SUCCESSION Cases - General To Art. 1105

SUCCESSION Cases 1 of 1166
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Leilanie C. Yangyang-Espejo, CPA
Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon .........................................................................................................96

SUCCESSION IN GENERAL ....................................................................................... 9
Ramirez v. Ramirez 111 S 82 .................................................................................................... 9 Eastern v. Lucero ................................................................................................................ 100
ARTICLE 728 ............................................................................................................... 13 Emnace v. CA ....................................................................................................................... 105
Cuevas v. Cuevas.................................................................................................................... 13 In the matter of Guardianship of the Lavidesv. City Court of Lucena ..............................112
Jutic v. CA .............................................................................................................................. 16 Bonilla v. Barcena ................................................................................................................ 116
Maglasang v. Cabatingan ..................................................................................................... 21 Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo 152 S 172............................................................................ 119
Ganuelas v. Cawed 401 S 447 ................................................................................................. 25 Dela Merced v. Dela Merced ................................................................................................ 134
ARTICLE 774 ............................................................................................................... 30 Gayon v. Gayon ..................................................................................................................... 138
Coronel v. CA ........................................................................................................................ 30 Palicte v. Ramolete ...............................................................................................................140
ARTICLE 776 .............................................................................................................. 42 Locsin v. CA ......................................................................................................................... 145

Liu v. Loy............................................................................................................................... 42
Llenares v. CA .......................................................................................................................151
Conde v. Abaya 13 Phil 240 ................................................................................................... 45
Gevero v. IAC ........................................................................................................................ 159
Junio v. Collector 34 Phil. 433 (Case not found!) .................................................................52
Suarez vs. CA G.R. NO. 94918 September 2, 1992 (Case not found!)................................. 163
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v. CA .............................................................................52
Lorenzo v. Posadas ..............................................................................................................164
Robles v. Batacan.................................................................................................................. 58 ARTICLE 779 ............................................................................................................. 173
San Agustin v. CA .................................................................................................................. 61 Rodriguez vs. Borja (17 SCRA 41) ........................................................................................ 173
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) ......................................................................................... 66 Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) ........................ 177
Alvarez v. IAC ........................................................................................................................73 ARTICLE 780 ............................................................................................................. 183
Pamplona v. Moreto 96 S 775............................................................................................... 80 Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) See Earlier Case
under Article 779 ................................................................................................................. 183
Ledesma v. McLachlin 66 Phil 547 ...................................................................................... 86
ARTICLE 783 ............................................................................................................. 183
ARTICLE 777............................................................................................................... 89
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) See Earlier Case Article 776 .......................................... 183
Rioferio v. CA ........................................................................................................................ 89
Herreros vs. Gil (88 Phil 260). ............................................................................................184
Heirs of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. v. Prado................................................................................ 92
Montinola vs. Herbosa (Court of Appeals case) Case cannot be located! ......................... 191 Enriquez vs. Abadia (95 Phil 627) ...................................................................................... 244
Merza vs. Porras (93 Phil 142) ............................................................................................ 192 Ibarle vs. Po (February 27, 1953 .......................................................................................... 246
Vitug vs. CA, 183 SCRA 755) ............................................................................................... 195 Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005) ... 248
Seangio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 149753 (Wrong citation! G.R. No. 149753 refers to Cosme v. ARTICLE 16 ............................................................................................................... 254
Philippines Case. Seangio v. Reyes case is G.R. No. 140371-72) ......................................... 199
Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil 867) ........................................................................................ 254
ARTICLE 784 ............................................................................................................. 210
Bellis vs. Bellis (June 8, 1967) ............................................................................................. 257
Castaeda vs. Alemany (3 Phil 426) ................................................................................... 210
Testate Estate of Christensen vs. Garcia (January 31, 1963) ............................................. 260
ARTICLE 788 ............................................................................................................. 212
Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984)............................................................................. 270
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) ............................................................................... 212
PCIB vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 266) ......................................................................................... 277
Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico (4 SCRA 550) ........................................................................ 219
Malang vs. Moson (August 22, 2000) ................................................................................ 379
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) ............................................................................. 223
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000) ............................... 392
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) see under 779 230
Testate Estate of Suntay (JULY 31, 1964) ........................................................................... 398
ARTICLE 789 ............................................................................................................. 231
ARTICLE 798 ............................................................................................................ 404
Estate of Rigor vs. Rigor (89 S 493) .................................................................................... 231
Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12, (1999)) ............................................................................. 404
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) see under 788...................................................... 237
ARTICLE 799 ............................................................................................................ 408
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under 776 ................................................................. 237
Bagtas vs. Paguio (22 Phil 227) ..........................................................................................408
ARTICLE 791 ..............................................................................................................237
Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil 163) ............................................................................................. 413
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) see under 788 ....................................................... 237
Torres vs. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) .............................................................................418
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico (February 28, 1962) see under 788 ........................................... 237
Sancho vs. Abella, 58 Phil. 728 ........................................................................................... 442
Yambao vs. Gonzales (1 SCRA 1157) ....................................................................................238
Alsua-Betts vs. CA (July 30, 1979)...................................................................................... 446
ARTICLE 792 ............................................................................................................ 240
Avelino vs. Dela Cruz (21 Phil 521) ..................................................................................... 470
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) see under 779 240
Jocson vs. Jocson (46 Phil 701), ........................................................................................... 471
ARTICLE 795 ............................................................................................................ 240
In Re Will of Riosa (39 Phil 23) ......................................................................................... 240 Cuyugan vs. Baron & Baron (62 Phil 859) ........................................................................ 474
Caguioa vs. Calderon (20 Phil 400) ................................................................................... 485

ARTICLE 805 ............................................................................................................. 571
Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan (27 Phil 579) ............................................................................. 489 Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) see earlier case under Article 804 ........................... 571
Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil 573) ................................................................ 497 Icasiano vs. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422) .................................................................................... 571
Galvez vs. Galvez (26 Phil. 243) ......................................................................................... 499 Barut vs. Cagacungan (21 Phil 461) ................................................................................... 576
Carillio vs. Jaojoco (46 Phil 957) ........................................................................................502 In Re Will of Tan Duico (45 Phil 807) ............................................................................... 583
Hernaez vs. Hernaez (1 Phil 683) ...................................................................................... 505 Leano vs. Leano (30 Phil 612) ............................................................................................. 586
Neyra vs. Neyra (76 Phil 333).............................................................................................. 510 Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489) ...................................................................................... 587
Albornoz vs. Albornoz (71 Phil 414) .................................................................................... 523 Balonan vs. Abellana (109 Phil 359). .................................................................................. 589
ARTICLE 800 ............................................................................................................ 526 Abaya vs. Zalamero (10 Phil 357) ....................................................................................... 592
Torres vs. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) see under Article 799 ........................................ 526
Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil 41)........................................................................................... 594
Ramirez vs. Ramirez (39 SCRA 147) .................................................................................. 526
Nera vs. Rimando ............................................................................................................... 597
Junquera vs. Borromeo (19 SCRA 656). ............................................................................. 536
Maravilla vs. Maravilla (37 SCRA 672) case not found!.................................................... 599
Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil 573) see earlier case under Article 799 .........543
Maravilla vs. Maravilla (37 SCRA 672) case not found!.................................................... 599
Cuyugan vs. Baron & Baron (62 Phil 859) see earlier case under Article 799..................543
Gabriel vs. Mateo, 51 Phil 216). ........................................................................................... 599
Gonzalez vs. Gonzales (November 29, 1951)...................................................................... 544
Gonzales vs. CA (May 25, 1979) .........................................................................................604
ARTICLE 804 ............................................................................................................. 551
Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152) ............................................................................................. 619
Abada vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005) see earlier case under Article 795 .. 551
In Re Estate of Saguinsin, (41 Phil 875) ............................................................................. 622
Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) ............................................................................................. 551
Avera vs. Garcia (42 Phil 145) ............................................................................................. 624
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) ...................................................................................554
Estate of Tampoy vs. Alberastine, (Feb. 25, 1960) ............................................................. 629
Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil 660................................................................................................556
Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152) see earlier case under Article 805 ...................................... 631
Reyes vs. Vidal, (91 Phil. 127) ..............................................................................................558
Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil 494), ........................................................................................... 631
Testate Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana (106 Phil 1973) ....................................................562
Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil 378), .......................................................................................... 637
Suroza vs. Honrado (110 SCRA 32) .................................................................................... 565
In Re: Pilapil (72 Phil 546) ................................................................................................. 640 Gonzales vs. CA (May 25, 1979) see earlier case under Article 805 ..................................698
Fernandez vs. de Dios, (46 Phil 922) ................................................................................. 646 Gabucan vs. Judge Manta (21 SCRA 1056, January 28, 1980) ............................................698
Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) see earlier case under Article 804 ..................................... 651 ARTICLE 808 ............................................................................................................ 700
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) see earlier case under Article 804 ........................... 651 Alvarado vs. Gaviola (226 SCRA 317).................................................................................. 700
Tenafrancia vs. Abaja (87 Phil 139) case not found!.......................................................... 651 Garcia vs. Vasquez (32 SCRA 490) Case not Found! ......................................................... 705
Leynez vs. Leynez (68 Phil 745) .......................................................................................... 651 ARTICLE 809 ............................................................................................................ 705
Alvarado vs. Gaviola (226 SCRA 317) see earlier case under Article 808 .......................... 705
Taboada vs. Rosal (November 5, 1983) .............................................................................. 654
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784) see earlier case under Article 805 ............................ 705
Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489) see earlier case under Article 805 .............................. 658
Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032) see earlier case under Article 805 .................................... 705
Payad vs. Tolentino (62 Phil 848): ..................................................................................... 658
Taboada vs. Rosal (November 5, 1983) see earlier case under Article 805 ....................... 705
Jallores vs. Interino (L-42463) case not found! ................................................................. 660
Villaflor vs. Tobias (53 Phil 714) ......................................................................................... 705
Uy Coque vs. Sioca ............................................................................................................. 660
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784) see earlier case under Article 805 ............................ 708
Sao vs. Quintana .............................................................................................................. 663
ARTICLE 810 ............................................................................................................. 708
Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil 30) ...................................................................................... 664
Roxas vs. De Jesus, Jr. (Jan. 28, 1985)................................................................................. 708
Quinto vs. Morata .............................................................................................................. 666
Labrador vs. CA (180 SCRA 120) ......................................................................................... 712
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784) ................................................................................... 668
ARTICLE 811............................................................................................................... 716
Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032) ........................................................................................... 679
Azaola vs. Singson (109 Phil 102) ........................................................................................716
Azuela vs. CA (G.R. NO. 122880, April 12, 2006) ............................................................... 680
Icasiano vs. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422) see earlier case under Article 805 .............................719
ARTICLE 806 ............................................................................................................ 690
Azaola vs. Singson (109 Phil 102) see earlier case under Article 811 ..................................719
Azuela vs. CA (G.R. NO. 122880, April 12, 2006) see earlier case under Article 805 ....... 690
Codoy vs. Calugay (312 SCRA 333 (1999)) ...........................................................................719
Garcia vs. Gatchalian (G.R. No. L-20357. November 25, 1967.) ....................................... 690
Rodelas vs. Aranza:. ............................................................................................................. 731
Javellana vs. Ledesma (97 Phil 258)................................................................................... 692
Rivera vs. CA (182 SCRA 322) ............................................................................................. 734
Cruz vs. Villasor (November 26, 1973) .............................................................................. 695
ARTICLE 814 ............................................................................................................. 738
Conejos vs. Yves (11 C.A. Rep. 945) Case not Found! ........................................................ 698
Kalaw vs. Relova (132 SCRA 237) ........................................................................................ 738 Alsua-Betts vs. CA (July 30, 1979)......................................................................................808
Ajero vs. CA (236 SCRA 488, 1994) .................................................................................... 741 Lim vs. CA (January 24, 2000) ........................................................................................... 832
Venura vs. Ventura (106 Phil 1159) Case not Found! .......................................................... 747 In Re Estate of Johnson (39 Phil 159) ..................................................................................841
Guevarra vs. Guevarra (74 Phil 479)................................................................................... 747 Leviste vs. CA (169 SCRA 580) ........................................................................................... 850
ARTICLE 817 ............................................................................................................. 756 Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12, (1999)) see earlier case under Article 798 ...................... 854
Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil 867) ........................................................................................ 756 Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) ........................................................................... 854
Testate Estate of Suntay (JULY 31, 1964) see earlier case under Article 16 ...................... 759 Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449 (1966)) .......................................................................... 863
ARTICLE 818 ............................................................................................................. 759 Pastor, Jr. vs. CA, (G.R. No. L-56340. June 24, 1983) ........................................................869
Dela Cerna vs. Potot (12 SCRA 576) .................................................................................. 759
Lim vs. CA (323 SCRA 102, January 24, 2000) See Earlier Case also under Article 838 ... 879
ARTICLE 821 ............................................................................................................. 762
Coronado vs. CA, (G.R. No. 78778. December 3, 1990).................................................... 879
Cruz vs. Villasor (54 SCRA 31) see under Article 806 ....................................................... 762
Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984) see earlier case Under Article 16 .......................884
ARTICLE 824 ............................................................................................................ 762
Solivio vs. CA (G.R. No. 83484. February 12, 1990) ..........................................................884
Caluya vs. Domingo (27 Phil 330). .................................................................................... 762
Ajero vs. CA (236 SCRA 488) See under Article 814 .......................................................... 895
ARTICLE 828 ............................................................................................................ 765
Magallanes vs. Kayanan (Jan. 20, 1976) ............................................................................ 895
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. CA .......................................................................... 765
Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Leonidas ( April 27, 1984) ..........................................................899
ARTICLE 832 ............................................................................................................ 769
Vda. De Kilayko vs. Judge Tengco (G.R. No. L-45425. March 27, 1992) .......................... 903
Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951 ........................................................... 769
Arancillo vs. Peaflorida ..................................................................................................... 911
NAVAL vs NAVAL G.R. No. L-11823, February 11, 1918 ....................................................... 776
Caiza vs. CA, (G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997) ........................................................ 914
ARTICLE 838 ............................................................................................................ 783
Spouses Pascual vs. CA (G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003) ...............................................783 Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) See under article
779 ........................................................................................................................................ 921
Maninang vs. CA (114 SCRA 478) .......................................................................................792
Cruz vs. Villasor (54 SCRA 31) see earlier case under Article 806..................................... 921
SO ORDERED. ................................................................................................................... 795
Camaya vs. Patulandong (G.R. No. 144915. February 23, 2004)......................................... 921
Atilano Mercado vs. Santos (66 Phil 216).......................................................................... 796
ARTICLE 847 ............................................................................................................ 926
Nable vs. Unson (27 Phil 73) .............................................................................................. 926 1977) .................................................................................................................................... 953
ARTICLE 850 ............................................................................................................ 928 Gonzalez vs. CFI of Manila (G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981)........................................... 957
Austria vs. Reyes (31 SCRA 754) ........................................................................................ 928 De Papa vs. Tongko Camacho (September 24, 1986) ........................................................ 967
ARTICLE 854 ............................................................................................................ 933 ARTICLE 898 ............................................................................................................ 974

Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) see earlier case under Article 838 ....................933 Del Rosario vs. Conanan (G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977) ........................................ 974
Acain vs. IAC (October 27, 1987) ........................................................................................933 ARTICLE 912 ............................................................................................................. 980
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. vs. Antonio Balansag (G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005) ........................ 939 Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) see Under Article 788 ..........................................980
Seangio vs. Reyes (G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006) see under Article 784 ....... 949 ARTICLE 960 ............................................................................................................ 980
ARTICLE 857 ............................................................................................................ 949 Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor vs. Rigor (G.R. No. L-22036,
April 30, 1979) see under Article 789 .................................................................................980
PCIB vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 266) see earlier case under Article 16 .................................... 949
ARTICLE 962 ............................................................................................................ 980
ARTICLE 859 ............................................................................................................ 949
Bagunu vs. Piedad (347 SCRA 571, December 8, 2000) .....................................................980
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under Article 776 .................................................... 949
ARTICLE 970 ............................................................................................................ 984
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez (G.R. No. L-27952, February
15, 1982) See under succession in General.......................................................................... 949 Bagunu vs. Piedad (347 SCRA 571, December 8, 2000) see Article 962............................984
ARTICLE 863 ............................................................................................................ 949 Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales vs. Rosales (February 27, 1987) ................................984
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez (G.R. No. L-27952, February ARTICLE 971 ............................................................................................................. 988
15, 1982) see under succession in General .......................................................................... 949
Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales vs. Rosales (February 27, 1987) see Article 970 .......988
PCIB vs. Pablico (56 SCRA 266) see earlier case under Article 16 .................................... 949
ARTICLE 975 ............................................................................................................ 988
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under Article 776 .................................................... 949
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977) ......................................988
ARTICLE 882 ............................................................................................................ 949
ARTICLE 980 ............................................................................................................ 994
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) See under Article 776 ................................................... 949
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) ..................................994
ARTICLE 888 ............................................................................................................ 950
ARTICLE 992 ........................................................................................................... 1002
Francisco vs. Francisco (354 SCRA 112, March 8, 2001) .................................................... 950
Diaz vs. IAC (June 17, 1987)............................................................................................... 1002
ARTICLE 891 ............................................................................................................. 953
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista (March 25, 1992) ................................................................1007
Chua vs. The Court Of First Instance Of Negros Occidental (G.R. No. L-29901, August 31,
Corpus vs. Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco (G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978) ............... 1012
ARTICLE 1051 ........................................................................................................... 1050
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco- Imperial vs. CA (G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999) ..........................................................1050
Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010) .............................................................................1016
ARTICLE 1053 .......................................................................................................... 1057
ARTICLE 994 ........................................................................................................... 1029
Imperial vs. CA (G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999) see under Article 1051 ...................... 1057
Heirs of Spouses Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. vs. Lina (351 SCRA 183,
February 6, 2001) ............................................................................................................... 1029 ARTICLE 1058 .......................................................................................................... 1057
ARTICLE 995 ........................................................................................................... 1039 Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) see earlier case under Article 838 .................. 1057
Calisterio vs. Calisterio (April 6, 2000) ............................................................................ 1039 Corona vs. CA (G.R. No. L-59821, August 30, 1982) ......................................................... 1057
ARTICLE 1000 .......................................................................................................... 1043 ARTICLE 1061 .......................................................................................................... 1060

Del Rosario vs. Conanan (G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977) see under Article 898 ... 1043 Vda. De Tupas, vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986) ................................... 1060
ARTICLE 1003 .......................................................................................................... 1043

Zaragosa vs. CA (341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000) ....................................................1063
Baranda vs. Baranda (May 20, 1987) ................................................................................ 1043
ARTICLE 1062 .......................................................................................................... 1068
ARTICLE 1005 .......................................................................................................... 1050
Buhay De Roma vs. CA (July 23, 1987)\ ........................................................................... 1068
Baranda vs. Baranda (May 20, 1987) see under Article 1003 ........................................... 1050
ARTICLE 1078 ........................................................................................................... 1071
ARTICLE 1006 .......................................................................................................... 1050
Noceda vs. CA (313 SCRA 505) .......................................................................................... 1071
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977) see Article 975 ............ 1050
ARTICLE 1079 .......................................................................................................... 1080
ARTICLE 1008 .......................................................................................................... 1050
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) see Article 980....... 1080
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977) see Article 975 ............ 1050
Heirs of Quirico Seraspi and Purificacion Seraspi vs. CA (April 28, 2000) ................... 1080
ARTICLE 1025 .......................................................................................................... 1050
ARTICLE 1080.......................................................................................................... 1084
Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor vs. Rigor (G.R. No. L-22036,
April 30, 1979) see under Article 789 ................................................................................ 1050 Zaragosa vs. CA (341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000) see Article 1061 ......................... 1084
ARTICLE 1039 .......................................................................................................... 1050 ARTICLE 1082 .......................................................................................................... 1084
Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984) see earlier case under Article 16 ....................... 1050 Crucillo vs. IAC (317 SCRA 351) ........................................................................................ 1084
ARTICLE 1043 .......................................................................................................... 1050 Non vs. CA (325 SCRA 652) .............................................................................................. 1096
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo vs. Borromeo (July 23, 1987) see under Article Pada-Kilario vs. CA (G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000) ................................................ 1099
777 ...................................................................................................................................... 1050
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) see Article 980 ........ 1105
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibaez (G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005) .... 1105
ARTICLE 1083 ............................................................................................................1112
Santos vs. Santos (October 12, 2000) ................................................................................. 1112
ARTICLE 1088 ........................................................................................................... 1123
Garcia vs. Calaliman, (Apr. 17, 1989) ................................................................................. 1123
Baylon vs. Amador (G.R. No. 160701. February 9, 2004) ................................................. 1130
Alonzo vs. IAC (159 SCRA 259) .......................................................................................... 1133
Primary Structures Corp. vs. Sps. Valencia (G.R. No. 150060. August 19, 2003) ............ 1138
ARTICLE 1091 ........................................................................................................... 1141
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) see Article 980 .........1141
ARTICLE 1104 ............................................................................................................ 1141
Non vs. CA (325 SCRA 652) see Article 1082 ......................................................................1141
ARTICLE 1105 ............................................................................................................ 1141
Landayan vs. Bacani (G.R. No. L-30455, September 30, 1982) .........................................1141
Mendoza vs. IAC (July 30, 1987) ........................................................................................ 1144
Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. CA (March 7, 2000)................................................ 1149
Fernandez vs. Fernandez (363 SCRA 811, August 28, 2001) .............................................. 1156
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas

menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No.
1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con
Ramirez v. Ramirez 111 S 82 sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en
su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
SECOND DIVISION
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser
vs. aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador,
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u
Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, fideicomisaria a saber:
the testator provided for substitutions.
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V.
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente
inventory of the estate as follows: (ommitted)
ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los
nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is
tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary
titulares fideicomisaarios. estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-
half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:
or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half
of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to
give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention
the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V.
for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to
Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
favor Wanda.
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not 2. The substitutions.
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another
Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in
heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5,
instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the
Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have
variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
appealed to this Court.
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
1. The widow's legitime.
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his
should die before him, or should not wish, or should be They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda
incapacitated to accept the inheritance. survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which
for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in
it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding
Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation
to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
one degree from the heir originally instituted."
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of follows:
the testator.
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view,
vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
vulgar reciprocal entre ambos. substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell
and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda
interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The
the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have
Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related
ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
to and be one generation from the first heir.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan
a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives
Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
193-194.) proscribed by the Constitution.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the ordered distributed as follows:
appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor
pronouncement as to costs.
of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
SO ORDERED.
acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground
that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also
testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision
which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda

because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals
ARTICLE 728 forwarded the case to this Court because, the case having been submitted on a
stipulation of facts, the appellant raised only questions of law.
Cuevas v. Cuevas The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed "Exhibit A"; whether
it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis
EN BANC
causa revocable freely by the transferor at any time before death. 1
G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that
ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff-appellant, a donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in
vs. defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668;
CRISPULO CUEVAS, defendant-appellee. Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the controversy
REYES, J. B. L., J.: revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,
entitled "Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the and lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na
northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality of mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang
Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko
the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas. binabawian ny buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis
pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument
entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa" (Exhibit B) purporting to set There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor
aside the preceding conveyance; and on August 26, 1952, she brought action in reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other
the Court of First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that rights and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will not takle away"
(2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die."
was not properly accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part with the title to
property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of the property immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she
ingratitute, for having refused to support the donor. had died. If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would
Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied the be confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because
the formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil Code, Arts. 728 and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor
828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 250 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and
Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8 July 1943). attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.lawphi1.net
We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the present donation Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid
is operative inter vivor lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the
dispose or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I donor. We may add that it is highly desirable that all those who are called to
am reserving it to him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly prepare or notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors to
renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property before their
of the naked title to the property in favor of the donee. As stated in our decision death, without need of the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the
in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is characteristic of express reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that the
donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the formalities of
disposition post mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right
provides: of free disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond
dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568).
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void. The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely
recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor
he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is
intended that she should retain the entire beneficial ownership during her
expressing his gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p.
lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only
7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at the same time
thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and
express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance,
when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession,
If the donee did not accept, what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer
cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she
under the formulary system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to
meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court below
be used under paid of nullity.
correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be
construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor
and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain failed to reserve enough for ther own support. As we have seen, she expressly
full or absolute ownership she had no need to specify possession, cultivation and reserved to herself all the benefits derivable from the donated property as long as
she lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution of income. If that was not
enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the donation.
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude, because it was
expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out
of which he had to support himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his
means did not allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance,

appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered.
The petitioners, averred the following in their answer:

Jutic v. CA
xxx xxx xxx
THIRD DIVISION
7. That the defendants are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and
G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987
improvements thereon, containing an area of 11.9499 and 9.6862
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO
hectares, respectively, both covered by Original Certificates of
SEVILLE, RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA
Title No. P-15964 .
SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN,
8. That defendants are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville.
and PACIFICO MANICAN, petitioners,
Melquiades Seville in turn is the brother of the deceased Arsenio
vs.
Seville. Arsenio Seville died ahead. Melquiades Seville died later.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD
During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he executed an instrument
SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN,
... .
BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE, respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
9. That Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual
This is a petition to review on appeal by certiorari the decision of the Court of
possession, occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172,
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Davao
Cad-283, since 1954 continuously and peacefully in concept of
del Norte, Branch 9. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
owner, up to the time of his death, and had introduced valuable
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
improvements thereon. After his demise his heirs, the
and this case is remanded to the courta quo for implementation
defendants herein, succeeded to the occupation and possession
of, and compliance with Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court, and to
of the said parcel of land and improvements with the knowledge
partition the property in accordance with the rights as herein
of the plaintiffs and with the acquiescence of Arsenio Seville
determined, defined and declared, with costs against
during his lifetime.
defendants-appellants. (p. 48, Petitioner's brief)
10. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio Seville
Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the then Court
it had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170 and
of First Instance at Tagum, Davao del Norte against the petitioners for partition
172 shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of the herein
and accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the
defendants.
decedent.
11. That the ownership over the said Lots l7O and l72, Cad-283
and improvements had been vested, transmitted, conveyed On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades
and/or descended unto the defendants by virtue of Exhibit "1" of Seville, which reads:
this answer and through continuous possession and cultivation
AFFIDAVIT
of the land since 1954 continuously up to the present, in concept
I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and a
of owner as alleged under paragraph "9" hereof.
resident of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines,
12. That by reason of this unfounded action by the plaintiffs,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do
defendants have been compelled to engage services of counsel
hereby depose and say, as follows:
for which they bound themselves to pay P3,000.00 as attomey's
That I am the declared and legal owner of a certain parcel of land
fees.
otherwise known as Lot Nos. 172 and 170 Cad- 283, containing an
13. That Melquiades Seville during his lifetime had taken legal
area of 21.6361 has., and situated at Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao
steps to perfect titles to these parcels of land in his name." (pp.
and covered by HA No. V-77791 (E-69793) and approved by the
11, 14-15, Record on Appeal).
Director of Lands as per Order issued on March 5, 1954;
On September 19, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private
That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one to
respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades Seville
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
who appears to be the only and rightful person upon whom I
Involved in this appeal is the issue of whether or not there was a valid donation have the most sympathy since I have no wife and children;
from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.
That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my
The facts of the case are briefly stated as follows rights, interest, share and participation over the above-
mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case of
During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned (1) a parcel of agricultural land
my death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to
described as Lot No. 170 situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte
possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce of my said land and
containing an area of 11-9499 hectares, more or less; (2) a parcel of agricultural
that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I shall be the
land described as Lot No. 172 likewise situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug),
one to enjoy it;
Davao del Norte with an area of 9.6862 hectares; (3) a residential house erected
on Lot 172; (4) rice and corn mills and their respective paraphernalia valued at That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and
P5,000.00; and (5) five (5) carabaos in the possession of the then defendants (pp. desire as to the way the above-mentioned property shall be
6-9, Petitioners' brief). dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve.
xxx xxx xxx(SGD.) ARSENIO SEVILLEAffiant THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING CATEGORICALLY THAT
ARSENIO SEVILLE COULD VALIDLY DISPOSE OR DONATE THE PROPERTIES
(p. 7. Appellees' brief; Exh. 4, p. 52, Folder of Exhibits).
IN QUESTION.
On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine
III
National Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and
acquiescence of Melquiades Seville. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE LOWER COURT AND ENTERED (SIC) A NEW ONE HOLDING THAT THE
On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without
AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION IS A DEED OF DONATION AND THAT THE
any debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville
DONATION IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS THUS VALIDLY CONVEYING THE
who are included as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters
LAND UNTO THE DONEE MELQUIADES SEVILLE. (p. 10, Petitioners' brief).
Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville. Thereafter, Melquiades died and is survived
by his children Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio, Ravelo, Sonita, Lucy, Epifania, All the above assigned errors discuss the issues as relating to a donation. The trial
Naracy and Emmanuel, all surnamed Seville. Sisters Encarnacion and Petra died court was correct in stating that "a close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a
later. Encarnacion is survived by her children Trinidad, Teresita, Ulysses and donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a
Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan and her husband Vicente Sullan while Petra desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The
Seville is survived by her children Orlando Manican and Pacifico Manican. form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply support this conclusion." (p. 3 7,
Record on Appeal).
The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the
properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for their
Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual effectivity is irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no intention to
possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the
continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio
Seville's death. Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his properties should go
to Melquiades Seville.
The petitioners assign the following alleged errors of the respondent court:
In Aldaba v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 263, 269-270) we ruled on a similar
I
expression of an intention, as follows:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT IN
The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a
QUESTION A DEED OR INSTRUMENT OF DONATION INTER VIVOS:
disposition of the property in question made by the deceased
II
Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6,
considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of
confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of Arsenio Seville and the land, much later, was mortgaged by him to the Philippine
the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the National Bank (Annex 1, p. 100, Rollo) in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt
property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of with the land and entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened with
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, the knowledge and acquiescence of the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville.
expressed that the property was really intended for the Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in their brief, there was no immediate
petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was transfer of title upon the execution of Exhibit 4.
only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the
Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal heirs of
property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no
Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial interests in the subject of litigation
evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried
thus qualifying them as real parties-in-interest.
out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere
Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of ownership
expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is
of the petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4 but on the fact that they are heirs of
an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, (17 American
Arsenio Seville together with the private respondents.
Jurisprudence, 2d p. 334) We cannot, considering Exhibit 6
alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed
convey, the property in question to the petitioners. ... . affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate during his lifetime. He
could not write his name. He executed documents by affixing his thumbmark as
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession ("... in case I
shown in the Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit A-4), which he executed on May 24,
win die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the above-
1968 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. The real estate mortgage came
mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death ...").
much later or more than five years after the supposed donation (Exhibit 4) to
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the
Melquiades Seville where Arsenio Seville allegedly affixed his signature. This fact
nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established
was not disputed by the petitioners.
in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their claim of ownership.
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as only
During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB amortization out of his
donations are accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could not have
personal funds and out of the income on his property. The payments were not
accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was not
continued by the petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that the
given to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership except in
property was extrajudicially foreclosed and had to be repurchased by Zoilo
clear and express terms.
Seville, one of the respondents, through installment arrangements. (Deed of
Promise to Sell appended as Annex 4 to respondents' brief). The actions of the

respondents are in consonance with their claim of co-ownership.
Finally, it is a well-established rule that the factual findings of the trial court are
generally not disturbed except where there is a clear cause or a strong reason
appearing in the record to warrant a departure from such findings (Alcaraz v.
Racimo, 125 SCRA 328; People v. Tala, 141 SCRA 240; and People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA
280). There is no such clear cause or strong reason in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate
Maglasang v. Cabatingan
(50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land
FIRST DIVISION
located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002 portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.).2 These deeds of donation
contain similar provisions, to wit:
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, petitioners, "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
vs. for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-
M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the
NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE
NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and
DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)
NAVADA, respondents.
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with
Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole issue of whether the donations And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed
made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos ormortis causa. as Civil Case No. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of
donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that
The facts of the case are as follows:
petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of
petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter
the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply
Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house
with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.1 Four (4) other deeds of donation were
testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.4 Respondents
subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing
prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed properties,
upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in
and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares,
together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.5 Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's decision to this
Court,9 alleging that:
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents' allegations contending
that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the "THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-
preparation of the instruments.6 WELL-ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER
On respondents' motion, the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the
VIVOSOR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO
pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following
INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN QUESTION IN A MANNER
dispositive portion:
CONTRARY THERETO."10
"WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and
by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the
unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the four Deeds of Donation
donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the
Annexes "A", "A-1", "B" and Annex "C" which is the subject of this partial
donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.11 In addition,
decision by:
petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die
Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio
ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the
for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with
donation as inter vivos.
formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code;
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the
plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita Cabatingan and
donee while the donor is still alive."12In determining whether a donation is one
therefore hereditary co-owners of the properties subject of this
of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
partial decision, as mandated under Art. 777 of the New Civil
Code; (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
SO ORDERED."7
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and
while alive;
therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14, 1995 are null and
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
solemnities of wills and testaments.8
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor by these presents does
hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the DONEE, her heirs and assigns
and
a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000) SQUARE METERS,
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described property.
transferee.13
(The portion herein donated is within Lot 2-B of the proposed
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all
the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass the buildings and improvements thereon, to become effective upon the
proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death.14 The phrase "to death of the DONOR. (italics supplied.)"18
become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
causa donation, and that the above quoted provision establishes the donor's
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and
intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the
Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
donee only after the former's death. Further:
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis
"As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself
formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article 728 of
of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and
the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
generosity of the DONOR."
effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), "If the
xxx donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that
the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this
donee because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the
Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15
donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the
embodied in a last will and testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of
donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis
Appeals, 95 Phil. 481)."19
causa may also be made for the same reason.16
We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds expressly
Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban.17 In said
provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease
case, the questioned donation contained the provision:
Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20 one of the decisive
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be
considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the shall be interpreted to them. (n)
donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to
reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject
retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
deeds.1wphi1.nt
Court. (n)"
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must
donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided
be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
for under the above-quoted provisions of law.
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject
"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed
deeds of donation null and void.
at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible SO ORDERED.
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE

Ganuelas v. Cawed 401 S 447
the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the
THIRD DIVISION
DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003 DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect.
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO
GANUELAS, petitioners, xxx xxx xxx.3
vs.
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San
Donation4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later
Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G.
or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants
AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE
and siblings.
LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA,
After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated
Administrator, respondents.
properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation,
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a
Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the
question of law, the February 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
donated properties, to wit: Tax Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112,
San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an action for
18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.
in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of San Fernando, La Union a complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio
Donation of Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas who were alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The
Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners. complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor of
Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a
xxx xxx xxx
disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. The
DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has plaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered
rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these
ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and deed contained an attestation clause and an acknowledgment showing the intent
ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for the cancellation of the tax of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the acknowledgment was
declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the partition of the properties defective as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the deed
among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an before the notary public, thereby rendering the entire document void.11
accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the
pay the value of their shares.
Revocation of Donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer6 that the donation in donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding that the conveyance wasmortis
favor of Ursulina was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil causa.12
Code,7 hence, the deed did not have to comply with the requirements for the
On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the
execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is null and void as the
ground mentioned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for
ground mentioned therein is not among those provided by law to be the basis
revocation, the trial court held that the legal grounds for such revocation as
thereof; and at any rate, the revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing
provided under the Civil Code arise only in cases of donations inter vivos, but not
of the appropriate complaint in court within the prescriptive period provided by
in donationsmortis causa which are revocable at will during the lifetime of the
law, which period had, at the time the complaint was filed, already lapsed.
donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to comply with the formalities
Deed of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the required therefor, the Deed of Revocation was a superfluity.13
DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and
Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court
effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa,8 found
erred:
for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus:
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION
WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the
EXECUTED BY CELESTINA GANUELAS;
Deed of Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
orders the partition of the estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs.
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER
SO ORDERED.9
URSULINA GANUELAS.14
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed
Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the
implied that Celestina retained complete dominion over her properties, thus
main consideration for its execution was the donor's affection for the donee
supporting the conclusion that the donation is mortis causa,10 and that while the
rather than the donor's death;15 that the provision on the effectivity of the
donation after the donor's death simply meant that absolute ownership be embodied in a last will and testament.
would pertain to the donee on the donor's death;16 and that since the donation
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or
is inter vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles
independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
760,17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil Code.
ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
In a letter of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because
this Court's January 28, 1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
CAUSE why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as
failure to submit the name and address of their new counsel, explains that they
the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the
are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are "willing and ready to waive
donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities
whatever rights" they have over the properties subject of the donation.
prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is
Petitioners, who were required to comment on the letter, by Comment of October
onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the
28, 1998,21 welcome private respondents' gesture but pray that "for the sake of
donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of
enriching jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and resolved."
wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.27
The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
deed.22
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the alive;
act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
the donee until the death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24
properties conveyed;
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to
transferee.28
the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which
the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should
indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be
transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for
the DONEE, x x x. the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer,
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no
convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described
other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the
property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing
properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded
and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis supplied)
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a
In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
quoted provision conclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the
should survive the donee.30
ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did not contain any
as mortis causa: clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the
donor's death.
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of
this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been
us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.35
like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which
considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was provides:
prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to
constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical
retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
motivation.32 In other words, love and affection may also underline
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
transfers mortis causa.33
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of
In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained
Donation to be mortis causa. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for
provisions almost identical to those found in the deed subject of the present case:
lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ramona) which is reproduced hereunder:

ARTICLE 774
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
Coronel v. CA P1,240,000.00 Total amount
THIRD DIVISION 50,000 Down payment
G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996
P1,190,000.00 Balance
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL,
ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog,
as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and Quezon City, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of
CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners, our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the
vs. Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA P1,240,000.00.
PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in- We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our
fact, respondents. deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of
MELO, J.:p title immediately upon receipt of the down payment above-
stated.
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific performance to
compel herein petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will
consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its improvements located along immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of said property
Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the
1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00. balance of the P1,190,000.00.
The undisputed facts of the case were summarized by respondent court in this Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
wise: 1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et (P50,000.00) Pesos upon execution of the document aforestated;
al. (hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a document 2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title
entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A") in favor of of the property registered in the name of their deceased father
plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos down
payment; 327403 (Exh. "E"; Exh. "5").
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of
Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of adverse claim covering the same property with the Registry of
Ramona and the latter will pay the former the whole balance of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. "F"; Exh. "6").
One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P1,190,000.00)
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
Pesos.
over the subject property in favor of Catalina (Exh. "G"; Exh. "7").
On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee
On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued
Concepcion D. Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as Concepcion),
in the name of Catalina under TCT No. 351582 (Exh. "H"; Exh.
mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of Fifty Thousand
"8").
(P50,000.00) Pesos (Exh. "B", Exh. "2").
(Rollo, pp. 134-136)
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court (Branch 83, RTC, Quezon
name of the Coronels' father was transferred in their names
City) the parties agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of
under TCT
documentary exhibits. Thus, plaintiffs therein (now private respondents)
No. 327043 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4")
proffered their documentary evidence accordingly marked as Exhibits "A"
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by
through "J", inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Adopting these same
TCT No. 327043 to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag
exhibits as their own, then defendants (now petitioners) accordingly offered and
(hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for One Million Five
marked them as Exhibits "1" through "10", likewise inclusive of their
Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after the latter
corresponding submarkings. Upon motion of the parties, the trial court gave
has paid Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos (Exhs.
them thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously submit their respective
"F-3"; Exh. "6-C")
memoranda, and an additional 15 days within which to submit their
For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract corresponding comment or reply thereof, after which, the case would be deemed
(Exh. "A") with Ramona by depositing the down payment paid submitted for resolution.
by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
On April 14, 1988, the case was submitted for resolution before Judge Reynaldo
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for Roura, who was then temporarily detailed to preside over Branch 82 of the RTC of
specific performance against the Coronels and caused the Quezon City. On March 1, 1989, judgment was handed down by Judge Roura from
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. his regular bench at Macabebe, Pampanga for the Quezon City branch, disposing
as follows: Estrada, thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby The prayer contained in the instant motion, i.e., to annul the
rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a decision and to render anew decision by the undersigned
deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in Presiding Judge should be denied for the following reasons: (1)
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT The instant case became submitted for decision as of April 14,
No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, together 1988 when the parties terminated the presentation of their
with all the improvements existing thereon free from all liens respective documentary evidence and when the Presiding Judge
and encumbrances, and once accomplished, to immediately at that time was Judge Reynaldo Roura. The fact that they were
deliver the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon receipt allowed to file memoranda at some future date did not change
thereof, the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon receipt the fact that the hearing of the case was terminated before Judge
thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole Roura and therefore the same should be submitted to him for
balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in decision; (2) When the defendants and intervenor did not object
cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of to the authority of Judge Reynaldo Roura to decide the case prior
Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby to the rendition of the decision, when they met for the first time
canceled and declared to be without force and effect. Defendants before the undersigned Presiding Judge at the hearing of a
and intervenor and all other persons claiming under them are pending incident in Civil Case No. Q-46145 on November 11,
hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and deliver 1988, they were deemed to have acquiesced thereto and they are
possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' claim for damages and now estopped from questioning said authority of Judge Roura
attorney's fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and after they received the decision in question which happens to be
intervenors are hereby dismissed. adverse to them; (3) While it is true that Judge Reynaldo Roura
was merely a Judge-on-detail at this Branch of the Court, he was
No pronouncement as to costs.
in all respects the Presiding Judge with full authority to act on
So Ordered.
any pending incident submitted before this Court during his
Macabebe, Pampanga for Quezon City, March 1, 1989. incumbency. When he returned to his Official Station at
Macabebe, Pampanga, he did not lose his authority to decide or
(Rollo, p. 106)
resolve such cases submitted to him for decision or resolution
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner before the new presiding
because he continued as Judge of the Regional Trial Court and is
judge of the Quezon City RTC but the same was denied by Judge Estrella T.
of co-equal rank with the undersigned Presiding Judge. The
standing rule and supported by jurisprudence is that a Judge to While we deem it necessary to introduce certain refinements in the disquisition
whom a case is submitted for decision has the authority to of respondent court in the affirmance of the trial court's decision, we definitely
decide the case notwithstanding his transfer to another branch find the instant petition bereft of merit.
or region of the same court (Sec. 9, Rule 135, Rule of Court).
The heart of the controversy which is the ultimate key in the resolution of the
Coming now to the twin prayer for reconsideration of the other issues in the case at bar is the precise determination of the legal
Decision dated March 1, 1989 rendered in the instant case, significance of the document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" which was
resolution of which now pertains to the undersigned Presiding offered in evidence by both parties. There is no dispute as to the fact that said
Judge, after a meticulous examination of the documentary document embodied the binding contract between Ramona Patricia Alcaraz on
evidence presented by the parties, she is convinced that the the one hand, and the heirs of Constancio P. Coronel on the other, pertaining to a
Decision of March 1, 1989 is supported by evidence and, particular house and lot covered by TCT No. 119627, as defined in Article 1305 of
therefore, should not be disturbed. the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the "Motion for Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons
Reconsideration and/or to Annul Decision and Render Anew whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
Decision by the Incumbent Presiding Judge" dated March 20, something or to render some service.
1989 is hereby DENIED.
While, it is the position of private respondents that the "Receipt of Down
SO ORDERED. Payment" embodied a perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to
enforce by means of an action for specific performance, petitioners on their part
Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 1989.
insist that what the document signified was a mere executory contract to sell,
(Rollo, pp. 108-109)
subject to certain suspensive conditions, and because of the absence of Ramona
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, 1991, the Court P. Alcaraz, who left for the United States of America, said contract could not
of Appeals (Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Abad Santos (P), JJ.) rendered its decision possibly ripen into a contract absolute sale.
fully agreeing with the trial court.
Plainly, such variance in the contending parties' contentions is brought about by
Hence, the instant petition which was filed on March 5, 1992. The last pleading, the way each interprets the terms and/or conditions set forth in said private
private respondents' Reply Memorandum, was filed on September 15, 1993. The instrument. Withal, based on whatever relevant and admissible evidence may be
case was, however, re-raffled to undersigned ponente only on August 28, 1996, available on record, this, Court, as were the courts below, is now called upon to
due to the voluntary inhibition of the Justice to whom the case was last assigned. adjudge what the real intent of the parties was at the time the said document was
executed.
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus: retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of
the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain
title from acquiring binding force.
in money or its equivalent.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere
full payment of the purchase price, the prospective seller's obligation to sell the
consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
subject property by entering into a contract of sale with the prospective buyer
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which states:
ownership in exchange for the price;
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a
b) Determinate subject matter; and
price certain is reciprocally demandable.
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the
Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
the prospective seller explicity reserves the transfer of title to the prospective
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the
buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property
ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said
event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition
purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill is
agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a
is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the purchase price
conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the
partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the
property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition,
obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective
because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present,
seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer. In Roque vs. Lapuz (96
although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may
SCRA 741 [1980]), this Court had occasion to rule:
or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the
Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the
contract of sale is completely abated (cf. Homesite and housing Corp. vs. Court of
respondent was a contract to sell where the ownership or title is
Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]). However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title,
the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had already been or at least was charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a
previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's title. In
thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of
further act having to be performed by the seller. the property subject of the sale.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the With the above postulates as guidelines, we now proceed to the task of
full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to deciphering the real nature of the contract entered into by petitioners and private
the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The respondents.
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into
It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein should
a contract of absolute sale.
be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning was
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract intended (Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]). Thus, when petitioners
of sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to declared in the said "Receipt of Down Payment" that they
the party the seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench.
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog,
In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person
Quezon City, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of
buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as
our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 1199627 of the
the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
P1,240,000.00.
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to
without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase
the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller's
price, the natural and ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their
title per se, but the latter, of course, may be used for damages by the intending
property.
buyer.
When the "Receipt of Down Payment" is considered in its entirety, it becomes
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive
more manifest that there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer
condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the seller's title
title to the buyer, but since the transfer certificate of title was still in the name of
thereto. In fact, if there had been previous delivery of the subject property, the
petitioner's father, they could not fully effect such transfer although the buyer
seller's ownership or title to the property is automatically transferred to the buyer
was then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase price. Therefore,
such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to any third person.
petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who
respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title change in the certificate of title so as to bear their names. That is why they
in their names from that of their father, after which, they promised to present undertook to cause the issuance of a new transfer of the certificate of title in their
said title, now in their names, to the latter and to execute the deed of absolute names upon receipt of the down payment in the amount of P50,000.00. As soon
sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn, pay the entire balance of the purchase as the new certificate of title is issued in their names, petitioners were committed
price. to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale. Only then will the obligation of
the buyer to pay the remainder of the purchase price arise.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein
made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. There is no doubt that unlike in a contract to sell which is most commonly
Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into entered into so as to protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the
an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of property in installment by withholding ownership over the property until the
title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. buyer effects full payment therefor, in the contract entered into in the case at bar,
Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely the sellers were the one who were unable to enter into a contract of absolute sale
presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers by reason of the fact that the certificate of title to the property was still in the
at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale name of their father. It was the sellers in this case who, as it were, had the
could not have been executed and consummated right there and then. impediment which prevented, so to speak, the execution of an contract of
absolute sale.
Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case at bar did not merely
promise to sell the properly to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that
suspensive condition. On the contrary, having already agreed to sell the subject when the said "Receipt of Down Payment" was prepared and signed by
property, they undertook to have the certificate of title changed to their names petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the parties had agreed to a conditional
and immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute sale. contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer
of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, Constancio P.
Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers,
Coronel, to their names.
after compliance by the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell
the property to the latter. What may be perceived from the respective The Court significantly notes this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled on
undertakings of the parties to the contract is that petitioners had already agreed February 6, 1985 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4"). Thus, on said date, the conditional contract
to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father, completely willing to of sale between petitioners and private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz became
transfer full ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the documents obligatory, the only act required for the consummation thereof being the delivery
were then in order. It just happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title of the property by means of the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public
was then still in the name of their father. It was more expedient to first effect the instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves to do as
evidenced by the "Receipt of Down Payment." of the downpayment above-stated". The sale was still subject to
this suspensive condition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly applies
to the case at bench. Thus, (Rollo, p. 16)
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is Petitioners themselves recognized that they entered into a contract of sale subject
a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the to a suspensive condition. Only, they contend, continuing in the same paragraph,
contract and upon the price. that:
From the moment, the parties may reciprocally demand . . . Had petitioners-sellers not complied with this condition of
performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the first transferring the title to the property under their names,
form of contracts. there could be no perfected contract of sale. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as
well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, (Ibid.)
shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
not aware that they set their own trap for themselves, for Article 1186 of
the condition.
the Civil Code expressly provides that:
Since the condition contemplated by the parties which is the issuance of a
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
certificate of title in petitioners' names was fulfilled on February 6, 1985, the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
respective obligations of the parties under the contract of sale became mutually
Besides, it should be stressed and emphasized that what is more controlling than
demandable, that is, petitioners, as sellers, were obliged to present the transfer
these mere hypothetical arguments is the fact that the condition herein referred
certificate of title already in their names to private respondent Ramona P.
to was actually and indisputably fulfilled on February 6, 1985, when a new title was
Alcaraz, the buyer, and to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale, while
issued in the names of petitioners as evidenced by TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "D";
the buyer on her part, was obliged to forthwith pay the balance of the purchase
Exh. "4").
price amounting to P1,190,000.00.
The inevitable conclusion is that on January 19, 1985, as evidenced by the
It is also significant to note that in the first paragraph in page 9 of their petition,
document denominated as "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A"; Exh. "1"), the
petitioners conclusively admitted that:
parties entered into a contract of sale subject only to the suspensive condition
3. The petitioners-sellers Coronel bound themselves "to effect
that the sellers shall effect the issuance of new certificate title from that of their
the transfer in our names from our deceased father Constancio P.
father's name to their names and that, on February 6, 1985, this condition was
Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt
fulfilled (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4"). succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his
last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject
We, therefore, hold that, in accordance with Article 1187 which pertinently
property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining
provides
thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly
Art. 1187. The effects of conditional obligation to give, once the
provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the
of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva,
constitution of the obligation . . .
90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
In obligation to do or not to do, the courts shall determine, in
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless
each case, the retroactive effect of the condition that has been
the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to
complied with.
effect the transfer of the title to the property from the decedent's name to their
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the perfected names on February 6, 1985.
contract of sale became mutually due and demandable as of the time of
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of
fulfillment or occurrence of the suspensive condition on February 6,
capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to
1985. As of that point in time, reciprocal obligations of both seller and
now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the
buyer arose.
agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 states that:
because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
We cannot sustain this argument. rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring
ownership as follows: Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property
at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the absolute owners thereof at that time.
the property, rights and obligations to be extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of
another or others by his will or by operation of law. sale between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal
obligation when she rendered impossible the consummation thereof by going to
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the
the United States of America, without leaving her address, telephone number,
decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to
and Special Power of Attorney (Paragraphs 14 and 15, Answer with Compulsory ever questioned Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43), for which reason, so they accepted her personal check. Neither did they raise any objection as regards
petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding rescinding the payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are
contract of sale. concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind
the contract of sale.
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract
of sale in the instant case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' Corollarily, Ramona P. Alcaraz cannot even be deemed to be in default, insofar as
rescission, are mere allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which her obligation to pay the full purchase price is concerned. Petitioners who are
by express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed precluded from setting up the defense of the physical absence of Ramona P.
by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are Alcaraz as above-explained offered no proof whatsoever to show that they
absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners' actually presented the new transfer certificate of title in their names and signified
allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by their willingness and readiness to execute the deed of absolute sale in accordance
sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. with their agreement. Ramona's corresponding obligation to pay the balance of
Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De the purchase price in the amount of P1,190,000.00 (as buyer) never became due
Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]). and demandable and, therefore, she cannot be deemed to have been in default.
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of Article 1169 of the Civil Code defines when a party in a contract involving
America on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of reciprocal obligations may be considered in default, to wit:
unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in
express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the contract
delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially
of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132
demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
SCRA 722 [1984])
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
Alcaraz because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her
one of the parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins.
daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made by
(Emphasis supplied.)
Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check (Exh. "B"; Exh. "2") for and
in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale
between petitioners and respondents. prejudice of the first buyer.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B. In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now
Mabanag, gave rise to a case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code a distinguished member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
will apply, to wit:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale
be movable property. (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in
registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals,
Registry of Property.
G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential,
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in
to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the
the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title,
second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
provided there is good faith.
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99,
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02 September 1992).
as proof of the second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds (J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993
of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name Edition, p. 604).
of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article
Petitioner point out that the notice of lis pendens in the case at bar was annoted
1544 shall apply.
on the title of the subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the second
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to sale between petitioners Coronels and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly
the first buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, perfected prior thereto or on February 18, 1985. The idea conveyed is that at the
registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription time petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer, bought the property under a clean
by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires title, she was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for which reason she
possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer is buyer in good faith.
satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the
We are not persuaded by such argument.
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or Although there may be ample indications that there was in fact an agency
not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second between Ramona as principal and Concepcion, her mother, as agent insofar as
buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any the subject contract of sale is concerned, the issue of whether or not Concepcion
defect in the title of the property sold. was also acting in her own behalf as a co-buyer is not squarely raised in the
instant petition, nor in such assumption disputed between mother and daughter.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not
Thus, We will not touch this issue and no longer disturb the lower courts' ruling
have in good faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because
on this point.
as early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the
transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of and the appealed judgment AFFIRMED.
registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had
SO ORDERED.
already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged
with knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same property.
Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in petitioners' title to the
property at the time of the registration of the property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has

acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same
property to a third party or that another person claims said
property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a
registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right.
(Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs.
Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554;
Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P.
Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and
Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the
courts below.
registered mail.
ARTICLE 776
The issues that the Loys raise in their motion for reconsideration are not new.
Liu v. Loy The Court already considered and discussed extensively these issues in the
assailed Decision. We find no compelling reason to reconsider the assailed
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
Decision.
G.R. No. 145982 September 13, 2004
The Loys insist that the transaction between Teodoro Vao and Benito Liu, the
FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse Diana Liu, predecessor-in-interest of Frank Liu, is a contract to sell. In contrast, the
and children, namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr., Henry and Jockson, all transactions between Teodoro Vao and Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita A. Loy were
surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui and Pearl Liu Rodriguez,petitioners, contracts of sale. According to the Loys, the contract to sell did not transfer
vs. ownership of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Benito Liu or Frank Liu because it was only a
ALFREDO LOY, JR., TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE promise to sell subject to the full payment of the consideration. On the other
VAO, respondents. hand, the contracts of sale in favor of the Loys transferred ownership, as the
RESOLUTION conveyances were absolute.3
CARPIO, J.: As we held in our Decision, a prior contract to sell made by the decedent during
his lifetime prevails over a subsequent contract of sale made by the administrator
The Loys seek a reconsideration of the Decision dated 3 July 2003 of this Court
without probate court approval. It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere
declaring void the deeds of sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 executed by Teodoro Vao in
contract to sell and does not immediately convey ownership. Frank Lius contract
favor of Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita Loy. We held that Lot Nos. 5 and 6 belong to
to sell became valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to
Frank Liu1 since the probate court approved his deeds of sale in accordance with
convey the property upon full payment of the consideration.
Section 8,2Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. The deeds of sale of the Loys lacked a
valid probate court approval. As a result, we ordered the Estate of Jose Vao to It is apparent from Teodoro Vaos letter4 dated 16 October 1954 that the reason
reimburse the Loys the amounts they paid for Lot Nos. 5 and 6, with interest at why Frank Liu stopped further payments on the lots, leaving a balance of P1,000,
6% annually from 4 June 1976, the date of filing of the complaint, until finality of was because Teodoro Vao could not yet transfer the titles to Benito Liu, the
the decision, and 12% annually thereafter until full payment. predecessor-in-interest of Frank Liu. It would appear that Frank Liu and Teodoro
Vao lost contact with each other thereafter and it was only on 25 January 1964
The Court heard the parties on oral arguments on 10 March 2004 and granted
that Frank Liu wrote Teodoro Vao informing the latter that he was ready to pay
them time to submit their memoranda. Frank Liu filed his memorandum on 29
the balance of the purchase price of the lots. Teodoro Vao did not reply to Frank
March 2004 while the Loys filed their memorandum on 25 March 2004 by
Lius letter. On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold to Frank Liu the lots, including Lot
Nos. 5 and 6, which Benito Liu purchased from Teodoro Vao on 13 January 1950. property, otherwise the sale is void.8 Court approval of the sale of estate property
Frank Liu sent three letters dated 21 March 1968, 7 June 1968 and 29 July 1968 to is clearly required under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the
Teodoro Vao reiterating his request for the execution of the deed of sale instances when the court may allow the sale or encumbrance of estate property.
covering the lots in his favor but to no avail. On 19 August 1968, Teodoro Vao Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy and on 16 December 1969, he sold Lot No. 5 to
even provides for the regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage or
Alfredo Loy, Jr. The sales to the Loys were made after Frank Liu offered to pay the
otherwise encumber estate property.9
balance of the purchase price of the lots and after he repeatedly requested for the
More importantly, Section 9110 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) and
execution of the deeds of sale in his favor.
Section 8811 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
The sale of the lots by Teodoro Vao to Benito Liu was valid. The sale was made
specifically require court approval for any sale of registered land by an executor or
by Teodoro Vao on 13 January 1950 in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of Jose
administrator.
Vao. The sale to Benito Liu was made during the lifetime of Jose Vao, not after
The laws, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and regulations explicitly require court
the death of Jose Vao who died on 28 January 1950.5 The power of attorney
approval before any sale of estate property by an executor or administrator can
executed by Jose Vao in favor of Teodoro Vao remained valid during the
take effect. The purpose of requiring court approval is to protect creditors. In this
lifetime of Jose Vao. In his letter dated 16 October 1954, Teodoro Vao stated
case, Frank Liu is a creditor, and he is the person the law seeks to protect.
that on 30 June 1954, the Supreme Court allowed the probate of the will of Jose
Vao. Teodoro Vao likewise mentioned in the letter that in July 1954, the The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976 approving the
Supreme Court held that all the sales made by Teodoro Vao of the properties of contracts of the Loys are void. The orders did not ratify the sales because there
his father were legal.6 Thus, Benito Lius deed of sale in favor of Frank Liu was already a prior order of the probate court dated 24 February 1976 approving
covering the lots sold to him by Teodoro Vao constitutes a valid charge or claim the sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court had already
against the estate of Jose Vao. lost jurisdiction over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots no longer formed part of the
Estate of Jose Vao. In fact, the administratrix of the estate filed a motion for
The Loys reiterate their contention that Teodoro Vao, as administrator and sole
reconsideration of the orders of the probate court approving the contracts of the
heir to the properties, can sell the lots to them since the rights of an heir are
Loys because she already executed a deed of sale covering Lot Nos. 5 and 6 in
transmitted from the moment of death of the testator. Although a property under
favor of Frank Liu.
estate proceedings cannot be sold without judicial approval, the Loys allege that
in their case, the probate court later approved the sales to them, thereby ratifying The Loys impliedly admitted that their contracts of sale dated 19 August 1968 and
the sales.7 16 December 1969 were ineffective when they belatedly asked in 1976 for court
approval of the sales. If the Loys believed that their deeds of sale in 1968 and 1969
Well-settled is the rule that an administrator needs court approval to sell estate
were valid, they would not have asked for court approval in 1976. By asking for
court approval, they necessarily admitted that without court approval, the sale to
them was ineffectual.
The Loys are not buyers and registrants in good faith considering that they
bought from a seller who was not a registered owner. Teodoro Vao signed both
contracts of sale but the titles to the lots sold were in the name of "Estate of Jose
Vao." And since the titles to Lot Nos. 5 and 6 were in name of "Estate of Jose
Vao," the Loys were on notice that court approval was needed for the sale of
estate property. The ex-parte motion for the court approval of the sales filed by
the Loys some seven or eight years after the sales transaction reveals a less than
honest actuation, prompting the administratrix to object to the courts
approval.lawph!l.net
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court
Conde v. Abaya 13 Phil 240
ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of
the property of the estate.
EN BANC
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the foregoing
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909 motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,
that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in
vs.
consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and
ARELLANO, C.J.:
that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special thereof.
proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral
settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano
evidence, and the court below entered the following judgment:
Abaya it appears:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya
Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that
and Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the
the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her
mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had
children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father
by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the
Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only
said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the
heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said
administrator, Roman Abaya.
Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya,
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this
came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being
court, and presented the following statement of errors:
the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on
the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya 1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the
moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of acknowledgment of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code,
Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, might be brought in special probate proceedings.
and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate,
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged
natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and
may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is
accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code. affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the
the Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the
deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late
last preceding section.
Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate
of Juana Pimentel vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in
not having declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the
Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is
securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the
those who might fall within the reservation. acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear
in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special
natural father.
proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an
action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as
the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one the only foundation:
might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can
deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or
only be demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it
compulsorily by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same
shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such
time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed
person as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her
legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession
child so long as he is under her authority." On this point no positive
opened in the special proceeding.
declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not considered
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be
followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: "It may so happen that the
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who
child dies before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that
the lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share
the document supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered
to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such
after his death, such death perhaps occurring after his parents had died,
as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such who recognized him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the family,
right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they
acknowledgment may interest." (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother.
Civil Code, Vol. I.)
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the than to establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and
Civil Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right one to enforce acknowledgment.
of such action by the natural child to his descendants can not be sustained under
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child
the law, and still less to his mother.
at any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall
positive, limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.
such right of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs,
hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time no
if it has not lapsed before then.
argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could
ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
be based.
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized
following cases:
natural children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which
under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same place as
case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first
legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still
four years of its maturity.
great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and the
succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as legal 2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before
maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children, or in unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly
connection with their rights, must still less be understood as granted to acknowledged.
recognized natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following
single exception in its provisions.
the discovery of such instrument.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the
rights of the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among
other consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole
illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the father or the mother
lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in
parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for the the said article; (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural
acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that
general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.
inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be
presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right
recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that the of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly,
former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child,
may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the
indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his
endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No
parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of
legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater
the death of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not brought one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing
against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases prescribed the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate
by article 137 transcribed above. one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, no
even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate
filiation, or to acknowledge the natural filiation. From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are
derived:
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his
legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
the code grants it in the first case, but not in the second. It contains provisions for during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose claiming his child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural
That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the
presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter. legitimate child, and even to compare themwould not fail to be a strained
and questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the
character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any
said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said,
time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be
there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the
transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or
other hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be
the supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of
the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, children, grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their
executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space
life of the latter. of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in
a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised
the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of
by him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118,
whether said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not
descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to the prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on general principles
time of his death, and decides it as follows: of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason
that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be
latter case is not, nor it can be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to
deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the
establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a
acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by the analogy to his
legitimate child and to a natural one.
heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the
descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article (Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Cdigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the
the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the
heirs of a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the
father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge"? And says: The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This
theory, which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir who did
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13,
not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting
1844) that the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child,
it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was
and along with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation
not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain
is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same
things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to
thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as
accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and
already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy is not
personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et
transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under
per omnia. According to the article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance
certain limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the
includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person, which are not
doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for
extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the
natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation.
latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action of
This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived that the legislator
his acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, if after his
should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child,
death in some of the excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion
which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to
of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was so
those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules that
understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not
govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural child are entitled
as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death,
to claim it in the cases prescribed by the article 118. The majority,
but a any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right of
however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a
supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by
personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really
the argument of analogy.
there are no legal grounds to warrant the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument
superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And
of analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are
it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those
entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the
rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it
legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence
forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there
thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio
would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an
alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the
exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order
same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.
that it may constitute a portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary that the
conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without
them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and
exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of
transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore,
where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception,
extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the
inheritance of the deceased child.
On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance,
it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an
acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an
absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in
the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a
natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate
child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations,
most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the
general principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in
all its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
the widow-beneficiary, for lack of cause of action. 3

Junio v. Collector 34 Phil. 433 (Case not found!)
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Great Pacific
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v. CA Life Assurance Corporation (hereinafter Grepalife) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (hereinafter DBP). Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible
SECOND DIVISION
housing loan mortgagors of DBP.
G.R. No. 113899 October 13, 1999
On November 11, 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor of
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner,
DBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application
vs.
form, Dr. Leuterio answered questions concerning his health condition as
COURT OF APPEALS AND MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO, respondents.
follows:
QUISUMBING, J.:
7. Have you ever had, or consulted, a physician
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the for a heart condition, high blood pressure,
Decision 1 dated May 17, 1993, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution 2 dated cancer, diabetes, lung; kidney or stomach
January 4, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 18341. The appellate court affirmed in toto the disorder or any other physical impairment?
judgment of the Misamis Oriental Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in an
Answer: No. If so give details _____________.
insurance claim filed by private respondent against Great Pacific Life Assurance
8. Are you now, to the best of your knowledge,
Co. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
in good health?
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered adjudging the defendant
Answer: [x] Yes [ ] NO. 4
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION as insurer
under its Group policy No. G-1907, in relation to Certification B- On November 15, 1983, Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558, as insurance
18558 liable and ordered to pay to the DEVELOPMENT BANK coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness
OF THE PHILIPPINES as creditor of the insured Dr. Wilfredo amounting to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.1wphi1.nt
Leuterio, the amount of EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
On August 6, 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage."
HUNDRED PESOS (P86,200.00); dismissing the claims for
Consequently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the complaint
claim alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for an
and counterclaim, with costs against the defendant and
insurance coverage on November 15, 1983. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did
dismissing the complaint in respect to the plaintiffs, other than
not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death. 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
Allegedly, such non-disclosure constituted concealment that justified the denial DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANT OF
of the claim. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OR
NATURE OF THE ACTION AND OVER THE
On October 20, 1986, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio, respondent Medarda V.
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
Leuterio, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 18, against Grepalife for "Specific Performance with Damages." 5 During 3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
the trial, Dr. Hernando Mejia, who issued the death certificate, was called to DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY TO DBP
testify. Dr. Mejia's findings, based partly from the information given by the THE AMOUNT OF P86,200.00 IN THE
respondent widow, stated that Dr. Leuterio complained of headaches presumably ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO SHOW
due to high blood pressure. The inference was not conclusive because Dr. HOW MUCH WAS THE ACTUAL AMOUNT
Leuterio was not autopsied, hence, other causes were not ruled out. PAYABLE TO DBP IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS
GROUP INSURANCE CONTRACT WITH
On February 22, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
widow and against Grepalife. On May 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court's decision. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners interposed the 4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
following assigned errors: THAT THERE WAS NO CONCEALMENT OF
MATERIAL INFORMATION ON THE PART OF
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
WILFREDO LEUTERIO IN HIS APPLICATION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT LIABLE TO THE
FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE GROUP LIFE
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
INSURANCE PLAN BETWEEN DEFENDANT-
(DBP) WHICH IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE
APPELLANT OF THE INSURANCE CLAIM
FOR PAYMENT OF THE PROCEEDS OF A
ARISING FROM THE DEATH OF WILFREDO
MORTGAGE REDEMPTION INSURANCE ON
LEUTERIO. 6
THE LIFE OF PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND
WILFREDO LEUTERIO ONE OF ITS LOAN Synthesized below are the assigned errors for our resolution:
BORROWERS, INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
holding petitioner liable to DBP as beneficiary
[Petitioner Grepalife] FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF
in a group life insurance contract from a
ACTION.
complaint filed by the widow of the
decedent/mortgagor? pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the loss
payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor's interest, and the
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance,
finding that Dr. Leuterio concealed that he had
the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable
hypertension, which would vitiate the insurance
clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract. 9
contract?
Sec. 8 of the Insurance Code provides:
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding Grepalife liable in the amount of eighty Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of property effects
six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos insurance in his own name providing that the loss shall be
without proof of the actual outstanding payable to the mortgagee, or assigns a policy of insurance to a
mortgage payable by the mortgagor to DBP. mortgagee, the insurance is deemed to be upon the interest of
the mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the original
Petitioner alleges that the complaint was instituted by the widow of Dr. Leuterio,
contract, and any act of his, prior to the loss, which would
not the real party in interest, hence the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over
otherwise avoid the insurance, will have the same effect,
the case. It argues that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
although the property is in the hands of the mortgagee, but any
judgment, Grepalife was held liable to pay the proceeds of insurance contract in
act which, under the contract of insurance, is to be performed by
favor of DBP, the indispensable party who was not joined in the suit.
the mortgagor, may be performed by the mortgagee therein
To resolve the issue, we must consider the insurable interest in mortgaged
named, with the same effect as if it had been performed by the
properties and the parties to this type of contract. The rationale of a group
mortgagor.
insurance policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the "mortgage redemption
The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or
insurance," is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the
interests in the insurance, the policy stating that: "In the event of the debtor's
mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such form of
death before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid,
contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during
an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor
the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will
and the balance of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the
be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the
beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor." 10 When DBP submitted the insurance
mortgagor from paying the obligation. 7 In a similar vein, ample protection is
claim against petitioner, the latter denied payment thereof, interposing the
given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death; the
defense of concealment committed by the insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the
mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance
debt from the mortgagor and took the necessary action of foreclosure on the
proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. 8 Consequently, where the mortgagor
residential lot of private respondent. 11 In Gonzales La O vs. Yek Tong Lin Fire & material to the risk, and honesty, good faith, and fair dealing requires that he
Marine Ins. Co. 12 we held: should communicate it to the assured, but he designedly and intentionally
withholds the same. 15
Insured, being the person with whom the contract was made, is
primarily the proper person to bring suit thereon. * * * Subject to Petitioner merely relied on the testimony of the attending physician, Dr.
some exceptions, insured may thus sue, although the policy is Hernando Mejia, as supported by the information given by the widow of the
taken wholly or in part for the benefit of another person named decedent. Grepalife asserts that Dr. Mejia's technical diagnosis of the cause of
or unnamed, and although it is expressly made payable to death of Dr. Leuterio was a duly documented hospital record, and that the
another as his interest may appear or otherwise. * * * Although a widow's declaration that her husband had "possible hypertension several years
policy issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the benefit of the ago" should not be considered as hearsay, but as part of res gestae.
mortgagee and is made payable to him, yet the mortgagor may
On the contrary the medical findings were not conclusive because Dr. Mejia did
sue thereon in his own name, especially where the mortgagee's
not conduct an autopsy on the body of the decedent. As the attending physician,
interest is less than the full amount recoverable under the
Dr. Mejia stated that he had no knowledge of Dr. Leuterio's any previous hospital
policy, * * *.
confinement. 16 Dr. Leuterio's death certificate stated that hypertension was only
And in volume 33, page 82, of the same work, we read the "the possible cause of death." The private respondent's statement, as to the
following: medical history of her husband, was due to her unreliable recollection of events.
Hence, the statement of the physician was properly considered by the trial court
Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest, although
as hearsay.
he has assigned the policy for the purpose of collection, or has
assigned as collateral security any judgment he may obtain. 13 The question of whether there was concealment was aptly answered by the
appellate court, thus:
And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or
succession to any person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such The insured, Dr. Leuterio, had answered in his insurance
person may recover it whatever the insured might have recovered,14 the widow of application that he was in good health and that he had not
the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer, Grepalife. consulted a doctor or any of the enumerated ailments, including
hypertension; when he died the attending physician had
The second assigned error refers to an alleged concealment that the petitioner
certified in the death certificate that the former died of cerebral
interposed as its defense to annul the insurance contract. Petitioner contends
hemorrhage, probably secondary to hypertension. From this
that Dr. Leuterio failed to disclose that he had hypertension, which might have
report, the appellant insurance company refused to pay the
caused his death. Concealment exists where the assured had knowledge of a fact
insurance claim. Appellant alleged that the insured had
concealed the fact that he had hypertension. The policy states that upon receipt of due proof of the Debtor's
death during the terms of this insurance, a death benefit in the
Contrary to appellant's allegations, there was no sufficient proof
amount of P86,200.00 shall be paid.
that the insured had suffered from hypertension. Aside from the
statement of the insured's widow who was not even sure if the In the event of the debtor's death before his indebtedness with
medicines taken by Dr. Leuterio were for hypertension, the the creditor shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the
appellant had not proven nor produced any witness who could outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the Creditor and
attest to Dr. Leuterio's medical history . . . the balance of the Sum Assured, if there is any shall then be paid
to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor." 22 (Emphasis
xxx xxx xxx
omitted)
Appellant insurance company had failed to establish that there
However, we noted that the Court of Appeals' decision was promulgated on May
was concealment made by the insured, hence, it cannot refuse
17, 1993. In private respondent's memorandum, she states that DBP foreclosed in
payment of the claim. 17
1995 their residential lot, in satisfaction of mortgagor's outstanding loan.
The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to entitle
Considering this supervening event, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the
the insurer to rescind the contract.18 Misrepresentation as a defense of the
benefit of the heirs of the deceased person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates
insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish such
that DBP should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another (Nemo cum
defense by satisfactory and convincing evidence rests upon the insurer. 19 In the
alterius detrimenio protest). Hence, it cannot collect the insurance proceeds, after
case at bar, the petitioner failed to clearly and satisfactorily establish its defense,
it already foreclosed on the mortgage. The proceeds now rightly belong to Dr.
and is therefore liable to pay the proceeds of the insurance.1wphi1.nt
Leuterio's heirs represented by his widow, herein private respondent Medarda
And that brings us to the last point in the review of the case at bar. Petitioner Leuterio.
claims that there was no evidence as to the amount of Dr. Leuterio's outstanding
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
indebtedness to DBP at the time of the mortgagor's death. Hence, for private
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 18341 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
respondent's failure to establish the same, the action for specific performance
that the petitioner is ORDERED to pay the insurance proceeds amounting to
should be dismissed. Petitioner's claim is without merit. A life insurance policy is
Eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos to the heirs of the insured,
a valued policy. 20 Unless the interest of a person insured is susceptible of exact
Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio (deceased), upon presentation of proof of prior settlement
pecuniary measurement, the measure of indemnity under a policy of insurance
of mortgagor's indebtedness to Development Bank of the Philippines. Costs
upon life or health is the sum fixed in the policy. 21 The mortgagor paid the
against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
premium according to the coverage of his insurance, which states that:
SO ORDERED.
he continued discharging his father"s work as his statutory successor. 3

