iwill argue here)
instead of focusing on the simplistic evaluative categories of egalitarian
and inegalitarian pornography, we should rather highlight the variety and
criticality of queer pornography. Queer pornography challenges hetero-
sexual mainstream pornographys gendered roles, bodies, and scenarios,
yet it also does justice to the cultural, psychological, and emotional com-
plexity of mainstream pornography; it does not shun the representation
and endorsement of sexual power dynamics, including subordination and
violence.
11.2. You Say Pornography!
Pornography activates different meanings and values according to the

different contexts in which the term is used. In a newspaper headline Art
or Pornography?, pornography refers to artworks that produce disgust
in certain viewers. This disgust is produced by the depiction of nudity,
explicit sex, sexual violence, transgression of social sexual norms, or sex-
ploitation. Opinion makers rightly perceive that this reaction is similar
to what pornography might elicit, yet they wrongly conclude that these
works therefore stand in opposition to art. There exists indeed a category
of artworks we can properly qualify as pornographic art (Maes 2011a,
2011b); to call these works pornography, in the sense of being opposed
to art, is taking ones taste preferences in art as definitional (Prinz and Van
Brabandt 2012). The question Art or pornography? reveals in these cases
first the speakers opinion that good art aims at sublimation or purposeless
beauty, and second her desire to empty art from all works that do not have
this ambition. Pornography is in this context used to install a prescriptive
hierarchy between the civilizing forces of art and brutalizing pornography.
In feminist philosophy the term pornography maps things simi-
larly. We are familiar with several definitions of pornography, some of
which are foundational to feminist philosophy of pornography. Almost
every article, for instance, refers to Catharine MacKinnons definition
(MacKinnon 1987). Another commonly cited example is Helen Longinos
(Longino 1980). More recently, Melinda Vadas focused on the use rather
than the content of pornography (Vadas 2005); and Rae Langton has also
explored this account (Langton 1995). There are several more feminist
definitions of pornography, but what most have in common is their use
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223
of pornography as a negative evaluative term to indicate a category of

sexually explicit images that afford arousal and release through content
that endorses or condones womens subordination. In this sense feminist
philosophers use of the term is comparable to the art critics and is in-
debted to a cultural-critical use of pornography as a negative evaluative
term. It is the cultural critic who says This is pornography and means
This is bad. Feminist philosophy specifies this badness in a political and
emancipatory way:This is bad for women.
This political use of pornography is interesting and effective, yet fem-
inist philosophers nevertheless fall short in relating their use of the term
to its ordinary use. This ordinary use refers to an endless variety of sexu-
ally explicit materials that afford sexual stimulation, arousal, or release,
including both inegalitarian and egalitarian materials. That the philosophi-
cal use of a word differs from the everyday use is in itself not problem-
atic; being part of the philosophical aim of conceptual clarification and
appropriation, an alternative description (Rorty 1991) can be clarifying
and revealing and can even reset the score of the game. One possible effect
of feminist philosophers use of pornography, however, is linguistic con-
tamination. By dropping the qualifier inegalitarian and replacing it with
the generic term pornography, the specific criticism and condemnation of
pornography (in feminist terms) might spread to the broader category of
pornography (in everyday use). This could enhance societys negative at-
titudes toward sexually explicit images and have a cooling-down effect on
the efforts of pornographers at making innovative pornography, be it from
a commercial, aesthetic, or critical perspective. Further, we can wonder if
feminist philosophys use of pornography in terms of the subordination of
women has not contributed to a pornographic gaze. This is a variation
on what Mihail Evans (2015) calls the pedophile gaze. In our culture,
obsessed with pedophilia, our gaze is restructured into a simulacrum of
the gaze of the pedophile (Evans 2015, 152). Images of children become
sexualized by this pedophile gaze, which is apparent from the controver-
sies surrounding the works of Nan Goldin, Rinneke Dijkstra, and Richard
Prince. Asimilar effect might have resulted from the feminist definitions
of pornography. It restructures our gaze into the simulacrum of the gaze
of a women-subordinating heterosexual man and constructs in all porno-
graphic materials signs of subordination. This effect is not only detrimen-
tal to the analysis of pornographic images, but also to experiments with
alternative pornography.
Linguistic and perceptual contamination is enhanced by the fact that
feminist philosophers rarely engage with pornographic images; they
IN/EGALITARIAN PORNOGRAPHY |223

224
remain highly abstract about what exactly distinguishes subordinating

pornographic images from nonsubordinating ones. Specifically, in femi-
nist philosophy the discussion on the interpretation of images is simplistic
and limited. For instance, MacKinnons definition is quite graphic, yet it
remains open to much confusion. For her, pornography is about graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and words
that includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, who enjoy humilia-
tion or pain, and in scenarios of degradation, humiliation, injury, torture,
shown as bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these condi-
tions sexual. But which images represent women as not just sexual objects
but dehumanized sexual objects? What are postures of sexual servility,
and are the context, narrative, title, and specific succession of images ir-
relevant? When does an image represent a body part so that the woman is
reduced to that body part, and when not? And what is the relation between
subordination and the representation of a bleeding woman as sexual? In
some pornographic art-house films we come across representations of
bleeding women as sexual; these representations are actually everything
but degrading, as is for instance the case in the films of Catherine Breillat
(Anatomy de LEnfer, 2004)and Claire Denis (Trouble Every Day, 2001).
In Anatomy de LEnfer, the female protagonist tries to escape the hetero-
sexual pornographic gaze, so she pays a homosexual man to look at her
body in all its details and states. The male character is played by Rocco
Siffreddi, a famous Italian porn actor. Breillat puts him in scenes of rest
and observation; playing a homosexual man in a heterosexual interaction,
he is not prompted into sexual action. In what follows, a dynamic of dis-
gust and desire unfolds in which the swift pornographic gaze is replaced
by a female nude aesthetics that transgresses its traditional purpose. Hair,
menstruation blood, the anus:nothing is hidden from long and close-up
observation. The homosexual character is first disgusted by this female
body, yet it is exactly in all of its transgressive radicality (for instance,
when blood is troubling the limits between the pure outside and the impure
inside, first leaving the body through the vagina, then re-entering the body
through the mouth) that this female body re-emerges to him, and to us,
the viewers, as a singular sexually desirable body. In Trouble Every Day
the aesthetics of blood is even more radical. Denis plays out Batailles
eroticism as an affirmation of life into death. Her characters are contem-
porary vampires and their sexual encounters reach their summit in baths
of blood. Denis too transgresses the border between inside and outside,
in her case by a radical interpretation of the love bite. Not only does this
encounter bear on a strong symbolic dimension; Denis aesthetic of the
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225
flesh, realized through camerawoman Agns Godards take on skin, hair,

and blood, also produces a visceral reaction in the spectators, if not a por-
nographic experience. Both of these are art-house films of the genre New
French Extremity, and they are considered to be pornographic art in estab-
lishing their aesthetics in relation to mainstream pornography. They are
also examples of a critical, feminist position, especially in their explora-
tion of the sexual power dynamics. In Anatomy de lEnfer Breillat em-
ploys a radicalized female nude aesthetics, by which she forces an escape
from the pornographic gaze. In Trouble Every Day, Agnes Godard real-
izes a radical wet aesthetics of the flesh, underscored by the Tindersticks
soundtrack, in which drums, keyboard, and strings drip and stream blood
over the spectator. Its specific sexual power dynamics is radically egali-
tarian; the characters played by the equally powerful Vincent Gallo and
Batrice Dalle are equally helpless, hungry, and violent in their sexual
desire. To conclude, representing a bleeding woman as sexual can be not
only sexually exciting, but also the core element of a nondegrading porno-
graphic aesthetics. Since the moral status of images is not different in por-
nography than it is in pornographic art-house cinema, we cannot conclude
that all representations of bleeding women as sexual in pornography are
necessarily degrading images ofwomen.
To avoid linguistic and perceptional contamination, an ongoing engage-
ment with images is necessary. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is lack-
ing in feminist philosophy. One finds descriptions and summaries of what
subordinating images might depict and do, but there is hardly any analy-
sis and discussion of specific (non-)subordinating images. In discussing
the connection between art and pornography, Anne Eaton (2012) offers a
feminist analysis of the female nude in Western art. In choosing nonpor-
nographic images, however, she succumbs to the cultural authority of high
art, which she addresses herself while pointing at the greater danger of
female objectification in art than in pornography. If feminist philosophers
of art would venture out of their comfort zone, some interesting collabora-
tion between feminist philosophy of pornography and feminist philosophy
of art could occur:a concrete analysis of pornographic images could be
afforded and our understanding of pornographic images, and the variety of
things they say and do, would be enhanced.
The problem with feminist philosophy on pornography, however, is
not only its lack of familiarity with and analysis of pornographic images,
but also its ambiguous position with regard to the use of pornographic
materials. In her content-based definition of pornography, MacKinnon
for instance differentiates between material that subordinates women

226
(pornography) and other sexually explicit material (erotica). Yet when she
talks about the use of pornography (as a sexual partner) and its objectifying
impact (when sex is something you do with a thing, it becomes something
you do with a thing even when you do it with a human being), it seems
to encompass all sexually explicit and arousing material, and therefore to
entail, as Rae Langton (1995, 180)suggests, that if erotica is used in the
same way as pornography (sex between persons and things), it is also por-
nography. It might be the case that there is a specific causal or constitutive
relation between the content of pornography (subordination of women)
and its being used as a sexual partner, a relation that could exclude erotica,
yet MacKinnon is not clear about this, nor is she explicit about how erotica
could be used differently than pornography.
Melinda Vadas also focuses on how the use of pornography subordi-
nates women. Pornography according to Vadas is any object that
has been manufactured to satisfy sexual desire through its sexual use or
consumption as a woman (2005, 187). With the expression use or con-
sumption as a woman, Vadas means in the role, function or capacity of
a woman (2005, 178). Using something as a woman is personification,
and in Vadass opinion this personification constitutes the objectification
of women. Jennifer Saul (2006) pointed out that in attributing to women
a role, function or capacity, Vadass redescription itself is degrading to
women: her amendment that it is about the role, function, or capacity
that (male) viewers of pornography attribute to women does not solve
the problem. According to Saul, Vadas gives no good reasons to assume
that all (male) consumers of pornography attribute such a role, function, or
capacity to women. For people to sexually consume objects as a woman,
a prior objectification of women has to have taken place. This implies that
Vadas cannot hold that it is this use of pornography that constitutes the ob-
jectification of women (Langton 1995); the objectification on the contrary
precedes the personification. (For a detailed discussion of Vadass view,
see Papadaki, Chapter7 in this volume.)
A more fundamental criticism, which can also be made against
MacKinnon, concerns the phenomenological truthfulness of our use of
pornography as having sex with it. Langton (1995) has called this quali-
fication uncontroversial, yet this is not self-evident. If one sees ones in-
teractions with pornography as having sex with it, one already holds a
limited view of what it is to have sex. Sex is then seen as the direct road
from arousal to release, which comes down to the optimal instrumentaliza-
tion of oneself and ones sexual partners toward this objective. This is not
what most sexual encounters come down to; precisely the fact that we are
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embodied beings, endowed with a fruitful imagination and uncontrollable

fantasies, detours this minimalist script when we have sex with ourselves
or others, and this even happens when we are intentionally looking for
a quick fix. MacKinnons assertion, then, that when you have sex with
things, you will also have sex with things when you have sex with human
beings should be reversed:having sex with human beings as if they were
things precedes having sex with things. If you consider your interac-
tions with pornography as having sex with it, then you have already a very
limited view on sex, in which you use yourself and other human beings as
pornographic materials. We can therefore generalize Sauls observations
that objectification precedes personification.
We could also approach things from a different angle. Lets assume for
a moment that our use of pornography can indeed be captured by having
sex with a thing. If we rephrase having sex as having sexual emotions,
this does not seem so implausible. The use of pornography as having
sexual emotions toward a thing would then replace the arousalrelease
paradigm. This rephrasing of pornography could bring us closer to a com-
parison with other genres:for instance, what else is tragedy than experi-
encing emotions of fear and pity toward things? What follows is the obvi-
ous question:if we have these emotions toward things, will we then also
have these emotions toward things when we have these emotions toward
human beings? From Aristotle to Nussbaum, philosophers have answered
this question negatively, and they have been quite appreciative of fiction
and its emotional impact. The emotional impact of things does not neces-
sarily have as a consequence the objectification of human beings, but there
can on the contrary be some edifying aspects in fictions emotive play with
imagination, identification, and moral limits. This play being pornogra-
phys stronghold, it seems evident that its edifying potential should not be
ruled out in advance. Put differently:pornographys emotional success is
not sufficient to speak of pornography as constitutive of the objectification
of women in the way Vadasdoes.
A further problem with Vadass definition is its heteronormativity that
excludes all homosexual, asexual, and queer pornography from being
pornography. Vadass position is not unique in this respect; most femi-
nist philosophers start from a heteronormative take on pornography. This
is explained by feminist philosophys primary concerns with the place
of women in patriarchal societies, in which equality between men and
women is not achieved and sexual violence of men against women is en-
demic. According to feminist philosophy, heterosexual inegalitarian por-
nography advances this domination of men over women. Further, feminist

