FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:

Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008
DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo
and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing
said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that
he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to have
caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government
like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use
their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The
NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio
and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster
sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among
others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales
and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify

straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

III. THE RULING

 [The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as
against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in
granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned.
Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ.
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the
same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]

1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an
altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable
whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of
them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons
private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but
their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free
press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech
and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all
these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not
be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be
vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the
need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free
press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
 [I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced
in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements
were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its
statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on
behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result
in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are
acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right
to free speech and press.

Marcos v Manglapus (Constitutional Law)

Marcos v Manglapus
GR No. 88211 September 15, 1989

CORTES, J:

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

FACTS:
(1) This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to order respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. This is in response to Marcoss wish to return to the Philippines to die. The petitioners
case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill of Rights:

Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

And other contentions including:

President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do
so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
(2) The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights, citing
Article II

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

and the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista), etc.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:
Petition dismissed. President did not act with abuse of discretion in determining the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time since it poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their
followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive.
(4) The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of
the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

Right to Information, access to public documents7 CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENTFacts:
-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former
governmentofficial) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents
[PCGG and its chairman] from privately enteringinto, perfecting and/or executing any agreement
with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located inthe Philippines and/or abroad including
the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be theyongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or
relating to such negotiations andagreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez
is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies whocommitted
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of thecountry's
economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several newsreports 2
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news itemsreferred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in variouscoded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between
thegovernment (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-
PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations
and agreementspertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
claims that anycompromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount publicinterest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that
would be greatlyprejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in
general have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the
government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with theMarcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature,
because there is noshowing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And evenif he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since
the proposed terms andconditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-
PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
berecognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts,transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development,shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

[CHAVEZ VS PCGG CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TOINFORMATION)]

March 8, 2010-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer
to completed andoperative official acts, not to those still being considered.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreementdated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declaredNULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers andall
government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in
therecovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED
todisclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the
finalagreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with
the discussionsembodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.
RD:-
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of
the Constitutionhave as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing
the exactlimitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged.However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:(1) national security
matters and intelligence information- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secretsregarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24
But where there isno need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to
withholddocuments and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in
strictconfidence" and given "scrupulous protection."(2) trade secrets and banking transactions-
trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other relatedlaws)
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure(3) criminal matters- Also excluded are classified law
enforcement matters, such as those relating to theapprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of criminals, which courts neither maynor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention
and prosecution. Efforts at effective lawenforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free
public access to, for example, policeinformation regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts
of fugitives, or leads on covertcriminal activities.(4) other confidential information.

PEOPLE v. OBRERO
J. MendozaMay 17, 2000Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Manila
RATIO:
Perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to the accused without any effortto find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he hadhis own counsel or he wanted the
police to appoint one for him is merely ceremonialand inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect.
QUICK FACTS:
Accused is charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was apprehended and
brought to the police station where he was provided with alawyer who is a station commander of
another police station, and interrogated.
FACTS:
Accused: Jimmy ObreroVictim: Emma Cabrera robbery victim. Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta (the twomaids of Emma) murder victims Jimmy Obrero is a delivery boy employed
by Angie Cabosas whose businesswas selling chickens to customers. Jimmy was asked to
deliver chickens to EmmaCabrera, a regular customer.In Jimmys extrajudicial confession, he
stated that the day before the robbery,his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they
rob Emma in order to beable to go to La Union to visit his family. On the day of the
robbery, they learnedt h a t o n l y t w o h e l p e r s w e r e t h e n a t t h e r e s i d e n c e
o f E m m a C a b r e r a , t h u s t h e y decided to pull the
heist.R o n n i e c o v e r e d t h e m o u t h o f o n e N e n a B e r j u e g a t o p r e v e n t h e
r f r o m shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie thengave
the knife to Jimmy who stabbed the younger maid, Remedios Hitta from whichshe died.
Thereafter, they divided the
money. This extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by Jimmy in thep r e s e n c e o f
Atty. De los Reyes. Atty. De los Reyes is a PC Captain of the
W PDHeadquarters in UN Avenue. He was at Station 7 of the W PD
b e c a u s e h e w a s representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was
asked by Lt. Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist Jimmy Obrero in
executing an extrajudicialconfession.At the trial, Jimmy Obrero pleaded not guilty of
the crime charged. He saidthat he came back from his errand and remitt ed the
amount of P2000 which hadbeen paid to him. He also claimed that after being informed of
the charges
againsth i m , h e w a s b e a t e n u p a n d d e t a i n e d f o r a w e e k a n d m a
d e t o e x e c u t e a n extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De
los Reyes beforeand stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial
confessionwhich he signed because he did not know how to read.
People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]Facts:

On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October1991, an emboldened Gerry
Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino,suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis
Aquino and stabbed himrepeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with
him,stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggledand
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashedtowards the nearby
Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out ofnowhere Edward Endino appeared
and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered forsafety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the
airport. Meanwhile, Dennis,wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where
hecollapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara withthe help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired evenbefore he could receive medical
attention. On 18 October 1991, an informationfor the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against
Edward Endino and GerryGalgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both
accusedremained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order puttingthe case
in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon theirapprehension. On 19 November 1992,
Gerry Galgarin was arrested through thecombined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at
a house in SitioSto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. The Antipolo Police immediately took him
intotemporary custody. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetchedfrom the Antipolo
Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 EdwinMagbanua of the Palawan police force to be
taken to Palawan and be triedaccordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-
CBN televisionstation where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of
theinterview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to hisnephew
Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attackingAquino, they left for
Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward'smother, was waiting. Langging gave
them money for their fare for Manila. Theytook the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a
few days, and proceeded toManila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo.
Galgarin appealedfor Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown
overthe ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disownedthe
confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was inducedby the threats of the
arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotapedconfession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under theexclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the
Constitution. The trial courtfound Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced
him toreclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino inthe
amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actualdamages.
Issue:
Whether the ABS-
CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is
admissible as evidenceHeld: The interview was recorded on video and it showed
Galgarinunburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence ofnewsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as itwas not given to police officers but
to media men in an attempt to elicitsympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed beenforced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmenwho, in
all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However,because of the inherent danger
in the use of television as a medium foradmitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this
phenomenon in several cases, itis prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution
must be taken infurther admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with
theconnivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimizecoerced extra-
judicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary ruleby having an accused admit an
offense on television. Such a situation would bedetrimental to the guaranteed rights of the
accused and thus imperil ourcriminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped
confessions givenbefore media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence
ofpolice officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalidpolice
techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in casessuch as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determiningwhether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychologicalatmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we
should never presumethat all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given.
Thistype of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughlyexamined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly adifficult and arduous task for the
courts to make. It requires persistence anddetermination in separating polluted confessions
from untainted ones. We havea sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed
by the constitution.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in

Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
 Senator Enrile
(Source: wikifilipinas.org)

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix

Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless
the crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is

strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight

risk.
HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of

innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused

at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal

offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life

imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs.

Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

-o0o-

LEONEN DISSENT

Justice Leonen
(Source: wikipedia.org)
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal
basis the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also
claims that the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds.
Leonen argues that [Petitioner's] release for medical or
humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion
to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor were these grounds
raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.

Bailfor humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in

our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.

Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a

special accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize
the decision to wit:

[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on
their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.

xxx

Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance,
whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension,
pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and
not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, and
other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...

Procedure for granting bail

Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the
lower courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail.
In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:

It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be

besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges
involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic
principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its
Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the
regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the
following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court,
trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if
not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this
Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot
justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his

bail without any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution
had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the
prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent
asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion
based on prematurity.

Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate

Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian
reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the
prosecution were able to develop their arguments as to this point to
establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail.

The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant
bail merely on the basis of the certification of the attending
physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering
from numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:

Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on

judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend
our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and
authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing
whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative
detention is possible.

xxx

The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched,

long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to
determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined
when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is
filed by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be
pleaded and heard.

asgasgf
Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the
version deliberated upon
This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant
bail based on a substantially different version of the opinion, one
which did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for the
granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4
solely on the issue of whether or not bail is a matter of right and
reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially similar
to an earlier draft which used humanitarian considerations as the
basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that this
was an irregularity.

The majority opinion offers no guidance

The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the
privilege (humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply
to those who have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege
will only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or
not this privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous
standard for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical
conditions.

There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and

how bail can then be canceled.

Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced

The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong
Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to
extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on international
law. As applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the
remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be
qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.

Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding

the case back to the lower court for factual determination of
whether or not the accused was a flight risk.

BLOGGER'S COMMENTS
The majority opinion and the dissent both make for a very
interesting treatise on Criminal Procedure.These will likely be
quoted again and again in bail hearings and in classrooms.

The majority opinion is very strained, it had to rely on motherhood

statements regarding a person's right to liberty and right to bail.
The decision used no compelling legal reasoning apart from our
commitment to international laws.

Here comes Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, seeing himself as CJ

Claudio Teehankee reborn, comes to the rescue claiming that the
decision will:
will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the
presence or absence of human compassion.

Factual Milieu is Important

We must note however the factual milieu. At the time Senators
Enrile, Revilla and Estrada were charged with plunder, the public
perception was that these Senators were the target of a campaign
to eliminate the Administration's political enemies.

The perception of some circles critical of the current administration

that these three senators, (the trio known colloquially as Pogi,
Tanda and Sexy) were hastily charged and unfairly
detained. The accusation that the administration was quick to
charge its enemies while defending its allies is a valid one. No
discussion of the grant of bail will overlook the highly politicized
nature of the 3 Senator's incarceration.

That is not to say that this trio and particularly Enrile are innocent.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision drew a slew of criticism and a
few defenders. Below are just a few links to articles criticizing or
defending the decision.