Robles v. Batacan
The petitioner, for his part, insists that Severino Geronimo was never an
FIRST DIVISION
agricultural tenant of his but worked merely as a watcher in his land. He did
G.R. No. L-46978 October 12, 1987
receive the sum of P100.00 every harvest but not as his share therein for that
ERNESTO ROBLES, petitioner, amount was given to him as a reward for his past services. The only work he did
vs. was watch over the petitioner"s land and make brooms out of the fallen coconut
HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. leaves he would gather. He sold these brooms and kept the proceeds for himself
JIMENEZ. ATANACIO GERONIMO and BENEDICTO without sharing them with the petitioner. 4
GERONIMO, respondents.
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations * rendered judgment recognizing the
CRUZ, J.: defendant as the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff and ordering the payment to
him of the sum of P12,000.00 as his tenancy share. 5 Not satisfied, the petitioner
The central figure in this case is Severino Geronimo, who worked in the
went to the Court of Appeals, ** which affirmed the challenged decision in
petitioner's land for twenty years until 1969 and died the following year at the age
toto. 6 The petitioner is now before us and faults the respondent court with grave
of 86. The central question in this case is the nature of the work he performed
abuse of discretion for upholding the trial court.
and the compensation he was supposed to receive.
We do not agree that the respondent court erred. On the contrary, we find that its
After his death, an ejectment suit was filed against his two sons by the petitioner,
findings are supported by the evidence of record and in accord with the
who claimed they had no right to remain in his land.1 Benedicto Geronimo did
applicable law and doctrine.
not choose to answer and so was declared in default. 2 The other defendant.
Atanacio Geronimo, averred that he was entitled to succeed his father as the Thus, on the nature of the work performed by Severino Geronimo, it quoted with
petitioner's agricultural tenant in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and Section 9 of approval the conclusion of the trial court that he "was the tenant on the subject
R.A. No. 3844. parcel for quite a time and was recognized by Ernesto Robles as such,"
discharging such tasks as supervising the harvest, cutting down bushes, clearing
The private respondent's position is that his father was an agricultural tenant of
the land, picking up the fallen nuts, and paying the laborers, like the coconut
the petitioner during the twenty years the former worked in the latter"s land.
gatherers and huskers, from his 1/3 share. 7 This was based on the declarations of
Hence, in accordance with the aforementioned laws, he could remain in the
several witnesses, 8 including the petitioner himself, and the several documents
petitioner"s land under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy
presented by Atanacio in which his father was described by the petitioner as his
share arrangement entered into between his father and the petitioner. His share
"kasama" to whom was being given his "bahagui" or share. 9
should also be P100.00 more or less per harvest every forty days during the time
As for the private respondent's right to succeed his father, the respondent court brief, plaintiff did not appeal from that portion of judgment of
was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court that, as the son of Severino the trial court awarding them damages. Neither does it appear
Geronimo, Atanacio had the right to take over as agricultural tenant in the that, as appellees to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed
petitioner"s land in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No. out in their brief inadequacy of the award or that the inclusion
3844.10 Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in succeeding his father of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that
as his brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to claim his right and in fact defaulted the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.
in resisting the petitioner"s claims in the ejectment suit. Significantly, when in Thus, the court of Appeals committed error in raising the
his prayer the petitioner asks for authority to appoint the said Benedicto to amount for damages.
succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher only and not as agricultural
In Dy v. Kuizon, 16 we declared:
tenant. The petitioner"s consistent claim, it should be noted, is that Severino
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an
Geronimo was not his tenant but only his watcher.
appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
The Court gave cited due course to this petition to enable the parties to argue on
appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
the amount of damages in view of the apparent lack of a credible basis therefor as
relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court
observed by the trial court. 11 In his memorandum, the petitioner says the basis
below. An appellee who is not appellant may assign errors in his
should be the weight of the coconut harvested and then, consistent with his main
brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other
thesis, urges that no damages should be awarded at all.12 The private respondent
grounds, but he may not do so if this purpose is to have the
says that the basis should be the number of nuts harvested and then asks that the
judgment modified or reversed for, in such a case, he must
damages be doubled.13 In his reply, realizing probably that the matter may have
appeal. Here, the respondent did not appeal and so it was error
gotten out of hand, the petitioner now counters that the private respondent
for the Court of Appeals to award him a relief not granted by the
cannot claim an increase in the amount of damages because he has not,
lower court.
providentially, appealed the same. 14 This is correct and estops the private
In Madrideo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 17 our ruling was:
respondent.
... whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who
In La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court said:
has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of
P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however, cannot be
the court below.
sustained. Generally, the Appellate Court can only pass upon the
The latest decision on this matter is Aguilar v. Chan,18 where the Court noted
consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant"s
that although the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff-appellee exceeded the
amount awarded to her by the lower court, this amount could not be increased
because she had not appealed.
The trial court had the opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand and so was
in the best position to determine the factual relationship between the parties as
well as the share to which the private respondent was entitled. We do not find
that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
decision of the court a quo and see no reason to reverse it. We too affirm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
speculation or profit by a future assignment of his/their right herein

San Agustin v. CA
acquired or the resale of the lot through rent, lease or subletting to others
SECOND DIVISION
of the lot and subject of this deed, and therefore, the vendee shall not sell,
G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001 convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise encumber the property in favor of
any other party within five (5) years from the dates final and absolute
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,
ownership thereof becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of
vs.
hereditary succession or resale in favor of the vendor:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
x x x (emphasis supplied).3
QUISUMBING, J.:
A day after We issuance of TCT No. 436465, or on February 20, 1974, Macaria Vda.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the
de Caiquep sold the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as
Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1995, affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "D").4 This deed was notarized but
LRC Case No. R-4659.
was not registered immediately upon its execution in 1974 because GSIS
The relevant facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
prohibited him from registering the same in view of the five-year prohibition to
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a sell during the period ending in 1979.
certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168
Sometime in 1979, for being suspected as a subversive, an Arrest, Search and
square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7,
Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against private respondent. Military men
Pcs-5816 of the Government Service and Insurance System Low Cost Housing
ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon learning that he was wanted by the
Project (GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 2 On
military, he voluntarily surrendered and was detained for two (2) years. When
February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Macaria
released, another order for his re-arrest was issued so he hid in Mindanao for
Vda. de Caiquep. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 436465 with the
another four (4) years or until March 1984. In December of 1990, he discovered
following encumbrance annotated at the back of the title:
that the subject TCT was missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act
This Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the conditions enumerated immediately on the matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of
below which shall be permanent encumbrances on the property, the Loss5 was filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy6 of TCT
violation of any of which shall entitle the vendor to cancel x x x. this Deed No. 436465 was issued. Private respondent also declared the property for tax
of Absolute Sale and reenter the property; purposes and obtained a certification thereof from the Assessor's Office.7
The purpose of the sale be to aid the vendee in acquiring a lot for Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address appearing
himself/themselves and not to provide him/them with a means for in the title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for the
,registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog Petitioner shall pay all legal fees in connection with the issuance of the
City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search new owner's copy.
proved futile.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the petitioner, the registered owner
On July 8, 1992 private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R- of his given address in the title, in the deed of sale, and in the tax
4659 with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner's declaration; the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, the Office of the Solicitor
duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the General; and the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Metro Manila.
owner of the contested lot, he showed the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "D". The
SO ORDERED.10
petition was set for hearing and the court's order dated July 10, 1992 was
On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the
published once in Malaya, a nationally circulated newspaper in the Philippines.8
abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware of the
During the hearing on September 3, 1992, only Menez and his counsel appeared.
case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime
The Register of Deeds who was not served notice, and the Office of the Solicitor
in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of
General and the Provincial Prosecutor who were notified did not attend.
Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings''11 on
On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said
evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted his petition in its decision9 dated motion.12
September 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, as earlier stated, was
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the Registry of denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby directed to issue a new Owner's it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.13
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 436465 based on the
Thus, the present petition, attributing the following errors to the court a quo:
original thereon filed in his office which shall contain the memorandum
A.
of encumbrance and an additional memorandum of the fact that it was
issued in place of the lost duplicate and which shall, in all respect, be THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LRC CASE
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, for all legal NO. R-4659 BEING ONLY A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW
intents and purposes. OWNER'S DUPLICATE OF TITLE, THERE IS NO NEED OF PERSONAL
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, THE ACTUAL POSSESSOR [WHO HAS] AND
Issuance of new owner's duplicate copy shall be made only after this
ACTUALLY BEEN PAYING THE REAL ESTATE TAX, DESPITE PRIVATE
decision shall have become final and executory. The said lost owner's
RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OF AND INTEREST
duplicate is hereby declared null and void.
OVER THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 436465.14
B. respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE
BETWEEN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND MACARIA VDA. DE CAIQUEP IS In Office of Court Administrator vs. Matas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-836, 247 SCRA 9, 16-
NOT NULL AND VOID AND UNDER ARTICLE 1409 OF THE CIVIL CODE 17 (1995), we held:
SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPH (7) THEREOF WHICH REFERS TO CONTRACTS
In the case at bar, the respective certificate of title of the properties in
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED OR DECLARED VOID BY LAW.15
question on file with the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the
Considering the above assignment of errors, let us resolve the corresponding owner's copy of the certificate of title that was alleged to have been lost
issues raised by petitioner. or destroyed. Thus, it is Section 109 of P.D. 1529 which was approved on
June 11, 1978 that becomes effective and is applicable, a reading of which
The first issue involves private respondent's alleged failure to send notice to
shows that it is practically the same as Section 109 of Act No. 496,
petitioner who is the actual possessor of the disputed lot. Stated briefly, is
governing reconstitution of a duplicate certificate of title lost or
petitioner entitled to notice? Our finding is in the negative.
destroyed. Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under Section 109
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration
is sent to the Register of Deeds and to those persons who are known to
Decree" is decisive. It provides:
have, or appear to have, an interest in the property as shown in the
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of the original or transfer
loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under certificate of title on file in the office of the Register of Deeds. From a legal
oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the standpoint, there are no other interested parties who should be notified,
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as except those abovementioned since they are the only ones who may be
the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A person dealing with
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a registered is not charged with notice of encumbrances not annotated on
new certificate to him or for :the registration of any instrument, a sworn the back of the title. (Emphasis supplied.)
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the
registered owner or other person it interest and registered.
memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot
court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new and the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of
duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the
it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the
time of the filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not Act."18
entitled to notice.
We find petitioner's contention less than meritorious. We agree with respondent
Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent of the court that the proscription under Com. Act No. 141 on sale within the 5-year
RTC's order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. restrictive period refers to homestead lands only. Here the lot in dispute is not a
This is sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large. homestead land, as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said lot is owned by
GSIS, under TCT No. 10028 in its proprietary capacity.
Petitioner contends that as possessor or actual occupant of the lot in controversy,
he is entitled under the law to be notified. He relies on Alabang Development Moreover, as far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive condition imposed by
Corporation vs. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-54094, 116 SCRA 261, 277 (1982)) which GSIS in its contract with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is concerned, it is the
held that in reconstitution proceedings, courts must make sure that GSIS and not petitioner who had a cause of action against private respondent.
indispensable parties, i.e.. the actual owners and possessors of the lands involved, Vide the instructive case of Sarmiento vs. Salud:
are duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition. As pointed out by
The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the
the appellate court, his reliance on Alabang is misplaced because the cause of
property except to the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
action in that case is based on Republic Act i No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing A
(PHHC for short) within the next 25 years after appellees' purchasing the
Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or
lot is manifestly a condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of
Destroyed," while the present case is based on Section 109 of P.D. 1529 as above
the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right on
explained.
appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus
Under Republic Act No. 26, reconstitution is validly made only in case disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of
the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds is lost or ownership. It follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to
destroyed. And if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is appellee Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition in the
served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to invoke the condition
deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void.16 The aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the
case at bar is not for reconstitution, but merely for replacement of lost duplicate sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus violative of its right of
certificate. exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and
treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for
On the second assigned error, petitioner contends that Exhibit "D" is null and
breach of the condition aforestated.19
void under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph (7),17 because
the deed of sale was executed within the five-year prohibitory period under In this case, the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of Exhibit "D",
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as "The Public Land nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question. In our view, the contract of sale
remains valid between the parties, unless and until annulled in the proper suit pari delicto, being participes criminis as it were." As in Sarmiento, in this case
filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale is binding both were aware of the existence of the stipulated condition in favor of the
upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be original seller, GSIS, yet both entered into an agreement violating said condition
one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered and nullifying its effects. Similarly, as Acting Chief Justice JBL Reyes concluded
into by their predecessors-in-interest.20 inSarmiento, "Both parties being equally guilty, neither is entitled to complain
against the other. Having entered into the transaction with open eyes, and having
We are not unmindful of the social justice policy of R.A. 8291 otherwise known as
benefited from it, said parties should be held in estoppel to assail and annul their
"Government Service Insurance Act of 1997" in granting housing assistance to the
own deliberate acts."
less-privileged GSIS members and their dependents payable at an affordable
payment scheme.21 This is the same policy which the 5-year restrictive clause in WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is
the contract seeks to implement by stating in the encumbrance itself annotated AFFIRMED.
at the back of TCT No. 436465 that, "The purpose of the sale is to aid the vendee
SO ORDERED.
in acquiring a lot for himself/themselves and not to provide him/them with a
means for speculation or profit by a future assignment of his/their right herein
acquired or the resale of the lot through rent, lease or subletting to others of the
lot and subject of this deed, . . . within five (5) years from the date final and
absolute ownership thereof becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of
hereditary succession or resale in favor of the vendor."22 However, absent the
proper action taken by the GSIS as the original vendor referred to, the contract
between petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and private respondent deserves to
be upheld. For as pointed out by said private respondent, it is protected by the
Constitution under Section 10, Article III, of the Bill of Rights stating that, "No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." Much as we would like
to see a salutary policy triumph, that provision of the Constitution duly calls for
compliance.
More in point, however, is the fact that, following Sarmiento v. Salud,23 "Even if
the transaction between the original awardee and herein petitioner were
wrongful, still, as between themselves, the purchaser and the seller were both in
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000)
Repeated Case: Article 776, Article 783, 789 (a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is
registered in my name according to the records of the
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA (b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
VILLACARLOS, respondents. aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set
DECISION forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by

the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated xxx
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the FOURTH
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that
to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered
The antecedent facts are as follows: by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75)
land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic
was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:

FIFTH
"FIRST
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
December of each year.
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
SIXTH
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his 1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina testatrix.
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
(75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by
addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's
heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
(100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they respondent.
decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
than my near descendants and my sister."4 reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
the late Aleja Belleza.
name.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S.
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT
sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing
wit:
the complaint and disposing as follows:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the
names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each
action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet
sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children
annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally,
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and
being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may
which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of
initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla
sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE
and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
DISMISSED without prejudice.
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
SO ORDERED."6
wit:
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus: Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by
appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died
Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja
single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the
estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference
enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and
of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies. 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety
Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza. of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action,
there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private
SO ORDERED."7
respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on
Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix
which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
The petition is not impressed with merit.
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,
are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as piculs of sugar to private respondent.
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter
Again, the contention is without merit.
by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the
rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr.
place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
Jorge Rabadilla.
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2)
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of
the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted
testatrix's near descendants.
heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct,
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner
the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In
cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
complaint below.
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
"Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to known in the law of succession as aninstitucion sub modo or a modal institution.
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
the usufruct to private respondent. imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon
the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near
condition.21
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on
therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
wishes. clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
conditional.22 compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the
lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee. Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will,
Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be
as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby
circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and
defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver
of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
pronouncement as to costs
obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise SO ORDERED.
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event
that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed
by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply
to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the
lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein
Alvarez v. IAC
private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino
THIRD DIVISION
who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes,
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990 are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It
is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had
ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether
YANES, respondents. the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is
established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places
FERNAN, C.J.:
as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision
"Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question
of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar
August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo
produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer
and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the
Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818
actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of
Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the
the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also
dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT
No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and
certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No.
Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of
8804.
Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was
registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr.
Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956,
Occidental Negros (Exh. A). TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant
motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court
Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and
order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella
823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now
sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166
Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued
in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the
to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother pronouncement as to costs.
Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance
SO ORDERED. 16
of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the
mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
"return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed
that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773.
complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he
accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they
them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and
form of attorney's fees. 11 that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per
writ of execution." 17
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold
Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance,
Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13who herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of
thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14 First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate
of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of
Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the
the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil
certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims
(sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A,
Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots
enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil
773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September
Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not
4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning
a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and
said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses'
executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court,
cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and
in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to
estoppel." 27
surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico
execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September
pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable
28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had
consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a
instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at
notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order
the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party
to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022,
in the case. 23
equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The
property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, dispositive portion of the decision states:
Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is
Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291
hereby rendered in the following manner:
and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the
certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs
Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,
return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot
773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed
issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo
severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of
filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros
Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by
the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages SO ORDERED. 32

and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said
interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final
appellate court denied the same.
payment.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason
following issues:
against the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had
surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed
in the lower court.
Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the
SO ORDERED. 29
private respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in
decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by
ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil
of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
Case No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil
moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of
Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had
said decision reads:
unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots
it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their
plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4"
actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or
of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it indirectly denied by them.
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez
actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively.
arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia
No costs.
Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be
legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis
petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33 pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that
Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is
Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The
the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez
trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to
to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had
pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00
long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason,
representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order
who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of
defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to
appeal the decision against them. 34 As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an
them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of
come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it.
justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the
Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for
decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely
another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For,
sought to be guarded against." 40
if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in
number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36 The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question
be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription
have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court,
and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners
from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally
could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore
deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil
foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in
Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No.
another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing
5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses,
become final and executory.
the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners'
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773- the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the
A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the successors.
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization"
the Civil Code state:
of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law. patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their
xxx xxx xxx
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present
beyond the value of the property received from the decedent. claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein
is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case
devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased
debts of the estate. 42
party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of
money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his
the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners'
estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule
admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient
89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the
to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent
state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
surnamed Moreto.
Pamplona v. Moreto 96 S 775
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed
FIRST DIVISION
Moreto.
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
Victoria Tuiza.
ONTE, petitioners,
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely,
vs.
herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO
MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA Josefina Moreto.
TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
MENDOZA, respondents.
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
GUERRERO, J.:
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-
Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the
wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Bian.
and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that: married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering
lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba
of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica
Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021
Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result of the
square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name
sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title
of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage
Onte (Exh. "A").
six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to
part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the pay actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the
land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958 until they have
son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the same.
within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid
vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the
as the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are
time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their
purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot
sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter
sold.
in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is that the said portion sold
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it
thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed
enlarged their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of
recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it
their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot
was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the
1496.
subject matter of their sale transaction.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house
as follows:
and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs
he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership
declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining
of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale
to the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square
was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square meters of which
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the
plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to
premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of
its possession.
Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of
July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the property subject matter The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half
of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of (1/2) of 1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square
said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the meters of which defendants are declared lawful owners and
entitled to its possession. 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had
already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence,
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
with an area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants
had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil
shall be entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and
Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the Register
liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The
of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles
necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not
issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their
instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
respective portions.
deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register
was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs
of Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the
of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the
name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by
purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between
virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased
ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of
5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become
this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to
final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
the legal partnership and becomes the property of a community,
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for
by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs
the province of Laguna for his information and guidance.
of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower
With costs against the defendants. 2 or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse.
Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to
fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
Court.
person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
and circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30,
the surviving husband for the management and control of the community filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of
property of the marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the
community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband might be heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on
formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger
Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by
as administrator of the community property, has authority to sell the property the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private
withut the concurrence of the children of the marriage, nevertheless this power respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as
can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of bringing about a null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he
property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same. (International
property will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
who join in the act of conveyance.
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable
son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a and it provides a follows:
cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
vendor and vendees believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
an area of 781 sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the parties Identified
involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case below,
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the area sold was within Lot 1496.
the co-ownership.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and
concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the
location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the
latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto,
likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery. but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the
vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq.
meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
of lots are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from
southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto,
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles
constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of
places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by private respondents. delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole property sold, which is
Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. The articles
three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one- cited provide, thus:
half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price
belonging to him at the time of the sale.
certain in money or its equivalent.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and
vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a
deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the
title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title
sale.
may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed
out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
be erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents'
possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale
executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the
private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the
whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation
of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private
respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by
petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961
had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are
entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843
covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and
executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby
declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at
the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon
their houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate
of Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C
Ledesma v. McLachlin 66 Phil 547
has not yet prescribed.
EN BANC
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
defendants from their deceased grandfather by the right of
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their deceased
vs. father who died without any property whatsoever.lawphi1.net
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly
VILLA-REAL, J.: and severally the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions
Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and raised in this appeal are those set out in the appealed decision, which have been
Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental established at the trial, namely:
Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with
For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation,
this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff
daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal purposes, but Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro
absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed
the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as
properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco. his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C), of the following
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to
tenor:
pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum
of one thousand five hundred pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma
from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine currency under the
made as to the costs. So ordered. following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the
first day of March 1922; another two hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to be
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors
paid on the first day of November 1922; the remaining one
allegedly committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision:
thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date of
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of
the execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21, 1922. assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the action to recover the sum of
P1,500, representing the last installment for the payment of the promissory note
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita
Exhibit C, has prescribed.
McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are the other
defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased
still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be
died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death, paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on
administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that
court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased is, more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. The fact that the
Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court. plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee
on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio
suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the
Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and appraisal,
recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of
the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed before said
the promissory note should no have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio
committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment, and the
Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the
commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing
intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said
upon it, elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and as
Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned
authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an
said consulta and refrained from giving his opinion thereon (Exhibit C),
administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having
the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal, alleging lack of
thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he same (Exhibit H).
P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the
On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order
Code of Civil Procedure.
of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco,
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.
and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs,
Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From court erred in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from their
the order denying the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and
thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case. obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property, while
it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first
children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of
his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the
said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or
mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with
the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio
Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay
the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third
assignment of error is also well-founded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That
the filing of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in
the intestate of the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died
before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the
recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an
indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his
father, and the propertiesinherited from the latter by the children of said
deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness contracted during
the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are

absolved from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are
ARTICLE 777 the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P.
Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher
Rioferio v. CA
P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
SECOND DIVISION
paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004 part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-
husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6
UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners, On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada
vs. discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
ORFINADA,respondents. Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora
DECISION Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-
Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
TINGA, J.:
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.7
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks
for Letters of Administrationdocketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional
to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated
Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing
January 31, 1997, as well as its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying
the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.8
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City
with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada,
Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.
of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence,
City.9
the petition before this Court.
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-
legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to
judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents
the commencement of the administration proceedings.21
of Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the
advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to
name.11 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not
bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in
stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies
view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996,
in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the
aforesaid ground. SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds
for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the
pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had
ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the
thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118.
Petitioners moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16 Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly
indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.23Subsequently,
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No.
the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of
42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the Court",
issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground
apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section 6,24 in Rule 16 thereof.
that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep
respondents.18 for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for
recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997,
stating that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring
decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
operation of law.25 when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an
appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
guilty parties himself.
still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the
proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the
party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration
Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the administrator such as in this case.
decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of
Thus:
the lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and
to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit
resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
SO ORDERED.
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been
appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing
while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
with firewall3 on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who
Heirs of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. v. Prado
occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the
FIRST DIVISION
construction. Flordeliza Flora and her husband Wilfredo declared the property
G.R. No. 156879 January 20, 2004 for taxation purposes4 and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.5 Likewise,
Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas cousin, built a small house on the northern
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and
portion of the property.
TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., Petitioners,
vs. On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property
surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO, Respondents. against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas
Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100,
DECISION
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8404.6 Respondents alleged that the transaction
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisas children tried to redeem the
consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their
Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa
August 15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering that
Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its
Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein. acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title;7 that
Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern
The pertinent facts are as follows:
half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently married
P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.
Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first
In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property,
husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed on April
consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband
26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to
and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that the consideration
the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00.1 On
of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968; that
July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the
Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support her minor children; that
said property.2
Narcisas claim was barred by laches and prescription; and that the Philippine
In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex
Homesite and Housing Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED
interest to question the sale within the prohibited period. BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo8 dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale
VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE TAKEN
was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute
ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE
Sale were duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject
EXCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED
property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was
without objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to II
contest the transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
and reaching the majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.9
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO
as CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision10 was rendered by the CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN
Court of Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject THE SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE
property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share OF RESPONDENT NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER
thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads: RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE
SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS THEN AT THE
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
ISSUANCE OF THE SAID TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.
that the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7)
share of plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is III
equivalent to 78.8857 square meters. In all other respects, the same decision
stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN
SO ORDERED.11 RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE
ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
WITH THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID
dated January 14, 2003.12 Hence this petition for review on the following assigned
PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.
errors:
IV
I
THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY
ENRICH THE RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of
PETITIONERS.13 Tomas is contained in a notarized21 document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v.
Spouses Sevilla, et al.,22 it was held that a public document executed and attested
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in
through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear,
petitions for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.14 It was
unequivocal manner therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial
thus error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of
documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
discretion. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible error.15
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
instrument or document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of
(2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a
regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more
sale, what was the area of the land subject of the sale?
than merely preponderant.
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered
It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
proving it.23 Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of
conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support
or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua
thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private
non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.16
transactions have been fair and regular.24
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she
Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit
bought the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with
allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between
her own funds,17 she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and
the two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex was made of
Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with
strong materials, the roofing being galvanized sheets. While the deed of sale
her first husband, Patricio, Sr.18 A verbal assertion that she bought the land with
between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title,
her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under
respondents had knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the northern half
the parole evidence rule.19 The so-called parole evidence rule forbids any addition
portion of the property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of
to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other
Tomas, petitioners predecessor-in-interest.
evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties
Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00
written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
consideration was paid.1wphi1 Both theAgreement of Purchase and Sale and
varying the purport of the written contract. Whatever is not found in the writing
the Deed of Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in full. Moreover,
is understood to have been waived and abandoned.20
the presumption is that there was sufficient consideration for a written mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition in the
contract.25 Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to invoke the condition
aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriff's
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of
foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the PHHC; the
the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa,
latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it
as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other half, in turn,
(PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event,
were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa,
the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition aforestated.
who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus,
as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and
Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet been
was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court.28 While Narcisa could validly
succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could
(1/7) each pro indiviso.26 Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition,
husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) the terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court.
thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well
Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire
as the Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the
property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject
following MODIFICATIONS:
property.
1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of
Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the
552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy,
property within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al.,27 it
Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;
was held that:
2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in
xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the
favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
property except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the
short) within the next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is manifestly a
purpose of determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of
condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses.
Tomas Calpatura, Sr. pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon
The condition conferred no actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated
by the respondents. SO ORDERED.
as a restriction upon their jus disponendi of the property they bought, and thus
limited their right of ownership. It follows that on the assumption that the
purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of
Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon
the defendants and rendered the following judgment:
SECOND DIVISION
a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the
G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
property subject of the present litigation;
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V.
b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without
FELIPE, petitioners,
merit and is therefore hereby ordered dismissed;
vs.
c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA, SOFIA
P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the costs of
ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
the suit.
APPEALS, respondents.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
following judgment:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby
divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land
RENDERED, ordering the defendants-appellees to surrender the
Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate.
lots in question as well as the plaintiffs'-appellants' muniments
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and
of title thereof to said plaintiffs-appellants, to make an
Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband,
accounting of the produce derived from the lands including
Maximo.
expenses incurred since 1951, and to solidarity turn over to the
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary value of the profits, after
their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First deducting the sum of P1,800.00. No attorney's fees nor moral
Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint which was docketed as damages are awarded for lack of any legal justification therefor.
Civil Case No. 2372 alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots 1370, 1371 No. costs.
and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an offer
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following paragraphs of the decision
to redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in order to
penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of Justices Venicio
recover the three parcels of land.
Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa:
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by
One of the principal issues in the case involves the nature of the
aforementioned conveyance or transaction, with appellants The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for review. They invoke
claiming the same to be an oral contract of mortgage or several grounds in seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
antichresis, the redemption of which could be done anytime One of the grounds is factual in nature; petitioners claim that "respondent Court
upon repayment of the P1,800.00 involved (incidentally the only of Appeals has found as a fact that the 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' executed by
thing written about the transaction is the aforementioned respondent Gimena Almosara is not a forgery and therefore its authenticity and
receipt re the P1,800). Upon the other hand, appellees claim that due execution is already beyond question." We cannot consider this ground
the transaction was one of sale, accordingly, redemption was because as a rule only questions of law are reviewed in proceedings under Rule 45
improper. The appellees claim that plaintiffs never conveyed the of the Rules of Court subject to well-defined exceptions not present in the instant
property because of a loan or mortgage or antichresis and that case.
what really transpired was the execution of a contract of sale thru
The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of lands
a private document designated as a 'Deed of Purchase and Sale'
belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of
(Exhibit 1), the execution having been made by Gimena
the husband.
Almosara in favor of appellee Hermogena V. Felipe.
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is the
After a study of this case, we have come to the conclusion that
administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to
the appellants are entitled to recover the ownership of the lots in
certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
question. We so hold because although Exh. 1 concerning the
the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the
sale made in 1951 of the disputed lots is, in Our opinion, not a
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except
forgery the fact is that the sale made by Gimena Almosara is
in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.)
invalid, having been executed without the needed consent of her
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal
husband, the lots being conjugal. Appellees' argument that this
partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by
was an issue not raised in the pleadings is baseless, considering
the phrase "except in cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals described the
the fact that the complaint alleges that the parcels 'were
sale as "invalid" - a term which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts
purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband
because the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective contracts,
Maximo Aldon' (the lots having been purchased during the
namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et seq.), voidable(Arts. 1390 et
existence of the marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and
seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.)
inferentially, by force of law, could not, be disposed of by a wife
without her husband's consent. The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category?
The answer: it is a voidable contract.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them
"[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is
(Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third
contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
alone but to both spouses.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo
the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of Aldon died.
the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil
by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon
Code.)
barred by the statute of limitations?
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the essential elements
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the
are untainted but Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be
Court of Appeals:
classified as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art.
We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein]
1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent
could not have acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in
because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process
view of what we regard as their bad faith. This bad faith is
of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable contract.
revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-appellee
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only
Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and
during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the
Hermogena V. Felipe) attempted in December 1970 to have
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for
Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made document purporting to
its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
self the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation clearly
contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right
indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to
to the lands sold.
them, otherwise, why were they interested in a document of sale
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership in their favor? Again why did Vicente V. Felipe tell Gimena that
by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What the purpose of the document was to obtain Gimena's consent to
she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. the construction of an irrigation pump on the lots in question?
The only possible reason for purporting to obtain such consent
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they
is that the appellees knew the lots were not theirs. Why was there
an attempted improvement (the irrigation tank) only in 1970?

Why was the declaration of property made only in 1974? Why
were no attempts made to obtain the husband's signature,
despite the fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close
relatives? An these indicate the bad faith of the appellees. Now
then, even if we were to consider appellees' possession in bad
faith as a possession in the concept of owners, this possession at
the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for extraordinary
prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when the present
action was instituted on April 26, 1976.
As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the death
of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil
Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified.

Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of the
lands as stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as possessors in
bad faith shall make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share
aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity pay their value to Sofia and Salvador
Aldon; costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs.
Eastern v. Lucero
Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
SECOND DIVISION
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3)
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, messages to the Company's Manila office:
vs.
First Message: 1
JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.
February l6,1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom
ESCOLIN, J.:
EMINICON
Petition for review filed by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to set aside the
Urgent Eastship Manila
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the
judgment rendered by the National Seamen Board, the dispositive portion of REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS
which reads as follows: WEATHER WITH STRONG NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH
GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL ROLLING AND
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant
PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20
her monthly allotments from March, 1980 up to the amount of
DEGREES PORT FEARING MIGHT JETTISON CARGO ON
P54,562.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
DECK IF EVERYTHING COME TO WORSE SITUATION
Respondent is likewise further ordered to pay complainant her
HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST BEST TO FACILITATE
future monthly allotment up to the arrival of the M/V EASTERN
EVERYTHING IN ORDER STOP NO FIX POSITIONS FROM
MINICON in the port of Manila or after four (4) years when the
NOON 15th UP TO 0600 HRS TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE
presumptive death established by law takes effect.
APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT 0600 HRS 10TH WITHIN
The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October 31,
THE VICINITY LATITUDE 20-02, ON LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE
1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines,
COURSE 120 DEGREES REGARDS ...
Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon
LUCERO
plying the HongkongManila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship
board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was Second Message: 2
good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate
February l6/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM
upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further
EMICON
EAST SHIP MANILA requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible
survivors and to scan the area whether there are signs of debris
RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO
from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has
ON PORT SIDE AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN
foundered In the meantime, two (2) vessels of the respondent
LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE HAVE TO
were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for
JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN
search and rescue operation, but the collective efforts of all
ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO
parties concerned yielded negative results, (p. 79, Rollo)
NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING
VIOLENTLY REGARDS Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through
its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the
LUCERO
corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except
Third Message: 3
respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.
FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with -the National Seamen Board,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00,
which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E
said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila.
SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15
She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband
TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE
with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to
ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDON
terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
ANYTIME
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no longer
MASTER
entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the
confirmed the total loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the company's
following steps:
insurance claim and [b] the Company, with the approval of the Board, had
RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately likewise paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the other seamen
reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and The Company further invoked the provisions of Article 643 of the Code of
rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air Commerce, to wit:
Force based at Clark Air Base. Respondent also released radio
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by
messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route
reason of capture or wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both
as regards the crew to demand any wages whatsoever, and as to presume him dead as four years has not yet expired. Thus,
regards the ship agent to recover the advances made. even in Judge Advocate General vs. Gonzales, et al., (CA) 48 O.G.
5329, the very case cited by the respondent herein, the court Id.
xxx xxx xxx
in the case of the missing soldier that although nothing was
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs.
heard of him since 7 May 1942, the fact of his death is not
Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the
presumed until seven years after 1942.
presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided
Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be presumed dead as
for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of
demonstrated hereinabove, it logically follows that as of now, he
death benefits to the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a
is presumed have It is of no moment to Us that the vessel was
voluntary agreement entered into by and between the heirs and the Company,
conceded by the Lloyds of London to have been totally lost
and did not bind respondent Mrs. Lucero who was not a party thereto.
which, in the first place, was admittedly merely based on
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Conunission affirmed the
presumption as even the whereabouts of the vessel remains
said decision. It held that:
unknown. Similarly, even the agreement, which formed the basis
Within the context of the foregoing circumstances, the only of the Decision of the NSB ordering payment of death benefits to
recourse is to presume the vessel totally lost and its crew the heirs of some of the crew must have been predicated upon a
members dead. But in this connection, the question that comes presumption of death of the crew members concerned. Such
to the fore is: When will the presumption arise? Article 391 of the circumstances do not suffice to establish the actual death of
Civil Code provides the answer, to wit: Capt. LUCERO.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, xxx xxx xxx
including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person
Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
engagement terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of Manila. He is considered to be still working entitling his
of the vessel or aeroplane;...
spouse to allotment until the vessel returns or until it is officially
By the aforequoted law, it is quite clear that the person to be declared totally lost, or until the presumption of his death
presumed dead should first "not been heard of for four years becomes effective in which case the burden of proving that he is
since the loss of the vessel" before he can be presumed dead for alive is shifted to his wife for purposes of continuing her
all purposes. Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is evidently premature allotment.
We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent alone that the person in question has been absent and unheard
NLRC. from for a specific length of time, but also on the fact that the
vessel has not been heard front The question, moreover, is not
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio
whether it is impossible that the person may be alive, but
messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which,
whether the circumstances do not present so strong a probability
received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the
of his death that a court should act thereon. The presumption of
existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to
death from absence of tidings of the vessel on which the
60 degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After
absentee sailed is strengthened by proof of a storm to which the
this message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the
vessel probably was exposed. The presumption is even stronger
present time.
where it appears affirmatively that the vessel was lost at sea, that
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
nothing has been heard of a particular person who sailed
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts,
thereon, and that a sufficient time has elapsed to permit the
quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had
receipt of news of any possible survivors of the disaster.
sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the
In People vs. Ansang 6 where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta ignited
rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to
three home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims,
the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs.
and the said boat was later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never
Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
heard or seen again by anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
murder, holding that the victims were dead.
preponderance of evidence controls."
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that there was
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American
no conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found
Jurisprudence: 5
was overruled by this Court in this wise:
Loss of Vessel. Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither
In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the
the vessel nor those who went in her are afterward heard of, the
body or to show where it can be found. 'Mere are cases like death
presumption arises, after the utmost limit of time for her to have
at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It
completed the voyage and for news of her arrival at any
is enough that the death and the criminal agency be proven.
commercial port of the world to have been received, that the
There are even cases where said death and the intervention of
vessel has been lost and that all on board have perished. The
the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
presumption of death in such cases does not rest on the fact
established by circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cages

decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason the
accused is held responsible for the death of persons he had or
tortured and later taken away, where the victims were never later
seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they were lulled
or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused
this, for the purpose of fixing the penalty.
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must
be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the
fact of death was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in
entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or
be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a
moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio
message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.
In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the

other issued raised in this case, they being mere adjuncts to the principa issue
already disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set
aside, and the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However,
Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an

Emnace v. CA
action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.3 In
FIRST DIVISION
their complaint, respondents prayed as follows:
G.R. No. 126334 November 23, 2001
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets
EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, and liabilities of the partnership at bar; and
vs.
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs the following:
TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY,
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties,
VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT
dividends, cash, land(s), fishing vessels, trucks, motor vehicles,
TABANAO, respondents.
and other forms and substance of treasures which belong and/or
should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partnership;
partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime
B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as
in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
moral damages;
agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among
C. Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the
them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the
entire share/amount/award which the Honorable Court may
partnership.1 Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six
resolve the plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every
(6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros
appearance in court.4
Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and Prudential Bank. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper
venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's
capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue.5 On August 30, 1994, the trial court
untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any
denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while
statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting
realties were involved, the action was directed against a particular person on the
of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over
basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal action but
to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,
also an action in personam. As regards petitioner's argument of lack of
amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal
jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not paid
demand for payment thereof.2
considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted that a II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or
request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership with grave abuse of discretion in insisting to try the case which involve
may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial (sic) a parcel of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;
court held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in their own names, in view
III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or
of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the
with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the estate of the deceased to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.6
appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by one
The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,7 incorporating the who was never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates;
additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and
and thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their
IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or
corresponding share in the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a
with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case on the ground
manifestation and motion to dismiss,8arguing that the trial court did not acquire
of prescription.
jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay the proper docket
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to dismiss,9 petitioner also raised
decision,12 dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave
prescription as an additional ground warranting the outright dismissal of the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by
complaint.
the trial court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order,10 denying the motion to dismiss
dismiss.
inasmuch as the grounds raised therein were basically the same as the earlier
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same
motion to dismiss which has been denied. Anent the issue of prescription, the
issues resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:
trial court ruled that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the
partnership when the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;
the absence of a final accounting. Moreover, an action based on a written contract
II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is
prescribes in ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
outside the said court's territorial jurisdiction;
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,11 raising the
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente
following issues:
Tabanao; and
I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with
IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs' cause of action.
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite the
It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and ultimate objective in
failure to pay the required docket fee;
instituting the action below was to recover the decedent's 1/3 share in the the Honorable Court may grant them in this case should there be any deficiency
partnership' s assets. While they ask for an accounting of the partnership' s assets in the payment of the docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court."17 There
and finances, what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel is evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is
petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or the equivalent value thereof, from inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to avoid paying the required
the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They also assert that until and amount, but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the time of filing. This
unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partnership' s assets, as consideration may have moved the trial court and the Court of Appeals to declare
well as their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the judgment award.
they feel justified in not having paid the commensurate docket fee as required by
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
the Rules of Court.1wphi1.nt
condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in become a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in
ascertaining the estimated value of the partnership's assets, for respondents favor of respondents. There is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph
themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos of Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that:
(P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in
estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a simple collection case where the
favor of the pauper-litigant.
value of the subject assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it
determinable.13 While it is true that the exact value of the partnership's total
specifically applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that
assets cannot be shown with certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and
respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from the
must ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the amount they
payment of court fees.18
expect to collect from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to
determine the proper amount of docket and other fees.14 It is thus imperative for The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of
respondents to pay the corresponding docket fees in order that the trial court Court, which defines the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately
may acquire jurisdiction over the action.15 ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as to the
exact amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
finally determined by the courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely
Appeals,16 where there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in
under the third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which provides:
avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts on
the part of respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or
desire to remit to the court "any payable balance or lien on whatever award which more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee
shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. (Underscoring ours) clear that it is only the difference between the amount finally awarded and the
fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to adjustment and which
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court
may be subjected to alien.
pronounced that the above-quoted provision "clearly contemplates an Initial
payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano
subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved."20 Moreover, we reiterated Asuncion,22 this Court held that when the specific claim "has been left for the
therein the principle that the payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of the docket fees lien on the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
based on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the filing of the duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the fee." Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing
judgment later turn out to be adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs. and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only when
there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment award until
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are
such additional fee is collected.
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in
order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint
the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the outright despite their failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in
case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant. other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to
secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim - 1/3 of the value of
payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be adhered to, there are
all the partnership assets - but they did not allege a specific amount. They did,
certain exceptions which must be strictly construed.23
however, estimate the partnership's total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00), in a letter21 addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to
say that they are unable to make an estimate, for the said letter and the the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees
admissions therein form part of the records of this case. They cannot avoid within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or
paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their reglementary period.24
amended complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held
fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the
that:
amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141,
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may refund
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees,
the 'excess or exact additional fees should the initial payment be insufficient. It is
or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of jurisdiction of the court a quo. This contention is not well-taken. The records
the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the indubitably show that respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership
court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. be accounted for, sold and distributed according to the agreement of the
partners. The fact that two of the assets of the partnership are parcels of land
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the
does not materially change the nature of the action. It is an action in
complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of
personam because it is an action against a person, namely, petitioner, on the basis
docket fees. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
of his personal liability. It is not an action in rem where the action is against the
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an
thing itself instead of against the person.27 Furthermore, there is no showing
action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of
that the parcels of land involved in this case are being disputed. In fact, it is only
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to
incidental that part of the assets of the partnership under liquidation happen to
comply within this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the
be parcels of land.
issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the
latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al.,28 settled this issue thus:
amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or any
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership,
award he may obtain in his favor. (Underscoring ours)
including the fishpond in question, did not change the nature or
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket character of the action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of
fee based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of
petitioner, and direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided its process of dissolution.
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired, Failure to
The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also
comply therewith, and upon motion by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of
seeks the enforcement of, and petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the
the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional grounds.
partners executed to formalize the partnership's dissolution, as well as to
On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on the part of the trial court implement the liquidation and partition of the partnership's assets. Clearly, it is a
and the Court of Appeals in holding that the case below is a personal action personal action that, in effect, claims a debt from petitioner and seeks the
which, under the Rules, may be commenced and tried where the defendant performance of a personal duty on his part.29 In fine, respondents' complaint
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership with
latter.26 damages is a personal action which may be filed in the proper court where any of
the parties reside.30 Besides, venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction for venue
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a
touches more upon the substance or merits of the case.31 As it is, venue in this
real action involving a parcel of land that is located outside the territorial
case was properly laid and the trial court correctly ruled so. Appeals gave scant consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments, and rightly so.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and
Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as (3) termination.36 The partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its
administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this regard is legal personality is retained, at which time it completes the winding up of its
misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or affairs, including the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children to the partners.37 For as long as the partnership exists, any of the partners may
are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the demand an accounting of the partnership's business. Prescription of the said
very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final
was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are accounting is done.38
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.32
Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and business affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years
petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly thereafter, prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a final
by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, accounting. Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides:
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his
transmitted.33Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective
legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving
hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.34
partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to
capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon
account, the above-cited provision states that the right to demand an accounting
his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the
accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
decedent.35 From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
When a final accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to run.
fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement
In the case at bar, no final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what
were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and
respondents are seeking in their action before the trial court, since petitioner has
seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnership's business and assets.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the Hence, the said action is not barred by prescription.
complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing that respondents' action
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied
prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of
petitioner's motions to dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not commit
reversible error in upholding the trial court's orders. Precious time has been lost
just to settle this preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same
arguments from the trial court all the way up to the Supreme Court. The
litigation of the merits and substantial issues of this controversy is now long
overdue and must proceed without further delay.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit, and the case isREMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Branch 60, which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based
on the estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said
plaintiffs to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court
is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-C.
Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
On June 23, 1971, respondent City Court, then presided by Honorable Judge
In the matter of Guardianship of the Lavidesv. City Court of Lucena
Filemon Juntereal, upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the estate
SECOND DIVISION
extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stocks.
G.R. No. L-50261 May 31, 1982 Pursuant to said authority, petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on
August 28, 1971, sold the said shares of stocks for the sum of P64,512.00
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MINORS CECILIA,
REBECCA, FLORIDA, RAPHAEL, RODOLFO, LUISITO, TEODORO, all On November 22, 1978, petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of
surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C. LAVIDES, petitioner, a Deed of Exchange Agreement dated November 18, 1978. While this latter
vs. motion was still pending consideration, the respondent court, now presided by
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I, respondent. Honorable Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., reviewed the records of the case and
finding that the undivided estate left by the deceased was worth at least
DE CASTRO, J.:
P35,000.00, dismissed the case in an Order dated December 5, 1978, for lack of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the two (2) orders of respondent City
jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled all
Court of Lucena, Branch I, one dated December 5, 1978 dismissing petitioner's
proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order of December 5, 1978.
petition for guardianship for lack of jurisdiction and the other, dated December
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order which was denied by
27, 1978 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of
respondent city court in its order dated December 27, 1978. Hence, this instant
December 5, 1978.
petition, petitioner raising the following issues, namely:
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
a. Whether or not respondent city court's jurisdiction over a
Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted on April 5, 1971
petition for general guardianship is based on the total value of
before respondent City Court a guardianship proceeding (Special Proceeding No.
the estate or on the value of the individual share of the minors in
0609) with respect to the person and property of their seven (7) minor children
the estate of their deceased mother; and
named Cecilia, Rebecca, Florida, Raphael, Rodolfo, Luisito and Teodoro, all
b. Whether or not the promulgation of the Revised Rules of
surnamed Lavides. Said petition alleged that the estate left by the deceased wife
Court which was made effective on January 1, 1964 overruled the
of herein petitioner, mother of the above- named minors, has a total value of
doctrine laid down by this Honorable Tribunal in the case of
thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000.00) or an amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to
"Delgado vs. Gamboa," G. R. No. L-14326, February 28, 1962, 4
each minor. Although there had been no previous settlement of the estate of the
SCRA 505.
deceased, petitioner was appointed and qualified as judicial guardian on May 10,
1971. It appears that respondent city court dismissed the petition for guardianship on
ground of lack of jurisdiction 1) because a perusal of the records of the case shows and if he resides in a foreign country, in the Court of First
that the undivided estate left by the deceased is worth P35,000.00 which is clearly Instance of the province wherein his property or part thereof is
outside its jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of situated; provided, however, that where the value of the property
Court, and 2) because of this Court's ruling in the case of Delgado vs. of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the
Gamboa, supra, to the effect that the concurrent jurisdiction of the Justice of the justice of the peace or municipal court, the proceedings shall be
Peace Courts with the Court of First Instance over the guardianship of the person instituted in the Court of First Instance.
and properties of the minors and incompetents cannot be exercised when the
In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be instituted in the
estate has a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount for the former courts.
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that in the case of petition for
The above section, in clear terms, grants concurrent jurisdiction between
guardianship of more than one minor, the individual share of each minor which
municipal and city court and Courts of First Instance in the appointment of
is then the estate of said minors determines the jurisdiction of the court pursuant
guardians either with respect to the person or property of the minor or
to Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court; that inasmuch as there are
incompetent, except that where the value of the property of such minor or
seven (7) minor children sought to be placed under guardianship and that the
incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts, the
total value of the estate is P35,000.00, then by simple mathematical computation,
guardianship proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance. It is
the value of the property of each minor is P5,000.00, already a determined estate,
clear, therefore, that the value of the property of the minor or incompetent
which is well within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court; that the case of
sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court has jurisdiction. And
Delgado vs. Gamboa, promulgated in 1962, invoked by respondent city court in
that property referred to is the individual estate of the minor so much so that
dismissing his petition has been overruled and abandoned by the promulgation
when there are more than one minor or in competent sought to be placed under
of the Revised Rules of Court, which took effect in 1964.
guardianship, what determines which court has jurisdiction is the value of the
Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court granting concurrent jurisdiction individual property of each minor or incompetent.
to the municipal and city courts with the Court of First Instance in the
In the case at bar, it appears that respondent city court dismissed the petition for
appointment of guardians, provides:
guardianship on ground of lack of jurisdiction because a perusal of the record of
Section 1. Where to institute proceedings. Guardianship of the the case shows that the undivided estate left by the deceased mother is worth
person or estate of a minor or incompetent may be instituted in P35,000.00 which amount is clearly outside its jurisdiction. This reasoning must
the Court of First Instance of the province, or in the justice of the be rejected for it overlooks the fact that the petition for guardianship filed by
peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court of the herein petitioner before the respondent city court clearly alleged that the
chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, individual estate or share of each of the seven minor children sought to be placed
under guardianship is P5,000.00, which amount is well within the jurisdiction of what is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent, but the value
the respondent city court (Section 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. of the individual share of each of the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought
No. 3828). That the respondent city court has jurisdiction over the case cannot be to be appointed individually not collectively.
denied, for the rule is well-settled that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
But petitioner would contend, as raised in the second issue of this petition, that
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and/or petition. 1 That
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the aforecited case of Delgado vs.
each of the seven (7) minor children became owner of a one- seventh (1/7) share
Gamboa, has been overruled by the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court,
or an amount of P5,000 from the estate left by the deceased mother valued at
particularly Section 1 of Rule 92, He argued that the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa,
P35,000.00 upon the death of the latter cannot also be denied for Article 777 of
promulgated on February 28, 1962, was decided when Section 1, Rule 93 of the
the New Civil Code expressly provides that "the rights to the succession are
former Rules of Court was still effective, which rule commands that guardianship
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent," and from then on, the
shall be originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance; that when the
heir becomes the absolute owner of the decedent's property, subject of the rights
Revised Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the institution of
and obligations of the decedent and he cannot be deprived of such right except
guardianship proceedings is now governed by Section 1 of Rule 92 which states
by methods provided for by law. 2
that guardianship proceedings may be instituted in the Courts of First Instance or
Respondent city court, however, would also base its dismissal of the case in the in the municipal courts.
light of this Court's ruling in the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, supra, to the effect
A perusal of the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, decided when Section 1 of former
that the concurrence of jurisdiction between Courts of First Instance and inferior
Rule 93, as amended by R.A. No. 643, was still effective, shows that it merely
courts over guardianship of the minors or incompetents cannot be exercised
restated and confirmed the doctrine laid down in the case of Morales vs.
when the estate has a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount for the latter
Marquez, G. R. No. L-7463, May 27, 1955, which in effect, expounded the grant of
courts. The respondent Court, however, overlooked one vital fact. A more careful
concurrent jurisdiction between inferior courts and Court of First Instance, as
examination of the facts of said case, decided in 1962, reveals that it involved
provided for by R.A. No. 643. And a comparison of the provisions of Section 1 of
guardianship proceeding over the person and property of three (3) minor
former Rule 93, as amended, and Section 1 of the present Rule 92 shows that the
children of decedent and an undivided estate valued at P7,000.00. That would
latter rule restates the former rule. Under the former rule, municipal or city
make a share of P2,333.33 for each minor child, which amount is also in excess of
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance in cases
the jurisdictional amount for inferior courts. 3 In the case at bar, there are seven
where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent falls within the
(7) minor children to share in an undivided estate valued at P35,000.00 or a share
jurisdiction of the former courts. Likewise, under the present rule, concurrent
of P5,000.00 for each minor, which amount is well within the jurisdiction of the
jurisdiction was also granted except that "where the value of the property of such
respondent city court, 4 which, therefore, cannot validly invoke the case of
minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
Delgado vs. Gamboa to support its dismissal of the petition for guardianship. For
proceedings shall, be instituted in the Court of First Instance." The criterion, SO ORDERED.
therefore, in determining in which court the guardianship proceeding shall be
instituted under the provision of both the former Rule 93 and the present Rule 92
remains the same. Hence, it cannot be accurately stated that the Delgado ruling
has been abandoned. In any case, the Delgado doctrine, as already demonstrated,
does not militate against petitioner's contention that the City has jurisdiction
over the instant guardianship case.
Lastly, there is still one aspect of this case which must not be overlooked. It is not
disputed that the respondent City Court has entertained and granted petitioner's
petition for guardianship in its Order as early as May 10, 1971 and has exercised its
jurisdiction by granting authority to petitioner to settle the estate extrajudicially
and to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stock; that after the lapse of
seven (7) years or on November 22, 1978, respondent City Court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian
and annulled all proceedings taken. Would it serve the interest of justice to
dismiss the case at this stage and let a new petition for guardianship be filed in
another court? To draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in
litigations. The time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional
expenses incurredthese are considerations which weigh heavily if this situation
is allowed to happen. As aptly stated by the petitioner."To let the respondent
court reverse its stand now will pave a pattern of judicial instability which, to
reason and logic, is definitely not healthy administration of justice and not
inducive of court's veneration." 5
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of respondent City Court of

December 5, 1978 dismissing the petition and the Order of December 27, 1978
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby set aside and
the case is remanded to it for further proceedings. No costs.
on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal
Bonilla v. Barcena
capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the
minors, petitioners, ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal
vs. personality to sue.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and
dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order
HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
Abra,respondents.
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
MARTIN, J:
counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but
the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for
aforementioned case. the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the
Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located Hence, this petition for review.
in Abra.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for
before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is
amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the
to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
amended complaint. Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on
March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975,
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint
Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased,
the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action
can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In
party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and
court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury
complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff
asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects
however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by
of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3
be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative
law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not
right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the
proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be
parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila
death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in
the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff. known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is
directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is
instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its
discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the
substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing

the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the
motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set
aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the
minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to
appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo 152 S 172
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987
THIRD DIVISION
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a
vs.
formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the
NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
vs.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED,
PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V.
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,
BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,
and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the
Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L.
No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
ANTIGUA, respondents.
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII, First Instance of Cebu.
RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp.
G.R. No. 41171
Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L.
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March
ANTIGUA, respondents.
13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but 3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro,
leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre,
Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left
shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme
by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia,
Borromeo.
all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe
by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin
Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses. Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo
represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial,
the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following
was a forgery. facts were established:
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate 1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter
of the will was affirmed inTestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children,
v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). namely,
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several Jose Ma. Borromeo
parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as
Cosme Borromeo
heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
Pantaleon Borromeo
The following petitions or claims were filed:
Vito Borromeo
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
Paulo Borromeo
Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of
heirship. There was no opposition filed against said petition. Anecita Borromeo
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for Quirino Borromeo and
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo
Julian Borromeo
filed an opposition to this petition.
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
brothers and sisters predeceased him.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
The last three died leaving no issue.
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and
Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who
left the following children:
died on March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
one of the petitioners herein.
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
children:
4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only
aa. Federico Borromeo
daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following
children: bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
b. Ramon Ocampo dd. Jose Borromeo
c. Lourdes Ocampo ee. Consuelo Borromeo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and ff. Pilar Borromeo
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose gg. Salud Borromeo
Barcenilla, Jr.
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
left the following children:
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
a. Marcial Borromeo
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife,
children:
Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
c. Asuncion Borromeo
bb. Luz Borromeo Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are
divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated.
dd. Rosario Borromeo
All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated portion.
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be
order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an
of the deceased Vito Borromeo: illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the
trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case
3. Vitaliana Borromeo to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order
of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal
5. Salud Borromeo
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25,
6. Asuncion Borromeo
1973.
7. Marcial Borromeo
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the
basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N.
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo
Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud
shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion
shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the
waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of
declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and
is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no effective
waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code,
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights
to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be
to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to
certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057
order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order
the motion for reconsideration. for the distribution of the estate.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article
of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir
against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must
constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he
allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of
under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver
of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their
private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity
been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30,
of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the
1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere
jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a
memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it
was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70
probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the Phil., 151, 159).
debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document
same.
did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus:
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the
of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real,
because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator,
the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then
the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent
deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise,
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to
in 1969. them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the
majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the
considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1)
trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and
intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p.
assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his
the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said
act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of
assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs- The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on
assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because
was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969,
Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969. when the estate was ordered distributed.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no object, which
that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, therefore,
the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio but was
the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several inexistent.
parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any
as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the
formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of
trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions.
the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two things
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and
which are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with authority and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver agreement,
the estate.
nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the appealed
24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE. order of December 24, 1974, which approved the validity of the waiver agreement.
The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise of
G.R. No. 55000
jurisdiction.
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, declaring
in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly
the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court
and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they lost
certified this case to this Court as the questions raised are all of law.
their rights because the rights from that moment on became vested in Fortunato
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also
Borromeo.
question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is
claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate
an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of the death of the person The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of
from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time of the assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported
document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were also waiver of hereditary rights.
certain of their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of
lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver the estate.
document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and setting the
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as
G.R. No. 62895
to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no question of title to property and,
therefore, the probate court can decide the question. A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative
of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The
Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose
appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are
Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the fact that there was nothing more
contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974,
to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the estate since the order of
declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo
partition and distribution had long become final.
under the waiver agreement.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be
aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for
validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing
mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to
intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case.
terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to
eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to
compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real
the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending
lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had
claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not lie to compel the
allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the respondent.
performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the petition
on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied 2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement
signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion
resolution by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be
justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and accounting because the 3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his
latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then accounting; and
Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations
matter within three months from the date of its submission.
of notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the properties of the
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already estate.
been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to
previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the
some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending
resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to
resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983,
maintain status quo on the case.
required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-
exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of
properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, the estate and to render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from
in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the rents of several properties.
administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of
the estate shall be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees. 1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial
court dated December 24, 1974;
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p.
197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) 2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the
declared heirs the properties due to the following circumstances: decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and
inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to
Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case to the
segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of
further acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11 herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In connection
because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion.
Court in G.R. No. 63818. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among others,
Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
"fat commission" from the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty.
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and
Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in contempt of court
an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as co-administrator
with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his profession.
of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by this Court in its Resolution
But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and
dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate speed.
suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined
G.R. No. 63818
forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together, continued to harass
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed administrator
a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided
xxx xxx xxx
over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in
9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of
Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among others, the
the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L.
following:
Antigua.
xxx xxx xxx
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for
agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual
the production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the
heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are
Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested
not willing to sell their distributive shares under the terms and
buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of
conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment
October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various motions
has become apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco
for reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as
Borromeo. Among the harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al. are
owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons
the pending motions for the removal of administrator Jose Cuenco
advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for reconsideration,
Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which seeks to
Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for production of titles.
invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another and the other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More
harassment motions are expected until the herein movants shall finally the rationale that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn
yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for interest more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of the
an entirely independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to say their piece.
said incidents. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the
courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly favored by
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
of this proceeding, including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable
to be misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and xxx xxx xxx
prejudiced against the herein movants. Incidents which may create this
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the
impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion now pending in the court below which smack of harassment against the
for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents,
for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before the petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court. Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R
by reason of the following circumstances:
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the
following: (a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as
initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to
xxx xxx xxx
a brother of respondent.
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the
herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue
conformity of the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly
interest in pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al.
refused the sale, to the great disappointment of respondent.
Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is
married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua. (c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents
are clearly intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate
Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding to the
cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees
proposed sale.
because the certificates of title are already registered in their names
Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. (d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners
Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based on by failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose
Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of
by the other lawyers were resolved by respondent after the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They claim that the
petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo) respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of this
Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of the
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition
case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the disqualification of judge
for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
Burgos would delay further the closing of the administration proceeding as he is
taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also
the only judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.
ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling. Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed.
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on
the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an
April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the
accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as rentals for the land
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits
upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to February
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate Estate of Vito
1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of
Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge
from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr.,
Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the
sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide
projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
the petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case will be
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by
reassigned and others concerned.
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed.
file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for cash, a report on
They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the
which the administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be examined
proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty.
under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also prayed that
Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March 2,
subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the Manager of the
1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add that he only
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of
ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to pay
Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-
the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge
distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana
Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders against the failure of
Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the properties of the
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million
the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more
tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored.
the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In
of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo. the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of ... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the
the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At
joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well
administrator. grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself
from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
honest actuations and probity in favor or of either partly or incite such
produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order by Judge
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
Burgos.
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such
tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles
circumstances is to disqualify himself "That way he avoids being
in court.
misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve ed.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, what is more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is
before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the private lived up to.
respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound
subpoena.1avvphi1
reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits
is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito
miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had not done anything Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not only taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the
valid but the issue itself has become moot and academic. transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which was appealed to
G.R. No. 65995
this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this
obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their
petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents related to
respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969,
the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent Judge was
segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value of the
disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void and without force
estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.
and effect whatsoever.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in
No. 63818, we grant the petition.
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-
distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their WHEREFORE,
names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December
before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's
916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET
who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;
fees should be legally charged against their respective clients and not against the
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver
estate.
document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the
and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering
directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the
the inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special
decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which was already final and
Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who
executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate Appellate
has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall
Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 when it granted the petition for
immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the
certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the

Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case
shall be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue
seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R.
No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily
terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner-administrator
of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15,
1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and
paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect
from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees
according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which
should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the
latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.

Dela Merced v. Dela Merced
Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise, Francisco (Evarista's
THIRD DIVISION
brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
three legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M.
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.
M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN,
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela
RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO,
Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P.
ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO,
Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an
CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M.
extrajudicial settlement, entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
ADRIANO, petitioners,
Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the properties of Evarista to
vs.
them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of
PURISIMA, J.:
the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced
dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the decision, with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order", alleging that he was fraudulently
dated June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of
Case No. 59705. his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent
Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-
The facts of the case are, as follows:
third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista,
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left
corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.
On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order prayed
At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1)
for by private respondent Joselito, enjoining the sale of any of the real properties
Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her
of the deceased Evarista.
niece who is the only daughter of Rosa dela Merced-Platon (a sister who died in
After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial court dismissed
1943); and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another
the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and cancelled
sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio,
the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the real properties of
Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-
the deceased Evarista. barrier between the illegitimate and the legitimate family. . . .
(Rollo, p. 87-88)
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private respondent appealed
The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the
to the Court of Appeals.
circumstances of the entire case and the other evidentiary facts
and documents presented by the herein parties points only to In its Decision of October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
one issue which goes into the very skeleton of the controversy, to the trial court of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an amendatory
wit: "Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so as to include
estate of the late Evarista M. Dela Merced in his capacity as private respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of Francisco, which estate
representative of his alleged father, Francisdo Dela Merced, includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latter's inheritance from the deceased
brother of the deceased, whose succession is under Evarista.
consideration.
The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the
It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code
herein plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff,
that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
on the other hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child of the late
moment of the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela
Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his
Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister's estate at the moment of the
alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate
latter's death. Said 1/3 of Evarista's estate formed part of
estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in
Francisco's estate which was subsequently transmitted upon his
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that:
death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor his share in Francisco's estate from the time of the latter's death
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from in 1987. The extrajudicial settlement therefore is void insofar as it
the illegitimate child. deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in the estate of Francisco
M. dela Merced. As a consequence, the cancellation of the notice
The application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant case,
of lis pendens is not in order because the property is directly
it is clearly worded in such a way that there can be no room for
affected. Appellant has the right to demand a partition of his
any doubts and ambiguities. This provision of the law imposes a
father's estate which includes 1/3 of the property inherited from transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Evarista dela Merced.
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died,
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent,
hereby ordered to execute an amendatory agreement/settlement Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of
to include herein plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela Merced as co- Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by
heir to the estate of Francisco dela Merced which includes 1/3 of right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late
the estate subject of the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M. dela Merced dated April
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional rights to the
20, 1989. The amendatory agreement/settlement shall form part
intestate estate of his father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of his
of the original Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs against
own father's intestate estate, as this Court held in the case ofGutierrez vs.
defendants-appellees.
Macandog (150 SCRA 422 [1987])
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 41)
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (supra) is misplaced.
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate The said case involved a claim for support filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez against
child, private respondent Joselito isbarred from inheriting from Evarista because the estate of the decedent, Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an heir
of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an to the estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had no obligation
impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this Court ruled that Elpedia should have
asked for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
The Petition is devoid of merit.
in which court her husband (one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a
instituted a case for legal separation against her on the ground of an attempt
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate
against his life. When Mauricio (her husband) died, she should have commenced
sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it
an action for the settlement of the estate of her husband, in which case she could
is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share
receive whatever allowance the intestate court would grant her.
in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister,
The present case, however, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir
Evarista.
to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article
which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is no
777 of the New Civil Code which provides that the rights to succession are
legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late
Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father's estate, which estate
includes a one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.
be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the

Gayon v. Gayon
aforementioned property.
EN BANC
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that
PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant, Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to
vs. be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees. executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the
complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and
Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First
incurred expenses of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased
Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be
the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.
on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed copy of which was attached to
Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments
the complaint, as Annex "A" whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of
made in her answer and stressing that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon,
P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the
there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on
barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
record." Presently, or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later
appealed from, reading:
than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by
Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit
Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite
"A" annexed to the complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute
the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita
owner of the land in question, and considering the fact that
Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale copy of which was attached to the
Silvestre Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has
complaint, as Annex "B" dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to
nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint, as
plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961,
prayed for, this case is hereby dismissed, without
introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully
pronouncement as to costs. 1
paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our
Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the
land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order present appeal, which is well taken.
Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art.
true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory
Family relations shall include those:
heirs 2and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Moreover, her
(1) Between husband and wife;
own motion to dismiss indicated merely "a necessity of amending the complaint,"
to the end that the other successors in interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of the (2) Between parent and child;
latter, be made parties in this case. In her opposition to the aforesaid motion for
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia, that the "heirs
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship."
Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews
moment of the death of the decedent" 3and "(t)he inheritance includes all the and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration
property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his contained in said Art. 217 which should be construed strictly, it being an
death," 4it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they exception to the general rule and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded
would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the
interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. complaint does not bar the same.
Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants
decedent. 5
therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the
present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not
inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the
appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.
same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits
"filed or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase,
Banilad Friad Lands Estate, Cebu City;

Palicte v. Ramolete
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu
THIRD DIVISION
City, covered by TCT No. 27639;
G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu,
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner,
covered by TD No. 010661, with an area of 76-708; (sic)
vs.
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of
Sa-ac Mactan Island, with an area of Forty Four Thousand Six
Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator, respondents.
Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square meters more or less;
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First
Government lot at Lahug, Cebu City;
Instance of Cebu declaring the deed of redemption executed for the petitioner
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central,
null and void and denying the petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of
Cebu City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of
Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone
Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name. bid for them for the amount of P217,300.00.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was
issued on February 5, 1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order dated awarded to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the
Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
heirs of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
administered by respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of Felipe V. Belandres and approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City; Officio Sheriff, was issued for these lots:
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of 1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre,
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City; Cebu City, bid at P20,000.00;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of the 2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642, of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00; ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00; B
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640, of RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER,
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, WHO IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE
p. 42) JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge
THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
Ramolete for the transfer to her name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land
SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
covered by the deed of redemption.
C
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled
"Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH
among which, is that movant, Palicte, is not one of those authorized to redeem PETITIONER IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER
under the provisions of the Rules of Court. RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF REDEMPTION OF
CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE AFTER
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE AS THERE IS STILL
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl.
JUDGMENT DEBT CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
Proc. No. 2706-R, she does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem
D
the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed of redemption is null and void. The
motion of Palicte was denied. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4) PARCELS OF
Hence, the present petition.
LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL
A AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly
JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM UNDER exercise the right of redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property of the fact that some portion of her husband' title passes to her
sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This court has held
sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter that a surety can not redeem the property of the principal sold
provided, by the following persons: on execution because the surety, by paying the debt of the
principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor,
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole
and consequently is not a successor in interest in the property.
or any part of the property;
(G. Urruitia & Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil., 260, 268).
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or
(Emphasis supplied).
mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof,
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto
subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold.
whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against
Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
it. She is one of the declared heirs in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by
legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
the judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"?
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
the death of the decedent.
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property,
whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of
subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even
redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276 Fed., 216, 223);
while the property is under administration. (Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845;
one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the
Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the
property for the purpose of redemption (Southern California
decedent's property even while it is under administration. With more reason
Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs.
should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the
Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61;
presence of an administrator.
127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law (XI McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three
one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property other co-heirs, the administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to
sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85 the redemption of the disputed parcels of land. We see no need for such prior
Pac., 122); the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason approval. While it may have been desirable, it is not indispensable under the
circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator
the act of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contends that the as the judgment debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the
administrator and the three other heirs agreed to the redemption. There is, deceased is the judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that
however. no clear proof of such approval. What is beyond dispute from the estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
records is that they did not disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the petitioner.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to
There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was not
transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of
beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon Sotto to her name cannot
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate prosper at this time.
pending the order of distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the
preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties is greater than
estate.
anybody else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely holds it for
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56
the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
SCRA 267, 345- 346):
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and
interest were allowed to exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-
unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103 Phil. 889, 892) where a son
redeemed the property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made.
Sheriff of Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
called "inchoate right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax,
successor-in-interest of her husband. if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
mother, is also an inchoate or contingent interest, because upon
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions,
the death of the father or the mother or both, he will have a right
or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem a property
administrator, or any other person having the same in his
sold on execution, then the son is such a successor in interest, as
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
he has an inchoate right to the property of his father.
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the stated above.
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
SO ORDERED.
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order

that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have
been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the
estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will
or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is
shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the estate"
have been paid, which is but logical and proper, (3) besides, such
an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application
for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the
court."
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-
redemptioners in the redemption made by the petitioner before the motion to
transfer titles to the latter's name may be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders

declaring the deed of redemption null and void and denying the motion to
transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and
Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural

Locsin v. CA
properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was
FIRST DIVISION
divided among his three (3) children as follows:
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V.
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the
DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed
vs.
Locsin;
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18)
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS
hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in
OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN,respondents.
Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage
NARVASA, C.J.:
to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the
favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with
B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is children.
sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin,
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin,
however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina,
petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit
as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his
their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully
wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney
considered, the Court now decides the case.
Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record: properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective
sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her his Locsin nephews and nieces:
"Jaucian relatives." 4
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES (ommitted)
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
nephews and nieces and others:
without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will,
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE (ommitted)
Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate
proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6 Catalina
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming
declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of
and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives
surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes- the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of
Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian
made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of
nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares
any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador
from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch
Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often
VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the
than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious,
Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena
without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession.
Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact,
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave,
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
and against the defendants:
properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales
and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to (1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja
and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and (6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees
entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina and litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without
Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian,
Costs against the defendants. 9
and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and
rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the
decision.
estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to
The petition has merit and should be granted.
those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the
complaint) as null and void ab-initio; The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private
respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City
inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years
to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real
before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary
properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and
time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other
delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the
persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her
defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from
death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property
the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery
that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs;
cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and
and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since
interest from the filing, of this case
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his
sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina,
heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no
Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian,
legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property
among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the
during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in
genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself,
nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to
Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente)
the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the
concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
respondents may not invoke:
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring
the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020.
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years
Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same
old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced
lot to Julian Locsin. 19
years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her
pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to
relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia,
them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The
Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan
records do not support that conjecture.
Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina
private respondents.
had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to
which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26,
Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to
years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin
make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was
nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-
equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul
II? and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,
although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to
persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent
his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication
when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering
that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her
their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the
parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that
petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her
estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don
to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena
Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the
Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house.
surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during
Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her
the marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing
properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners
included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in
were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador
fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by
Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty.
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who
would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood
is married to Doa Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is
to inherit from her eventually.
married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 26 The sales which she made in favor of
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before
Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena
Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed
Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been
that their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal
anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also
erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the
prejudice his own interest.
ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa
consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4)
Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew
years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of
Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her
Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an
nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective
injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign
ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was

constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14,
1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and
reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private
respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
be approved by the court;