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philosophy holds that sexual domination of men over women is not only a
symptom of patriarchal society; it is its fundamental paradigm. The rela-
tion between subordination and sexuality is thus intrinsically patriarchal;
therefore, all subordinating pornography could be seen as endorsing a pa-
triarchal society. This might sound reasonable, yet it endorses a hetero-
normative view of sexuality. Together with patriarchal society and psy-
choanalytic theory, it affirms the norm of heterosexual power dynamics. It
implies that in patriarchal societies nonheterosexual sexual subordination
is nothing but a misplaced identification with the heterosexual male perpe-
trator, a role-play defined by the heterosexual paradigm.
Sexual subordination and domination is an existing trope of our sexual
imagery. Whether it is related to what Bataille called eroticism as the
affirmation of life into death, to the transgression of liberal individual-
ism and egalitarianism, to what Scruton calls the normality of our sexual
urge, or to the patriarchal construction of our sexuality, or a combination
of those, is an open discussion not already dealt with from an exclu-
sively heteronormative framework. Nonheterosexual pornography calls
us to explore the relations between sex, domination, subordination, and
imagination from different angles and power relations. For now, it suffices
to say that excluding nonheterosexual pornography from pornography, or
reducing it to a heteronormative reading, is not only counterintuitive to
our ordinary pornographic practices, but it also empties out pornography
from an emancipatory or liberating potential. Queer pornography, for in-
stance, is based on the assumption that there are no stable sexual identities
or orientations; they are fluid and performative. Sexual desire therefore
emerges in these performative sexual practices. This assumption enables
queer pornography to undo the heteronormative stability of pornography,
and thus to counteract patriarchal society in its most fundamental struc-
ture. Egalitarian pornography is less radical:it addresses feminist phi-
losophys concerns with pornographys subordination of women, yet in
doing so it shares feminist philosophys assumption of heteronormativity.
Its egalitarianism is proposed as a solution for the wrongs of heterosexual
pornography, but it does not question the supposed stability of heteronor-
mativity and gender identities as a wrong in itself. The idea of heteronor-
mativity and stable gender identities, however, is exactly the supporting
structure of patriarchal society.
The above shows that the compatibility of feminist philosophy and egal-
itarian pornography is not straightforward. With regard to egalitarian por-
nography, feminist philosophers use of the term pornography is prob-
lematic in two ways. First, it excludes material that does not subordinate
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women from being pornography; therefore, it might be difficult to speak

of egalitarian pornography. Second, as the example of the representation
of bleeding women as sexual shows, some images may in theory be cat-
egorized as degrading women, yet in concrete instances their meaning
might be more complex, even egalitarian. In abstaining from concrete en-
gagement with pornographic images, the feminist categorization of what
counts as pornography becomes slippery, comparably to the operation of
what Evans calls the pedophile gaze. What makes the compatibility of
feminist philosophy and egalitarian pornography even more problematic
is the belief that the use of pornography (personification) constitutes the
objectification of women. This use-based criticism leaves no room for
egalitarian pornography, unless egalitarian pornography is to be used dif-
ferently. A last remark concerns feminist philosophys heteronormative
take on pornography. Addressing feminist philosophys criticism of por-
nography, egalitarian pornography is viewed in this same heteronormative
framework, neglecting more liberating pornographic projects that question
the stability of heteronormativity and gendered identities altogether, as for
instance the project of queer pornography.
11.3. ISay Inegalitarian
In the above, Iquestioned egalitarian pornographys ambitions. Not only

is its compatibility with feminist philosophy problematic, but because of
its heteronormativity, it is not the most liberating pornographic project.
In what follows, Iwant to express some further reservations with regard
to the seemingly straightforward categories of in/egalitarian pornography.
Ibelieve that this opposition only makes sense in a feminist, theoretical,
and heteronormative endeavor to distinguish good from bad pornography.
But the reality of images is messier, more complex, and less stable than the
egalitarian/inegalitarian distinction can account for. To make these con-
cerns vivid I will address some aspects of the content and aesthetics of
contemporary pornography. This will show the difficulties of talking in
such general terms as in/egalitarian. Iwill focus on endorsement, token
resistance, and the aesthetics of contemporary pornography.
Inegalitarian pornography is sexually explicit material that endorses
the subordination of women (Eaton 2007). With regard to specific por-
nographic images, however, we need discussion and dialog about how to
apply this criterion. Which features of the image and its context realize this
endorsement, and how? Let us take the example of Japanese pink porn.

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In these films the visual pleasure is realized by violently subordinating

women in a generalized patriarchal and even misogynist world. This en-
dorsement, and the viewers complicity, however, happens sometimes to
be exposed by the subtle interaction between narrator and protagonists,
narrative and camera perspective, image and language, and the specific
succession of scenes. The endorsement is indeed not obstructed or re-
versed by this processon the contrary, it is precisely through the endorse-
ment that the viewers awareness of her problematic pleasure position is
raised. It is difficult to conceive of films that are at the same time women-
subordinating pornography and feminist, yet Secret Chronicle:She Beast
Market (Nabber Tanaka, 1974) and Violated Angels (Kji Wakamatsu,
1967)are some controversial examples. In Violated Angels, for instance,
the camera is a furtive observer who follows from close by the despair of
the victims and the cold cruelty of the perpetrator, yet at regular intervals it
loses attention for the dramatic events, sexually attracted by and enjoying
the exposed bodies of killed and suffering women. The viewers identifica-
tion with this furtively moving camera and its exploitative search for plea-
sure is highly confrontational:it does not undo, yet raises nevertheless, our
awareness of the perverse pleasure position we occupy with regard to the
passive (dead, tortured) female nude. To understand the specific endorse-
ment a work embodies, it is then important to disentangle several aspects.
Who is the narrator, and can we be sure about her truthfulness? Is she
conflated with one of the protagonists or rather with the pretended neutral
perspective of the camera? Which kind of (shifting) identification process
is set in play by the camera? How is the succession of images constructed,
and to which external images, texts, or supposed reality do they relate?
What is the relation between image and language, image and frame? It is
easy to state that inegalitarian pornography endorses the subordination of
women, yet it might be more interesting to study how endorsement is not
necessarily a stable process and how it sometimes moves back and forth
between criticality and exploitation. Like all images, pornographic images
are complex images that we cannot exhaust by applying straightforward
moral categories; they are ambiguous images and reflect our own morally
ambiguous desires. This might be inconvenient, but so it is and so weare.
In the context of inegalitarian pornography, feminist philosophers
often refer to pornographic images depicting female token resistance.
Narratives of female token resistance all evolve around women initially
resisting sexual advances and interactions, yet finally enjoying the trans-
gression of their resistance and refusal. The moral of the story is that the
initial resistance was only fake resistance. Feminist philosophy states that
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this narrative lies about womens nature and desires and may even under-
mine the strength and credibility of their resistance and words, eventually
banalizingrape.
Koppelman reminds us that token resistance is a social script that
makes sense within a hierarchical conception of gender (2013, 184). As
long as women are socially rewarded for sexual modesty and moderation,
token resistance is rational, gain-maximizing behavior for women and
girls. It permits them to keep their reputation intact and at the same time
to enjoy sex. Therefore, even though token resistance might be a lie about
womens sexual nature, it does not lie about womens social position and
the strategies available to them to improve their power position given the
social structure in which they have to operate. It is similar to another gen-
dered social script, in which men have to prove their virility and potency
by constantly being in search of and open to sexual interactions. As social
and gendered scripts, token virility and token resistance have an impact on
the sexual dynamics of desire and pleasure, and therefore play an impor-
tant role in pornography. Whereas vintage pornographic narratives often
evolve around female sexual voracity and male sexual fragility (women
want sex; men cannot have or keep their erections), contemporary por-
nographic narratives primarily feature female token resistance and male
virility. It is only when these social gendered scripts dissipate that their
impact on our gendered desires and pleasures will diminish and their func-
tion in pornography will wither.
That feminist philosophy calls inegalitarian those pornography narra-
tives that feature female token resistance makes sense in the context of pa-
triarchal society and heterosexual relations. It nevertheless seems to throw
away the baby with the bathwater. Resisting something we want is one
of the most effective pleasure-enhancing mechanisms. Sexually we see
it most clearly in our ascent to orgasm: not rarely we cry no, no, no,
resisting as long as possible, only to enhance the final intensity we deeply
crave for. Token resistance therefore not only is a social script but also
says something about pleasure and the ways to enhance its intensity. This
is relevant in the interesting example of BDSM practices. In BDSM, the
pleasure-enhancing qualities of token resistance are taken into account,
yet not at the detriment of consent (Koppelman 2013):the latter is taken
radically seriously and fully implemented as part of the sexual narrative.
In BDSM interactions consent itself is eroticized (Reynolds 2010). This is
realized in two moments of explicit consent. First, there is the initial pro-
cess of consent, which comes down to a shared preparation and in itself
exciting anticipation of the script. Second, there is the stop word, which

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is different from no. In a BDSM context, the meaning of no is more

complicated than in situations of ordinary token resistance; no is the
quasi-instinctive reaction we give to pain. When the meticulous adminis-
tration of pain is used to enhance the intensity of pleasure, the utterance of
no is ambiguous and therefore replaced by a clearer stop word that both
parties explicitly agreeupon.
It is not clear if feminist philosophy can conceive of heterosexual BDSM
pornography as egalitarian pornography. Since the consensual signs are
more integrated in the BDSM practice than in its pornography, it might
be problematic to call these representations egalitarian. Eaton (2007, 676,
footnote 6), however, seems to leave some space for heterosexual BDSM
pornography being egalitarian, specifically in cases where heterosexual
partners take turns performing the dominant and submissive roles. This
exchangeability, however, seems very unrealistic:it is hardly psychologi-
cally credible that someone is at one moment a dom and at another a
sub, and it is therefore rarely the case in BDSMporn.
So far we have focused on endorsement and token resistance to il-
lustrate how pornographic images are more complex than the in/egal-
itarian paradigm can account for. Paying attention to the aesthetics of
contemporary pornography will only stress this conclusion. With the
exclusion of hentai pornography, the most popular pornography web-
sites (xvideos, pornhub, xhamster) reveal that the most influential trend
in contemporary Internet pornography is indebted to DIY aesthetics
(Aexa Internet, Aug. 11, 2014). This does not indicate, however, that
all that is out there is amateur pornography; professional pornogra-
phers commonly use DIY aesthetics for economic and popularity rea-
sons. This popularity is puzzling; whereas advertising and mainstream
cinema show a tendency toward more airbrushing and styling, more
perfectly Photoshopped bodies and environments, pornography seems
to take the opposite direction. The kitchens and rooms where the action
takes place could be yours or mine. Also, the bodies display a wide
diversity; this breaks not only with traditional mainstream pornogra-
phy, but also with contemporary visual culture and the tradition of the
female nude in Western art. Eaton (2012) argues that the problem with
the female nude in Western art is not that it objectifies a specific woman,
but that it objectifies women in general. Her claim is that the female
nude in the European tradition is almost always both generic and ide-
alised (Eaton 2012, 297):they are pale and without any trace of body
hair, with full round breasts and erect nipples (298). The problem with
these generic and idealized presentations of women is that they have a
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normative function () where the women depicted serve as ideals of

female beauty and erotic excellence (Eaton 2012, 298). The DIY aes-
thetics of contemporary pornography completely breaks with this tradi-
tion:not only is there a wide diversity of bodies, but they also transgress
the normative standard of female beauty and sexiness. (For a discussion
of sexiness, see Maes, Chapter 10 in this volume.) DIY pornography
seems to hold that all bodies can be sexually attractive. Even more, it
is precisely this ordinary body aesthetics that makes contemporary por-
nography so compelling; we are troubled by how the ordinary body car-
ries desire and release. We could refer to Roland Barthes punctum and
argue that it is the radical singularity of the individual bodya mole
on a bottom or a grimaced facethat holds the punctum of the porno-
graphic image and explains its spellonus.
Contemporary Internet pornographys DIY aesthetics goes beyond the
normative function of beauty and sexiness, yet it naturalizes sexual ex-
cellence. Whereas the first characteristic might liberate women from the
standards of beauty in advertising and visual culture, the second can hold
young people to unrealistic standards of sexual performance. For hetero-
sexual men this sexual excellence implies an enduring penis and a su-
permans stamina. For heterosexual women it often implies a position of
passivity. This passive position of women in pornography is in line with
the passivity of the traditional female nude in art history. For Eaton (2012)
it is the male gaze that constructs this passivity of the female nude. The
male gaze refers to the images endorsement of the woman depicted as
an object of sexual desire, even in situations that are totally void of erotic
content. The woman depicted is herself not actively desiring; she is only
there to be sexually desired and taken. It reduces the function and mean-
ing of women foremost to an erotic function, more specifically to a sub-
ordinate one. How does this male gaze operate in Internet pornography?
Pornography represents a sexual universe, and it therefore cannot convey
the message that womens primary and only function is erotic the way
advertising and art do. In advertising and art women are offered as objects
of desire in contexts that are not necessarily sexual, which stresses and
highlights womens primary function as erotic and sexual. Put differently,
if women are sexualized in nonsexual contexts (think of Manets paint-
ing Le Djeuner sur lherbe) this conveys that they serve only an erotic
function. We cannot make the same deduction from an intrinsically sexual
context. The context only speaks of itself. For that reason Iwould dare to
say that the male gaze in advertising, film, and art has a bigger impact on
the sexualization and objectification of women than pornographydoes.

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Is there then no male gaze at work in contemporary pornography? It

is normal that in pornography the erotic function of bodies is stressed;
pornography is by definition about explicit sexual interactions. Yet if a
woman consults heterosexual Internet pornography, she is confronted with
a substantial catalog of ways her body can be pleasured. Aman only sees
himself being represented as a penis, full stop. The story of heterosexual
pornography goes that there is nothing to a mans body other than a penis;
it seems to be the only tool that can give pleasure and the only receptor
of pleasure. This seems just a trivial observation, but it is more telling.
That a womans body is more explored in heterosexual pornography is a
consequence of all desire being oriented toward her; in heterosexual por-
nography man is the locus and beholder of desire. Female bodies are not
represented as desiring bodies, and women experience nothing about what
it is to desire mens bodies. Heterosexual pornography is mostly structured
by mens active desires. The poverty of mans body as an object of desire
is in heterosexual pornography the mirror of womans lack of desire.
The male gaze in contemporary pornography is the quasi-absence of the
female gaze. This absence is realized through gonzo filming, which is a
feature of the DIY aesthetics of contemporary pornography. Gonzo means
that one of the participants holds the camera (in reality this is not always
the case, and the shooter can also be close to the action). In heterosexual
pornography however, gonzo shooting invites the spectator into the male
perspective of action.
Whether this leads to the traditional objectification of women is not
so clear. The particularities of gonzo shooting have changed this tra-
ditional objectification process considerably. This is due to what Icall the
Bruegelian choreography of gonzo filmingcontemporary Internet por-
nography is to the female nude in Western art what a Bruegel painting is
to traditional landscape painting. In front of a traditional landscape paint-
ing, you get a clear overview of the landscape as possession; in front of a
Bruegel painting you are invited to zoom in, zoom out, go left, then right.
While zooming in, you miss what is happening elsewhere; while zooming
out, you miss the details. The perceptual choreography to which a Bruegel
painting invites the spectator is activating, troubling, jubilating, and acti-
vating again; there is no overview, stability, or control. This is comparable
to what is happening in gonzo pornography. Think of the traditional female
nude; the spectator sees a shape, with clear contours, separate from con-
text, and contained by the frame. The nude is stable in time and space, and
is presented to be possessed. In gonzo pornography, by contrast, there is
constant movement; the spectator is engaged in a changing choreography,
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not in a stable overview. Women are not represented with contours and
limits, they are not separate from their environment (which is hardly no-
ticeable), and they break out of the frame. Any possession is temporary,
and constantly deconstructed in further movements. Comparing gonzo
shooting to more traditional film and video pornography is even more
instructive. In traditional pornography, think for instance of the 1970s/
80s films of Grard Kikone or the more recent work of Marc Dorcel, the
camera progresses slowly and retains an outsiders position; the viewer
is offered a rather stable overview, regularly interrupted by moments of
action and close-ups. In gonzo pornography the viewer is no outsider; she
cannot hold the overview because she is in the middle of the action, not so
much as a voyeur who observes the sexual interaction, but as a male partic-
ipant, inflamed by maximum visibility and delivered to the sexual beat. In
this troubling and pulsating choreography, the womans body is explored
and visited indeed, but there is no time and space, letalone a clear head to
keep overview and possession. This makes it difficult to speak of the con-
struction of an object.
The Bruegelian choreography of contemporary Internet pornography is
enhanced by what Iwould call a wet aesthetics. Oil painting represented
the female nude as a firm body:its limits are clearly defined, its surface is
dry and contained, and its specific tactility orients us towards its posses-
sion (Berger 1972). The wet aesthetics of contemporary pornography on
the contrary is representing bodies as wet, slippery, attractive to the touch,
but difficult to possess. Sweat, sperm, blood, saliva, and milk soften the
edges of the body and melt down its object-like qualities. In this sense
the cum shot points at the essence of pornography as liquidification.
It symbolizes a warm, fluid encounter in which the spectator drowns and
loses possessive grip. Wet aesthetics is therefore radically different from
traditional pornography, in which sweat, sperm, and juices were less vis-
ible, but it also departs from contemporary visual culture in which the
body is a contained and disciplined body; hygiene, standards of beauty,
and health harness the body in advertising, for instance. The pornographic
body, with its sweat, juices, sperm, blood, unruly hair, and blemished skin,
transgresses these control mechanisms. It sins against the important com-
mandment that the body interior should not reveal its dirt on the exteriors
surface, and meets in this the feminist aesthetics of the aforementioned
art-house films of Breillat and Denis. Gaspard No explored in his latest
pornographic art-house film Love (2015) this wet aesthetics in a porno-
graphically promising way; the 3D technology made it possible for the
sperm to fly in the direction of the spectator, which gives both female and

