Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v.

Escolin

Facts:

Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates
should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands,
with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate
inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers and
sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges
estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they
could inherit.

Issue:

Whether there is a substitution of heirs.

Ruling:

No. Linnies will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code
nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution because
there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3)
incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and
invalid.

The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are
not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from
his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject,
however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory,
since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal
and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he
could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself,
he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would
cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual
existence of any remainder of her estate then.

It was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to
Charles during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his
lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole
or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of
one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a
parcel of land. The said Codicil was duly probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to
the same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer
Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.

The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza, because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that
since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank, which is a violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the
fruits of the devised land.

Issue:

Whether the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

Held:

YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point.From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly
worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadillas inheritance
and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It
is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrixs near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Miciano v. Brimo

Facts:

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of partition.
However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives respect his
wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of the
oppositor.

The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the deceased was
a Turkish citizen and that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.

Issue:

Whether the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

Whether there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor

Ruling:

No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by Philippine Laws
and those who opposed the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled from the disposition, the
fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.

It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedents national law, according to Article 10 of
the Civil Code, such national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions.

Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and are valid, as well as those favorable to
herein appellant-oppositor.