Llenares v. CA
3. That in keeping with the findings of this court, the Register of
THIRD DIVISION
Deeds, Lucena City, should, as he is hereby ordered cancel Entry
G.R. No. 98709 May 13, 1993
No. 35285 in TCT No. 28170, said entry being an annotation of
MAGDALENA LLENARES, petitioner, the adverse claim of defendant Apolinar Zabella inscribed on
vs. Feb. 17, 1977;
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and APOLINAR ZABELLA, respondents.
4. That the defendant pay to plaintiff the amount of P2,500.00 as
DAVIDE, JR., J.: attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation. 3
Petitioner availed of this recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to Petitioner filed the aforementioned complaint on 12 July 1977 after she had been
obtain a reversal of the Decision of the Seventh Division of Court of Appeals in allegedly dispossessed of the property in question by private respondent Apolinar
CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, promulgated on 24 April 1990, 1 and the reinstatement of Zabella in 1976, and after the latter had caused to be annotated in Transfer
the 4 April 1986 Decision of Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lucena Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28170 an affidavit of adverse claim on 17 February
City, in a case2 involving the recovery of the possession and quieting of title over 1977. She prayed therein that, inter alia, she be restored to the possession of the
a parcel of land. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as said property and that the adverse claim be cancelled. 4
follows:
As disclosed by the pleadings and the challenged decision, the antecedent facts
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff who are as follows:
is declared the true and absolute owner of the land covered by
Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners, in equal shares, of a parcel
TCT No. 28170 (Registry of Deeds, Lucena City) particularly
of land situated in barrio Silangang Mayao of the then Municipality, now City, of
described in par. 2 of plaintiff's complaint and it is hereby
Lucena. In the cadastral survey of the said municipality, the lot was designated as
ordered
Cadastral Lot No. 4804-D. This designation was later changed to Lot. No. 5015.
1. That the defendant or any person acting in his behalf
On 21 December 1929, Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half (1/2) share in the lot
surrender and transfer possession of the land in question
to Ariston Zabella, private respondent's father. Subsequently, after due
(covered by TCT No. 28170 to the plaintiff;
proceedings, the cadastral court awarded Lot. No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and
2. That the defendant render an accounting of the fruits he Anastacio Llenares in equal shares. Decree No. 54398 was issued to both of them
received from the aforementioned property from August 1976 and on the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 43073 was issued
until possession is transferred to the plaintiff, said accounting to in their names on July 1937.
Anastacio Llenares passed away on 27 March 1931 leaving the petitioner, his only proved that she had been paying the land taxes on the property until the filing of
child, as his sole heir. On the other hand, Juan Zabella and niece Irene Catapat. the case.
On 5 February 1960, Rosario and Irene adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's
On the other hand, according to his own version, private respondent and his
one-half (1/2) share in the lot. This adjudication was annotated in OCT No.
siblings took possession of that portion of the land sold by Anastacio Llenares
43073. Rosario died on 5 June 1962 leaving, as her only heirs, her children
after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930. He then converted the same into
Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana, all surnamed Zaracena.
riceland. It was irrigated in 1955 and he has been paying the irrigation charges
On 22 June 1976, petitioner, as the sole heir of Anastacio Llenares, adjudicated to since 1960. Moreover, he and his co-heirs have been in possession of the property
herself, by way of a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang without interference by any party until "the present." 5
Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A"), the one-half (1/2) share in the property belonging to
The trial court limited the issues to the following: whether the private respondent
Anastacio Llenares. This fact was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
had acquired absolute ownership of the land in question by prescription and
On 26 August 1976, however, OCT No. 43073 was cancelled and in its place, TCT whether the plaintiff's (petitioner) action is barred by laches. 6 In finding for the
No. T-27166 was issued for the entire lot. On 16 February 1977, private respondent petitioner, the lower court made the following disquisitions:
Zabella filed an adverse claim which was duly annotated in TCT No. T-27166.
It is beyond cavil that the land in question (then part of a big
As a consequence of a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") executed by and parcel) has been registered and titled in the name of plaintiff's
between Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario Zabella Zaracena, Lot No. 5015 father Anastacio Llenares since July 28, 1937 even as it is now
was subsidivided into Lot. Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, which registered in the name of plaintiff who made an affidavit of self-
comprises one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 5015 corresponding to Anastacio's share, was adjudification on June 22, 1976 being the only child of Anastacio
allotted to the petitioner. TCT No. T-27166 was thereafter cancelled and separate Llenares. Anastacio Llenares became the registered owner by
Transfer Certificate of Title were issued for each of the subdivided lots. TCT No. virtue of a cadastral proceedings, a proceedings in rem that is
28170 was issued in the petitioner's name for Lot No. 5015-A. binding and conclusive against the whole world. No evidence of
irregularity or fraud in the issuance of the title has been
As regards the issue of possession, the petitioner's evidence discloses that since
adduced, and even if there is intrinsic fraud, the period of one
she was only four (4) years old when her father died, her cousin Rosario Zabella
year within which to ventilate this infirmity has long expired. It
administered the land in question until 1959 when she (petitioner) placed Rufo
is a postulate in law that "no title to registered land in derogation
Orig as tenant therein. The latter worked as such, delivering to the petitioner her
to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
share of the harvest until 1976, when he stopped doing so as he was ordered by
or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against
the private respondent not to give the petitioner her share anymore. Private
the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors
respondent allegedly claimed ownership over the property. Petitioner further
because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by exhaustively discussed by defendant's counsel in his brief we
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the find this to be devoid of merit because of the following cogent
personality of their predecessor in interest." (Barcelona vs. reasons, viz:
Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251). On this score alone, defendant's claim
Firstly, the defense of laches was never
of prescription should fail. The court also notes, in passing, that
interposed or pleaded in the answer filed by the
defendant's evidence does not convincingly establish that he
defendant. Not even in our most gratuitous
possessed the property publicly, exclusively and peacefully in the
moment can we see a nuance of this defense
concept of owner. For one thing, he has not even paid any realty
being asserted in the answer: It is a rule of
tax on the property as the property is not declared for taxation
procedure that defenses and objections not
purposes in his name. The court is neither impressed with the
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
credibility of defendant's witnesses. For example, the witness
answer are deemed waived. (Sec. 2 Rule 9 of the
Sergio Dalida testified that in 1918 the land in litigation was in
Rules of Court).
the possession of Ariston Zabella (T.S.N. 8-21-84 p. 8). There
Secondly, the evidence shows that plaintiff has
seems to be no truth to this because the property was bought by
not been sleeping on her rights. According to
Ariston Zabella only in the year 1929. And then, there was that
her she was dispossessed of the land in 1976. It is
other witness Cosme Ranillo who unequivocally admitted during
admitted by the defendant that in 1977, plaintiff
cross-examination that he was coached by the defendant (vide:
lodged a complaint against the defendant
t.s.n. 11-20-84 p. 24-26).
regarding the land in question with the
As regards the Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor
Presidential Action Committee On Land
of Ariston Zabella (Exh. "1") which is apparently the cornerstone
Problems (PACLAP) as (sic) Camp Wilhelm,
of defendant's claim over the property the court concurs with the
Lucena City. And then the instant action was
submission of the plaintiff that after final judgment has been
filed in court on July 12, 1977.
rendered in the cadastral proceedings, all rights or claims prior
On the contrary it is the defendant and/or his
thereto are deemed barred by the principle of res judicata. Hence
predeccessor in interest who have been sleeping
after the finality of the judgment in the cadastral case, the Deed
on their rights if any. They did not assert their
of Sale has lost its efficacy being functus oficio.
right of ownership over the land in question
With respect to the defense of laches so emphatically and
arising from the Deed of Sale during the
cadastral proceedings in the year 1937 or one entered

thereabout (sic). Except for filing an adverse
(1) declaring defendant-appellant the true and lawful owner of
claim on February 17, 1977, defendant has not
the 12,501 square meters of land described in and covered by
taken any step to have the title of the property
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-28170 of the Registry of Deeds
and its tax declaration transferred to his name.
of Lucena City;
Thirdly, as adverted to, a title once registered
(2) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to execute to the defendant-
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
appellant the proper deed of conveyance transferring full
notorious possession. In the same vein, laches,
ownership of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-28170 to the said
too, may not be considered a valid defense for
defendant-appellant;
claiming ownership of registered land. Where
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to cancel said
prescription would not lie, neither would laches
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-28170 and to issue thereafter a
be available (De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz, CA-
new one in the name of defendant-appellant, in the event the
G.R. No. 4700-R, Aug. 14, 1950; Adove vs, Lopez,
plaintiff-appellee shall fail or refuse to execute the conveyance;
CA-G.R. No. 18060-R, Aug. 30, 1957. 7
(4) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to pay attorney's fees of
From this adverse decision, the private respondent appealed to the respondent
P10,000.00.
Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 09853. He asked
the respondent Court to reverse the RTC because the latter erred: (a) in not Costs against the plaintiff-appellee. 9
considering the unsullied testimonial and documentary evidence for the
In resolving the appeal against the petitioner, the respondent Court stressed the
appellant; (b) in appreciating the plaintiff-appellee's flimsy and insufficient
fact that although OCT No. 43073 was issued in 1937, it was only on 26 August
testimonial evidence; (c) in not declaring that prescription and laches were
1976 that the petitioner initially moved "to change the registered ownership" of
raised by the defendant; (d) in declaring that the failure to present to the
the property with the issuance of TCT No. 27166. At that time, petitioner was
cadastral court the deed of absolute sale bars the appellant (private respondent)
already forty-nine (49) years old. In short, the respondent Court observed that
from proving his ownership over the land in suit; and (e) in rendering judgment
she allowed twenty-eight (28) years to pass from the time she attained the age
in favor of the petitioner. 8
of majority before taking any affirmative action to protect her rights over the
In its Decision, the respondent Court upheld the private respondent's position property. It thus concluded that "suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that
and decreed as follows: the inaction was because the appellee knew of the sale by her father Juan Zabella
(sic)," and that such knowledge is notice "that appellee had no right over half of
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and another
the land. " 10 2. Whether or not a party in (sic) whose title was vested by virtue
of a rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree of
Anent the petitioner's contention that the private respondent is not only guilty of
registration in a judicial proceeding in rem which as such, binds
laches but that prescription had already set in against him, the respondent Court
the whole world and who ever claim (sic) thereafter on the said
ruled that the former's evidence speaks otherwise because after TCT No. T-27166
land are (sic) deemed barred under the principle of res judicata.
was issued on 26 August 1976, the private respondent promptly filed his adverse
claim, thereby making of record his interest in the land. Thus, neither 3. Whether (sic) or not property covered by Torence (sic) Title
prescription nor laches applies against him. 11 can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 14
Public respondent also overturned the trail court's finding that the petitioner was After the private respondent filed his Comment, We gave due course to the
in possession of the property until she was dispossessed in 1976 by the private petition and directed both parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which
respondent principally because it was in the third quarter of 1977 that she they complied with.
(petitioner) declared the questioned property in her name, and had paid land
The petition is impressed with merit.
taxes thereon only for the same third quarter of 1977. The other tax payments
1. In the first place, the public respondent's factual findings on the issuance of
were not in her name, but in the names of Godofredo Zaracena and Juan Zabella.
possession on the basis of which it rejected the findings of fact and
The respondent Court opined that "[N]ormally, one who claims possession in
conclusions of the trial court are conjectural and speculative. Hence, We
ownership will declare the property in his name and will pay taxes on it," 12 and
cannot be bound by such findings under the rule that findings of fact of the
concluded that the petitioner's claimed possession "is not possession in law that
Court of Appeals are conclusive on this Court. 15 The trial court gave credence to
deserves protection and recognition." 13 On the other hand, it gave credit to the
the petitioner's account that she had legally possessed the property in question
private respondent's version chiefly because he has been paying irrigation
until 1976, categorically ruling that the private respondent's "evidence does not
charges since 1960.
convincingly establish that he possessed the property publicly, exclusively and
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner took this recourse, and raises the following
peacefully in the concept of owner." 16 The reasons for this pronouncement have
issues:
already been given. Clearly, these matters are inexorably anchored on the
1. Whether or not the alleged sale of a property by virtue of an witnesses' credibility. It is a settled judicial precept that the issue of the credibility
instrument which was not filed or registered under Act 3344 and of witnesses is primarily addressed to the trial court since it is in a better position
was not submitted before the Cadastral Court during the hearing to decide such a question, having seen and heard the witnesses and having
thereof may deprived (sic) an adjudicated-declared owner the observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 17
(sic) enjoyment of possession and the improvements thereof.
Moreover, its findings on such credibility carry great weight and respect, and will
be sustained by the appellate court unless certain facts of substance and value . . . The suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that the
have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the inaction was because the appellee knew of the sale by her father
case. 18 That the petitioner neither declared the property in her name nor paid to Juan (sic) Zabella. . . . 20
the taxes thereon until 1977 is not, contrary to the public respondent's
Such a suspicion has no basis at all. The parties do not dispute the fact
conclusion, fatal to her cause. Until 27 June 1976, the property remained covered
that at the time of Anastacio Llenares' death on 27 March 1931, the
by OCT No. 43073 in the names of Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares. The
petitioner was only four (4) years old. The deed of sale was executed by
private respondent's alleged claim was not annotated thereon. There is, as well,
Anastacio Llenares on 21 December 1929, when the petitioner was only
no evidence to show that the private respondent had earlier made any
two (2) years old. Being at that time very much below the age of reason,
extrajudicial or judicial demands to enforce his claim on the property based on
the petitioner could not have been expected to be aware of the existence
the so-called deed of sale which Anastacio had executed on 21 December 1929 in
of the said deed of sale, much less understand its contents. The evidence
favor of Ariston Zabella, the private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. Since
failed to show that the private respondent informed the petitioner of
the petitioner is Anastacio Llenares's sole heir, the continued existence of OCT
such a sale at any time before the former filed the adverse claim on 17
No. 43073 fully protected her rights; and her failure to declare for taxation
February 1977.
purposes the one-half (1/2) portion of the land pertaining to Anastacio did not,
2. Secondly, the respondent Court erroneously applied the rule on prescription
therefore, prejudice her because the payments of the real estate taxes by other
against the petitioner and not against the private respondent. The evidence
such as Godofredo Zaracena and Juan Zabella, as found by the public respondent
conclusively established that at an appropriate cadastral proceedings, Lot No.
per Exhibits "C", "C-1" and "C-2" 19 for and in behalf of the registered owners
5015 was awarded by the cadastral court to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in
benefited the registered owners themselves and their successors-in-interest.
equalpro-indiviso shares; the decision became final; and on 28 July 1937, OCT No.
On the other, the private respondent neither had the property declared in his
43073 was issued in favor of Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares. It was only on 17
name for taxation purposes nor paid the real estate taxes thereon. All that he
February 1977, or after the lapse of over thirty-nine (39) years, that the private
paid, and this was only beginning in 1960, were the irrigation charges. And yet,
respondent, as a successor-in-interest of Ariston Zabella, took the first legal step
the respondent Court resolved the issue in his favor. This palpable inconsistency
i.e., the filing of the affidavit of adverse claim to protect and preserve his
on the part of the Court of Appeals defies all logic.
supposed right acquired under the deed of sale. Unfortunately, however, this
Furthermore, the respondent Court's conclusion that the petitioner made no
move did not produce any legal effect. An adverse claim under Section 110 of the
move to have the property declared in her name or pay the real estate taxes
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), the governing law at that time, referred to a
thereon before 1976 because she knew all along about the 1929 sale executed by
claim of "any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
her father to Ariston Zabella, is plain speculation and, as characterized by the
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration." 21 In the instant case,
public respondent, a mere "suspicion," thus:
the private respondent's "adverse claim" is one based on a transaction which had latter, or those claiming interest in the entire land or any part of it, whether
occurred long before the rendition of the decision in the cadastral proceedings named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file an
and the issuance of OCT No. 43073. This seems to have escaped the attention of answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be followed
the public respondent which instead concluded that it was the petitioner who did by the court. 26 All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and the
not take any legal action from 1937, when OCT No. 43073 was issued, until 26 decree awarded in favor of the party entitled to the land; when it has become
August 1976, when TCT NO. 27166 was issued following her execution on 22 June final, the decree shall serve as the basis for an original certificate of title in favor
1976 of the affidavit of "self-adjudication." This conclusion has no basis. As has of the said party. This shall have the same effect as a certificate of title granted
been earlier adverted to, the continued existence of OCT No. 43073 in Juan under the Land Registration Act. 27
Zabella's name protected the petitioner as the sole heir of Anastacio Llenares.
A party fraudulently deprived of his property in a cadastral proceeding may
There is no law which requires her, as a sole heir, to execute an affidavit of
nevertheless file, within one (1) year from the entry of the decree, a petition for
adjudication and cause both the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a
review. 28 After the lapse of the said period, if the property has not yet passed on
new one in her name and in the names of the heirs of co-owner Juan Zabella in
to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be filed by
order to transfer the ownership of the property to her, or protect her rights and
the aggrieved party.29 In the instant case, that action for conveyance could have
interests therein. The transfer in her favor took place, ipso jure, upon the death of
only been based on an implied trust in Article 1456 of the Civil Code:
Anastacio Llenares. 22
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
3. Finally, the so-called deed of sale executed by Anastacio Llenares in 1929 had
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
lost its efficacy after the judgment in the cadastral proceedings adjudicating Lot
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
No. 5015 to him and Juan Zabella became final. Ariston Zabella, the vendee in the
property comes.
said sale, did not file any answer in the cadastral proceedings or advance any
It is now settled that an action for the conveyance of property based on an
claims on the said lot. It is to be noted that the proceedings under the Cadastral
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. 30
Act (Act No. 2259, as amended) 23 are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the
whole world. The final judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition,
status of the land subject thereof; any claim over it not noted thereon by other ANNULING the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals of
parties is therefore deemed barred under the principle of res judicata. 24 In a 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853 and REINSTATING the decision of the
cadastal proceeding, the Government is actually the plaintiff and all the trial court subject of the appeal in the latter case.
claimants are defendants. 25 This is because the former, represented by the
Costs against the private respondent.
Solicitor General, institutes the proceedings by a petition against the holders,
SO ORDERED.
claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands or any part thereof while the
4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero,

Gevero v. IAC
in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on
SECOND DIVISION
February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero
G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990 which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of
Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and
identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha
CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners,
1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo,
vs.
Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
CORPORATION, respondents.
meters.
PARAS, J.:
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the
survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of
then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No.
Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-
69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al.,
Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica
etc. affirming the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By
Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by
and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre,
the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I,
particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly
an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters
approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D,
more or less.
among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then
As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows: alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in
1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the
the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or
Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square
annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha
meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was
insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a
acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September
portion of lot 2476.
15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of
plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made
by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same and Francisca Aquino;
prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476.
Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and
Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first
Emilia Merida Rumohf ;
investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spouses
same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh.
"B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A
Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between
found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel
claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is
occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No
possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly pronouncement as to costs,
entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)
SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp.
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive 21-22)
portion of which reads as follows:
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20,
rendered declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.
absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28)
Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan
but was denied on April 21, 1986.
(LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND
Hence, the present petition.
EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters,
more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby This petition is devoid of merit.
adjudicated as follows:
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or
Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero; not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid;
2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is
Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres
included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private
respondents' action is barred by laches. all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant
(Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws
must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners
thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was forged without his
allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under
knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952
Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is
deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid
proven.
the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding
the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the
number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid
Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party
20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule
the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios
consent of the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where
lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the
sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area former." It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a
covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
(Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78). admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario,
5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros'
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in
declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on
favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p.
DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the
legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the
both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already
legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of
SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has Appeals:
long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the
Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court
intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal
found that Luis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon
manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict
proper investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was
indeed Luis Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6). the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577
[1972]).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8
SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the
SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore
America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when
C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]). Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica.
Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor
before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale
neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below considering that a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize
[1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434
and give effect to the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v.
[1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development
Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the
Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989).
provisions of a contract, its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners,
Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create
intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught the entire
of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and provisions thereof.
that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the
Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it
petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse
was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public
from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil
instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with
equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately
deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban
SO ORDERED.
Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that
Suarez vs. CA G.R. NO. 94918 September 2, 1992 (Case not found!)
transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January
20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a
right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look
for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A.,
161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with
registered land may generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez
vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612
[1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely
on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated
and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise
inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found
everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in
possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had
therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.
The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear
unnecessary.
4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew

Lorenzo v. Posadas
Hanley.
EN BANC
5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937
sold or otherwise disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my death,
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, and that the same be handled and managed by the executors, and
deceased, plaintiff-appellant, proceeds thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at
vs. Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my
brother's children and their descendants.
LAUREL, J.:
6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the
above mentioned Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks
estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of First
most advantageous.
Instance of Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the
Collector of Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by xxx xxx xxx
the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased, and for the
8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley,
collection of interst thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from
and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother,
September 15, 1932, the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under protest. The
Malachi Hanley.
defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best
in question and which was not included in the original assessment. From the
interests of ther estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties
decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga dismissing both the
which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two
plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both parties appealed to
executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore
this court.
took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga,
February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his
Zamboanga, leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and considerable amount of real and
stead.
personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of
the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First
Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his
Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will provides,
death consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and
among other things, as follows:
allowing a deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in court as compensation to the "trustees" and paid to them from the
the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for deliquency in decedent's estate.
payment consisting of a 1 per cent monthly interest from July 1, 1931 to the date of
V. In not rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and in denying his
payment and a surcharge of 25 per cent on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74. On
motion for new trial.
March 15, 1932, the defendant filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings
The defendant-appellant contradicts the theories of the plaintiff and assigns the
pending before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga (Special proceedings
following error besides:
No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff herein, be ordered to pay to the
Government the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion was granted. On September The lower court erred in not ordering the plaintiff to pay to the
15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under protest, notifying the defendant at defendant the sum of P1,191.27, representing part of the interest at the
the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be rate of 1 per cent per month from April 10, 1924, to June 30, 1931, which
brought for its recovery. The defendant overruled the plaintiff's protest and the plaintiff had failed to pay on the inheritance tax assessed by the
refused to refund the said amount hausted, plaintiff went to court with the result defendant against the estate of Thomas Hanley.
herein above indicated.
The following are the principal questions to be decided by this court in this
In his appeal, plaintiff contends that the lower court erred: appeal: (a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate
I. In holding that the real property of Thomas Hanley, deceased, passed
at the time of the testator's death, or on its value ten years later? (c) In
to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment of the death of
determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
the former, and that from the time, the latter became the owner thereof.
compensation due to trustees? (d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the
II. In holding, in effect, that there was deliquency in the payment of
provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given retroactive effect?
inheritance tax due on the estate of said deceased.
(e) Has there been deliquency in the payment of the inheritance tax? If so, should
III. In holding that the inheritance tax in question be based upon the the additional interest claimed by the defendant in his appeal be paid by the
value of the estate upon the death of the testator, and not, as it should estate? Other points of incidental importance, raised by the parties in their
have been held, upon the value thereof at the expiration of the period of briefs, will be touched upon in the course of this opinion.
ten years after which, according to the testator's will, the property could
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the
be and was to be delivered to the instituted heir.
same. Section 1536 as amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes the tax
IV. In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net upon "every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, giftmortis
amount of the estate subject to said tax, the amounts allowed by the causa, or advance in anticipation of inheritance,devise, or bequest." The tax
therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any
decedent, made effective by his death. (61 C. J., p. 1592.) It is in reality an excise or event at the moment of the decedent's death. The time when the heirs legally
privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take property by or succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually
under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or receive such inheritance. "Poco importa", says Manresa commenting on article
after death. Acording to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession 657 of the Civil Code, "que desde el falleimiento del causante, hasta que el heredero
of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." "In other words", said o legatario entre en posesion de los bienes de la herencia o del legado, transcurra
Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the mucho o poco tiempo, pues la adquisicion ha de retrotraerse al momento de la
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death muerte, y asi lo ordena el articulo 989, que debe considerarse como complemento
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to del presente." (5 Manresa, 305; see also, art. 440, par. 1, Civil Code.) Thomas
them a deed for the same before his death." (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232. See Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
also, Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195; Suilong & Co., vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13;
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not
Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil., 391; Innocencio vs. Gat-Pandan, 14 Phil., 491; Aliasas
follow that the obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the
vs.Alcantara, 16 Phil., 489; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs.
payment on inheritance tax is clearly fixed by section 1544 of the Revised
Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bowa vs. Briones, 38 Phil., 27; Osario vs. Osario & Yuchausti
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of
Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Dais vs. Court of First
the same Code. The two sections follow:
Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396; Baun vs. Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil., 654.) Plaintiff,
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. The
however, asserts that while article 657 of the Civil Code is applicable to testate as
following shall not be taxed:
well as intestate succession, it operates only in so far as forced heirs are
concerned. But the language of article 657 of the Civil Code is broad and makes (a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.
no distinction between different classes of heirs. That article does not speak of
(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by
forced heirs; it does not even use the word "heir". It speaks of the rights of
the fiduciary heir or legatee to the trustees.
succession and the transmission thereof from the moment of death. The
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in
provision of section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the
favor of another beneficiary, in accordance with the desire of the
authentication and probate of a will as a necessary condition to effect
predecessor.
transmission of property does not affect the general rule laid down in article 657
of the Civil Code. The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once In the last two cases, if the scale of taxation appropriate to the new
probated and allowed the transmission is effective as of the death of the testator beneficiary is greater than that paid by the first, the former must pay the
in accordance with article 657 of the Civil Code. Whatever may be the time when difference.
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. The tax fixed in this article shall be Matthew Hanley, until after the expiration of ten years from the death of the
paid: testator on May 27, 1922 and, that the inheritance tax should be based on the
value of the estate in 1932, or ten years after the testator's death. The plaintiff
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section,
introduced evidence tending to show that in 1932 the real properties in question
before entrance into possession of the property.
had a reasonable value of only P5,787. This amount added to the value of the
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death
personal property left by the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would
of the predecessor; but if judicial testamentary or intestate
generate an inheritance tax which, excluding deductions, interest and surcharge,
proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said
would amount only to about P169.52.
period, the payment shall be made by the executor or
If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose
administrator before delivering to each beneficiary his share.
inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent,
If the tax is not paid within the time hereinbefore prescribed, interest at
succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax
the rate of twelve per centum per annum shall be added as part of the tax;
should be measured by the vlaue of the estate as it stood at the time of the
and to the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
of notice and demand thereof by the collector, there shall be further
subsequent increase or decrease in value. (61 C. J., pp. 1692, 1693; 26 R. C. L., p.
added a surcharge of twenty-five per centum.
232; Blakemore and Bancroft, Inheritance Taxes, p. 137. See also Knowlton vs.
A certified of all letters testamentary or of admisitration shall be Moore, 178 U.S., 41; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 747; 44 Law. ed., 969.) "The right of the state
furnished the Collector of Internal Revenue by the Clerk of Court within to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment of death, and hence is ordinarily
thirty days after their issuance. measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as
passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depriciation is immaterial." (Ross,
It should be observed in passing that the word "trustee", appearing in subsection
Inheritance Taxation, p. 72.)
(b) of section 1543, should read "fideicommissary" or "cestui que trust". There was
an obvious mistake in translation from the Spanish to the English version. Our attention is directed to the statement of the rule in Cyclopedia of Law of and
Procedure (vol. 37, pp. 1574, 1575) that, in the case of contingent remainders,
The instant case does fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of
taxation is postponed until the estate vests in possession or the contingency is
section 1544 above-quoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee
settled. This rule was formerly followed in New York and has been adopted in
or donee. Under the subsection, the tax should have been paid before the delivery
Illinois, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. This rule,
of the properties in question to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10, 1924.
horever, is by no means entirely satisfactory either to the estate or to those
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas Hanley, in so far as the real
interested in the property (26 R. C. L., p. 231.). Realizing, perhaps, the defects of
properties are concerned, did not and could not legally pass to the instituted heir,
its anterior system, we find upon examination of cases and authorities that New (Barney vs. Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not
York has varied and now requires the immediate appraisal of the postponed follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the
estate at its clear market value and the payment forthwith of the tax on its out of net value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which
the corpus of the estate transferred. (In re Vanderbilt, 172 N. Y., 69; 69 N. E., requires trustees' commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the
782; In re Huber, 86 N. Y. App. Div., 458; 83 N. Y. Supp., 769; Estate of Tracy, 179 estate subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705). Furthermore, though a
N. Y., 501; 72 N. Y., 519; Estate of Brez, 172 N. Y., 609; 64 N. E., 958; Estate of Post, testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator intended
85 App. Div., 611; 82 N. Y. Supp., 1079. Vide also, Saltoun vs. Lord Advocate, 1 that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In
Peter. Sc. App., 970; 3 Macq. H. L., 659; 23 Eng. Rul. Cas., 888.) California adheres re Vanneck's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate,
to this new rule (Stats. 1905, sec. 5, p. 343). 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.) On the contrary, in paragraph 5 of his will, the testator
expressed the desire that his real estate be handled and managed by his executors
But whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we hold that a transmission
until the expiration of the period of ten years therein provided. Judicial expenses
by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding
are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in State vs. Hennepin County
the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the
Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said: ". . . The compensation
beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that
of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but in the
time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come
(c) Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in
properly within the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. . . .
arriving at the net value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be
Service rendered in that behalf have no reference to closing the estate for the
computed (sec. 1539, Revised Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the
purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and are not required or
defendant and the trial court allowed a deduction of only P480.81. This sum
essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . . of
represents the expenses and disbursements of the executors until March 10, 1924,
the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those
among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The plaintiff
to whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended
contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate
for the preservation of the estate. No sound reason is given to support the
P1,187.28 (Exhibits C, AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL, NN, OO), should also be deducted
contention that such expenses should be taken into consideration in fixing the
under section 1539 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides, in part, as
value of the estate for the purpose of this tax."
follows: "In order to determine the net sum which must bear the tax, when an
(d) The defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax due from the estate of
inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in case of a resident, . . . the
Thomas Hanley under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised
judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, . . . ."
Administrative Code, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services
went into effect on January 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law in force when the
testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at the time was section 1544 above- only, instead of on both the tax and the interest, as provided for in Act No. 3031,
mentioned, as amended by Act No. 3031, which took effect on March 9, 1922. and (2) the taxpayer is allowed twenty days from notice and demand by rthe
Collector of Internal Revenue within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at
only as required by the old law.
the time of the death of the decedent (26 R. C. L., p. 206; 4 Cooley on Taxation,
4th ed., p. 3461). The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be required to Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
guess the outcome of pending measures. Of course, a tax statute may be made committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the
retroactive in its operation. Liability for taxes under retroactive legislation has power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to
been "one of the incidents of social life." (Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. S., 360; 49 include within the term "penal statutes" all status which command or prohibit
Law. ed., 232 Sup. Ct. Rep., 44.) But legislative intent that a tax statute should certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation, and even those which,
operate retroactively should be perfectly clear. (Scwab vs. Doyle, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep., without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their
491; Smietanka vs. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S., 602; Stockdale vs. commission (59 C. J., p. 1110). Revenue laws, generally, which impose taxes
Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323; Lunch vs. Turrish, 247 U. S., 221.) "A statute should collected by the means ordinarily resorted to for the collection of taxes are not
be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enacts, amends, or classed as penal laws, although there are authorities to the contrary.
repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute clearly demands or (See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 361; Twine Co. vs. Worthington, 141 U.
expresses that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . ." (61 C. J., P. 1602.) Though the S., 468; 12 Sup. Ct., 55; Rice vs. U. S., 4 C. C. A., 104; 53 Fed., 910; Com. vs.
last paragraph of section 5 of Regulations No. 65 of the Department of Finance Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St., 150; State vs. Wheeler, 44 P., 430; 25 Nev. 143.) Article
makes section 3 of Act No. 3606, amending section 1544 of the Revised 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to the case at bar, and in the
Administrative Code, applicable to all estates the inheritance taxes due from absence of clear legislative intent, we cannot give Act No. 3606 a retroactive
which have not been paid, Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions indicating effect.
legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect can begiven the
(e) The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax may arise at a certain
statute by this court.
time and the tax may be paid within another given time. As stated by this court,
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue maintains, however, that certain "the mere failure to pay one's tax does not render one delinqent until and unless
provisions of Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than those of Act the entire period has eplased within which the taxpayer is authorized by law to
No. 3031, that said provisions are penal in nature and, therefore, should operate make such payment without being subjected to the payment of penalties for
retroactively in conformity with the provisions of article 22 of the Revised Penal fasilure to pay his taxes within the prescribed period." (U. S. vs. Labadan, 26 Phil.,
Code. This is the reason why he applied Act No. 3606 instead of Act No. 3031. 239.)
Indeed, under Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent is based on the tax
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the
inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent's property to the trustee. inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid on or
Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was delivery before March 10, 1924, to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason
to the cestui que trust, the beneficiery in this case, within the meaning of the first already stated that the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of
paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. the same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is
This contention is well taken and is sustained. The appointment of P. J. M. Moore but an instrument or agent for thecestui que trust (Shelton vs. King, 299 U. S., 90;
as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 689; 57 Law. ed., 1086). When Moore accepted the trust and took
testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word "trust" is not mentioned possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to
or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or him but to hiscestui que trust (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil.,126, cited in 65 C. J., p.
technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C. J., p. 711). The 692, n. 63). He did not acquire any beneficial interest in the estate. He took such
words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, legal estate only as the proper execution of the trust required (65 C. J., p. 528)
the use of these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created and, his estate ceased upon the fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The estate
(69 C. J., p. 714). "To create a trust by will the testator must indicate in the will his then vested absolutely in the beneficiary (65 C. J., p. 542).
intention so to do by using language sufficient to separate the legal from the
The highest considerations of public policy also justify the conclusion we have
equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty designate the beneficiaries, their
reached. Were we to hold that the payment of the tax could be postponed or
interest in the ttrust, the purpose or object of the trust, and the property or
delayed by the creation of a trust of the type at hand, the result would be plainly
subject matter thereof. Stated otherwise, to constitute a valid testamentary trust
disastrous. Testators may provide, as Thomas Hanley has provided, that their
there must be a concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient words to raise a
estates be not delivered to their beneficiaries until after the lapse of a certain
trust; (2) a definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some
period of time. In the case at bar, the period is ten years. In other cases, the trust
jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing." (69 C. J., pp. 705,706.) There is
may last for fifty years, or for a longer period which does not offend the rule
no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that
against petuities. The collection of the tax would then be left to the will of a
certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a
private individual. The mere suggestion of this result is a sufficient warning
stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in
against the accpetance of the essential to the very exeistence of government.
appointment a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will (see sec. 582,
(Dobbins vs. Erie Country, 16 Pet., 435; 10 Law. ed., 1022; Kirkland vs. Hotchkiss,
Code of Civil Procedure).
100 U. S., 491; 25 Law. ed., 558; Lane County vs. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71; 19 Law. ed.,
P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. On that date trust estate vested 101; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. vs. Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
in him (sec. 582 in relation to sec. 590, Code of Civil Procedure). The mere fact 36; 50 Law. ed., 150; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; 9 Law.
that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the ed., 773.) The obligation to pay taxes rests not upon the privileges enjoyed by, or
operation of our inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the the protection afforded to, a citizen by the government but upon the necessity of
money for the support of the state (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, supra). For this ". . . that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with
reason, no one is allowed to object to or resist the payment of taxes solely because as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the
no personal benefit to him can be pointed out. (Thomas vs. Gay, 169 U. S., 264; 18 duty is developed of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of
Sup. Ct. Rep., 340; 43 Law. ed., 740.) While courts will not enlarge, by government, and thereby, cause serious detriment to the public." (Dows vs.
construction, the government's power of taxation (Bromley vs. McCaughn, 280 U. Chicago, 11 Wall., 108; 20 Law. ed., 65, 66; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil.,
S., 124; 74 Law. ed., 226; 50 Sup. Ct. Rep., 46) they also will not place upon tax 580.)
laws so loose a construction as to permit evasions on merely fanciful and
It results that the estate which plaintiff represents has been delinquent in the
insubstantial distictions. (U. S. vs. Watts, 1 Bond., 580; Fed. Cas. No. 16,653; U. S.
payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and
vs. Wigglesirth, 2 Story, 369; Fed. Cas. No. 16,690, followed in Froelich & Kuttner
surcharge provided by law in such cases.
vs. Collector of Customs, 18 Phil., 461, 481; Castle Bros., Wolf & Sons vs. McCoy, 21
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore
Phil., 300; Muoz & Co. vs. Hord, 12 Phil., 624; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
became trustee. The interest due should be computed from that date and it is
Corporation vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil., 145; Luzon Stevedoring Co. vs. Trinidad, 43
error on the part of the defendant to compute it one month later. The provisions
Phil., 803.) When proper, a tax statute should be construed to avoid the
cases is mandatory (see and cf. Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas, supra), and neither the
possibilities of tax evasion. Construed this way, the statute, without resulting in
Collector of Internal Revenuen or this court may remit or decrease such interest,
injustice to the taxpayer, becomes fair to the government.
no matter how heavily it may burden the taxpayer.
That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy deeply intrenched in our tax
To the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date of notice
system. Thus, no court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of
and demand thereof by the Collector of Internal Revenue, a surcharge of twenty-
any internal revenue tax ( sec. 1578, Revised Administrative Code; Sarasola vs.
five per centum should be added (sec. 1544, subsec. (b), par. 2, Revised
Trinidad, 40 Phil., 252). In the case of Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas (47 Phil., 461), this
Administrative Code). Demand was made by the Deputy Collector of Internal
court had occassion to demonstrate trenchment adherence to this policy of the
Revenue upon Moore in a communiction dated October 16, 1931 (Exhibit 29). The
law. It held that "the fact that on account of riots directed against the Chinese on
date fixed for the payment of the tax and interest was November 30, 1931.
October 18, 19, and 20, 1924, they were prevented from praying their internal
November 30 being an official holiday, the tenth day fell on December 1, 1931. As
revenue taxes on time and by mutual agreement closed their homes and stores
the tax and interest due were not paid on that date, the estate became liable for
and remained therein, does not authorize the Collector of Internal Revenue to
the payment of the surcharge.
extend the time prescribed for the payment of the taxes or to accept them
without the additional penalty of twenty five per cent." (Syllabus, No. 3.) In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for us to discuss the fifth error
assigned by the plaintiff in his brief.
". . . It is of the utmost importance," said the Supreme Court of the United States,
We shall now compute the tax, together with the interest and surcharge due from defendant more than what he claims, we must hold that the plaintiff is liable only
the estate of Thomas Hanley inaccordance with the conclusions we have reached. in the sum of P1,191.27 the amount stated in the counterclaim.
At the time of his death, the deceased left real properties valued at P27,920 and The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the
personal properties worth P1,465, or a total of P29,385. Deducting from this plaintiff in both instances. So ordered.
amount the sum of P480.81, representing allowable deductions under secftion
1539 of the Revised Administrative Code, we have P28,904.19 as the net value of
the estate subject to inheritance tax.
The primary tax, according to section 1536, subsection (c), of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be imposed at the rate of one per centum upon the
first ten thousand pesos and two per centum upon the amount by which the
share exceed thirty thousand pesos, plus an additional two hundred per centum.
One per centum of ten thousand pesos is P100. Two per centum of P18,904.19 is
P378.08. Adding to these two sums an additional two hundred per centum, or
P965.16, we have as primary tax, correctly computed by the defendant, the sum of
P1,434.24.
To the primary tax thus computed should be added the sums collectible under
section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. First should be added P1,465.31
which stands for interest at the rate of twelve per centum per annum from March
10, 1924, the date of delinquency, to September 15, 1932, the date of payment
under protest, a period covering 8 years, 6 months and 5 days. To the tax and
interest thus computed should be added the sum of P724.88, representing a
surhcarge of 25 per cent on both the tax and interest, and also P10, the
compromise sum fixed by the defendant (Exh. 29), giving a grand total of
P3,634.43.
As the plaintiff has already paid the sum of P2,052.74, only the sums of P1,581.69
is legally due from the estate. This last sum is P390.42 more than the amount
demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim. But, as we cannot give the
Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
Article 779 the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the
instant case".
Rodriguez vs. Borja (17 SCRA 41)
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963
EN BANC in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for
vs. leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was
Branch III, withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents. before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things,
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
this Court for a writ of certiorariand prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia
Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the
No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was
jurisdiction. stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque,
Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy,
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court,
Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he
dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal,
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court
jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of
of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while
another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp.
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far
support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of
Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance
prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a
proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners, time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and
and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955. place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration probate has been filed by the testator himself.
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment.
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate
is incontestable.1wph1.t of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last
resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will
probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing
province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction
he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance
Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' 1
residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many Courts of
estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190,
the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In
section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73
brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element
Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is
he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing
upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the
of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case
estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue"
before us.
(Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the that:
same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a (3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
(Sec. 1) repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first provided in this Code.
invoked, without taking venue into account.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported
done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Rodriguez.
Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has
not disposed;
written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975)
owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the
Article 779, 780, 788, 792 absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par.
III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
SECOND DIVISION among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should
be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian.
was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and
vs.
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of
Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B.
in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *
LANABAN, respondents.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
AQUINO, J.:
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors
Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had
his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an received from the testatrix.
intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of
creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the
Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic)
Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights
and Emilia B. Pabaonon. in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed
the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for
conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared
and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that the
will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an
issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on
order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special
that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo that the will was
administrator of the decedent's estate.
void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered
18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing
owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June
partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and
children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of
opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973. April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaa, Sr., Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's
was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaa had no authority to
to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was
authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaa a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaa and signed
claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B.
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaa's services and informed him that
his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will was without their
Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He
will was "very sacred" to them.
prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be
converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for
asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued. reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974.
It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their
assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaa's arguments.
comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
declaring it void.
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs.
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
Civil Code which reads:
meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that
heirs.
the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may
of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering
conjugal estate. that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is
not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will
does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her
presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half
first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as
of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes
upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a
period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing
during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the
from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code). disposition shall take effect."
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended
share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her
said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal
share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the
limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
Or at least his legitime should be respected.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
surviving spouse. institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his
the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy
wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal
resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1wph1.t
share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect
of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition
course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's
will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making
of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the
the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme
Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty
to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make
Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428). (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice
testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed.
his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to
incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed.
independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after
Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565). granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and
them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the
principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June
appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation
administrator.
that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a
construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims
Code). against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86
and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of
whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary
and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his
of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L- clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch
23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762). clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his
administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed
accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official
and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs.
duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's
Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set
aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is
affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special
Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Article 780
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) See
Earlier Case under Article 779
Article 783
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) See Earlier Case Article 776
hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y

Herreros vs. Gil (88 Phil 260).
expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de
EN BANC persona extraa, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad

en castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:
G.R. No. L-3362 March 1, 1951
1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel
TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE Herreros no tuvimos hijos;
GIL, administratrix-appellee,
vs. 2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant. Pampanga;
Eligio C. Lagman for appellant. 3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herretos todos mis bienes ya
Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee. que muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la
condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes
JUGO, J.: heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a
Don Carlos Worrel.
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and
testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano 4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al
appealed to this Court, raising only question of law. Her counsel assigns the two Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de
following alleged errors: fianza;
Primer Error. El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen
alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley. izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas, utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron
Segundo Error. Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento.
cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi
The alleged will read as follows: presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac,
Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve.
Primera Pagina (1)
EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN CARLOS GIL
Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 aos de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., Testificacion:
so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to

Segunda Pagina (2)
the validity of the attestation clause.
Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the
el testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce alleged testor signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses.
la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the
parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may
nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the
firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in
testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros. matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement.
(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency
by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply
(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA
fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following that
(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAA procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implication, and
even by internalcircumtantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the
Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the clear, uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should
court below said: be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear
words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged
. . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record
deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No.
appeal in case G.R. No. L-254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil;
190, before it was amended, contained the following provision:
Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y
Gil, oppositor and appellee." Both parties are agreed that this is a true . . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will
and correct copy of the will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal). invalid if it proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this
section provided.
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below
cannot be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916,
Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties besides increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the
agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have above-quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act
was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. The right to
Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by dispose of the property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is
inferences, implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended.
cases the law requires certain requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously
evidence. goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative
intention.
It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last
paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first 2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. The Philippine authorities relating to the
glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Sao vs.
clause, which is the function of the witness. But the important point is that he Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924],
attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be accurate, his signature certifies 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of
itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not Quintana, supra, adopted and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs.
increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.
own bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil
way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding zero to an
Procedure, as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause shall
insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
wills. This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which must be so clear in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
that it should not require any construction. the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other" applied and enforced.
The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some
of which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An attestation clause which does not recite that
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645. the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left
margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect
In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following
annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)
to say:
In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V.
1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634
Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the
following pronouncement: strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of the
Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the
. . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se hace
execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the
constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres
defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
testigos instrumentales y que estos firmaron el testamento los unos en
Sioca, supra.)
presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos
firmaron el testamento enpresencia de los testadores, ni que estos y It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the
aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los doctrine of the Gumban vs. Gorchocase, supra, but not to the extent of validating
primeros en presencia de los segundos y vice-versa. an attestation clause similar to that involved herein.
En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation
alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses.
declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado. For this reason, the court said:
The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration
doctrine: about the points contained in the above described paragraph; however,
as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS
declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above
OF. The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the
quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said
requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that: . . . (p.
clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those
381,supra.)
requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the
disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. The attestation clause involved herein is very different.
Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to
In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:
establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said
evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended. An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading:
(Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.). "We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated
opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the testatrix, whose
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS
name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will
AMENDED. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a
consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed
the same in our presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact , however, appears
the same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in case of the will complied with all the
the presence of each other," held not to be fatally defective and to requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted.
conform to the law.
1
In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No.
This very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar. 23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:
In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionadios otorgo el
1939), the will was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamentao compuesto de
stated that "each of the pages of which the said will is composed" was signed by cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clasula de atestiguamiento. Que
the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el
that the signature was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, testamento arriba mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento
however, that said deficiency was cured by the phrase "as well as by each of us in compuesto de cuatro paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente
the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix estabamos presentes cuando el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y
signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia
is equivalent to "also." The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in suya y de cada uno de nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo
the present case, does not necessitate any correction. In the body of the will the de esta escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en
testatrix stated that she signed in the presence of each and all of the three prsencia del testador y de cada uno de nosotros.
witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it was unnecessary.
The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that
In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, it says "testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador."
October 18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows: The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the verb "firmamos."
2
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the
voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was
ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de held that this deficiency was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted
los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testsador, Valerio Leynez. El of three pages and in fact it had three pages.
testamento consta de dos (2) paginas solamente.
In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947),
The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish)
reads as follows: intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the language of the statute,
can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows
Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemos firmado es el
a compliance with the statute. Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815,
testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de
30 L. R. A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700,
Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y de leer y de leerle el
701.)
mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firmo
y marco con su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any
de cada uno de nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the
testigos, firmamos enpresencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno chief purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are observed. It
de nosotros. is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had
made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of
It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of
his intention, but of what he actually did, or . . . failed to do. . . . It may
the testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the
happen . . . that . . . wills . . . truly expressing the intertions of the testator
omission is cured by the fact that their signatures appear on every page. This
are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that
attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case.
happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . . has
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially taught of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of
with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential frustrating (that intention, . . . in preference to the risk of giving effect to
elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . .
statutory requirements should be satisfied. . The evil probably to arise by giving to wills made without any form, . . ."
or, in derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious
The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely
wills on his effect on his estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103
of statutory creation, and is available only upon the compliance with the
Atl. 533.
requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has
prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally
cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers
exercise of the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be
by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether presented apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419,
a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in 420.)
executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the
probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased
Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
Montinola vs. Herbosa (Court of Appeals case) Case cannot be located!

The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the tetratrix and the
Merza vs. Porras (93 Phil 142)
witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the
EN BANC instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The Appellate Court dismissed the
first objection, finding that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in question
G.R. No. L-4888 May 25, 1953 that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page of Exhibit
A were cured by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to
JOSE MERZA, petitioner,
be signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47
vs.
Phil., 152, (1924); Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932); Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off.
PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.
Gaz., 3rd Suppl. (October 18, 1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz., 4938,
TUAZON , J.: 4940)." But granting the correctness of the premise, the court held the second
objection well taken and thus concluded: "The question whether the testatrix
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the
had signed in the presence of said witnesses can not be verified upon physical
Court of First Instance of Zambales denying the probate of the last will and
examination of the instrument. Hence, the absence of the require statement in
testament and
said clause may not, pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset
so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased.
by proof aliunde even if admitted without any objection."
The testatrix was survived by the husband and collateral relatives, some of
whom, along with the husband, were disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons The premise of the conclusion is, in our opinion, incorrect.
set forth therein.
It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn, its
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation language exceedingly ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to
clause. Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, understand; but from a close examination of the whole context in relation to its
as translated into English in the record on appeal, reads: purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of
the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign
The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-
and attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors of
mentioned, was executed, signed and published by testatrix Pilar
the proceeding were the maker and the witnesses acting and speaking
Montealegre and she declared that the said instrument is her last will
collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our presence," used as it was
and testament; that in our presence and also in the very presence of the
in connection with the process of signing, can not imply anything but the
said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two witnesses and the
testatrix signed before them. No other inference is possible. The prepositional
testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this a testament.
phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. The verb not be made in any instrument other than the will of Exhibit A, as expressly
could not be other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix. provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being no disposition as
to the disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving
The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the
spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is quite clear that he can not be disinherited in
witnesses sign in the presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the
any other instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as above stated, a simple
testatrix sign in similar or like manner in their presence.
affidavit."
In consonance with the principle of the liberal interpretation, adhered to in

Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of
numerous later decision of this Court and affirmed and translated into
the Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a persons dispose of all his property
inactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827), we are constrained to hold the
or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a
attestation clause under consideration sufficient and valid.
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
"Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit
However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be B comes within this definition.
made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be

Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities
deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it."
of law, Exhibit B is entitled to probate as an independent testementary
(Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
desposition. In the absence of any legal provision to the contrary and there is
"It could have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential none in this jurisdiction it is the general, well-established rule that two
safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right of the separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other (68
testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred." C.J., 885) and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution
(Leynesvs. Leynes, supra.) of wills have been complied with (Id. 881). As seen, Exhibit B embodied all the
requisites of a will, even free of such formal of literary imperfections as are
With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that
found in Exhibit A.
the document having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be
considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful
addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the heirs from testate or intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain
content of Exhibit B are couched in the language of ordinarily used in a simple does not, as the appealed decision seems to insinuate, require that the
affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disinheritance should be accomplished in the same instrument by which the
disposition." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals observed, disinheritance "may maker provides the disposition of his or her property after his or death. This
article merely provides that "disinheritance can be affected only by a will (any
will) in which the legal cause upon which it is based is expressly stated."
It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to

probate, subject of courts to the right of the disinherited person under particle
850 to contest the disinheritance, and it is so ordered, with costs against the
appellee.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that
Vitug vs. CA, 183 SCRA 755)
the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
SECOND DIVISION partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990 sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
4
estate."
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs. Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO- same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank
CORONA, respondents. on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
SARMIENTO, J.: We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF
1 AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us
York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such
the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, survivor or survivors.
plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of
2 We further agree with each other and the BANK that the
Appeals, the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of
receipt or check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or
estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment
3 the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any
thereto." According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and
payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account
P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati,
shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK
Metro Manila.
5
for such payment or withdrawal.
6
The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion The petition is meritorious.
to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should
used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66
7
be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable
... ."
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights
14
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." In other
15
the herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal
16
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected
8
Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate
9
prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states: xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November ... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption
26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds-
granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on
the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as
other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens
include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No. that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of
35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the served her master for about nineteen years without actually
10
decedent's death. With costs against private respondent. receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently
Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on
and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship
the strength of our decisions inRivera v. People's Bank and Trust
11 12
agreement in question although there was no relation of
Co. and Macam v. Gatmaitan in which we sustained the validity of
13
kinship between them but only that of master and servant,
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts.
nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon
to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before
certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the
question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired
they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana
19
them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account had died first.
during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the
17
xxx xxx xxx
death of either, belonged to the survivor.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence
xxx xxx xxx
it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence
18 20
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held: of the marita. relations.
xxx xxx xxx Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious
reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory
not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a
contract whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code,
spouse's own properties to the other.
one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give
or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
21
is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by "mere
22 23
uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the law on conjugal
stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case
Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they
the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They
this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
respective property to one another conditioned upon who sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can
might die first, the time of death determining the event upon not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her
which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" has been imputed and established against the agreement
26
feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the involved in this case.
24
term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased
happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur
her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the
at an indeterminate time.
amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by
on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of
occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29,
insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life
1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under
25
the second. In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the No costs.
risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
SO ORDERED.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary

to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For
instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a
mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property
in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it
may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice
obligation on the part of the said accused to settle and clear the accrued real
Seangio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 149753 (Wrong citation! G.R. No. 149753 refers to
estate taxes of 231,707 square meters of land covered by PSU-20888 located at
Cosme v. Philippines Case. Seangio v. Reyes case is G.R. No. 140371-72)
Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, but said accused once in possession of the
FIRST DIVISION said amount, far from complying with his aforesaid obligation, failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to settle and clear the accrued real estate taxes
G.R. No. 149753 November 27, 2006
of the aforesaid lot despite repeated demands made upon him to that effect, and
MIGUEL COSME, JR., Petitioner, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, he thereafter
vs. misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his own personal use
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Paul P.A. Bunda in the
aforesaid amount of P1,800,000.00, Philippine currency.
DECISION
2
Contrary to law.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On June 3, 1997, upon being arraigned, petitioner with the assistance of a
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules 3
counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued, after which, the
1
of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
RTC rendered its Decision with the following findings and disposition:
June 22, 2001 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23015 which affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, finding herein Records disclose that on April 9, 1993, Judith Rodriguez and the private
Miguel Cosme, Jr. (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of complainant, Paul Bunda, entered into a Memorandum Agreement concerning
Estafa; and the CA Resolution dated September 10, 2001, denying petitioners lots nos. 1 and 2, PSU-208888, with an aggregate area of 231,907 sq.m., situated
motion for reconsideration. at Barrio Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, Exhibit "G". Under the agreement,
Judith agreed to assign and convey 40% of the aforementioned lots in favor of
An Information dated January 16, 1996, was filed against petitioner, alleging as
the complainant as consideration for the payment by the latter of the accrued
follows:
real estate taxes on the property.
That in [sic] or about and during the period comprised between September 12,
Sometime in August, 1994, the complainant visited the property and, for the
1994 and October 13, 1994, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
first time, met the accused who represented himself as the overseer of the
accused did then and there wilfully [sic] unlawfully and feloniously defraud Paul
property where he also resided.
P.A. Bunda in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received in trust
from the said Paul P.A. Bunda the sum of P1,800,000.00, under the express
Sometime in September 1994, the complainant and the accused met at the WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Miguel Cosme, Jr., guilty beyond
Aurelio Hotel on Roxas Blvd., Manila. It was in this meeting that accused reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and, as a consequence, sentences him to
succeeded in convincing the complainant to entrust to him Two Million suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
(P2,000,000.00) Pesos for the payment of the accrued real estate taxes on the minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay
property, telling the complainant that he was a nephew of the then incumbent the costs.
mayor of Las Pias and had good connections with the Mayors Office as well as
Further, accused is ordered to pay the complainant actual damages in the total
with the Offices of the Treasurer and of the Assessor of Las Pias.
amount of P1,800,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
On September 12, 1994, the complainant again met the accused at the same filing of this action until fully paid.
hotel and gave to the latter an initial amount of One Hundred Thousand 4
SO ORDERED.
(P100,000.00) Pesos for the payment of the accrued real estate taxes on the
property. Another One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in cash was Petitioner appealed the case to the CA.
given to the accused by the complainant on September 14, 1994. Both payments
On June 22, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision with the following dispositive
were unreceipted because the accused told the complainant that it was no
portion:
longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed Decision dated October 20,

Again, on two separate occasions thereafter, complainant handed to the accused
1998 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the amount of actual
two checks both payable to cash, dated September 28 and October 13, 1994, in
damages be reduced to P1,600,000.00 with legal rate of interest from the date of
the respective sums of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos and Six Hundred
5
filing of the action until fully paid.
Thousand (P600,000.00) Pesos, Exhibits "B" and "C", which checks were later
encashed by the accused, Exhibits "B-3", "B-4", "C-3" and "C-4". Accused, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the
however, did not use the money for the payment of the accrued real estate taxes CA in its Resolution of September 10, 2001.
on the property in question, but instead misappropriated it for his own use and
benefit. Hence, herein petition with the following assignment of errors:
I
The court has judiciously examined the evidence on record and finds that the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKE THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
committed estafa under Article 315 (b) of the Revised Penal Code x x x.
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE SOLE, UNCORROBORATED, VARIABLE
xxxx AND INCOHERENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II specifically payable to the Municipal Treasurers Office; (6) if it were true that
petitioner told private complainant to prepareP2,000,000.00 as payment for the
real estate taxes, how come the latter only paid P1,800,000.00; (7) if private
FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED DEMAND LETTER WAS RECEIVED
complainant has indeed entered into an agreement with the owner of the
BY THE PETITIONER.
property that the former shall be given 40% of the subject property in exchange
III for his payment of the accrued real estate taxes, he should have been aware of
the actual real estate taxes due and that the amount of P1,800,000.00 would not
suffice to cover the said taxes.
FAILING TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE
6
PETITIONER. Anent the second assigned error, petitioner contends that no less than the
evidence presented by the prosecution shows that he (petitioner) never received
In his first assigned error, petitioner argues that the private complainants
the demand letter sent by private complainant. Citing authorities on the rule on
testimony is full of improbabilities, falsehoods and half-truths, to wit: (1) that it
service of notice, petitioner argues that the prosecution cannot presume on the
is highly improbable that the private complainant entrusted to him the amount
basis of the registry return receipt that the demand letter was sent through
of P200,000.00 cash which was allegedly given on two separate occasions; (2) it
registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioner or his
is irrational and improbable for private complainant, who is an experienced real
agent, especially in the present case where petitioner denies having received the
estate dealer, to delegate and commission the petitioner, a mere overseer and
said demand letter.
security guard whom he hardly knows, to undertake the payment of real estate
taxes with the Treasurers Office considering that with his knowledge and As to the third assigned error, petitioner asserts that it is error on the part of the
experience he can do it himself; (3) it boggles the mind why private complainant trial and appellate courts to rely hook, line and sinker on the inconsistent and
could not care less even if petitioner allegedly had not told him the exact uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant and at the same time
amount to be paid for the accrued real estate taxes and that notwithstanding the brush aside as "difficult to believe" the defense of petitioner. Petitioner
alleged lack of computation, he freely gave in to petitioners demand and paid maintains that he has sufficiently shown that it is not far fetched for the
him P1,800,000.00 without demanding any receipt or written agreement as complainant to commission petitioner to act as overseer of the subject property
evidence to prove why he paid such amount; (4) it is difficult to believe that as and facilitate its titling after the former pays the accrued real estate taxes
an experienced real estate dealer private complainant does not know that real considering that complainant claims to have an interest over 40% of the subject
estate taxes cannot be paid on staggered or installment basis; (5) if indeed the property; that the amount of P1,600,000.00 is given as payment for a "package
check payments in the amount of P1,600,000.00 were intended as payment for deal" which includes the hiring of security guards to look after the property, the
accrued real estate taxes how come the checks were paid to cash and not made construction of a steel fence on portions of the same, the facilitation in the
computation of accrued real estate taxes and the eventual titling of the property. fact in a petition for review when, among others: (1) the conclusion is a finding
Petitioner also contends that it is error on the part of the trial court to grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
completely disregard the affidavit of denial executed by Judith Rodriguez made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
considering that the prosecution admitted the existence, authenticity and judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
genuineness of the said affidavit by way of stipulation. premised on the absence of evidence; and (6) the findings of fact are
9
contradicted by evidence on record. The Court finds that the present case does
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends at the outset
not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. Thus, on this ground alone, the
that the petition should be dismissed as it essentially raises issues of fact which
instant petition should be dismissed.
are not the proper subjects of a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. On the trial courts act of giving credence to the testimony of However, considering that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
10
private complainant, the OSG argues that under settled jurisprudence, the review, the Court deems it proper to delve into the merits of the present
Supreme Court will not interfere in the judgment of the trial court in passing petition.
upon the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts
The Court notes, at the outset, that the RTC found petitioner guilty of Estafa by
or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and, if
conversion or misappropriation under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
considered, would affect the outcome of the case. The OSG submits that there is
Code, to wit:
no reason to assail the credibility of the private complainant especially in the
absence of any showing that he was motivated by bad faith. The OSG also Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of
contends that the testimony of a single witness, if found credible and positive is the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
sufficient to convict.
xxxx
The Court deems it proper to discuss first the issue whether the present petition
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
should be dismissed on the ground that it raises issues of fact which are not
proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. xxxx
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on
7
amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law not of fact. The rationale of commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
this rule is founded on the fact that the Supreme Court is not a trier of duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
8
facts. However, as exceptions to this rule, the Court may pass upon questions of
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such However, a reading of the Information filed against petitioner shows that while
money, goods, or other property; it contains conclusions that petitioner committed fraud against private
complainant, there are no allegations indicating specific acts which constitute
xxxx
fraud as contemplated under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, more
On the other hand, the CA found petitioner guilty of Estafa as defined under particularly petitioners alleged act of falsely pretending that he had the needed
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: connections to settle the realty taxes due on the subject property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed Prior to its most recent amendment, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: which was in effect at the time the Information against petitioner was filed,
states:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
means of other similar deceits. constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language
without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
xxxx
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
As correctly enumerated by the CA, the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the
12
defined under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that court to pronounce judgment.
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that such 13
In People v. Almendral, the Court held thus:
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the The information filed against an accused is intended to inform him of the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. It
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property is thus textbook doctrine that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) that as unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To ensure that the
11
a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The CA ruled that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
deceit employed by petitioner consisted in his act of pretending "that he had the accusation against him is not violated, the information must state the name of
authority and capability to cover the payment of the realty taxes for he is the accused, the designation given to the offense by the statute, a statement of
influential in Las Pias and has connections with the Assessors & Treasurers the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
Offices being an alleged nephew of then incumbent Mayor Casimiro of Las Pias the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the
City." offense, and the place where the offense has been committed. It must embody
the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
14
so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an
opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
In the present case, the Information filed against petitioner did not specify the 17
case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not
alleged fraudulent acts or false pretenses that supposedly induced private
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
complainant to part with his money. Hence, petitioner may not be convicted of 18
and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. After
Estafa as defined under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code since the
examining the records of the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to
prosecution failed to allege the essential elements of this kind of offense.
depart from the lower courts assessment of the credibility of private
However, the RTC correctly found that petitioner has been properly charged complainant. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the
with estafa as defined under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. In Lee sole witness of the prosecution strongly tends to indicate that his testimony is
15 19
v. People, this Court held that the elements of Estafa by conversion or worthy of full faith and credence. Moreover, the Court agrees with the OSG
misappropriation as defined under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of
are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
20
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
In his defense, petitioner does not deny having received the amount
(2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
of P1,600,000.00 from private complainant. However, he asserts that the said
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation
16
sum was given as payment for his services in hiring men to provide additional
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
security within the premises of the subject property, in building a fence along
Clearly, the aforequoted Information filed by the prosecution against petitioner portions of the propertys perimeters, for facilitating the computation of the
was able to allege all the essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of accrued real estate taxes, and for the eventual titling of the land after the realty
the RPC. taxes shall have been paid by private complainant. He testified thus:
In finding petitioner guilty, the RTC and the CA relied on the testimony of Q You said that Mr. Bunda offered to you a proposal, did he immediately tell
private complainant. you that he would give you 1.6 million as payment for your services?
The Court agrees with both the defense and the prosecution that the present
petition dwells basically on the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the
A No sir. In fact I was the one who asked for such amount because I told him A None sir.
that I would be needing the money for more security guards as well as expenses
Q You did not also maintain or keep any list of the names of the security
for fencing and for the processing of the title of the property.
guards? You did not have any logbook?
Q Did you hire security guards?
A None sir, because I know all of them.
A Yes sir.
xxxx
Q How many security guards did you hire?
Q I would say that you dont have any proof also that you spent for the fencing
A Ten (10). as you obliged to perform for the private complainant, is that correct?
Q What security agency did you hire for the security guards? A No sir, I dont have any proof.
A I did not hire from any agency, I just hired from private persons because if I Q What kind of fence was that which you installed?
would hire security guards from the agency there will be more paper works.
A Steel fence.
Q What proof do you have to show that you hired security guards?
Q That would require concrete posts?
A None sir, because I hired private persons.
A No sir. What were used were just steel posts with barbed wire.
Q For how long did you hire these security guards?
Q How much did you spend for this fence?
A From the time Paul Bunda gave me 1.6 million, I immediately hired ten
A I cannot recall.
security guards and that was until December 1994.
Q You did not keep any receipt for the materials?