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male spectators an enhanced and ungendering experience of the sexual

wetness and intensity on screen.
DIY, Bruegelian choreography, and wet aesthetics are features of some
of the most popular Internet pornography; they have an impact on the
traditional standards of beauty and the traditional objectification of the
female body. Most gonzo shootings are executed from the male perspec-
tive, thus constructing the female body as a receptive, passive body, and
the male body as an active, virile body, reduced to a penis. Male sexual
fragility and female sexual voracity, which were once tropes of pornog-
raphy, are now clearly pornographys most gated taboos. This gender in-
equality in Internet pornography warrants the qualification of inegalitarian
pornography, yet this qualification obstructs from view the more interest-
ing and promising features of popular Internet pornography, namely its
DIY, Bruegelian choreography, and wet aesthetics. It is queer pornogra-
phy that radicalizes these promising tendencies of mainstream pornog-
raphy. Queer projects such as Dirty Diaries (Mia Engberg, 2009)or A.L.
Steiner and A.K. Burnss Community Action Center (2010) are collections
of short movies that exemplify a radical wet aesthetics and Bruegelian
choreography; they push the limits of the traditional standards of beauty
and represent sexual intercourse as movement and dance rather than as
the possession (objectification) of the (female) body. What makes queer
pornography radically different from mainstream pornography, though, is
its lack of dualism in a male-active and female-passive pole. For this it
does not necessarily abandon gonzo filming, but it gets rid of its common
male position. For a heterosexual example of such queer pornography, it
is interesting to refer to Elin Magnussons short film Skin (2009, from the
Dirty Diaries). In this short film Magnusson stays close to the skin of an
act of heterosexual sexual intercourse, yet her camera constantly changes
position between the male and female point of view, so that it is difficult
to know which body you are looking at and who is manipulating what and
how. There are of course some identifying elements at play (breasts, penis,
vagina), yet these are elements belonging more to the interaction than fea-
tures belonging to gendered subjects. The gonzo filming and music are
important to realize this unifying choreography, but so are the use of skin-
colored, tightly fitting bodysuits that function as second skins. This second
skin initially prevents the viewer from clearly distinguishing a male and
female pole in the sexual interaction, and directs her attention to the wet
patches that slowly start to show on the material (armpits, mouths, geni-
tals). In Skin our excitement is realized not through the identification with
a man desiring a woman, or vice versa, but through the participation in a
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sexual interaction that plays with a wet aesthetics, with the anticipation
of fear, with the desire to remove the second skin, and a choreography of
bodies that are not distinct entities but a dance of skin onskin.
11.4. Transgression ofEgalitarianism
Above Ishowed how the categories of in/egalitarian pornography might

not be adequate to deal with the complexity of pornographic images. The
content and aesthetics of contemporary Internet pornography is less stable
and more multilayered than these categories can account for, and it is
queer pornography that accounts for and politically radicalizes this com-
plexity. In this last section, Iwill address how pornographys transgression
of egalitarianism challenges the in/egalitarian categorization. Also here, it
is queer pornography that in my opinion offers the best wayout.
Laura Kipnis (1996) has argued that pornography is about transgres-
sion. This transgression is not necessarily a danger to the social order;
as in tragedy, the denouement restores the social order. The same is the
case with pornography:after the climax the fictional space is closed and
the social order restored. The transgressions pornography plays with are
not that different from those explored in literature and films. We can cat-
alog a few basic taboos: incest, the intergenerational, the radical other,
the mother, the animal, blood, milk, excrement, and pain. For instance,
the Lolita trope in pornography plays, on the one hand, with this sexual
dynamics between knowledge, experience, decay, and death, and on the
other, with innocence, beauty, and life. In itself this transgression is not
problematic; it is rather instructive and exciting. What is problematic is
that in mainstream pornography innocence, beauty, and life are generally
gendered female (doctor/nurse, teacher/female student) and knowledge,
experience, and decay are gendered male (even though the popular catego-
ries MILF with daughters boyfriend and housewife with pizza delivery
boy seem to be popular exceptions to thisnorm).
Egalitarianism is another regulative ideal that pornography tends to
transgress. This transgression concerns the autonomous individual and the
principle of equality and is quite fundamental to pornographys explora-
tions of power dynamics. These explorations include subordination, dom-
ination, and surrender. How do these explorations fit the categories of in/
egalitarian pornography? Egalitarian pornography seems to be limited in
these explorations because it presupposes egalitarian interactions. In this
context, queer pornography is more promising. Its proposal to go beyond

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fixed sexual orientations and identities is nothing less than a proposal to

radically undermine the most fundamental structures of patriarchal society.
This implies that queer pornographys transgressions of egalitarianism are
not endorsing a patriarchal sexual gender hierarchy in which men sexually
dominate women. Queer pornography therefore has the potential to realize
a broader range of pornographic experiences than egalitarian pornography.
It can fully explore inegalitarian, even heterosexual inegalitarian sexual
interactions, including domination, subordination, and even violence, and
it can do so without endorsing the subordination of women by men. The
reason for this is that queer pornographys representations do not refer to
patriarchal society as it is, but project us in a future utopia beyond stable
gender identities, sexual orientations, and patriarchal society.
Queer pornography, then, has a clear pornographic advantage: it can
radically explore sexual power dynamics, and this does not exclude de-
grading or abusive interactions. Often the sign of consent is not only
absent, but its absence is also an essential part of the pornographic fantasy.
Agood example of queer art that explores this power dynamics is Feed/
Kill (2010) by the Indian artist Tejal Shah. The film shows two highly
made-up women in traditional Indian clothes sitting next to each other in
front of a low table covered with fruits, chutneys, chocolate paste, drinks,
and flowers. One woman feeds the other in a degrading and abusive way,
forcing the other to eat, sticking her fingers and hands in the others mouth,
pouring drinks in her mouth and over her face. The make-up starts to blend
with tears, leftovers of fruits, chutneys, wine, and water. The chosen fruits
and vegetables have phallic and vaginal connotations, and the fluids and
chutneys make us think of blood, excrement, and sperm. The woman who
is fed is submissive; she accepts and swallows everything and makes no
resisting gestures or noises. Her arms or hands are hanging passively along
her body. Now and then the two women look at each other, yet there is no
indication of anger, reproach, even less understanding. This video refers to
the ambiguous relation between host and guest, and mother and daughter;
it also has some references to the eating culture in India. Yet even though
this film is not sexually explicit, the dom/sub relation between the women,
the way the mouth and hands are used, and the symbolism of the food and
fluids have strong sexual connotations that have an intense emotional if
not pornographic impact on the viewer. The camera, which shoots both
women frontally and only zooms in on the feeding hands, liquids, food,
and mouth, does not invite us to identify with either of the women; rather,
we are viscerally addressed by the emotional impact of a wet aesthetics
and the transgressing of blood and excrement taboos, and by what it does
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to the receptive body when the ideals of individuality and equality are
transgressed.
Christophe Honors Ma Mre (2004), a film adaptation of Georges
Batailles story of the same title, shows a different transgression of the
principle of egalitarianism. It also sexually exploits the taboos of incest,
the intergenerational, the inside of the body, blood, pain, the mother figure,
and nonreproductive intercourse. Ma Mre depicts the sexual relation be-
tween a mother and her son, ending in the death of the mother, who cuts
open her belly to be penetrated by her son in her blood and bowels. The
more traditional intergenerational and incestuous opposition between an
older man and a younger woman is here transposed in the less conven-
tional power dynamics between mother and son. In Let the Punishment Fit
the Child (1997), Maria Beatty explores a film noir and German expres-
sionist aesthetics to transgress the same taboos. The result is a deeply trou-
bling black-and-white S/M pornographic film with two women, of which
the artist herself plays the role of the young mistreated child. The stress is
on token resistances intensity-enhancing qualities in sexual role-play and
sexual power dynamics. The aim is a game of frustration and disguise to
enhance and dislocate desire and pleasure.
Another path queer pornography has taken to transgress egalitarian-
ism is the sheer negation of resistance and refusal by the creation of what
we could call a pornutopia (Bauer 2007). In pornutopia, sexual interac-
tions are not the result of decisions of subjects, but the consequence of
constant desire. Shahs five-channel video installation Between the Waves
(2012) is a good example of such a utopia. It depicts an earth deserted by
human beings, where unicorn female-like creatures rediscover the natural
elements and their bodies. These creatures transgress the human/animal
distinction but also the idea of human beings as beings of speech and
choice. Shahs creatures are speechless, and their movements and interac-
tions seem only to be guided by a natural drive toward care and restora-
tion of nature and pleasure. With the unicorns horn firmly strapped on
the female-like creatures heads, they integrate a male dimension in their
identity, which makes a concession to mainstream pornography in its re-
fusal of mens fragile sexuality:their horns are immense and ever hard.
The creatures female identity is abundant in their curves, flesh, wetness,
and receptivity; they have a constant receptivity for penetration, caresses,
and fluids. Shahs camera is at moments distant to the occupations of these
creatures, but then again maximally close to their orifices, eyes, mouths,
and vaginas. The spectator is not so much invited into a process of identifi-
cation but rather absorbed and sucked into the abundance of wet flesh and

240
orifices. Shah also playfully integrates some references to BDSM aesthet-

ics, corseting the body in white straps, which only stress the abundance of
the flesh even more. As in Feed/Kill, red fruit and juices are integrated in
the sexual plays, referring to blood and functioning as lubrication for the
diverse penetrations. Between the Waves shows how queer pornography
addresses the complexity of mainstream pornography and subtly dislo-
cates its meaning.
11.5.Conclusion
Egalitarian pornography seems to be a category developed to serve two

masters, and yet as is often the case in these circumstances, it fails at both.
First, it wants to address feminist philosophys critique of pornography,
yet this critique is so ambiguous with regard to images and their use that
the project of egalitarian pornography can never be on stable grounds.
Even worse, by aligning itself with feminist philosophy, egalitarian por-
nography falls into the same heteronormative traps as inegalitarian por-
nography did. Secondly, egalitarian pornography wants to realize a truth-
ful pornographic space, yet its oppositional categorization (in/egalitarian
pornography) is too simplistic to make intelligible the complex meaning
and aesthetics of contemporary Internet pornography, letalone to take into
account pornographys radical transgressive potential. In this context, the
practice of queer pornography is more promising. Not only does it propose
a truly revolutionary position on gender identity and sexual orientation,
and therefore seeks to undermine patriarchal structures, but it also engages
in an ongoing dialog with contemporary pornography, realizing its most
promising aesthetic experiments and transgressive potential.
References
Bauer, Nancy. 2007. Pornutopia. n+1(5):6373.

Berger, John. 1972. Ways of Seeing. London:PenguinBooks.
Eaton, Anne W. 2007. A Sensible Anti-Porn Feminism. Ethics 117:674715.
Eaton, Anne W. 2012. Whats Wrong with the (Female) Nude? AFeminist Perspective
on Art and Pornography. In Art & Pornography, edited by Hans Maes and Jerrold
Levinson, 277308. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.
Evans, Mihail. 2015. Art in the Frame:Spiritual America and the Ethics of Images.
Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 2(2):143170.
Kipnis, Laura. 1996. Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in
America. NewYork:GrovePress.
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Koppelman, Andrew M. 2013. Another Solipsism: Rae Langton on Sexual Fantasy.

Washington University Jurisprudence Review 5(2):16387.
Langton, Rae. 1995. Sexual Solipsism. Philosophical Topics 23(2):149187.
Longino, Helen E. 1980. Pornography, Oppression and Freedom. In Take Back the
Night:Women on Pornography, edited by Laura Lederer, 4054. NewYork:William
Morrow.
University Press.
Maes, Hans. 2011a. Art or Porn:Clear Division or False Dilemma? Philosophy and
Literature 35:5164.
Maes, Hans. 2011b. Drawing the Line:Art versus Pornography. Philosophy Compass
6:385397.
Prinz, Jesse, and Petra van Brabandt. 2012. Why Do Porn Films Suck? In Art &
Pornography, edited by Hans Maes and Jerrold Levinson, 161190. Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.
Reynolds, Paul. 2010. Seksuele toestemming ontrafeld. Ethiek en Maatschappij
13(1):6890.
Rorty, Richard. 1991. Feminism and Pragmatism. Radical Philosophy 59:314.
Saul, Jennifer M. 2006. On Treating Things as People: Objectification, Pornography,
and the History of the Vibrator. Hypatia 21(2):4561.
use of Pornography and Womens
Inequality. Journal of Political Philosophy 13(2):174193.