Treachery at the Philippine Supreme Court

The Supreme Court Ruling on Enrile Shames the Philippines

Its time to make a stand on Supreme Courts Enrile ruling, says

member of Cyber Plaza Miranda

Would you grant bail if it was not Enrile?

Nothing higher than liberty

In defense of Enrile bail

Ongoing discussion on pinoyexchange.com

Keep in mind that some of these articles were written before the
decision actually came out.

Am I comfortable with the decision?

Justice Bersamin - Author of the main decision

(Source: wikipedia.org)

Yes. The decision re-emphasizes the right of people to bail from an

ideological standpoint politically well connected or otherwise it
serves to remind courts and prosecutors to establish probability of
guilt for heinous crimes early on. For the innocent languishing in
detention centers, this decision is a Godsend and can potentially
speed up criminal justice.

Courts and prosecutors will have to take steps to adapt to this new
environment. Needless to say, I argue that the requisites of 1.
Flight risk and, 2. Strong evidence of guilt are fairly simple and
reliable guidelines for the lower courts to follow. The dissent's
warning of courts getting swamped with requests of accused to be
released on bail and lack of guidance to lower courts is unwarranted
fear-mongering.

I am uncomfortable with the dissenting opinion. While I think its

arguments as to the finer points of procedure is warranted, it
nevertheless casts the Supreme Court in a bad light and can serve
to weaken it as an institution.
 Tag Archives: Government of Hongkong v. Olalia
4APR2014

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

posted in CONLAW2 cases

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a
petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private
respondent.The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant
petition.

Issue:WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling:A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi:Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.On the
other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.In
this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No.
153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international
law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and
the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be
allowed to post bail.

IMMUNITY STATUTES

Consti II case digest: MAPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

STATUTORY IMMUNITY

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was
granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that
he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand
Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for
charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New
York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American
prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not
able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect.
However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from
being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being
tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on
the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy
the requirements both of the law and the parties implementing agreements. Though the petitioners
were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which
under the law has the power to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no
longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence
derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

People v. Echegaray (CRIM1)

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted
out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The
motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming
for the reversal of the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of
merit.

Ratio:
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as
ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory
in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination
against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the
U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion
which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices
and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the
crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the
death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.
Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not
over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in
its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new
death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any
bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's
spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or
not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of
the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system
through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the
enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with
the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not
the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a
higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which
the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and
mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and
inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock
the moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her
own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and
social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing
acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of
the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
heinous by their very nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and
honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society
and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but
the society itself.

PEOPLE v. ROBERT NUEZ y LAGASCA

G.R. No. 112092. March 1, 2001

Accused was found guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the death of the victim and
pursuant to P.D. 1866 in relation to the 1987 Constitution the court sentences the said accused to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and with costs.

HELD:

Appellant was convicted of illegal possession of firearms resulting to the death of the victim. At
the time of the commission of the crime, the existing jurisprudence was People v. Quijada. The SC
held then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes one
for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or murder. In the
meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294, 27 which lowered the penalties for
illegal possession of firearms. Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides If
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In the present case, there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately tried.
Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither adopted nor
presented before the trial court trying the illegal possession case. For this reason, there is a
dearth of evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated homicide.

The Court held that accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A. No. 8294, being favorable to the accused,
should be applied retroactively.

371 Misolas vs. Panga [GR 83341, 30 January 1990] En Banc, Cortes (J): 11 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2
dissented in separate opinions Facts: After receiving information from an unidentified informant that
members of the New People's Army (NPA) were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster
Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house
in the early morning of 8 August 1987. Three persons were inside the house, Arnel P. Misolas and two
women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the
confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a pillow
allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner
was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. On 4 September 1987, an information charging
Misolas with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Presidential Decree 1866 was filed by
the provincial fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance
of subversion so as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866. Upon
arraignment, Misolas, with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
However, a few days later, the same counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that
there was Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) basis for the filing of a motion to
quash. Judge Benjamin V. Panga, as Judge of RTC Branch 33, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, gave Misolas
time to file a motion to quash. Misolas filed a motion to quash on the grounds (1) that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense because the information does not charge the proper offense since from the
allegations the offense that may be charged is either subversion or rebellion; and (2) that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of violations of his constitutional rights, i.e, his
arrest and the seizure of the firearm and ammunition were illegal. The judge denied the motion to
quash for lack of merit in an order dated 7 January 1988. Misolas moved for reconsideration, but such
was denied on 15 February 1988. Misolas filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether PD 1866
constitutes a bill of attainder. Held: Misolas objected to PD 1866 on the ground of substantive due
process. Established rules of constitutional litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the
theory that PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. Yet, even if a challenge on the ground that PD 1866 is
a bill of attainder could be appropriately considered, it will still be met with little success. The Court, in
People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the
lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in
the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the
decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the
qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of
the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying
circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and
judicial precedents require.