Q But all this time you did not maintain any payroll for the security guards?
21
A I did not keep copies of the receipts.
A None sir, I did not maintain any payroll. I just paid them in cash every 15th
and 30th of the month. Aside from his bare assertions, petitioner failed to present any proof that he
actually hired security guards or that he caused the erection of fences along the
Q Everytime you paid them you did not also prepare any receipt or any
subject propertys perimeters.
document signed by the security guards?
Settled is the rule that, to be credible, testimonial evidence should come not Property Tax Order of Payment, the document is a mere piece of paper without
22
only from the mouth of a credible witness. The testimony must also be any indication that it was officially issued by the Assessors Office of Las Pias.
23
credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience. No better test has Such document can easily be printed out of any cash register.
yet to be found to determine the weight of the testimony of a witness than its
24
As to petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove that he
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. In the
received the demand letter sent to him by private complainants counsel, the
present case, petitioner claims that he is a legitimate, respected and learned
25
rule is that demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to
businessman. As such, he is expected to take ordinary care of his concerns by 29
the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be
keeping evidence of the salaries he gave to the security guards he hired as well
convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
as the expenses he incurred in the building of fences around the property. At the
Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused
least, he could have kept his own record of the expenditures he made pursuant 30
of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for
to his contract with the private complainant.
estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
31
Thus, the RTC and the CA did not give credence to petitioners claims. This conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property
32
Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the trial and appellate courts held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As found earlier,
assessment of petitioners credibility because he failed to present substantial petitioner failed to account for the money given to him in trust by private
and convincing evidence to prove his claim. complainant.
Furthermore, to prove his claim that he facilitated the computation of accrued The CA held:
real estate taxes due on the subject property, petitioner presented a copy of a
26 The prosecution has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim that
Real Property Tax Order of Payment dated December 13, 1994, together with a
aside from the P1.6 Million shelled out by private complainant to appellant in
detailed computation of the land tax due on the property. He claims that he
27
the form of checks, private complainant had earlier given appellantP200,000.00
gave copies of these documents to private complainant. However, a perusal of
33
in cash.
these documents convinces the Court that they are, at best, dubious. Why is the
Real Property Tax Order of Payment dated December 13, 1994 when petitioner Petitioner makes much of the fact that the CA gave credence to his defense that
claims that he was able to obtain said document prior to or sometime in he did not receive the amount ofP200,000.00 in cash from private complainant.
October 1994? Petitioner testified in his re-direct examination that the Order of On this premise, petitioner concludes that, in effect, private complainants
28
Payment covers the period up to December 1994. If that is the case, why was testimony should not be given credence because it is full of falsehoods, half-
the computation only up to December 13 and not December 31? Petitioner failed truths and improbabilities.
to explain this discrepancy. As to the detailed computation attached to the Real
The Court is not persuaded. The modern trend of jurisprudence is that the Maximum 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part,
Medium 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and
34 36
improbabilities of the case. Consistent with this rule, the fact that the CA Minimum 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
discounted private complainants claim that he gave P200,000.00 in cash to
In the present case, since the amount involved is P1,600,000.00,
petitioner does not mean that the remaining portions of his testimony should
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty to be imposed should be the maximum period
not also be given credence.
of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 further
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
provides: additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the
total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of
from private complainant greatly exceeds the amount of P22,000.00, which
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000.00
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision defrauded goes beyond 20 years. Under the law, the maximum penalty to be
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does imposed in the present case should be 20 years of reclusion temporal.
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
As regards the imposition of the minimum penalty, the leading case of People v.
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one 37
Gabres is instructive:
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty;
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances
temporal, as the case may be. in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This
interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the
estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum
time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
35
to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1)
penalty prescribed are:
day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum term of the unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can
indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
38
each additionalP10,000.00. to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
As to the rate of interest, the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
39
v. Court of Appeals are applicable to the present case, to wit:
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law contracts, quasi- time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
for damages. The provisions under Tile XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.1wphi1

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
imposed, as follows: 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a 40
forbearance of credit. (emphasis supplied).
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest found guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. He is
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
1169 of the Civil Code. temporal as maximum. Petitioner is held civilly liable to return to private
complainant Paul P.A. Bunda the amount of P1,600,000.00 with legal interest at
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
6% per annum from the date of filing of the action until finality of the judgment.
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
After the judgment becomes final and executory, the amount due shall further
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate
earn interest at 12% per year until the obligation is fully satisfied.
of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
SO ORDERED.
the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in
Article 784 his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of
writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case
Castaeda vs. Alemany (3 Phil 426) the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no
consequence. The English text of section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in
EN BANC
translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904 the second.
ANTONIO CASTAEDA, plaintiff-appellee, (2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that
vs. a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant. was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under
the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
the execution of the will of Doa Juana Moreno, as the proof shows that the said
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not
will was not written in the presence of under the express direction of the
decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could
testratrix as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had
The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed are limited to those the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by her
mentioned in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure. first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable
person to discharge such trust.
WILLARD, J.:
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on
(1) The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doa
which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those
Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who
grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal
signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was
condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities
therefore executed in conformity with law.
connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the
which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian
testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express for the children of the deceased.
direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to
show that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the
court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence
does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and
identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that we are justified
in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court
below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document
then in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the
appellants that it was not the same instrument. In the last question put to the
witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants.
In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the
testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then
opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however,

the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The
costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in
Article 788 the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554)
Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina
Article 788, 791 Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
EN BANC In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at
vs. P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA 2

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and by order dated March
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and
TEEHANKEE, J.: admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office,
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the
letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants'
1 After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of
proposed counter-project of partition.
Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
the parties.
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
3
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. (/7 of the half of the estate reserved
4
oppositors-appellants. for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). In her will, the
testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real
properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties,
thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the
are as follows: other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties
that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
number 2 above;
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39 (4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41 grandchildren remain untouched.<re||an1w>
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, (a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly reduced to the value of one-half () of the entire estate, the
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00 value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b)
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01 the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced;
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
(c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire
adjudicating the estate as follows:
estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are
considered to have received in the will more than their adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by
Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less which the devise in their favor should be proportionally
than their respective legitime; reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own,
made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law,
stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38,
the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows: principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her
five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
1. Estela Dizon ............................ P 49,485.56
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to
2. Angelina Dizon ....................... 53,421.42
make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect
3. Bernardita Dizon .................... 26,115.04
to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid
4. Josefina Dizon ........................ 26,159.38
solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
5. Tomas V. Dizon ...................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .............................. 36,273.13 From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this
7. Marina Dizo............. ..576,938.82 appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ..................... 34,814.50
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .. 36,452.80
the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore
T o t a l .................................. P905,534.78 subject to reduction;
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting 2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under
the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906
among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes. of the Civil Code; and
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of 3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the
provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be Testatrix;
completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and
the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
5
shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." In consonance therewith, our Civil
the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f
which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt,
that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
6 10
preferred which will prevent intestacy." InVillanueva vs. Juico for violation of valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first
these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall
lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and for the right of such compulsory heirs:
literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
intention was otherwise." 8
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the that the same be fully satisfied.
matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish
of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the
the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on
only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied
petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or
with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these
excessive.
interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the
testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's
finds for the appellee. project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants
namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the
to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs,
partition by will more than their respective legitimes. as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in
of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article
plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being
1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that
questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion
Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to
11
Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A
partition his estate by actinter vivos." This was intended to repeal the then
12
partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter
property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of
vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.
13
her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be
Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment but the
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts.
question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, 15
657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots
duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect.
in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized
provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by
by herself and her co-heirs ..."
the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition 4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in
or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix'
would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her
disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can
will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after
provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies,
him." have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free
16
14
portion."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of
the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the property,provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix
little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil
intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the
the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not
significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will
that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided,
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were
but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the
therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is
construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to
expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following
collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the
her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I 19
legitime", while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law
partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any
enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
17
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
deceased."
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second undisputed.
paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
has compulsory heirsmay dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and
going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912
this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can
Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly
no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that
"(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix- requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect
appellee. to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and
21
sanctioned. That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with
now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could
real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved
have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project
project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the
of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their
testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the
own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the
intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the
properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower
court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there
cannot be said to be any question and none is presented as to fairness of
the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine
peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no
legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix.
The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value
thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be
settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the
values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the
record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita,
accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the
20
parties' manifestation, "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to
her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of
the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in
cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes,

Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico (4 SCRA 550)
instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos
Article 788, 791 y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
EN BANC iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones
y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
siguiente: .
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
vs.
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate
muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos
First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff- legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were originally
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof
owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to
would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa
his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este

The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor,
testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se
a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados,
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other
pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon
instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she
appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she never remarried.
submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24,
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of partition and
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a
declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now
usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject
shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and
to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried,
possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of
her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real
was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she
and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The
did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso
order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession
second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q- remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with
1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed the testator's brother (clause 6). 1wph1.t
and qualified judicial administrator.
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes,
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
nieta Leonor Villaflor". Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator
y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending
siguiente.
that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of
the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless
equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and
Rules of Court. that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator,
any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and
will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." . all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
effect to all." .
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que
contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the
han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera,
clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary
hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the
no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de
words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the
alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo
widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because
enjoins the following: .
they involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and should remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the
sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." . possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies
should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's
death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the
widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her
estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had
been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent
third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the

appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and
further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the
Administrator-appellee.
health will permit, their support to be paid out of the testamentary

Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321)
estate and they to live in the house of the widow.
Article 788, 789

Eleventh. The testator declares that in a case the said young men should
EN BANC be still engaged in study at the time of the death of the testator's wife,
they shall continue to be supported at the expense of the testamentary
G.R. No. 1027 May 19, 1903 estate, without deducting such expenses from their legacies, if they
should desire to continue the same studies.
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife is at the
CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant. present time fifty-five years of age, and consequently is not likely to
marry again, as she herself says, nevertheless it is impossible that the
WILLARD, J.:
opposite of what she asserts might occur, and, if so, then it is to be
I. Don Nicolas del Rosario died in this city on July 14, 1897, leaving a last will, the regarded as sufficient reason to authorize the young men Ramon and
eighth, ninth, eleventh, and eighteenth clauses of which are as follows: Enrique, so often referred to, separate from their aunt, in which event
they are to be supported by the testamentary estate on a small
Eight. The testator declares that the 5,000 pesos which he brought to
allowance of twenty-five pesos per month, provided that they continue
his marriage he hereby bequeathes to his nephew Enrique Gloria y
their studies or should be in poor health, this without in any respect
Rosario and Ramon del Rosario, natural children of his brother
reducing the amount of their shares.
Clemente del Rosario, notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be
the issue of the marriage of Escolastico Gloria and Rosendo del Rosario, Don Ramon del Rosario, one of the persons mentioned in these clauses, brought
successively. this action in 1902 against Don Clemente del Rosario, the then executor, asking,
among other things, that the said executor pay him an allowance from the death
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of 5,000 pesos is to be
of the widow of the testator at the rate of 75 pesos a month, and that the
divided, 3,000 pesos for the first named and 2,000 pesos for the second
executor allow him to live in the house in which the widow was living at that
named, the delivery of the said sums to be effected by the wife of the
time.
testator, provided that these young men behave themselves as they have
done up to the present time, and do not cease to study until taking the The widow of the testator, Doa Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, 1900.
degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a business course, if their
The court below ordered judgment in respect to this allowance, and the right to without authority to convey any of such property, inasmuch as she,
live in the house as prayed for by the plaintiff. In this we think that the court being grateful for the benefit resulting to her, binds herself in turn to
erred. deliver said property at her death to the testator's brothers, Don
Clemente del Rosario and Don Rosendo del Rosario, and his
While by the eight clause the support of the plaintiff and of Don Enrique Gloria
sister, Doa Luisa del Rosario, who shall enjoy the revenue from the
is charged against the estate, yet the eleventh clause makes it plain that this
said property during their respective lives, and shall then, in turn,
unconditional right was to last only during the lifetime of the widow. After her
transmit the same to their male children, both those born in wedlock
death the right to this allowance is made to depend on the continuance of their
and natural children who may be known.
studies. That this is the correct construction of the will is made more plain by
the eighteenth clause above quoted. In the case of their separation from their This was later modified by a codicil, as follows:
aunt by her remarriage, they were entitled to the specified allowance of 25 pesos
That in seventh clause of said testament he desires and wills that in the
a month only on condition that they were pursuing their studies or were in poor
distribution of his property and that of his wife among the male
health.
children of his brothers, Clemente and Rosendo del Rosario, and those
The court did not find that the plaintiff was still pursuing his studies. On the of his sister, Luisa del Rosario, in such distribution his nephews Enrique
contrary, he found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the condition by obtaining the Gloria and Ramon del Rosario must be understood to be included, in
degree of bachelor of arts in 1898. addition to the legacies mentioned in his said testament.
The right to live in the house of the widow terminated at her death. The thirteenth clause of his will was as follows:
II. The seventh clause of the will of Don Nicolas is as follows: The testator declares that in case Doa Luisa del Rosario should die
before or after the wife of the testator, then the legacy due her by virtue
Seventh. The testator states that in the present condition of his affairs
of this will shall not pass in its entirety to her male children, except as
he has acquired, during his married life, some tens of thousands of
to the sum of 1,000 pesos, the remainder to pass to Don Enrique Gloria
dollars, of which one-half belongs to his wife as her share of the profits
Rosario and Don Ramon del Rosario, natural sons of Don Clemente del
of the conjugal partnership, and the other half belongs to him as his
Rosario, as already stated.
share of such profits; but, in view of the agreement entered into
between the two spouses, the property will not be partitioned, and upon This was modified by the codicil as follows:
the death of the testator all the said property will pass to his wife, in
That in the thirteenth clause the testator provided that upon the death
order that she may enjoy the revenue therefrom during her lifetime, but
of his sister, Luisa del Rosario, her male children were to inherit from
her up to the sum of 1,000 pesos, and this he rectifies, for better Don Ramon del Rosario claims in this action that he is now entitled, by virtue of
understanding, to the effect that it is his will that the remainder of all both wills, to a certain part of the share of the estates left to said Doa Luisa
her portion should be divided into equal parts, one-third to go to his during her life, and he asks that the defendant be directed to render accounts
brother Don Clemente del Rosario and the other two-thirds to be and to proceed to the partition of the said estates. The controversy between the
divided equally among his said nephews, Enrique Gloria and Ramon del parties upon this branch of the case is as follows:
Rosario.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is entitled to nothing under the wills,
Doa Honorata Valdez made her will three days after that of her husband. The because the gift to him was conditional, the condition being that he should be
seventh clause is as follows: the natural son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter as such in one of the
ways pointed out by the Civil Code; that he can not prove such recognition, the
The testatrix declares that she institutes her beloved husband, Don
parol evidence presented at the trial being prohibited by said Code, and that he
Nicolas del Rosario y Alejo, as her heir to all the property which she
has therefore not complied with the condition.
may have at her death, and in the unexpected case of the death of her
said husband then she institute as heirs her brothers-in-law, Don The plaintiff claims that such evidence was proper, that both wills state that
Rosendo and Don Clemente del Rosario y Alejo, and her sister-in- Don Ramon del Rosario is the natural son of Don Clemente, and that in any
law, Doa Luisa del Rosario, who shall enjoy the usufruct during their event the bequests are made to the plaintiff by name.
lifetime of all the revenue of the said property. Upon the death of any of
The court below, holding the parol evidence immaterial, ordered judgment for
them, the property shall pass to the male children of her said brothers-
the plaintiff as prayed for.
in-law and sister-in-law, the issue of lawful marriage or natural children
who may be known; that upon the death of her sister-in- (1) So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in the aunt's will
law, Doa Luisa, then her share shall not pass in its entirety to her male to Doa Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from doubt. It is
children, except the sum of 1,000 pesos, Enrique Gloria and Don Ramon distinctly declared that Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take certain
del Rosario, natural children of her brother-in-law Don Clemente del parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been deducted. They are pointed out by name
Rosario. as the legatees. It is true that they are called the natural sons of Don Clemente.
But this is merely a further description of persons already well identified, and, if
Doa Luisa died one yea after Don Nicolas and two years before the death
false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of article 773 of the Civil
of Doa Honorata, which, as has been said, occurred on July, 7, 1900.
Code, which by article 789 is applicable to legatees.
Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6, 1900.
(2) The ninth clause of the will of Doa Honorata is as follows:
The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her nephews Enrique Gloria may have taken in the share of Doa Luisa under the will of Don Nicolas he took
and Ramon del Rosario in equal parts that is, 1,500 pesos each. as an heir and not as a legatee.
The plaintiff was entitled to one-half of this legacy in his own right. This has The distinction between the two is constantly maintained throughout the Code,
been paid to him. Don Enrique Gloria died before his the testatrix. By the and their rights and obligations differ materially. (Arts. 660, 668, 768, 790, 858,
provisions of articles 982 and 983 of the Civil Code the right of accretion exists 891, 1003.)
as to the other half in favor of the plaintiff and he is entitled to have it paid to
(5) The legatee can demand his legacy from the heir or from the executor, when
him.
the latter is authorized to give it. (Art. 885.) The powers given to the executors
(3) The will of Doa Honorata plainly declares that, on the death of any one of by the will of Doa Honorata are contained in the fourteenth clause, which is as
the life tenants, the male children of such tenant shall inherit, and in respect follows:
to Doa Luisa it is expressly declared that this shall take place whether she dies
The testatrix appoints as the executors of her will, in the first place, her
before or after the testatrix. The derecho de acrecer did not therefore exist in
beloved husband, Nicolas del Rosario y Alejo, in the second place her
favor of the other two life tenants, Don Clemente and Don Rosendo. "En la
brother-in-law Clemente del Rosario, in the third place her brother-in-
sucesion testada es ley preferente la voluntad del testador, de modo que este
law Rosendo del Rosario, in the fourth place Don Ramon del Rosario
prohibiendo expresamente el derecho de acrecer, nombrando sustitutos, o
when he shall attain his majority, all of them without bond and free
marcando el destino especial de cada porcion vacante, excluye la aplicacion de
from the obligation of terminating the administration within the legal
los articulos que vamos a examinar." (7 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.
term. At her death they shall take possession of all such goods and
276.)
things as may be her property, and are hereby authorized fully and as
This right does, however, exist in the share of Doa Luisa in favor of the required by law to prepare an inventory of said property, and to effect
plaintiff, for the reasons stated in connection with the legacy of 3,000 pesos. the division and partition of the estate among her heirs. She also
authorizes them to execute and sign deeds of partition, sales with a
(4) We have passed upon the rights of the plaintiff to the share of Doa Luis
resolutory condition, cancellations, receipts, acquittances, and such
under the will of Doa Honorata, because the interest is expressly left to him
other documents as may be necessary.
(en concepto de legado) as a legacy. This is controlling. (5 Manresa, 315.)
The twenty-first clause of the will of Don Nicolas is substantially the same. Each
These or equivalent words are wanting in the will of Don Nicolas. Applying
will prohibited any judicial intervention in the settlement of the estates.
article 668 of the Civil Code, we must hold that any interest which the plaintiff
The clause in the will of Doa Honorata which is a copy of that in the will of It was also properly directed against him, so far as it related to the share to
Don Nicolas is as follows: which the plaintiff is entitled under the will of Doa Honorata in the portion
to Doa Luisa for life.
The testatrix declares that she expressly prohibits any judicial
intervention in this her will, although minors, absentees, or persons The provisions of articles 1025-1027 are no obstacle to this suit. That an
under disability be interested therein, as it is her wish and will that all inventory is being formed, or that the creditors have not been paid, is a matter
the proceedings be conducted extrajudicially, and in case a family of defense which should have been set up in the answer.
council should be necessary, she designates the persons who, in
It was not properly directed against him in so far as it related to the similar
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code now in force, should
share left to him by the will of Don Nicolas. He took that as heir and not a
form such council, or else leaves their appointment to the discretion of
legatee, and the heir can maintain no such action against the executor.
her executors.
The fact that the plaintiff under the will of Doa Honorata is a legatee of an
If the executor was not authorized to pay these legacies, the heirs must pay
aliquot part of the estate, having become entitled to receive one-third of it on
them.
the death of Doa Luisa, does not prevent him from maintaining this action
The life tenants and the heirs who take the remainder under these wills are against the executor. Though such a legatee closely resembles an heir, yet, like
numerous. If they did not pay the legacies and did not agree upon an all other legatees, he must seek his share from the heir or executor. (6 Manresa,
administrator, judicial intervention would be necessary, the very thing which 561.)
the testators had expressly prohibited. The important power of making the
(6) While in this action he has a right to have his interest as legatee declared,
partition was attempted to be given to the executors. In view of these
yet it can not be delivered to him without a partition of the estate.
considerations and a study of the whole will, we hold that the executors are
given power to pay the legacies. It remains to be considered whether the executor has power to make the
partition. Such power is expressly given by the will. This provision is, however,
The action, therefore, was properly directed against the executor so far as it
void under the terms of article 1057 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:
related to the allowance and the legacy of 3,000 pesos. As to these legacies, the
action may be supported also under article 902, 2, which allows executors to pay The testator may, by an act inter vivos or causa mortis, intrust the mere
money legacies. power of making the division after his death to any person who is not
one of the coheirs.
The provisions of this and the foregoing articles shall be observed even The court below ordered the executor to render accounts of his administration
should there be a minor or a person subject to guardianship among the of both estates.
coheirs; but the trustee must in such case make an inventory of the
As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the only thing here in question is the right to
property of the inheritance, citing the coheirs, the creditors, and the
the allowance. As we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, he is not entitled
legatees.
to any statement of accounts as such pretended legatee.
Don Clemente, the executor, against whom the action was directed, was not
As to the estate of Doa Honorata, he is entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500
only an heir as a life tenant but also in the fee after his death of Don Rosendo if
pesos. Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the heir, not to
the latter died without issue. Upon the death of the widow, Doa Luisa then
the legatee; and although by article 789 all of the provisions of Chapter II (in
being dead, it became his duty to divide the estate into three parts, or at least to
which both articles are found) relating to heirs are made applicable to legatees,
set off the third, which was to pass to the plaintiff by the death of the widow
we can not hold that this requires an executor to submit his accounts to one
and Doa Luisa. In this partition he was directly interested, for, with his brother
who has no interest in the estate except to a money legacy when there is no
Don Rosendo, he had a life interest in the part of the estate not set off to the
suggestion that it will not be paid when the right to it is established.
plaintiff. Article 1057 prohibited an heir from being contador for this very
reason, namely, that the partition should be made impartially. In respect to the share of Doa Luisa, there is reason for saying that a legatee on
an aliquot part is entitled to an accounting. But, inasmuch as in this case there
Although the executor has no power to make the partition, the heirs can do so.
can be no final determination of the rights of the parties interested in the estate,
Arts. 1058-1060, Civil Code.)
because they are not all parties to this suit, the executor should not in this suit
The plaintiff is not bound to remain a co-owner with the other heirs. Being a be ordered to submit his accounts.
legatee of an aliqout part, he has the same right to seek a partition that an heir
(8) The plaintiff in his complaint has limited himself to claiming the allowance,
has. (7 Manresa, 578; art. 1051, Codigo Civil.) But in so seeking it he must make
his rights to the share of Doa Luisa, and the legacies left to him.
parties to his suit all persons interested in the estate (7 Manresa, 577). This he
has not done in this suit, and he consequently is not entitled to the partition The question as to whether he would be entitled to any part of the share of Don
ordered by the court below. Clemente upon the latter's death, under the seventh clause of the two wills, was
not presented by the complaint nor passed upon by the court and is not before
(7) We have held that the only thing that can be decided in this case is the
us for decision.
rights of the plaintiff as legatee.
(9) The result of the foregoing considerations is:
1. The plaintiff is not entitled to any allowance under either will. This ruling was correct. According to the Spanish authorities, anyone legally
affected by the judgment might appeal. According to the American authorities,
2. He is not entitled to live in the house No. 128 Calle Clavel.
if a trustee refuses to appeal, the beneficiary may do so in his name.
3. He is entitled to be paid, under the ninth clause of the will of Doa Honorata,
That the son of Don Clemente has a direct interest in the question of the
the sum of 1,500 pesos, in addition to the 1,500 pesos already received under that
allowance of 75 pesos a month to the plaintiff is plain. We have held that in
clause.
respect to this allowance the executor represents the estate and the judgment
4. He is entitled to the share of the estate left by the will of Doa Honorata against him binds it.
to Doa Luisa during her life, after deducting 1,000 pesos.

It would be manifestly unjust to allow an executor, with perhaps only a slight
5. This share can not be set off to him in this suit, but only in a proceeding to personal interest in an estate, by withdrawing an appeal, to fasten upon the
which all persons interested in the estate are parties. estate a claim which, as we hold, it should not bear.
6. His interest in the share left to Doa Luis during her life by the will of Don IV. At the argument of this case on the merits, after the appellant had closed,
Nicolas can not be determined in this suit. the respondent made the point for the first time that the appellant's brief
contained no assignment of errors.
7. The executor can not be required to render in this suit his accounts as such
executor. This is true. But a full assignment of errors is found in the bill of exceptions at
pages 14 and 15. The appellee answered the brief of the appellant without
8. The plaintiff's rights under the seventh clause of the two wills, to the share
making any suggestion of this mistake. He has been in no way prejudiced by it,
left to Don Clemente for life are not before us for decision.
and we can not affirm the judgment on this ground.
III. After judgment had been rendered in the court below and a bill of
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded with
exceptions allowed, but before the record had been sent to this court, Don
directions to the court below to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Clemente del Rosario, the defendant, died. After his death Don Rosendo del
The costs of this instance will be equally divided between the parties. So
Rosario, who was named in both wills to succeed to the executorship on the
ordered.
death of Don Clemente, appeared in the court below and withdrew the appeal
and bill of exceptions. Thereupon the widow of Don Clemente, for herself and in
representation of the minor son of her late husband, asked and was granted
leave to prosecute the appeal.
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) see
under 779
on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated
Article 789 by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as
devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters:
Estate of Rigor vs. Rigor (89 S 493) Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao.
The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
SECOND DIVISION
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing

G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR.
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno
THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA,
palayeros situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE
vs.
TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; Titulo Num. 6530, mide
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and
16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO,respondents-appellees.
242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665
AQUINO, J.: m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m.
cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands
cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de
located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares
Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado
That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of
son;
Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. (1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba
situados objectos de este legado;
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the (2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor de empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a
vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su
24319-R, August 1, 1963). muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar
y gozar de este legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios para
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died
ordenarse de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar indicated, to wit: (table omitted)
cada ao VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de
Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00
mis padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase
excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este legado, y la Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of
administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y sus partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including
sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac. the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix
should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado
segun lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze
este legado a cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male
de Victoria, Tarlac. relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the
testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara,
that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the
anualmente todos los productos que puede tener estate legado,
same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
ganando o sacando de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por
pending.
ciento para su administracion, y los derechos correspondientes
de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February
celebrar cada ao, depositando todo lo restante de los productos 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a
de estate legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado. petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the
deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a
said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to
project containing the following item:
render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another
petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be
given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of
Philippines, or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
parish priest of Victoria. trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe
in this appeal .
de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the
testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction,
motions for reconsideration. where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be
ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil.
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named
209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in
the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be
in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held
certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In
that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative
re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty
years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is
perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty "the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the
years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs.
articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
Code.
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into
finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the
construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
prevent intestacy. Philippines).
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a
would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest. priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer
enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee
the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no
would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies
nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in
for the priesthood.
case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every

What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined
parents.
that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish
the administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Victoria and his successors.

Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be
percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment
masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each year, the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art.
depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his 1025, Civil Code).
bequest.
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after
his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention. seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals
that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or
Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao.
Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as
had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our
relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the
exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to
relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms
nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his of the will.
nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his
Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will
sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited
lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son,
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation
the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that
whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a
Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the
priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In
Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the
was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and
told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time
that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the
Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood
San Jose Seminary.
or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is
categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960
19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not
relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
25 and 35, Record on Appeal). accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest,
the said ricelands.
the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the
does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered
testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That
by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a against the petitioner.
nephew who became a priest.
SO ORDERED
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee
only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could
not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the
old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason
should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of
substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por
qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de
los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) see under 788
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under 776
Article 791
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) see under 788
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico (February 28, 1962) see under 788
xxx xxx xxx

Yambao vs. Gonzales (1 SCRA 1157)
(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng
G.R. No. L-10763 April 29, 1961
bukid habang panahon, at ang nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng
DELFIN YAMBAO, plaintiff-appellant, pamamahala ng Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at may
vs. utang pa.
ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: appellees all her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated
in 1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees to request that he be
This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against Angelina Gonzales and Maria placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision of said will, they
Pablo praying that the latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant were directed to give to him for cultivation, as tenant, and when they refused
during his lifetime on the parcels of land bequeathed to and inherited by them alleging that they had already given it to another tenant he filed the present
from Maria Gonzales, as well as to deliver to him the value of the harvests action.
belonging to him as tenant of said parcels of land. In their answer, defendants
averred that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff is not mandatory; In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes only
that the determination of who should be the tenant of the land is vested in a a moral but not a legal obligation, the trial court went on to consider the import
special court; and that the present action is not the proper remedy. of the word "Pahihintulutan" employed with reference to appellant. In its opinion
said word only means to permit or to allow, but not to direct appellees to appoint
After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. appellant as tenant. Rather, it opines, it merely contains a suggestion to employ
It held that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff merely amount to a because the testatrix did not use the words "ipinaguutos ko" which she used in
suggestion to the defendants who, though morally bound, are not legally connection with other provisions of the will, so that there is no clear indication
compelled to follow said suggestion, invoking as authority Article 797 of the old that it was her intention to make such provision compulsory.
Civil Code. Plaintiff has appealed.
We believe, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the real
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as follows: import of the wish of the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the
same contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the
Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA
words preceding the word "pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din naman
PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod:
GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga
sumusunod." The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to

carry out as a mandate or directive, and having reference to the word
"pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon
appellees. To follow the interpretation given by the trial court would be to devoid
the wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is inapplicable. That
refers to an institution of an heir intended to be conditional by providing that a
statement to the effect cannot be considered as a condition unless it appears
clearly that such is the intention of the testator. We are not faced here with any
conditional institution of heirship. What we have is a clear-cut mandate which
the heirs cannot fail to carry out.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Appellees are hereby

ordered to employ appellant as tenant immediately after this decision has
become final. Costs against appellees.
each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left
Article 792 margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) see
under 779 of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

Article 795
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid

In Re Will of Riosa (39 Phil 23)
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless
EN BANC it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa. witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant, attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused
it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
MALCOLM, J.:
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such
the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the
death of the testator, controls. will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as
January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The to make said section read as follows:
will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with
preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional
charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1,
known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name
1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested
and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at
or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him,
thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The be a will, the law in force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of
attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
testator and of each other.
execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old
Justice, as to a will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord
comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that
dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a decision the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the
handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of
place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of
inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58
an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act Vt., 103.)
No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, learned Justice Sharswood (Taylorvs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded
as to the effect of a change in the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
be observed in the execution of a will, when such change is made intermediate to
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and
the execution of a will and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc., 1076.
ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature is
and any textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn.,
imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to
182.) The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in
the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would
force at the testator's death are controlling, and that a will not executed in
unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition
subsequently enacted, though before his death. is, we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more
than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the
is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on
maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal
the property until a future time.lawphil.net
right to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has
ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to the unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective
property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In
revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect."
however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into effect at (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew
a future time. Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202
U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one,
thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein
finding support in the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating
otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of
to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary formalities, should be
retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when they
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to
lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively
testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558;
executed according to the law in force at the time of their making
Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of
(Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 1
the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquia [1918], R. G. No. 13176, concerning
252.)
the language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out
described. Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend
of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides
more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact
that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not
that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that
executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course,
his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the
become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is
second and third rules on the subject.
admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure
as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the

law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our
statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of
the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment
of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that
date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our
own the second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of
December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record
shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to
probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in
Enriquez vs. Abadia (95 Phil 627)
his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
EN BANC evidence.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954 The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will;
that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was
vs.
to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention
MONTEMAYOR, J.: of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952,
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked
Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only
Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the
questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties
Court of Appeals.
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of
the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact,
however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the
testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-
law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as
witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin
the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his
pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the
name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the
testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said
only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of
of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said: legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome
enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear
doctrine and should be followed.
upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the
authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling
of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses. and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should
be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same
after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the
requirement, this Court declared:
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law
left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day
Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the
margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate. requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by
can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will
is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is
at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that denied probate. With costs.
alleging among other things, that she needed money for the support of
Ibarle vs. Po (February 27, 1953
her children;
EN BANC
5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto
G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953 Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named
Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. 6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant. and have never been registered up to the date;
TUASON, J.: 7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of
court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned
sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of
above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion
a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the
belongs to the children of the above named spouses.
same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the
the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends
pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision:
upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a
and wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the
person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
surviving spouse and some minor children;
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu; The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or
3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed
to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so
far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of
the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not
been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-
registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause
than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of
the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such damages as
they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.
natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the
Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January
31, 2005) son of Eulogio.
FIRST DIVISION Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that
Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will,
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005
if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG- was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the
NOBLE, petitioner, last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure
vs. and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents. by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et
DECISION
al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi
CARPIO, J.: Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews,
nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
The Case
6
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-
1 2
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will
Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al.
3
sustained the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).
Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to probate the last will
7
and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada"). On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition before the RTC-Kabankalan,
docketed as SP No. 069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of
The Antecedent Facts administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.
4
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the
sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children. will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration,
8
the order allowing the probate of Torays will became final and executory.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda
5
petition, docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the last will and Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of
testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
9
Abada and Toray. Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other
probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied the motion in an issues.
10
Order dated 20 August 1991.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge
Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-
Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-
Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the will of Abada.
Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.

There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is
substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that The Issues
the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was
The petition raises the following issues:
able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further,
there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, 1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and
allowed probate. 2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary
13
public;
11
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar is appointed administrator of the estate
of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of 3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language
administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking his oath and or dialect known to the testator;
filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.

4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so,
whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada
shall continue discharging her duties as such until further orders from this applicable laws;
Court.
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of
SO ORDERED.
12 whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada;
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their 6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the
motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada will of Abada.
has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
to probate the will of Abada.
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the
The Applicable Law following:
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the (1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the
Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil testator;
14
Procedure which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name
New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of direction;
Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
15 16
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
2645, governs the form of the attestation clause of Abadas will. Section 618 of
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other;
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding
17
the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect
the will on the left margin;
the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator
and signed by him, or by the testators name written by some other person in his (5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or placed on the upper part of each sheet;
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
and every page of the will, or caused some other person to write his
on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of
and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will
sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is
and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the written in a language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains
presence of the testator and of each other.
23
that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She cites in particular necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abadas will does not require
Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus: acknowledgment before a notary public.1awphi1.nt
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada
known to the testator. knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result
in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
18
matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to
and the witnesses. xxx
raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of
24
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings. In addition, the language used
19
Code. Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil
administrators of the property of an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Code defines a legitime.

Nevertheless, Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or
25
the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by
20 26
Procedure. Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony,
21
Old Civil Code which provides: has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents
of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be
that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish
identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known to the 27
language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also
endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the legal The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
capacity required to make a will.

A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases clause of Abadas will reads:
falling under Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y
22
However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en
Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del
mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the
de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de presence of the witnesses.
todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does
estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS en la parte
28
not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the
superior de la carrilla.
appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number
Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
pages on which the will is written.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the
30
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada effectivity of the New Civil Code. InDichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza, the
una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the law on wills,
margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction.
31
that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with In Dichoso, the Court noted thatAbangan v. Abangan, the basic case on the
the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS." 32
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez, the petitioner, arguing for liberal
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her
expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of argument while the respondent, contending that the rule on strict construction
three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court,
case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
29
Code.
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible,
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and
testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given
nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will,
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is: and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance
"Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation
although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin
other non-essential defect. x x x. of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly
a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all
of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable.
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x
33
However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute
x 1a\^/phi1.net
be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be
35
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de
reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question
nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this
on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself
means "in its witness, every one of us also signed in our presence and of the
and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained
testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of
the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence of
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it one another and of the testator.
open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January
where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision.They do not allow
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only SO ORDERED.
permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the
requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
34
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the
signatures appearing on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only
mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses that
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5)
Article 16 the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery
Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil 867)
of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
EN BANC requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
appellee,
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
vs.
things, provides the following:
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
situated.
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
question in this case.
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
approved it. those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not
in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the with the laws of the Philippines.
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented
complied with and executed. lawphil.net
from receiving his legacy.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law,
erroneous.
for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals
the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
provide.
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above
and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
dispositions.
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel oppositor.
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null
and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are
contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that
the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
Bellis vs. Bellis (June 8, 1967)
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
EN BANC three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors- and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to
appellants, his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
vs. Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
equal shares.1wph1.t
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
The facts of the case are as follows: P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749,
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
2
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
first and second marriages. situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory 3
ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
heirs of the deceased.
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather,
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
1
executor.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it succeed. They provide that
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
did not provide for legitimes.
country where it is situated.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this
decedent. that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
Code, stating that
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. law should govern.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
against appellants. So ordered.
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed
is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
Testate Estate of Christensen vs. Garcia (January 31, 1963) Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
EN BANC
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the xxx xxx xxx
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
LABRADOR, J.: Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed
thereon, is exhausted..
during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue
to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
xxx xxx xxx
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions: 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d
877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen. The most important assignments of error are as follows:
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen

I
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L- THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
II
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the
entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth. III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which
IV time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the
United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
V
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
OWNERSHIP.
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief: Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
1953.) another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle

expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living
we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to
in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California. business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property
law of the country where it is situated. is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee,
on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, Philippines.
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system;
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows: On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same
is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict
that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal
law as the rule of reference. X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
next of kin.
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only
way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon to to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the
of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court
forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account
would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict
latter course, thus applying its own law.
of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict- The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted
to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine country' means the whole of its law.
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer"
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of of nationality that is the English law he must accept this
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following reference back to his own law.
theses:
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
application of foreign laws.
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
shall respect: apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred. When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states,
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property,
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law. will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
xxx xxx xxx
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state.
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of
the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
442-443.)
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock,
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in
above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
appellees.
Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984) surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory
heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I
FIRST DIVISION
of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984 ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a
vs. petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents. testatrix.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner. In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix
died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her
sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of
of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and
Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent. L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
of the estate located in the Philippines. the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines
and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was
of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate
filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has
by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the
could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to
said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E
him.
to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the
Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be
Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines,
truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-
and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the
parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned
estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will
will was made.
annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit: in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of
Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same
19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a to be his voluntary act and deed.
Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for
that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to
connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the Hence, this petition.
special proceedings case.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent,
appear. He made several motions for postponement until the hearing his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void,
was set on May 29, 1980. and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his
last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to
substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted
Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss
by the court on September 13, 1982.
the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing
provided: A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may
I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed. judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition 1955).
with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the
Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-
allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not opposition to the reprobate of the will.
made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an
judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that
order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially providing
the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and
that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days
that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records
after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in
show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a
accordance with the rules of Court.
later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed.
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge
his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
no other opposition to the same.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias,
will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to
Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Art. 1039.
(Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent
decedent.
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C.
Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
for him. Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
This contention is without merit.
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established public policy and would run counter to the specific
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American provisions of Philippine Law.
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the
which respectively provide:
Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
Art. 16 par. (2). squarely applied in the case ofBellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein
we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. in a mere notice of hearing.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the
must prevail over general ones.
Rules of Court, it is provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
relief, the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the
petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she
fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the
." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of

Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel
Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby

dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
PCIB vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 266) IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO
EN BANC
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC.,movant-appellee.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
and Industrial Bank.
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for
Iloilo), petitioner, private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. BARREDO, J.:p
MAGNO, respondents.
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974 "declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp.
of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and
Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES
void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to
NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any
vs.
acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix of
SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA
above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO,
and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO
court from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition
estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make
being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court
any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any
of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and
part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other
its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of
or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances
said order.
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas
the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property
testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges. as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any
THE FACTS
part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose
executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows: of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or
near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided.
paid out of my estate.
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor,
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of pursuant to the provisions thereof.
my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike,
to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which
namely:
capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE
Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING
named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his
of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament,
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton
a copy of which is attached to the petition for probate of the same.
Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct
that no bond or other security be required of him as such executor. 2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles
Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to manage, control use
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the
and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way,
probate court, in the administration of my estate, other than that
a provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise
necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to
appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."
Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
was engaged in the business of buying and selling personal and real perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.
SO ORDERED.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
or ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as
executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent. Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor
another motion thus:
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze
the business of petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES,
and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND
these transactions. SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N.
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his
which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
living.
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.) Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee
named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following
properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
order:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N.
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
Hodges, that the business in which said petitioner and the deceased
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton 3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said had been buying and selling real and personal properties, in
estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the
part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other
herein Executor to have all the sales, leases, conveyances or
or additional property as he may think best; toexecute
mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in
fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may 5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases
deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon.
and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and
as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be
estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part approved;
of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be accounted for,
left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the especially the amounts received.
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales,
Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by the Executor, be
the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was
approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales,
and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of
even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize
the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with
said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the
authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the
Honorable Court. City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.) That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on
well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached
December 14, 1957 as follows:
and made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
ORDER
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that,
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well
assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual
taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by
income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges
"A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance
are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
in the last will and testament of the latter.
examining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is
So ordered. the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the
last will and testament already probated by the Honorable court.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
(Annex "I", Petition.)

On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as
Executor for approval, Hodges alleged: The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21,
1959 in its order worded thus:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of
the deceased, renders the following account of his administration Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the
covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and
account may be found in detail in the individual income tax return liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax
filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
approved. reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
SO ORDERED.
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91,
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959. Appellee's Brief.)
(Annex "J", Petition.) xxx xxx xxx
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual
January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
statements of account just mentioned, the following assertions the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of
not appear from all indications discernible in the record to be Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
disputable: earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by
Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement
of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane xxx xxx xxx
Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N.
Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests
estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts,
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of
taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and
earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid."
Likewise the following:
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven "affidavit" wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M"
of his estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green
1
wife's will.
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May
ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership with
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated
straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as
may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet.
and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. . (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the
return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so
answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and
decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy
their respective positions in regard thereto. of the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in 3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and
the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal
26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the properties that may remain at the death of her husband Charles
same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among
counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles
as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed Newton Hodges, which need to be administered and taken care of.
the following:
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-
the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most respectfully
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal
states:
partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of
as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated
the existence of the last will and testament of Charles Newton
June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and
Executor and had performed the duties as such.
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron
stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, safe in his office, and will be presented in due time before this
honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an 9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum
Administratrix be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully
perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and take
prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers
provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
administration, because the last will and testament of deceased,
(Annex "O", Petition.)
Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the
meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date
Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger thus: .
of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane counsel for the Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the Court
Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed
(30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter
the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept
Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of
of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well- both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
qualified person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix is appointed.
Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided that "at
of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.) the death of my said husband I give devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
respondent Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a
brothers and sisters, share and share alike ". Accordingly, it became
representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who
incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly
had) arrived from the United States of America to help in the
liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her
administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-
estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest,
Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow -
residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and
Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and
administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to
sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her
had) arrived from the United States with instructions from the other
estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of
heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles
Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as already
Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests
2
Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges, with a prayer
passed to him as surviving spouse "except for purposes of
for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the
administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges"
motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty.
and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to
Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this
latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate and distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for. their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her
are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies
will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to
now before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said
that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal
quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
review are apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in
proper orientation.
behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the that everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was
precise perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was
questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs simply due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the
submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in
matter. order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the
Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by
operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a
petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover
meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October 3, as
and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus
formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and
operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the
Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act
conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his
the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court until October 3,
agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while 1964.
reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of September
SO ORDERED.
11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading
thus: there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it
afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was made in the
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss
appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green
Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained in the motion
Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to
locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to interrupt the operation of the office of both estates, the Court aside
take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard
locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal
1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all
refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great
City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative
moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an
and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30
order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in
tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said
the said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof
estates could operate for business.
and place thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes;
instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated
supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
the PCIB.
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the
compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then
comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I.
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates
the estate of C.N. Hodges;
should remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of September
1, 1964. (c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of
P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her
compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer operative, but
chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only; again there is nothing to show when this situation started.
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14,
to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on
her possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe
documents and papers it may have in its possession;
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs.
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family
accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.N. who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned
Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges. parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by
this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix
sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims
Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)
representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as
without previous consent and authority from this court.
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however,
SO ORDERED. to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred percent (100%)
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all
(or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned
collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be
by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On
deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol.
Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed V, Sp. 1307).
its recognition of the afore-described basic demand by the PCIB as
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty.
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent
Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of
(100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim
the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and
what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and
resolution of the issues herein. Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684,
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages
Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by
respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking
attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows: that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus
and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been presented in
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R.
support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of
Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964
counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is
asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which
claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel
Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services to protect and
or attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a
defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings
matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the
and the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp.
the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L.
1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm
Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate
has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of
payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate
said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as expenses for the
of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in
Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides for the connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of
payment of attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp.
prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965
Sp. 1307). approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the
annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The
reply to the opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to
alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
issue or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the
Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is
above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the
ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N.
Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and
Quimpo formally entered their appearance in behalf of motion dated January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to
(pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307). enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and administrator in
these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964
or comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965.
stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the
In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the
parties to submit memorandum in support of their respective
order of January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was
contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation
never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of
and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439,
Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the
Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
late Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto
dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the consideration by the court Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of
(Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307). both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada,
hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for
4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been
reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated
filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the
January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being
personal heir; treated and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that
in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307)
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between
which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty.
them;
Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27,
prejudice of the other heirs not represented by said attorneys; 1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the
addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
estate;
expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625- Court and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V,
6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307). Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null
Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the and void.
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by
Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining
the attorneys for the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp.
6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A.
approved. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
directed to be needed to implement the approval of the agreement
annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N. SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as
may be.
administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his
3
name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. And this was not an isolated
SO ORDERED.
instance.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
independent but simultaneous administrations.
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court,
execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C.
acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale
N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for
executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the
the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
following order, also on appeal herein:
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
land of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's
in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of
Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had
Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of taken over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting
Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and these motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion for
considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of
believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for
the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere
cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of
D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant the Hodges spouses.
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3,
was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by
1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion
another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final
for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations
deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R.
of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-
Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which
6596) the allegations of which read:
was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates
having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed "1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell"
similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and real property, and the prospective buyers under said contracts have
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. already paid the price and complied with the terms and conditions
Magno and the appellant. thereof;
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone "2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors
will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval have already paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of
deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;
Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the
September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4,
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp.
1964 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds
Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor
of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 8 deeds of sale; (f)
motion dated May 7, 1965 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent court
allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions,
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the administrator of
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is
assets of the estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his proper and legal.
full debt or diminish his dividend."
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing: either of them.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 SO ORDERED.

of the Rules of Court, this honorable court approve the aforesaid
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's
Brief.) On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when
respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the 1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal,
Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved payments approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract
helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife,
both estates as follows: which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of
Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve
payment of overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable 2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale
and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman
chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges
said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the on September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of
testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to said appellee to pay the installments on time.
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of
pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion
motion.
Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
SO ORDERED. Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.) 4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by
Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they 5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale
were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing
of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on 10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of
February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife. sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico
on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale
March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas
claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico
Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
to pay the installments due on time.
Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale
approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero
appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a
and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively,
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the
pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and
death of his wife.
November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed
of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion
Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on
Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6,
December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26,
"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960
1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October
and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
31, 1959, after her death.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral
approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the
on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been
May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on
claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee
pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:
Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges,
assignments of error have already been discussed previously. In the through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already
explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself, (1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the
sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of
Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final
November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the
deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina
A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now (3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary
therefore final. to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307).
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more
fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, (4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the
1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of following allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by
the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co- Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left
self-explanatory motion was filed:
as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS issued the following order:
OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the
INCOME THEREFROM.
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court
considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased, already
of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby probated by this Honorable Court."
APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized to execute
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the (7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." Statement of Account By The Executor for the Year 1960" submitted
through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory
time and place of examining the herein account, as herein Executor is
and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased, already
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of probated by this Honorable Court.
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." (8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.). (9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P.
Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual
Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among "Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
other things: Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter
case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is
both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special (p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
Administratrix is appointed."
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307) motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963
for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to
Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of
order:
December 25, 1962
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said
venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender,
deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and
firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que
to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
el precio estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado. Se
property, said Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix having
autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de
filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307) consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. "Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida
Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to: para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane (p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
Hodges;
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for
Charles Newton Hodges; and
Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Hodges, alleges:
Newton Hodges.
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and (16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has
Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for paid and still is paying sums of money to sundry persons.
those "contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during
lifetime, and the purchasers have been demanding the execution of
the hearings before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963
definite deeds of sale in their favor.
that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
executed by the Administratrix and by the co-administrator Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C.
(Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of
Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms and all of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under
thereto." her Last Will and Testament.
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, (18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of
1963 are all registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges. her administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has
However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her
been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that
For Sale at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased
spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
the Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
Served Basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that
Avelina A. Magno this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:
Administratrix
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of
the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET
her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL
any character remaining in her possession; PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C.
N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid
RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER
issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first secures the
5, 1963.
conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such
as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney- COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred
in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges: to as PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special
Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates: Court respectfully alleges that:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation. 1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys,
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator
equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co- Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and
herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an
approved by the court, and because the above motion of October 5,
amicable agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this
heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way
dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the
Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred
Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
administration to the PCIB.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.
of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs.
absent in the United States, this Honorable Court ordered the
William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family
indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5,
who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
1963.
Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed
parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by 6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N.
this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly carry out its duties
sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because
against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those
existed)of both estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as Hodges:
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of
the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
all of the assets in the Philippines of both estates including those
exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,)
claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her
(or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned
locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on August
by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines.
31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by this "full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased C.
Honorable Court on September 7, 1964. N. Hodges
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide "and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
how the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered, property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
who the PCIB shall employ and how much they may be paid as
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the
evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks issued by the PCIB
right to the immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the
payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee agreement
properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other
approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.
assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death,
possession of the records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his
the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines
evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal checks. registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by
Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has
the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as
knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or
evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's
were derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported due and
payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges. 9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court,
appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
particularly those of January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the
mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January (a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this
24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously
as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI 10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable
Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May Court of December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets
28, 1957 was appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take
1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone
(p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307). only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N.
Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI
22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-
Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. to take over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all
Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on
with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307). January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol,
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno,
the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and
Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec.,
exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22, 1963 by
this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. 11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this
Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
Magno who at that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-
the estate of C. N. Hodges.
33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A.
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the
Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate
Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78,
of C. N. Hodges";
81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of
C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964,
Higdon family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges at
(pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on estates."
January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
24 ems.
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders
January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P.
of this Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of
No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the
March 3, 1964. date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession
of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or
the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-
accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special
Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of
administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting
C. N. Hodges.
of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her 14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable
conformity (supra). request of PCIB concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N.
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A.
Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno
Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September
3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the
and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964. records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court 18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane
is again in physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings
Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in
records, properties and assets because Miss Magno continues to fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and
assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the
use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated
that this Honorable court:
within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that
said combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his (1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest
lifetime. possible date with notice to all interested parties;
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of (2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as
Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-
Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,
Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased
counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
taxes.
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties
Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties
issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United
interferring with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal
the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives; estate.
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses,
Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N. this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31 and December 12,
Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----
August 31, 1964; ), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had
lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had,
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and
therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they
others allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the premises
retained until the time of their respective deaths.
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N.
Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB; 3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of
Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and
as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present issue
equitable in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in full
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official hereunder.
Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
(hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the located, to my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this unto him, my said husband during his natural lifetime.
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from the State of Texas, estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical properties of said estate by sale of any "Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other or Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple
his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas
Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she used
and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property
as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said 5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City,
estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any predeceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of
part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband,
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer
near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to to as the HIGDONS.
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as above
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the
provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell
Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex
lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
"A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate without
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of
namely:
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of its
testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws
because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to 8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate
govern her Will; of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the
(1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in
property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of
the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the
Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges,
conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is
provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see paragraph
the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her
2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and
heirs.
successional rights over movables (personal properties), and the law
of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties 9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to
located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or
Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No. Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need
estate insofar as her movableand immovable assets in the Philippines or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of
are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must
govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane
the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no
Special Proceedings. more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time
of her death on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the 12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the
surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants successor are transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title
is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges
at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of
this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie
Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-
Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of
fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets
Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate.
of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and
He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts
1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own
emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the
name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while
moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole
as her sole and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as
pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
estate, except only with regards certain properties "owned by us,
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without
expressly and impliedly by various orders of this Honorable Court, as
relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited
follows:
above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife,
was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines. (a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that
C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing (c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified
while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.) inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the
other things,
following fact, alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges: "That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." (CFI
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44;
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified
issued the following order:
"Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged,
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court among other things.
considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is
by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained
pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)
in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.) (e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified
"Annual Statement of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960"
24 ems
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe 17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph,
time and place of examining the herein account, as herein executor is provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane namely:
Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and
authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and remainder", at least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which
control all the conjugal assets as owner. remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie
Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in
Hodges.
connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1)
declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane 18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of
Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit because said provision is
as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in
Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to
and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance
Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right,
but absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute
involving a very similar testamentary provision, the Supreme Court heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson,
held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the G. R. No.
property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights. L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. order that a vulgaror simple substitution can be valid, three
No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.) alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first
designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide
wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do
that no charge, condition or substitution whatsoever upon the
so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore,
legitime can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of
the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the
Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the legitime of a
Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa,
surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse.
commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that:
Consequently, the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie
"... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por
Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges
fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas
was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the
segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a tener efectividad en el
conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In
and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, other words, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death
(1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely true intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, Jane Hodges' Willis void.
because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the 1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed
Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses
Hodges estate is irrevocable and final. Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety 2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C.
of the conjugal estate appeared and was registered in him exclusively N. Hodges as his share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate
estate. Therefore
accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of
substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered
Linnie Jane Hodges;
by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any
testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim 5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in
against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the the Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-
present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of
the spouses. distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
1672;
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under
separate administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane 6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is
Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in entitled to full and exclusive custody, control and management of all
matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous. said properties; and
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and 7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare: Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or
participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just 4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed
and equitable in the premises." and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to
probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
(Record, pp. 265-277)
No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however,
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may
on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own
have any claims against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already
"Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie
been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp.
Jane Hodges" as follows:
34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against
and, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the
respectfully states and manifests: Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this
Honorable Court;
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges
were American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having 6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already
amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines; admitted to probate contains an institution of heirs in the following
words:
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will
and testament (the original of this will now forms part of the records "SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or
Folio I, pp. 17-18); located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo
at the time survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
several relatives named in her last will and testament; Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale of any
part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband,
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs
or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."
and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property
above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over
as he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate
all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested
shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of
remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her
the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
relatives named therein;
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of
the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the 8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission
City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, to probate of her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of
manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with full
shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon
and may sell unimproved town lots. him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the
estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of
sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
namely: 9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter
two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income"
Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, by virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and
American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were
of America; bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23,
1957, she was the co-owner (together with her husband Charles 13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton
Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal Hodges in the combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957,
properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are while it may have earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie
by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under other dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until
the control and supervision of this Honorable Court; the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the 14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie
interests of husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the
there has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than
both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the estate of
"rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be
continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were exactly determined by the following manner:
alive;
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined estate as they existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23,
conjugal estate was earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her 1957 one-half of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane
death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more Hodges;
charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature,
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in
income" of all these assets again one-half of these belong to the accordance with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; motion;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the
disbursements and other dispositions made by Charles Newton combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the
Hodges personally and for his own personal account from May 23, estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom
1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges, disbursements they properly belong and appertain.
and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf since
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
December 25, 1962 up to the present;
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8,
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as
1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the
the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of
liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate,
respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part
and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and
that:
testament.
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved
supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for
and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma
pending before this Honorable Court, such as:
Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe,
Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of
and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles
to her estate; Newton Hodges "through ... written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and collected and held, as well as those which she continues to
usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges'; inofficiously collect and hold;
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate 5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and
of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the inconveniences not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom";
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex
U, prayed that:
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference
of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of 1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the
Linnie Jane Hodges; administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts
Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
involved therein being matters of record, and therefore require only
the resolution of questions of law; 2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order
Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
could be very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges; 3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) closed;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two
administrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome 4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration
upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to hereinabove set forth are resolved.
answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously (Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus
the respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus: all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions
to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September
ORDER
14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, of title as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial
Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the
involving no issues of facts and only require the resolution of
estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the
question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as
emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N.
this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her
Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but
collections to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate
also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie
of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the
Jane Hodges.
hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in
hereinabove set forth are resolved. consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending
before this court such as (a) the examination already ordered by this That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and
Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that
sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament already
urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. probated by the Court.
Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as
accounts submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel well as the other motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been
Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of
N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane evidence with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition
of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question
stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the to the motions dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; said motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court, the
PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C.
become moot and academic since they are premised on the
N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses
assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C.
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that
N. Hodges.
administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges. That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the
determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of
stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a
administratrix Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied
motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the
for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of
claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in
heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and
the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reception of evidence.
and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of are claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
documents which are in the possession of administratrix Magno can
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the
be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration
PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of
of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official
the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for therefore no disposition of her estate.
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby
of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come
DENIED.
to her possession plus all rents and income.
(Annex "W", Petition)
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this
dated May 19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated
order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made
by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was
conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order based on the fact that:
dated December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances made by C.
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane
N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to
insofar as her properties in the Philippines are concerned;
declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the
lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles
Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no Newton Hodges rights over said properties which, in sum, spell
order of adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the

c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
PCIB as well as those in the opposition and rejoinder of

Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was
administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to
granted by this Honorable Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was
sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by" the late filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing
Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales, fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two
conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and authorized. separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court
This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the below).
reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for
only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
resolution herein, appeals from the following:
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent 1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition) with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.)
October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie
repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
Jane Hodges had already been factually, although not legally, closed
with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as 2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds
sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the executed by petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well
order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying
1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and reconsideration.
held that "the court believes that there is no justification why the
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the
order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on
deposit of all collections in a joint account and the same order of
July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for official declaration
February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial
of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to
of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
above, was set for hearing.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for
payment of attorney's fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. reconsideration was filed either.
and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee different matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or
Western Institute of Technology to make payments to either one or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20
both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order of thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for
March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration. which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket
fees.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection
Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII)
alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them
Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with
covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition
the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308,
for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the
and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration 4
Court to dispose of all these cases together.
of said approval.
The assignments of error read thus:
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on
I to IV
Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed. OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow
ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
LIFETIME. HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO.
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE
PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL. CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND
AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A
COURT. PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN,
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING XXXVII to XXXVIII

WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
XXVI to XXIX IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL
SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO
CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE
P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXXIX to XL
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES,
EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
XXXV to XXXVI CORONADO.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS XLI to XLIII
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME. NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH. THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT
OF P2,337.50.
XLVII to XLIX
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH
TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND RULES OF COURT.
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
LIII to LXI
OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING
AS A PROBATE COURT. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
L
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF SALE
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, LXV

PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE,
THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L.
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
LUCERO.
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
LXII CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF LXVI

THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER
BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
LXIII HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING LXVII

THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF
TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23,
PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT
FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
LXIV PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN LXVIII
THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF
RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
CONTAINED THEREIN.
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF. BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXIX
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES. LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
LXX
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED
LXXIV
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
LAWYERS. LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXI
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES. DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXII
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF. injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see
Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently,
LXXVII
Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs
THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the
HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been
acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her
LXXVIII
husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for
AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying
RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact
Brief.) that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended
representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the
narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be
heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat
mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to
precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as
have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the
administrator of the Hodges estate.
proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that
respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved
PROHIBITION CASES in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of
more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent
I
eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking
As to the Alleged Tardiness account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and
of the Present Appeals time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the
number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the
hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases.
alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of
In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around
prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein
practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it
them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results
is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is
hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no consequence
indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given
whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing
case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the
of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple
II appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
Prohibition instead of Appeal
pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded
impropriety of the special civil action of certiorariand prohibition in availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common
view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict
proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to between the parties and render more simple the determination of the
take into account that there is a common thread among the basic
secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her
objection to the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition must be estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings
overruled. 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased
to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant,
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that
petition as well as in its main brief as appellant. such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
III To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of

December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite,
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no other
exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors,
recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate and most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and
administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would
posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the
date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that
as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true
quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a
Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the deceased person have already actually distributed among themselves
contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone
formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and
concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue as in ordinary cases.
the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
considered terminated, the respective rights of all the parties
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and
time as the court directs.
relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without the
corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect. These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal.
deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued
Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2)
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts,
to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc.
accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the application of chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties,
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, and not of the court.
or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p.
397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization
Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. to enable said "Executor to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
86, Appellee's Brief) leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and
xxx xxx xxx
testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated
Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the
a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to court predicated the order in question did not pray for any such
the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege
by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.) that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and
left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that
varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the above
"herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease
indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the
or dispose of the properties in the Philippines during his lifetime",
adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied
thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing
with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already
more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the
stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the
particular portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to
issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27,
be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the
1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and
conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other
the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what
words, the authority referred to in said motions and orders is in the
the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14,
nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which
1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an
permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of
explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or
of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely
by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and
affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of
surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later
pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for determination and
conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of
Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable implication of the prayer
tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges of the withdrawn motion.
meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges
that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be
bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what
construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in
amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime,
the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have
she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should
not been disposed of by him up to his death.
remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so
subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of during his
contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion,
of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We have he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested
quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or
1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and
no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for
whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in
further against petitioner, by way of some kind of estoppel, that in its question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to
own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever
of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor, of
Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting
Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced said motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded,
could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the
them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule
rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that no 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn between that case and the
one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a
attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and distribution
them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed
even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As
motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect
but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and read as follows:
adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra
over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor,
procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni
which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of
adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten
Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal
la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754
estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have
del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan
acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the
sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha
clear language of the will but also because none of the interested
fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan
parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof.
a cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la
Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957
terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha
were really intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner,
presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley,
We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado
September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of
testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha ASI SE ORDENA.

condicion.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los person cannot be but perfunctory.
unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied
Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon
upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facieto be of the same tenor and
Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose
nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances
Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla,
attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of
Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador,
Mrs. Hodges.
declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho
al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M,
coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor
11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance
administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no
testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate
alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and
principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers and sisters,
conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally
auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein.
terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the
administradora, y cancelando su fianza. terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there
are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual
indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co- Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
promised that "proper accounting will be had in all these the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
transactions" which he had submitted for approval and authorization "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of
by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his
in her brief as appellee: combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual
of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Statement of Account by the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate
Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N.
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane
return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate
P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
Appellee's Brief.) his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 92-93,id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green to the view that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be
straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due
were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane time.
Hodges".
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the
wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who
time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26, 1962
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the
himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in
have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of
wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the
able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties
accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said
the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it
assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance stands to reason that his understanding of the situation, implicit in
taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges'
payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the own understanding thereof.
rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the
Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy real attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of
Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference his wife.
to which is made in the above quotation from respondent Magno's
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there
brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion.
are documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's
Said allegations read:
answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he
the probate of the will. filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as
Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the
renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated. However, in the
answered the pertinent question thus:
petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing,
the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was 2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between
unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife (1) the provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower,
Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased electing to take dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons
were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
filing the return, is any action described under question 1 designed or
Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline
contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in
the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property
Annex 2 of Magno's Answer Record, p. 260) interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
taxes and other legal charges.It is the intention of the surviving 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as
of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees
evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them
named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our
administration are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer
eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor
Record, p. 263)
jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated: related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow,
these documents, considering they are supposed to be copies of their
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the
originals found in the official files of the governments of the United
United States Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane
States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible
Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all
apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of
right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate,
Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without
as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said
basis in fact.
return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and
made a part hereof. Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions
towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby
that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be
ratify and confirm, the declaration made in Schedule M of said
declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated to him
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my
without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her
part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from
brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise.
the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is
On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that
made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of
Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his
income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie
wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the
Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914: conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to
Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued
more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half
to be conjugal property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is
interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged
provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of
to administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by
the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made
prescription against those for whom he was administering the
and this court in construing this provision in connection with section
conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of
No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event
the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides
of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty
that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a continuing and
of liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde
subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and
luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil.,
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of
395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10
the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate
Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson,
or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law
17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera,
imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No
40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case which came into his possession on the death of his wife in September,
of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting
discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of trust. He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego).
the community property. Attention was called to the fact that the He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after One of the conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil
the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title exclusive of any other
for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property while right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution
convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in
nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters. the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of
substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and
reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone,
December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past
and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the
and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale
innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the
and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders void for
peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in
which such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to
and approval thereof by the probate court may be secured. If We the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items
sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and
should be declared ineffective either way they are understood, marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A
considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis
them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of
immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on considerable real and other personal kinds of properties. And since,
Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof
would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose of any of
procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death,
protection of parties interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and
creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges
and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are objecting to had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the
said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less
court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges,
inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our
conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such some properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the
estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed. estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no
right to take part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased
right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action
to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that
should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass
she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her
with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased,
with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from the Court having been
on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely
expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8, 1972.
against the estate, on the other.
Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in
stressing that it is not questioning said respondent's status as such We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it,
administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of
raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate
insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned. proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB
of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at
of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the
the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet
community properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the
been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same
course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more
were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties
specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often
pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable,
mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title
it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should
between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the
administer everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis,
time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining
the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved
estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to her
pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal
for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate
meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said issue is
incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the
root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their properties in question, which would necessarily include the function
true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying
whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties
adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the
to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will? remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit
equally among themselves.
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the
present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the
cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be
estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December, 1962, objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned
a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe
and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of
that he ever exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is
estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among
already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the
the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality
his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate,
the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred
properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co- to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into
heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted
conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their
that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having these properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal
considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be
procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their
segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the
warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, rule just cited.
albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was
from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of
already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of
his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as
Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78
executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed for more than five
which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall not,
years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not
as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without
difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were
saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an
no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and
executor like PCIB here.
there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice of
"When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All
proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice
provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any
are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all
proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of
matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been
After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the segregated from each other.
husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters
brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto
may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention is correct.
Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal
Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a 6
and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which
simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis
no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease
entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his
(1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or
brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the
(3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by
death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to remainder of her estate then.
preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the
premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does,
usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the
that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore
Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but
inoperative and invalid.
the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment to
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will
"so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law,
instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default is except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving
contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs.
Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900,
would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before Us,
conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance
7
in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an
the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear
the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas
7
relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should are. * Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent
be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related
Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention
of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other
legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and
other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in
Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her accordance with her duly probated will.
original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the
that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably
petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her
corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and
estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide
taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to
8
provisions of the latter, and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven
the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties
by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it
consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any
is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges
event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as
himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which should
allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned
constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed
earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly
among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that,
questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of
more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of
Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it
Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering
would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined
that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws
in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the
has reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB
simple reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court
that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now
beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present
be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two
Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet
existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do
position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of so in the first instance.
Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot
constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in
any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations,
applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be
the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no
proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A.
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that
"with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under
Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which,
as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in
not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs.
Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the
waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in
parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to
the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate
make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact,
testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
even our finding above about the existence of properties constituting the estate
of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that,
their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared
should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in
concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in
the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of
support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and
Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than that Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
We have fixed above. [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met.
There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West
what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of
like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding,
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other
executed."
cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found
In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held: in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties
herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in
and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if We took into
Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia
certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the
govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg
would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said
Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of
provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime.
the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law.
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American
conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois we note that it
does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly,
reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law
as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside,
Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take even upon application made within six months under section 113 of
judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear
Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That section affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true,
authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and
of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois,
words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the
States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we
provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tend to
American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
derived from the broader language, used in the same section, where it It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public moment.
knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain
think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do
Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in
not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court
any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without
taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be
such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases
wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables
even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also
amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the
We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and
actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by
longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could this Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R.
be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine
concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will
pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as
claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not now or well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.
later pretend differently.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July
The law governing successional rights.
31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges,
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and
was an American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the
testamentary successions both with respect to the order of succession State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower court, pronouncements
which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules,
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights well as immovables situated in the Philippines.
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
The subject of successional rights.
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." community property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the
two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own
national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of
property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the
Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the order of
conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas,
successional rights. There can be no question about this.
in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs
the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil
or personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect Code provides:
to immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be
property, as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines,
entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse,
the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was
and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen"
solemnized inarticulo mortis, and the testator died within three
(G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that
months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving
Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will
spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than
five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges
be that specified in the preceding paragraph. properties pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21,
petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a
fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the
that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by
immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal
spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton
property, as his legitime.
Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue. Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25,
petition).
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30,
1968, the following appears: f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole
ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines ownership and such was the status of the properties as of the time of
(pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, quoted in the earlier part of this option.
Philippine law governs the successional rights over the properties left
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the
by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs.
the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24
laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have already SCRA 1018).
explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the
fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We
further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is
have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of
how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and
disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her
this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas
brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the
do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime
same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is
provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived
untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such
his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions,
namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some
violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further
that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the
December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and irrevocably Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his
exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express
overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is
PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own
in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the
will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was
virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of
Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order
from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in
asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of question.
properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own
THE APPEALS
share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right
over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in
inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are
exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had
or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting his
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of
properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since
make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee
the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders
brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with law.
of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such
belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best
of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be
belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two
considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost their
that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however,
died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the relating peculiarly to the respective orders in question, if commonly
remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance,
of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or without
concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury
further claims that either the matters involved were not properly to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary
within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings
followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine, whether or
dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals. not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record,
there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower
exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may
court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee
not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the
Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which
applicable purely adjective rules.
is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any
qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on
her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to
administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the
might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such
existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to
commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that should deprive
function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court
appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator
ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
not have authority to act independently from her. And considering December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely barred
that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved.
In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special
view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each
Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective
other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts
administrators therein "act conjointly none of them to act singly and
above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each
independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We
of the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the said
has to be set aside or they may all be legally maintained properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might
notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position which could result
in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited
concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of
than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may
C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been
be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these
deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn
proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide
and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of
therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration
thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed.
9 Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that)
Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records,
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what
documents and papers she may have in her possession, in the same
appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the
manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and
sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the
papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of
order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
Assignments of error numbers transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII. Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of
records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the
August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to
protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4)
involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly
the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for
by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and
reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp.
Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
455-456, id.)
Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary
steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is
sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8,
denying the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967,
276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965 and, more importantly, with what We have said the trial court should
have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December 19,
of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration
arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.)
differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.)
two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV
have been done and should be done until the two estates are and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965
separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix
Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs.
hereby overruled. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus
and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases
The orders complained of under these assignments of error now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo , more
commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126-129, id.)
Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever
administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the
Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of
fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in the estate of C. N. Hodges to countersign the said check or checks
effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges. as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order
of approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.)
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to
Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order
reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court
of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that
and three other persons for services in copying the court records to
"PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.) legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at
most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it,
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors
is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the
insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the heirs,
questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature
expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot
Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture prevail.
is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties
in these cases are ultimately resolved,
10
the final result will surely be that there Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing
are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the
current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right, as interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those
such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be
involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters
paid for her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is
related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as
not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to
administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is
her credit.
without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually,
end had the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs.
manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the
regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's
see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any
in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the nature
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the
of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing
ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses
of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the
of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to
exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney- reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any cannot be represented by a common counsel.
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should
PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate
court, all the expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges
be paid without awaiting the determination and segregation of the have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has
estate of Mrs. Hodges. no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of
11
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, no prejudice
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in
under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the question. And in this connection, it may be added that, although strictly
parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the first
instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of
final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs
respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate,
has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or
is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical
not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and
these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to Assignments of error I to IV,
both. The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of
interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of
that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of
independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the
segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of
corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell
his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that,
Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell
inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as
Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell
absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales
that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and
Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell
consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts
may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by
Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell
the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in
Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to
which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those
Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the contract to sell
in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico,
Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by
Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the
Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell
immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, 1
cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 * all proceeds of
Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell
remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his
wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third
subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense parties are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to
that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or
suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their
property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges
own making. What is more, the transactions they rely on were
to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby
submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from
belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part
of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had
involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
payments made by the appellees should be considered as payments to the estate appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions
of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs
with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one
specified in the will.
of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before
during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned
blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures
degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of from the estate made by her either conjointly with or independently
PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be
would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that said that said buyers-appellees merely followed precedents in
have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders
five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal
and practical view of the legal situation involving them by infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by
observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what
said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute
should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would
concerned.
finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the
spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of
her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and
May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and voluminous selling personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent
pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict with said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of
deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can
those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket
been actually under her control and administration had Hodges orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of
complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself
the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB
prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by
errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges,
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts
definitely not PCIB.
to sell" upon which the deeds in question were based were executed
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold,
sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered by the
will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the
nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the
Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the actuations of the trial court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by
simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects
for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things
was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already
business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned
been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by
assignments of error under discussion. PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees,
and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of
Assignments of error V to VIII,
properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non- unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that
fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms any objections were raised by said parties or that they would
and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant
assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to
automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of the failure PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which
of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the
again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already
deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator of
have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the
portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in
covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate
Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties
that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of view, against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in effect
it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not it was proper determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the
respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers- of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the
appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to so
in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding
appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of the said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration
issue". of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against
PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in
orders favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be
their favor that is decisive. Since We have already held that the
recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by
properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to
a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As
be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is
of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in
PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents. Considering,
the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it
therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the
received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters
real parties in interest having the right to oppose the consummation
of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee
of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones
Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct
who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the
estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it
assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must
made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by
accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
paying all your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the said she would "appreciate very much if you can make some
orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the
owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On
the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging
Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue
installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that
prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing
court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after
administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that
trial court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same
this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green
administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant can pay to R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not
both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
(Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
at this point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions We have
entitled thereto."
already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally,
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not
said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned
was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to
was heard, considered and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas a contract to convey property executed by a deceased person raises
the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor or
order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may
the substantive aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a
motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the
order authorized payment to a person other than the administrator of cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in
the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted. agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant
to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the
consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the
supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to
sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective
clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them
nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the
amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal,
2nd paragraph) the pactum commissorium or the automatic rescission wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to
provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to
has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the
Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other
made in connection with the transactions herein involved. is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of
the latter.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII. Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27,
Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a
SUMMARY
separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling
the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been
varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14,
error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been
only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in
our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties
restatement of the whole situation be made together with our left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. . deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton
Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and
Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the
executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges
corresponding statements of account of his administration, with the repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the
particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally
the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more
of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of
last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
said accounts approved as prayed for. had its own income distinct from his own.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or 2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its
Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her
the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in
to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased
said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that
my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or Hodges".
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he
and share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that
expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29,
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate
brothers and sisters from the inheritance. of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of
the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and
United States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had
Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB
renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs,
alone.
which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an
alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been
in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the
and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the
or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it
income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for
wife, since her death. approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow,
however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day,
them began acting later on separately and independently of each
upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its
she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate
own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as
the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in
acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton
the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is
Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the
still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste,
not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the
unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26,
conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the
other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner
lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside.
and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will
Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is
estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the
actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be
point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the
about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the
deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen,
them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than
administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the
and the present judicial controversies came about. fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article
16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and
issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to
December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the
act alone.
annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that
the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the
virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her
Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring
have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of administration
Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-
Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell"
allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on
jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to
on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the present
estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively. existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties,
which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial
correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the
court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be
conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends
provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and
that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past and
undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to
future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course
her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that
of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position
the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant
is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the
the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged
provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the
final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders
conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to
furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time
her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the
said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the
Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs.
point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.
Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such
legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her
disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders
share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further
merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of
advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under
law renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole
Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third
estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest
parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent
upon the death of Hodges.
taxes have been paid.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances
just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of
presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges'
purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the
Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for
the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which
whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact,
period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, create estoppel.
when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in
made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, whether
Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes
in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his
ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on
wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently
the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime
disposed of them gratuitously.
usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with
pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of
under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would
positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of
be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in
free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged
and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a
parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby
the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one- the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition
fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the
hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-
ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence,
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the
her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than
contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
to conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his
unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be
wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of
distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent
the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to
Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted
make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two
correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition
issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings
for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels
and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and
indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further
the determination of the specific properties constituting her estate,
proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is
the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's
that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs.
resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the
Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or
dispositive portion of its decision.
caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our
conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the
what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be
therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the
it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that
the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and
estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear
administration expenses in question. that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has
objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties,
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions
there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties
registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related DISPOSITIVE PART
earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife,
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING,
on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to
by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the
as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of
this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with
properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized,
from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1)
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent
the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the
obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether
assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his
the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the
death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already
said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs.
gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
there would be prejudice to anyone, including the government, the
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently
Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that
of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are
lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner- directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special
appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the
Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A.
Court in the foregoing opinion.
Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special
Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice
from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part
hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision
of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and
fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them hereof in
segregation from each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the
finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the accordance with the rules.
partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one- Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of
said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be
administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its
12
removal as administrator ; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the
final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for
further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation
and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said
resolution.
Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child

Malang vs. Moson (August 22, 2000)
was born out of Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was
EN BANC pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
G.R. No. 119064 August 22, 2000 In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were
childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai
NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, petitioner,
(Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a
vs.
daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that
HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Shari'a District Court,
place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling
Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL
of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula
MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG,
married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he
LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG
eventually divorced them.
and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner
DECISION
Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless.
For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of
agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and
whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the
Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He
property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the
deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank
effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter,
and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
"P.D. 1083" or "Muslim Code"). The question is raised in connection with the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City,
Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday)
with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of
Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael
his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of
Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang
her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar).
Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that
Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and
Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the
6
titled in Hadji Abdulas name "married to Neng P. Malang," and a pick-up required bond. He took his oath on the same day. The following day, Hadji
jeepney. Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were
7
allowed to take their oath as administrators.
On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the
1 2
petition. After such publication or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the
Ulyssis Malang ("Hadji Mohammad", for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9) major
8
Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters banks. Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of those banks be ordered
9
that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula. The
10
spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; Sharia District Court having granted the motions, Assistant Vice President
(d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that
Ulyssis Malang who is also known as "Teng Abdula," son; (f) Hadji Ismael as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one
Malindatu Malang, also known as "Keto Abdula," son, (g) Fatima Malang, also million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight
11
known as "Kueng Malang," daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai centavos (P1,520,400.48). The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of
Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993, "Hadji Abdula Malang or
since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their Malindatu Malang" had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred
father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos
3 12
his estate. (P378,493.32). PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a
balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, 13
August 11, 1994.
Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an
opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure
4
Mohammad. that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion
praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw from UCPB
On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji
the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute
Mohammad administrator of his fathers properties outside Cotabato City. The 14
her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula. After due hearing, the Sharia
same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as joint
District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty
administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required 15
5
thousand pesos (P250,000.00).
to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. On April 13, 1994, letters of
On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael contributed to the decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner
as joint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of all properties of had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the
16
Hadji Abdula. In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an inventory presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal
showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the
assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an agricultural land with decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not
assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in
17
two-storey residential building. All these properties were declared for taxation the name of the decedent "married to Neng Malang" because such description is
purposes in Hadji Abdulas name. not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because
petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged "to the
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula
estate of decedent," she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of
"married to Neng Malang" had seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed
evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of the
value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at
18
properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name "married to Neng Malang." Fifth,
P30,000.00 and bank deposits.
if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should have
20
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent.
asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge
and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of
Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between
the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located
petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married eight times.
19
outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent.
The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that more than one wife because "conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil
all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship." The court
reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner further found that the decedent was "the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of
because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women his families" and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the
was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description "married to Neng
conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous Malang" in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the
marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent adopted a description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such
"complete separation of property regime" in his marital relations; while his description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal
wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis partnership of gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate
properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the
properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -
provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of the
c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -
petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing marriages.
Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the d) Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do -
property regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is against the law, e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -
public policy, public order, good moral(s) and customs.
f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do -
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of
property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage
g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -
settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no
h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -
evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had
begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal, i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -
21
but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.
Total------------------------ 64/64
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in
the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the 3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng "Kagui Kadiguia"
case as follows: Malang by way of advance be charged against her share and if her
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:

share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse 4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their
the funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from
expenses in the amount of P2,040.80; receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties,
located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that
ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as follows: Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia
22
District Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one
23
petitioner filed a notice of appeal. However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a of first impression --- this is a singular situation where the issue on what law
manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the
provisions of P.D. No. 1083: passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for the
Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts 26
curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno and former Congressman Michael O.
whether on appeal from the ShariaCircuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing 27
Mastura . The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici curiae for their
herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the 28
valuable inputs in their written memoranda and in the hearing of June 27,
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
2000.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing "an original
24
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of
action of certiorari with the Supreme Court."
the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events or
29
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that the Sharia judicial decrees affecting civil status. It also explains why the evidence in the
District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages,
Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties acquired
counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were
during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of
properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law, the regime of
the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely, Aida, Saaga,
relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to
25
Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the enactment of
the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract.
the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the
As petitioner sees it, "the law applicable on issues of marriage and property Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida,
regime is the New Civil Code", under which all property of the marriage is Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some
viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took
plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 ("R.A. 394"), authorizing Muslim
property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083. divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim
Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present
3, 1988. in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage
celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the
multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code valid?
case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete
(3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense
(1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages
with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us could result
celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the
in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound implications
property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before the
on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein.
Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim
Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to supply
who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws
the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words, "missing links", that would
apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages
be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve
entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husbands death)
the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our
after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected
part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of
before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?
pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition ---
curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of
concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to the
respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:
effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the settlement of
the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages
acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated
that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely presented and identify
was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the
such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate
31
marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code recognized the right of Muslims to
case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often
contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that
come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by
30
---
a discussion of the "watershed of collateral issues" that this case presents.
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian

provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or
33
practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification of Muslim
34
the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92. personal laws, also provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its
enactment:
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed
between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of
with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution,
recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability
provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of incurred thereby.
the non-Christian provinces.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
35
enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
36
1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws. Article 186
Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that
Code. took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the
Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous
Dumpo marriage. "Bigamous or polygamous marriages" are considered void and
37
inexistent from the time of their performance. The Family Code which
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which
superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent
32
sanctioned multiple marriages. It is also not to be disputed that the only law in
marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior
force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was 38
marriage void shall likewise be void. These provisions illustrate that the
the Civil Code of 1950.
marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that
subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is
subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim
enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our
exist at any given time.
holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the
parricide, since --- property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of
the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the
marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether
defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time.
Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial
Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-
39
amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its
Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law , which
provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after
merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not
August 3, 1988.
thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime
of parricide. Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2)
whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when,
the subject properties were acquired.
legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage
with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did
when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such
partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property
union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of
relations between husband and wife.
the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second
she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.
marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for
40
bigamy would have prospered. Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income provisions of the said Code are pertinent:
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
by the husband and wife. industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144: In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in family and of the household.
Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
41
must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Situating these rulings to the
consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.
instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common
are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
42
with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such proof, surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing of the cohabitation.
marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting
43
marriage.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint Property Regimes
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit. Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual
parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or
the last paragraph of the preceding Article. born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil
Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
bad faith.
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties "live
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
together as husband and wife" the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
"live exclusively with each other as husband and wife." Also, in contrast to
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first
instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
prove their "actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry" and only the child.
to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are
embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share (1) By the impotence of the husband;
of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of
such existing marriage.
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved
such a way that access was not possible; and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the
child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be
(3) By the serious illness of the husband. presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born
thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the
wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance
days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former
of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula
husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to
on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or
take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.
illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by
provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply.
the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of
Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:
the conception of the child.
(a) The husband, the wife;
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;

(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be
legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation (c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
must prove his allegation.
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of uterine brother.
marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son,
shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no
she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such
evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of 44
descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. The respective shares
access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in
the child. Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are
Code illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The
provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June fact and time of conception or birth may be determined
45
18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969. Thus, a Muslim by proof orpresumption depending upon the time frame and the
divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
applicable law.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of
issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the
his death on December 18, 1993?The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of
guidance of the lower court. Thus:
the following:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as
time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in
determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and
1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage
should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the
which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting
Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas
marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is
death.
because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of
the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144
at any given time. of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988
are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim
the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than
divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A 1wphi 1
the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may
Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June
submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is
18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 46
theirs exclusively.
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as
regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages,
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in
148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or illegitimate)
begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or
1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as
d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding lawful heirs.
paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji

Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of
Abdula are his exclusive properties. petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on
47
the issue of marriage settlement, but espouses that customs or established
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in
practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of
intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful 48
law to the instant case. Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven
wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which Islamic law
children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly the
49
Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims and the impracticability of
a strict application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under
will govern the determination of their respective shares.
50
Muslim law. Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent civil
in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with
remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be received customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a
to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the distribution of property between
accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions 51
divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death.
of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia
rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal
District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE,
partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third
and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence
collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods of actual
and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in
cohabitation ("common life" under a "common roof") of each of the marriages
this Decision.
during which time the parties lived together; (4) the identification of specific
properties acquired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in SO ORDERED.
paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicating joint or
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000)
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines
5
FIRST DIVISION Sur.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, 6
States District Court, Southern District of New York.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo
was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited
DECISION 7
the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living
8
PARDO, J.: in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
The Case On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the
The case raises a conflict of laws issue. 9
child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946,
1
Appeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
2
Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all
"Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N.
other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
The Facts conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
3
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother.
10
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.
referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic

4
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce "(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically
the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
11
and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
12
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. "(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
13
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both
14
town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and "(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
15
wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to
16
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by
and among themselves;
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with "(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to of my children in the order of age, if of age;
wit:
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my should served (sic) without bond;
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree
in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever
my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of
17 "Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
this Last Will and Testament."
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive
18
Administratrix of his estate. any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the
19
testator Lorenzo was still alive. "On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
20
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
admitted the will to probate.
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
21
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
22
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she
the remaining free portion in equal shares.
was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired
during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor "Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
23
conjugal property. administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
24
755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.