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CHAPTER12 Feminist Pornography

A. W.Eaton
12.1.Introduction
When Catharine MacKinnon asserts in Toward a Feminist Theory of the

State that male and female are created through the eroticization of domi-
nance and submission (MacKinnon 1991, 113), she invites us to critically
examine what I call below our erotic taste (although she does not use
this term). What do we find to be sexy or otherwise attractive about other
human beings, as well as about ourselves? Why do we find these things to
be sexy? What work does our erotic tasteour sense of what is sexydo
in sustaining the existing socialorder?
It is difficult to ask such questions about erotic taste in the abstract
without thinking about what makes women and men sexy or otherwise
attractive. This is because erotic taste is typically bound to gender, and in
particular to gender norms. According to what Ibelow call our collective
erotic taste, some form of dominance is what makes men attractive, while
some form of submissiveness makes women attractive. This is precisely
why it is important to subject our collective erotic taste to critical scrutiny.
But many of us are reluctant to do this. For one thing, erotic taste can
seem merely given and so beyond ones rational control: we did not
choose to be attracted to the things that we find attractive, nor can we
simply decide to be attracted to other things instead. Following the idea
that ought implies can, there is no point in subjecting our erotic taste to a
feminist analysis. Another reason why many tend to resist subjecting erotic
taste to critical examination is that this can be deeply unsettling. Because
ones erotic taste often lies at the core of ones self-understandingunlike,
say, ones taste in socks (although we can imagine particular cases where
244
socks might matter that much)critically dissecting it can cause consider-

able discomfort.
Following MacKinnons prompt, this chapter urges that, despite these
difficulties, we subject our collective erotic taste to critical analysis. This
is because, Iargue in Section 12.2, our collective erotic taste plays a sig-
nificant role in sustaining the dominant patriarchal order. This exercise is
not futile, Ishall also argue, because erotic taste is shapedif not entirely,
then at least in significant partby social forces and through representa-
tions. This is where pornography enters my discussion. Section 12.3 dis-
cusses the ways in which vivid and compelling sexual representations can,
through repeated use, shape their users erotic taste in the direction of
gender inequality (what Icall inegalitarian porn). However, this convic-
tion in the power of representations to shape our sentimental lives should,
Iargue in Section 12.4, commit feminists to embracing forms of pornogra-
phy that serve to shape our collective erotic taste in the direction of gender
equality. Some of these new transformative forms of pornography are al-
ready being produced under the banner of what is often called feminist
porn. As we shall see, this is a vibrant and growing genre embracing
works that cater to a wide variety of proclivity and interests, all united by
a commitment to undermine gender injustice.
12.2. Erotic Taste and Patriarchy
By taste I mean an individuals or collectives standing disposition for

evaluative sentiments regarding some xwhether a particular thing or a
kind of thingwhere these sentiments are partially or fully constituted
by or based on pleasurable or displeasurable responses to some of xs
properties. Iconstrue sentiment broadly here to include various occurent,
affect-laden, object-directed mental states such as emotions and also some
feelings and pleasures. By evaluative Ido not mean that these sentiments
need involve explicit appraisals of the worth of the object toward which
they are directed; rather, the phenomenology of these sentiments is to
present their object as valuable and so worthy of experiencing, having, or
preserving (or as disvaluable and so to be avoided or discarded). To have
the taste for x, then, is to have the standing disposition to take pleasure
in x based on some of xs properties, whereas to have a distaste for x is to
have the standing disposition to be displeased by (or to have an aversion
toward) x based on some of its properties. This is the sense of taste in
play when we speak, for instance, of a persons having a taste (or distaste)
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for something (e.g., She has a taste for peaty whisky) or a taste in some-
thing (e.g., I admire his taste in shoes).
Taste is not here restricted to the sense that has been the focus of much
philosophical aesthetics, namely the rarefied faculty for discerning aes-
thetic excellence. Taste as Iconstrue it is not necessarily contemplative or
disinterested, nor need it be directed at high art or nature. Rather, Imean
the concept in the expanded sense that concerns what has come to be called
everyday aesthetics.1 Taste can beand most often isdirected at every-
day things like food, fashion, home furnishing, popular culture, automo-
biles, people, and finally, to the point of this chapter, various dimensions of
people (including their bodies) and most other aspects of our eroticlives.
In emphasizing tastes everydayness, however, Ido not mean to suggest
that taste is trivial or practically insignificant. On the contrary, as Iargue
in this chapter, Ithink that feminism has typically not taken taste seriously
enough, as if it were only peoples beliefs that really mattered in sustaining
sexism. This is a major oversight, Ithink, because taste, as Iconstrue it
here, plays an important role in precisely those aspects of a persons life in
which she is deeply invested. Taste really matters:it is highly motivating,
typically activating all sorts of behavioral tendencies, and it has, as Ihope
to demonstrate, many serious social ramifications.
This is especially true for what I call erotic taste, where the concept
erotic should be construed broadly to include a persons sexual taste
for instance, her positive and negative preferences for particular types of
sex acts, or orientation toward certain kinds of sex partnersbut also to
extend to ones general sense of what makes a person sexy or even simply
attractive. Erotic taste includes positive and negative preferences for par-
ticular kinds of mannerism and comportment (for instance, a persons way
of walking, talking, or holding themself), for activities such as a kind of
dance or sport, for particular facial and body types, for fashion and per-
sonal grooming (hair, make-up, fragrance), and for personality traits (such
as confidence or coyness), to name only a few. Erotic taste can even extend
to ones preferences for inanimate objects that are erotically inflected, such
as shoes or automobiles. Finally, erotic taste is not merely other-directed;
it also importantly includes ones own sense of what would make oneself
Everyday aesthetics has become its own subfield within philosophical aesthetics to which
1.
many articles and books have been devoted. My understanding of taste in the everyday sense has
been strongly influenced by Yuriko Saitos excellent study (2007), which also contains a useful
bibliography on the topic. See also Irvin (2008a, 2008b). For a criticism of Irvins argument, and of
in general overextending our concept of the aesthetic, see Soucek (2009).
FEMINIST PORNOGRAPHY |245

246
pretty or handsome, sexy, and otherwise attractive. (For more on our

standards of sexiness, see Maes, in this volume.)
To be clear, when Ispeak of our erotic taste, Imean the collective taste
that is manifest in the erotic aesthetic that dominates mainstream popular
culture, advertising, sex education, and the like in North America and much
of Europe. (I am not qualified to say whether this extends beyond these con-
texts.) As noted above, our collective erotic taste is governed by norms that
assume sexual dimorphism (that is, that there are only two biological sexes
and that these are mutually exclusive) and that are sexist, cis-and hetero-
normative, racist, fattist, and ableist. This notion of collective erotic taste is
meant to acknowledge the important fact that some ethnic, racial, and sexual
minorities, as well as some individuals, do not adhere to the dominant erotic
aesthetic, and that this is sometimes on purpose as the result of having culti-
vated strategies of resistance. Indeed, it is the point of Section 12.4 that femi-
nist porn can play an important role in resisting our collective erotictaste.
This chapter focuses on the many ways that the dominant gender
normsnorms regarding the behavior and characteristics considered ap-
propriate to females and males (where, to be clear, the dominant gender
norms are cis-and hetero-normative and assume sexual dimorphism)
inflect erotic taste in both its self-and other-directed modalities. The cen-
tral idea is that the eroticization of masculinity and femininity is a signifi-
cant component of the dominant mode of erotictaste.
As just noted, contemporary feminist thought, at least in the ana-
lytic tradition, tends to eschew considerations of the role of taste in
sustaining the current order. Ithink that part of this eschewal is due to a
misunderstanding about taste, a misunderstanding that Sally Haslanger
expresses when she worries that construing the claim crop tops are
cute as a judgment of taste would not make room for meaningful cri-
tique (Haslanger 2007, 73). But it is a commonplace in the philosophy
of art and aesthetics that this is a mistake: contrary to the adage De
gustibus non disputandem est, there is disputing about taste. For in-
stance, we can ask whether our judgments of taste are properly directed
at appropriate aesthetic properties. Andwhat is often an entirely dif-
ferent kind of questionwe can also inquire into the morality of our
judgments of taste; for instance, we can ask whether they support or un-
dermine social justice. The second and related reason for this eschewal
of taste is feminist analytic philosophys generally intellectualist ten-
dency, by which I mean a tendency to conceive of sexism primarily
in terms of peoples (misguided) beliefs about the two sexes (and, of
course, the actions based on these beliefs). Antiporn feminism tends
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to suffer from this tendency of being overwhelmingly concerned with

the falsehoods that pornography propagatesfor instance, falsehoods
about female inferiority, rape myths, etc. that it purportedly leads its
audiences to accept, whether consciously or unconsciously.
While Ido not disagree with the idea that false beliefs play a signifi-
cant role in sustaining sexism, and while Iaccept that the dominant form
of pornography can lead its audiences to internalize various falsehoods,
Iagree with Rae Langton (2012) that we need to move beyond belief to
give more attention to the role of the affective life in sustaining sexism,
and in particular more attention to taste. One important reason for this is
that on any plausible account of action, beliefs do not by themselves leaf
out into action: motivation is also required, and this, on most accounts,
must come from our affective life, in particular from our desires. More
important, when our affective life is norm-discordantthat is, when our
likes and aversions and fears and desires are out of sync with our deeply
held moral convictions and/or with what we know to be truewe are often
akratic; that is, it is the affective life that usually carries the day. It is for
these reasons that an account of the role of erotic tasteof what we find
desirable, attractive, and sexyneeds more attention from feminists and
theorists of other kinds of oppression. In particular we need to think about
the ways that erotic taste generates motivations and behaviors (on the part
of both men and women) that instantiate sex inequality. This means at-
tending to the eroticization of male dominance and female submission, as
MacKinnon exhorts us in the bit quoted at the start of thispaper.
To some, eroticization of dominance and submission may sound hy-
perbolic. Isubmit, however, that this is actually the right way to put things
and that it captures something significant about our collective erotic taste.
Here are just a few examples of the banal ways that the eroticization of
dominance and submission infects the dominant norms and practices that
infect everyday heterosexuallife:
Womens high heels are hobbling, even crippling, yet sexy, whereas
mens shoes are grounding, enabling, and foot-friendly.
Whereas men initiate romantic encounterswhether it be asking a
woman out on a date or asking for her hand in marriagewomen
wait to be asked. This is not simply customary; it is part of behaving
in a way that is considered attractive. Women commonly want men to
askthem.
Opening doors, carrying heavy packages, and paying for meals is still
very much a standard part of being a gentleman and still has a grip

248
on the dominant heterosexual romantic sensibility as expressed in

popular culture, norms of etiquette, andsoon.
When women exhibit diminutive postures and ways of speaking, it
sounds as if they are always asking questions and displaying a lack
of confidence in their assertions. Men, by contrast, command more
space, speak more loudly, and are more assertive, all of which is part
of being attractive under the dominant paradigm.
Heterosexual women display a marked preference for taller men,
and men a preference for shorter women. It is not simply that a man
should be tall to be attractive; he should be taller than the female with
whom he is coupled.
These are just a handful of ways that womens subordination to men

and mens domination of women are eroticized (in the expanded sense
described above) in daily life. I deliberately chose examples that are
not extremecompare these examples to, say, rape, which also is com-
monly eroticizedto make the point that the eroticization of male
dominance and female subordination is all around us and is unwittingly
promoted by well-meaning people, to use a phrase from Iris Marion
Young (2011).
The eroticization of female subordination and male dominance is so
pervasive that it is built into our everyday understanding of heterosexual
coitus. We standardly use the word penetration to denote intercourse,
figuring the male part as active (the thing that penetrates) and the female
part as passive (the thing penetrated). If, by contrast, one were to conceive
of the female member of this union as active and the male member as the
objectthe passive recipient of the actionwe would use terms like en-
velopment or invagination. My point is that the eroticization of female
passivity and submission to active and dominant males extends even to the
way that we conceptualize coitus in the first place:men act, women are
actedupon.
One significant locus of this eroticization of sex inequality is what
Ielsewhere call (and there following Larry May) inegalitarian pornogra-
phy (Eaton2007).
12.3. Inegalitarian Pornography
As mentioned above, when explaining the role of culture in maintaining

patriarchy, feminism tends toward a kind of intellectualism; that is, the
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focus tends to be on the ways that various cultural forms of representation

(from advertising to music videos to pornography) inculcate false beliefs
rather than on the ways that representations shape audiences emotional
landscapes (of which taste is an important part). For instance, when ex-
plaining pornographys role in sustaining sexism, MacKinnon gives a lot
of attention to the ways that pornography authoritatively asserts falsehoods
about women (e.g., the propositions that women enjoy subordinating
treatment) that are then internalized, in the sense of believed, by their
audiences.2 (This leads pro-pornography feminists like Laurie Shrage to
insist that the solution is not to limit or criticize pornography but, rather, to
focus on education and other mechanisms to, as she puts it, make people
unsubscribe to the idea that coercive sex is enjoyable [Shrage n.d.,3].)
This is not to say that antiporn feminism completely ignores the defor-
mation of our emotional lives under patriarchy. There are moments where
MacKinnon, for instance, attends to pornographys capacity to produce vi-
olent desires. As we saw at the start of this chapter, she highlights pornog-
raphys eroticization of male dominance and female submission (where, as
Iargued in Section 12.2, eroticization is primarily a matter of sentiments
and taste rather than belief). MacKinnons model here is classical condi-
tioning:pornography, she writes, works as primitive conditioning, with
pictures and words as sexual stimuli (MacKinnon 1996, 16). This picture
is troublesome for several reasons. For one thing, the model is determinis-
tically causal; this, Ihave argued, is implausible (Eaton 2007). For another
thing, classical conditioning rests on a kind of monkey-see-monkey-do pic-
ture that underestimates pornographys audiences, and in particular their
ability to distinguish between fiction and reality. As Langton and West put
it, pornographys audience members, on the conditioning model, have
more in common with the salivating dogs of Pavlovian fame than with
the political agents of liberal utopia (Langton and West 2009, 175). But
attention to pornographys effects on the sentimental lives of its audiences
(on our tastes, desires, pleasures, and so forth) need not take a Pavlovian
form. There is a decidedly different model of how pornography shapes its
audiences erotic taste, namely an Aristotelian model of habituation.3
2.
MacKinnon writes:Together with all its material supports, authoritatively saying something is
inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment are demarcated and actualized
(MacKinnon 1996, 31). This idea appears in its most precise and convincing form in Langton and
Wests essay (2009).
3.
What follows is based on Aristotles discussion of virtue and habituation toward virtue in
the Nicomachean Ethics, especially Book II. Aristotle discusses the use of representations in
habituation toward virtue in Book VIII of the Politics, the Poetics, and also the Rhetoric. Iargue for
the relevance of this model in A Sex-Positive Antiporn Feminism, forthcoming.