25 debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when
26
"Bicol Star".
required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
33
performed. reconsideration of the decision.
34
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
could not be granted. 35
Hence, this petition.
27
"SO ORDERED."
The Issue
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
28
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
aforequoted decision. 36
raised, the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration Llorente?
but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case
children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
29
to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
adopted by him. Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court
declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her The Applicable Law
to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
30 The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
estate.
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
31
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise: Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she The Civil Code clearly provides:
and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
cohabitation.
legal capacity of persons arebinding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
32
"SO ORDERED." though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
country where it is situated. State law.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one
be found." (emphasis ours)
half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
37 The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
alleged and proved.
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the circumstances here obtaining.
fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
40
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
38
our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated
1 wph!1 their national law.
in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law.
41
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that
There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law
39
and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing
42
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether
that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
the status of persons.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
43
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national
45
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the law.
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
Validity of the Will
The Fallo
The Civil Code provides:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
executed.
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination
(underscoring ours)
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
44
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."
No costs.SO ORDERED
after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the
Testate Estate of Suntay (JULY 31, 1964)
latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On
EN BANC 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing
SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant, of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
vs. evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY, order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee. the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case
to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil.,
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
793). In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to
PADILLA, J.: the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance
of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents
1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy,
of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed
China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the
by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and
deceased is more than P50,000.
probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed
personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his
namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano,
mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of
and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria
the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their
Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted
share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G.
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and
Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goo and the
subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the
latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B.
cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned only with the Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence
probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on November 1929 of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's
or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation
to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien clause and each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of
province, Republic of China. the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd
interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7
(answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents of the will
February 1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before
written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language (answers to the
the expiration of ten years.
22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides: knows about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay
at the time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution 8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents
and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of
to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the
69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft
the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction"
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When
(answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking
a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated
Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and
and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-
certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B)
recorded. translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an
up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-
attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was
interrogatories, Id.).
an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her brother
brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of the Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n.,
arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.
document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying
Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24
against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole
February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in
will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only the
her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by
signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto
her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and
Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she
his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr.
read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in
(pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he
chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or handed
turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on
adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto
and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, in November 1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that
Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had
better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n.,
the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" cannot
hearing of 19 January 1948), before the last postponement of the hearing granted
be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it
by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes Building and
must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in
left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing
lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will
of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A
which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on
with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was
that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At
exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).
any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned to them from
Teodoro And returned by the latter to the former because they could not agree information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the
on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight from the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the
Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the final
he read the supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez;
the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s.
s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and
appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to draw up another will
acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the
deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396,
s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay
not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all the share, copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the
participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp.
second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will made up of four
testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds of the or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months
estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his
of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on
the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion Dasmarias street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all
and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and her come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an
child Silvino. envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were written: "Testamento de
Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in
placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the
the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not
properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the
revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls
testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that
short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be
he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part
"clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible
of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-
witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or
6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law
upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition;
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will
prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in
rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez
his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.). presented for allowance.
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in

Section 3 provides:
connection with the complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the
alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay at Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts,
attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same
to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and
assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro
recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if
(p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not
originally proved and allowed in such court.
give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to
bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
6).
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides: will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is
no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set
of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
Court of First Instance in the Philippines. inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does
not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
Section 2 provides: procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would
be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines,
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of
by the executor or other person interested, in the court having taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed

HUANG KUANG CHENG
that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese
courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were Clerk of Court
so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It
is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice CHIANG TENG HWA
or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested Judge
parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows
that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the (Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).
Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be
notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental
interested parties. concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
follows: leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to
therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this
ORDER:
country.
SEE BELOW
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated

parties, who declare that there are no errors, after said minutes were
loudly read and announced actually in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of

the 35th year of the Republic of China in the Civil Section of the
Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the
Article 798 dispositive portion of which reads:
Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12, (1999)) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of
FIRST DIVISION
the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the
1
vs. government.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion
for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same
was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
2
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals
issue that arose from the following antecedents: on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement
the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private respondents
who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents
did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside
the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated
4
merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of
which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents
time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question
filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed
determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in
5
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes
contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due
6
have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. execution.
Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
7
validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the
late Alejandro and to maintain thestatus quo or lease of the premises thereon to n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
3
third parties. Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that
8
n the testamentary capacity of the testator;
petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late
Alejandro. n and the due execution of the last will and testament.
9
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he
aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or
effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,
10
that he was of
settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by
superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and law from making a will.
11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
12
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same
13
rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that
is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved
18
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this adversely by some other court. It is clear from the executory order that the
Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws
decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher of intestate succession.
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence
remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of
it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues
other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision
heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares
or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound
from one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must
19
14
filed." The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is
at some point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end
not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate
to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the very object of which the
15 children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it
courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to
16 of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy.
be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a party interested in
Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate
a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out
distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
17 the same will.
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur
herein. It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
20
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there
could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and SO ORDERED.
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the
transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed
21
to give Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate
can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test
is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will
are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled
that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial
court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the

conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved
wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties
which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with
respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the
void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot

considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not
an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is

AFFIRMED.
wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of
Article 799 his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a
valid will.
Bagtas vs. Paguio (22 Phil 227)
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of
EN BANC
fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left
DECISION side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired
and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles
March 14, 1912
his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of
G.R. No. L-6801 his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of
vs. his family.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary
Salas and Kalaw for appellants. witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney,
Jose Santiago for appellee. Se?or Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have
since died, and consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of
Trent, J.:
the case in the lower court. The other three testamentary witnesses and the
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was
Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was offered as the last will and executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will
testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been was executed in the following manner:
executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April,
1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items
following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn
executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son delivered to Se?or Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The
and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are
a deceased daughter. delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator
asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole
executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching
had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted
presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Se?or Marco gave the document matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made
to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after
the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated
the testator and each other. that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The
testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we
the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two
are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of
physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had
the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.
attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants second assignment of error, latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted.
viz, the testators alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the The following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:
will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you
attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the
attended him, do you think he was in his right mind?
testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he
indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the mental disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years,
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that
and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness,
the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental
Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was
disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time
unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only
of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was
reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the
without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in
testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the
what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had
testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing
noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited
witness.
him.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer
when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration
was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a
of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator
person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the
testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep.,
whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some 463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1
length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator Phil. Rep., 689.)
had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged
stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person
insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it
who was suffering from such a disease.
is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases
strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly
fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not
with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a
greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and
condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard,
be no doubt that the testators infirmities were of a very serious character, and it few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting
is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in
of his life. However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there
necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will. are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such
circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any
it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified
charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In
testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of
Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that ?
court. The numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not
States courts are especially applicable to the case at bar and have our approval.
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of
In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of
mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of
the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack
executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect
statement.) the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of
memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity,
his immediate family or property. . . .
section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466),
as follows: xxxxxxxxx
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will,
shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking
or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties. contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf,
but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events,
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes,
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular
testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable for vigor and
he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was
bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational
to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when expression.
he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)

In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking
trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of
he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to
death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the
shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the
observant of the properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any
said: particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again,
the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of
a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and
Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil 163)
mentally incapable of making a will.
EN BANC
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and
DECISION testament of Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing
and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in
September 18, 1909
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the
G.R. No. 4445 making of wills.
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,

Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario,
vs.
testified in support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in
Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants. all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present
when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the third
Fernando Salas for appellee.
subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes
Carson, J.: no comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that there was
some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros,
to observe that, when because of death, sickness, absence, or for any other
admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of
reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the subscribing
Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow,
witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of these
Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by
witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such
the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and who would be
as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it
appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the
line. will and swore that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind
and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his last will
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the
and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each other, they
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of
as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching and exhaustive
the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will
cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could
point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it is alleged the
incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the
contradiction, however, which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity,
witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and on the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and
and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other detailed account of all that occurred, and is so convincing and altogether
testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify
eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that his wife properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence and belief.
aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving
instrument, and that he was given nourishment while he was in that position,
that at the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified
but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately before or after, or both
that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the
before and after he attached his signature to the will. To say that the sick man
testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical and
sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with the fact that
mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of
he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible
these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the
that nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing
house at or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on
the will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and the
which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the
other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both.
witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other
But, however this may have been, we do not think that a slight lapse of memory
witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the
on the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of an
testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore
unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly
that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about
directed, is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as
the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that time the
to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the
alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged testator
instrument. Of course, a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged
was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make himself
subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was
understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the
executed, or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the
testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In
incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was present
addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly
must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard
discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to
to it are so clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or probability of
that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear to any fact which
mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the witnesses
he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine and
authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the
with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny opinion of the trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:
the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the
positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was not his brothers
presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in
signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a
the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures,
somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to
and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that
understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On
the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that
cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because his brother and his at the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two
brothers wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact,
other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a
one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further, that, person who was not in the habit of signing his name every day.
although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two
members of his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even
signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are
attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true, it
identical.
would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing witnesses to the
alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on the That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened to pay established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively
his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true
witness would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in
contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and place or in the an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks
manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not think that the of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed
testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the
sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this
subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a
manner and from in which it was executed. lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing
witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the
his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
deceased was introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to
give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the
desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his difficulty of the undertaking (Trish vs. Newell, 62 Ill. 196, 203).
testamentary capacity.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of
property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held
influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or
unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble
corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory
will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is
heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long disposing of his property (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.) 418); that, To
separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should
with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan vs.
Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, Maxwell, 3 N.J.Eq. 563); that it has not been understood that a testator must
although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the
death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct.
leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its
his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or
means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the
influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants rational faculties common to man (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 680); and, that
allegation that the will never was executed. Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of
soundness is one of degree (Boughton vs. Knight, L. R., 3 P. & D. 64; 42 L.J.P.
It has been said that the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to
25); on the other hand, it has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
determine the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind.
everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of
Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease, or
measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes
great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the
(Greene vs. Greene, 145 Ill. 264, 276); and that it is probable that no court has
testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really
ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of
disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or
consequences of the act she is engaged in (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of
Am. St. Rep. 293, 302). this instance against the appellants.
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
down a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases
which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already
been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under
consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the
following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently
announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is
some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof
of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof
of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements in
sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction

which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of
and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and
to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among
the objects of his bounty.
(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of
Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive

manner the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and
testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the
requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased
was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his own free
will and accord.
All this evidence taken together with the circumstances that before and at the
Torres vs. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772)
time Tomas Rodriguez was caused to sign the supposed will Exhibit A, and the
EN BANC
copies thereof there already existed a final judgment as to his mental condition
DECISION wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of
himself and manage his estate shows in a clear and conclusive manner that at
February 26, 1926
the time of signing the supposed will of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such
G.R. No. L-24569 mental capacity as was necessary to be able him to dispose of his property by the
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, supposed will.
appellant,
But even supposing as contended by petitioners counsel that Tomas Rodriguez
vs.
was at the time of execution of the will, competent to make a will, the court is of
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
the opinion that the will cannot be probated for it appears from the declaration
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant. of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee Luz Lopez presented
Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas Cary Welch for appellee. the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to sign said
Malcolm, J.: Exhibit A because it was a document relative to the complaint against one
This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Castito, which Exhibit 4, then pending in the justice of the peace court, and for
Lopez. the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was then under guardianship, due
to his being mentally and physically incapacitated and therefore unable to
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, manage his property and take care of himself. It must also be taken into account
1924, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the that Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age, and was sick in the
executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. hospital when his signature to the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows
Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained
the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of through fraudulent and deceitful representations of those who were interested
senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been in it. (Record on Appeal, p. 23)
exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others
who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the From the decision and judgment above-mentioned the proponents have
document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial appealed. Two errors are specified, viz: (1) The court below erred in holding that
judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of at the time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess the mental
the trial judge appeared, among others, these findings: capacity necessary to make the same, and (2) the court below erred in holding
that the signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained through property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The
fraudulent and deceitful representations, made by persons interested in the deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows that
executions of said will. he was able to answer nearly all of the questions propounded intelligently
(Exhibit 5-g). A trial had at which considerable oral testimony for the petitioner
The record is voluminous close to two thousand typewritten pages, with a
was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was issued by the
varied assortment of exhibits. One brief contains two hundred seventy-four
presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of
pages, the other four hundred fifteen pages. The usual oral argument has been
himself and to manage his property and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his
had. The court must scale this mountains of evidence more or less relevant and
guardian. (Exhibit 37).
of argument intense and prolific to discover the fertile valleys of fact and
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make such of one incident which occurred
principle.
in connection with the guardianship proceedings, it may as well be mentioned
The topics suggested by the assignments of error Testamentary Capacity and here as later. This episode concerns the effort of deputy sheriff Joaquin Garcia to
Undue Influence will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be make service on Tomas Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will let the witness
made under each subject first to make findings of fact quite separate and apart tell in his own words what happened on the occasions in question:
from those of the judge and second to make findings of law and the law by
I found him lying down on his bed. . . . And when it (the cleaning of his head)
rendering judgment.
was finished, I again entered his room, and told him that I had an order of the
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY court which I wanted to read as I did read to him, but after reading the order he
asked me what the order meant; I read it to you so that you may appear before
A. Facts. For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble
the court, understand, then I read it again, but he asked what the order said; in
health. His breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing
view of that fact I left the order and departed from the house. (S. R., p. 642.)
years and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on
August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez To return to our narrative possibly inspired by the latter portion of the order
as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7). of Judge Diaz, Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on
November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his death. The
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of
physician in charge during this period was Dr. Elias Domingo. In the clinical
Manila to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and
case record of the hospital under the topic Diagnosis (in full), we find the
pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta
following Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus (Exhibit 8).
acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was far
from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after his On the door of the patients room was placed a placard reading No visitors,
except father, mother, sisters, and brothers. (Testimony of head nurse
physician, there were permitted to visit the patient only the following named his desire to do so. I told him that it seemed that we were not called upon to
persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno, decide or give an opinion as to whether or not he can make a will; it is a
Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio question to be submitted to the court, but as he had announced his desire, it is
Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not include the names of our duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to do what was necessary to
Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named comply with his wishes: I told him I was to see him; then we agreed that on the
persons experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating in to the room of morning next to the following evening that is on the 16th, I should go to the
Rodriguez. General Hospital and so I did.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th? A. Yes, sir.
Rodriguez in the hospital , Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will
Q. Did you meet D. Tomas? A. Yes, sir.
and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550).
This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez, who then Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the
OCAMPO: Leading.
purpose of securing him to prepare the will. In accordance with this request,
Judge Mina conferred with Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital in December 16th ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that
and December 29th. He ascertained the wishes of Rodriguez and wrote up a occasion when you saw him there? A. He told me that.
testament in rough draft. The attorney expected to return to the hospital on
Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. The
December 31st to have the will executed but was unable to do so on account of
conversation I had with him that evening according to my best recollection I
having to make a trip to the provinces. Accordingly, the papers were left with
cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the order. After the usual greetings,
Santiago Lopez.
Good evening, D. Tomas, Good evening, How are you, How do you do? Very
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge well, just came here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez why does he not come. He
Minas testimony which has not been challenged in any way: cannot come because he has many things to do, and besides it is hard for him
and makes him tired, so he told me to come. Mina, your tenant, attorney. Are
ARANETA: Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with
you an attorney? Yes. Where do you live? I live in Quiapo. Oh, in Quiapo, a
Vicente Lopez?
good district, it is gay a commercial place you must have some business there
MAXIMINO MINA: A. Then I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the because that is a commercial place. Unfortunately, I have none, D. Tomas. Well,
usual greeting and other unimportant things, he consulted me or presented the you must be have because the profession alone does not give enough. Where is
question as to whether or not D. Tomas could make his will, having announced your office? I work in the office of Mr. Chicote. That Mr. Chicote must be rich, it
seems to me that he is. The profession gives almost nothing it is better to have which compelled me to be absent from Manila until January 1st at least, for I
properties. I am an attorney but do not depend upon my profession. I might be there for several days, so I went to the General Hospital of my own
interrupted D. Tomas saying, since you want to make a will, when and to whom accord since I had not received any messages from them with a rough draft
do you want to leave your fortune? Then he said, To whom else? To my cousin which I had prepared in accordance with what he had told me in our
Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez. Which properties do you want to conversation. After the greetings, I told him, Here I am D. Tomas; this is the
give to your cousin and niece? All my properties, Wont you specify the property rough draft of your will in accordance with your former statements to me in
to be given to each of them? What for? All my property. Dont you have any order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it? Please do me the favor of
other relatives? Yes, sir I have. Wont you give any to those relatives? What for? reading it. I read it slowly to him in order that he could understand it . After
was his answer. Well, do you want to specify said properties, to say what they reading, Is it all right, that is the way,- few words you see it takes only a few
are? and he again said, What for? they know them, he is my attorney-in-fact as minutes; now I can execute the will. We can do it takes only a few minutes. In
to all property. I also said, Well and as legacy wont you give property to other view of that statement of his, I called his attention, But we dont have
persons? answers, I think, something, they will know it. After being asked, witnesses, D. Tomas. I looked out through the door to see if I could call some
Whom do you think, would you want to be your executor? After hesitating a witnesses but it was late then and it was thought better to do it on the 31st of
little, This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also. Then I asked him, What is December. Then we talked about other things, and he again asked. Where were
your religion? He answered, Roman Apostolic Catholic, and then he also asked you born? I told him in Quiapo. Ah, good district, and especially now that the
me, and your? Also Roman Apostolic Catholic, Where have you studied? In the fiesta of Quiapo is coming near, and then I interrupted him, Yes, the fiesta of
University of Santo Tomas. It is convenient to preserve the Catholic religion the Holy Child and of Our Lady of Mount Carmel because we also talked about
that our descendants have left us. And you, what did you have anything more to the fiesta of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that we could not do it
say as to your testamentary dispositions? No, he answered. Then I remind him, because the witnesses were not there and he explained, Good Christmas
You know that Vicente Lopez has sent me to get these dispositions of yours, present, isnt it? I did not tell him anything and in view of that I did not deem it
and he said, Yes, do it. I asked him, When do you want it done? Later on, I will necessary to stay there any longer.
send for you. After this believing to have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening
Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him? A. Yes.
of the 31st of December you said that it was agreed that the will be executed on
Q. When? A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening. the evening of December 31st? A. With Santiago Lopez and Don Tomas.
Q. Why did you go to see him? A. Because as I had not received any message Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December? A. What happened is this:
either from Vicente Lopez or Tomas Rodriguez, as I had received notices in In view of that agreement, I fixed up the draft which I had, dating it the 31st of
connection with the few cases I had in the provinces particularly in Tayabas, December, putting everything in order; we agreed that Santiago would meet me
on 31st day between five and six in the evening or a little before, but it happened First I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my body be
that before the arrival of that date Santiago Lopez came and told me that I need buried in accordance with my religion, standing and circumstances.
not trouble about going to the General Hospital; because it could not be carried
Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
out for the reason that certain requisites were lacking. In view of this and
Bueno as my only universal heirs of all my property.
bearing always in mind that on the following day I had to go to the provinces, I
told Santiago Lopez that I would leave the papers with him because I might go Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my prosecutors.
to the provinces.
In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single page, in
Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present? A. They the presence of the witness who sign below.
are given a Christmas present when Christmas comes or on the occasion of
(Sgd.) TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
Christmas.
(Left marginal signatures:) TOMAS RODRIGUEZ ELIAS BONOAN V. L.

Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the
LEGARDA A. DE ASIS
will or copy of the will which you delivered to Santiago Lopez on December 21,
31, 1923? A. With the exception of the words 3 de enero de 1924 It seems to be We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don Tomas
literally identical. (S. R. pp. 244-249.) Rodriguez executed this will, consisting of one single typewritten page, having
signed at the bottom of the will in the presence of us who saw as witnesses the
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that
execution of this will, we signed at the bottom thereof in the presence of the
signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses with the single exception of
the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies
besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief and simple in (Sgd.) V. L. LEGARDAELIAS BONOAN A. DE ASIS (Exhibit A.)
terminology.
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas
For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English: Rodriguez in the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De
Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo and
ONLY PAGE
Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes of observation.
In the City of Manila, Philippines Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly also
Rodriguez, of age and resident of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do freely Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were
and voluntarily make this my will and testament in the Spanish language which hovering in the background.
I know, with the following clauses:
As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed, did Luz
contradictory accounts. One emanates from the attesting witness, Doctor Lopez talk to you? A. Yes, sir.
Bonoan. The other is the united testimony of all remaining persons who were
Q. How many days approximately before was it? A. I cannot tell the day, it was
there.
approximately one week before, on that occasion when I was called up by her
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called at the trial. He testified on about the deceased Vicente Lopez.
direct examination as to formal matters, such as the identification of the
Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one
signatures to the will .On cross-examination, he rather started the proponents
week approximately before signing the will? A. That Tomas Rodriguez would
of the will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas Rodriguez to sign the
make a will.
document it concerned a complaint against Castito and that nobody read the
will to the testator. Doctor Bonoans testimony along this line is as follows: Q. Dont you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made? A. In the
General Hospital.
QUESTIONS.
Q. Was that document written in the hospital? A. I have not seen it.
MARCAIDA : Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?
Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the
Araneta: I object to the question as being immaterial.
persons you met in the room where the patients was ? A. I met one of the
Court: Objection overruled. nieces of the deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez and Dna. Luz Lopez.
Dr. Bonoan: A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me to Q. Were those the only persons? A. Yes, sir.
be in the hospital at 3 oclock sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of January.
Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January 3d?
Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned? A. Luz Lopez, daughter of A. A quarter to 3.
Vicente Lopez.
Q. After you, who came? A. Antonio de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on Doctor
Q. What day, January 3, 1924? A. Yes, sir. Calderon arrived with Doctor Elias Domingo and lastly Santiago Lopez came
and then Mr. Legarda.
Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the
hospital? A. On the morning of the 3d she called me up by telephone. Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the
General Hospital in what position did you find him?- A. He was lying down.
Q. On the morning? A. On the morning.
Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. I did.
Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you? A. Dna. Nena immediately answered Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet or seated?
in advance and introduced me to him saying that I was the brother of his A. Lying down.
godson.
Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time of
Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon, signing the will, did they read it to him? A. Nobody read the will to him.
Herrera, Domingo, De Asis and Legarda greet Tomas Rodriguez?
Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will? A. I have not seen it.
ARANETA: I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It has
Q. Were you present? A. Yes, sir. ( S. R. p. 8)
not been the subject of the direct examination.
As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all the others
COURT: Objection overruled.
who attended the making of the will, we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who appears
ARANETA: Exception. to have assumed the leading role, tell what transpired. He testified in part:
A. No, sir, they joined us. ARANETA : Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-
2?
Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will.? A. To sign it.
LEGARDA: A. Santiago Lopez.
Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the will? A. Luz Lopez.
Q. Did he show you the same document? A. First that is to say the first
Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the
document he presented to me was a rough draft, a tentative will, and it was
will? A. She told him to sign the document; the deceased Tomas Rodriguez
dated December 31st, and I called his attention to the fact that the date was not
before signing the document asked what that was which he was to sign.
December 31, 1923, and that it was necessary to change the date to January 3,
Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas? A. Luz Lopez told 1924, and it was done.
him to sign it because it concerned a complaint against Castito. D. Tomas said,
Q. And it was then, was it not when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written? A.
What is this? And Luz Lopez answered, You sign this document, uncle Tomas,
Yes, sir.
because this is about the complaint against Castito.
Q. Do you any know where it was written? A. In the General Hospital.
Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document
Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it? A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it his
which you delivered to Santiago Lopez be written until those three Exhibits A,
own hands.
A-1, and A-2 were presented to you? A. About nine or ten minutes Q. What did D. Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place? A. The
approximately. eyeglasses were adjusted again and then he began to read, and as he could not
read much for a long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and took off the
Q. The time to make it clean? A. Yes, sir.
eyeglasses, and as I saw that the poor man was tired, I suggested that it be read
Q. Where were you during that time? A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez. to him and he stopped reading and I read the will to him.
Q. Were you talking with him during that time. A. Yes, sir. Q. What happened after you had read it to him? A. He said to me, Well, it is
all right. It is my wish and my will. Dont you have any pen? I asked a pen of
Q. About what things were you talking with him? A. He was asking me about
those who were there and handed it to D. Tomas.
my health, that of my family how my family was my girl, whether we were living
in Pasay, he asked me about the steamer Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time What is that which I am
it had been lost because he knew that my father-in-law was the owner of the going to sign? and Luz Lopez told him: It is in connection with the complaint
steamer Ildefonso. against Castito? A. It is not true, no, sir.
xxxxxxxxx Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to Tomas
Rodriguez? A. No, Sir, she said nothing.
Q. When those documents, Exhibit A, A-1, and A-2, that is the original and two
Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord? A. Yes, sir.
copies of the will signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were written clean, will you
Q. Did nobody tell him to sign? A. Nobody.
please tell what happened? A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to me clean, I
Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez? A. I
approached D. Tomas Rodriguez and told him: Don Tomas, here is this will
called the witnesses and we signed in the presence of each other and of Tomas
which is ready for your signature.
Rodriguez.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to him Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas
was ready? A. The first thing he asked was: the witnesses? Then I called the Rodriguez? A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some questions.
witnesses Gentlemen, please come forward, and they came forward, and I Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between Doctor
handed the documents to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took his Calderon and D. Tomas after the signing of the will? A. I remember that
eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw that the electric lamp at the center was afterwards Doctor Calderon talked to him about business. He asked him how
not sufficiently clear, he said: There is no more light; then somebody came the business of making loans at 18 per cent. It seems that Tomas Rodriguez
forward bringing an electric lamp. answered: That loan at 18 per cent is illegal, it is usury. (S. R., p. 38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect and but a complaint in connection with Castito. Is that true? A. I have not heard
engineer in the Bureau of Public Works and professor of engineering and anything of the kind.
architecture in the University of Santo Tomas, suffice it to say that Luz Lopez de Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes, sir.
Bueno denied categorically the statements attributed to her by Doctor Bonoan Q. Was Luz Lopez there? A. I dont remember having seen her; I am not sure;
(S. R., p. 568). In this stand, she is corroborated by Doctor Calderon, Domingo, D. Santiago Lopez and the three witnesses were there; I dont remember that
and Herrera, the attending physicians. On this point, Doctor Calderon the Luz Lopez was there.
Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes,
in the University of the Philippines, testified: sir.
Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it? A.
Mr. ARANETA: Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution of
I dont know; it is a detail which I dont remember well; so that whether or not
the will?
he was given a pen or he himself asked for it, I do not remember.
Dr. CALDERON: A. Mr. Legarda handled the will to D. Tomas Rodriguez. D.
Q. But did he sign without hesitation ? A. With no hesitation.
Tomas asked for his eyeglass, wanted to read and it was extremely hard for him
Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to sign?
to do so. Mr. Legarda offered to read the will, it was read to him and he heard
A. Yes, without anybody having indicated it to him.
that in that will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we also saw
Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before
him sign that will, and he signed not only the original but also the other copies
signing? A. He asked for more lights, as I have said before.
of the will and we also saw how the witnesses signed the will; we heard that D.
Q. Do you remember that detail? A. Yes, sir. They first lighted the lamps, but
Tomas asked for light at that moment; he heard that D. Tomas asked for light at
as the light was not sufficient, he asked for more light.
that moment; he was at that time in a perfect mental state. And we remained
Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light? A. Yes, sir. (S. R. p.993).
there after the will was executed. I asked him, How do you feel, how are you?
Well I am well, he answered. How is the business? There is a crisis at there is A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of Vicente
one good business, namely, that of making loans at the rate of 18 per cent, and Legarda, corroborated as it is by other witnesses of the highest standing in the
he answered, That is usury.; When a man answers in that way, That is usury it community. The only explanation we can offer relative to the testimony of
shows that he is all right. Doctor Bonoan is that possibly he may have arrived earlier than the others with
Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him? A. Yes, sir. the exception of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de Bueno may have
Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that was a complaint to be filed against made some sort of an effort to influence Tomas Rodriguez. There is however no
one Castito? A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the kind. possible explanation of the statement of Doctor Bonoan to the effect that no one
Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas Rodriguez read the will to Rodriguez when at least five other persons recollect that Vicente
asked what that was which he was to sign and that Luz Lopez answered, That is Legarda read it to him and recall the details connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of the Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as attending
will which should here be mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando
Lopez de Bueno signed a document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in the amount of Calderon the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Florentino
one thousand pesos (P1,000). This paper reads as follow: Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged to
have two members of the medical fraternity, Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as
Be it know by these present:
attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had taken equal precautions by
That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno in consideration of the services which at my
calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles
instance were and will when necessary be rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in
Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of
connection with the execution of the will of my uncle, Don Tomas Rodriguez
the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases;
and the due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of
thereafter by continuing Doctors de Los Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas
remuneratory donation, the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine
Rodriguez and by associating with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known
currency, as soon as said services shall have been fully rendered and I shall be in
physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet
possession of the inheritance which in said will is given to me.
the medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests arise.
In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and spontaneously
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of
executed by me in Manila, this January 7, 1923.
their testimony shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from
(Sgd.) LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO (Exhibit 1)
these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task to
There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is natural between Doctor Bonoan and try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly arrived
Luz Lopez de Bueno relative to the execution of the above document. We shall at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do under the
not attempt to settle these differences as in the final analysis it will not affect circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon committed on the
the decision one way or the other. The most reasonable supposition is that Luz hand and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Lopez de Bueno imprudently endeavored to bring over Doctor Bonoan to her Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez
side of the race by signing and giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event cannot individually and jointly before the date when the will was executed. All of them,
easily be explained away. as we have noticed were, present at the signing of the will to note the reactions
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we said on of the testator. On the same day that the will was accomplished, the three
February 25, 1924. Not even prior to his demise the two actions in the Lopez doctors signed the following certificate:
family had prepared themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices in the City of Manila, and
faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge of engaged in the practice of their profession do hereby certify:
the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an Assistant Professor of That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, confined in the General
Hospital, floor No. 3, room No. 361 on three different occasion and on different to have interviews with his, he begging a person whom I knew since several
days and have found that said patient is suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, years ago; at the end of the interviews I became convinced that there was
chronic dyspepsia and senility. nothing wrong with him; I had not seen anything indicating that he was insane
As to his mental state the result of the different tests to which this patient was and for this reason I accepted the request of my companions and joined them;
submitted is that his intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory is we have been on five different occasions examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly
weak, which is almost a loss for recent facts, or events which have recently from the physical standpoint but chiefly from the standpoint of his mental state;
occurred, due to his physical condition and old age. I have been there with Messrs. Herrera and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas
They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on January Rodriguez and submitting to a mental test on the 28, 29, 10 and 31 of December
3, 1924, at 1:25 p.m. and have found his mental state in the same condition as and the 22nd of January, 1924 five consecutive days in which he have been
was found by the undersigned in their former examination and that in executing together besides my particular visits.
said will the testator and full knowledge of the contents thereof. Q. Will you place state the result of the observation you made alone before
In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924. those made by the three of you jointly? A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some
(Sgd.) FLORENTINO HERRERA Tuberias 1264 Quiapo questions when I went alone there, I asked him were he was living formerly and
he well remembered that in Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether he
(Sgd.) Dr. FERNANDO CALDERONGeneral HospitalManila
remembered one Calderon who was living in the upper floor of the house and
(Sgd.) Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO613 RemediosMalate
then he told me yes; than I asked him about his tenant by the name of Antonio
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.) Jimenez and he told me yes, now I remember that he had two daughters,
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the house of the
the mentality of Tomas Rodriguez What follows is possibly the most significant gentlemen, Antonio Jimenez already dead in the upper story of the house
of the doctors statements: belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him that Antonio Jimenez was his tenant
Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption: of the upper story, that is that he was living on the ground floor and Antonio
A. I was naturally interested in finding out the true mental state of Tomas Jimenez upstairs and he remembered all of this I also began to talk of my
Rodriguez and that was the chief reason why I accepted and gave my brother, Felipe Calderon, who he said of course that he knew; he remembered
cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera because had I him because he was his companion and was a successful attorney. This was
found that Tomas Rodriguez and Florentino Herrera because had I found that when I had an interview with him. Then in order to observe better and to be
Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should have ordered his transfer to the San sure of my judgment or opinion about the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, I
Lazaro Hospital or to other places, and would not have left him in the General saw him again and we began to speak of something which I dont remember
Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in his room alone twice now. In fine, we talked of things of interest and as I had finally accepted the
request of Drs. Elias Domino and Florentino Herrera to join then the first and decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez.
second time that Herrera, Domingo and myself went there, no stenographic Why would you not give anything to Margarita Lopez? No because her husband
notes were taken of what happened there. is very bad, to use his exact language is very bad.
Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate? A. Yes, sir, he told
two visits to the patient? A. Yes, sir. me that he had three estates, one on Calle Magallanes, another on Calle
Q. From the result f the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on those Cabildo and the third on Calle Juan Luna and besides he had money in the
two visits what is your opinion as to his mental capacity? A. That he was sick; Monte de Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
that he was weak, but I have found absolutely no incoherence in his ideas; he
xxxxxxxxx
answered my questions well and as I was observing him there were times when
he did not remember things of the present because this must be admitted Q. From the question made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas
but on the other hand he had a wonderful memory of past events; in talking Rodriguez on that occasion, what is your opinion as to his mental capacity? A.
with him, you would not notice in the conversation any alteration in his mind The following: That the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed as to
nor that man had lost the reasoning power or logic. things of the present, but is all right with regard to matters or facts of the past;
Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening about that his ideas were incoherent; that the thought with logic, argued even with
things of the past? A. About things of the past, I mean that you talk to him power and generally in some of the interviews I have arrived at the conclusion
now about specific matters, and after about five or ten minutes he no longer that Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not need that anybody
remembers what had been talked of. should make him any suggestion because he answered in such a way that if you
permit me now to show you my stenographic notes, they will prove to you
xxxxxxxxx
conclusively that he had an initiative of his own and had no need of anybody
Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the first time when making him any question. (S. R. p. 72.)
the three of you paid a visit to the patient? A. I dont remember the details, but
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas Rodriguez
I do remember the questions I put to him. I asked D. Tomas Rodriguez: You are
throughout all the time that Rodriguez in the hospital had examined him, was
an old man aged, sick: Yes, I am thinking to make a will. But why dont you
likewise certain that Rodriguez possessed sufficient mentality to make a will.
decide? There is no hurry there is time to make a will, he said. Then in case you
Among other things, Doctor Domingo testified:
decide to make a will, to whom are you going to leave your property? Dont you
have any relatives? I have a relative, Vicente Lopez, my first cousin, and ARANETA: Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
Margarita Lopez my first cousin they are brothers. In that case, to whom, do Dr. DOMINGO: A. Yes, sir.
you want to leave your property? Why, I dont have much, very little, but I am Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician? A. On November 28, until sometimes he showed eagerness and certain delay. I based these points of my
his death. declaration on the questions which are usually asked when making a mental
Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember? A. I had been examination for instance I asked him, What is your name, and he correctly
attending him as physician from November 28th although it true that I had answered Tomas Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and he answered
opportunities to see and examine him during the months of October and No; I asked him his profession and he answered that formerly he was an
November. attorney but that at the time I was making the examination he was not
Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of practising the profession; I asked him with what he supported himself and he
October and November? A. It was for the purpose of observing his mental said that he lived upon his income, he said verbatim, I live on my income. I also
state. asked him what the amount of him income was and he answered that it was
Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the months about P900; I asked him what the source of this income was and he said that it
of October and November? A. Yes, sir. came from his property.
Q. How many times did you visit him? A. I dont remember exactly but I Q. Did you ask him about his property? A. No, at that time.
visited him about five or six times. Q. Proceed. A. I also observed his emotional status and effectivity. I found it
rather superficial, and he oftentimes got angry due to his physical disease; I
xxxxxxxxx
asked him if he had any relatives and he answered correctly saying that he had.
Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of October He mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to his
and November? A. I examined him physically and mentally; I am not going to memory. His memory of the past. He very easily remembered past events and
tell here the physically result but the result of the mental examination, and that when he described them he did it with such pleasure the he used to smile
is: General Conduct: In most of the times that I have seen him I found him lying afterwards if it was a fact upon which one must smile, His memory of recent
on his bed, smoking a cigarette and asked for a bottle of lemonade from time to facts was very much lessened. I say this because on various occasions and not
time; I also observed that he was very careful when throwing the ash of the having known me when he had a better memory, after I had seen him thrice he
cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall on the blankets; he also was careful not remembered my name and he recognized me. Insight and judgment. I arrived at
to throw the stub of the cigarette in any place to avoid fire; I made more the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of himself because he knew that he
observations as to his general conduct and I found that sometimes Don Tomas was sick and could not be moving with ease, but he believed that he could
could move within the place although with certain difficulty. On two occasions I perform with sufficient ease mental acts; his judgment was also all right because
found him seated, once seated at the table, seated in the chair, and other on a I asked him this question: Supposing that you could find a bill of P5 in the
rocking chair. I also examined his manner of talking and to all questions that I vestibule of a hotel, what would you do with it ? He told me that he would take
put to him he answered with a coherence and in a relevant manner, although the bill and give it to the manager in order that the latter may look for the
owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that he showed a moderated Magallanes St., Manila, on November 6th and 7th , 1923; Dr. Samuel Tietze, at
retardation in the flow of his thought, especially with regard to recent events, the patients home on November 9th and 12th, 1923, and at the Philippine
but was quite all right as to past events, His capacity, He believed that he was General Hospital no January 17th, 20th, and 24, 1924; and as a result of the
capable of thinking properly although what did not permit him to do so was his medical examinations and the history of the case we found and hereby certify to
physical decrepit condition. The conclusion is that his memory is lost for recent the following conclusions:
events tho not totally and diminution of his intellectual vigor. This is in few (a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or of mental
words the result of my examination. impairment exceeding to a pathological extent the unusual conditions and
changes found to occur in the involutional period of life.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles,
(b) That he was under the influence of the above condition continuously, at
Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the
least from November, 1923, till the date of our joint reexamination, January 27th
gurardianship proceedings and had seen the patient of November 6 and 7, 1923.
and 28th, and February 10th, 1924; and that he would naturally have continued
Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and had visited
without improvement, as these cases of insanity are due to organic pathological
the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze
changes of the brain. This form of mental disease is progressive in its
and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924. The
pathological tendency, going on to progressive atropy and degeneration of the
three physicians conducted a joint examination result, on March 15, 1924, they
brain, the mental symptoms, of course, running parallel with such pathological
prepared and signed the following:
basis.
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE (c) That on account of such disease and conditions his mind and memory were
In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single and so greatly impaired as to make him unable to know or to appreciate sufficiently
residing or being confined in the Philippine General Hospital. the nature, effect, and consequences of the business he was engaged in; to
We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and Samuel understand and comprehend the extent and condition of his properties; to
Tietze, do hereby certify as follows: collect and to hold in his mind the particulars and details of his business
1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and are in the transactions and his relations to the persons who were or might have been the
actual practice of the medical profession in the Philippines. objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the influences of importunities,
2. That on January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924, at the Philippine threats and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less resistance, he might had
General Hospital, we three have with care the diligence jointly and personally been induced to do what others would not have done.
examined the person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and previous to these 3. We have diagnosed this case as senile demential of the simple type,
dated, we have separately and partly jointly observed and examined said patient approaching the deteriorated stage upon the following detailed mental
on various occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patients home, 246 examination:
(a) Disorder of memory. There was almost an absolute loss of memory of intellectual perception. Making no effort to correlate facts or to understand
recent events, to the extent that things and occurrences seen or observed only a matters discussed in their proper light.
few minutes previously were completely forgotten. Faces and names of person (d) Emotional deterioration. The patient was not known during his time of
introduced to him were not remembered after a short moment even without physical incapacity to express in any way or lament the fact that he was unable
leaving his bedside . He showed no comprehension of the elemental routine to enjoy the happiness that was due him with his wealth. As a matter of fact, he
required in the management of his properties, i.e.: who were the lessees of his showed complete indifference. He showed loss of emotional control by furious
houses, what rents they were paying, who was the administrator of his outbreaks over trifling matter and actually behaved like a child; for example, if
properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the amount of money his food did not arrive immediately of when his cigar was not lit soon, he would
deposited in such banks. Regarding his personal relation, he forgot that Mr. becomes abusive in his language and show marked emotional outburst. If the
Antonio Ventura is the husband of his nearest woman cousin; the Mrs. servants did not immediately answer his call, he would break down and cry as a
Margarita Lopez was married, saying that the latter was single or spinster, in child.
spite of the fact that formerly, during the past twenty-five years, he was aware of (e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. There was a laxity of the
their marriage life, He did not know the names of the sons and daughters of Mr. internal connection of ideas. The patient has shown no insight regarding his
Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest relatives, even failing to name Mrs. Luz Lopez own condition. He did not appreciate the attitude of the parties concerned in
de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente Lopez, and who now appears to be the only his case; he would on several occasion become suspicious and fail to
living beneficiary of his will. He also stated that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently comprehend the purpose of our examination. He was inconsistent in his ideas
visited him in the hospital, though the latter died on January 7th, 1924. He did and failed to grasp the meaning of his own statements. When questioned
not recognized and remember the name and face of Doctor Domingo, his own whether he would make a will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he intended to
physician. However, the memory for remote events was generally good, which is bequeath his money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose.
a characteristic symptom of senile dementia. When He was informed, however, that he had made a will on January 31, 1924,
(b) Disorientation of time, place and persons. He could not name the date he denied the latter statement, and failed to explain the former. Although for a
when asked (day or month); could not name the hospital wherein he was long time confined to bed and seriously ill for a long period, he expressed
confined; and failed to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo was his himself as sound physically and mentally, and in the false belief that he was fully
physician. able to administer his business personally.
(c) Disorders of perception. He was almost completely indifferent to what was His impairment of the intellectual field was further shown by his inability,
going on about him. He also failed to recognize the true value of objects shown despite his knowledge of world affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the
him, that is he failed to recognized the Saturday Evening Post nor would he statement made by Doctor Tietze as follows: We have here a cheque of P2,000
deny that it was a will when presented as such. He also failed to show normal from the King of Africa payable to you so that you may deposit it in the bank.
Do you want to accept the cheque? His answer was as follows: Now I cannot ngeles, me conoce usted?R. De nombre.
give my answer. It may be a surprise. Such answer given by a man after long P. Este es el Doctor Burke, le conoce usted?R. De nombre.
experience in business life, who had handled real estate property, well versed in P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, le conoce usted?R. De vista.
the transaction of cheques, certainly shows a breaking down of the above field. P. Este es el Doctor Burke, recuerda usted su nombre?R. No. (P. 10, sten.
No proper question were asked why the cheque was given by the King, who the N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
King was, why he was selected by the King of Africa, or if there is a King of P.Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Sealando al Doctor Burke).R. De vista;
Africa at present. He further shows doubt in his mental capability by the su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
following questions and answers: P.Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores ngeles, Burke y Tietze).R. Ya lo
creo.
MARCAIDA: P. Tiene usted actualmente algn asunto en los tribunales
Dr. BURKE: P. Qu profesin tenemos? (Sealando a los Sres.
de justicia de Manila? R. No recuerdo en este momento.
ngeles, Burke y Tietze).R. YO creo que son doctores.
P. De tener usted algn asunto propio en los tribunales de justicia de
P. Y lso dos? (Sealando a los Doctores ngeles y Tietze).R. No.
Manila, a qu abogado confiara usted la defensa del mismo?R. Al
s.
Sr. Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
P. Y este seor? (Sealando al Doctor ngeles).R. No me acuerdo en
P. Ha hablado usted y conferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos
este momento. (P. 4. And 5, sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
das, o sea desde el 25 de octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algn abogado
(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by investigation of
para que le defendiera algn asunto ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Doctor Angeles:
Manila?R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombrara al Sr.
I. Family History. His parents were noted to be of nervous temper and
Marcaida. (P. 5, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
irritable.
ARANETA: P. No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como
II. Personal history. He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice, devoting
abogado para que me oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o incapacitado?R.
the greater part of his life to collecting antiquities, He was generally regarded by
S, seor, quien ha solicitado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
his neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary habits of life. He lead a very
Dr. DOMINGO: P. Don Toms, me conoce usted? Se acuerda
unhygienic life, making no attempt to clean the filth of dirt that was around
usted que soy el Doctor Domingo?R. S. (P. 7, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
him. He was neglectful in personal habits. On April, 1921, he suffered an injury
P. Quin soy, Don Toms, usted me conoce?R. No s. (P. 6,
to his forehead, from which he became temporarily unconscious, and was
sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
confined in the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. He frequently
Dr. NGELES: P. Me conoce usted, D. Toms?R. Le conozco de
complained of attacks of dizziness and headache, following this injury; suffered
vista. (P. 6, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
form a large hernia; and about two years ago, he was fined for failure in filing his
P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Toms, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor
income tax, from which incident, we have reason to believe, the onset of his Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not? A. Slightly.
mental condition took place. This incident itself can most probably be Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do? A. He said that it was
considered as a failure of memory. His condition became progressively worse up aching.
to his death. Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered incoherent
4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this certificate to words whenever he awakes? A. As for instance, Maria, repeating it Where are
the best of our knowledge and belief. my 50 centavos, where is my key?
Manila, P.I., March 15, 1924. Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria? A. Only the word Maria.
Q. How long approximately was he talking uttering the name of Maria, Where
(Sgd.) SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES W.B. BURKE, M.D. SAMUEL TIETZE
are my 50 centavos, and where is my key? A. For two or three minutes.
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.) Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name of
Maria he said other words and was talking with somebody? A. He was talking
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is
to himself.
disclosed by the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the
Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B when was it written by you? A. January 2, 1924.
nurses remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the testimony
Q. In the observation correspondingly to January 2, 1924 you say, With pains
of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in the habit for no reason at all of calling
over the body, and later on talked too much whenever patient is awakened.
Maria, where are my 50 centavos, where is my key. In explanation of the
How did you happen to know the pain which you have noted here? A. The pains
observation made by the nurses, the nurse Apolonio Floreza testified.
all over the body, I have observed them when giving him baths.
Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO:
Q. Besides saying that it ached when you touched the body, do you know
Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say with pains all whether he did any extraordinary thing? A. You mean to say acts?
over the body, and uttered some incoherent words of the same topics whenever Q. Acts or words? A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said which
is awakened. How could you observe that he had pains all over the body? he used to say Maria, the key, 50 centavos.
APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse: A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date
touched the body of the patient he complained of some pain. January 2, 1924? A. He used to say Maria where is Maria?
Q. On what part of the body did you touch him? A. On all the parts of his Q. On that date January 2, 1924, did you answer him when he said Maria? A.
body. No sir.
Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C you say among other
xxxxxxxxx
things with pain all over the body and shouted whenever he is given injection.
Did you really observe this in the patient? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did he shout? mentality to make a will, or had he passed so far along in senile dementia as to
ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial. require the court to find him of unsound? We leave the facts in this situation to
COURT: Overruled. pass on to a discussion of the legal phases of the case.
ARANETA: Exception. B. Law. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance
A. In a loud voice. of a will that the testator be of sound mind (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614).
Q. Besides shouting do you remember whether he said anything? A . He A sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds for disallowing a will
repeated the same words I have said before Maria the 50 centavos the key. is If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution.
Q. When did this observation occur which appear on page 8-C? A. On January (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].) Predicated on these statutory provisions,
3, 1924. (S. R. p. 5595.) this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary capacity:
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76
property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to
years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and
have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
senility. Physically he was a wreck.
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon,
(Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 46
Domingo and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De
Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the
los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his memory however for
execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
remote events was generally good. He was given to irrational exclamations
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only
symptomatic of a deceased mind.
later to be rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the
age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the
intellectual faculties of the patient are sound, except that his memory is weak,
appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to
and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of the act he
show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be
was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof, Doctors De Los
decided by its own facts.
Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound mind
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of
and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type
some practical utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is
approaching the deteriorated stage. Without attempting at this stage to pass in
the will simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of
judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of the medical witnesses, or on other
heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an
disputed point, insofar as the facts are concerned, a resolution of the case comes
unsound mind.
down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take senile dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will
a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under the
determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy, would have
concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeares King Lear made a
are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of will, without any question it would have invited litigation and doubt.
the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon. (Alexander on Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages. To
Willis, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stilles Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I pp. constitute complete senile dementia there must be such failure of the mind as to
100 et seq.) deprive the testator of intelligent action,. In the first stages of the diseases, a
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to person may possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1910], p. 89;
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that Wharton & Stilles Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I. pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on
the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez vs. Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.) It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship gone forth from this court, relating to the testator having a sound and disposing
at the time he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure mind, and which have been brought to our notice by counsel, every one of them
and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the judgment is conclusive has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the judgment of the
with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we cannot write trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the
down our conformity. The provisions of the cited section were taken from wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also
California, and there the Supreme court has never held what is now urged upon show great tenderness on the part of the court towards the last will and
us by the appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force of statute, testament of the aged. (See Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per
the finding of insanity is conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the Arellano, C. J., In the matter of the will o f Butalid [1908] 10 Phil., 27 per
continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of which no Arellano, C. J.; Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909] 14. Phil., 163, per Carson, J.; Macapinlac
counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C.J., 647; Gridley vs. Boggs [1882], 62 vs. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per Arellano, C.J.; Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22
Cal., 190; In the matter of the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even where Phil., 227, per Trent, J.; Galvez vs. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J.;
the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J.; and Jocson
most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity vs. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701, per Villamor, J.) Because of their peculiar
to make a will but does not invaluable the testament if competency can be applicability, we propose to make particular mention of four of the earlier cases
shown. The burden of providing sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents. of this court.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of In the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez supra the subject of the action was the will
executed by Dona Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought first disease of body, or from age, will to render a person incapable of making a will a
upon the ground of the incapacity of the testatrix. She was over 80 years of age, weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will provided he has
so ill that three days extreme unction, and two days afterwards she died. Prior understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about
thereto she walked in a stooping attitude and gave contradictory orders, as a and how or to whom he is disposing of his property (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst.
result of her senile debility. The chief Justice reached the conclusion that [Del.] 418); that, To constitute a sound be unbroken or unimpaired,
neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan vs. Maxwell, # N. J. Eq., 563); that it
presented can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of her has not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound
mental faculties. The will was held valid and efficacious. and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . .Few indeed would
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested be the wills confirmed it this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body from age
for the reason that Dominga Butalid at the date of the execution of the or infirmity, would according to its violence or duration in a greater or less
document was not in the date of the execution of the document was not in the degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must
free use of her intellectual powers, she being over 90 years of age, lying in bed be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man (Den. vs.
seriously ill, senseless and unable to utter a single word so that she did not know Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and that Sound mind does not mean a perfectly
what she was doing when she executed the will while the document was claimed balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree (Boughton vs.
to have been executed under the influence and by the direction of one of the Knight. L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. P. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held
heirs designated in the will. Yet after an examination of the evidence in the will. that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
Yet after an examination of the evidence in the will. The Chief Justice rendered actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it
judgment reversing the judgment appealed from and declaring the will arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering,
presented for legalization to be valid and sufficient. or from all these combined, may render the testator in capable of making a valid
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra the court gave credence to the testimony will, providing such weakness really disqualifies for from knowing or
of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that at the time of the appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in
execution of the will the testator was of sound mind and memory. Based on (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for court, laid down the
In the case of Nagtas vs. Paquio, supra, the record shows that the testator for
following legal principles:
some fourteen or fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which paralysis of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to his death his
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary known as insanity or idiocy hearing became impaired and that he had lost the power of speech. However, he
there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one retained the use of his hand and could write fairly well. Through the medium of
hand it had been held that mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from signs, he was able to indicate his wishes to his family. The will was attacked n
the ground that the testator lacked mental capacity at the time of its execution. shall be wholly unbroken unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise or
The will was nevertheless admitted to probate, Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
the court, announcement the following pertinent legal doctrines: In note, 1 Jarnan on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by the
* * * There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the
testator as had, he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property
courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by
he was about to bequeth the manner of distributing it and the object of his
age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does
bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him
not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were
he executed his will. (See authorities there cited)
the legal standard few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the
such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal are
trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years
universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree
he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his
and that there are many graduations from the highest degree of mental
death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory
soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
were much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was
other right which a person may exercise and this right should be nullified unless
observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case,
mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In
said:
discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, page
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect
70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law that
the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression perfect soundness of mind is not
memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total or extend to
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of
his immediate family to property. . . .
mental weakness, disorders or peculiarities and still be capable in law of
x x x x x x x x x
executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will
statement.)
and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswel on Insanity,
contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf,
section 365 and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill. 466) as
but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of recent events,
follows:
especially of names and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes,
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
when aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular and the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence proving that
that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable for vigor and such person at the time he executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing
intelligence are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was mind and memory: Stone vs. Damon, 12 Mass., 487; Breed vs. Pratt, 18 Pick, 115:
incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational In re Slingers Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W. 236).
expression. The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of the
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the contents of the books he had read and studied when he was young but that he
same contract as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. . . . could not readily recall to his mind the ordinary incidents of his later life. The
The particular difference between all of the Philippine case which are cited and depth and intensity of mental impression always depend upon and are
the case at bar are that in none of the Philippine cases was there any declaration measured by the degree of attention given to the perception of truth, which
of incomplicated and in none of them were the facts quite as complicated as demands reflection; and hence the inability of a person to recollect events and
they are here. A case in point where the will was contested, because the testator hence the inability is evidence of mental decay, because it manifest a want of
was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and because at the time of power on concentration of the mind. The aged live in the past and the
the making of the will he was acting under the undue influence of his brothers impression retained in their minds are those that were made in their younger
and where he had a guardian when he executed his will, is Ames Will ([1902] 40 days, because at that period of their lives they were able to exercise will power
Ore., 495). Mr. Justice Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said: by giving attention. While the inability of a person of advanced years to
remember recent events distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of the human
It is contended by contestants counsel that on the day said pretended will
faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile dementia, which is something
purports to have been executed, Lowell was declared incompetent by a court
more than a mere loss of mental power, resulting from old age and is not only a
which had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter and that the decree
feeble condition of the mind but a derangement thereof. . . . The rule is settled
therein appointing a guardian of his person and estate raises the distable
in this state that if a testator at the time he executes his will understand the
presumption that he did not possess sufficient testamentary capacity at the time
business in which he is engaged and has a knowledge of his property and how
to overcome which required evidence so strong as to leave no reasonable doubt
he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his bounty, he possess
as to his capacity to make a valid will, and the testimony introduced by the
sufficient testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old age, sickness debility
proponent being insufficient for that purpose the court erred in admitting it to
of body, or extreme distress.
probate.
x x x x x x x x x
The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis, by
It is contented by contestants counsel that if Lowell at the time he executed the
a court having jurisdiction must necessarily create a presumption of the mental
pretended will, was not wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he was, in
infirmity of the ward; but such decree does not conclusively show that the
consequence of age ill health, debility of body and infirmity of will power,
testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship is entirely destroyed
Andrew and Joseph having knowledge thereof took advantage of his physical latter subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his
and mental condition and unduly influenced him to device and bequeth his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and
property in the manner indicated, attempting thereby to deprive the contestant his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez, who, on the
of all interest therein except such as was given her by statute. . . . Assuming that suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it was
he was easily persuaded and that his brothers and the persons employed by Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the witnesses and physicians
them to care for him took advantage of his enfeebled condition and prejudiced for the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also a favor
his mind against the contestant did such undue influence render the will through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the
therefore executed void? . . . When a will has been properly executed, it is the patient.
duty of the courts to uphold it, if the testator possessed a sound and disposing The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed a preconceived plan
mind and memory and was free from restraint and not acting under undue on the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez to secure his
influence notwithstanding sympathy for persons legally entitled to the testators signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this supposition. It
bounty and a sense of innate justice might suggest a different testamentary is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors
disposition. Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda would so demean
Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by the themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as to participate in a
weight of the testimony its decree is affirmed. scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in his age,
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned and rather named was acting according to the best of his ability to assist in a
carrying alone one step further the question suggested at the end of the legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the attitude of
presentation of the facts on the same subject a resolution of the case comes Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his apparent
down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made
mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have
capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of prepared somewhat a similar document.
proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date? B. LAW. One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE undue and improper pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or
A. Facts. The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence some other person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]). Undue
exercised by the persons benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and as further
trial judge found this allegation to have been established and made it one of the mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which compelled
bases of his decision. it is now for us to say if the facts justify this finding. the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the desire of peace or
Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The from other feeling which is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved. making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to have retained a
III. JUDGMENT distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his
To restate the combined issued of fact and law in this case pertaining to memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he
testamentary capacity: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F.
sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument
testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully distributed the property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations
the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date? with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to the two
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the persons whom he specified.
regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testators mental On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may
condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a physician on the contrary have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have
testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow the suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been
will. The attending physician and three other eminent members of the medical extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that
fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed opinions strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms testamentary capacity.
professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive and
medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on those facts is exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the
all with those who offer the will for probate. oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. deserves.
It was reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez
prejustice of the testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez. will be admitted to probate without special pronouncement as to costs in this
With special reference of the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say instance.
this: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended the
nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two conferences
with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will
was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the
proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator
recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally
be supposed to have claims upon him While for some months prior to the
B. Quitoriano for appellee.

Sancho vs. Abella, 58 Phil. 728
VILLA-REAL, J.:
EN BANC
This is an appeal taken by the opponent Marciana Abella from the judgment
DECISION
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of
November 13, 1933 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. L-39033 Wherefore, this court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the opposition filed by
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant- Marciana Abella is without merit and, therefore, it is hereby denied. The
appellee, application filed herein is granted and the document, Exhibit A, is hereby
vs. ordered and decreed probated as the last will and testament of the late Matea
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant. Abella. So ordered.
Sotto and Astilla for appellant. In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in the
B. Quitoriano for appellee. decision of the court a quo, to wit:
Villareal, J.: 1. The lower court erred in holding that Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment
MATEA ABELLA. SANTIAGO SANCHO vs. MARCIANA ABELLA of her mental faculties and executed the document, Exhibit A, as a true
expression of her last will.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
2. The lower court erred in holding that the requirements of the law have been
EN BANC
complied with in the execution of the will, Exhibit A.
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933
3. The lower court erred in holding that when the late Matea Abella affixed her
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant- alleged signatures to the will, Exhibit A, she did not act under the illegal and
appellee, undue influence of certain legatees.
vs. 4. The lower court erred in decreeing the probate of the will, Exhibit A.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant. The following facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence presented
during the trial, to wit:
Sotto and Astilla for appellant.
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was done. At about 7:30
had been informed that Dr. Antonio Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a oclock on the morning of April 29, 1932, the signing of the will took place in the
good physician. On April 13, 1932, she left her home situated in the said corridor of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was the first to sign it on a
municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the table in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses
said physician in his clinic in San Fernando, La Union, stopping at the convent thereto and of other persons, including Father Cordero. After the testatrix, each
of the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of Father Cordero with of the instrument witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each
whom she was acquainted he having been the parish priest of Sinait. During her and every one of the other witnesses. After the will had been signed, Attorney
stay in the said convent, she went to Dr. Antonio Querols clinic twice within Teodoro R. Reinoso delivered the original and the copies thereof to the testatrix,
the period of one week accompanied by her aforesaid niece, Filomena Inay, to retaining one for his file. On July 3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile debility
consult the said physician who, after submitting her to a general medical in the municipality of Sinait at the age of 88 years.
examination, found that she was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the
The opponent herein attempted to prove that the testatrix was deaf and that her
stomach.
eyesight was defective; that when one moved away from her and again
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton of the convent to call approached her she was unable to recognize him; that it was necessary to shout
Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will, into her ear to call her for meals; that she used to urinate on her clothes without
in the presence of the Father Corderos sister, Father Zoilo Aguda, Macario being aware of it; that she had a very poor memory inasmuch as she used to try
Calug and the fiscal of the convent. Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to to collect from her debtors in spite of the fact that they had already paid their
attend to other business, he could not finish his interview with the testatrix on debts; that once, although she had sold a parcel of land for P60 she said she had
the first day and had to continue it the following day, also in the presence of sold it for P160; that she was unable to go downstairs without assistance; that
Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena Inay and some children who were then at when she was called at mealtime she used to answer: Why, I have already
the convent. Inasmuch as he did not finish the interview on the second day, the eaten; that she could not remember her properties nor the names of her
said attorney returned again on the afternoon of the 28th and continued it in tenants; that she could no longer read; that she often repeated to her tenants
the presence of the same persons who entered and left the sala. At the end of the same questions regarding their crops; that she had been suffering from the
the interview, Matea Abella ordered he niece, Filomena Inay, to bring her some disabilities for more than two months previous to her death; that the deceased
papers which were in her trunk, which she delivered to the said attorney. After complained of headache and of stomachache; that she already began to be dotty
the will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix, Macario Calug five years before, and particularly a few days previous to her death; that in her
read it to her and she approved it. When the will had been copied clean, it was will she bequeathed properties which she had already donated to other persons.
again read to the testatrix and she express her approval thereof, but inasmuch as
it was rather late at night, she did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be
We are face to face with two divergent theories regarding the mental state of the intelligence that she could not, with full understanding thereof, dispose of her
testatrix Matea Abella at the time of the execution of her will, Exhibit A. The properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness,
opponent claims that, inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age when she nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making his
made her will, she was already suffering from senile debility and therefore her ill (Avelino vs. De la Cruz, 21 Phil. 521; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil. 227; Jocson vs.
mental faculties were not functioning normally anymore and that she was not Jocson, 46 Phil. 701; Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil. 485; Torres and
fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772; 28 R.C.L., p. 94, par. 44). The mere fact
prove that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection with her properties that in her will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she had already
and interest; that she could not go downstairs without assistance, and that she donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity.
could not recall her recent acts. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the
irrevocability of certain donations.
On the other hand, as to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of the
execution of her will, we have the undisputed fact of her having left her home in It is insinuated that the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of
Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13, 1932, in order to go to San Fernando, La Union, to her will. There is nothing in the records establishing such claim either directly
consult Dr. Antonio or indirectly. The fact of her having stopped at the convent of the parish church
of San Fernando, La Union, is not unusual in the Philippines where, due to lack
Querol of whose ability she had heard so much regarding her headaches and
of hotels, the town convents are usually given preference by strangers because
stomach trouble, stopping at the convent of the parish church; the fact of her
they are given better accommodations and allowed more freedom. In the
having walked twice to the aforesaid doctors clinic, accompanied by her niece,
present case, the testatrix Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando, La
Filomena Inay; the fact that she had personally furnished the aforesaid doctor
Union. Inasmuch as Father Cordero, the parish priest of the said town, was well
with all the necessary data regarding the history of her illness the fact of her
known to her having served in the church of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, in the same
having brought with her in her trunk the deeds to her properties; the fact of her
capacity, she did not have any difficulties in obtaining accommodations in his
having called for Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso; the fact of her having personally
convent. The fact that Matea Abella stopped at a convent and enjoyed the
furnished said attorney all the data she wished to embody in her relative to her
hospitality of a priest who gave her accommodations therein, nor the fact that
properties and the persons in whose favor she wished to bequeath them; the fact
the will was executed in the convent in question in the presence of the parish
of her not wishing to sign her will on the night of April 28, 1932, but the
priest and witnessed by another priest, could certainly not be considered as an
following day, in order to be able to see it better, and the fact of her having
influence which placed her under the obligation to bequeath of her property to
affixed her signature, in her own handwriting, to the original as well as to the
the bishop of said diocese.
copies of her will which consisted of nine pages. All these data show that the
testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1)
That neither senile ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by
itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom
is not in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient
evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will; and (2)
that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue
influence sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of
a diocese made in her will by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective
eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping at a convent within the aforestated
diocese.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby
affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

possession and to reimburse the latter the net gain in the proportion that
Alsua-Betts vs. CA (July 30, 1979)
appertains to them in the properties from the date of the firing of the complaint
FIRST DIVISION up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's
fees and costs.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, the following.
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners, On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella,
vs. both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson,
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents. agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present
and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners. enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which
are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to wit: t.hqw
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the

properties of the Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97
GUERRERO, J.:1wph1.t pages, all of them signed by the spouses and all the above
named heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo primers).
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First (2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties
Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special described in the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties
Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after with the exception of five parcels of land Identified with the
declaring the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock
1
respondent court denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two which are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a Tinay
sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to (segundo parafo).
pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of
nine children but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. t.hqw
tercero y cuatro).
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the and admit that the totality of the properties allotted and
Civil Code (old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among adjudicated to the heirs as described in the preceding
their children concerning the inheritance they are entitled to in paragraph, constitute one half of the properties described in
the event of death of one of them they have decided to Annex "A", including any amount of cash deposited.
effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the properties
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the
described in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and
properties assigned to them as their hereditary portion
conditions: (Parafo quinto):
represent one-half not only of the conjugal properties but
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the includes the paraphernal properties waiving now and forever
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages any complaint or claim they have or they may have concerning
1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. the amount, value, extension and location of the properties that
meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00. are allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any claim
they have or they may have over the remaining portion of the
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real
properties, which spouses reserved for themselves.
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-
20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. (c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and
meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00. everyone of the heirs acknowledge that the properties which
are left in the possession of the surviving spouse, including any
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the
amount in cash, are even less than the one- half that should
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages
correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate
20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of 6,639,810
participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they
sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
waive any claim that they have or may have over said portion of
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all said properties or any amount in cash during the lifetime of the
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from surviving spouse, including any right or claim they have or they
may have over the paraphernal properties of Do;a Tinay in the On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a Tinay
event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus. separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly
them, the surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have
provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
over the properties assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under
properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to
and by virtue of this deed. The properties which were reserved
constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial
for them (the spouses) should be considered as his or her
Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future acquisitions
legitimate participation in the conjugal properties and the fair
of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would belong to the other
compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the
spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children. The
surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be
holographic will of Do;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as
distributed in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her
translated: t.hqw
death unless said properties of some of them have been
disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. TESTAMENT
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married
of the provision contained herein shall be under obligation to to Don Jesus Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the
pay to the other heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in
the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees. the full possession of my mental and physical faculties freely
and spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the
my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish
herein heirs.
language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
assigned or adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall and in which I ordain and provide:
be considered as his share or participation in the estate or as his

First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my
inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the
husband Don Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him,
absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under this
four (4) of whom are still living and they are Francisco Alsua,
deed.
Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in
(5) died during their minority, single and without children. equal parts.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua
and during our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts without having to post any bond.
and industry, we were able to acquire conjugal properties
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting
consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands and urban lands
this testament on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the
registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.
Philippines. t.hqw
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the
(
following- my spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my
S
properties, real and personal, and the other half, to my children
G
Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua,
D
Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo
.
Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be
)
understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as
legitime to my above named children have already been given
F
to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25, 1949 and
L
ratified on the same day, month and year before Notary Public
O
Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of 1949)
R
enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully
E
comply with each and every clause contained in the said
N
document.
T
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the I
execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned N
among my spouse and above named children or the children A
mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is, one-
R themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not
. disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition,
and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their
D participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired
E subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving
spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would
A be divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils
L that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was
S designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the
U properties reserved for themselves.
A
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R) translated: t.hqw
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar CODICIL
holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament.
conditions as the above will of his wife.
That my spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the Court which we have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would
of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their correspond to me covers all the properties that I have
respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings No. partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition
484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G.
Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner). Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949)
(and) even as the properties which by reason of this testament I
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their
leave to my husband as his share and the other half that
mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective
corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that
holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that
up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban
one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been
lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay
disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the
and in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion
"Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for
that I bequeath to my husband as his inheritance and his among my above-mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay,
legitimate. Philippines, August 14,1956. t.hqw
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my (

husband Don Jesus Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, S
Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my G
aforecited children all the properties described in the above D
mentioned Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 .
which correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits) )
expressed in the same, and in the event that the properties
granted to one or any of my children should exceed in quantity F
or value those corresponding to another or others, I hereby L
declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my O
children as their inheritance from the free portion of my R
property. E
N
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws
T
inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which
I
have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
N
Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed
A
1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above stated, including all those properties which we shall
R
acquire after the execution of this document.
A
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby L
declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that L
pertain to me or would pertain to me, which have not been A
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally

D
E
the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
A August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his properties donated to
L his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of
S 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his
U estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees
A of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever
may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a Tinay
also a separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as
had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court
the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the
for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and
spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental
which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the
petitions for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings
holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved
earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the
the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the
codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on
October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix
he took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960. named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said
new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by
holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the
Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with
following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at
their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was
the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed
then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his
under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and
attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This
improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of
notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was
had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all
secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over the same,
formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate alleging that she bought the properties from their father and presenting the two
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show
deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the
and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened price of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale
Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, of the four urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the
respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949 oppositors filed Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the deeds of sale, with damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then
partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959. jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated
November 14, 1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance
of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an of Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of
inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the oppositors which states: t.hqw
therein (the private respondents now) did not include some properties
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached
rendered, to wit:
thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as
belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According to the oppositors, these 1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and
properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots with a total ALLOWS the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay,
land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a on November 14, 1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A,
total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made
P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots the basis for division and distribution of the estate of said
Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi City including the lot and the testator;
building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an assessed
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint
value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of
and holds that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale
P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were
on November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and
bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of
accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The
the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also
Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly and severally to
raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory of the estate
pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand findings of the probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that
(P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred private respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will, are in
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs. estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus
Alsua.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the
appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding
portion of which states, as translated, thus t.hqw that testator Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on
constrained to set aside as it hereby sets aside the decision speculation, surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross
appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special misapprehension of facts.
Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of
denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles
August 26, 1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void,
ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that
to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed damages, the sum of the same is of no moment. The controversy as to the competency or
P5,000.00 and to render an accounting of properties in their incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by
possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain, in the acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in formally
proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their
litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their
this complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla
pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus
Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which petitioners
the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of
attorney's fees, and the costs. the private respondents from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid
assigned errors, to wit: t.hqw down in the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo,
et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with
eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of
Appeals, and We quote: t.hqw a deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt
262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the
Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208,
application therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the
N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div.,
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding
733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of
the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public
Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S.,
policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of
581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an
the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if,
additional party to every litigation affecting the
and only if, executed conformably to law.
disposal of the assets of the deceased. Matter
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295,
Will, 300 N.Y.S., 502: t.hqw 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court
to establish the existence of the right of any erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus
living person, but to determine whether or not Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations,
the decedent has performed the acts specified surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The
by the pertinent statutes, which are the Civil Court is very clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be
essential prerequisites to personal direction of disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows: t.hqw
the mode of devolution of his property on

Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
death. There is no legal but merely a moral
cases:
duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to
validate the wishes of the departed, and he (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
may and frequently does receive no personal with;
benefit from the performance of the act.
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable
One of the most fundamental conceptions of of making a wilt at the time of its execution;
probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the August 14, 1956. In the presence of his
influence of fear, or threats; bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez,
he crossed out in ink each and every page of
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
said page he wrote on each page the word
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon
person;
(Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud, including Exh. V-14). He then instructed
Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
their corresponding descriptions.
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto. Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his
lawyer, Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the
latter came accompanied by his son, Atty.
respondent court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the
Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a
due execution of the questioned will and testament of Don Jesus,
judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga
declaring: t.hqw
City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his
... and going back to the previous question, whether the lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and
questioned will and testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, accordingly gave more detailed instructions as
was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil to how he wanted to divide his properties
Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning accepts the among his four children. He handed to them a
findings of the inferior court concerning the list and on the left he indicated the name of
question, t.hqw the child to whom the listed properties shall

pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus,
Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks after said death of Spanish is his major language, as in fact his
his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a conversations with Don Gregorio are always in
new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his
Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959,
previous holographic will which he made on Atty. Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the
January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated semi-final draft of the will and after reading it
Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted
and after making a few minor corrections, he Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial
instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the and immediately joined them in conversation.
win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose
Imperial that the signing of the will should be residence is just across the road from the
at his home in Ligao, in the morning of house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already
November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact
should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of signing the will that morning, and so, on
of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials
friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to
sort of employee of Don Jesus. the residence of Don Jesus, without much
delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959,
coming back of Gaya, there were now six
Don Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial,
people gathered in the living room, namely:
riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi
Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty.
residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed
Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose
the latter that Don Jesus was requesting him to
Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses
be one of the attesting witnesses to his will.
who testified for the petitioner declared that
Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don
Don Jesus was in bright and lively conversation
Jesus, considered it an honor to be so asked,
which ran from problems of farming and the
and gladly went with the Imperials. They
merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock,
arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;
Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about
Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and
time to do what they were there for, and this
they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the
was followed by a more or less statement from
latter requested them to be seated at the usual
Jesus, who said: t.hqw
receiving room on the ground floor while he
announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was 'Preisamente es por lo que he
on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came Hamado a ustedes que esten
down, carrying with him the will to be signed presentes para ser testigos de
rni ultimo voluntad y Madarieta signed next as another attesting

testamento que ha sido witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished
preparado por el abogado Sr. signing all the three sets, the same were passed
Gregorio Imperial segun mis to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third
instrucciones cuyo documento attesting witness. On each of the three sets,
tengo aqui conmigo y Don Jesus signed ten times, one on the
encuentro que, despues de lo margin of each of the nine pages, and at the
he leido, esta end of the instrument proper. Each of the
satisfactoriamente hecho three attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta
segun mis instrucciones, and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set,
Como saben ustedes tengo one on the margin of each of the nine pages,
cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.' one at the end of the instrument proper and
(pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of one below the attestation clause. The original
December 7, 1967, Sarte. will was marked as Exh. A (or set A); the
duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to
of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and
the big round table on another part of the
Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr.
same sala for convenience in signing because
Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It
there were chairs all around this table. The will
was also clearly established that when Don
which consisted of nine pages, with a
Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr.
duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and
table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S.
witnessed said signing, and that when each of
Imperial assisting each person signing by
these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus
indicating the proper place where the
and the two other attesting witnesses were
signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as
present and Witnessing said Signing. The
testator, signed first. After signing the original
signing by the testator and the attesting
and the two other sets, the three sets were
witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge
then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed
S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission
as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose
for the entire province of Albay, notarized the Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain
wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat which details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of
seal he brought along that morning. After all things and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay
the three sets were notarized, they were all together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had
given back to Don Jesus who placed them executed the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which
inside the same folder. At that moment, it was divided the conjugal properties of the spouses between the spouses themselves
already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited and the children under the terms and conditions and dispositions herein before
all of them to lunch, which invitation was stated and to implement its provisions, Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently
gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp. 474-480, executed separately their respective holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955
Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492- and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as
R) reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been
probated thereafter and upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite
appointed executor of the will and in due time the partition of the properties or
difficult to conclude that the same had not complied with the
estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by the probate court on July 6, 1960.
requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA
Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated). The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25,
1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of
surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring
the lower court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the
him from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding
August 14, 1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and
is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same.
testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings
Hence, there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower
elevated to this Court.
court and the respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts
and such facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the
the conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly executed in Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056
accordance with law. We rule that the questioned last will and testament of Don in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto.
Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements of the law. These Articles provide as follows: t.hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property ratified in the holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so codicil of August 14, 1956.
far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior
from the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of will before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and We
contracts. quote the pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the
future inheritances, except those the object of which is to make partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her
a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid and
1056. enforceable.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
the subject- matter of contract.
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so
the law may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13,
other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to
1903, laid down the following doctrine:
include in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be

Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and
interpreted to mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos,
new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a
partition his property referred to in the section wherein said
little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to
article is found, without the authority of a testament containing
partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil
an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for,
Code. The court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the
otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to
partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates,
making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor
citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court
included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially,
held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition of November 14, 1949 was
to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is
lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part the expression of the testator's last will and must be
of their property; surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second
part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition,
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article
and the testator may make this division in the same will or in
1271 makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that
another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words, the law,
no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
in article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall hereafter
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a
examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the
division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056,
partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for
it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion
purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must
that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
accompany every testament or last will are not necessary.
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in
Neither is it necessary to observe the special for. realities
conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of
required in case of donations, because it is not a matter of
the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two
disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those
provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that
which already have been legally disposed of.
they simply provide for the division of the estate during the
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the
upon the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of
partition of the estate among the persons interested. opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks
and its division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it
the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his
last will, must be understood in accordance with this heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is
distinction. The Idea is to divide the estate among the heirs not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word
designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one
disposition of the properties to take effect after his death, and who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of
it by will to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was must be made by public instrument in which the property
expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the donated must be specifically described and in the amount of
holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a
executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions
separate public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not
of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he
made during the lifetime of the donor.
mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument,
therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don authentic notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this
Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses
thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple
which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like
expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is
in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision
an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and
enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs
inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it
or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and
involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos
Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only
of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against their
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half
1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their
that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos respective shares.
under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion
no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of
was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955
Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided
and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil,
were not specifically described in the public instrument, an essential
independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him
requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows: t.hqw
on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills
and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia
joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only que se sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos
her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus. bienes de los que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en
la escritura de reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of
mitad de gananciales que le corresponds tal como arriba
Do;a Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay expressly
declare, incluyendo todos aquenos bienes que se adquiriesen
or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free
por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of
her children as heirs was made in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi
wit: t.hqw esposo declaro que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de
todo genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de
dispuestas aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis
otorgado este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre
herederos mencionados despues de mi muerte.
mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la
misma proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion
mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes iguales. states: t.hqw
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his
"Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the same inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which
shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed
(1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts." From the 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don above stated, including all those properties which we shall
Jesus whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of acquire after the execution of this document.
her will.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that
share in the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have not been
codicil: t.hqw disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally
among my above-mentioned heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed
of Do;a Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested.
the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally to the
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted
children, upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing him.
to the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone, and
November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous
not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the children, it holographic will and codicil, by making another win expressly cancelling and
follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of
her holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by the provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear
any condition obligation or proviso. that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by
the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon the
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of
intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated. Thus We
November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a
declared inNuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: t.hqw
holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Do;a
Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the
not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such, will should be allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the
would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: case is the intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes
"A win may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made authenticated. ...
on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt
made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be
bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first
protracted and for ought that appears in the record, in the
place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of
event of probate or if the court rejects the will probability exists
the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are
that the case win come up once again before us on the issue of
transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777,
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time,
New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the
considerations that induce us to a behalf that we might as well
meet head-on the time of the validity of the provisions of the ... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to
will in question. ... advance its own Idea of a just distribution of the property in the
face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
the testatrix in the latter will. ...
contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and
the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation
donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account of a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an
in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and equitable division of the estate of a deceased person. The only
legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his functions of the courts in these cases is to carry out the
properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo intention of the deceased as manifested in the wig. Once that
and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond. intention has been determined through a careful reading of the
will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties
violated, it is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire
distributed to the children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under
into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The
the contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the former had in fact been
court should not sit in judgment upon the motives and
included in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed that the intention of
sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated,
Don Jesus in his last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the
nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her
Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion of the
property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because
conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which he received as his
there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward process
inheritance from Do;a Tinay. The legitimes of the forced heirs were left
of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude
unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated
toward those who expected her bounty. ...
otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged
wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly
whomsoever he may choose. benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who
would have been entitled to an equal share under the extrajudicial partition of
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo
1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and
as in fact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and
honor and would not snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the
sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule
other as one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had been
in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: t.hqw
diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84
years of age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to
administration of his properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound
his part received instructions from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
According to the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not legally unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does
follows: t.hqw not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or
of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and
by disease, injury or other cause. under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the
absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed
the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the
of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements of
testamentary act,
the law. But more than that, gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally
weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by
not render a person incapable of making a will. t.hqw private respondents. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don
Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory
to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties
which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity,
should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his
and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will
insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental
at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the
capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held
conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-
that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease
made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses
of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid
gathering, to wit: t.hqw
will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found
presentes para ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere
que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify
segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did
encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous
hecho segun mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere
cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos. speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the
testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun
the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable
implications thereof.
consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other motives of the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or
details which, in the words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of
with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus the wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for
had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already assigned
1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus
concerned, he had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his desired to have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the
lifetime, the alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by sale instead of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or
Don Jesus in the properties under question to petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was
when the same properties had already been bequeathed to her in the will of actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or
November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the as difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a
basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his other children with less conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
favor, and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the

Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for
former depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the
annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and
latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to
petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents mainly
violate his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial
contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no actual
partition, Exh. 8."
consideration paid. They further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact
and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the
respondent court to set aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial court 6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
that the two sales were valid. the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the
Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same principle applies even if In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion
the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight as to the nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the evidence on
of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should record and adduced during the trial.
not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U,
"findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the
a deed of sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus
record or those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid
in favor of Francisca for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos
down by the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the
(P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the
a forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not
general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the
assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit
Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the
"W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for the
Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises bears the signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a
or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257); document dated August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as
witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna
the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927); the genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine
Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the amount of
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing,
P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable
30, 1957); and to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ", endorsements on the back of the last
two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures thereon were not assailed. (7)
Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No. Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the
2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging the receipt of inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a
BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was
payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not
convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in fact, find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience,
Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the
consideration of P150,000.00. subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for
being without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that there was no hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special
need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs
nothing in the evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his against respondents.
mind as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children. The two
SO ORDERED.
contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by
Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any
time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the
consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the
receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the private
respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment
of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money
was involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which
show that the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given
to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically
Exhibit "A" in the annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used
Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the
estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make
Avelino vs. Dela Cruz (21 Phil 521)
his will because he was blind at the time the same was executed and had been
EN BANC for several years theretofore. There is absolutely no proof to show that the
deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of
DECISION
incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement
February 21, 1912 of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and
of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.)
G.R. No. 6322
Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in
DOLORES AVELINO, as administratrix of the estate of Pascual de la Cruz,
the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary
plaintiff-appellee,
capacity, except age and soundness of mind.
vs.
VICTORIANA DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant. In our opinion the record contains nothing which justifies the modification of
the order made legalizing the will in the present case. The order of the lower
Buencamino, Diokno, Mapa, Buencamino, Jr. Platon & Lontoc for appellant.
court admitting to probate and legalizing the will in question is therefore hereby
Alfonso Mendoza for appellee.
affirmed with costs.
JOHNSON, J.:
The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized the
will of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the
said Pascual de la Cruz was blind and had been for a number of years, and was
incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will
were called as witnesses, and each declared that the deceased was of sound
mind at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and
signed the same in their presence and that they each signed the will in the
presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the deceased.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.

Jocson vs. Jocson (46 Phil 701),
M. Fernandez Yanson, Pio Sian Melliza and Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros
EN BANC
for appellees.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
June 8, 1922
On June 10, 19120, Rafael Jocson, Cirilo Manlaque, and Filomena Goza presented
G.R. No. L-17627 a petition in the court below for the probate of the document Exhibit A, as the
In re will of Marcelo Jocson, deceased, RAFAEL JOCSON, ET AL., last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson. This petitioner was
petitioners-appellees, opposed by Rosauro, Asuncion, and Dominga Jocson, alleging that: (a) The
vs. supposed will was not the last will of the deceased, and the signatures appearing
ROSAURO JOCSON, ET AL., opponents-appellants. thereon, and which are said to be of the testator, are not authentic; (b) the
testator, that is, the deceased, was not of sound mind and was seriously ill at the
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.
time of its execution; and (c) the supposed will was not executed in accordance
M. Fernandez Yanson, Pio Sian Melliza and Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros
with the law.
for appellees.
Villamor (Ignacio), J.: After trial the lower court rendered decision finding, among other things, as
MARCELO JOCSON. RAFAEL JOCSON, ET AL. vs. ROSAURO JOCSON, ET AL. follows:
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila For all of the foregoing reasons the court finds that some hours before, during
and one hour after, the execution of his will, Marcelo Jocson was of sound mind;
EN BANC
that he dictated his will in Visaya, his own dialect; that he signed his will in the
G.R. No. L-17627 June 8, 1922 presence of three witnesses at the bottom, and on each of the left margins of the
three sheets in which it was written; that said three witnesses signed the will in
In re will of Marcelo Jocson, deceased, RAFAEL JOCSON, ET AL., petitioners-
the presence of the testator and of each other, all of which requirements make
appellees,
the documents Exhibit A a valid will, in accordance with the provision of section
vs. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
ROSAURO JOCSON, ET AL., opponents-appellants. By virtue thereof, it is adjudged and decreed that the document Exhibit A Is the
last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson, and it is ordered that
the same be admitted to probate, and Rafael Jocson is hereby appointed that the alleged witnesses were not present, together, at the time when the
administrator of the estate left by said deceased, upon the filing of a bond in the alleged will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of one of these
sum of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). witnesses as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his
attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt the truth and
The appellants allege that the trial court erred in holding that Exhibit A is the
veracity of the testimony in support of the execution of the will.
last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson, and in ordering and
decreeing the probate thereof as his last will. As to the mental capacity of the testator at the time of executing his will, the
finding of the trial court that the testator was of sound mind at the time of
All the arguments advanced by the appellants tend to show that the testator
dictating and signing his will is supported by the evidence. This court, in the
Marcelo Jocson, at the time of executing the will, did not have the mental
case of Bagtas vs. Paguio (22 Phil., 227), held:
capacity necessary therefor; that said will was not signed b the witnesses in the
presence of the testator; that the witnesses did not sign the will in the presence To constitute a sound mind and disposing memory it is not necessary that the
of each other; and that the attestation of the supposed will does not state that mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, and unshattered by disease or
the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. otherwise, or that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties.
Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or extend to his immediate
All of these points raised by the appellants were discussed at length by the trial
family or property.
court upon the evidence introduced by the parties. After an examination of said
evidence, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the findings made by the trial And in Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra, it was declared:
court upon the aforesaid point are supported by the preponderance of evidence.
Proof of the existence of all the elements in the following definition of
We have noticed certain conflicts between the declarations of the witnesses on testamentary capacity, which has frequently been adopted in the United States,
some details prior to, and simultaneous with, the execution of the will, but to held sufficient to establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof
our mind such discrepancies are not sufficient to raise any doubt as to the of very exceptional circumstances: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
veracity of their testimony. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil., 163), it was comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
held: the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the
While a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing
manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects
witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a
of this bounty.
single contradiction as to a particular incident to which the attention of such
witnesses must have been directed, may in certain cases justify the conclusion
Whether or not the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and
whether or not they signed in the presence of each other, are questions of fact
that must be decided in accordance with the evidence. The trial judge, who tried
this case and saw and heard the witnesses while testifying, held that these
solemnities were complied with at the execution of the will in question and we
find no reason for altering his conclusions.
The objection to the attestation of Exhibit A is groundless if the terms thereof

are considered, which, translated from the Visayan dialect, in which the will was
written, into English, says:
We, witnesses, do hereby state that the document written on each side of the
three sheets of paper was executed, acknowledged, signed, and published by the
testator abovenamed, Marcelo Jocson, who declared that it was his last will and
testament in our presence and, at his request and all of us being present, we
signed our named on the three sheets of paper as witnesses to this will in the
presence of each other. (Translation of Exhibit A, page 18, documentary
evidence.)
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants.
So ordered.
Que despues de pagados todos los gastos quese han de ocasioner desde
Cuyugan vs. Baron & Baron (62 Phil 859)
que me caiga enferma hasta el entiero de mi cadaver, los bienes y
EN BANC propiedades que he de dejar se repartiran buenamente y en partes

iguales mis hermanos Ilamados Guillermo Baron, con exception de todo
G.R. No. L-41947 January 16, 1936 el dinero en metalico y mi casa de materiales fuertes construida en el
barrio del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga que actualmente habita mi
In re Will of the deceased Silvestra Baron.
hermano Guillermo Baron, porque estos los doy de una manera
VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, petitioner-appellant,
absoluta como herencia de mi sobrino Vivencio Cuyugan.
vs.
FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON, oppositors-appellees. Que a la muerte de mis hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, todos los
terrenos que en virtud de este test tamento les dejo en herencia, los doy
Pedro Abad Santos, Quirino Abad Santos, Francisco M. Ramos, and Aurelio
herencia a mi so brino VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, por lo que, encargo y
Pineda for appellant.
prohibo a mis citados hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, que graven
Arturo Joven for appellee Guillermo Baron.
o pongan cualquiera clase de obligacion sobre los bienes que les dejo en
Vicente J. Francisco and Jesus E. Blanco for appellee Faustina Baron.
herencia.
BUTTE, J.:
The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Baron" (t.s.n. pp. 170, 171). Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and
denying all the petition of Vivencio Cuyugan for the probate of the will of consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano
Silvestra Baron. Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator).
The petition which was filed on February 1, 1933, recites among other things that The petition for probate recites:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she
9. That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on
was eighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites
December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or
that she left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed
less, and was found and disposing mind, and not acting under duress,
of by will dated December 17, 1932, that she died single without forced heirs.
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect competent
The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor and contains the to dispose of her estate by will.
following paragraphs which dispose of her estate:
The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia
Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time conviviendo durante 40 aos . . . .
of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically
Sentadas las premisas de hecho y de derecho que an teceden, el Juzgado
incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and
no puede menos de llegar a la con ser legalizado como el testamento y
alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the
ultima voluntad de la finada Silvestra Baron. Cuando existen pruebas
document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
suficien tes para concencer al Juzgado de que se ha ejercido in fluencia
Upon the issues thus drawn by the pleadings of the judge of the Court of First indebida en el animo de la testadora y que como resultado de dicha
Instance, after and extended trial and a full consideration of the evidence, came influencia indebida esta ha otorgado el testamento de la voluntad de la
to the following conclusion: supuesta testadora sino de los que sobre ella ejercieron la influencia
indebida.
Opinamos que influyeron indebidamente e impropia mente en la
voluntad ya debilitada de doa Silvestra Baron por su avanzada edad la An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance
presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante with the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of
el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida regularity. But the burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the
de presenciarlo por algunos soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator
Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino Cuyugan a did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not
que ella firmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any
declarando que no habia otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was executed under due
translado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hisciese firmar influence or by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary capacity. In the
documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y del algunos otros present case the learned trial judge refused the probate of the alleged will on the
soldados, no solamente cuando se otorgo el testamento, sino cuando ground that it was executed under the due influence of other persons and we
ella fue transladada de casa contra su voluntad y cuando se le hizo think the record warrants his findings in this respect. The trial court also made
firmar el Exhibit 10, y por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una completa findings of fact tending to show actual lack of testamentary capacity of Silvestra
libertad para disponer de sus bienes en testamento, o con pleno Baron and we have preferred to base our conclusion on that finding. The
conocimiento del alcance de su contendido. Solo asi se explica el que testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron at the time she executed the said
ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con purported will.
quienes habia estado en pleito, con pretericion de sus hermanos,
The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the P. Desde que los tres abogados Abad Santos, Silva y David y usted y
alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a Vivencio Cuyugan se acercaron a la cama de la finada, hasta que tanto
physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age ella como usteded firmaron el testamento, ha pronunciado ella alguna
and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Her palabra? ha dicho ella algo o no? R. No recuerdo.
grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who reached the house about one hour or so
P. Pero, por lo que usted recuerda, ha dicho ella algo o no ha dicho
after the old lady's collapse, telephoned a message to Vivencio Cuyugan at San
nada? R. No recuerdo.
Fernando, some fourteen kilometers distant, that Silvestra had an attack and
was in a serious condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately, P. Usted ha dicho algo a ella? R. Nada.
Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated the patient
P. El seor Quirino Abad Santos le ha dicho algo a ella? R. Nada. No
with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a
he oido.
hypodermic injection in the arm. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving,
Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house P. Los otros abogados Silva y David le han dicho algo ? R. No he
prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse oido.
were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Epifania Sampang, admittedly an
intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron and P. Ella ha dicho algo a cualquiera de osos tres o a los abogados? R.
remained throughout the morning attended to her, testified that when she No he oido que dijera algo.
reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and
P. Si ella hubiese dicho algo a los abogados, asi como los abogados
unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned;
hubieran hablado a ella, usted hubiera oido porque usted estaba cerca,
that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a
no es verdad? R. Si seor, hubiera podido oir.
doctor but all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned as
stated to San Fernando for a doctor. P. Cuando el senor Silva termino de leer el testamento, dijo algo la
vieja? R. No he oido que dijera algo.
The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra
understood the alleged will which she signed, but all of them admitted that There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation
although they were in her house about two hours not one of them exchanged a of the alleged will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her
single word of conversation with Silvestra. The subscribing witness Zacarias sister Faustina in the will she said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative
Nuguid testified in part as follows: evidence that she understood the document when it was read to her. The person
who read the will to her testified as follows:
R. Despues de leido el testamento, tuve que entregarlo a doa Silvestra, subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes
y lo miro algun rato. no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the
testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has
P. Y ella, efectivamente, cogio el testamento de manos de usted? R.
been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover,
Lo entregue a sus manos.
where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental
P. Y ella lo cogio con sus manos? R. Si seor. condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor
obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief
P. Y lo tuvo en sus manos leyendo, mirando? R. Mirandolo asi.
that he had not executed the will in question.
P. Pero, no lo leia? R. Lo estuvo mirando por mucho tiempo asi.

In view of the premises, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs
Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief against the appellant.
beneficiary, Vivencio Cuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word
Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.
was exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't
know what drug the doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence
that in her dazed physical and mental condition she had no adequate
understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her Separate Opinions
name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign
another copy (t.s.n. page 109) which was done. The main issue in this case, as I see it, is whether or not Silvestra Baron, a
woman of advanced years and in a critical state of health, possesses
She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which
testamentary capacity to make a will. This was an issue of fact, and resolving it
occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney
the trial judge reached the conclusion that the testatrix was not of disposing
who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it
mind. My review of the evidence does not permit me to say that in thus deciding
secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death
the trial judge was wrong. As was expected, in a case of this character, the oral
she had denied to several persons that she made any will.
testimony was conflicting, but in resolving the credibility of the witnesses, a
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do judge as experienced as Judge Hermogenes Reyes was in a much better position
any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. to do so than we are. However, I may state that I have been considerably
The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will influenced by the testimony of the parish priest, certainly a disinterested party,
who stated on the witness stand that in response to his question if she had made declarando que no habia otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su
a will, Silvestra Baron answered: "There is no will, Father." But from the premise translado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hiciese firmar
of lack of testamentary capacity, it does not necessarily follow that anything of documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y de algunos otros
an unprofessional nature should be imputed to the lawyer who prepared the will soldados, no solamente cuando se otorgo el testamento, sino cuando se
and the other lawyers who acted as attesting witnesses. The first named is the le hizo firmar el Exhibit 10, y, por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una
justice of the peace of San Fernando, Pampanga, and has an excellent completa libertad para disponer de sus bienes en testamento, o con
reputation, which is not lessened in the least by his acts in this case, and the last pleno conocimiento del alcance de su contenido. Solo asi se explica el
named are reputable members of the bar. que ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con
quienes habia estado en pleito, con pretericion de sus hermanos,
For these reasons and to this extent, I concur.
especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia estado
Vickers, and Recto, J., concur. conviviendo durante 40 aos . . ..
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting: And the facts constituting lack of testamentary capacity are condensed in the
opinion of the majority as follows:
The lower court refused to probate the will of Silvestra Baron on the ground that
when she executed it she was under the undue influence of other persons; but The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed
the majority of this court, while admitting the existence of such undue the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature
influence, prefers to base its refusal on the ground that she lacked testamentary that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of
capacity at the time of the execution of said will. her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do
anything for herself. Her grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who reached
The facts constituting the undue influence in the opinion of the lower court are
the house about an hour or so after the old lady's collapse, telephoned a
summarized in its decision as follows:
message to Vivencio Cuyugan at San Fernando, some fourteen
Opinamos que influyeron indebitamente e impropiamente en al kilometers distant, that Silvestra had had an attack and was in a serious
voluntad ya debilitada de doa Silvestra Baron por su avanzada edad la condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately. Doctor
presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated the patient
el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor
de presenciarlo por algunos soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de gave her a hypodermic injection in the arm. As the doctor and the nurse
Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino Cuyugan a were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses,
que ella firmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither
the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Constabulary soldiers could have unduly influenced the testatrix in the making
Epifania Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the of her will.
first to reach Silvestra Baron and remained throughout the morning and
The presence of some Constabulary soldiers outside the house and in the
attended to her, testified that when she reached the house she found
kitchen is also one of the reasons which led the lower court to conclude that
her grandaunt lying in the bed, very pale and unconscious; that she
undue influence was used in making Silvestra Baron sign her will. Silvestra
called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth
Baron was not an ignorant old lady. She was a landed proprietress, who
was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a doctor but
according to the custom prevailing in the Philippine Islands, managed her won
all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned as
property, and in o doing she had to deal with many farm laborers in such a way
stated to San Fernando for a doctor.
as to make them respect her. The presence of Constabulary soldiers in towns
Examining now the facts which according to the findings of the lower court and barrios is not a rare occurrence, and country people are accustomed to
constituted undue influence, we have in the first place the presence of the seeing them around whether on patrol or quarantine duty. There is, therefore,
testatrix nephews Regino Cuyugan and Vivencio Cuyugan. There was nothing nothing in the mere presence of the Constabulary soldiers in the house of
either in the presence of Vivencio Cuyugan or of that of Regino Cuyugan which Silvestra Baron at the time of making her will which could have influenced her.
could have compelled Silvestra Baron to make Vivencio Cuyugan her most Besides, the testatrix must have known the presence of such soldiers before she
favored beneficiary in her will. There is certainly nothing ill in nephews being collapsed, because they had been there investigating the assault and robbery
present at the making of a will. The evidence shows that these two Cuyugans committed against her a few days before. There is no evidence that said soldiers
just stood by while the will was being read to the testatrix and when it was were brought to the house for the purpose of guarding the making of the will.
presented to her for her signature.
The fact that the chief of police of San Fernando, Zacarias Nuguid, was brought
The absence of Faustina Baron, the sister of Silvestra Baron, in whose by Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, whom the old lady had requested to prepare
company the latter was living, who, according to the witnesses for the her will, had no more significance than the bringing of the other attorneys to
opponents, but denied by the witnesses for the proponent, while the will was witnesses to the will. There is certainly no evil in making a chief of police a
being made, was prevented to come into the house by some Constabulary witness to a will, nor is there any law disqualifying him to be such witness.
soldiers and the chief of police of San Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, is
The alleged attitude of Regino Cuyugan in trying to prevent her aunt Silvestra
another fact mentioned by the lower court as constituting undue influence.
Baron on December 18, 1932, the day following the making of her will, to sign a
Even granting that Faustina Baron was prevented to come to the house while
document prepared by Attorney Jose A. Narciso revoking her said will, even if it
Silvestra Baron was making her will, I fail to see how such act on the part of the
were true, could in no way have influenced her in the making of said will which already stated. On the 20th of December, 1932, the old lady was taken by her
took place the day previous. brother Guillermo Baron, one of the opponents, to her own house in San
Fernando, Pampanga, occupied by said Guillermo, and there she stayed for forty
The lower court also found that the will of Silvestra Baron was weakened by old
days before her death. During that time she signed on two different occasions
age. In this connection I prefer to reproduce here what is said in 68 Corpus Juris,
two documents, one ratifying the making of her will and the other appointing
440-442:
her nephew Vivencio Cuyugan her attorney in fact. An old lady who after
Old age. A person possessing the requisites of testamentary capacity making her will remains in the house of her sister, free from any outside
is not incapacitated from making a will by old age, although his influence, refuses to sign a document purporting to be a revocation of her will,
advanced years to be accompanied by infirmity of mind and body. Nor lives for forty days in her own house in San Fernando, Pampanga, in the
is he incapacitated by failing a memory, vacillating judgment, company of her brother, and there signs two important documents, cannot
childishness, slovenliness in dress, eccentricities or peculiarities in habit certainly be said to have been unduly influenced when the made her will.
or speech, and even delusions or hallucinations if they do not affect the

In Brownlie vs. Brownlie (93 A.L.R., 1048), the Supreme Court of Illinois said the
execution of the will, and he is not limited to conventional methods of
following:
disposition. The will is not valid where an aged person is so enfeebled
mentally as not to understand what he is doing. . . . The undue influence which will invalidate a will must be directly
connected with the execution of the instrument, be operating when the
If undue influence had been used to compel Silvestra Baron to make the will on
will was made, and thereby prevent the testator from exercising his own
the 17th of December, 1932, she could have changed her said will after all the
wish and will in the disposition of his estate. (Flanigon vs. Smith, 337
circumstances which according to the court below constituted said undue
Ill., 572; 169 N.E., 767; Chaney vs.Baker, 304 Ill., 362; 136, N.E., 804;
influence had disappeared. After the making of her will Silvestra Baron was left
Goff vs. Gerhart, 316 Ill., 513; 147 N.E., 419; McGrady vs. McGrady, 298
alone in her house in the company of her nephew Regino Cuyugan, her
Ill., 129; 131 N.E., 251.) The fact that the beneficiaries of a will are those
grandniece Epifania Sampang and her sister Faustina Baron. Upon gaining
by whom the testator was surrounded and with whom he stood in
access to the house and learning that her sister Silvestra Baron had signed some
confidential relationship at the time of executing his will is no ground
papers, Faustina Baron started immediately to look for Attorney Jose A. Narciso,
for inferring undue influence. (Michael vs. Marshall, 201 Ill., 70; 66 N.E.,
and with him went to the house of Attorney Valeriano Silva who upon being
273; Rutherford vs. Morris, 77 Ill., 397.) The influence must be directed
questioned informed the latter that the old lady had signed a will. Thereupon
towards procuring the will in favor of certain parties and must be such
efforts were made to have the will revoked, and to this effect Attorney Jose A.
as to destroy the testator's freedom of will and purpose.
Narciso prepared a document which the old lady refused to sign as we have
(Pond vs. Hollett, 310 Ill., 31; 141 N.E., 403; Gregory vs. Richey, 307 Ill.,
219; 138 N.E., 669; Blackhurst vs. James, 304 Ill., 219; 136 N. E., 754, require that a testator, in making disposition of his property, shall be
Snell vs. Weldon, 239 Ill., 279; 87 N.E., 1022.) Proof of undue influence humane or even just. If he possesses the requisite mental capacity, he
must be consistent with the exercise of undue influence and also be has the right to make an unequal distribution of his property among his
inconsistent with its absence. heirs or to give it entirely to strangers. (McGrady vs. McGrady, 298 Ill.,
(Cunningham vs. Dorwart, supra;Compher vs. Browning, 219 Ill., 429; 76 129; 131 N.E., 251.)
N.E., 678; 109 Am. St. Rep., 346.)
We have seen that none of the facts which the lower court found to constitute
In the case of Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez (48 Phil., 772), this court in undue influence is such as to cause fear, desire of peace, or any other feeling
an opinion written by Justice Malcolm, defines undue influence as follows: which Silvestra Baron was unable to resist.
Undue influence as used in connection with the law of wills, may be As to the effect of an opportunity of revocation upon an alleged undue
defined as that which compels the testator to do that which is against influence, we read in 28 R.C.L., 151, the following rule:
the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling which he is
106. Opportunity of revocation. Where the testator has had an
unable to resist.
opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged
In Applehans vs. Jurgenson (67 A.L.R., 857), the Supreme Court of Illinois said: undue influence upon him, but makes no change in it, the court as a
general rule considers the effect of the testimony of the undue influence
The undue influence which will avoid a will must be directly connected
as destroyed.
with the execution of the instrument and operate at the time it is made.
The influence must be specially directed toward procuring the will in From the foregoing definition of undue influence, and the existence of an
favor of a particular party or parties, and it must be such as to destroy opportunity to revoke without taking advantage of it, I come to the conclusion
the freedom of the testator's will and render the instrument obviously that when Silvestra Baron signed her will she was not under any undue
more the offspring of the will of another or others that of his own. influence, and that if she had ever been in such during the forty days which she
(Ughetti vs. Ughetti, 334 Ill., 398; 166 N.E., 90; Ray vs. Koenigsmarck, survived the making of said will. The fact that not only she had not done so but
329 Ill., 588; 161 N.E., 124; Farmer vs. Davis, 289 Ill., 392; 124 N.E., 640; that she made a power of attorney in favor of her nephew Vivencio Cuyugan, the
Hurd vs. Reed, 260 Ill., 154; 102 N.E., 1048; Larabee vs. Larabee, 240 Ill., chief beneficiary under her will, and ratified the making of said will, is
576; 88 N.E., 1037; Snell vs. Weldon, 239 Ill., 279; 87 N.E., N.E., 1022; conclusive proof that no undue influence had been exerted to compel her to
Wickes vs. Walden, 228 Ill., 56; 81 N.E., 798; Woodman vs. Illinois Trust sign her will.
& Sav. Bank, 211 Ill., 578; 71 N.E., 1099; Roe vs. Taylor, 45 Ill., 485.) The
evidence failed to establish these requirements. The law does not
Another fact which led the trial court to conclude that undue influence was a will is an unnatural one it is the duty of the proponent on the probate
exercised upon Silvestra Baron is that in her will she left most of her property to of the will to give some reasonable explanation of its unnatural
her nephews leaving nothing to her brother and sister Faustina Baron except a character.
life usufruct.
In the present case there is evidence to the effect that Silvestra Baron trusted
In the case of Pecson vs. Coronel (45 Phil., 216), this court said the following: her nephews, specially Vivencio Cuyugan, more than her brother Guillermo
Baron and her sister Faustina Baron. Faustina Baron herself testified that after
Although family ties in this country are very strongly knit, the exclusion
the assault and robber on December 9, 1932, Silvestra Baron entrusted to her
of relatives, who are not forced heirs, from the inheritance is not an
nephews Ventura Cuyugan and Vivencio Cuyugan the combination of the safe
exceptional case. The inhabitants of the Archipelago do not appear to
where she kept her valuables and documents and gave them the duplicates of
be averse to the freedom to make a will enshrined by article 783 of the
the keys to the interior compartments and drawers (pp. 254, 255, t.s.n.). That
Civil Code, which has been in force in the Philippines since the year
Silvestra Baron did not trust her sister Faustina Baron may be inferred from the
1889. But even if the appointment of a beneficiary do not seem to be the
latter's own testimony on page 291 (t.s.n.) to the effect that before the 17th of
most usual and ordinary because the beneficiary is not a relative of the
December, 1932, she did not dare to suggests to her sister Silvestra Baron to
testatrix who has relatives by blood, this alone will not render the
make a will because the latter did not like to hear anything about the matter,
appointment void per se.
but she told Faustina that she had already made her will long time ago. If to this
In 68 Corpus Juris, 452, we read the following: we add the fact that a complaint was signed by Silvestra Baron against her sister
Faustina and the latter's son Emilio Lacson for the assault and robbery
The fact that a will may be unnatural, unfair, or unjust creates of itself
committed against her, then we have a full explanation why in her will Silvestra
no presumption that the testator was incompetent at the time of its
Baron bequeathed to her nephews almost all her property leaving to her brother
execution. No presumption of mental incapacity arises from the fact
and sister nothing but a life usufruct.
that the will makes an unequal distribution of property among the next
of kin, or that it gives property to persons other than the natural objects Passing now to the question of lack of testamentary capacity or disposing mind,
of the testator's bounty. Any departure form the usual course in which a which is the ground preferred by the majority opinion on which to base its
person prompted by ordinary instincts and natural impulses would have rejection of the probate of the said will, we find in the first place the alleged
his property go is presumed to have been made by the testator because failure of the proponent to call as witnesses the doctor and the nurse who
of reasons rationally conceived which were satisfactory to him, and on attended Silvestra Baron immediately after she collapsed, apparently inferring
the probate of a will the fact the will is unnatural does not shift the that had they testified their testimony would have been unfavorable to the claim
burden to the proponent. According to some decisions, however, where of sanity. The burden of proving sanity, which falls on the shoulders of the
proponent of a will, was discharged by Vivencio Cuyugan when he put to the In the case of Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, supra, this court said:
witness stand Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, the drawer of the will, and
On January 3, 1924, when the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, made his will,
attorneys Vicente T. David and Valeriano Silva, and the chief of police of San
he was 76 years old, physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering from
Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, the three witnesses who signed the will.
a loss of memory, had a guardian of his person and his property, and
They testified unanimously that when testatrix signed her will she was of sound
was eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that
mind, judging from her appearance and the manner she signed it. "An attesting
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
witness to a will may base an opinion of the testator's mental capacity upon his
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary
appearance at the time of executing the will. (Brownlie vs. Brownlie, 93 A.L.R.,
capacity." Two of the subscribing witnesses testified clearly to the
1041.) This testimony was sufficient to make and did make a prima facie case, (68
regular manner in which the will was executed, and one did not. The
Corpus Juris, 450), and the burden of going forward to show testamentary
attending physician and three other doctors who were present at the
incapacity having shifted to the contestants (68 Corpus Juris, 451). It was not
execution of the will expressed opinions entirely favorable to the
therefore the duty of the proponent to call the doctor and the nurse who
capacity of the testator. Three other members of the medical profession
attended Silvestra Baron when she collapsed to show that she was of sound
expressed opinions entirely unfavorable to the capacity of the testator
mind but of the contestants to show incapacity.
and certified he was of unsound mind. Held: That Tomas Rodriguez on
That Silvestra Baron did not become unconscious as the result of her fall is January 3, 1924, possessed sufficient mentality to make a will which
shown by the very testimony of Epifania Sampang who said, referring to her would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity; that the
grandaunt: "Estaba inconsciente, lanzaba quejidos, decia: 'Faustina, Faustina'; proponents of the will have carried successfully the burden of proof and
mandaba buscar a la vieja Faustina." If the testatrix was really unconscious as have shown him of sound mind on that date; and that it was reversible
the result of said fall she would not have been able to call her sister Faustina by error on the part of the trial court not to admit his will to probate.
her name, nor could she have given orders to locate her. Because her grandaunt
While it is true that in the present case no physician testified as to the condition
did not answer her when she called her, Epifania Sampang imagined that she
of Silvestra Baron's mind when she signed her will, we have however the
was unconscious. Thus, all the evidence concerning the unconscious state of
testimony of three reputable attorneys to the effect that judging from her
Silvestra Baron in the morning she made her will consisted of the testimony of
appearance and the ways she acted when she signed her will she was of sound
Epifania Sampang alone. The doctor who attended Silvestra Baron after her fall
mind. This was corroborated by the fact that when the next day Attorney Jose A.
was the one qualified to testify as to her mental condition and not her
Narciso, upon learning that she had made a will, he tried to make her revoked
grandniece. The contestants whose duty it was to call said doctor to prove
said will which she refused. This in itself is an admission that she was of sound
unconsciousness failed to do so.
disposing mind. The very finding of the lower court that Silvestra Baron was
unduly influenced in the making of her will is an implied admission that she
possessed testamentary capacity.
The preponderance of evidence and the implied admission of the lower court
show, therefore, the when Silvestra Baron made her will she was of sound
disposing mind.
From all the foregoing considerations, I come to the conclusion that Silvestra
Baron made her will free from any undue influence and in a sound disposing
mind, and, therefore, said will should be probated.
1. That the said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the time he
Caguioa vs. Calderon (20 Phil 400)
authorized and signed his will.
EN BANC
2. That he executed the said will under illegal and undue influence or persuasion
DECISION on the part of some persons who acted in behalf of the beneficiaries or heirs.
October 24, 1911 3. That the signature of the testator was obtained by deceit or fraud, for the reason
that it was not his intention that all that was recorded in the said instrument
G.R. No. 6625
should be his will at the time he signed it; for the testator had informed the
JUANA CAGUIAO, administratix of the estate of the deceased Emigdio
opponent, Maria Calderon, before and after the said will had been signed, that he
Zarate, petitioner-appellee,
had not disposed of the one-half of the house and lot now mentioned in the third
vs.
clause, latter (a), of the said will, because the said testator recognized that the
MARIA CALDERON, opponent-appellant.
house and lot referred to belonged to the said Maria Calderon.
M. Legaspi Florendo, for appellant.
Therefore, the opponent prays the court to annul the will alleged to have been
Pedro Ma. Sison, for appellee.
executed by Emigdio Zarate, and to order that its probate be dissallowed, with the
JOHNSON, J.:
costs against the petitioner.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff, upon the 17th of February, 1910,
presented in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan, praying After hearing the evidence adduced pro and con, the lower court reached the
for the probation of the last will and testament of Emigdio Zarate, deceased, in following conclusion:
conformity with section 630 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. The
It having been proved completely on the part of the petitioner that the will in
petition was accompanied by the original will, marked Exhibit A, of said
question was executed and signed in entire conformity with all the requirements
Emigdio Zarate.
and solemnities set out in the Code of Civil Procedure, the court overrules the
Due notice of said petition was given in accordance with law, and the hearing opposition, sustains the petition, admits to probate Exhibit A, holding that the
for the probation of said will was fixed for the 9th of March, 1910. Later the said same is legal in all its parts as the last will and testament of the deceased Emigdio
hearing was transferred to the 16th of July, 1910. On the latter date the said Zarate.
Maria Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and opposed the probation of said
From that conclusion of the lower court, the oppositor appealed to this court
will upon the following grounds:
and made the following assignments of error:
I. The court erred in holding that the deceased, Emigdio Zarate, was in the full will and testament, the original of which appears in the record and is marked
possession of his mental faculties at the time of the execution of his will. Exhibit A. Emigdio Zarate died on the 19th day of January, 1910.
II. The court erred in holding that the said Emigdio Zarate executed his last will From an examination of said Exhibit A it appears to have been signed by
and testament without illegal persuasion or influence on the part of persons Emigdio Zarate and by four witnesses, Sabino M. Sandoval, Esteban Sandoval,
working in behalf of the heirs. George Zarate and Eugenio Zarate. From the record it appears that the testator
dictated his will in the Pangasinan dialect and it was then translated into
III. The court erred in holding that Emigdio Zarate executed and signed his last
Spanish. After the will had been written in Spanish it was read to the deceased
will without fraud and deceit being brought to bear upon him.
and translated to him in the Pangasinan dialect, and, according to the
IV. The court erred in holding that the testator signed his will in the presence of allegations of the appellee, the said Exhibit A received his approval as his last
four witnesses, Sabino Sandoval, Esteban Sandoval, George Zarate and Eugenio will and testament.
Zarate, who, on their part, signed, each of them, in the presence of the others.
The appellant alleges that at the time of the execution of the said alleged will of
V. The court erred in holding that it was proved that the will in question was Emigdio Zarate, he was not in the full possession of his mental faculties. This
executed and signed in conformity with the requirements and solemnities set out question was presented to the lower court. After hearing the evidence, the lower
in the Code of Civil Procedure. court found that Emigdio Zarate, at the time of the execution of the said will,
was in the possession of his faculties. Two of the witnesses who signed the will,
VI. The court erred in holding that the document Exhibit A, of the petitioner, is
as well as others who were present in the house at the time the said will was
legal in all parts, as the last will and testament of the deceased Emigdio Zarate.
executed, testified that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of sound mind and
VII. The court erred in rendering judgment in this matter without waiting for the memory at the time he signed the said will. Practically the only testimony to the
written argument of both sides. contrary adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court was the
testimony given by two doctors, one of whom had not seen the deceased for
VIII. The court erred in not holding that all the proof taken together sustained the
many months before his death, whose testimony was based wholly upon
claim of the oppositor, Maria Calderon.
hypothetical questions.
IX. The court erred in imposing the costs upon the oppositor.
The appellant attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some months prior to
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, it appears from the his death had been troubled with insomia, as well as some other physical
record that upon the 13th day of January, 1910, Emigdio Zarate executed his last infirmities. The hypothetical questions were based upon the question whether
or not a person who had been suffering with insomia for some months would
have sufficient mental capacity to execute a will. The two doctors who appeared
on behalf of the opponents testified that insomia tended to destroy the mental interested in the will, or who was present at the time of the making of the same,
capacity, but that there were times, even during the period while they were induced or attempted to induce the deceased not to will the said house to the
suffering from insomia, when they would be perfectly rational. Even admitting opponent herein. The theory of the opponent that the deceased did not will to
that there was some foundation for the supposition that Emigdio Zarate had her the house in question is a mere presumption and there is not a scintilla of
suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not believe that the testimony was evidence in the record to support it.
sufficiently direct and positive, based upon the hypothetical; questions, to
The fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error may be considered together.
overcome the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses who were present
at the time of the execution of the will in question. The evidence adduced During the trial of the cause two of the persons who signed the will as witnesses
during the trial of the case, shows a large preponderance of proof in favor of the appeared and testified. They testified that the deceased signed the will in their
fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the full possession of his mental faculties at the presence and in the presence of the other witnesses to the will; that they each
time he executed his last will and testament. signed the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of the other
witnesses; that the other two witnesses who were not called also signed the will
The second and third assignments of error may be considered together. Upon
in the presence of the testator and in he presence of each of the other witnesses.
the question presented by the said assignments of error, the lower court found
There is no sufficient proof in the record to overcome the declarations of these
from the evidence that Emigdio Zarate executed his last will and testament
witnesses. We find no reason, therefore, for modifying the conclusion of the
without threats, force or pressure or illegal influence. The basis of the claim that
lower court upon these assignments of error.
undue influence had been exercised over Emigdio Zarate is that a day or two
before the said will was made, it is claimed by the opponent, Maria Calderon, With reference to the seventh assignment of error, to wit: that the court erred in
that the deceased promised to will to her a certain house (one-half of which rendering judgment without waiting for the written arguments of both parties,
seems to belong to her) upon the payment by her to the deceased and the said it may be said that it is customary for courts to wait until the parties have
property was not willed to the defendant herein. The agreement between Maria presented their arguments before deciding a cause, nevertheless, it is not
Calderon and the deceased, if there was an agreement, seems to have been made reversible error for a court to decide a cause without waiting for written
between them privately, at least at the time the will was made the deceased arguments to be presented by the respective attorneys. It appears from the
made no reference to it whatever. Those present at the time the will was made record (p. 102) that the trial of the cause was closed on the 5th of august, 1910,
and the witnesses who signed the same heard no statement or conversation and that the decision in the cause was not rendered until the 5th of October,
relating to the said agreement, between the opponent herein and the deceased. 1910, or until after two months had expired. There is nothing in the record
There is no proof in the record which shows that any person even spoke to the which shows that either of the attorneys during these two months asked for
deceased with reference to the willing of the said house to the opponent. There additional time in which to present their written arguments. It also appears of
is nothing in the record to indicate in the slightest degree that any person record (p. 102) that the respective attorneys asked for fifteen days time within
which to present their written arguments. There is nothing in the record which
shows whether they presented their written arguments presented before the
decision was rendered in the cause, it was clearly not the fault of the judge.
The arguments heretofore given seem to be sufficient also to answer the eight
and ninth assignments of error.
Upon a full consideration of the evidence and the assignments of error, we are
of the opinion that the will of Emigdio Zarate, deceased, was executed and
signed in entire conformity with all the requirements and solemnities required
by law. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed with costs.
had signed the will as a witness; that Anselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had
Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan (27 Phil 579)
also signed said will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the
EN BANC presence of the deceased.
DECISION Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 40 years of age;
that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that she died on
September 1, 1914
the 11th day of August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had
G.R. No. 6845 executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time said last will
YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee, was executed; that there were also present Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora and
vs. a person called Anselmo; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA LLU, objectors-appellants. will in the presence of the witnesses; that he had seen her sign the will with his
own eyes; that the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the said
Chicote and Miranda for appellants.
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and in the presence of each other; that the said
OBrien and DeWitt for appellee.
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will voluntarily, and in his judgment, she
JOHNSON, J.:
was in the possession of her faculties; that there were no threats or intimidation
It appears from the record that on the 23d day of August, 1909, one Perfecto
used to induce her to sign the will; that she signed it voluntarily.
Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap No further witnesses were called and there was no further opposition presented
Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga to the legalization of the said will.
Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in
After hearing the foregoing witnesses, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, on
the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition
the 29th day of September, 1909, ordered that the last will and testament of
and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. The will was
will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and
attached to the record and marked Exhibit A. The court further ordered that
Timoteo Paez.
one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving of a bond, the
Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing on the 18th amount of which was to be fixed later.
day of September, 1909. Timoteo Paez declared that he was 48 years of age; that
From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the 28th
he had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the 11th
of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a
day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and
petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and
testament; that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he
desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even
represent them in the cause. though they had been negligent in presenting their opposition to the
legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age.
On the 1st day of March, 1910, the court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad
litem of said parties. Gabriel La O accepted said appointment, took the oath of Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the
office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad litem of order of the 29th day of September, 1909, and to grant to said minors an
said parties. On the 2d day of March, 1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in opportunity to present new proof relating to the due execution of said will. Said
court and presented a motion in which he alleged, in substance: petition was based upon the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions.
First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate
by order of the court on the 29th day of September, 1909, was null, for the While it is not clear from the record, apparently the said minors in their petition
following reasons: for a new trial, attached to said petition the alleged will of August 6, 1909, of the
said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, and the affidavits of Severo Tabora, Clotilde
(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the
and Cornelia Serrano.
law prescribes.
Upon the 10th day of March, 1910, upon the hearing of said motion for a
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap
rehearing, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, granted said motion and
Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her
ordered that the rehearing should take place upon the 18th day of March, 1910,
sickness.
and directed that notice should be given to the petitioners of said rehearing and
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal to all other persons interested in the will. At the rehearing a number of
influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, witnesses were examined.
and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of executing the
It will be remembered that one of the grounds upon which the new trial was
same.
requested was that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, had not signed the
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, will (Exhibit A) of the 11th of August, 1909; that in support of that allegation, the
the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another will, with all the protestants, during the rehearing, presented a witness called Tomas Puzon.
formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909. Puzon testified that he was a professor and an expert in handwriting, and upon
being shown the will (of August 11, 1909) Exhibit A, testified that the name and
surname on Exhibit A, in his judgment were written by two different hands,
though the given name is the same as that upon Exhibit 1 (the will of August 6,
1909), because he found in the name Tomasa on Exhibit A a similarity in the the will or not; that he signed two bills; that he did not know La O; that he did
tracing to the Tomasa in Exhibit 1; that comparing the surname on Exhibit A not believe that Tomasa had signed the will (Exhibit A) before he arrived at the
with the surname on Exhibit 1 he found that the character of the writing was house; that he was not sure that he had seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong sign
thoroughly distinguished and different by the tracing and by the direction of the Exhibit A because there were many people and there was a screen at the door
letters in the said two exhibits; that from his experience and observation he and he could not see; that he was called a a witness to sign the second will and
believed that the name Tomasa and Yap Caong, appearing in the signature was told by the people there that it was the same as the first; that the will
on Exhibit A were written by different person. (Exhibit A) was on a table, far from the patient, in the house but outside the
room where the patient was; that the will was signed by Paez and himself; that
Puzon, being cross-examined with reference to his capacity as an expert in
Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he was not sure whether Anselmo Zacarias
handwriting, testified that while he was a student in the Ateneo de Manila, he
signed the will or not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
had studied penmanship; that he could not tell exactly when that was, except
could see the table on which the will was written at the time it was signed or
that he had concluded his course in the year 1882; that since that time he had
not; that there were many people in the house; that he remembered the names
been a telegraph operator for seventeen years and that he had acted as an expert
of Pedro and Lorenzo; that he could not remember the names of any others;
in handwriting in the courts in the provinces.
that the will remained on the table after he signed it; that after he signed the
Gabriel La O was called as a witness during the rehearing and testified that he will he went to the room where Tomasa was lying; that the will was left on the
had drawn the will of the 6th of August, 1909, at the request of Tomasa Elizaga table outside; that Tomasa was very ill; that he heard the people asking Tomasa
Yap Caong; that it was drawn in accordance with her request and under her to sign the will after he was (the witness) had signed it; that he saw Paez sign
directions; that she had signed it; that the same had been signed by three the will, that he could not remember whether Anselmo Zacarias had signed the
witnesses in her presence and in the presence of each other; that the will was will, because immediately after he and Paez signed it, he left because he was
written in her house; that she was sick and was lying in her bed, but that she sat hungry; that the place where the table was located was in the same house, on
up to sign the will; that she signed the will with great difficulty; that she was the floor, about two steps down from the floor on which Tomasa was.
signed in her right mind.
Rufino R. Papa, was called as a witness for the purpose of supporting the
The said Severo Tabora was also called as a witness again during the rehearing. allegation that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was mentally incapacitated to make
He testified that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Papa declared that he was a physician;
she was dead; that his signature as a witness to Exhibit A (the will of August 11, that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that he had treated her in the month
1909) was placed there by him; that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, of August; that he visited her first on the 8th day of August; that he visited her
became familiar with the contents of the will because she signed it before he again on the 9th and 10th days of August; that on the first visit he found the sick
(the witness) did; that he did not know whether anybody there told her to sign woman completely weak very weak from her sickness, in the third stage of
tuberculosis; that she was lying in bed; that on the first visit he found her with room; that he did not know whether Tomasa had been informed of the contents
but little sense, the second day also, and on the third day she had lost all her of the will or not; he supposed she must have read it because Lorenzo turned
intelligence; that she died on the 11th of August; tat he was requested to issue the will over to her; that when Lorenzo asked her to sign the will, he did not
the death certificate; that when he asked her (Tomasa) whether she was feeling know what she said he could not hear her voice; that he did not know whether
any pain or anything of that kind, she did not answer at all; that she was in a the sick woman was him sign the will or not; that he believed that Tomasa died
condition of stupor, induced, as he believed, by the stage of uraemia from which the next day after the will had been signed; that the other two witnesses,
she was suffering. Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora, had signed the will in the room with the sick
woman; that he saw them sign the will and that they saw him sign it; that he
Anselmo Zacarias, who had signed the will of August 11, 1909, was also called as
was not sure whether the testatrix could have seen them at the time they signed
a witnesses during the rehearing. He testified that he had known Tomasa
the will or not; that there was a screen before the bed; that he did not think that
Elizaga Yap Caong since he was a child; that Tomasa was dead; that he had
Lorenzo had been giving instructions as to the contents of the will; that about
written the will exhibit A; that it was all in his writing except the last part, which
ten or fifteen minutes elapsed from the time Lorenzo handed the will to Tomasa
was written by Carlos Sobaco; that he had written the will Exhibit A at the
before she started to sign it; that the pen with which she signed the will as given
request of the uncle of Tomasa; that Lorenzo, the brother of the deceased, was
to her and she held it.
the one who had instructed him as to the terms of the will ; that the deceased
had not spoken to him concerning the terms of the will; that the will was Clotilde Mariano testified that he was a cigarette maker; that he knew Tomasa
written in the dining room of the residence of the deceased; that Tomasa was in Elizaga Yap Caong and that she was dead; that she had made two wills; that the
another room different from that in which the will was written; that the will was first one was written by La O and the second by Zacarias; that he was present at
not written in the presence of Tomasa; that he signed the will as a witness in the the time Zacarias wrote the second one; that he was present when the second
room where Tomasa was lying; that the other witnesses signed the will in the will was taken to Tomasa for signature; that Lorenzo had told Tomasa that the
same room that when he went into the room where the sick woman was second will was exactly like the first; that Tomasa said she could not sign it.
(Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong) Lorenzo had the will in his hands; that when
On cross examination he testified that there was a lot of visitors there; that
Lorenzo came to the bed he showed the will to his sister (Tomasa) and
Zacarias was not there; that Paez and Tabora were there; that he had told
requested her to sign it; that she was lying stretched out on the bed and two
Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first.
women, who were taking care of her, helped her to sit up, supporting her by
lacing their hands at her back; that when she started to write her name, he During the rehearing Cornelia Serrano and Pedro Francisco were also examined
withdrew from the bed on account of the best inside the room; when he came as witnesses. There is nothing in their testimony, however, which in our opinion
back again to the sick bed the will was signed and was again in the hands of is important.
Lorenzo; that he did not see Tomasa sign the will because he withdrew from the
In rebuttal Julia e la Cruz was called as a witness. She testified that she was 19 Lorenzo Yap Caong testified as a witness on rebuttal. He said that he knew
years of age; that she knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that Anselmo Zacarias and that Zacarias wrote the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong;
she lived in the house of Tomasa during the last week of her illness; that Tomasa that Tomasa had given him instructions; that Tomasa had said that she sign the
had made two wills; that she was present when the second one was executed; will; that the will was on a table near the bed of Tomasa; that Tomasa, from
that a lawyer had drawn the will in the dining room and after it had been drawn where she was lying in the bed, could seethe table where the witnesses had
and everything finished , it was taken to where Doa Tomasa was, for her signed the will.
signature; that it was taken to her by Anselmo Zacarias; that she was present at
During the rehearing certain other witnesses were also examined; in our
the time Tomasa signed the will that there were many other people present also;
opinion, however, it is necessary to quote from them for the reason that their
that she did not see Timoteo Paez there; that she saw Severo Tabora; that
testimony in no way affects the preponderance of proof above quoted.
Anselmo Zacarias was present; that she did not hear Clotilde Mariano ask
Tomasa to sign the will; that she did not hear Lorenzo say to Tomasa that the At the close of the rehearing the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, in an
second will was the same sa the first; that Tomasa asked her to help her to sit up extended opinion, reached the conclusion that the last will and testament of
and to put a pillow to her back when Zacarias gave her some paper or document Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, which was attached to the record and marked
and asked her to sign it; that she saw Tomasa take hold of the pen and try to Exhibit A was the last will and testament of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
sign it but she did not see the place she signed the document, for the reason and admitted it to probate and ordered that the administrator therefore
that she left the room; that she saw Tomasa sign the document but did not see appointed should continue as such administrator. From that order the
on what place on the document she signed; and that a notary public came the protestants appealed to this court, and made the following assignments of error:
next morning; that Tomasa was able to move about in the bed; that she had
I. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed by the
seen Tomasa in the act of starting to write her signature when she told her to
deceased Tomasa Yap Caong, without the intervention of any external influence
get her some water.
on the part of other persons.
Yap Cao Quiang was also called as a witness in rebuttal. He testified that he
II. The court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew
knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and knew that she had made a will; that he
what she was doing at the time of signing the will.
saw the will at the time it was written; that he saw Tomasa sign it on her head;
that he did not hear Lorenzo ask Tomasa to sign the will; that Lorenzo had III. The court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap
handed the will to Tomasa to sign; that he saw the witnesses sign the will on a Caong in the first will, Exhibit 1, is identical with that which appears in the second
table near the bed; that the table was outside the curtain or screen and near the will, Exhibit A.
entrance to the room where Tomasa was lying.
IV. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed in possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict
accordance with the law. in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do not
feel justified in reversing his conclusions upon that question.
With reference to the first assignment of error, to wit, that undue influence was
brought to bear upon Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong in the execution of her will of With reference to the third assignment of error, to wit, that the lower court
August 11th, 1909 (Exhibit A), the lower court found that no undue influence had committed an error in declaring that the signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
been exercised over the mind of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. While it is Caong, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is identical with that which
true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one appears in the second will (August 11, 1909, Exhibit A), it may be said:
Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he
First. That whether or not Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of
will, upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that
August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the question presented to the court. The
Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of the will, to influence
question presented was whether or not she had duly executed the will of August
her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear,
11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
and to note the witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that
a preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue influence had been Second. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did
used. we find no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon execute the will of August 6, 1909. Several witnesses testified to that fact. The
that question. mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in
With reference to the second assignment of error to wit, that Tomasa Elizaga
accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life.
Yap Caong was not of sound mind and memory at the time of the execution of
She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her
the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we
former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails
found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is
to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did
very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet,
not make the new will.
nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before
the execution of the will in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that
at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in her first will (Exhibit 1) was not
mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A) the inference
possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants
that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that relating to said third assignment of error is based upon the alleged fact that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified
that they saw her write the name Tomasa. One of the witnesses testified that The precise case of a signature by the first name only, does not appear to have
she had written her full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law arisen either in England or the United States; but the principle on which the
sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of decisions already referred to were based, especially those in regard to signing by
her name tot he will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount initials only, are equally applicable to the present case, and additional force is
to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will given to them by the decisions as to what constitutes a binding signature to a
may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If contract. (Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Denio, 478; Sanborne vs. Flager, 9 Alle, 474;
writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the Weston vs. Myers, 33 Ill., 424; Salmon Falls, etc. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.),
person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all 446.)
of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply
execute the will. (Re Goods of Savory, 15 Jur., 1042; Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr., 504; therefor, upon the will, is held to sign as effectually as if he had written his
Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El., 94 Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400; Vernon vs. Kirk, initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a
30 Penn., 218; Cozzens Will, 61 Penn., 196; Re Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443; signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or
Main vs. Ryder, 84 Penn., 217.) all or any part of his name thereon. In the present case we think the proof
shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not
We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R.
sign her full name, did at least sign her given name Tomasa, and that is
A., 353), and cited by the appellees, which was known as Knoxs Appeal. In this
sufficient to satisfy the statute.
case one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888, at the
residence of her father. After her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the
her handwriting, written with a lead pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary argument which was preceded is sufficient to answer it also.
folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature simply of Harriett. In this
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that
paper the deceased attempted to make certain disposition of her property. The
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the
will was presented for probate. The probation was opposed upon the ground
witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the
that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the only
presence of each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of
question presented to the court, whether the signature, in the form above
proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in
indicated, was a sufficient signature to constitute said paper the last will and
one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the
testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper was in the
will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one
handwriting of the deceased. In deciding that question, Justice Mitchell said:
room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the
other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon
the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which
Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses
signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign
the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in
the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will,
yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is
sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary
parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.
In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very
difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt.
Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the
witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity.
Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the

proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily,
while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909
(Exhibit A). Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to
probate is hereby affirmed with costs.
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind when the document in
Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil 573)
question was executed.
EN BANC
Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a
G.R. No. L-19142 March 5, 1923 witness for the opposition, is to the effect that the deceased was suffering from
diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days prior to his
In the matter of the estate of Mariano Corrales Tan, deceased. death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December 26, 1921,
FLAVIANA SAMSON, petitioner-appellee, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the same day.
vs. Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and vigorously
VICENTE CORRALES TAN QUINTIN, oppositor-appellant. that coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore,
could not at that time have been in possession of his mental faculties and have
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo for appellant.
executed a will. There are, however, varying degrees of coma and in its lighter
Epimaco Molina for appellee.
forms the patient may be aroused and have lucid intervals. Such seems to have
OSTRAND, J.: been the case here. Doctor Tee Han Kee, the opponent's principal witness, who
visited the deceased in the evening of December 25th, says he then seemed to be
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
in a state of coma and that in the forenoon of December 26th, when the doctor
admitting to probate a document alleged to be the last will and testament of the
again visited him, he was in "the same state of coma." Maximina Ong, the wife of
deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There is no direct evidence as to the interest of
the opponent, the only other witness for the opposition, states that on
the oppositor-appellant in the estate in question, though it may, perhaps, be
December 26th the deceased could not talk and did not recognize anyone. But
inferred from the testimony of his wife Maximina Ong that he is the son of the
all the witnesses presented by the petitioner, five in number, testify that the
deceased.
deceased was conscious, could hear and understand what was said to him and
In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will is was able to indicate his desires. Four of these witnesses state that he could speak
incomplete and fraudulent and does not express the true intent of the testator; distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head in
that the testator acted under duress and under undue influence, and that at the answer to questions.
time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing mind.
That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will
We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations. was executed is evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition
There is no evidence whatever showing that the testator acted under duress or told the truth there can be no doubt that he was of sound mind and capable of
undue influence and the only question of fact which we need consider is making his will. And we see no reason to discredit any of these witnesses; the
discrepancies found between their respective versions of what took place at the The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
execution of the document are comparatively unimportant and so far from ordered.
weakening their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence
of any conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr.
Tee Han Kee. The former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of
the latter it is sufficient to say that mere professional speculation cannot prevail
over the positive statements of five apparently credible witnesses whose
testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
There is no direct evidence in the record showing that the publication of the
time and place of the hearing of the petition for probate has been made as
provided for in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellant
argues that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate without proof
of such publication. This question not having been raised in the court below will
not be considered here.
Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaking of hearings for the probate
of wills, also provides that "At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under
oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses" and the appellant
maintains that the transcript of the testimony of the witness Dr. N. M. Saleeby,
not having been signed by the witness, the testimony should have been
excluded.
There is no merit in this contention. When, as in this case, the testimony is

taken by the stenographer of the court and certified to by him, the provision
quoted can only be regarded as directory and a failure to observe the provision
will not render the testimony inadmissible. (Reese vs. Nolan, 99 Ala., 203.)
Further on in the same record, pages 6 to 7, there appears another will written
Galvez vs. Galvez (26 Phil. 243)
in Tagalog and executed on the same date by Victor Galvez in presence of the
EN BANC witnesses Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan Menodoza.
G.R. No. L-6650 December 5, 1913 In the course of the proceedings various witnesses were examined by the
petitioner and by the respondent, Canuta Galvez, the only daughter of the
SANTIAGO GALVEZ, petitioner-appellant, alleged testator, and the attorney Antonio Constantino stated that he waived
vs. the right to present evidence and acquiesced in the petition made by Santiago
CANUTA GALVEZ, opponent-appellee. Galvez for the probate of the will, in view of a transaction entered into by the
parties; but the court did not accept the compromise, on the ground that it is
Eugenio Paguia, for appellant.
improper to hold that a will is the faithful expression of the last wishes of a
Antonio Constantino, for appellee.
decedent, upon the mere fact of the parties' petitioning to that effect, when such
will, as in the case at bar, was assailed at the commencement of the suit.
TORRES, J.: After due trial the judgment aforementioned was rendered, from which an
appeal was entered by counsel for the petitioner, Santiago Galvez.
This appeal was raised by counsel for Santiago Galvez from the judgment of
October 25, 1910, whereby the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, denied This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez on
the petition presented by the said Galvez for the probate of the will, Exhibit B, August 12, 1910, and signed in his presence by the witness Juan Dimanlig,
and appointed as administratrix of the testator's estate, the latter's only Nazaria Galvez and J. Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no longer able to sign
legitimate daughter, Canuta Galvez, under condition that she furnish bond in on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed his own
the sum of P2,000 for the faithful discharge of the duties of her office. signature to the instrument, for him and below his written name. This will,
written in Tagalog and translated into Spanish, is marked as Exhibit B and is
Counsel for Santiago Galvez petitioned the Court of First Intance of Bulacan for
found on pages 3 and 5 of the bill of exceptions.
the probate of the will which it was alleged Victor Galvez executed in the dialect
of the province, on August 12, 1910, in presence of the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, J. The other will, written in Tagalog and marked Exhibit A, was presented during
Leoquinco, and Nazaria Galvez. This instrument appears also to have been the proceedings; it was the first one the testator executed on the same date, and,
signed by the witness Lorenzo Galvez, below the name and surname of the for the purpose of correcting an error contained in this first will, he executed
testator. (p. 3, B. of E., translated into Spanish on p. 5.)lawphil.net another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate.
Notwithstanding the opposition by Canuta Galvez, the testator's daughter, who disease; but his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present suit, served
alleged that her father, owing to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did not
the intellectual capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will, and examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him between the hours of 12 in the
notwithstanding her testimony adduced in corroboration of her brief, the record morning and 3 in the afternoon of the 12th of August, 1910, during which period
sufficiently proved the contrary; the subscribing witnesses to the will affirmed the testator ordered his will drawn up and the attesting witnesses signed it,
under oath that they were present when Victor Galvez, then sick in his house, Galvez having died at about 6 o'clock that same afternoon. It may be true that
stated to them that the document read before them by Lorenzo Galvez cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become incapacitated in the
contained his last will and testament, and that, as the testator was no longer manner described by the witness; but there may be exceptions to the general
able to sign, he charged his nephew Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which he rule, and to judge from the testimony of the witnesses who saw and
latter did by affixing his own signature to the document, after having written at communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the time he executed his will,
the foot of the same the name and surname of the testator, Victor Galvez, who his physical and mental condition must have been an exception, since he
as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in the full enjoyment of his demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and clear intelligence to execute his
mental faculties; he talked intelligently and with perfect knowledge of what was last will in accordance with the requirements of the law.1awphi1.net
taking place. They further testified that they all, including the said Lorenzo
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of
Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the testator, Victor Galvez, who was at
the will and the testator's positive determination to rectify the error he incurred
the time lying on his bed.
in the execution of his first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound mind
In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not then and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights of
of sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was his daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the proceedings disclose
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will (Exhibit B), signed
conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and
in the name of the testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig,
judgment at the time he executed his will in the presence of the witnesses
Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by section 618 of
whose signatures appear at the foot thereof, for these witnesses capacity
the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testator's name appears
positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will showed that he was
written at the foot of the will and under this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by
in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was perfectly cognizant of his
direction of the testator himself, and the instrument was also signed by the
acts.
attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they heard and attested
The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the reading of the will, that
results of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of this they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the will in the name of
the testator and that they signed it in the presence of all the persons assembled
in the latter's house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing
his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental faculties;
therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.
For the foregoing reasons, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from in so
far as it denies the probate of the said will, we hereby hold that the same was
duly executed by Victor Galvez and expresses his last wishes, and we affirm the
rest of the said judgment, with respect to the appointment, as administratrix, of
Canuta Galvez, the testator's daughter and sole heir.
The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially in
Carillio vs. Jaojoco (46 Phil 957)
the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo performed acts which indicated that she was
EN BANC mentally deranged. We have made a thorough examination of the character of