250
Aristotelian habituation is importantly different from operant con-

ditioning. On Aristotles account, the disposition to feel properly about
some object in the world is inculcated in a subject by repeatedly getting
the subject to have that feeling with the right intensity toward the object.
Representations, on Aristotles view, can play a critical guiding role in
habituation by encouraging their audiences to imaginatively engage with
represented objects (characters, inanimate objects, events, situations, and
the like). Aristotles basic idea is that representations solicit from their
audience particular sorts of sentimental responses and train them on repre-
sented objects in our imaginations, and in repeatedly doing so over time,
inculcate in this audience a predisposition to respond similarly to similar
objects in the real world. This directed imaginative engagement inculcates
in the audience a predisposition to see similar kinds of real-world objects
as meriting similar sentimental responses.4
There are two things worth noting about this. First, in order for repre-
sentations to do this kind of work in habituating, they must be vivid:that
is, they must be such as to convey the freshness of immediate experience.
Whatever else one might say about the aesthetic worth of pornography, it
is hard to deny that most pornographic representations possess vivacity in
the requisite sense. Second, while Aristotle is concerned primarily with
using representations to habituate audiences in the direction of virtue,
nothing in the nuts and bolts of his model precludes its applicability to
representations that habituate audiences in a morally unsalutary direction.
A sensible antiporn feminism as Iconceive it is decidedly Aristotelian
in its understanding of the power of pornographic representations to shape
their audiences erotic taste. The model proposed here does not attribute
determinative power to pornography, nor does it reduce pornographys au-
diences to salivating dogs. But nor should a sensible antiporn feminism
adopt the other extreme, which holds that representations have no effect
whatsoever on their audiences and merely cater to fully preestablished
In Book VIII, Section 5, of the Politics, Aristotle writes:When men hear imitations, even apart
4.
from the rhythms and tunes themselves, their feelings move in sympathy. Since then music is
a pleasure, and excellence consists in rejoicing and loving and hating rightly, there is clearly
nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming
right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions. Rhythm and
melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and
of all the qualities contrary to these in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change.
The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not far removed from the same
feelings about realities (1340a11-25). Aristotle says similar things in Poetics 1.1447a13-28 and
Rhetoric 1.11.1371b4-10. By imitations (mimesis) Aristotle means what we now mean by
representation, although he includes things under this concept that we typically do not today, like
music anddance.
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tastes. Instead, a sensible antiporn feminism follows Aristotle and

MacKinnon (or at least one strain of her thought) in respecting the power
of representations to actually shape what people desire and find attractive.
This is something that advertisers have long known:sufficiently vivid and
compelling representations can actually change what people want and find
attractive in the firstplace.
Like MacKinnons conditioning model, the Aristotelian model pro-
posed here is a causal model in that it aims to describe representations ef-
fects on their audiences. But unlike MacKinnons conditioning model, the
Aristotelian model respects the complexity of peoples engagements with
representations and reflects the way that pornographic representations
actually work in the world. As Ihave argued elsewhere (2007), a causal
model of pornographys harms need not be crudely deterministic, nor need
it portray pornographys audiences as unthinkingly and automatically as-
sociating stimulus with response, nor should it focus on the extreme but
rarer kinds of effect at the expense of the mundane and quotidian. The
causal model that Ithink antiporn feminism ought to adopt (a)is probabi-
listic, (b)holds ceteris paribus, (c)and is cumulative; that is, it insists on
the importance of repeated engagementAristotles habituation, after
all, takes time. And finally, this model (d)sees pornographic representa-
tions as one salient component of a larger complex causal mechanism that
deforms erotic taste and thereby sustains gender inequality (Eaton2007).
As mentioned above, advertising has picked up on something that
Aristotle described in some detail, namely that sufficiently vivid and com-
pelling representations can mold peoples tastes; that is, alter their sense of
what is desirable, attractive, and praiseworthy. While many kinds of repre-
sentation work to deform audiences erotic taste (in the sense of bending
our taste toward gender inequality), mainstream heterosexual pornogra-
phy stands out as having special potency in this regard due to both what
it represents (i.e., its representational content) and also how it represents.
Mainstream heterosexual pornographys representational content strongly
tends toward sexually explicit scenes in which women take a subordinate
role to men. This content is highly eroticized in the sense that it is presented
with particular vivacity and detail aimed at erotically stimulating its target
audience.5 While many kinds of representation eroticize male dominance
and female subordination to some degreefor instance, this is common
in mainstream music videos, television, and advertisingfeminists pay
It is worth noting that these can come apart. For instance, a documentary about the harms of
5.
pornography might depict sex and gender subordination without eroticizingit.

252
particular attention to pornography because, more than many genres

of representation, pornography aims to elicit the strongest of erotic re-
sponses and focuses them on stark examples of male sexual dominance
and female subordination. Here Irefer not just or even primarily to those
pornographic representations that eroticize rape; rather, Iam talking about
garden-variety heterosexual pornography.
Mainstream heterosexual pornography has the following features:(1)it
eroticizes women performing and enjoying passivity, (2) it eroticizes
women forgoing their own pleasure in order to service men, and (3)it does
these things in ways that enhance womens subordinate position to men
who are active and in control and whose pleasure determines the course
of events. (As noted above, when Isay that pornography eroticizes these
things, Imean that it not only represents them, but that it represents them
in such a manner as to make them sexually stimulating for the audience.)
The problem that this chapter aims to highlight is that what Iam calling
garden-variety pornographythat is, everyday nonviolent heterosexual
pornographypresents gender imbalance to us in such a way as to merit
an erotic response. The Aristotelian hypothesis Ipropose here is that regu-
lar engagement with this kind of representation shapes its audiences taste
in the direction of finding various manifestations of gender imbalance to
be erotically attractive.
12.4.FeministPorn
One of the main points of this chapter is that achieving gender equal-
ity is not simply a matter of getting everyone to believe in equality; we
must also organize our sentimental lives, and in particular our erotic
tastes, around gender equality. To this end I proposed (in Section 12.3)
an Aristotelian model of imaginative engagement with representations to
explain how peoples tastes became distorted in the first place. But this
conviction in the power of representations to shape our sentimental lives
cuts both ways:pornographic representations that promote sexist taste can
doand, we believe, have donedamage, but by the same token, porno-
graphic representations promoting gender equality can do good. As porn
artist Annie Sprinkle puts it, The answer to bad porn is not no porn, but
to try to make better porn.6 The question we finish with in this section,
The quote is widely reproduced without citation. As near as Ican tell, its source is a newspaper
6.
article from 1999 (Rich1999).
252 | BeyondSpeech
253
then, is this:what, exactly, does this better pornwhich Ielsewhere call

egalitarian pornography, but which one might also refer to as feminist
pornographylooklike?
The last 10 years have witnessed a burgeoning industry of self-
identified feminist porn. Witness, for instance, the Good For Her Feminist
Porn Awards in Toronto and the PorYes Feminist Porn Award in Berlin.7
Indeed, since feminist pornography is a vibrant and growing practice that
(a)caters to a wide variety of interests and proclivities and (b)fosters con-
tinued scrutiny of and dialog about its own practices, it is not possible to
give anything like necessary and sufficient conditions for feminist porn.
What Ioffer below instead is a characterization that Ithink captures what
most feminist porn makers and users are after; there will, of course, be
exceptions.
At the most general level, feminist porn is pornography that is com-
mitted to, in the words of Tristan Taormino (a sex educator, feminist por-
nographer, and theorist), fight[ing] gender oppression and attempt[ing]
to dismantle rigid gender roles (2013, 260). This commitment mani-
fests itself in two ways. First, in the production of pornographic works.
As Taormino makes clear, the production must be a fair and ethical
process and a positive working environment for everyone (2013, 260).
Second, the commitment to gender equality and social justice is manifest
in the finished product itself in terms of both content (i.e., what is rep-
resented) and form (i.e. how it is represented), as discussed below. It is
important to note that feminist pornography is truly pornographic:that
is, it is typically sexually explicit material that functions to sexually
arouse its audience, often aiming at achieving sexual fulfillment, either
alone or with others. Feminist porn is not merely what some people call
couples porn, which is typically considered to be soft porn that
focuses on kissing and foreplay and excludes things like anal sex and
rough sex. But couples porn can be quite conservative with respect
to gender roles, while some feminist porn includes so-called kinky sex,
anal sex, BDSM, and rough sex. What exactly makes the latter feminist,
though?
We can begin with negative criteria. Feminist pornographic representa-
tions are marked by an absence of the following:representations of non-
consensual violence, expressions of contempt for women, and sexist ste-
reotypes, and scenes of men ejaculating on womens faces are typically
7.
http://www.poryes.de/en/

254
avoided. Further, narrative and visuals are not organized around mens
orgasms but, rather, centrally feature female pleasure and orgasms. (The
so-called cum or money shot is often the most important element in a
pornographic work, around which everything else is organized.)
But once we have said what feminist porn is not, there is still much
to say about what it is. Feminist porn should, as feminist pornographer
Petra Joy puts is, spread the message of pleasure and respect for women
and sexual liberation in the world.8 Although she does not specify crite-
ria for how to achieve this, here are some noticeable features of her own
films (and of the films of other feminist pornographers). First, women
are portrayed in active roles, both as initiators of and guides of sexual in-
teraction, and also as subjects of desire and pleasure (rather than merely
objects of desire). Second, there is an emphasis on genuine womens
sexual pleasure: women receive oral sex and prolonged stimulation of
the clitoris and other erogenous zones. Joy sums up the point thus:The
men appearing in my films are not cast by the size of their penis but by
their ability to enjoy giving women pleasure.9 Third, men are portrayed
as sex objects in two sensesdiegetic objectification, where men are
sexually objectified by female characters in the world of the film (the di-
egesis), and extradiegetic objectificationthat is, objectification by the
representation as opposed to in the world of the representationin the
sense that men are made into sex objects for the viewer. Again Joy sums
this up nicely:
Women are voyeurs, too. We like to watch sexy men. And there is this fan-
tasy of watching a stranger but he doesnt know youre there. And we get
pleasure out of watching him pleasuring himself. Ithink its very important
that heterosexual women get some eye candy. Its long overdue.10
Fourth, feminist porn includes erotic representations of male bisexual-

ity. Fifth, it often includes scenes where men take submissive roles and
women are shown in dominant roles (but not exclusively according to the
dominatrix stereotype). Sixth and related, women are represented as pow-
erful and physically strong. Seventh, realistic female bodies of all ages that
do not promote unhealthily thin stereotypes are not only represented but
are also eroticized.
8.
From the documentary that accompanies her film, A Taste of Joy (2012).
9.
Ibid.
10.
Ibid.
254 | BeyondSpeech
255
But, one might wonder, can feminist pornography handle a taste for
rough sex and BDSM? The answer, Ithink, is yes, but these things must be
handled with considerable care. One example is Tristan Taorminos Rough
Sex series, where each vignette begins with a lengthy interview with the
performers. In these interviews, the performers discuss their actual fan-
tasies and explain how they establish trust with their partners and how
they both establish and test their own boundaries. This establishes a rich
context for the fantasies that follow, making it clear that the dominance,
submission, and violence are not only consensual but actually emanate
from the performers themselves.
One point that Taormino and other feminist pornographers continually
make is that feminist pornography is far from being humorless, preachy,
or man-hating. Rather, it is an inventive, edgy, highly erotic genre that
ranges from mild to wild (as the Good For Her Feminist Porn Awards puts
it) and focuses on representing and generating authentic pleasure for ev-
eryone. For this reason, many think that feminist porn might actually make
for better pornography; that is, it might not be just morally and politi-
cally better but also pornographically better precisely because its creators
assume critical distance from mainstream porn. (And it is worth noting
that art, quite broadly construed, has always benefited from precisely this
kind of distance.) The result is pornography that does not rely on the over-
used formulas of mainstream porn such as predictable and mechanical sex
and redundant close-ups of so-called money shots.
12.5. Concluding Thoughts
I would like to return to one of the basic questions that feminism must
confront:what explains the ubiquity and intransigence of gender inequal-
ity? MacKinnon offers part of an answer when she draws our attention to
the socially dominant mode of erotic taste that permeates our mundane
everyday existence (although she does not use these words). This mode of
erotic taste, which is heterosexual in orientation and internalized by men
and women alike, strongly favors dominance as an alluring feature in men
and submissiveness as an alluring feature in women. Since the pursuit of
some degree of erotic allure infuses almost everyones ordinary everyday
lives, this gives gender inequality considerable influence despite our con-
sidered views and commitments (and the laws and regulations based upon
them). If this is right, then the following question becomes urgent:how
can we rid gender inequality of its erotic appeal?

256
The problem is that we cannot simply argue our way toward finding the
right things attractive and sexy. Even strong cognitivists about emotions
do not think that propositional knowledge or rational argument suffices
to change our feelings and desires. So how can we bend the predominant
mode of erotic taste toward gender equality?
I have proposed feminist porn as part of an Aristotelian program to re-
shape the dominant mode of erotic taste in this direction. To some, the very
concept of feminist pornography is incoherent. Many antiporn feminists,
as is well known, define pornography as inherently subordinating. Popular
stereotypes, on the other hand, typically portray feminists as sex-negative
prudes incapable of endorsing, much less producing, pornography and
other erotic material. Against both of these views, Ihave argued that we
have good reason on feminist groundsgrounds that also support feminist
arguments against mainstream inegalitarian pornographyto champion
this new form of pornography.
References
Eaton, Anne W. 2007. A Sensible Antiporn Feminism. Ethics 117(4):674715.

Haslanger, Sally. 2007. But Mom, Crop-Tops Are Cute! Social Knowledge, Social
Structure and Ideology Critique. Philosophical Issues 17(1):7091.
Irvin, Sherri. 2008a. The Pervasiveness of the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience. British
Journal of Aesthetics 48(1):2944.
Irvin, Sherri. 2008b. Scratching an Itch. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
66(1):2535.
Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech, edited by Ishani Maitra and
Game. In Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and
Objectification, edited by Rae Langton, 173195. Oxfordand New York: Oxford
UniversityPress.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1991. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Reprint edition.
Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1996. Only Words. Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress.
Rich, Eric. 1999. Learning Stripped Bare. Hartford Courant, May 8.http://articles.cou-
rant.com/1999-05-08/news/9905080128_1_pornography-male-student-feminists.
[Accessed 29 March2016.]
Saito, Yuriko. 2007. Everyday Aesthetics. NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress.
Shrage, Laurie. n.d. Comments on A.W. Eatons A Sensible Antiporn Feminism.
Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy4(2).
Soucek, Brian. 2009. Resisting the Itch to Redefine Aesthetics:AResponse to Sherri
Irvin. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67(2):223226.
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Taormino, Tristan. 2013. Calling the Shots:Feminist Porn in Theory and Practice. In
The Feminist Porn Book:The Politics of Producing Pleasure, edited by Taormino,
Tristan, Constance Penley, Celine Parrenas Shimizu, and Mireille Miller-Young,
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Young, Iris Marion. 2011. Justice and the Politics of Difference. With a new foreword by
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258
259
INDEX
Acceptance, 7778, 81,106 subordinating depictions of women,

Accommodation, process of, 34, 192193 problem of focus on,129
Adaptive preferences,213 Antony, Louise, 9, 13, 59, 115,120;
Advertising industry, 72, 199, 233, Easterbrook and,74;
251252 on epistemic authority,82;
Aesthetics, 1213, 201202, 232237, Langton, agreement with,84;
245. See also Wet aesthetics on social constructionism,85
Affective life,247 Apartheid law,27
Agentive functions,9596 Appearing sexy. See Sexiness
Air Doll (film), 145147 Aristotle, 207, 250252
Akrasia,247 Arrowsmith, Anna, 10,130
All About Anna (film), 212, 213214 Art:as ally of radical egalitarian
All-white pornography,191 pornography, 216217;
Alternative pornography (alt porn), 192, Bruegels landscapes,234;
214215 differences from pornography,
American Booksellers v.Hudnut (1985),66 113114;
Analytic feminism, 1112, 1213, distancing in,255;
246247 female nudes in Western art, 225,
Anatomy de LEnfer (Breillat), 224225 232235;
Anderson, Michelle,44 philosophers of, on pornography,113;
Animalization, 166, 170,173 philosophy of, separation from feminist
Animation of things. See Personification philosophy,120;
Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance. pornographic,222;
See MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance ready-mades in,121;
Antipornography feminism and women in,233
feminists:concerns of, Artifacts:nature of,116;
177178,256; social artifacts,9293;
on erotica,132; types of, 116117, 120. See also
intellectualist tendencies of, 246247; Makers intentions;
on mens use of pornography,137; Pornographic artifacts
259
260
Artistic pornography,217 Barthes, Roland,233

Asian Americans, 182, 185, 188,191 Bartky, Sandra,86
Assiter, Alison,8 Bartoli, Marion, 207208
Attractiveness, 187,189 Bataille, Georges, 228,239
Audience reception, as basis for Battye, Louise,206
pornographic artifacts,127 Bauer, Nancy, 8, 9, 25, 31, 53,239
Austin, J.L.:Langton and,3,13; BDSM, 9, 41, 129, 231,255
on performatives,7580; Beatty, Maria,239
speech act theory of, 3, 7, 23, 24, 25, Beauty, 125, 187, 189, 222, 233, 236237
28, 33, 5966,6873; Behavior, normalization of. SeeNorms
on uptake,45 Being a gentleman, 247248
Authority and authority Beliefs, 4752, 128n6, 247, 248249
condition:acceptance and,7778; Bell, Jennifer Lyon,217
constitution of harm and,43; Berger, Fred,1
of the law, 27,28; Berger, John,235
MacKinnon on,26; Bettcher, Talia Mae,98;
nonideal refusals and,4546; on colonial/modern gender system,
permission and,4445; 158159;
of pornographers, 6061, on colonial/modern sex-
7475,8185; representational system, 162165;
of pornography, 9, 3235,5253; concluding reflections by,176;
of pornography and the law,24; on interpersonal spatiality, 159162;
pornography as constitutive of norms overview, 157158;
for,55; on racialized nakedness and sexual
pornography as possible source of,28; desire, 167170
recognition failure of,48; Between the Waves (Shah), 239240
silencing and,50; Bianchi, Claudia,5
social agreement for,79; Biasin, Enrico,214
for speech acts,28 Biological sex, gender and,9899
Authority vs. power,5987; Bird, Alexander,67
MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance, Bisexuality,254
history of,6275; Black Feminist Thought (Collins),157
overview,5962; Black Lives Matter movement,79
performatives, Austins account Black women. See Women ofcolor
of,7585; Blood, depictions of, 224225,240
sexual objectification, social Blue, Vanessa,179
constructionist model of,8587 Bodies:in Anatomy de LEnfer,224;
Automobile industry,124 in DIY pornography, 232233;
embodied subjects,201;
Baartman, Saartjie (Hottentot Venus), exposure of, 157, 170171,173;
157,177 as locus of sexiness, 200201;
Background conditions, 77,8485 magnificence of, 200201;
Bad girls, 173,174 male, primacy of penis as pleasure
Bad pornography, 193, 222223 receptor,234;
Baird, Robert,1 ordinary, sexual attractiveness of,233;
Baker, Peter,4 pornographic, wet aesthetics of,235;
Barker, Sarah,63 sexual desire and,167;
260 | Index
261
in Violated Angels,230; Communication:authority condition

womens, in gonzo pornography,235; and,48;
womens, in heterosexual pornography, communicative failure,50;
234. See also Nakedness andnudity silencing as communicative
Boundaries, interpersonal, 159160,162 interference,45;
Brabuster, Sasha, 178,182 sincerity failure and,49;
Breaking Barriers (film),216 true feelings failure and,4950;
Breillat, Catherine, 224225,235 uptake as necessary for, 45, 48. See
Burgess, Anthony,25 also Silencing
Burns, A.K.,236 Community Action Center (Steiner &
Butler, Judith, 9, 31,53,81 Burns),236
Concealment, female,171
Cahill, Ann,200 Conde, Encarna,216
Cake-baking pornography, 118119,127 Conditioning, classical,249
Califia, Pat,9,129 Consent, 7, 31, 46n3, 142143, 231, 238.
California, porn industry in,123 See alsoNo
Cameron, Deborah,4,9 Constance (film), 212, 213214
Carrera, Asia,182n3 Constative (descriptive) statements,
Causal connection:between pornography 6869, 7172,73
and objectification, 105108, Constitutive connections:between
141144, 148154; pornography and objectification,
between pornography and 105108,138;
silencing,5052 between pornography and
Chattel slavery. See Slaves and slavery silencing,5256;
Chatterley syndrome, 205206 between pornography and
Child abuse,5 subordination of women,59
Child pornography, 42,115n1 Constitutive felicity conditions,7677
Childrens Commissioner report (UK Constructionist claim (MacKinnon). See
2013),2935 Subordination
Chong, Annabel, 180181,182 The Construction of Social Reality
Civil rights, pornography as violation of (Searle),95
womens,2 Contamination, linguistic and perceptual,
Civil Rights Act (1964),62,73 223224,225
Classical conditioning,249 Content of pornography:effects vs.,24;
Clothedness, 162163 of feminist porn,253;
Collective erotic taste, 243, 246247 of misogynistic pornography,9798;
Collective intentionality,96,97 objectification of women and,
Collective recognition,107 143,152;
Collins, Patricia Hill, 5, 157159, 166, representational,251
169,177 Conventions, acceptanceof,78
Colonial/modern gender system:dark side Conversational exercitives,32
of, 159, 166167, 169, 173175; Conversation-specific norms,5354
light side of, 158159, 169. See Cooper, Brittney C.,185
also Trans feminist analysis of Counts as formula,9697
pornography Couples porn, 212n3,253
Colonial/modern sex-representational Coy, Maddy, 29, 30,31,33
system, 162167 Crush pornography,214
Index |261
262
Cruz, Ariane, 181, 189, 190,191 on objectification,8;

Cultural boundaries, personal boundaries on pornography, 2, 8, 24, 26, 28,
vs.,161 31,42;
Cultural dignity, nakedness and,163 stories of harm to individual
performers,4n3;
Dalla Costa, Mariarosa,102 on womens social definition,102
Dalle, Batrice,225 Dworkin, Ronald, 2, 5, 93,108
Davies, Alex,47 Dwyer, Susan,1,211
De Beauvoir,103 Dyzenhaus, Davis,9
Debunking moves,101
Decency offenses and violations, 160,164 Easterbrook, Frank, 24, 63, 6667,74
De Gaynesford, Maximilian,5 Easton, Susan,9
Le Djeuner sur lherbe (Manet),233 Eaton, Anne W., 15, 207, 211, 221,
De Jour, Belle,201 229,243;
Delphy, Christine,102 on antipornography feminists,
Denis, Claire, 224225,235 187188;
Derived authority,3334 on eroticization, 210, 248,249;
Descriptive (constative) statements, on erotic taste, 244246;
6869, 7172,73 female nude in Western art,
Desire, 25, 168169 feminist analysis of, 225,
Devoe, Diana,190 232233;
Diegetic objectification,254 on gender inequality, 255256;
Dignity:boundaries and, 160161; on harms, 6,251;
interpersonal spatiality and,162; on heterosexual BDSM
personal dignity,161; pornography,232;
sexual access and, 170171; on oppression, overcoming,189
sexualized animals lack of, Egalitarianism, transgression of,
173174,175 237240
Dijkstra, Rinneke,223 Egalitarian pornography, 10, 211217,
Dines, Gail, 177, 190191,200 228229, 240, 253. See also
Dirty Diaries (Engberg), 125, 129, Inegalitarian pornography;
131,236 In/egalitarian pornography
Disabled women. See Women with Elderly women, sexiness of, 200,
disabilities 202203, 205, 215216
Discrimination, 52, 7273. See also Race Engberg, Mia,236
andracism Enoch, David,25
Disgust, as definer of pornography,222 Entertainment industry,199
DIY aesthetics, 232233,236 Epistemology, 12, 33,8283
Donnerstein, Edward,28 Erickson, Loree,188
Dorcel, Marc,235 Erotica, 2, 41, 132, 177,225
Dotson, Kristie,186 Eroticism:eroticization of female
Drive (film),207 indignity, 174175;
Durham, Aisha,185 eroticization of male dominance
Dworkin, Andrea, 2, 5, 9, 10, 35,93; and female submission, 247248,
critiquesof,9; 251252;
MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance, 3, erotic taste, 188, 243, 244248,
2324, 6275,92; 251253,255;
262 | Index
263
of sexualized animals, 173174; characteristics of, 253254;

sources of,167 concluding thoughts on, 255256;
Evans, Mihail, 223,229 creation of,177;
Everyday aesthetics,245 description of,10;
Everyday Sexism (blog),208 examples of, 129130;
Evidence, American rulesof,69 feminist porn, 125, 214, 244, 252255;
Exercitive speech acts:advertising as,72; grassroots, 124125;
Austin on,13; on industrial pornography,10;
authority and,28; inegalitarian pornography, 248252;
conditions for successful,76; mainstream industrial pornography vs.,
description of,60; 129132;
as nondescriptive, 61,70; need for,214;
pornography as, 73. See also overview, 243244;
Performative speechacts own work, views of,15;
Expositive speech acts, 70,71,73 patriarchy, erotic taste and, 244248;
Exposure, 157, 170171, 173,175 possible nonharmful makers
Expressive speech,68 knowledge in, 131132;
Extradiegetic objectification,254 Zheng on,192
Femme Productions,212n3
False beliefs, 4751, 247, 248249 Fetishization, of racial difference,
Fantasy, pornography as, 6, 13, 30, 137, 189191,194
141, 150, 153, 190,238 Fey, Tina,200
Feed/Kill (Shah), 238,240 Finlayson, Lorna, 107108
Feigenblatt (magazine),130 Firestone, Shulamith,103
Feinberg, Joel,2,5 First Amendment and free speech, 8n6,
Felicity conditions,7576 40, 53, 59, 62, 66, 72, 92, 94,
Feminism:feminist consciousness,101; 108,128
hip hop feminism,185; Frazer, Elizabeth,4
intellectualist tendencies of, 248249; French Revolution,122
personification, problem of definition Frye, Marilyn,86
of, 149150
Feminist philosophy,120; Gallo, Vincent,225
in the future,1115; Garden-variety pornography,252
heteronormativity in, 228229; Gardner, Jasmine,216
on heterosexual BDSM Gaze:male gaze, 204, 233234;
pornography,232; pedophile gaze, 223,229;
images, lack of engagement with,225; pornographic gaze, 223, 224225
in the past,14; Gender:antipornography feminists view
philosophy of art, separation from,120; of,138;
on pornography, 113, 222224; colonial/modern gender systems,
in the present,410; 158159;
primary concern of,227; determinations of,9899;
taste, lack of attention to,246 Eatons preferred model for
The Feminist Porn Book (Taormino), pornography on inequality,251;
124125, 193,214 erotic taste, relationship to,243;
Feminist pornography, 125, 214, 243257; erotic tastes and, 244, 252253,256;
antipornography feminism vs., 132133; gendered social scripts,231;
Index |263
264
Gender:antipornography feminists Habituation, 249252

view of (Cont.) Hacking, Ian, 61n2,8586
gender identities, heteronormativity Hnel, Hilkje Charlotte,1
and,228; Hanrahan, Rebecca,79n8
gender injustice, 87,244; Harel, Alon,31
gender norms, 86, 243,246; Harm:causing vs. constituting,4243;
gender oppression,5,61; discrimination vs.,7273;
gender presentation, differences harmful knowledge, 89, 128129;
in,164; nature of pornographic objectification
gender relations, 54,158; and, 153154;
gender roles, 102103, 207208, open questions on,1112;
222,236; from pornography, 2, 3, 24, 142143.
gender stereotypes,132; See also Objectification;
heteronormative gender roles and, Social ontology;
207208; Violence
impact on reality,153; Haslanger, Sally, 8, 86, 98, 101,246
MacKinnon on,97; Hearsay evidence,69
pervasiveness, 139, 255256; The Hedgehog (Ron Jeremy),211
promotion of inequality,210; Hedges, Chris,213
radical egalitarian pornography Hefner, Cooper,1,2
and,215; Hermaphroditism, 159,167
sex and,99n10; Heteronormativity, 227, 228229
sex vs., 138139. See also headings Heterosexual:coitus, eroticization of
starting with Women; dominance and submission and,248;
Transpeople pornography, men vs. women in,234;
Ghetto porn,181 power dynamics,228
Giantess point-of-view pornography, Hip hop feminism,185
120121 Honor, Christophe,239
Gill, Rosalind,204 hooks, bell,191
Godard, Agns,225 Hornsby, Jennifer, 67, 24, 28, 39, 45,
Goldin, Nan,223 4748,49
Golding, Martin,53 Hottentot Venus (Saartjie Baartman),
Gonzo filming, 234235 157,177
Good For Her Feminist Porn Awards, How to Do Things with Words
253,255 (Austin),68,75
The Good Girl (film), 213,215 Hunt, Lynne,122
Good pornography,193 Hypersexualized racial stereotypes,
Graham, Gordon,216 178180, 182, 185187,194
Grassroots feminist pornographers,
124125 Illocutionary disablement,28
Green, Leslie, 9, 25, 31, 32, Illocutions (illocutionary acts), 3, 24,
53,129; 5960,6465
on authority, acceptance of,8384; Images:complexity of reality of, 229,230;
on illocutions,73n7 feminist philosophys (lack of)
Greenawalt, Kent,42 engagement with, 223224,
Grice, Paul,7 225,229;
Gruen, Lori,10 moral status of,225;
264 | Index
265
sexually explicit, in medieval Irvin, Sherri, 199205, 208210,