those acts, and believe that they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo
G.R. No. L-21015 March 24, 1924 was mentally insane. The same thing can be said as to her having entered the
"Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San Jose," in the absence of an
MIGUELA CARRILLO, for herself and as administratrix of the intestate
affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions, for while it is
estate of ADRIANA CARRILLO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
true that insane persons are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter
vs.
persons who are not insane. Against the inference that from said acts the
JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.
plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the mental incapacity of Adriana
Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for appellant. Carrillo in that time, there is in the record evidence of acts while more clearly
Salinas & Salinas for appellees. and more convincingly show that she must not have been mentally
incapacitated before the execution of the document sought to be annulled in
AVANCEA, J.:
this action. In January, 1917, her husband having died, she was appointed judicial
On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of administratrix of the latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath of office,
sale of eleven parcels of land, with one-half of the improvements thereon, gave the proper bond discharged her functions in the same manner and with the
situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, Province of same diligence as any other person of knowingly sound mind would have done.
Cavite, containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco Documents, were introduced which show complex and numerous acts of
for the price of P4,000 which the seller admitted having received. Nine days administration performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such as the
afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of disposition of various and considerable amounts of money in transactions made
First Instance and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for the with different persons, the correctness of said acts never having been, nor can it
administrator and settlement of her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was be, put in question. We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana
appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such Carrillo having executed contracts of lease, appeared in court in the testate
administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment of said proceeding in which she was administratrix, and in fact continued acting as
contract of sale executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against such administratrix of the estate of her husband until August, 1917, when for the
Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco. The defendants purpose of taking vacation, she requested to be relieved from the office. On
were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios"
appealed. by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and
there she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was
December of the same year very much better off although not completely cured. declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that she was so
Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by
Doctor Ocampo answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently.
affirm that the answers she gave him were responsive to the questions put to
Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the
her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only one-half of the
usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of being mentally capable, and
body. After leaving the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918,
consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a
Adriana Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr. Ramos Salinas, and
specified time is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to
there executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month. The
this effect is presented, her capacity must be presumed.
notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he
has been for some time with Adriana Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to Attention is also called to the disproportion between the price of the sale and
the document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her countenance, the real value of the land sold. The evidence, however, rather shows that the
which on the contrary, appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an area of 33 hectares,
questions he made to her without inconsistencies or failure of memory, for represents it real value, for its is little more than P100 per hectare, which is
which reason, says this witness, he was surprised when afterwards he learned approximately the value of other lands of the same nature in the vicinity. But
that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question. even supposing that there is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to
justify the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for
It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most
having made the sale under such conditions. Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of
interested party in the case, being the plaintiff herself, was the surety of Adriana
Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both
Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her
defendants, who are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to
husband in 1917. It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time
the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her during the time she was
mentally incapacitated, why Miguela Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it,
there, and for such acts they may have won her gratitude. Under these
consented to be a surety for her. It must likewise be noted that the other
circumstances there is nothing illegal, or even reprehensible, and much less
witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also
strange in Adriana Carrillo's having taken into account those services rendered
made transactions with her precisely at the time, when according to them, she
her by the defendants and reciprocated thereof by a favorable transaction.
was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents
Having no ascendants and descendents, she could, in consideration of all the
and the testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot
these circumstances, have even given as a donation, or left by will, these lands to
be held that on December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed the document,
the defendants.
she was mentally incapacitated.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the ground: (1) of the
Hernaez vs. Hernaez (1 Phil 683)
incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses,
EN BANC and the interpreter; and (3) a substantial formal defect in the will.
February 10, 1903 The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is alleged to consist in
this: That on the 5th of December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was so
G.R. No. 857
ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction,
EULALIO HERNAEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a
vs.
stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile
ROSENDO HERNAEZ, defendant-appellee.
debility. The incapacity of the notary in that he did not understand the Visayan
Ramon N. Orozco, for appellant. dialect, the language of the testatrix. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is
Ramon Avancea, for appellee. supposed to consist in their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the
ARELLANO, C.J.: incapacity of the interpreter in that he was an amaneunsis of the notary and was
The subject of this action is the will executed by Doa Juana Espinosa, widow of the person who wrote out the will. The substantial formal defect of the will is
Don Pedro Hernaez, on December 5, 1894, in Bacolod, Island of Negros, before a supposed to consist in the fact that two physicians were not present to certify to
notary public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter, the the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution, and the absence of two
testatrix not understanding Spanish. In this will the principal dispositions are interpreters to translate the will, because executed in a foreign language.
those relative to the legacy of the third part of the hereditary estate of free
These are briefly, the grounds upon which the action for the annulment of the
disposal, which the testatrix leaves to her eldest son, Rosendo, to the betterment
will rests, and these were the issues raised at the trial. The evidence introduced
of the other third made in favor of this same son, and the distribution of the
bears upon the issues above stated to which alone the decision of the court must
remaining third in six equal parts among her five children, Rosendo Domingo,
be limited.
Magdalena, Mateo, and Eulalio Hernaez y Espinosa, and her two
granddaughters, Peregrina and Victorina Parapa y Hernaez, in representation of For the purpose of proving the mental incapacity of the testatrix the plaintiff
their deceased mother, Clara Hernaez y Espinosa. introduced oral testimony and expert evidence; the oral testimony was for the
purpose of proving the following facts: That the testatrix on the 5th day of
The plaintiff is one of the sons of the testatrix and the complaint has not been
December, 1894, was so ill that she could not speak; that by reason of her age
acquiesced in by Magdalena Hernaez y Espinosa nor Peregrina and Victorina
she walked in a stooping position and gave contradictory orders. The priest who
Parapa y Hernaez, whose consent plaintiff sought to obtain.
was with her during the last hours of her life was called to testify that on the 3rd
day of the same month and year he had administered the sacraments to her, and
that the patient was at that time so seriously ill that he scarcely understood her mental faculties by the weakening of the brain, either as the result of illness or
when she spoke. The expert witnesses were called to testify upon the question of abuses, while others preserve their understanding to a very advanced age. It is
propounded: Could an octogenarian in the pathological condition peculiar to unnecessary to pass upon the oral evidence introduced by the defendant; the
that age possess sufficient mental faculties to permit her to dispose of her documentary evidence (record, p. 38) shows that the testatrix did not die two
property causa mortis? The result of the oral evidence is that the testimony of days after the execution of her will. The will was executed on the 5th and her
the four witnesses called has proven one fact, which is, that the testatrix toward death occurred on the 12th of December, 1894.
the end of her life walked in a stooping position. The first witness, Isidora de la It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories
Torre, affirmed that three days before her death she was very ill but answered nor the documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be reached
questions which were addressed her, and only one witness, Ambrosia Sotsing, that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties. The fact that on old
testified that four days before the death of the testatrix she had been to see the woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping position, that
latter and that she could not speak then because she was suffering from fainting she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before making
fits, this witness being the only one who testified that the testatrix had given her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no
contrary order. These four witnesses are, respectively, 78, 75, 60, and 57 years of lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a
age. The priest, D. Nicolas Alba, stated that he had administered the sacraments person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties
to the testatrix before the execution of the will but was unable to remember the until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in compliance with the
day; that he understood her then when she spoke and that the testatrix requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment the
frequently confessed even when not feeling seriously ill, and that when sick she testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental
was accustomed to confess in her house (this point is confirmed by the witness faculties for the purposes of the execution of the will. The Code might have
Sotsing who testified that she had been to see the testatrix three times and that adopted either one of two systems [with respect to the mental capacity of the
on all three of these occasions the communion had been administered to her); testator] that of establishing as a general rule the presumption of soundness of
that when he confessed her some days before the execution of the will he had the mental faculties until the contrary be proven, or that of presuming mental
also administered the extreme unction on account of her advanced age; that at weakness in the absence of proof that the act was performed while the mental
that time she was in the enjoyment of her mental faculties but the witness could faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first presumption a will
not state whether she preserved them up to the moment of her death, he not made should be declared valid in all cases, in the absence of evidence to the
being present when this occurred. The expert evidence introduced by the contrary. Under the second it would have to be considered as void upon the
testimony of Dr. Lope de la Rama gave the following result: That if the organs presumption that it was executed by a person demented, unless the contrary is
are intact the physiological functions are perfectly performed, and that shown. The Code has adopted the first system as being the most rational, by
consequently some men before reaching the age of decrepitude lose their accepting the principle that mental soundness is always to be presumed with
respect to a person who has not been previously incapacitated until the contrary to the interpreter but the witnesses, and there is nothing to authorize the
is demonstrated and proven by the proper person and the correctness of this extensive interpretation attempted to be made of its precepts.
choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the intervention of the notary and the
The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article 665,
witnesses constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of
was not necessary. This precept refers clearly and expressly to the conditions
their knowledge of the matter. (Manresa, Commentaries, vol. 5, p. 344.)
which must be complied with in order that a demented person may make a will
It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment of a public by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from the cases
instrument executed before a notary public by a native of these Islands, ignorant governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared demented.
of Spanish, that the notary was not acquainted with the dialect of the party (Judgment of June 10, 1897.)
executing the same. If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the obligation of
Had anyone observed any incapacity in the testatrix some time before it would
drawing the instrument in the official language, that is, Castilian, does not know
have been easy to have taken the proper steps to obtain a declaration of the
the dialect he can avail himself of an interpreter in accordance with the
status of incapacity in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, and
provisions of the law itself; hence the fact that the notary who legalized the will
then, after a legal declaration of this condition, she could not have executed a
in question did not know the Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is by no
will unless two physicians had certified that at the time of her examination she
means an argument in favor of the nullity of this public instrument, nor has it
was in the enjoyment of a lucid interval; but there was no necessity of waiting
been for the nullity of any one of the long series of instruments executed before
for a lucid interval when the constant condition was that of lucidity.
Spanish notaries, and even Filipino notaries, unacquainted with the dialect or
dialects of the locality in which they performed their duties or the special dialect Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article 648
of the party. With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven by of the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a foreign
the manner in which they testified at the trial, without the necessity of an language, and neither by the letter nor by the purpose of this article could it be
interpreter, as to those called as witnesses and by conclusive evidence as to the required with regard to the will in question. Not by the letter, because neither
deceased attesting witness whose signature and competency have been the testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign language. Neither
completely established, that they knew the dialect of the testatrix in accordance the Castilian spoken by the notary nor the Visayan spoken by the testatrix are
with section 5, article 681, of the Civil Code, and also understood Spanish. As foreign languages. Nor is the case within the purpose of the law. The prior laws
alleged, but not proven, their knowledge of the latter language may not have had not provided for the execution of a will by a foreigner in his own language.
been perfect, but this does not make them incompetent, nor is it a ground for Such a case could not arise under the old law because the right to make a will
annulment. Finally, the prohibition of article 681, section 8, is not applicable to being one inherent in citizenship they systematically denied to the foreigner the
the interpreter, of whose services the notary availed himself for the execution, exercise of that right. The execution of a will being at the present time based
drafting and legalization of the will, for the simple reason that it does not refer upon natural right, the foreigner is entitled equally with the citizen to make a
will. Although it is true that foreigners, under international law, can make a will Ramon N. Orozco, for appellant.
before the consuls of their nation, it is none the less true that they do not always Ramon Avancea, for appellee.
make their wills in a town in which an accredited consul resides. For all these ARELLANO, C.J.:
reasons it was necessary to provide by law for a special form for the will of the This action was brought in connection with the proceedings on the
foreigner who might be ignorant of the Spanish language and yet have occasion administration of the intestate estate of Pedro Hernaez, father of the plaintiff
to make a will. The form which the law has adopted satisfies the most exigent and of the defendant. The purpose of the action is to obtain the inclusion in the
spirit, for the presence of two interpreters, the fact that the will is recorded in a estate by collation of the values of the Naga and Panaogao properties, owned by
public instrument in both languages, and that it is signed by all who take part in the defendant, that the same may be included in the inventory of the mass of
the act are the most efficacious guarantees against fraud and bad faith. (Falcon, the intestate succession. The facts set up in the complaint are the following: (1)
3 Civil Code, p. 94.) Text writers discuss the application of article 684 to a will That as Rosendo Hernaez was a poor man after his return from his student life
executed in one of the local idioms of Spain, considering them to be on the same in Manila, he was supported by his father. (2) That shortly afterwards he
footing as a foreign language in a place in which Castilian is the tongue spoken purchased the Naga estate, he at that time not being engaged in any profitable
or understood; but we have no occasion to enter into this discussion, the legal trade or industry. (3) That he was the administrator of the property of his
sense and constant practice observed in these Islands being sufficient. parents. (4) That the money with which he purchased the Naga estate belonged
to his father. (5) That the Panaogao estate was purchased by Rosendo after the
Upon these grounds we hold that judgment must be for the defendant,
death of his father.
declaring the will executed by Doa Juana Espinosa on the 5th of December,
1894, to be valid and efficacious, without special imposition of costs. The legal principle upon which the plaintiff relies is that established by article
1035 of the Civil Code, in accordance with which a forced heir in certain cases is
So ordered.
required to bring into the mass of the succession properties or moneys which he
may have received gratuitously from the decedent during the lifetime of the
latter. Therefore it is evident that of the facts set up in the complaint the only
EN BANC one relevant to the issue is the fourth, concerning the acquisition of the Naga
estate. With respect to the fifth, as to the Panaogao estate, apart from the fact of
February 12, 1903
its irrelevancy, it is not apparent what connection the simple statement that a
G.R. No. 847 forced heir acquired the said estate after the death of thecausante can possibly
EULALIO HERNAEZ, plaintiff-appellant, have with the question of collation.
vs. But, whatever might be said about the facts alleged, none of them have been
ROSENDO HERNAEZ, defendant-appellee. proven. In the replication an allegation was added to the effect that Rosendo
Hernaez was never in partnership with Julian Hernaez, his brother, this fact
having been set up in the answer of the defendant.
Two witnesses, Miguel Solis and Severino Duran, testifies that they had never
seen any articles of co-partnership recorded in a public or private instrument.
Rosendo, however in answering interrogatories, testified that he had been an
industrial partner and that no written articles had been executed. Of the nine
witnesses presented by the defendant, Domingo and Magdalena Hernaez and
Peregrina Jarapa, the latter a nephew and the former brothers of both the
contending parties, denied that Rosendo purchased the Naga estate with money
belonging to his father, but testified that it was purchased with money acquired
by his own labors.
The Naga and Panaogao estates were acquired by the defendant, the first from
his brother Julian on the 25th of November, 1881, and the second from Pedro
Garganera on the 2nd of November, 1898. There is not the slightest indication
that the money with which these estates were purchased was or could be other
than that of the purchaser himself. (Public instruments on pp. 350 and 401 of the
record.)
It not having proven that the property which it is sought to require one of the
forced heirs, the defendant herein, to bring into collation was acquired
gratuitously from the intestate, the action can not be maintained.
We therefore dismiss the complaint, with the costs of both instances to the
plaintiff. So ordered.
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals
Neyra vs. Neyra (76 Phil 333)
for Manila, alleging several errors, attacking the execution and validity of said
EN BANC agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed, pursuant to
the to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties, as shown by the
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946 corresponding document, dated November 3, 1942, which was filed in the case
the following day, November 4, 1942.
TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years,
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee. unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly from heart
attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was claimed, she
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.
had been suffering for sometime.
Lucio Javillonar for appellee.
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942,
DE JOYA, J.:
dismissing the appeal, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since
Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a petition, dated November
recovery of one-half () of the property mentioned and described therein, 23, 1942, asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the Court of Appeals,
which had been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra, and which had been dismissing the appeal, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement,
previously divided equally between the two extrajudicially, demanding at the dated November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra,
same time one-half () of the rents collected on the said property by the as she was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact
defendant Encarnacion Neyra. The defendant filed an answer admitting that the she died the following day; and that if it had been signed at all by said
property mentioned and described therein was community property, and at the Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said document must have
same time set up counterclaims amounting to over P1,000, for money spent, been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will;
during the last illness of their father, and for money loaned to the plaintiff. and that the court had no more jurisdiction over the case, when the alleged
agreement was filed on November 4, 1942, at the instance of Trinidad Neyra, as
After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to
Encarnacion was already dead at the time.
one-half () of the said property, adjudicating the same to her, but at the same
time ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77, plus The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for
interests, by virtue of said counterclaims. reconsideration, is whether or not said compromise or agreement had been
legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942. decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in order to
Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative. overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not
accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a new
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the
will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for Atty.
parties, in this case, has fully established the following facts:
Ricardo Sikat, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving Atty. Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, merely prepared a draft of a codicil,
certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion amending said will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious
Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after organization, among others as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also
the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad forwarded to the authorities of religious organization, for their consideration
Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by and acceptance; but it was also rejected.
their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31,
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
concerning said properties. In the first case, filed in March 31, 1939, Trinidad
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession,
Neyra and others demanded by Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of
after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her house at No. 366
the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila which was finally
Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion; that Mons.
decided in favor of the defendants, in the court of first instance, and in the
Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made, and, as a matter of
Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162); and the second is the
fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house by Father
instance case.
Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any Neyra, who remained in bed, took holy communion; that after the mass, Father
ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two
of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and,
and her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will, in favor of fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the
her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter two sisters greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became
enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of reconciled and two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which
said Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations
organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, the instant case
being the second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition
that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by
Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no
collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the
Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of
the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the
could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when testatrix.
Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria
last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the
compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and
witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of
Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express
documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of
instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were
November 3, 1942.
ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the
afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however,
Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and
asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the
change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a
documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus
son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two
contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also
Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of testified that Encarnacion Neyra's, thumbmark was affixed to the will, only in
Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del
Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
protege, as witnesses.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at
the request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature conscious and able to understand what was said to him and to communicate his
of effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the
talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra. testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the
fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often
sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
live as long as ten (10) years, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as
the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the
the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
(Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250-1253; McCrae, Osler's although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.) effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the
testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November
of the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2)
years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted
that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3,
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered
1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly,
the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more
thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing
trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts.
and execution of the agreement and will in question.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons
opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.)
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental
testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the
faculties until the moments of their death.
third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27
Phil., 579.) The testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that
suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days, Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary
prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement
in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was and will, dated November 3, 1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the
Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her two documents, dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously placed
bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It great emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters
has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking
and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent.
testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet
each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might not impossible. They had forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious
have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian faith, and hope and
actually saw it all in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They had also forgotten that
thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is there could be no more sublime love than that embalmed in tears, as in the case
equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., of a reconciliation.
579.)
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of
children of legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death
from the will, dated November 3, 1942. must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And believing
perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness, and that
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect
she had always been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently
that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that
what was her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did
the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying
not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her
the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence;
head. It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the
and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question, when she was
benificiary of her generosity, under her last will and testament, and end all her
already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is
troubles with her, by executing said agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace
absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to
from the scenes of her earthly labors.
common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her
witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to deliberate It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally
falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the
evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal aphorism falsus presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos
in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs.Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.) mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the
time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of the
November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on December 3, 1943, admitting to
since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the deceased Encarnacion
accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a previous will dated September
hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated 14, 1939, alleged to have been executed by the said testatrix.
November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs.
Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942, filed, on
So ordered.
November 10, 1942, a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the
probate of said will.
On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda.
de Blanco, who had not been named as beneficiaries in said will, filed on
opposition to the probate of the said will dated November 3, 1942, alleging (1)
EN BANC
that at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix
C.A. No. 4 March 21, 1946 Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed testamentary capacity; (2) that her
thumb marks on said instrument had been procured by means of fraud by
In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra.
petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion Neyra never intended to
TRINIDAD NEYRA, petitioner-appellee,
consider said document as will; (3) that the alleged will, dated November 3,
vs.
1942, had not been executed in the manner and form prescribed by law; and(4)
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
that Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had executed a will, naming
BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.
as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and that said will had never been
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.
BLANCO, petitioners-appellants,
On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the
vs.
allegations in the opposition.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate of
Lucio Javillonar for oppositors and appellants.
the first will executed by Encarnacion Neyra, on September 14, 1939, marked as
Alejandro M. Panis for applicants and appellees.
Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio
DE JOYA, J.: Mendoza filed their opposition to the probate on said will marked as Exhibit 16,
and amended said opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which Teodora Neyra The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the
and the others filed a reply, on September 20, 1943. case in the court below, has satisfactorily and sufficiently established the
following facts:
On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and the
counter petition mentioned above, said petitioner as well as the oppositors, That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving
presented evidence, testimonial and documentary. The witnesses presented by certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion
the petitioner Trinidad Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez, Rev. Fr. Teodoro Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other relatives; that after the death of
Garcia, Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio A. Aldecoa, Atty. Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had
Ricardo Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, serious quarrels, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father,
who had acted as scrivener in the preparation of said will dated November 3, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two
1942. litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties
(Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and
Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses, the
others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra et al. the annulment of the sale of the
principal among whom were Presentacion Blanco, Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo
property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, and it was finally decided in
Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical expert, and the oppositors
favor of the defendants in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of
Teodora Neyra and Pilar de Guzman themselves.
Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162, Exhibit 9).
After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting to
In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded from
probate the will dated November 3, 1942; at the same time denying the probate
Encarnacion Neyra, one-half () of the property described therein, and one-half
of the will dated September 14, 1939.
() of the rents, and the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the plaintiff,
From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the but at the same time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77, under her
Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, assigning several errors, which may be counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra again elevated the case to the Court of
reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court erred (1) in finding that Appeals for Manila (G.R. No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided, pursuant to
Encarnacion Neyra wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was the document of compromise marked as Exhibit D; and the petition for
reconciliation between Encarnacion Neyra and her sister Trinidad; (3) in reconsideration filed therein still remains undecided.
accepting as satisfactory the evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in

That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any
ignoring the evidence submitted by the oppositors; and (5) in not admitting to
ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing
probate the will dated September 14, 1939.
of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria"
and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took holy communion; that after said
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will in favor of religious ceremony had been terminated, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion
her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra
said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion Neyra accepted said advice and at about noon
after due deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister
the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation Trinidad Neyra, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that on seeing one
was duly communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties another, the two greeted each other in a most affectionate manner, and became
encountered by said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of reconciled; that the two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of
Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, which the two sisters also talked about the properties left by their deceased
about one week before her death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City
working in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions of Manila, and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed, on the condition
for the preparation of a new will; that Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new that the property involved therein, consisting of a small house and lot, should
will, in accordance with the express instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, on the condition that the latter should
merely prepared a draft in the form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending waive her claim for her share in the rents of said property, while under the
said will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious organization, administration of Encarnacion Neyra, and that the two should renounce their
among others, as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to mutual claims against one another. It was also agreed between the two sisters to
the authorities of the said religious organization, for their consideration and send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document
acceptance. embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis could come only in the
afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement,
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
and other instructions relative to the disposition she wanted to make of her
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession,
properties in her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said
after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in her house at
document of compromise or agreement marked as Exhibit D, as well as the new
No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion, in
will and testament marked as Exhibit C, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio
view of her condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra, Mons.
Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express instructions given by
Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made for the celebration of
Encarnacion Neyra, and said instruments were ready for signature on November
holy mass in the house of Encarnacion Neyra, and, as a matter of fact, on
3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942; Attorney Panis read
November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia,
said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to Encarnacion Neyra slowly and in
also of the Quiapo Church, officiating in said ceremony, on which occasion,
a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion sent
Eladio Aldecoa, herein petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her, and that in fact she came to the house of
asked her if its terms were in accordance with her wishes, if she had anything Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon that same day, November 1,
else to add, or anything to be changed in said will; and as Encarnacion Neyra 1942, with said Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another, Encarnacion
stated that the terms of said will were in accordance with her wishes and express and Trinidad Neyra greeted each other most affectionately, forgiving one
instructions, she asked for the pad and the will Exhibit C and, with the help of a another, after which they talked about the property left by their deceased father
son of herein petitioner, placed her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the and the litigation pending between them; and the two sisters agreed to settle
presence of the three attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. their case, which had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for the City of
Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which the attesting witnesses Manila, concerning a certain house and lot, on the understanding that said
signed at the foot of the document, in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion property should be given exclusively to Trinidad, and that the latter should
Neyra, and of each and everyone of the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro renounce her claim against Encarnacion, for her share in the rents collected on
Garcia and petitioner Trinidad Neyra and several others were also present. said property, and, at the same time, Encarnacion renounced her claim for
P727.77 against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed between the two sisters
On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart attack,
that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to prepare the necessary papers
unexpectedly died.
for the settlement of said case. Presentacion Blanco, a witness for the
Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again oppositors, also testified substantially to the foregoing facts.
decided not to accept the provision made in its favor by the testatrix
By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the other
Encarnacion Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty. Ricardo Sikat, said
attesting witnesses, it has also been shown that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came
decision could not be communicated to the testatrix, before her death.
in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, and received
Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request instructions from Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said
made on October 31, 1942, by Encarnacion Neyra for the celebration of holy agreement, but also for the preparation of a new will, and consequently
mass in her house, on November 1, 1942; that said mass was in fact solemnized Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise and the will, dated
in her house, on that date, in the course of which the testatrix Encarnacion November 3, 1942, which were both thumb marked, in duplicate, in the
Neyra took holy communion; that on the same day, after the mass, Encarnacion afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who was then of sound mind, as
held a long conversation with Father Garcia, in the course of which, said priest shown by her appearance and conversation, aided by a son of Trinidad Neyra,
advised her to have reconciliation with her sister Trinidad; and that said advise on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B.
was accepted by Encarnacion. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who signed in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the request According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping
of Encarnacion Neyra, and so was Trinidad Neyra. sickness, known as Addison's disease, are not yet fully known: that persons
attacked by said decease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first attack,
On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's
while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease, progresses,
disease, perhaps, Encarnacion Neyra expired, at about 3 o'clock in the morning.
asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop
Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of
Presentacion Blanco, daughter of oppositor Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250, 1252, 1253; MaCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d
practically corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the petitioner, with ed., Vol. V. pp. 272-279).
reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, on

And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion
November 3, 1942.
Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, after an
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for the illness of about two (2) years.
oppositors, testified, however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has
was affixed, as stated above, to the document of compromise in question, dated
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting
testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.
witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the attesting
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
witnesses signed the documents thumb marked by Encarnacion Neyra, in
property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to
the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and
have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
Presentacion Blanco.
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also (Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
testified that Encarnacion Neyra's thumb mark was affixed to the will, only in
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the
the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del Barrio,
opponents to the probate of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental
when Encarnacion was already dead.
capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20
and effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the
talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra. physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being
in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental
Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony testimony of the attending physician that the faculties until the moments of their death.
deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose for several
Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court that
days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary
the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed testamentary
incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he
capacity, at the time of the execution of the will, cannot be properly disturbed.
was conscious and able to understand what said to him and to communicate his
desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the
testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the time that the testatrix thumbed marked the will in question, on her bed, in
fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida. But it has been fully
sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.) shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the
was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other,
will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
at the time of the signing of the will, but whether they might have seen each
although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the
in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by
testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of executing the
the testatrix on the will is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs.Yap Ca Kuan
will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted
The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties, as
that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3,
said oppositors had been named legatees in the will dated September 14, 1939,
1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood each other
but eliminated from the will dated November 3, 1942.
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of
the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men, who
had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons
ministers of the Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are professional men
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and talked to the
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
testatrix.
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the effect fact, had had successively instituted two suits against her, to recover what was
that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that her due, and for which Encarnacion believed she must atone, she finally decided
the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the document embodying upon reconciliation, so that she might depart in peace.
the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence;
The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence, and
and that her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question, when she was
that Trinidad had been demanding tenaciously her share; and as a Christian
already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view is
woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one has any right to enrich
preposterous, to say the least. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It
himself unjustly, at the expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that
violates all sense of proportion. The oppositors and their witnesses could not
Encarnacion should desire reconciliation with her sister Trinidad, and provide
have told the truth; they have testified to brazen falsehoods; and they are,
for her in her last will and testament.
therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the oppositors is
completely applicable the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served
(Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.) Encarnacion Neyra for so many years and so well, it was also natural that she
should make some provision for him, as gratitude is the noblest sentiment that
In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to show
springs from the human heart.
the alleged improbability of the reconciliation of the two sisters and the
execution of the will, dated November 3, 1942, they have erroneously placed The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with new
great reliance on the facts that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters beneficiaries named therein, including principally her bitterest enemy of late,
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking which is completely incompatible with the will, dated September 14, 1939, may
evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. really seem strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above the logic of
Dreadful indeed are the feuds of relatives, and difficult the reconciliation. But the head is the feeling in the heart, and the heart has reasons of its own which
they had forgotten the fact that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious and pious the head cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge of
woman instructed in the ancient virtues of Christian faith and hope and charity, eternal verity.
and that it was godly to forgive and better still to forget.
As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted to
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two follow "the path of the just, which is as the shining light that shineth more and
sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may be blessed. As a Christian
the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death woman, she must have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow the law, for
must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of childhood. And believing this is the whole duty of man.
perhaps that her little triumphs had not always been fair to her sister who in
In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter the
conclusions set forth in the decree appealed from. This court will not reverse
any findings of fact by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony and
depending largely upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the
presence of the trial judge, unless the court below failed to take into
consideration some material facts or circumstances, or to weigh accurately all of
the material facts and circumstances presented to it for consideration.
(Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336; Melliza vs. Towle, 34 Phil., 345;
Caragay vs. Urquiza, 53 Phil., 72, 79; Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil.,
419.)
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it
legally impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The
judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
El Juzgado de Ilocos Norte que conocio de los dos expedientes, ordeno depues
Albornoz vs. Albornoz (71 Phil 414)
de los tramites de rigor, la leglizacion de los documentos que Dolores Albornoz
EN BANC habia presentado como testamento y codicilo de la mencionada finada, y son los
que obran hoy en autos como Exhibits A y B (Expediente No. 4017 del Juzgado
G.R. No. L-47428 April 8, 1941 de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Norte y C.S.-R.G. No. 47429); y rechazo el que
presentara para el mismo fin el promovente del expediente No. 4054 que
Testamentaria de la finada Perpetua Albornoz Viuda de Soriano.
corresponde al de este Tribunal C.S.-R.G. No. 47428, Alfonso Albornoz. Esto
ALFONSO ALBORNOZ, solicitante-apelada,
hizo el Juzgado en una sola decision, a instancia de las partes interesadas.
vs.
DOLORES ALBORNOZ y JOSE ALBORNOZ, opositores-apelantes. En el primer expediente (Expdiente No. 4017; C.S.-R.G. No. 47429), fue opositor
Alfonso Albornoz y con el hicieron causa comun Amador, Alicia, Clara y los
Sres. Santos y Solidum y D. Emilio L. Medina en representacion de los apelantes.
hermanos de estos excepto Jose, apellidados todos Albornoz; y en el otro
Sres. Diaz y Lazaro en representacion de los apelados.
expediente, o sea, No. 4054 (C. S.-R. G. No. 47428) fueron opositores Dolores
DIAZ, J.: Albornoz y Jose Albornoz.
Estos dos expedientes nos fueron elevados en virtud de la apelacion de algunas Alfonso Albornoz y los que hicieron causa comun con el apelaron de la decision
de las partes interesadas contra la sentencia del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de dictada por el Juzgado en ambos expedientes; y en esta instancia arguyen ahora
Ilocos Norte, por tratarse en ambos de una legalizacion de dos alegados que aquel incurrio en los errores que apuntan en sus alegatos, sustancialmente
testamentos y codicilo en los que las propiedades de que la autora de los mismos en estos terminos:
trata de disponer, valen mucho mas de P50,000.
El error de haber declrado que Perpetua Albornoz viuda de Soriano no tenia
En el expediente C.S-R.G. No. 47428 fue promovente en primera instancia capacidad mental el 24 de Junio de 1936, para otorgar el testamento de dicha
Alfonso Albornoz (Expediente No. 4054 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de fecha, Exhibit A, que presentaron para su legalizacion en el expediente No.
Ilocos Norte), y en el expediente C.S-R. G. No. 47429 (Expediente No. 4017 del 40504 (C.S.-R.G. No. 47428).
mismo Juzgado), la promovente fue Dolores Albornoz. Los dos osn hermanos de
El de haber dejado de dar credito al testimonio de los testigos instrumentales
la hoy finada Perpetua albornoz Vda. de Soriano que dijeron en sus respectivos
del referido testamento de 24 de Junio de 1936.
casos, ser la otorgante de los testamentos y codicilo cuya legalizacion
solicitaron. El de haber dejado de declarar, sin tener en cuenta la clausula de
atestiguamiento del testamento que alegaron ser de la finada Perpetua Albornoz
viuda de Soriano, que el mismo fue otorgado debidamente; y el de haber dejado sus palabras eran entonces incoherentes. El 23 perdio completamente el habla, y
de declarar al mismo tiempo que Dolores Albornoz y Jose Albornoz que lo aunque tenia abiertos los ajos, ya no se movian, notandose que tampoco veian; y
impugnaron, no presentaron pruebas concluyentes para sostener su contencion nada de lo que le redeaba le causaba ya impresion o reaccion. Continuo asi hasta
de que no era de dicha finada el indicado testamento. sobrevenrle la muerte. En estas circunstancias, clore esta que era fisicamente
imposible que otorgase como trataron de probar los apelantes, su alegado
El de haber permitido la legalizacion como testamento de la finada, y como
testamento Exhibit A en el expediente No. 4054, (C.S.-R.G. No. 47428). Hay que
codicilo del mismo, los documentos que como tales fueron presentados por
tener presente que dicho documento muestra en su faz, y asi la declararon
Dolores Albornoz en el expediente No. 4017, C.S.-R.G. No. 47429; y finalmente,
ademas los testigos de los apelantes, que fue preparado y firmado por la finada y
El de haber denegado la mocion que presentaron para pedir la celebracion de por los testigos que presentaron, llamados Antonio Quirolgico, Adriano Ruiz e
una nueva vista. Isaac S. Pedro a las 6 a.m. del dia 24 de junio de 1936.
Los apelantes no impugnaron ni siquiera hicieron reparo a;gimp em cuanto a la La finada no era pobre y no carecia de medios para procurarse los servicios de
autenticidad y debido otorgamiento como testamento y codicilo, de los Exhibits domesticos y el cuidado de parients y amigos mas o menos interesados en su
A y B en el expediente No. 4017, C.S.-R.G. No. 47429; y Dolores Albornoz probo salud; no vivia sola ni se hallaba sola en su casa desde que se enfermo, y menos
cumplidamente por otra parte, que la finada Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano otorgo en el dia mencionado, siendo esto tanto mas cierto cuanto que el mismo Alfonso
los mismos el 25 de abril de 1934 y 19 de junio de 1936, respectivamente, con Albornoz, diclarando en la vista de los dos expedientes, manifesto que su
entra libertad, estando ella en el leno goce de sus facultads mentales y en hermana Dolores Albornoz y la amiga de esta llamada Cunegunda pe Benito
presencia de los testigos cuyos nombres y firmas se mencionan y aparecen en las tuvieron especial ciudado de que no la viese; y de hecho, la finada tenia a su
clausulas de atestiguamiento de los aludidos documentos. servicio nueve criados y nueve criadas. Si esto es cierto, es indudablemente
cierto tambien, como lo probo Dolores Albornos, que la finada nunca estuvo sin
La finada fallecio el 25 de junio de 1936, al rededor de las 8 de la maana, en el
compaia en su habitacion durante su enfermedad, especialement, durante sus
municipio de Laoag de la Provincia de Ilocos Norte, teniendo ella entonces 68
ultimos dias, porque aquella requeria ciudado continuo. Por consiguiente, es
aos de edad. Pedecio de diarrea y enteritis complicaciones de miocarditis,
increible queu Adriano Ruiz y los otros testigos instrumentales del alegado
desde el 3 de junio de 1936 hasta el momento de su fallecimiento el cual no
testamento de 24 de junio, pudiesen entrar, no ya dentro de la habitacion de la
debio mas que a dichas causas. Su debilidad fue acentuandose de dia en dia
finada pero siquiera dentro de su casa, sin ser vistos ni notados por nadie. El
desde poco despues de haber caido enferma, habiendo contribuido a esto la
otorgamiento del testamento de que se trata no pudo hacerse en un corto
absoluta dieta liquida a que habia sido sometida, mas su ya bastante avanzada
instante; debio requerir algun teimpo, teimpo bastante para que los de la casa
edad. La postracion que le sobrevino mas tarde fue dal que el 22 de los
pudiesen darse cuenta de que habia extraos en la misma, en una hora en que
expresados mes y ao ya deliraba y apenas podia moverse y hablar; y si hablaba,
no es costumbre visitar. Aadase a todo esto que el experto caligrafo Arcadio
Laperal que hizo un estudio detenido de las firmas "PERPETUA A. VDA. DE

SORIANO" que aparecen en el Exhibit A obrante en el expediente No. 4054, que
es el mismo Exhibit 1 que obra en el expediente No. 4017, comparando las
mismas conlas autenticas de la finada y las que aparecen en el testamento y en
el codicilo legalizados por el Juzgado a quo, que no fueron discutidas, expreso la
opinion de que unas y otras no pudieron haberse exrito por una misma persona,
ayudada o no poor otra, porque difieren en todos los respectos. Creemos que la
opinion del mencionado experto esta fundada en los hechos, sobre todo
teniendo en cuenta que la finada ya no podia ver bien, como asi lo dijo uno de
los testigos del testamento que se discute, y sin embargo, las firmas que se le
atribuyen estan escritas con mucha simetria, rectamente, y guardando las letras
entre si, casi la misma distancia. Aunque la finada hubiese sido ayudada por otro
para estampar dichas firmas, no hubieran salido tan bien como aparecen en el
expresado documento.
La mocion para una nueva vista que los apelantes presentaron y fue denegada
por el Juzgado a quo, no alega ningun nuevo hecho. La presentaron
simplemente pro forma, para que pueden revisarse los hechos.
Por todo lo expuesto, y siendo manifiestamente infundados los errores

atribuidos por los apelantes al Juzgado a quo, por la presente, confirmamos en
todas sus partes la decision apelada, con las costas a dichos apelantes, en ambas
instancias. Asi se ordena.
at the age of 84 on January 11, 1959. The will in question was an "open" one,
Article 800 executed before a notary public in Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her
niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now appellant, as sole and universal heir. Lirio
Torres vs. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) see under Article 799 is one of the four children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband
Ramon, the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and Horacio. Ramon had a half-
Ramirez vs. Ramirez (39 SCRA 147) brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez, now appellee,
opposed the petition for probate filed by Urio on February 20, 1959, alleging in
EN BANC
his opposition, inter alia, that there was a prior will executed by the testatrix in
Manila in 1949. The photostat copy of that will, marked in the record as Exhibit
D and Exhibit 2-J, shows that the testatrix instituted her husband as her
G.R. No. L-19910 May 31, 1971 universal 'heir, and in the event that he should predecease her (which he did),
named her niece Lily Ramirez and her nephews Horacio Ramirez and Jose Ma.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER
Ramirez as substitute heirs to all her properties in equal shares. This previous
GARREAU. LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ, petitioner-appellant,
will, however, is not involved in this case, and has been referred to by the parties
vs.
only in relation to the background circumstances concerning the execution of
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ, oppositor-appellee.
the "open" will in 1958.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
Ironically enough and certainly not without some overtones of poetic justice
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for oppositor-appellee. the order of the trial court denying probate is based in no small part on a
number of letters written by the petitioner herself, in which she used quite
strong terms to describe the mental infirmity of the testatrix. Those letters were
MAKALINTAL, J.: written by her in 1956 and 1957 to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez de la Cavada,
another brother of the testatrix husband, Ramon Ramirez. Even before then,
At issue in this appeal is the due execution of the last will and testament of
however, the testatrix' mental condition was already the object of serious
Maria Gamier Garreau, which was denied probate by the Court of First Instance
concern among her close relatives. The testimony of Jose Eugenio Ramirez,
of Manila in its order of August 15, 1961 (Special Proceeding No. 39365) on the
given in the form of deposition and submitted as Exhibit 3, discloses the
ground of the testatrix' lack of testamentary capacity.
following facts:
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Asnier Paris,
France, but a Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless
He arrived in Madrid in 1954. His niece Lily who was then residing there, came Dr. Manuel Ramon de Arcos was first called to the Ramirez household in 1953 to
to him and said that she could not accept the fact that Jose Maria Ramirez treat Ramon Ramirez, and after that his wife, on a number of occasions until
(herein oppositor-appellee) had been named as heir in the will of her aunt, not 1958. The material statements in his deposition are as follows:
being a member of the same family group. Lily, obviously referring to the 1949
... Alla por 1953 debia tener 77 o 78 aos de edad, y en esa
will, then suggested to her uncle that he do something to correct the same,
seora se notaba cada vez mas falta de memoria, eso mucho, y a
which suggestion he turned down, pointing out that the testatrix had the right
veces tenia cosas extranas, como imaginarse que habia hecho
to name her nephew Jose as one of her heirs. When he arrived in Madrid he
un viaje que no habia hecho o de escribir cosas como sobre la
found his sister-in-law "ya una mujer muy incapacitada." In 1955 he consulted a
casa de un cunado suyo en Palma donde nunca habia estado, y
physician, Dr. Romero de Arcos and asked him to examine her. Dr. de Arcos had
con el tiempo fue siguiendo la cosa asi pero motives de alarma
been treating the patient for various ailments, and it was he who suggested,
en cuanto a su vida no.
after conducting his examination, that Dr. Jose Germain, competent specialist,
be called to make his own diagnosis. The medical opinions of these two doctors xxx xxx xxx
will be discussed later. But from his own observations, Jose Eugenio Ramirez
Desde hacia tiempo ya que esta senora no tenia lucidez mental
declared that his sister-in-law was even then mentally incapacitated, citing by
y antes se me pidio que yo certificara de su estado exacto y yo
way of example her attitude and personal reaction when her husband died in
me encontre poco competente para ello, y efectivamente due
1956. She was present at his death and saw his body just before he was buried;
que yo queria Ilevar adelante una exploracion en el sentido
but when she went to her room after the funeral and saw that his bed was no
neurologico y yo necesitaba que alguien que se dedique a esa
longer there she came out crying asking where her husband was and saying that
especialidad venga conmigo y entonces se Ilamano al Dr.
she was going to look for him. She had totally forgotten that he had passed
Germain, y esto fue en marzo de 1955.
away. Apart from that, she was easily susceptible to any suggestion from others,
particularly those close to her, and after doing what she was told would El diagnostico a que Ilegamos, que despues fue confirmado, era
promptly forget all about it. de una involucion cerebral senil que Ilamanos a una involucion
regresiva debido a defectos cerebrales de arteriosclerosis, y
Another deponent, Julio Escribano Langa, a resident of Madrid who had known
cuando se tiene eso cuando las cosas son asi realmente, la
the spouses Ramon Ramirez and Maria Gamier Garreau for about nine years,
enfermedad no retrocede y la involucion avanza; es posible que
testified to the same mental condition of the testatrix: her susceptibility to
algana vez yo la saludara y ella me contestara con mas afecto y
another person's influence; her lack of memory for recent events, her lack of
pareciese que estaba mejor pero en realidad la involucion
understanding of, or volition for deciding, certain matters such as the making of
avanzaba como es normal.
a last will.
Dr. Jose Germain, who had been called in consultation by Dr. de Arcos in April P. La evolucion de la enfermedad hace suponer
1955, presented an impressivecurriculum vitae attesting to his qualifications as a posible que sea curable?
psychiatrist. The conclusions he arrived at after his examination of the patient
R. No, seor, es un proceso irreversible y
are set forth in his deposition as follows:
progresivo.
xxx xxx xxx
P. Que experiencias hizo usted con la enferma?
P. Quiere usted explicar la naturalization de
R. No recuerdo, pero eran las usuales.
los servicios prestados por usted?
P. Tenia memoria?
R. Sencillamente estudiar a la enferma bajo el
punto de vista psiquiatrico y analizar sus R. Si seor, pero perturbada.
reacciones ante las preguntas normales de
P. Gravemente perturbada?
orientation del tiempo y del espacio y
contestaciones a una serie de pruebas o tests, y R. Perturbada para las circumstancias
sobre esto forme un juicio que transmiti al Dr. normales de la vida.
Romero.
P. Un sujeto en esas condiciones, tiene
P. Que juicio forms usted? voluntad libre o es facilmente presionable de
ser llevado por personas extranas a
R. Que esta senora padecia un proceso
resoluciones no personales del enfermo?
arterioesclerotic cerebral con alteracion del
pensamiento y de la conducta que evidenciaba R. Todos estos enfermos lo que tienen es una
un estado de demencia presenila en evolucion. disminucion del criterio personal y, por tanto,
son susceptibles de ser influenciados.
P. Ese estado de demencia presenilla la
incapacitaba para realizar actos como un P. Normalmente por personal de su intimidad?
testamento con lucidez?
R. Por cualquier persona, el primero que
R. Indudablemente. venga.
P. Ha expedido usted un certificado?

R. Si senor. R. No, senor, irreversible y progresiva es un

proceso degenerativo cerebral.
P. Podia esta persona tener intervalos lucidos
para que fueran validos? In the light of the foregoing expert medical opinions the letters written by
herein appellant to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez, assume a vital significance
R. Repito que es un proceso irreversible y, por
on the issue of testamentary capacity, and of her own credibility as proponent of
tanto, la sintomatologia tenia que seguir mas o
the probate of the will. In her letter of January 8, 1956 (Exh. 2-A) she wrote:
menos en el primer plano de su personalidad.
I am trying to do all I can for poor Tia Marie who refuses to be
SR. GALLARDON: Nada mas.
helped. Poor dear she is getting worse and worse everyday. Her
xxx xxx xxx mind does not register anything y es terriblemente dura de
cabeza.
P. Pero usted conoce los requisitos para una
incapacitacion? In another letter (Exh. 2-B) dated July 15, 1956, she said to her uncle:
R. Si senor. I think it is my duty to look after her (Doa Marie) now that
she is alone especially since the poor dear is completely in
P. Esta senora incurria en todos los elementos
Irene's hands. *
para ser incapacitada totalmente?
You will remember that Irene was with them when the
R. Si senor.
thousands of pesos the Tios had for a rainy day were spent in
P. Al reconocer a ella, tenia usted algun two shakes of a lamb's tail.
prejuicio?
Appellant's letter of January 17, 1957 (Exh. 3-C) contained the following
R. No, senor. postcript:
P. Usted dijo que era una enfermedad P.S. Everyday several times a day she (Doa Marie) tells me she
irreversible, es decir que no tiene curacion? is going back to Paris. This morning she asked me where Tio
Ramon (who had died the previous year) was.
R. Exacto.
On January 29, 1957 appellant again wrote a letter to her uncle, in which she
P. Pero puede mejorarse?
said:
Tia Marie has completely forgotten Irene from the second day received any money from Cavanna. Referring to that incident, Cavanna
she left. continued in his letter to appellant:
Irene must have told Tia Marie to ask Mr. Collard for the Recordandoles la suma que les habia dejado en mi visita el ano
40,000 telling her that with that money they would go to Paris anterior, me lo negaron y aseguraron no haber recibido de mi
and if Mr. Collard would have had the money to send, she ninguna cantidad de dinero. Estaba entonces presente D. Pepe
would have kept it for herself, as Tia Marie would have Eugenio que habiendo oido sus insistentes protestas de no
forgotten about the money no sooner having collected it. Tia haber recibido el ano anterior cantidad alguna mia a exepcion
Marie signed for the money I went to collect and when I came de los giros mensuales, note que llego dudar de mis
back from the bank she did not ask me for it. She must have afirmaciones y entonces le invite ir al Banco en donde habia
done that with Irene. hecho el deposito para cerciorarse de aquellos hechos, en que
trataban de negar mis afirmaciones. Al dia siguiente nos
Appellants, having suspected the maid Irene of taking advantage of Doa
constituimos en el Banco D. Pepe Eugenio y yo y alli se
Marie's susceptibility to extraneous influence, succeeded in leaving her
corroboro todas mis afirmaciones y quedo probada la poca o
dismissed from the service; and Doa Maria had "completely forgotten (her)
casi ninguna memoria que existia en Da Marie, en vista del
from the second day after she left."
hecho de que ella misma habia firmado todos los cheques y no
Such was the testatrix' mental condition that as early as 1956 appellant, in her pudo seguir negando el hecho, confeso que se habia olvidado y
letter of January 8, told her uncle that she was thinking of having her aunt no se volvio a hablar de ese asunto. Pero este hecho dio lugar
judicially pronounced incapacitated and asked him to send her "the papers of que desde entonces los familiares comprendiendo el exceso de
the doctors who declared Tios Ramon and Marie incapaces." gastos que hacia y la suma tan gruesa que se habia gastado en
aquel ano acordaron designar como en efecto se designo a Dn.
Jose M. Cavanna, the Philippine administrator of the family of the testatrix, had
Pepe Eugenio para que actuara en sus intereses en Espana y les
the same idea, and so expressed it in his letter to appellant (Exh. 3-F) dated May
enviara los fondos que se recibian de Manila en forma tal que
4, 1957, making reference to the fact that the testatrix had very little memory or
no les hiciera falta nada para que no se les perdiera tantos
almost none at all. He had deposited for her account in a bank in Madrid the
fondos, pues Ilego a suspecharse de una sirvienta que entonces
sum of 100,000 pesetas so that she could draw regularly thereon which she did.
tenian que resultaba mas que sirvienta una ama de compania.
However, when after a year he again went to Madrid Doa Marie, in the
Tambien entonces habia hecho constar que se les enviaba
presence of her brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez, denied ever having
trimestralmente las cuentas de sus fondos por duplicado con
objeto de que despues de estudiada, dieran su conformidad y
devolviesen uno de los ejemplares. No solo no devolvian el one of the heirs, had been changed with a new one eliminating him. Appellant
duplicado sino que no acusaban recibo de ella y en muchisimas wrote to her brother:
ocasiones no sabian en donde lo habia dejado. En otra occasion
Enclosed am sending Tia Marie's letter to you. As you will note
anterior a estos acontecimientos tambien me aseguraron no
the date is Feb. 2nd. I am doing this so that the letter appears to
haber recibido uno de los giros de $300.00 enviados y hechas las
have been written before her new will. Keep her letter where it
correspondientes avariguaciones resulto haber sido cobrador
will be clear to see that the reason why Boby (appellee) does
por Da Marie.
not appear in her new will is because he intended to take Tio
Legal a pensarse la conveniencia de promover un expediente de Ramon to the "Tribunates," so if Boby by any chance tries to
tutela pero no se Ilevo a cabo para que no sufrieran en vida la contend it you will have her letter as a farther proof that is what
vajacion de ser judicialmente declarados incapacitados por su she had every intention to do. So Cillo (Horacio) for goodness
avanza da edad. sake keep it in a safe or in the bank until you will have use of it.
Tear this letter no sooner read in case it falls into wrong hands.
Lamenting the fact that her aunt was "completely in Irene's hands," and that
The less people know of the new will the better in case action
"Irene has taken complete possession of every penny and gives Tia Marie no
should be taken against it.
account of anything," * appellant expressed herself quite strongly in this wise:
The foregoing letter appears quite conspiratorial, as, though the will referred to
After all if the worst comes to the worst it is better that I who
in it had been obtained by appellant in order to cut off Boby (appellee) from any
am a member of the family should cheat Tia Marie rather than
share in the inheritance, and the enclosed letter of the testatrix had been
an absolute stranger.
antedated to February 2 so that it would appear "to have been written before her
The same fear was reiterated in her letter of February 2, 1957 (Exh. 3-E); new will." For some reason not disclosed in the record, that will never came to
light. Evidently Horacio was also an heir therein, but then was subsequently
... Que chasco y disgusto tendriamos si resultase Irene la
eliminated in the 1958 will which was actually presented for probate by
heredera de los Tios. Cosa muy posible conociendo las cosas
appellant.
que ha hecho y lo engaados que tenia a los pobres Tios.
The evidence hereinabove discussed, cumulatively considered, leads to the
A subsequent letter of appellant, dated April 9, 1957 (Exh. 2-K), this time
definite conclusion that Marie Gamier Garreau was indeed mentally
addressed to her brother Horacio, reveals a significant development. Apparently
incapacitated to make a will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be
the 1949 will, wherein Jose Maria Ramirez, appellee herein, was mentioned as
disposed of, the proper objects of (her) bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act" (Art. 799, Civil Code). As early as 1955, when she was R. No selo que quieren decir con esa pregunta.
examined by the family physician, Dr. Romero de Arcos and by a qualified Yom juzgo que ella estaba capacitada y hay una
psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Germain, she was already suffering from pre-senile clausula all de que esta capacitada legalmente.
dementia, a degenerative mental, infirmity that was described by them as "a
19. Diga usted si Doa Maria Garnier Garreau se daba cuenta de
progressive and irreversible process." The manifestations of this condition are
que estaba otorgando un testamento?
amply illustrated in the letters written by appellant herself as well as in the
testimony of her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez. In fact these two were convinced R. Se contesta con la repuesta anterior, pues si
that the testatrix should be placed under judicial guardianship, and actually estaba capacitada sabia lo que hacia.
took the initial steps towards that end. Appellant's subsequent turn-about in her
20. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus propriedades?
opinion of the testatrix' mental condition is of course understandable,
considering that in the will she is named as sole and universal heir. But precisely R. Supongo que si aunque el en testamento no
for this reason not much reliance can be placed upon her testimony to the effect se permite a menos que se hagan legados, pero
that the testatrix was possessed of the necessary testamentary capacity. aqui es un testamento en terminos generales.
The most pertinent evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of the 21. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus parientes?
notary public before whom the will in question was executed and the testimony
of two of the three instrumental witnesses. The notary public, Braulio Nolasco R. No puedo decir eso pero ella estaba con su
Carrasquedo, gave the following statements on the subject of the testatrix' sobrina, aunque supongo que recordara a sus
mental condition: parientes.
17. Sabe usted cual era el estado mental de dicha senora cuando As may be noted, the foregoing statements of the notary public are far from
otorgo el testamento anexo 1? satisfactory. They are vague and evasive, and tend to beg the very issue. Thus
the witness could not say, but merely supposed, that the testatrix had a
R. A mi juicio estaba bien. recollection of her properties or of the relatives who would logically inherit from
her and when asked to explain his answer to the question concerning her
18. Haga usted el favor de explicar su contestacion a la pregunta
mental state, he simply referred to the certification in the will on that point. It
anterior.
would seem that he was aware that he had no sufficient basis for a categorical
opinion on the subject, and so declined to fully commit himself.
Manuel Gomez Tortajada was one of the instrumental witnesses. He affirmed P. But did the testatrix talk about her relatives
that the testatrix was in "perfect" mental condition at the time of the execution on that occasion?
of the will; that she knew "perfectly" that he was executing a will; that on
R . Yo oi que ella hablaba con la senorita que le
another occasion she had even told him about certain properties of hers, and
acompafiaba y creo que tenian parentezco pero
about her relatives, who were a niece and a sister of that niece. The testimony of
hablaban en el idioma de ellas.
this witness on deposition gives the distinct impression of officiousness, of
pretending to be more intimately familiar with the affairs of the testatrix than Three additional witnesses, by way of rebuttal, were presented by appellant. The
their casual acquaintance justified. In any case his affirmation of the testatrix first was Dr. Suils Perez, whose deposition is marked Exhibit Q. He said that as a
"perfect" mental condition was so obviously an exaggeration in the face of the neurologist and a psychiatrist he was called several times in 1957 to Marie
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary that it only serves to weaken his Garnier Garreau. His diagnosis was that she had a "brain lesion" "(lesion en el
credibility. cerebro), but had a mentality corresponding to her age. "Era una mujer que en
interes o atencion dejaba mucho que desear salvo en las cosas que le interesaban
The other instrumental witness was Antonio Fernandez Caballero. He likewise
... En un test que se hubiera hecho con ella hubieramos visto resultados
affirmed the good condition of the testatrix' mental faculties, saying that she
contradictorias segun el momento de atencion en que se lo hicieramos que era
had a recollection of her properties as well as of her relatives. The affirmation is
muy variable."
rather strange' not to say incredible, considering that he met the testatrix for the
first and only time in the office of the notary public on the occasion of the The foregoing testimony leaves much to he desired insofar as the issue of
execution of the will, and that all that took place then was that the said will was testamentary capacity is concerned: no reference whatsoever was made therein
read by the notary and then signed by the testatrix, the witnesses and the notary to the very elements of that issue, such as capacity to comprehend the nature of
himself. And according to the latter he did not ask her anything about her the testamentary act, the recollection of the properties to be disposed of and of
properties or her relatives. Indeed this instrumental witness admitted that he the relatives who might have a claim upon the testatrix' generosity.
did not understand the language spoken by the testatrix on that occasion:
Salustiano Reyero, a priest, was the second rebuttal witness for appellant, whose
R. Yo quicro decir que esta senora como testimony was given in the form of deposition. The testatrix, he said, was in
hablaba algo diferente de nosotros todo lo que possession of her mental faculties, reacted well to questions directed at her, and
pudiera hablar no me entraba bien si ella even told him that she had a house in Paris. His impression was that she was not
hablaba con la sobrina, pero el lenguaje de susceptible to suggestion coming from or influence exerted by other persons.
ellas no lo entendia y no se si podian hablar de However, he qualified his assertions as follows: algunos ratos parecia que estaba
propiedades u otras cosas. alelada, "algunes veces note" eso cuando fui, y estaba como si no tuviera
interest." Asked whether the testatrix remembered things normally, this witness which was separated by a glass partition from the room where the testatrix, the
answered: "Algunas veces no, cuando estaba ya Lily con ella que fue cuando la notary public and the instrumental witnesses transacted the business at hand.
vi, porque no iba a ver a la difunta precisamente sino a Lily, y despues cuando
The witness was quite elaborate about the motive behind the execution of the
volvia yo ya no se acordaba de que habia estado yo alli."
new will making appellant the sole heir. He said:
Gonzalo Conejos Fernandez was the third rebuttal witness, also by deposition. A
... esta Senora (testatrix) me dijo que tenia otorgado un
lawyer by profession, he said he was consulted by the testatrix, after he came to
testamento en Manila distribuyendo la herencia entre Lily, una
know her in 1956, about certain personal matters, among them the revocation of
hermana o hermano, y un Seor Ramirez (appellee), y que el
a power-of-attorney given to Jose M. Cavanna and the designation of another in
motive de decidir que toda su herencia fuera de Lily,
his place as well as the proceedings for the adoption of appellant by the said
rectificando su anterior testamento, era debido aparte de las
testatrix. She consulted him also about what kinds of wills were permitted under
consideraciones de tipo afectivo a que me he referido al hecho
the Spanish law, and told him that she had previously made a will in Manila
de que ella estuvo casada con un Senor Ramirez, hijo natural de
where she was leaving her properties to her niece Lily, to a brother or a sister of
su padre, y que este Senor tenia un hijo legitimo, y a pesar de
the latter and to a "senor Ramirez," (evidently referring to appellee), but that
Ilevarse en buenas relaciones, cuando murio el hijo (evidently
because of certain actuations of appellee which did not please her she did not
referring to appellee) de este hijo legitime quiso anular las
consider him deserving of being her heir. The witness was present at the
disposiciones de su padre que no distinguio entre Ia condicion
execution of the will in question on May 24, 1958, and he noted, he said, that she
natural or legitimo, y por esta razon, a quien habia procedido
was aware of the nature of the act in which she was engaged and that she had a
de esa forma, que era sobrino de la difunta no le consideraba
recollection of her relatives and properties. From the tenor of his testimony the
acreedora ser heredero de ella.
testatrix was a completely normal person during the period of their
acquaintance; she was never absent-minded (alelada); and he did not know that If the foregoing were true, and had indeed been confided to the witness by the
she was suffering from cerebral arteriosclerosis or from pre-senile dementia. testatrix, it is strange that she should cut off from her new will not only the
appellee but also the other nephew, Horacio Ramirez, appellant's full brother
The testimony of this witness was not given weight by the trial court. It does
who was one of the heirs mentioned in the previous will executed in Manila and
suffer from the view point of credibility. He was presented as a rebuttal witness,
against whom the testatrix entertained no grievance.
who had been present during the taking of the depositions of the previous
witnesses for appellant. He was therefore in a position to cure, as he apparently The issue here is essentially one of fact, and involves an appraisal of the
tried to do, the weaknesses in their statements. Although he was present when conflicting evidence presented by the parties. That issue was addressed in the
the will was executed, he actually remained in another room, the "antesala," first instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the
testamentary incapacity of the testatrix is erroneous. It is based mainly on

expert medical testimony to the effect that her mental infirmity was observed by
the family physician as far back as 1953 and confirmed in 1955 by a competent
psychiatrist, who described the process of the mental degeneration as
progressive and irreversible; on the written admissions and declarations of
appellant herself, who would have no motive then to falsify the facts; and on the
testimony of the testatrix' brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez. On the
question of credibility, we find no ground to disregard such evidence in favor of
the vague, inconclusive statements of the notary public who authenticated the
will and of the two instrumental witnesses, nor even of the testimony of the
rebuttal witnesses, the more categorical character of whose affirmations only
serve to weaken their credibility, conflicting as they do not only with the
evidence for appellee but also with that given by the other witnesses for
appellant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the order appealed from is

affirmed, with costs against appellant.
document now in the record as Exhibit "A" was dated May 17, 1946, drafted
Junquera vs. Borromeo (19 SCRA 656).
in Spanish, and allegedly signed, and thumbmarked by said deceased, in the
EN BANC presence of Dr. Cornelio G. Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna and Filiberto

Leonardo as attesting witnesses. On June 14, 1952, the probate court appointed
G.R. No. L-18498 March 30, 1967 Junquera as special administrator of the estate.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE H. JUNQUERA, petitioner- On November 14 of the same year, Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the
appellee, probate of the will based on the following grounds: (1) that the formalities
vs. required by law had not been complied with; (2) that the testator was mentally
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. incapable of making a will at the time of its execution; (3) that the will was
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant. procured by undue and improper influence, on the part of the beneficiaries
and/or some other person; (4) that the signature of the testator was procured by
Benjamin A. Rallon for oppositor-appellant Fortunato Borromeo.
fraud; and (5) that the testator acted by mistake or did not intend the
Crispen Baizas and Associates for heirs oppositors-appellants Tomas Borromeo
instrument he signed to be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
and Amelia Borromeo.
Office of the Solicitor General for intervenor oppositor-appellant Republic. Upon motion of the abovenamed oppositor, on June 9, 1953, the Court removed
Miguel Cuenco and Fernando S. Ruiz for heirs oppositors-appellants Crispin Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his
Borromeo, Teofilo Borromeo, et al. place.
Filiberto Leonardo for petitioner-appellee.
On November 27, 1953, Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the deceased, filed her
DIZON, J.: own opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground that the signature "Vito
Borromeo" appearing thereon was a forgery. Other oppositions were
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of the City of Cebu, died on
subsequently filed by Patrocinio Borromeo de Tabotabo (her opposition was
March 13, 1952, in Paraaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs
later withdrawn), Lilia Morre de Tabotabo, Lamberto Morre, Patricia Morre de
but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Ranario, Aurora Morre de Borromeo, Ramon Ocampo, Isagani Morre and
On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Rosario Morre, invoking substantially the same grounds mentioned heretofore.
Instance of said province a petition for the probate of a one page document as
Meanwhile, Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, manifestly on behalf of
the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato
the "Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.", a duly organized
and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
partnership controlled by them, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of
designating Junquera as executor thereof (Special Proceedings No. 916-R). The
the Estate previously filed by the new special administrator, thirteen parcels of requested to act as such. Together, the three went to the residence of Vito
land situated in the City of Cebu with a total area of 2,148 square meters, Borromeo at Ramos Street, Cebu City. Upon their arrival the third witness,
alleging that during his lifetime the deceased testator had sold said lots to them, Eusebio Cabiluna, who was living on the ground floor of the house, was asked to
as evidenced by the document now in the record as Exhibit F-1 executed on May come upstairs. Thereafter, in their presence, Vito Borromeo executed first, the
17, 1945, confirming the alleged previous sale. After due hearing, the court, in its document Exhibit "F" (deed of confirmation of an alleged previous sale to Cebu
order of July 16, 1954, denied the motion for exclusion, ruling that movants' Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.) witnessed by Gandionco and Cabiluna.
remedy was to file a separate accion reivindicatoria against the administrator. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind, and without pressure
or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas
On October 28, 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document was
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the
then read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it (Exhibit "A")
ground that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to
and carbon copies thereof (Exhibits "E" and "K") in the presence of the attesting
collect a considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes. In its
witnesses, who, in turn, signed the will and its copies in the presence of Vito
order of December 10 of the same year, the Court allowed the intervention.
Borromeo and of each other.
After a prolonged trial, on May 28, 1960, the Court rendered a decision denying
Proponents also placed the Rev. Fr. Julio Corres, a Spanish Catholic priest who
the probate of the will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
was the confessor of Vito Borromeo from 1942 to 1946, the Rev. Fr. Sergio
question of ownership over the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed
Alfafara, who was his confessor from 1946 to 1947, and Vicenta Maacap, a mid-
as its own. All the parties appealed the proponents of the will from the
wife who lived in the testator's house and had served him from May 1945 up to
portion of the decision denying probate, and the oppositors and the Republic of
his death on March 30, 1952 on the witness stand. The gist of their testimony is
the Philippines, from that portion thereof where the court refused to decide the
to the effect that at the time of the execution of the will, Vito Borromeo was still
question of ownership of the thirteen lots already mentioned.
strong and could move around freely with the aid of a cane; that he was still
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three mentally alert and was a man of strong will; that his right hand was unimpaired
attesting witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio and he could write with it unaided; that as a matter of fact according to
Cabiluna, sought to prove the following facts: Vicenta Maacap he still wrote personal letters to Tomas Borromeo, could
eat by himself and even played the piano.
In the morning of May 17, 1945, Tomas Borromeo, complying with the request of
Vito Borromeo, went to the house of Atty. Filiberto Leonardo to request him to On the other hand, the oppositors presented several witnesses who testified that
be a witness at the execution of the latter's last will. Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, the signatures purporting to be those of Vito Borromeo on the document
who at the time happened to be in the house of Leonardo, was likewise Exhibit "A" and its copies were forgeries; that they were too good and too
perfect signatures and, therefore, quite impossible for the deceased an ailing The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as
man already 82 years old on May 17, 1945 to write; that he was found "positive a result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared
for bacillus leprosy" by Dr. Antonio Garcia as early as 1926 or 1927, having been not to be "wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious
treated for it consistently by injections of chaulmoogra oil administered by Dr. discrepancies in their testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of
Max Borromeo and Dr. Cornelio Gandionco; that Vito Borromeo's usual the disputed document. The court also found that the physical condition of the
signatures during his better days had always been characterized by certain deceased at the time of the execution of the questioned document was such that
flourishes, technically called "rubric"; that Vito Borromeo had also reared and it was highly improbable, if not impossible, for him to have affixed his
educated two of the oppositors, Crispin Borromeo and the late Teofilo Borromeo signatures on the documents Exhibits A, E and K in the spontaneous and
and there was no conceivable reason why they were left out in the will, if any excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led
such will had really been made by him knowingly; that the testamentary witness to believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for oppositors, adverse to
Cornelio Gandionco, is a nephew of the other witness, Filiberto Leonardo, and the genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned
was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, a sister of Tomas Borromeo, one of the document more than that of the handwriting expert presented by the
instituted heirs; that the third testamentary witness, Eusebio Cabiluna is the proponents of the will.
real father of Fortunato Borromeo, another instituted heir, who admittedly grew
It seems clear, therefore, that the main issue to be decided in the present appeal
up and was reared by Vito Borromeo and his wife Juliana Evangelista since he
is whether or not the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution
was barely three months; that Amelia Borromeo, the third instituted heir, is a
of the will in question.1wph1.t
younger sister of Tomas Borromeo and dependent upon him; that on May 17,
1945, the deceased's leprosy was so far advanced that the fingers of his right It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a
hand were already hardened and atrophied, this making it difficult, if not contested will are regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due
impossible, for him to write; and that on the same date, his sense of hearing and execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full credit, their test,
his eyesight had been considerably impaired, his eyes being always watery due testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any
to the progress of his leprosy. other witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence
direct or circumstantial (Board, etc. vs. Shasser, 10 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 [1917]).
The oppositors also presented Felipe Logan of the National Bureau of
Investigation and Jose G. Villanueva, as handwriting experts, who testified, after It is also an appellate practice of long standing in this jurisdiction to accord
examining the supposed signatures of the deceased in Exhibit "A" and great weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court and not to disturb
comparing them with his accepted standard signatures, that the questioned them unless said court had failed to consider material facts and circumstances
signatures were forgeries. The proponents, however, presented their own or had given undue weight to, or misconstrued the testimony of particular
handwriting expert, Martin Ramos, who testified to the contrary.
witnesses, the reason for this being that the trial judge had full opportunity to presented three copies of said will; the original, a carbon duplicate copy and a
hear and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying carbon triplicate copy, now in the record as Exhibits A, E and K, respectively.
and was consequently in a better position than the reviewing court to determine
While it is true that the testimony of these subscribing witnesses was given
the question of their credibility. While this is not applicable to the present case
around eight years after the alleged execution of the questioned will, still we
because His Honor, the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the
believe that the transaction in which they claim to have taken an important part
same judge before whom the evidence of the parties was presented, it must be
is of such character and importance that it can not be a very easy matter for
stated that, judging from the carefully written decision under review, it was only
anyone of them to have a hazy recollection of the number of copies signed by
after a thorough study of the record that His Honor arrived at the conclusion
the testator and by them. Stranger still would it be for them to say something in
that the subscribing witnesses do not appear to be wholly disinterested persons.
open contradiction with the reality on the matter. If, as may be clearly deduced
On the matter of the number of copies made of the questioned will allegedly from their testimony Cabiluna and Leonardo's there was only the original
signed by the testator and the three subscribing witnesses, His Honor found and one copy signed by the testator and the subscribing witnesses, why is it
that Cabiluna was very uncertain and confused; that a certain stage of his that three original and two copies were really in existence and were
examination, he said that only two copies of the will were prepared the produced in court during the trial?
original and one carbon copy while at another stage he affirmed that he did
In the case of the third subscribing witness, Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, the
not know whether or not there was a duplicate and that all he could say was
imputation was made by two witnesses, Dr. Teofilo Borromeo and Judge Crispin
that he had affixed his signature three times (Transcript, Marquiala, August 22,
Borromeo, that he was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, sister of Tomas
1958, pp. 49-50). In truth, however, he really signed six (6) times twice on the
Borromeo, who is one of the three heirs instituted in the questioned will,
original and twice on each of the two copies. Adding confusion to the situation
evidently to show that he is not a completely disinterested witness. The
is the answer he gave when he was asked if Vito Borromeo also signed the
evidence to this effect appears to have remained unimpeached, although the
carbon copy, to which his answer was "I did not see" (Idem., p. 50).
proponents of the will could have done it by calling on Dr. Gandionco himself or
On the other hand, the other subscribing witness, Atty. Filiberto Leonardo, on Angeles Borromeo to deny the imputation.
testified categorically that there were only the original and one carbon copy of
Moreover, the evidence also disclose that Dr. Gandionco was the uncle of the
the will and that the testator and all the subscribing witnesses signed both
other subscribing witness, Atty. Leonardo, and that, in fact, they were living
(Transcript, Marquiala, December 23, 1953, pp. 167, 210, and 218). However, the
together at the time of the alleged execution of the will. This circumstance
naked and highly disturbing fact is that, contrary to what is inferable from the
apparently trivial can not be taken lightly because in view of appellee's claim
vacillating testimony of Cabiluna and the categorical assertion of Atty.
that Angeles Borromeo was the fiance of Dr. Gandionco, it would not be
Leonardo, the proponents of the questioned will themselves
unreasonable to entertain the suspicion that both subscribing witnesses were Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will (Exhibits A, E
not wholly disinterested. Material to this point is the fact established by the and K) appear a total of six alleged signatures of the testator. They are all well
evidence that Atty. Leonardo was the notary public before whom the document written along a practically straight line, without any visible sign of tremor or
Exhibit 4-A which purports to convey to a partnership controlled by the heirs lack of firmness in the hand that wrote them. In fact, in the respects just
instituted in the questioned will thirteen parcels of land situated in the adverted to, they appear better written than the unquestioned signatures, of
commercial center of Cebu City was supposedly acknowledged by the attesting witnesses Gandionco and Cabiluna, inspite of the fact that on the date
testator on the same date May 17, 1945. of the alleged execution of the will (May 17, 1945) the testator was considerably
older and in a much poorer physical condition than they. According to the
In the light of the foregoing, We can not see our way clear to holding that the
evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-two years old, with the entire
trial court erred in refusing to give full credit to the testimony of the three
left half of his body paralyzed since six years before, while the oldest attesting
subscribing witnesses.
witness (Cabiluna) was around sixty-five years of age and Leonardo and
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned Gandionco were only forty-four and forty-five years old respectively, and were
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light all in good health. Despite the obviously very poor physical condition of the
of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or testator, Leonardo claims that he signed the alleged will unaided, writing his
forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, name thereon slowly but continuously or without interruption, and that, on the
saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to same occasion, he signed his name several times not only on the original of the
mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other. This can not will and its copies but also on the original and several copies of the alleged
be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and on his residence certificate. Considering all the
itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting attendant circumstances, we agree with the lower court that Vito Borromeo
nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the could not have written the questioned signatures.
conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to the witness
In view of what has been said heretofore, We find it unnecessary to examine and
stand by the parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical
consider in detail the conflicting testimony of the handwriting experts
appearance and condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will
presented by the parties: Martin Ramos by the proponents of the will, to sustain
found in the record particularly the signatures attributed to the testator
the genuineness of the questioned signatures, and Felipe Logan and Jose G.
and We have come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written
Villanueva, by the oppositors, to prove that said signatures are forgeries. We
by him.
shall limit ourselves in this connection to quoting with approval the following
portion of the appealed decision:
What the Court finds to be a weakness in the conclusions of Martin We shall now consider the appeal, taken by the oppositors and the Republic of
Ramos, based on his comparative examination of the questioned and the Philippines from that portion of the decision where the lower court declined
standard signatures of Vito Borromeo, is his apparent assumption that to decide with finality the question of who owns the thirteen parcels of land
all the signatures were made by Vito Borromeo under equality or subject-matter of the confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and whether or not they
similarity of circumstances, that is, that in all instances Vito Borromeo should be included in or excluded from the inventory of properties of the Estate
had normal use of both of his hands, the right and the left. He failed of the deceased Vito Borromeo.
to take into account that when Vito Borromeo allegedly affixed those
It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo,
signatures on May 17, 1945 on Exhibits 'A', 'E', and 'K' the left portion of
through counsel, filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the
his body, including the left hand, was already paralyzed, and Vito
Estate of the thirteen lots therein mentioned, with a total area of 2,348 square
Borromeo was represented to have written his name alone by himself
meters, claiming that the same had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo
and unaided. Maybe, if he was previously apprised of those
during his lifetime to the Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for
circumstances, he would hesitate to make the conclusion that those
exclusion was denied by the lower court in its order of July 16, 1954, and the
flawless signatures reading Vito Borromeo, written straight and in a
ruling was reiterated in the appealed decision "for the same reasons and
form as good as, if not better than, the signatures of three much
considerations" upon which it rejected the probate of the will. The ruling on the
younger attesting witnesses, were positively in the handwriting of the
matter, however, was expressly made provisional in nature.
82-year old, ailing, and paralytic Vito Borromeo. The Court
consequently, finds itself not disposed to adopt his conclusions, but on We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is
the contrary is inclined toward the views of the other two experts correct because said court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no
witnesses, Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva. jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership involved. That
such matter must be litigated in a separate action has been the established
As stated at the outset, the contested will is claimed to have been signed
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction (Ongsinco vs. Borja, L-7635, July 25, 1955;
and thumbmarked by the testator. An examination of the thumbmarks, however,
Mallari vs. Mallari, L-4656, February 23, 1953; Garcia vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-9233,
readily shows that, as the lower court found, the same are "glaringly far from
June 29, 1957; Cordova vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561
being distinct and clear"; that "they are not a possible means of identification"
and others), except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion
nor can "they possibly be identified to be those of Vito Borromeo, or for that
from the inventory of any particular property, in which case the probate court
matter, of any other person whatsoever". It is, therefore, obvious, that they are
may pass upon provisionally, the question of inclusion or exclusion, but without
of little use in the resolution of the issue before Us.
prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate separate action (Garcia vs.
Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388; Guinguing vs. Abuton,
48 Phil. 144, 147).
In view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil 573) see earlier case under Article
799
Cuyugan vs. Baron & Baron (62 Phil 859) see earlier case under Article 799
leaving to Manolita G. de Carungcong the greater bulk of the estate, without