Spain,123; 215,245n1
words vs.,25 Itzin, Catherine, 1, 2,3,113
Incest, 237,239
Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana, Jackson, Jennifer,191
Codeof,62 Jacobson, Daniel,7
Indignities, 160,174 James, Selma,102
Industrial pornography,10 Jansen, Carlyle,216
Inegalitarian pornography:Aristotelian Janssen, Sara,214
habituation and, 248252; Japan, 5, 229230
definition of,229; Jenkins, Katharine, 13, 91,109;
erotic taste and,244; on constitution and causation, 105,
heterosexual, in feminist philosophy, 107108;
227228; on gender,99;
influence and authority of,217; on MacKinnons definition of
lack of agreement on determining,221; pornography,9293;
problematic nature of, 210211. See on Searles theory of social
also Egalitarian pornography reality,9596;
In/egalitarian pornography, 221241; on speech act analysis of
cautions on categorizations of, pornography,94;
229237; on subordination and constructionist
conclusions on,240; claims, 102105
egalitarianism, transgression of, Jensen, Peter Aalbaek,211
237240; Jeremy, Ron (The Hedgehog),211
overview, 221222; Johansson, Scarlett,205
pornography, definitions of, 222229. Jolie, Angelina,205
See also Egalitarian pornography; Jnasdttir, Anna,103
Inegalitarian pornography Jouvet, Emilie,217
Inequality, eroticization of, 187188 Joy, Petra, 129130,254
Infelicities, typesof,76 Juries and jury systems,71,82
Informal authority,3334
Institutional reality, 95, 96, 105106, Kansas State Legislature,194
107,109 Kessler, SuzanneJ.,98
Intentionality, 96, 116, 118, 121, Khader, Serene J.,213
122127 Kieran, Matthew,114
Intent to refuse, 45, 4748, 55. See Kikone, Grard,235
alsoNo Kipnis, Laura, 42,237
Internet pornography, 233234, 236,237; Knowledge, 128. See also Makers
ally of radical egalitarian pornography, knowledge
215216 Koppelman, Andrew M.,231
Interpersonal spatiality and boundaries, Koreeda, Hirokazu, 145,146
158167 Ku Klux Klan, 179180, 181,184
Intersexuality, erasure of,158
Intimacy, 159161, 163169, Lady Chatterleys Lover (Lawrence),206
171175 Landers, Ann,80
Intimate apparel,165n6 Lane, Keiko,188
Inverdale, John,209 Lane, Lola,181
Index |265
266
Langton, Rae, 3, 10, 13, 23, 25, Love, Sinnamon, 130, 179, 186, 191192
2729, 32, 34, 35, 53, 93, 133, Lugones, Mara, 158159
222, 226,247; Lust. See Sexiness
on audience for pornography,249; Lust, Erika, 212,213
on authority, 9,8184; Lyon, Bill,123
on false knowledge,86;
on makers knowledge, 8, 12, 115116, MacKinnon, Catharine, 4, 10, 25, 28, 31,
128, 129, 131, 152153,154; 41, 44, 51, 53, 113, 244,247;
on objectification, 132, 138,143; on authority, 26, 106n14;
on personification,137; conditioning model,251;
on pornography as fantasy,6; on construction of reality by
on silencing, 67, 39,4749; pornography, 141142;
on speech acts, 4, 5968, 7274,120; on content of pornography,9798;
on subordination, 85,113; on definition of pornography, 222, 224,
on uptake,45 225227;
LAPD (Los Angeles Police on erotic taste, dominant mode of,255;
Department),170 Finlayson on, 107108;
Lars and the Real Girl (film), on gender,97;
144145,146 Jenkins on, 14, 99105;
Law, comparison of pornography MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance, 3,
to,2338; 2324, 6275,92;
authority of pornography,3234; on male and female, creation of,243;
conclusions on,3435; on mens use of pornography,148;
overview,2324; on nature of pornography, 2, 23, 59,
pornography as like law,2629; 132133, 137139;
pornography as unlike law,2526; on objectification,89;
UK Childrens Commissioner report objectification in work of,103;
(2013),2935 on pornography as harm,42;
Lawrence, D.H.,206 on process of social construction,
Leaving Evidence (Mingus blog),200 152153;
Lederer, Laura,2,113 on sexism,249;
Let the Punishment Fit the Child on social sanctions,86;
(Beatty),239 stories of harm to individual
Levinson, Jerrold, 12, 113114 performers,4n3;
Lewis, David,34 subordination and constructionist
Liberalism, 108,109 claims of, 9194,104
Lintott, Sheila, 199205, 208210,215 MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance,6268;
Locutions (locutionary acts), 3, 24,6465 aim of,92;
Lolita trope,237 description of pornography in,23;
Longino, Helen, 2, 4, 93, 113,222 history of,6263;
Looping, of social kinds,8586 Langtons defense of,6368;
Loots, Lliane,5 legal debates over, 6667,9495;
Lorber, Judith,210 mentioned,92;
Lorde, Audre,177 originsof,3;
Los Angeles Police Department unconstitutionality of,24,63
(LAPD),170 Maes, Hans, 12, 15, 113114, 187, 199,
Love (No),235 217, 222, 233,246
266 | Index
267
Magnusson, Elin,236 in feminist porn,254;

Mag Uidhir, Christy,114 heterosexual desire, characterization
Mainstream, 10, 123, 124, 129132, 216, of,173;
237, 251252 impact of pornography on treatment of
Maitra, Ishani, 7, 33, 34, 44n2,53 women by, 62, 74, 8586, 149154;
Makers intentions, 113134; as institutional entities, 97,99;
discussion of, 116119; male gaze, 204, 233234;
makers knowledge, 128133; male sexuality, as frame for trans sex
muddled intuitions about pornography, segregation,170;
126128; nakedness, 163164;
overview, 113116; pornographers epistemic authority,
pornographic artifacts, common ground acceptance of,8183;
on, 120121; pornography as benefiting,128;
pornographic intentions, 122126 sex dolls, treatment of, 144149;
Makers knowledge:discussion of, sexiness markers for, 204, 206209;
128133; sexual fragility, 231, 236,239;
harm from,129; trans men,165;
open questions on,12; use of pornography as a woman,
pornographers as having,60n1; 138141;
pornographic knowledge, relationship virility of, 231,236;
to, 130131; white men, crossing of racial borders
pornography as creator of, 89, 152154 by, 187. See also Gender;
Malamuth, NeilM.,29 Patriarchy
Ma Mre (Honor),239 Mental intermediation,7475
Manet, douard,233 Mercer, Kobena,5
Marcos, J.Elaine,180 Mikkola, Mari, 1, 5, 7, 14, 15, 60n1,113;
Marie Antoinette,122 on pornographers intentions,124;
Marital rape,48 on pornographic artifacts, 9293,
Marriage vows, 69, 76,9697 114115,119
Mass-produced pornography,123 Mill, J.S.,128
Masturbation, 118, 126,150 Miller-Young, Mireille, 178180, 182,
Matsuda, Mari,53 184, 186187,191
May, Larry,248 Mills, Charles,103
McElroy, Wendy,10 Mingus, Mia,201
McGowan, Mary Kate, 7, 9, 13, 39, 48,49; Minneapolis Council, draft
on constructivist claim,94; antipornography ordinancesfor,3
on nonauthoritativeness of Misogynistic pornography (m-
pornography,5354; pornography):constitutive role in
on speech acts,32 womens subordination, question of,
McKenna, Wendy,98 107109;
Media industry, 199, 251252 constructionist claims of,9495;
Men:Asian, erotic appeal of,188; content of,9798;
as determiners of womens sexiness, description of,93;
200,203; impact on womens social reality,
elderly and disabled, 205206; 98101;
eroticization of dominance of, 86, 247, role in definition of women as
251252,255; institutional entities, 104105
Index |267
268
Misogyny,104 Nonconstitutive felicity conditions,76

Miss Saigon (film), 179180,185 Nonheterosexual pornography,228
Modernity, as axis of power of Non-whites:as primitive,158;
Eurocentric capitalism,158 sex-representational physical
Money, as social entity,95 personhood of,165;
Money shots, 130, 131, 216, supposed aberrant sexuality of, 159.
253254,255 See also Primitivization
Monroe, Marilyn,202 Norms:activity-specific norms,54;
Morality, 1,9,246 constitution of harm and, 4243,52;
Morgan, Joan, 183,185 conversation-specific,5354;
Morgan, Seiriol, 122123 gender norms, 86, 243,246;
Morris, Susana M.,185 implicit,80;
Mottier, Vernonique,200 law as source of,27;
Music,250n4 pornography as norm-enacting but
nonauthoritative,5354;
Nakedness and nudity:as commonality in pornography as source of, 27, 28,
pornography,174; 3233,35;
female vs. male, 163164; silencing and,5456;
intimate apparel and,165n6; social norms, 54,7980
of primitives,165; Nudity. See Nakedness andnudity
racialized, sexual desire and, 167174; Nussbaum, Martha, 8,9,129
rationalizations of,170; Objectification:contexts for,129;
of slaves,166; forms of, as markers of sexiness,211;
social construction of, 162163; from increased visual access against
as unnecessary for pornography, public backdrop,172;
120121; Jenkinss critique of claims of,103;
as visual access,162 of men in feminist porn,254;
Nash, Jennifer, 178, 183185, 189,192 nature of,168;
The Nation, on women in politics,207 personifying pornography and, causal
New French Extremity genre,225 connection between, 141144,
No:with authority recognition 148154;
failure,48; question of,89;
in BDSM,232; question of morally problematic
as excitation,55; character of,129;
of female concealment, 171,175; sexiness and,200;
illocutionary disablement of,28; sexual objectification, 8587, 167, 169.
as insincere refusal,55; See also Personification;
as nonideal refusal,45; Women, objectificationof
as sexual excitation,55;
sexualized animals and, 173,174; Obscenity model/standard, 13,9,42
with sincerity condition failure,55; Office of the Childrens Commissioner
in true feelings recognition failure,49; report (UK 2013),2935
as Yes, pornographic contexts for, 51. Oh, Sandra,186
See also Intent to refuse; One Night Stand (film),217
Refusals Operant conditioning, 249250
No, Gaspard,235 Oppression, 153154, 157, 188,189
Nolan, Daniel,51 Other-objectifying desire,169
268 | Index
269
Panichas, George,10 Pornographers:authority of, 6061,

Papadaki, Lina, 8, 14, 137, 154,226; 7475,8185;
on Air Doll, 146,147; as epistemic authorities,83;
on causal claims,143; mainstream, 123, 124. See also
on personification, 138,144; Feminist pornography;
on pornographys influence on men,151; names of individual pornographers
on Vadas,141 Pornographic artifacts:artifacts with
Parent, William,2 pornographic aspects vs.,120;
Parreas Shimizu, Celine, 178182, common ground on, 120121;
185,186 definition of, 114115;
Passivity, of women in pornography,233 features of, 118,126;
Patriarchy, 139, 142, 152, 228, of feminist vs. mainstream
244248 pornographers,133;
Paul, Pamela, 9, 29,215 as kinds, 117118;
Pedophile gaze, 223,229 pornographers intentions toward
Peep shows,114n2 creation of, 125126;
Pepper, Jeannie, 178, 182,186 used as women,143
Performative speech acts, 5960, 6364, Pornography:authority vs. power in,5987;
6872,7585 background on,4042;
Performers:appropriation of work of, categories of, 190191;
181182; definitions of, 9293, 222229;
audience, communication with,184n4; feminist philosophy and,120;
as authors,180; feminist pornography, 243257;
choice by, skepticism of, 10. See also in/egalitarian pornography, 221241;
names of individual performers law, comparison with,2338;
Perlocutions (perlocutionary acts), mainstream industrial, 10, 129132,
3,24,65 216,237;
Permission, authority and,4445 makers intentions model, 113134;
Perry, Grayson,215 pornographic art, 217, 222,225;
Personal boundaries,161 pornographic gaze, 224225;
Personification:meaning of term,137; pornographic intentionality, 118,
objectification, relationship to, 138, 122128;
141144, 147154,226; pornographic knowledge, 130131;
of pornography, 139140; pornographic speech,34;
of sex dolls, 144149. See also as problem and solution, 209212;
Objectification race and, 177196;
Philosophy. See Analytic feminism; sexiness, 199219;
Feminist philosophy sexual desire as shaped by consumption
Pink porn, 229230 of,5152;
Pink Prison (film), 212, 213214 silencing,3958;
Playboy magazine:as art,1; social ontology and, 91111;
first black Playmate of the trans feminist analysis of, 157176;
Month,191; U.S.mass-produced,123;
as pornography, questionof,41 as a woman, womens objectification
Pleasure, 183187, 194195,231 and, 137155. See also specific
Politics (Aristotle),250n4 types of pornography, e.g., feminist
Porn (Walker),177 pornography
Index |269
270
Pornutopias,239 Radical egalitarian pornography, 212217

PorYes Feminist Porn Award,253 Rape:of black women, stereotypes
Poverty, cycle of,194 of,181;
Power:coloniality of,158; consent and,143n3;
female token resistance and,231; marital,48;
power dynamics, 86, 228, 237238; rapability of women, Vadas on,
of social opinion, 83. See also 142143;
Authority vs.power; rape-myth pornography,51;
Subordination rape pornography,214;
Practical authority,33 sadistic rape,150n6;
Primitivization, 158, 165166,175 silencing of womens refusals and,7;
Prince, Richard,223 UK Office of the Childrens
Prinz, Jesse,222 Commissioner report on, 2935. See
Privacy violations, 160,164 alsoNo
Proper appearances, 163166,170 Raymond, Janice,9
Public backdrop, 161162, 164, 174175 Raz, Joseph,25,33
Public exposure. See Exposure Rea, Michael, 910,128n6
Puzzy Power Manifesto, 211,214 Reality, pornographys construction of,
141142
Queer pornography, 193, 222, 228, 229, Reasonable belief, in entity as
236238,240 pornographic,128n6
Quijano, Anibal,158 Recognition failures,4750
Refusals, 7, 4346, 48. See also Intent to
Race and racism, 177196; refuse;
conclusions on, 194195; No
overview, 177178; Regulation of pornography,4142
as part of harms of pornography,5; Representation:burden of, on women of
pleasure, respectability politics and, color,186;
183187; constitutive role of, 106107;
in pornography, dilemma of, 192194; habituation and, 250251;
race-pleasures, 184185, 187,194; in impositions of status functions,98;
racial borders, white mens crossing power of, 244,249;
of,187; in queer pornography,238;
racialized nakedness, sexual desire and, role in institutional reality, 105106;
167174; unknowability of,181
racialized sexual preferences,191; Resistance, 179182, 230231. See
racialized standards of sexual alsoNo
attractiveness, 187192; Respectability politics, 183187
racially segregated societies, Revenge porn,174
importance of representations of Reynolds, Paul,231
women of color in,186; Robinson, Jenefer,206
racial oppression, as basis for Roldan, Patrice (Nadia Styles),213
pornography,157; Role-playing,51
racial stereotypes, 178187,194; Rorty, Richard,223
self-identification with, 190. See also Rosenbaum, Stuart,1
Women ofcolor Rough sex, in feminist porn,255
270 | Index
271
Rough Sex series (Taormino),255 identity, sexual,190;

Royalle, Candida, 10, 130,212n3 invisibility, sexual,200;
Rubin, Gayle, 9, 10,129 lies,4;
Russell, Diana, 2, 6, 8, 10,113 objectification, sexual, 8587, 167,169;
objects, sexual, 157,168;
Sadistic rape,150n6 pornography, sex with, 226227;
Safe words (stop words), in BDSM, 129, power dynamics, 222, 225, 228,239;
231232 refusals,4345;
Saito, Yuriko,245n1 representations,244;
Saul, Jennifer, 2, 5, 102, 140141, 151, sex dolls, 144149;
226227 sex inequality, taste and,247;
Savages, nakedness of, 166. See also sex-representational physical
Primitivization personhood,165;
Schauer, Frederick, 24,25,33 sex-representational systems, 158, 162,
Scherre, Muriel, 212,217 164165, 167, 175,176;
Scoccia, Danny,51 sex segregation, 170,176;
Scruton, Roger, 216,228 sex shows,114n2;
Searle, John, 1314, 9597, 99, sexual abuse,26;
105106,109 sexual attractiveness, transformation of
Second-order meaning conventions,51 racialized standards of, 187192;
Secret Chronicle:She Beast Market sexual dimorphism, 158,246;
(Tanaka),230 sexual excellence,233;
Seeing, as sensory encounter,160 sexual oppression,157;
Segal, Lynne,5 sexual satisfaction,140;
Self:erotic content and,168; sexual slave trade,41;
self-identification, racialized sexual sexual smothering,186;
preferences and,190; subordination, sexual,102;
self-objectifying desire,169; violence, sexualized, 5. See also
self-verification,60 Silencing;
Sensory access, 159, 160, 162, 167168 entries beginning sexual
Sex and sexuality:acts and activities, Sexiness, 199219;
120121, 139, 140,167; alternatives to, 205209;
animals, sexualized, 157,173; critique of, 199202;
arousal, 113114,125; critique of critique of, 202205;
authentic sexuality, 131, 201,203; in DIY pornography,233;
availability, markers of,31; overview,199;
behavior, pornography as guide to,30; pornography as problem and solution,
consent model of sexuality,44; 209212;
desire, 123, 167174; radical egalitarian pornography,
elderly and disabled women, sexuality 212217
of,205; Sexism, normsin,54
explicit materials, 2, 113,123; Sex Objects and Sexy Subjects (Lintott
fantasies,150; and Irvin),199
gender vs., 138139; Sex-positive, 26,249n3
harassment,62; Sex:The Annabel Chong Story
hierarchies, 41,86; (documentary), 180181
Index |271
272
Sexual desire. SeeDesire Smoking restrictions,6

Sexual Harassment of Working Women Snuff films, 42,115n1
(MacKinnon),62 Soble, Alan,9,129
Sexual Offences Act (2003, UK),31 Social criticism, use of pornographic
Sex without consent:Isuppose imagery for,122
that is rape:How young people Social justice,246
in England understand sexual Social ontology, 91111;
consent (Office of the Childrens conclusions on,109;
Commissioner),2935 constitution and causation, 105108;
Sexworld (film), 183184, 187,189 defense of subordination and
SF (Status Function) Declarations, 106,107 constructionist claims, 102105;
Shah, Tejal, 238, 239240 institutional reality, 97101;
Shrage, Laurie,249 overview,91;
Siffreddi, Rocco,224 Searles account of,9597;
Silencing,3958; subordination and constructionist
conclusions on,56; claims,9295
connections with pornography,5056; Spain, medieval,123
description of,40; Span, Anna, 212,216
harm, causing vs. constituting,4243; Speech:authoritative,5253;
intention to refuse, failure to expressive,68;
recognize,4748; free speech, 8n6, 40, 53, 108,128;
by the law, 27,28; pornography as, 3, 52n10, 59,
overview,39; 66,67;
pornography, background on,4042; speaking, as sensory encounter,160;
pornography as (possible) source of, subordinating,910;
28,31; unprotected by First Amendment, 67,
refusals,4346; 72. See also Authority and authority
scrutiny of claim of,68; condition;
silencing, pornographys relationship First Amendment and free speech;
to,3940; Sincerity condition;
sincerity condition, failure to True feelings
recognize,49; Speech acts:as actions,68;
speaker authority condition, failure to authority for,28;
recognize,48; constatives vs. performatives,6869;
speakers true feelings, failure to expositive, 70, 71,73;
recognize,4950; illocutions, 3, 24, 5960,6465;
uptake failures,4748; Langton on, 4, 5968, 7274,120;
of women, pornography as,34 limits of pornography as,25;
Sincerity condition, 46, 49, 5051,55 locutions, 3, 24,6465;
Skin (Magnusson), 236237 performatives, 5960, 6364,
Skin.Like.Sun (film),217 6872,7585;
Slaves and slavery:exposure of black perlocutions, 3, 24,65;
women in,175; pornography as, 9, 2324,120;
illocutionary disablement of slaves,28; sexual refusals as,4345;
slave law,27; theory of, 3, 61, 9495, 115. See also
slaves as animals, 166. See also Exercitive speechacts;
Colonial/modern gendersystem Verdictive speechacts
272 | Index
273
Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts Subpersons, 103,104

(Langton),3 Substantive concept of pornography,
Spinelli, Anthony,183 117118
Sprinkle, Annie, 130, 217,252 Sumner, L.W.,53
Staring, as boundary breach,162 Sweet, Corinne,4
Status Function (SF) Declarations, Systematicity condition,47
106,107
Status functions, 96100, 102,104 Tanaka, Nabber,230
Steinem, Gloria,2,132 Taormino, Tristan, 10, 125, 193, 214,
Steiner, A.L.,236 253,255
Stereotypes, 178187, 194,255 Taste, erotic, 244245
Stewart, Potter, 1,2,127 Testimonial smothering,186
Stop words (safe words), in BDSM, 129, Thomasson, Amie, 114115, 116119
231232 Tillet, Salamishah,207
Stripping (female strip), 171, 172, Tirrell, Lynne,28
173,175 Tokenization of racial difference,
Strossen, Nadine,5,10 191,194
Styles, Nadia (Patrice Roldan),213 Token resistance, 230231, 236,239
Stylistic conventions in pornography,8081 Touch, interpersonal boundaries and,162
Submission, eroticization of female,86 Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
Subordination:conclusions on,109; (MacKinnon),243
constitution and causation in, 105108; Tragedy, nature of,227
and constructionist claims,9195; Trans feminist analysis of pornography,
defense of, 102105; 157176;
depictions of,6566; colonial/modern gender system,
explanations for,85; 158159;
from feminist philosophys use of term colonial/modern sex-representational
pornography,223; system, 162167;
institutional reality and, 97101; concluding reflections on, 174176;
by the law,27; interpersonal spatiality, 159162;
MacKinnons subordination overview, 157158;
claim,9194; racialized nakedness and sexual desire,
mental intermediation of,75; 167174
by pornography, grounding conventions Transgression of egalitarianism, 237240
for,8081; Trans people:accommodation of, in
pornography as, 2, 34, 23,66; conception of gender,99;
pornography as illocutionary act public gender presentation of,
of,7374; 165,176;
pornography's role in, 27, 31, 59, transphobic oppression, 14, 145, 151,
62,74; 164, 175,176;
scrutiny of claim of,46; trans-positive pornography,98n9;
subordinating speech,910; trans women, 170,176
subordination claim, versions of, 93, Tremlett, Giles,216
100, 105,107; Trier, Lars von,211
Vadas on,226; Trinks, Stefan, 123124
womens refusal to accept, 101. See Trouble Every Day (Denis), 224225
also Authority vs.power True feelings, 46, 4950,56
Index |273
274
Truth/falsity, 75, 152154 as determiners of mens sexiness,204;

Twilight (film),207 dignity of, 172,173;
empowerment of,154;
U.K. Childrens Commissioner report female-friendly pornography,213;
(2013),2935 female strip, 171, 172, 173,175;
UK Sexual Offences Act (2003),31 heterosexual desire,173;
Underwear,165n6 as institutional entities, 97,99;
Undesirable, desirability of, 187192 mens uses of, 98, 102103;
Uptake, 7, 45,4748 nakedness of, 163164;
U.S. Attorney Generals Commission on as not persons, 142143;
Pornography,6n4 pornography as constructing womens
natures,94;
Vadas, Melinda, 8, 137143, 148, 222, pornography as norms on treatment
226227 of,2627;
Valian, Virginia,207 pornography as violation of civil
Valverde, Mariana,5 rightsof,2;
Van Brabandt, Petra, 15, 193, 221222, racially differential pornographic
229,237 representations of, 175176;
Vanting, Gala,212 role of, 140141;
Vasquez, Tina, 214,216 sexiness markers for, 206208;
Verdictive speech acts, 13, 33, 60, 61, sexual availability of,31;
7072, 76. See also Performative sexuality, feminist pornographers
speechacts depictions of, 130131;
Viewing pornography, by women of sexual voracity, 231,236;
color,185 shaping of, in feminist pornography,
Violated Angels (Wakamatsu),230 131,132;
Violence, 4, 5, 187188. See alsoHarm; submission of, eroticization of, 86,
Rape 247248, 251252,255;
token resistance, 230231;
Wakamatsu, Kji,230 trans women,165;
Waldron, Jeremy,27,34 white women, 157, 169. See also
Ward, Jane,193 Gender;
West, Caroline, 6, 25, 28, 51,249 Sexiness;
Wet aesthetics, 235, 236237, 238,240 Women ofcolor;
White fever, lack of term for,190 Women with disabilities;
White men, crossing of racial borders,187 entries beginning feminist
White women:as creatures of Women, objectification of, 137155;
culture,169; in Air Doll, 146147;
as sexualized objects,157 conclusions on,154;
Wicke, Jennifer,193 female nudes in Western art and, 225,
Wieland, Nellie,7 232233;
Willis, Ellen,5 knowledge generation and,128;
Wisconsin State Legislature,194 in Lars and the Real Girl, 144146;
Women:appearance, 80, 170,171; overview, 137138;
Asian American, 182, 185,191; personifying pornography, causal
desire of,8687; connection with, 141144, 148154;
274 | Index
275
pornography as a woman and, The Worlds Biggest Gangbang (film),180

138141,226; Wrongness, of pornographys
sex dolls and personification and, subordination of women, 93, 94,
147148 100101,105
Women Against Sex movement,200
Women of color, 177, 178182,186; Yellow fever, 189191
in colonial/modern gender system, 159, Young, Iris Marion, 207,248
166167, 169, 173175;
color hierarchy of,191; Zheng, Robin, 14, 15, 177, 206,
exposure of, 157,173; 210211;
as pornographers,189; on arguments against pornography
recovering history of pleasure of, based on racism, 192195;
183187; conclusions by, 194195;
as sexualized animals, 157, 169,175 overview,178;
Women with disabilities, 188, 200, 202, on pornographic representations of
205, 215216 women of color, 189190
Index |275
276

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i

STUDIES IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY

Recently Published in the Series:

Editedby Mari Mikkola

Published in the United States of America by Oxford UniversityPress

Oxford University Press2017

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, storedin

You must not circulate this work in any otherform

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Mikkola, Mari, editor.

List of Contributors vii

CHAPTER1 Feminist Philosophy and Pornography:The Past,

PART I | Speech Act Approaches to Pornography

PART II | Pornography and Social Ontology

PART III | Objectification as Harm of Pornography

PART IV | Feminist Pornography:An Oxymoron?

Louise Antony (B.A. Syracuse University, Ph.D. Harvard University) is

University of Chicago in both philosophy and art history and works on

viii | List of Contributors

List of Contributors |ix

CHAPTER1 Feminist Philosophy

The heir of Playboy, Cooper Hefner, stated in a recent newspaper arti-

8439849.html. Accessed October 15,2015.

However, even those who wish to distance themselves from conservative

The former objection, however, seems to rest on a misunderstand-

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |3

1.2. The Present

Langtons speech act theoretic analysis has dominated Anglo-American

1.2.a. Does theSubordination Claim Stand Up toScrutiny?

Whether this more controversial claim stands up to scrutiny has gener-

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |5

might be said that because pornography is fantasy, it cannot have subordi-

1.2.b. How Plausible Is theSilencingClaim?

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |7

Nancy Bauer puts forward a more thoroughgoing challenge by ques-

1.2.c. Does Pornography Objectify?

destroys womens sexual autonomy (for similar claims, see Dyzenhaus

1.2.d. Pornography asSubordinating Speech?

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |9

a nonstipulative, real definition that respects commonly held views

Since Langtons seminal paper, a rich literature on feminist philosophy

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |11

in pornography. With these in mind, a feminist analysis of pornography

1. Which definitions of harm and pornography would be most fitting

1. What kind(s) of representation does pornography involve?

With these themes and questions in mind, the collection starts by

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |13

understand the harms of pornography. Instead of relying on speech act

may not be harmful (see, e.g., Mikkola, Zheng). Moreover, self-

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |15

Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. Do We Have a Right to Pornography? In his A Matter of

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |17

Langton, Rae, and Caroline West. 1999. Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language

Parent, William. 1990. A Second Look at Pornography and the Subordination of

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY |19

West, Caroline. 2013. Pornography and Censorship. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of

PARTI Speech Act Approaches

CHAPTER2 Is Pornography Like TheLaw?

When pornography consists of words, it is not only words, as Catharine

dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; enjoying pain or

We accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend

2.2. How Pornography Is Unlike theLaw

IS PORNOGRAPHY LIKE THELAW? |25

Pornographic speech is informal, rather than formal. There is no

2.3. How Pornography Is Like theLaw

3.7.b.Type 2:Failure toRecognize theSpeaker

3.8.On Various Connections Between Pornography