Gonzalez vs. Gonzales (November 29, 1951)
impairing the legitimes of the other children.
EN BANC
In his opposition filed on February 16, 1949, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the
G.R. Nos. L-3272-73 November 29, 1951 disallowance of the wills executed on November 16, 1942, and May 5, 1945, on
the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by the testatrix
MANUEL GONZALES, petitioner-appellant, in an instrument executed by her on November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2Alejandro
vs. and Juan Gonzales), with the result that her estate should be distributed as if
MANOLITA GONZALES DE CARUNGCONG, petitioner-appellee; she died intestate.
ALEJANDRO GONZALES, JR., and JUAN GONZALES, oppositors-appellants.
With the exception of Leopoldo Gonzales, the children of the testatrix filed
Claro M. Recto for petitioner and appellant. mutual oppositions to one or the other instruments tending to negative their
Reyes, Albert, Agcaoili and Raf. L. Arcega for petitioner and appellee. respective positions.
Emiliano Pamintuan and Felixberto M. Serrano for oppositors and appellants.
After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision
PARAS, C.J.: with the following dispositive pronouncements:
On November 27, 1948, Manuel Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be referred All facts considered in the light of the evidence presented and in the
to as testatrix) died at the age of about seventy-eight years, leaving five children, manner in which the witnesses testified the court concludes and holds:
namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de
Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The estate left by her is estimated at P150,000. First: That Exhibit B Manuel Gonzales, though validly
executed on November 16, 1942, was revoked by Exhibit 1Manolita G.
On December 22, 1948, Manuel Gonzales filed in the Court of First Instance of Carungcong in accordance with the provisions of section 623 of the
Rizal a petition (Special Proceeding No. 837) for the probate of an alleged will Code of Civil Procedure.
executed by the testatrix on November 16, 1942 (Exhibit BManuel Gonzales),
devising to Manuel Gonzales the greater portion of the estate, without impairing Second: That Exhibit 2 Alejandro and Juan Gonzales being
the legitimes of the other children. executed without the knowledge and testamentary capacity of the
testatrix and being contrary to the provisions of section 618 of the Code
On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de Carungcong filed in the same court a of Civil Procedure, the said document is hereby declared null and void.
petition (Special Proceeding No. 838) for the probate of another alleged will
executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carungcong),
Third: That Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong having been

(Sgd.) MANUELA Y. VDA. DE GONZALES
executed in accordance with law the same is hereby declared as the true
MANUELA IBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES
and last will and testament of the deceased Manuela Ibarra Viuda de
Gonzales, and said will is hereby admitted probate.
Mga Saksi o Testigos:
From this judgment petitioner Manuel Gonzales and oppositors Alejandro

(Sgd.) BIENVENIDO DE LOS REYES
Gonzales, Jr. and Juan Gonzales have appealed. The appeal as to Juan Gonzales
(Sgd.) TAHIMIK T. SAYOC
was dismissed in view of his failure to pay the proportionate share of the
(Sgd.) LUIS GAERLAN
printing cost of the record on appeal.
In the parts material to the present appeal, the will executed by the testatrix on It is contended for the appellants that this will does not contain any attestation
May 5, 1945, is of the following form and tenor: clause; that, assuming the concluding paragraph to be the attestation clause, it
is not valid because it is the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses, and
IKALABING-DALAWA. Na ang aking HULING BILIN AT
because it does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will.
TESTAMENTONG ito ay binubuo ng PITONG (7) dahon o pagina na
may bilang na sunud-sunod at ang bawa't dahon o pagina ay mayroong In the very recent case of Valentina Cuevas vs. Pilar Achacoso, G.R. No. L-3497,
tunay kong lagda o firma, gayon din ang lahat ng aking saksi o testigos. decided May, 1951 * we sustained, finding a precedent in Aldaba vs. Roque, 43
Phil., 378, an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the
SA KATUNAYAN ng lahat ng isinasaysay ko dito ay aking nilagdaan ito
body of the will. Through Mr. Justice Bautista, we held:
dito sa Imus, Kavite, Filipinas ngayong ika-5 ng Mayo ng taong 1945, na
nakaharap dito sa ating paglagda o pagfirma ang tatlong saksi o The clause above quoted is the attestation clause referred to in the law
testigos. At aking ding nilagdaan o pinirmahan ang tagilirang kaliwa ng which, in our opinion, substantially complies with its requirements. The
lahat at bawa't dahon o pagina nitong testamento kong ito sa harap ng only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an attestation
lahat at bawa't isang saksi o testigos at ang lahat at bawa't isa naman sa made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses.
kanila ay nangagsilagda o nagsifirma din dito bilang saksi ko sa harap This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion serious nor
ko at sa harap ng lahat at bawa't isa sa kanila, at ganoon din silang mga substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right
saksi ko ay nangag-lagda o nagsi-firma sa tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the
bawa't isa sa mga dahon o pagina nitong aking testamento. three instrumental witnesses.
Instrumental witnesses, as defined by Escriche in his Diccionario its preparation a ruling of this Court has been followed." But the case at bar still
Razobada de Legislacion, y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p. 1115, is on who falls within this view, the will (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carongcong) having been
takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing" (in re will of executed on May 5, 1945.
Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809). An instrumental witness, therefore, does
The attestation clause contained in the body of the will being thus valid, the
not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper
statement in the penultimate paragraph of the will hereinabove quoted as to the
execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses
number of sheets or pages used, is sufficient attestation which may be
have signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator,
considered in conjunction with the last paragraph. It is significant that the law
shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his
does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause. While
signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the
perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure
attestation clause.
from the usual forms should be ignored, especially when the authenticity of the
The attestation clause in question bears also similarity with the will is not assailed, as in this case.
attestation clause in the will involved in Aldaba vs. Roque, (43 Phil.,
The result reached in respect of the sufficiency of the will (Exhibit 1Manolita
378). In that case, the attestation clause formed part of the body of the
G. Carongcong) necessarily disposes of the contention of the appellant Manuel
will and its recital was made by the testatrix herself and was signed by
Gonzales that the trial court erred in not admitting to probate the will (Exhibit
her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding the validity
BManuel Gonzales), since the latter will must be considered revoked by the
of the will, the court said:
subsequent will (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carongcong).
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration
What remains to be discussed is the claim of appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr.
about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however, as the
that the will (Exhibit 1Manolita G. Carongcong) has been revoked by the
witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration,
testatrix in the instrument of November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2Alejandro and Juan
we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the
Gonzales) which provides as follows:
testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of
Act No. 2465. Ako, MANUEL YBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES, may sapat na gulang at
naninirahan sa ciudad ng Rizal, may mahusay at wastong pag-iisip at
Of course three of the Justices of this Court concurred in the result, "in the
mabuting pagtatanda, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito at bilang
possibility that the testator in the present case, or the person or persons who
huling kapasiyahan ay sinasaysay ko ito at ipinahahayag sa ngayon sa
prepared the will had relied upon the ruling laid down in the case ofAldaba vs.
alin mang testamento o huling habilin na napirmahan kong una sa
Roque, supra, and that it would now be unfair to reject the present will when in
kasulatang ito ay pinawawalan ko ng saysay at kabuluhang lahat pagkat P. Cual era el resultado de su examen?R. Cuando fue al hospital a
hindi iyong tunay kong kalooban ngayon. examinarla en el primer dia via que la aphasia se agravo, o sea que ha
perdido el poder de hablar inteligentemente; tambien encontre que
Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito at sa pagkat hindi ako makalagda ngayon
estaba inconsciente, durmiendo constantemente y no se le podia,
ang pina-kiusapan si Constancio Padilla na ilagda ako sa kasulatang ito
despertar, tenia la respiracion fatigosa, lenta y con estertores, y no podia
ngayon ika-17 ng Noviembre ng taong ito 1948, dito sa ciudad ng Pasay.
levantarse, asi que yo perscribi que diera el alimento por medio de
Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee), hypodermoclysis, o sea por medio de inyecciones.
contends that the testatrix lacked the testamentary capacity when she allegedly
Sr. PAMINTUAN.Quisieramos saber, Su Seoria, si se presenta al
executed the instrument of revocation, and their contention was sustained by
testigo como experto?
the trial court. We have examined the record and found no valid reason for
reversing the finding of said court which had the benefit of observing and Sr. SERRANO.Tambien quisiera saber si se presenta como madico de
hearing the witnesses testify. Upon the other hand, the following considerations la familia o como medico experto?.
amply support the appealed decision:.
Sr. ARCEGA.Presento al testigo como medico de cabecere y como
1. For more than ten years prior to her death, the testatrix had suffered from medico experto al mismo tiempo.
hypertension. On November 14, 1948, she had aphasia and on November 15,
P. Y que hicieron en el hospital en vista de sus instrucciones?R.
1948, she was taken to the hospital upon advice of the family physician, Dr. Jose
Cumplieron la prescripcion mia.
C. Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities (Exhibit E
Manuel Gonzales), Dr. Leveriza stated that the testatrix was suffering from P. Que sucedio con respecto al estado de la paciente?R. La
hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. Particularly on November 18, 1948, when paciente a medida que pasaban los dias se quedaba grave cada vez y
the alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in a mas graves los sintomas aun que al primer dia en que fue ella llevada al
comatose and unconscious state and could not talk or understand. The hospital.
following is the testimony of Dr. Leveriza portraying the physical condition of
P. Volviendome a la condicion de la paciente, en que estado se
the testatrix up to November 18, 1948:
encontraba Doa Manuela I. Vda. de gonzales el 14 de noviembre de
P. Y que hizo usted cuando Doa Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales ya 1948 antes de ingresarla en el hospital?R. La encontre con aphasia, no
estaba en el hospital?R. Me fui alla para examinarla. podia hablar inteligentemente.
"P. Puede usted explicar al Juzgado el curso de la enfermedad de P. Y como estaba su estado mental?R. Estaba completamente
Doa Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales?R. Estuvo agravandose desde el inconsciente desde el dia en que entro en el hospital.
segundo dia en que fue ingresada al hospital, y desde ese dia orinaba y
Sr. ARCEGA. P. Podia hablar la paciente en la fecha en que fue
deponia en la cama inconscientemente.
ingresada al hospital?-R. No, seor.
xxx xxx xxx
P. Despues del 15 de noviembre de 1948 en que segun usted fue
(t.s.n., Laquindanum, March 21, 1949, pp. 24-26.) ingresada la paciente en el hospital podia hablar ella y hacer entender
sus palabras?R. No, seor.
P. Explique usted al Juzgado el curso de la enfermedad de la
paciente haciendo referencia de las fechas que aparecen en los Exhibitos P. Y que hacia la paciente?R. Estaba durmiendo continuamente,
3 y 3-4?R. El noviembre 14, ordene el ingreso de la paciente al Mercy no podia abrir sus ojos por si sola, sino que yo abria para ver la pupila.
Hospital, porque tuvo paralisis parcial en la lengua, probablemente de
P. Trato usted de tener conversacion con la paciente?R.
origen embalismo o thrombosis cerebral, y como ya era de noche no se
Naturalmente trataba, pero contestaba, y ni creo que me entendia.
llevo al hospital, sino el dia 15 de noviembre en donde le he hecho dos
visitas; la condicion de la paciente continuo empeorando hasta el dia 25 P. Podia levantarse la paciente?R. No, seor, porque estaba en
de noviembre en que sobrevino la complicacion de pneumonia hypostatica estado comtosos, y para prevenir la pneumonia hypostatica dos o tres
hasta que fallecio el noviembre 27, 1948, a las 2:30 p.m. hombres tenian que levantaria y ponerla algo de costado o algo asi
reclinada.
xxx xxx xxx
P. Y que resultado tuvo esa precaucion que usted tomo?R. Se ha

(t.s.n., Laquindanum, March 21, 1948, pp. 28-29.)
retrasado o retardado le pneumonia, pero sobrevino, al fin, que siempre
JUZGADO.P. Como llego usted a esa conclusion de que desde el 14 de es fatal.
noviembre de 1948 en que usted ordeno la entrega de la paciente al
P. Usted dijo que al fin sobrevino la pneumonia, que efecto tuvo esa
hospital empeoro su salud hasta que murio el dia 27 de noviembre de
pneumonia a la paciente?R. Precipito la muerte de la paciente.
1948?-R. Porque cada vez mas se acentua su estado comatoso, y demas su
respiracion se hacia mas fatigosa cada vez que pasaban los dias, y con P. El 18 de noviembre de 1948, segun testimonio de los testigos,
estertores. otorgaron el documento Exhibit 2-Alejandro y Juan Gonzales, puede
usted decir al Juzgado en que estado se encontraba Doa Manuela I.
Vda. de Gonzales?R. Estaba en estado comatoso.
P. Por que sabe usted eso?R. Porque en esa fecha yo la visite dos JUZGADO.Pero una persona en ese estado de salud, como estaba la
veces: una por la maana y otra por la tarde. paciente Doa Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales, el 18 de noviembre de 1948,
podia comprender palabras dichas a ella o indicaciones hechas por
P. Y estando en el estado comatoso, como usted, dice, puede usted
alguna persona a ella?R. No, seor.(t.s.n. Laquindanum, March 21,
decir al Juzgado si podia ella hablar o entender sus palabras o su
1948, pp. 30-33.).
deseo?R. No, seor.
While appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. has attempted to show that Dr. Leveriza
P. Hizo usted esfuerzos para hacerie comprender sus palabras?R.
was not an expert, the latters's testimony remains uncontradicted. The fact that
Siempre examinaba a ella para ver si reaccionaba favorablemente la
the testimony of the attesting witnesses tends to imply that the testatrix was of
paciente, pero cada vez era peor.
sound mind at the time the alleged instrument of revocation was executed,
P. Puede usted decir si en aquella fecha la paciente podia siquiera cannot prevail over the findings of the attending physician, Dr. Leveriza,
hacer movimiento de cabeza?R. No, seor, porque la parte derecha because even Dr. Ramon C. Talavera (an attesting witness) testified that
del cuerpo tenia hemiflejia o paralisis. although he had not examined the testatrix, her case appeared serious; that he
had a hunch that "they were taking advantage of the last moment of the
P. Cual es la causa de oso que usted dice hemiflejia o paralisis?R.
deceased and they were trying to make me an instrument in the
Generalmente se debe a una hemorragia cerebral o trombosis del
accomplishment of their aims," and that he had the idea that the testatrix was in
cerebro.
doubtful condition because he "could only judge from the people going there.".
P. Teniendo hemorragia cerebral o trombosis del cerebro, segun

It is also argued that if the testatrix was in a comatose condition, Dr. Leveriza
usted, cual es la parte del cuerpo humano que queda afectada?R. La
would not have ordered to "let her sit on bed or on chair and let her turn on her
cabeza y tambien los brazos, como los miembros del cuerpo.
side sometime." However, Dr. Leveriza has given the reason for this
P. Que quiere usted decir como los miembros del cuerpo?R. Las prescription, namely, to avoid hypostatic pneumonia.
manos y los pies.

In support of the contention that the testimony of the attesting witnesses
P. Podia mover la paciente sus manos y su cuerpo?R. La parte should be given more credence than the opinion of an expert witness, reliance is
izquierda si. placed on the case of Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400; Bagtasvs. Paguio, 22
Phil., 227; Galvez vs. Galvez, 26 Phil., 243; Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44
P. Y la parte derecha?-R. No, seor.
Phil., 573; Amata vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485, and Neyra vs. Neyra, 42, Off. Gaz.,
2790 ** These cases are notably distinguishable from the case at bar. The former
refer to situations in which the doctors were not in a position to certify 3. Even under the theory of the appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. it is hard to
definitely as the testamentary capacity of the testators at the time the wills rule that the testatrix had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of the
therein involved were executed, because they had not observed the testators on execution of the alleged instrument of revocation. In the first place, Constancio
said dates or never saw them; whereas the case now before us involves a family Padilla (brother of Jose Padilla) merely asked the testatrix, first, if she was
physician who attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her on the agreeable to the instrument of revocation prepared by Jose Padilla, and
day when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed. secondly, if she was agreeable to the signing of said document by Constancio
Padilla, to which two questions the testatrix allegedly answered "Yes". It is not
2. We cannot help expressing our surprise at the fact that the instrument of
pretended that the testatrix said more about the matter or gave any further
revocation was allegedly executed on November 18, 1948, when, according to the
instruction. The attesting witnesses were not introduced to the testatrix, and
testimony of Jose Padilla, the latter was asked by the testatrix to prepare the
their presence was not even mentioned to her. it is obviously doubtful whether
necessary document as early as in the month of May, 1948, and reminded about
the testatrix understood the meaning and extent of the ceremony. Assuming
it for the second time weeks before November 1, 1948, and for the third time
that the testatrix answered in the affirmative the two questions of Constancio
several days before the latter date (November 1, 1948). The first excuse given by
Padilla, without more, we cannot fairly attribute to her manifestation of her
Jose Padilla for the delay is that he was busy and the children of the testatrix had
desire to proceed, right then and there, with the signing of the questioned
certain disputes which he tried to settle. The second excuse is that he was not
instrument. In other words, contrary to the recital of the attestation clause, the
able to secure soon enough from Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. some documents of
testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the attesting
transfer which he wanted to examine in connection with the preparation of the
witnesses.
desired instrument of revocation. We are inclined to state that these excuses are
rather poor. If Jose Padilla was too busy to give attention to the matter, he could The appealed decision is, therefore, affirmed without costs. So ordered.
have very easily informed the testatrix and the latter, if really desirous of
revoking her former wills, would have employed another to prepare the
requisite document. The fact that there were disputes between the children of
the testatrix certainly was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the wish of
the testatrix. Neither was it necessary to examine the documents relating to the
properties of the testatrix, since the instrument of revocation could be prepared
without any reference to the details of her estate. Indeed, the instrument
(Exhibit 2Alejandro and Juan Gonzales) is couched in general terms.
incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and
Article 804 threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia
Abada vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005) see earlier case under Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the
Article 795 testator was procured by fraud or trick.
Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these
words: "That the court a quo erred in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was
EN BANC executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection is added the
alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Exhibit "A" was written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, rested his case and over the vigorous objection of the oppositor.
vs.
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic
Tirona, Gutierrez and Adorable for appellant. numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud,
TUASON, J.: and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any
of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the
Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly
1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed. In the identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in
court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence,
wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of
appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at
will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains
age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that
required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was
the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the
logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both
marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the
mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53
the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)
page one.Abangan vs. Abangan, supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46
With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion
Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.
that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the
Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the
error, the matter of the credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and
heading. On the merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of
deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not
instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and
of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64
recall in the same order in which they occurred. C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it
will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a
Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of
motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may
experimental psychology show that the contradictions of witnesses
be reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the
generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of
request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after
questioning, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a
the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon
demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch as not all those who witness an
the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)
incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating
their impressions they should not agree in the minor details; hence, the In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced
contradictions in their testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.) their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only,
but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.
paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to
(Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So,
sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing
generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it
has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the
evidence is to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to
present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the
will for its silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the
testament. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly
stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the
probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the
testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the
subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from
which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the
Tagalog dialect.
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament
of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476)
left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act
EN BANC No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object
(referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said
DECISION
sheets, thereby changing the testators dispositions. But when these dispositions
November 12, 1919 are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said
G.R. No. L-13431
sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the
In re will of Ana Abangan.
margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the
vs.
testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already
Filemon Sotto for appellants. signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee. an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the
AVANCEA, J.: witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left
Ana Abangans will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures,
appealed. affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume
that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangans will, consists of two sheets, the
witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures
first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the
repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix
of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But,
and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions,
when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object
according to appellants contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will
of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
to probate.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the
without considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the
hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in
testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the which this will is written.
pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover,
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby
referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not
affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains
only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but
executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first
of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom
by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on
the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be
disregarded.
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the
testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which
Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil 660
reads as follows:
EN BANC
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect,
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929 although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that
dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been
In re estate of Piraso, deceased. written in that dialect.
SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
vs. Such statements were not unnecessary for the decision of the case, once it has
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees. been proved without contradiction, that the said deceased Piraso did not know
English, in which language the instrument Exhibit A, alleged to be his will, is
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for appellant. drawn. Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a
ROMUALDEZ, J.: Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
Benguet, denying the probate of the instrument Exhibit A, as the last will and
known by the testator," etc. (Emphasis supplied.) Nor can the presumption in
testament of the deceased Piraso.
favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil.,
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the
court: locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked
in support of the probate of said document Exhibit A, as a will, because, in the
1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have
instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of
been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect.
Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where Exhibit A was drawn, but
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language
dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect. than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know
the English language in which Exhibit A is written. So that even if such a
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
We consider the other question raised in this appeal needless and immaterial to
the adjudication of this case, it having been, as it was, proven, that the
instrument in question could not be probated as the last will and testament of
the deceased Piraso, having been written in the English language with which the
latter was unacquainted.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or
not it be technically held that said will, in order to be valid, must be written in
the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated
language and used as a means of communication in writing, and whether or not
the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain that the
instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso
did not know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear
and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.
While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court, we believe, however,
Reyes vs. Vidal, (91 Phil. 127)
that for purposes of this appeal of discussion of some would be sufficient. Thus,
EN BANC the issues may be boiled down as follows: 1) Whether or not the signatures of
the deceased appearing in the will (Exhibit "C") are genuine; 2) whether or not
G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952 there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will
was written; and 3) whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN
mind when she signed the will.
REYES, petitioner-administrator-appellant,
vs. 1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law,
DOLORES ZUIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee. petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the
execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero,
Jose Sotelo Mati and Agustin Alvarez Salazar for appellant.
Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. The first used to provide the
Jose Perez Cardenas for appellee.
deceased with ice every day, and in one of those occasions she went to her
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: house to bring ice, she requested to act witness to the execution of the will. The
second was a laborer whose job was is to fix bed made of rattan, and in one of
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last
those days he went to the house of the deceased to work, he was asked also to
will and testament of Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando who died in the City of
witness the signing of the will. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased for
Manila on October 29, 1945.
many years who was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. These
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed
Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuiga Vda. de the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their
Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her signatures appear,
after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other. This is
evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the substance of what they have testified and from an examination of their
the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not testimony to the court entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. There is
proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, nothing in their testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility
and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give rise to the
was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner suspicion that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration.
appealed to this Court. They have impressed the court as simple persons who had intervened in the
execution of the will out merely of deference to the testatrix whom they had disputed signatures. Thus, he examined four genuine signatures that were
served for sometime and had known to be a good and respectable woman. affixed on October 16, 1945, other four signatures that were affixed in October
1945, one on January 2, 1945, on January 24, 1945, and one on September 24 1945,
What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony of these
He also examined one affixed on March 12, 1941, only for emphasis. The
instrumental witnesses? only one expert witness, Jose G. Villanueva, who made a
closeness or proximity of the time in which the standards used had been written
comparative analysis of the signatures appearing in the will in relation to some
to that of the suspected signature or document is very important to bring about
genuine signatures of the deceased, and in fact testified on the analysis and
an accurate analysis and conclusion. the selection of the proper standards of
study he has made of said signatures and submitted a memorandum on the
comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and
study and comparison he has made. And in his testimony as well as in his
the state of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. a signature
memorandum, this witness has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote
affixed in 1941 may involved characteristics different from those borne by a
the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is not the same hand that
signature affixed in 1945. And this is because the passing of time and the
wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and which he used as basis of his
increase in age may have a decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a
analytical study, thereby concluding that said signatures are not genuine. The
person. It for this reasons that the authorities of the opinion that in order to
lower court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and
bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison
decreed as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate.
must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such
There are, however, certain important facts and circumstances which make us was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. But such was observed in the
differ from this opinion of the lower court. In the first place, we find that the study made by Espinosa. He followed the standard practice in handwriting
opinion of this expert witness has been rebutted by another expert witness Jose analysis. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves more
C. Espinosa, whose opinion, to our mind, deserves more weight and credence. weight and consideration.
And our reason for reaching this conclusion is the fact that the standards of the
The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as
comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those used by Villanueva in
the suspected document. It is preferable that the standards embraced
the comparison are two signatures appearing in two documents executed on
the time of the origin of the document, so that one part comes from the
November 10, 1942, one signature in an identification card affixed in April 1940,
time after the origin. (Page 423 "Modern Criminal Investigation" by
a half signature appearing in a letter written on October 8, 1943, one signature
Soderman and O' Connell, 1936, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New
appearing in a letter written on July 16, 1945, and one signature appearing in a
York and London.)
letter written on January, 1945, whereas the disputed signatures appearing in the
will were affixed on October 29, 1945. On the other hand, the standards used by If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined
Espinosa in making his comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the and preferably double that number." (Page 139, Forensic Chemistry and
Scientific Criminal Investigation by Lucas, 1935, Edward Arnold & Co., written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on
London.) this ground.
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is 3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing
the failure of the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the the will is the fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when
language in which the will in question appears to have been written. According she signed the will, and it reached this conclusion, not because of any direct
to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be written in the dialect evidence on the matter, but simply because the deceased signed the will in a
or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the probate somewhat varied form. On this point the lower court said:
of the will must fail. And the wall was disallowed.
El Juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las firmas arriba
There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the indicadas feuran de Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando, las mismas revelan
petitioner which would indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish que ella no estabe en el pleno de sus facultades mentales cuando la
language used in the preparation of the will in question. But, in our opinion, this hicieron firmar el documento, Exhibit C, pues el hecho de que en una
failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important sola ocasion la repetida Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando firmo dos veces,
requirement of the law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is sin escribir su verdadero nombre, demuestra que ella no se daba cuenta
enough evidence on record which supplies this technical omission. In the first de sus actos por no hallarse mentalmente sana. Si esto es asi, no se debe
place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza espaola, legalizar como testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Maria Zuiga
was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In Vda. de Pando el documento, Exhibit C, porque el Articulo 614 de la Ley
the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the 190 y el Articulo 12, Reglamentos de los Tribunales, disponen que
oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish language, solamente pueden otorgar testamento las personas que al tiempo de su
oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to otorgamiento estaban en el pleno goce de sus facultades mentales.
the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament
The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses have said
has been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven
on this point. Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the
(Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this
deceased before the signing of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she
presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we have the very attestation
was of the impression that the deceased was of sound mind at the time. To the
clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish
same effect is the testimony of Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her
language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation
impression when the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk and
clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted
read, only that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These
to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was
statements had not been contradicted. They give an idea of the mental had not Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The Court admits the
contradicted. They give an idea of mental condition of the deceased in the will will Exhibit C to probate, and remands these case to the lower court for further
differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state of proceedings, with costs against the appellee.
health rather than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a
condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities
are common in the writings of old people and, far from showing lack of
genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer.
A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this
impression.
Abbreviated, distorted and illegible, forms, which are sufficiently free

and rapid, often actually indicate genuineness rather than forgery even
though they are very unusual and not exactly like those in the standard
writing. Those who write of difficulty or hesitation through some
physical infirmity may sometimes produced broken and unfinished
signatures and these results, which in themselves are distinctly
divergent as compared with signatures produced under conditions of
strength and health, may forcefully indicate genuineness . Under
conditions of weakness due to diseased or age, parts of a genuine
signature may be clumsily written over a second time not at just the
same place and in a way when clearly shows that the writer either could
not see or was so week and inattentive as not to care what the result
might be. This careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure 184), unlike
the painstaking and delicate retouching of the forger, often indicates
genuineness. (Page 365, Questioned Documents by Osborne, 2nd
Edition, 1927.)
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court erred in disallowing the
will Exhibit C.
To this petition, Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) filed
Testate Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana (106 Phil 1973)
separate opposiytions, both claiming that the alleged will of Jose J. Javellana
EN BANC deposited by peittioners with the clerk of court was null and void, the same not
having been executed in accordance with the formalities required by law and
DECISION
that the legal requirements necessary for its validit had not been complied
January 30, 1960 with.
G.R. No. L-13781 At the hearing, petitioners introduced as evidence in support of the petition, a
Testate Estate of JOSE J. JAVELLANA, Deceased. CRISTETA JIMENEA VDA. copy of the will; certification of the date and cause of death of the testator; proof
DE JAVELLANA, and BENJAMIN JAVELLANA, petitioners-appellees, of publication of the petition, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, in a
vs. newspaper of general circulation, and thre testimonies of Jose G. Guevarra,
JOSE JAVELLANA y AZAOLA and JOSE JAVELLANA, JR., oppositors- Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the 3 instrumental witnesses to the will, whi,
appellants.</B. in sustancer, testified that sometime in April, 1956, they were asked to witness
the execution of the will of the late Jose. J. Javellana; that on the said occasion,
Vicente Hilado for appellees.
Jose J. Javellana signed the 4 pages of the will in their presence, and they, in
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal and Arturo E. Balbastro for appellants.
turn, also signed each and evey page thereof in the presence of the testator and
Barrera, J.:
of one another; and that these acts wetre acknowledge before notary public
On June 29, 1957, a petition to probate the alleged last will and testament of Jose
Fernando Grey, Jr. on the same occasion.
J. Javellana, who died on May 24 of the same year, was presented in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal by Crsiteta Jimenea Vda. de Javellana and Benjamin For their part, the oppositor limited their evidence to the presentation of two
Javellana, widow and brother respectively of the deceased, alleging that the letters in the Visayan dialect allegedly written by the deceased, the signatures
aforesaid Jose J. Javellana, at the time of his death, a resident of Ssan Juan Rizal, appearing thereon being identified by Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) and Manuel
left porperties with an approximate value of P400,000.00; that he also left a will Azaola, as those of the deceased, for the sole purpose of comparing said
which was delivered to the clerk of court pursuant to the Rules of Court; that signatures woth those appearing in the will.
Oscar Ledesma, therein named executor, had agreed to act as such; that the
On December 10, 1957, the court a quo issued an order allowing the probate of
decedents next of kin were; the wido., Criteta J. Vda. de Javellana, his children
the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to Oscar Ledesma as
Erlinda Javellana, Jose Javellana y Azaola, and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito), his
executor thereoif, upon the latters filing a bond in the sum of P10,000.00. From
sister Juanito J. de Ledesma, and brother Benjamin Javellana, whose respective
this order, oppositors appealed to this Court charging the lower court of
addresses wre given in the petition.
committing error in allowing oprobate of the will, Exhibit C, on 2 grounds: (1)
that the 3 sttesting witnesses failed to clearly and convincingly estabish the due evidence aliunde.2 But here, there is absolutely no such evidence presented by
execution of the will; and (2) that petitioners failed to prove that the will was the petitioners-appellees. Not even the petition for probate contains any
written in a language known to the testator. allegation to this effect. No reference to it whatsoever is made in the appealed
The first basis of oppositors appeal has no merit. It is true that witnesses, order.
particularly Miss Eloisa Villanueva, apparently found difficulty recalling who In some cases, it is true, this lack of evidence was considered cured by
arrived first at the appointed place, or the order of the witnesses signing the presumptioin of knowledge of the language or dialect used in the will, as where
will, or failed to mention by name the persons present at the time of the the will is executed in a certain province or locality, in the dialect currently used
witnesses was signing the document. These details, however, are minor and in such provimnce or locality in which the testator is a native or resident, the
significant and do not enervate their positive testimony that at the execution of presumption arises that the testator knew the dialect so used, in the absence of
the will the testator, the 3 witnesses, the notary public and Atty. Vicente Hilado evidence to the contrary; 3 or where the will is in Spanish, the fact that the
were all together in the private office of the latter; that Jose Guevarra, Eloisa testratrix was a mestiza espaola, was married to a Spaniard, made several
Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the instrumental witnesses, were unanimous in trips to Spain, and some of her letters in her own handwriting submitted as
declaring that they actually saw the testator sign the will as well as each and evidence by the oppositor, are in Spanish, give rise to the presumption that she
every page thereof, and they, in turen, affixed their signatures to all of its 4 knew the language in which the will was written, in the absence of proof to the
pages. For the purpose of determining tjhe due execution of a will, it is not contrary.4
necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed
In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the contrary,
account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the
there is evidence that the testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan,
document by the dsaid wirtneese. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least
Rizal at the time of his death. The will was executed in the City of Manila.
were so situated at the moment that they could have seen each other sign, had
Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the
they wnated to do so.1 In fact, in the instant case, at least two witnesses, Yulo
language currently used either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows,
and Guevarra, both testified hat the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the
therefore, that no presumption can rise that the testator knew the Spanish
presence of each and every one of them.
Language.
With respect to the second ground, there is some merit in appellants
But petitioner-appellees insist in their brief that the burden is on the oppositors
contention that the language requirement of the law on wills has not been
to allege and prove that the testator did not know the Spanish language in the
satisfactorily complied with in this case. Admittedly, there is want of expression
face of the legal presumption that the law has been obeyed, that a will
in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew
executed in the Philippines must be presumed to have been executed in
Spanish, the language in which it is written. It is true that there is no statutory
conformity with the laws of the Philippines.5 and that things have happened
provision requiring this and that proof thereof may be established by
in accordance with the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life,
concluding that it woiuld certainly be contrary to the ordinary habits of life for a
person to execute his will in a language unknown to him. This, we believe, is, to
use a colloquial term, being the question. If the argument of counsel is correct,
then every unopposed will may be probated upon its mere presentation in court,
without need of producing evidence regarding its execution. Counsels
statement is its own refutation.
We find, in the record stone indicia, although insufficient to give rise to the
presumption, that the testator might, in fact, have known the Spanish language.
In oppositors own Exhibit 3 (a letter admittedly written by the testator) appear
the salutation Querido Primo and the complimentary ending Su primo
which are Spanish terms. Having found that al the formal requisites for the
validity of the will have been satisfactorily establishment, except the language
requirement, we deem it in the interest of justice to afford the parties a
opportunity to present evidence, if they so desire, on this controverted issue.
Wherefore, let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for
furhter proceedings as above indicated, without costs. It is so ordered.
148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro
Suroza vs. Honrado (110 SCRA 32)
married Marcelina in 1923).
SECOND DIVISION
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981 Federal Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated
some cash in two banks.
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, technologist and went abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled
Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared
Court, respondents. an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz

AQUINO, J.: wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove
that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having
to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate
admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in
case).
English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably
a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and
notary as admitted by the notary himself? confirmed Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case).
Agapito has been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto,
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the
California (p. 87, Record).
certiorari case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled
strands of human relationship: On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena
Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine
to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later
Scouts), Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc.
delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed
No. 7816). They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used the
daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R.
surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in his 1945
No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina
marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p.
but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the
residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11,
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house,
she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for
thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed
the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the
all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito
At the time of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that
Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place. She Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor
acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate case). the decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they
questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P.
97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other
Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-
alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado. 77, Record).
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside
court, Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and
stenographic notes taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that
in the record. Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and
attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as
and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or
administratrix. On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders
trick.
directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow
Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the savings accounts of Marcelina S.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in
the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
(pp. 83-91, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid "raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).
of Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil
and her omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned
filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402,
counter-petition for letters of administration. In that opposition, Nenita assailed Record).
the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the
intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not
executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been
aware of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio,
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in
Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125,
this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent
Record).
will of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will
that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was written.
Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's sonbut (In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will
merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record). was written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the
for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of testatrix had a son named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and
her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order. legal heir), who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the
consequences of such a preterition.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending
incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed
him that the testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the
beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the favorable decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of
testatrix. Nenita's pension from the Federal Government.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this
and her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina. Court in the Court Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The
case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not
investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report dated
giving her access to the record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless
October 7, 1981.
for Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his
decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge
thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the
advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be
she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her declared void.
pension from the Federal Government.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not
allegations of the complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother
appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix
asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an
that the latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil
to President Marcos. action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to
Nenita from having access to the record of the testamentary proceeding. dismiss the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
Evangeline was not the custodian of the record. Evangeline " strongly,
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for
vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline) said that
his improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a
the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a
miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted
heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and
interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206,
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
Revised Penal Code).
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
for serious misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only
implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious
the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial
wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law,
nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of
Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215). Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A
witness.
judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance
of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have
requires in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could
134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119). have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be
written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, inexcusable.
could have readily perceived that the will is void.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was judge (his compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).
stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because
language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was
she is no longer employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that
every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus,
jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101
SCRA 225).
SO ORDERED.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the
Article 805 allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged
will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) see earlier case under Article 804 Icasiano as executor thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused
notice thereof to be published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the
Icasiano vs. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422) time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila chronicle", and also caused personal
service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.
EN BANC
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964 opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed
as a special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on November
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as
VILLACORTE.
special administrator. 1wph1.t
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs. On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants. manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the
alleged will.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano. On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano. evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended
and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only
probate the document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de
true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the
executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as such. amended and supplemental petition, but by order of July 20, 1959, the court
admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed
her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective
evidence, and after several hearings the court issued the order admitting the will of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page
this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
same is contrary to law and the evidence. supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and
her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte
died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the
Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left
her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and
before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in
Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney
acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on Natividad on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and
the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof
City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the
Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to
decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also
of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single
instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies
testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the
the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the same date June 2, 1956.
said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the
the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who
original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he
actually prepared the document. The latter also testified upon cross
signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte
last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the
original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan. signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor
were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed
simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists
through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is
was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those particularly so since the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show
who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from convincingly that the are radical differences that would justify the charge of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident
provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being
profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not signed right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.
enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and
to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the
questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering the standard and
probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the
testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and
respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the
attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. United States during the trial, did not testify).
Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that
were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator
some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10
and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson,
Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity
together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a
of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion
decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the
of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix
heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the
appearing in the duplicate original were not written by the same had which
distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the
wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely
free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear
because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents,
motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by
but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support
ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being
the conclusion that the differences between the standard and questioned
diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are
signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The
valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion. It is also well to
expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix
note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz.
besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that
168, fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other;
with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate
their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs.
evidence against the validity of the will. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to
or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These
affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of
precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal
two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or
probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also
by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and
whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is
control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed
and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be
the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit
Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the
by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause". original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a
pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already
the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate. The amended
attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented
evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new
interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is
application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are
nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any
otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held
substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the amended petition.
that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with

costs against appellants.
being unable to read or write, the same had been read to her by Ciriaco
Barut vs. Cagacungan (21 Phil 461)
Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to
EN BANC sign her name to it as testatrix.
DECISION The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives
of the deceased on various grounds, among them that a later will had been
February 15, 1912
executed by the deceased. The will referred to as being a later will is the one
G.R. No. 6285 involved in case No. 6284 already referred to. Proceeding for the probate of this
PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant, later will were pending at the time. The evidence of the proponents and of the
vs. opponents was taken by the court in both cases for the purpose of considering
FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellees. them together.
A. M. Jimenez for appellant. In the case before us the learned probate court found that the will was not
Ramon Querubin for appellees. entitled to probate upon the sole ground that the handwriting of the person
MORELAND, J.: who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her
This case is closely connected with the case ofFaustino Cabacungan vs. Pedro behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will
[[ ]]
Barut and another, No. 6284, 1 just decided by this court, wherein there was an than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be. We do not
application for the probate of an alleged last will and testament of the same believe that the mere dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is
person the probate of whose will is involved in this suit. sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the
This appeal arises out of an application on the part of Pedro Barut to probate the will that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan at her
last will and testament of Maria Salomon, deceased. It is alleged in the petition request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the will.
of the probate that Maria Salomon died on the 7th day of November, 1908, in It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her
the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, leaving a last will and testament bearing date request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the
March 2, 1907. Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and A. M. execution of the will.
Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the execution thereof. By the
The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that under the law
terms of said will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedents property.
relating to the execution of a will it is necessary that the person who signs the
The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano dialect. Its name of the testatrix must afterwards sign his own name; and that, in view of
translation into Spanish appears at page 11. After disposing of her property the the fact that, in the case at bar, the name signed below that of the testatrix as
testatrix revoked all former wills by her made. She also stated in said will that the person who signed her name, being, from its appearance, not the same
handwriting as that constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is accordingly another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant
invalid, such fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the so far as the validity of her will is concerned. The plain wording of the statute
testatrix failed to sign his own. We do not believe that this contention can be shows that the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay down, is
sustained. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: absolutely unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions
of the statute relating to the execution of wills do not in any sense require such
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
a provision. From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw from
estate, real or personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and
the words of the law the inference that the persons who signs the name of the
signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other person in
testator must sign his own name also. The law requires only three witnesses to a
his presence, and by his expenses direction, and attested and subscribed by
will, not four.
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each. . . .
Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name of a
This is the important part of the section under the terms of which the court
person who is unable to write may be signed by another by express direction to
holds that the person who signs the name of the testator for him must also sign
any instrument known to the law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as the
his own name The remainder of the section reads:
validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who writes the name of
The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it the principal in the document to sign his own name also. As a matter of policy it
to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of may be wise that he do so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would
three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in enable a person proving the document to demonstrate more readily the
the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not execution by the principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the document,
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested it is unnecessary. The main thing to be established in the execution of the will is
as in this section provided. the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved, whether it be written by
himself or by another at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of such
From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the
signature can be proved as perfectly and as completely when the person signing
will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix
for the principal omits to sign his own name as it can when he actually signs. To
signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the
hold a will invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the name of
name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of three
the principal is, in the particular case, a complete abrogation of the law of wills,
witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
as it rejects and destroys a will which the statute expressly declares is valid.
presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a
practical matter that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; There have been cited three cases which it is alleged are in opposition to the
but that it is not essential to the validity of the will. Whether one parson or doctrine which we have herein laid down. They are Ex parte Santiago (4 Phil.
Rep., 692), Ex parte Arcenas (4 Phil. Rep., 700), and Guison vs. Concepcion (5 The judgment of the probate court must be and is hereby reversed and that
Phil. Rep., 551). Not one of these cases is in point. The headnote in the case last court is directed to enter an order in the usual form probating the will involved
above stated gives an indication of what all of cases are and the question in this litigation and to proceed with such probate in accordance with law.
involved in each one of them. It says:
Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
The testatrix was not able to sign it for her. Instead of writing her name he
Separate Opinions
wrote his own upon the will. Held, That the will was not duly executed.
TORRES, J., concurring:
All of the above cases are precisely of this character. Every one of them was a
The undersigned agrees and admits that section 618 of the Code of Civil
case in which the person who signed the will for the testator wrote his own
Procedure does not expressly require that, when the testator or testatrix is
name to the will instead of writing that of the testator, so that the testators
unable or does not know how to sign, the person who, in the presence and
name nowhere appeared attached to the will as the one who executed it. The
under the express direction of either of them, writes in the name of the said
case of Ex parte Arcenas contains the following paragraph:
testator or testatrix must also sign his own name thereto, it being sufficient for
Where a testator does not know, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will
the validity of the will that the said person so requested to sign the testator or
himself, it shall be signed in the following manner: John Doe, by the testator,
testatrix write the name of either in his own handwriting.
Richard Roe; or in this form: By the testator. John Doe, Richard Roe. All this
must be written by the witness signing at the request of the testator. Since this court began to decide cases with regard to the form, conditions and
validity of wills executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
The only question for decision in that case, as we have before stated, was
Procedure, never has the specific point just above mentioned been brought into
presented by the fact that the person who was authorized to sign the name of
question. Now for the first time is affirmed in the majority opinion, written by
the testator to the will actually failed to sign such name but instead signed his
the learned and distinguished Hon. Justice Moreland, that, not being required
own thereto. The decision in that case related only to that question.
by the said code, the signature of the name of the person who, at the request of
Aside from the presentation of an alleged subsequent will the contestants in this the testator or testatrix, writes the name of either of the latter to the will
case have set forth no reason whatever why the will involved in the present executed, is not necessary.
litigation should not be probated. The due and legal execution of the will by the
Various and considerable in number have been the decisions rendered by this
testatrix is clearly established by the proofs in this case. Upon the facts,
court in which, as will be seen further on, upon applying the said section 618 of
therefore, the will must be probated. As to the defense of a subsequent will, that
Code of Civil Procedure and requiring its observance in cases where the testator
is resolved in case No. 6284 of which we have already spoken. We there held
or testatrix is unable or does not know how to sign his or her name, expressly
that said later will not the will of the deceased.
prescribed the practical method of complying with the provisions of the law on
the subject. Among these decisions several were written by various justices of present to do so, and that as a matter of fact, the said witness wrote the name and
this court, some of whom are no longer on this bench, as they have ceased to surname of the testator who, stating that the instrument executed by him
hold such position. contained his last will, put the sign of the cross between his said name and
surname, all of which details are set forth in a note which the witnesses forthwith
Paragraph 2 of the syllabus of case No. 2002, Ex parte Delfin
[[ ]]
subscribed in the presence of the testator and of each other, said will may be
Santiago, 1 concerning the probate of a will, reads as follows:
probated.
Wills, authentication of. Where a will is not signed by a testator but by some
other person in his presence and by his direction, such other person should affix When the essential requisites of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
the name of the testator thereto, and it is not sufficient that he sign his own name execution and validity of a will have been complied with, the fact that the witness
for and instead of the name of the testator. who was requested to sign the name of the testator, omitted to state the words by
[[ ]]
request of . the testator, when writing with his own hand the name and
Paragraph 1 of the syllabus of case No. 1708, Ex parte Arcenas, 2 in the matter
surname of the said testator, and the fact that said witness subscribed his name
of the probate of a will, states:
together with the other witnesses and not below the name of the testator, does not
1. Wills, requisites of; Civil Code, article repealed. Article 695 of the Civil
constitute a defect nor invalidate the said will.
Procedure; consequently where a testator is unable to sign his name, the person
signing at his request must write at the bottom of the will the full name of the The following statement appears in the syllabus of case No. 4132, in the matter
[[ ]]
testator in the latters presence, and by his express direction, and then sign his of the will of Maria Siason: 5
own name in full. The recital of the name of the testator as written below the will at his request
[[ ]]
serves as a signature by a third person.
In the syllabus of decision No. 2586, Tomas Guison vs. Maria Concepcion, 3 the
following statements appear: Moreover among the grounds given as a basis for this same decision, the
Wills; inability to sign; signature by another. The testatrix was not able to sign following appears:
her name to the will, and she requested another person to sign it for her. Held,
In sustaining this form of signature, this court does not intend to qualify the
That the will was not duly executed. (Following Ex parte Arcenas et al., No. 1708,
decisions in Ex parte Santiago (4 Phil. Rep., 692), Ex parte Arcenas, above quoted,
August 24, 1905; Ex parte Arcenas et al., No. 1708, August 24, 1905; Ex parte
or in Abaya vs. Zalamero. In the Arcenas case the court pointed out the correct
Santiago, No. 2002, August 18, 1905.)
formula for a signature which ought to be followed, but did not mean to exclude
[[ ]]
The following syllabus precedes decision No. 3907: 4 any other for substantially equivalent.
[[ ]]
Execution of wills. Where it appears in a will that the testator has stated that by In the syllabus of decision No. 4454, 6 Ex parte Ondevilla et al., the following
reason of his inability to sign his name he requested one of the three witnesses appears:
The testatrix was unable to sign her will with her own hand and requested latters or the formers name and surname at the foot of the will in the presence
another person to sign for her in her presence. This the latter did, first writing and under the direction of either, as the case might be, and should afterwards
the name of the testatrix and signing his own name below: Held, That the sign the instrument with his own name and surname.
signature of the testatrix so affixed is sufficient and a will thus executed is
The statement that the person who writes the name and surname of the testator
admissible to probate. (Ex parte Arcenas, 4 Phil. Rep., 700.)
or testatrix at the foot of the will should likewise affix his own signature thereto,
The syllabus of decision No. 51497 sets forth that: name and surname, though it be considered to be neither a rule nor a requisite
necessary to follow for the admission of the will to probate, yet it is
The legality of a will is not affected by the insertion, supposed to have been
unquestionable that, in inserting this last above-mentioned detail in the
made subsequently, of another name before that of the testator when such
aforesaid decisions, it was deemed to be a complement and integral part of the
name may be treated as nonexistent without affecting its validity.
required conditions for the fulfillment of the provisions of the law.
Among the conclusions contained in this last decision the following is found:
It is undisputable that the latter does not require the said subscription and
Although the said words For Simplicia de los Santos be considered as inserted signature of the person requested to affix to the will the name of the testator or
subsequently, which we neither affirm nor deny, because a specific testatrix who is not able to sign; but by stating in the decisions hereinabove
determination either way is unnecessary, in our opinion the signature for the quoted that the name and surname of the said person should be affixed by him,
testatrix placed outside of the body of the will contains the name of the testatrix no act prohibited by law was recommended or suggested, nor may such a detail
as if she signed the will, and also the signature of the witness who, at her be understood to be contrary or opposed to the plain provisions thereof.
request, wrote the name of the testatrix and signed for her, affirming the truth
In the preceding decision itself, it is recognized to be convenient and even
of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies
prudent to require that the person requested to write the name of the testator or
with the provisions of section 618 of the Act.
testatrix in the will also sign the instrument with his own name and surname.
It is true that in none of the decisions above quoted was the rule established This statement induces us to believe that, in behalf of the inhabitants of this
that the person who, at the request of the testator or testatrix, signed the latters country and for sake of an upright administration of justice, it should be
or the formers name and surname to the will must affix his own signature; but maintained that such a signature must appear in the will, since no harm could
it no less true that, in prescribing the method in which the provisions of the said accrue to anyone thereby and, on the contrary, it would serve as a guarantee of
section 618 to be complied with, it was stated that, in order that a will so the certainty of the act performed and also might eliminate some possible cause
executed might be admitted to probate, it was an indispensable requisite that of controversy between the interested parties.
the person requested to sign in place of the testator or testatrix, should write the
The undersigned feels it his duty to admit that, though convinced of the witness who was unable or did not know how to sign, at the foot of his
complete repeal of article 695 of the Civil Code and, while he conceded that, in deposition, where a cross was then drawn, and, this done, it was considered that
the examination and qualification of a will for the purpose of its probate, one the instrument had been signed by the witness, though it is true that all these
has but to abide by the provisions of said section 618 of the Code of Civil formalities were performed before the judge and the clerk or secretary of the
Procedure, the sole law applicable in the matter, yet, perhaps imbued with the court, which thereupon certified that such procedure was had in accordance
strongly impelled by a traditional conception of the laws which he has known with the law.
since youth, relative to the form of execution of testaments, he believed it to be
The difference is that in the will, pursuant to section 618 of the Code of Civil
a vary natural and common sense requisite that the signature, with his own
Procedure, the person who writes the name and surname of the testator or
name and surname, of the person requested to write in the will the name and
testatrix does so by the order and express direction of the one or of the other,
surname of the testator or testatrix should form a part of the provisions of the
and this fact must be recorded in the will; but in the matter of the signature of a
aforementioned section 618.
deposition, the witness, who could not or did not know how to sign, did not
He undoubtedly thought, perhaps mistakenly, that such a requisite of the need to designate anyone to write the deponents name and surname, and in
signature of the person before referred to ? a requisite deemed to be convenient practice the witness merely made a cross beside his name and surname, written
and prudent in the majority opinion ? formed a part of the provisions of the law, by whomever it be.
since the latter contains nothing that prohibits it. The aforementioned different
With regard to the execution of wills in accordance with the provisions of
decisions were drawn up in the form in which they appear, and signed without
previous statutes, among them those of the Civil Code, the person or witness
dissent by all the justices of the court on various dates. None of them hesitated
requested by the testator or testatrix who was not able or did not know how to
to sign the decisions, notwithstanding that it was expressly held therein that the
sign, authenticated the will by signing it with his own name and surname,
person above mentioned should, besides writing in the will the name and
preceded by the words at the request of the testator or testatrix. Paragraph 2 of
surname of the testator or testatrix, also sign the said instrument with his own
article 695 of the Civil Code contains the following provisions bearing on the
name and surname.
subject:
Without being understood to criticize the provision contained in the said
Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able to sign,
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure it will not be superfluous to mention
one of the attesting witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his
that the system adopted in this section is the same as was in vogue under the
request, the notary certifying thereto. This shall be done if any one of the
former laws that governed in these Islands, with respect to witnesses who were
witnesses can not sign.
not able or did not know how to sign their testimony given in criminal or civil
cases, in which event any person at all might write the name and surname of the
So that, prior to the enforcement in this country in 1901 of the Code of Civil Even though the requisites referred to were not recognized in jurisprudence and
procedure prescribed by the old laws with respect to the signing of a will by a were unsupported by any legal doctrine whatever, yet, since it is in harmony
testator or testatrix who did not know how or who could not sign, consisted in with the juridical usages and customs observed in this country, it ought, in the
that the person appointed and requested by the testator or testatrix to sign in humble opinion of the writer, to be maintained for the benefit of the inhabitants
his or her stead, such fact being recorded in the will, merely affixed at the of the Islands and for the sake of a good administration of justice, because it is
bottom of the will and after the words at the request of the testator, his own not a question of a dangerous innovation or of one prejudicial to the public
name, surname and paragraph. good, but a matter of the observance of a convenient, if not a necessary detail,
introduced by the jurisprudence of the courts and which in the present case has
It is not at all strange that the attorneys of this country, imbued with and
filed a vacancy left by the positive written law.
inspired by these legal provisions, which it may said, are traditional to them in
the ideas they have formed of the existing laws in the matter of procedure in The foregoing considerations, which perhaps have not the support of better
compliance therewith as regards the execution and signing of a will, should have premises, but in the opinion of the undersigned, are conducive to the realization
believed that, after the name and surname of the testator or testatrix had been of the purposes of justice, have impelled him to believe that the proposition
written at the foot of the will, the person who signed the instrument in the should be enforced that the witness requested or invited by the testator or
manner mentioned should likewise sign the same with his own name and testatrix to write his or her name to the will, should also subscribed the
surname. instrument by signing thereto his own name and surname; and therefore, with
the proper finding in this sense, and reversal of the judgment appealed from,
If in various decisions it has been indicated that the person who, under the
that the court below should be ordered to proceed with the probate of the will
express direction of the testator or testatrix, wrote the latters or the formers
of the decedent, Maria Salomon, in accordance with the law.
name and surname, should also sign the will with his own name and surname,
and since this suggestion is not opposed or contrary to the law, the undersigned
is of opinion that it ought not to be modified or amended, but that, on the
contrary, it should be maintained as a requisite established by the jurisprudence
of this court, inasmuch as such a requisite is not contrary to law, to public order,
or to good custom, is in consonance with a tradition of this country, does not
prejudice the testator nor those interested in an inheritance, and, on the
contrary, constitutes another guarantee of the truth and authenticity of the
letters with which the name and surname of the testator of testatrix are written,
in accordance with his or her desire as expressed in the will.
his name and in the presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the
In Re Will of Tan Duico (45 Phil 807)
bottom of said document, and on the left margin of each of its three pages
EN BANC correlatively numbered in letters by Sala in the name of the testator Tan Diuco
and by the witnesses therein mentioned, named Pablo Maturan, Ladislao
G.R. No. L-20475 March 19, 1924 Fenomeno, and Enrique Pearedondo. After the signature of the testator, Tan
Diuco by Simplicio Sala, the following paragraph appears:
In re will of TAN DIUCO, deceased. MAMERTA BASE, petitioner-appellant.
We, the undersigned witnesses to the forgoing will, do hereby state that
C.K. Langleon for petitioner and appellant.
the testator signed this will and each of its sheets in the presence of all
ARAULLO, C.J.: and each of us, and we and each of us likewise did sign this will and all
of its sheets in the presence of the testator and each of us, witnesses.
On March 3, 1921, Mamerta Base instituted this proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for the probate of the will, Exhibit A, executed, according to "TAN DIUCO
her, by the Chinaman Tan Diuco, a resident of the municipality of Malitbog of By "SIMPLICIO SALA
said province, who died on December 8, 1920. That court denied the probate of "LADISLAO FENOMENO
the will on November 2, 1922, and the petitioner brought the case on appeal to "PABLO MATURAN
this court, alleging that the lower court erred in holding that said will was not "ENRIQUE PEAREDONDO"
signed by three instrumental witnesses and in not allowing it to probate.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
After a hearing on the petition, the Court of First Instance entered the order provides, indeed, among the necessary requirements before a will can be
appealed from, in which it is found that said will was executed with all the probated, that it be attested and signed by three or more credible witnesses in
solemnities prescribed by Act No. 2645, except that it was not signed by three the presence of the testator and of each other. And said section, as amended,
instrumental witnesses beside the signature of the testator and before the further provides as follows:
attestation clause, and this fact is the ground upon which the petition was
* * * The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
denied.
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
The document in question, Exhibit A, appears to have been signed by Simplicio and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
Sala by order of the testator, whose name is before the said signature, by reason numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.
of the latter's incapacity on account of his weakness and the trembling of his The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
hand, the testator also stating that he directed said Simplicio Sala to sign it in which the will is written, and that fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, In dealing with attestation, said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the amended by Act No. 2645, does not say that said witnesses must be different
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the from those who signed the attestation clause, for in the first part of said section,
presence of the testator and of each other. after speaking of the signature of the testator or the person signing in his place,
it adds, "and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
Instrumental witness, as defined by Escriche in his Diccionario Razonado de
presence of the testator and of each other," from which it clearly follows that the
Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, volume 4, page 1115, is one who takes part in the
same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the document
execution of an instrument or writing.
presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who should sign
At present and under the laws now in force, particularly Act No. 2645 the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to be stated
amendatory to said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a will is to in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the testator
be executed, the testator draws or writes it personally or through another sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will,
person and signs it also personally, or if he is physically incapacitated, as in the that is, the document constituting his last will and testament, and affirm that it
instant case, through another person who may or may not be the one who was signed under his express direction in the presence of said witnesses and that
prepared or wrote the will, that is, the document constituting the testator's last all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the presence of said
will and testament. The will having thus been prepared and before it is signed testator and of each of them, as stated in the attestation clause of the will of the
by the testator or the person acting in his stead, or the one directed by him to deceased Tan Diuco, with the other details appropriate in said clause.
sign it in his name, in which case the name of the testator is written before that
Besides, as may be seen, the said three witnesses who signed the attestation
of the signer, as above stated, in order that said document may have the
clause, did so also on the left margin and beside the signature of the testator or
character of a valid will, the testator gathers three or more credible witnesses
of Simplicio Sala who signed by order of the latter, and if account is taken of the
and tells them that the contents of said document is his will, without informing
fact that these witnesses are "instrumental" witnesses, as above demonstrated,
them of its contents, and then the testator, or the person directed by him to do
and they have made reference to their own signatures, as well as that of the
so, signs it in the presence of the testator and of each other, and the testator or
testator and of the person who signed by the latter's order below the attestation
the person acting in his stead, as well as the three witnesses sign on the left
clause, it is evident that in the instant case, it is merely a matter of technicality
margin of each page or sheet, which must be numbered correlatively in letters
devoid of any importance as to the probate of the will that said witnesses are
on the upper part of the page. These witnesses are the witnesses, referred to in
called instrumental witnesses, as if they were different from those who have to
the aforesaid law as instrumental witnesses, for the simple reason that they took
sign the attestation clause, for all of them are but the same witnesses; and, as
part in the execution of an instrument or document known as will, their
this court held in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), "The object of
participation being limited to the acts aforementioned.
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when a
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded;" which doctrine must be applied in this case, in view of the facts
herein mentioned and what has been above demonstrated.
For all of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the document,
Exhibit A, presented by the proponent as the last will and testament of the
deceased Tan Diuco is admitted to probate, without special finding as to costs of
both instances. So ordered.
our code, which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. (Page on
Leano vs. Leano (30 Phil 612)
Wills, par. 173, and the cases there cited in support of the doctrine just
EN BANC announced.)
G.R. No. L-9150 March 31, 1915 The trial judge was of contrary opinion, and declined to admit the instrument to
probate as the last will and testament of the decedent. We are of opinion,
MARIANO LEAO, petitioner-appellant, however, that the evidence of record satisfactorily establishes the execution of
vs. that instrument as and for her last will and testament in the manner and form
ARCADIO LEAO, objector-appellee. prescribed by law.
Vicente Llanes for appellant. The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be reversed, without
Severo Hernando for appellee. costs in this instance, and the record remanded to the court below, where
judgment will be entered admitting the instrument in question to probate in
CARSON, J.:
accordance with the prayer of the petitioner. So ordered.
The evidence of record satisfactorily discloses that Cristina Valdes, deceased,
placed her costs against her name, attached by some other person to the
instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament,
in the presence of three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting
clause, and that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence
and in the presence of each other.
We are of the opinion that the placing of the cross opposite her name at the
construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes
that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the
manner and from herein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator.
The right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executedanimo testandi has been
uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the United States in
construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in
language identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of

Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489)
January, one thousand nine hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.
EN BANC
(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO
GARCIA, petitioner,
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the
vs.
name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner. immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents. the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause
failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three
PARAS, C.J.:
pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the
Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty.
and contains the following attestation clause: Javier at the former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his
name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the
testament of Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin
of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name
and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
in letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the
presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues, however, that there is no need for such
presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses. recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient
signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's
theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having
been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona,
53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad vs.Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848;
Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual
signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his
name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the
cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not
have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a

sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the
testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner.
So ordered.
Climaco and Climaco for appellants.

Balonan vs. Abellana (109 Phil 359).
LABARADOR, J.:
EN BANC
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City
DECISION
admitting to probate the will of one Anacleta Abellana. The case was originally
August 31, 1960 appealed to the Court of Appeals where the following assignment of error is
made:
G.R. No. L-15153
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased The appellants respectfully submit that the Trial Court erred in holding that the
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee, supposed testament, Exh. A, was signed in accordance with law; and in
vs. admitting the will to probate.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
In view of the fact that the appeal involves a question of law the said court has
T. de los Santos for appellee. certified the case to us.
Climaco and Climaco for appellants.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
, J.:
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN vs. EUSEBIA ABELLANA, ET AL. It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit A), which is
sought to be probated, is written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2)
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
typewritten pages (pages 4 and 5 of the record) double space. The first page is
EN BANC signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de
G.R. No. L-15153 &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp August 31, 1960
Zamboanga, and on the second page appears the signature of three (3)
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee, the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below his
signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the said
vs.
testament. On the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants. appear the signatures of the instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which
is the last page of said last Will and Testament, also appears the signature of the
T. de los Santos for appellee.
three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second page on the left margin
appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign
following phrase, Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana. The will is duly the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators name must be written by some
acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney Timoteo de los Santos. (Emphasis other person in his presence and by his express direction. Applying this
supplied) provision this Court said in the case of Ex Parte Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil. 700:
It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the Code of Civil
The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature of Dr. Juan
Procedure that where the testator does not know how, or is unable, to sign, it
A. Abello above the typewritten statement Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana .
will not be sufficient that one of the attesting witnesses signs the will at the
. ., Ciudad de Zamboanga, comply with the requirements of law prescribing the
testators request, the notary certifying thereto as provided in Article 695 of the
manner in which a will shall be executed?
Civil Code, which, in this respect, was modified by section 618 above referred to,
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows: but it is necessary that the testators name be written by the person signing in
his stead in the place where he could have signed if he knew how or was able to
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
do so, and this in the testators presence and by his express direction; so that a
by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in
will signed in a manner different than that prescribed by law shall not be valid
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three
and will not be allowed to be probated.
or more credible witness in the presence of the testator and of one another.
(Emphasis supplied.) Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will
himself, it shall be signed in the following manner:
The clause must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testators name written by some other person in his presence and by his John Doe by the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: By the testator, John
express direction, is practically the same as the provisions of Section 618 of the Doe, Richard Doe. All this must be written by the witness signing at the request
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as follows: of the testator.
No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any Therefore, under the law now in force, the witness Naval A. Vidal should have
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and written at the bottom of the will the full name of the testator and his own name
signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other person in in one forms given above. He did not do so, however, and this is failure to
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three comply with the law is a substantial defect which affects the validity of the will
or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . . and precludes its allowance, notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared to
(Emphasis supplied). oppose it.
The same ruling was laid down in the case of Cuison vs. Concepcion, 5 Phil. 552.
In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil. 461, we held that the important
thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her
express direction; it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of
the testatrix signs his own or not. Cases of the same import areas follows: (Ex
Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil. 479, Caluya vs. Domingo, 27 Phil. 330; Garcia vs.
Lacuesta, 90 Phil. 489).
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear
written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is,
therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the
testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some
other person in his presence and by his express direction.
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we
are constrained to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana
may not be admitted to probate.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the petition
for the probate of the will denied. With costs against petitioner.
interposed, and has submitted a certified copy of the proceedings to which the
Abaya vs. Zalamero (10 Phil 357)
assignment of errors presented by him refers.
EN BANC
Two points are presented. The first is, that Juan Zalamero, while in life, executed
G.R. No. L-3907 March 12, 1908 his will on the 29th of October, 1905, under lawful pressure and influence
exercised by those who were thereby benefited; and second, that the said will
ROMAN ABAYA, petitioner-appellant, was not executed and signed in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of
vs. the Code of Civil Procedure.
DONATA ZALAMERO, respondent-appellee.
After an examination of the facts alleged and the evidence adduced by both
L. Joaquin for appellant. parties, and considering the case according to the rules of common sense and
Escueta and Lim for appellee. sound criticism, it must necessarily be admitted that the weight and
preponderance of the evidence prove in a conclusive manner the authenticity
TORRES, J.:
and genuineness of the said will as the real and true expression of the will of the
On the 6th of August, Roman Abaya filed a petition with the Court of First testator, Juan Zalamero, and for this reason the first point should have been
Instance of La Laguna, for the allowance of the will executed by Juan Zalamero, decided by the court below in a negative sense.
a resident of Pagsanhan, in said province, on the 29th of October, 1905, and
It was not expressly pretended that the said will should be disallowed under the
produced in court the said will, which was written in Tagalog dialect. Donata
provisions of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either because the
Zalamero opposed the petition, alleging that the will had been executed under
testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable to execute such instrument
pressure and unlawful and improper influence on the part of those who were to
at the time of its execution, or because it was procured by undue and improper
benefit thereby, and that it had not been executed and signed in accordance
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries; nor even if such request
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A day was
had been made, could the nullity of the said will have been judicially declared in
appointed for the hearing and in the course of the proceedings the witnesses
view of the lack of satisfactory proof of the presence of such circumstances.
offered by both parties were examined; on the 10th of January, 1907, the court
Therefore, the court, in order to disallow the petition, had to disregard them
refused to admit the will of said Juan Zalamero, as requested by Roman Abaya;
and rest the decision upon the allegation that the will was not executed in
Abaya appealed from the decision and moved for a new trial which motion has
accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
not been finally acted upon by the court; for this reason the petitioner, now
before this court, still insists thereon for the effects of the appeal which he had Notwithstanding the reasons stated in the judgment appealed from, it appears
that the will in question was executed with the requirements established by the
law in force, and that, therefore, the decision upon the second point should be heard his statement that the said instrument, written and drawn up under his
against the opponents to the petition. direction, contained his last will; that they saw and witnessed when, at the
express request of the testator, and under his direction, the witness, Mariano
It is shown by the evidence, and by the will itself, that for the reasons set forth
Zaguirre, wrote at the foot of the will the name and surname of Juan Zalamero,
by the testator and at his own request, one of the witnesses to the will, Mariano
and when the latter put the cross between his written name and surname, each
Zaguirre, wrote with his own hand the name and surname of Juan Zalamero, the
of the witnesses subscribing it at the time and in the presence of each other.
testator, and his presence, and that the latter put a cross between them and a
note stating that what had been written before the name and surname of the For the reasons hereinbefore set forth it is our opinion that the judgment
said Juan Zalamero, with the cross placed at the foot thereof, was his testament appealed from should be reversed and that it be declared, as we now do, that the
and contained his last will as stated by him when he directed the execution will executed by the late Juan Zalamero while in life, under date of the 29th of
thereof in the presence of the three witnesses who subscribed it in his presence, October, 1905, was executed in accordance with the law, and that therefore it
and in the presence of each other. should be duly admitted in order that it may produce all consequent legal
effects, and it is so ordered without any special ruling as to costs.
It is true that the witness Mariano Zaguirre, who was requested by the testator
to write his name and surname at the end of his will, did not affix his own
signature immediately below the name and surname of Juan Zalamero and
below the cross placed by the latter with the words "by request of the testator
Juan Zalamero;" but in the said will are clearly stated the reason why it was not
signed by the testator himself as also the request he made to the witness
Zaguirre, and a repetition thereof was not necessary; further, that this same
witness, upon being requested, wrote with his own hand the name and surname
of the testator, who afterwards placed the cross between them, stating that it
was his statement, all of which was written immediately after the said name and
surname of the testator and the cross made by him, and the same was
subscribed by the three witnesses in the manner provided by law.
The essential requisites prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of the

law have been complied with, namely, that three witnesses were present at the
execution of the will of Juan Zalamero at the date mentioned therein; that they
A. 1641 After the witness Aniceto signed the will I left the house,
Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil 41)
because I was in a hurry, and at the moment when I was leaving I saw
EN BANC Julio Javellana with the pen in his hand in position ready to sign (en
actitud de firmar). I believe he signed, because he was at the table. . . .
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
Q. 1641 State positively whether Julio Javellana did or did not sign
GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, as a witness to the will.
vs.
RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. A. 1641 I can't say certainly, because as I was leaving the house I
saw Julio Javellana with the pen in his hand, in position ready to sign. I
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellant. believe he signed.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellees.
Q. 1641 Why do you believe Julio Javellana signed?
CARSON, J.:
A. 1641 Because he had the pen in his hand, which was resting on
In these proceedings probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario the paper, though I did not actually see him sign.
Jaboneta, deceased, because the lower court was of the opinion from the
evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did Q. 1641 Explain this contradictory statement.
not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the
A. 1641 After I signed I asked permission to leave, because I was in
witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
a hurry, and while I was leaving Julio had already taken the pen in his
Procedure.
hand, as it appeared, for the purpose of signing, and when I was near
The following is a copy of the evidence which appears of record on this the door I happened to turn my face and I saw that he had his hand
particular point, being a part of the testimony of the said Isabeo Jena: with the pen resting on the will, moving it as if for the purpose of
signing.
Q. 1641 Who first signed the will?
Q. 1641 State positively whether Julio moved his hand with the pen
A. 1641 I signed it first, and afterwards Aniceto and the others. as if for the purpose of signing, or whether he was signing
Q. 1641 Who were those others to whom you have just referred? A. I believe he was signing.
The truth and accuracy of the testimony of this witness does not seem to have remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign
been questioned by any of the parties to the proceedings, but the court, his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence
nevertheless, found the following facts: of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned
while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under
importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for
the following circumstances the document in question, which has been
the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for
presented for probate as his will:
that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he document he was actually and physically present and in such position with
ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely
Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to
said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact
where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, signed before he finally left the room.
Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his

The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the
presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto
presence of the testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular
Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in
evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness
the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that
and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are vision and
moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the
mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30, p. 599, and
room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his
cases there cited.)
hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did
not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if
left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the
of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena. will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so;
and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is
We can not agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the
not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might
signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with
have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position
the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena
at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)
was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act
of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between
the testator and the witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the
witnesses signed the instrument in the presence of each other, as required by
the statute, and applying them to the facts proven in these proceedings we are
of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument
were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the
will on the ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
We are of opinion from the evidence of record that the instrument propounded
in these proceedings was satisfactorily proven to be the last will and testament
of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, and that it should therefore be admitted to
probate.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial condemnation of

costs, and after twenty days the record will be returned to the court form
whence it came, where the proper orders will be entered in conformance
herewith. So ordered.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this
Nera vs. Rimando
question of fact of vital importance in the determination of this case, as he was
EN BANC of opinion that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs.
Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., 541) the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911 was in the outer room when the testator and the other describing witnesses
signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the will. But we are unanimously
vs.
of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant. attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have
Anacleto Diaz for appellees. been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not
being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the
CARSON, J.:
line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the
the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the inner from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each signature."
subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their
signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the
in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but
was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to
the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
signatures to the instrument. with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing
witness was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to
witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such
and this finding, of course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does
affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have
testament of the deceased.
executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they
would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without
changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the case
relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness
Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in
such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical
obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the
doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to
an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not
depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper
at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment
existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that
by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility
of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose
for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the
requisites in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded
therein to probate as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is
affirmed with costs of this instance against the appellant.
Maravilla vs. Maravilla (37 SCRA 672) case not found! The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that
the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed
their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her
Gabriel vs. Mateo, 51 Phil 216).
right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned
to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the time of her
EN BANC
death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that Florencia Mateo
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927 did not sign this will.
Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner- There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the opponents in
appellee, support of their opposition.
vs.
The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did. The
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
signatures of the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are
R. Gonzales Lloret, Carlos S. Basa, Thomas Cary Welch and Camus, Delgado and between the signatures of the two witnesses Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel, and
Recto for appellants. below her surname is the signature of the other witness Felicisimo Gabriel. The
The appellee in his own behalf. signatures of Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel are on a level with each other, while
that of Felicisimo Gabriel is found a little lower down. The testatrix's signatures
start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's signature, but tend to rise and her
AVANCEA, C. J.: surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's signature.
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact that
6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed when it was written Felicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there, and so she
by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by had to write her surname upwards in order to avoid interfering with that
the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation Felicisimo Gabriel, which would have been the case had she continued on the
clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was horizontal line on which she had written her first name. From this detail it is
filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives. pretended to draw the inference that the attesting witnesses signed before
testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she singed before they did. This
deduction, however, is unnecessary. It may be inferred with equal, if not greater,
logic that the testatrix signed before him, and when it came to the witness Del Rosario who asserted, among other things, that the signature of the testatrix
Gabriel's turn, he, finding the space below the testatrix signature free, signed his is more recent than that of the attesting witnesses. If this opinion is correct and
name there. On the other hand, it may be noted that the testatrix's other if, as alleged, the testatrix's signature is forged, it would mean that the forgers,
signature at the bottom of the will also shows a more or less marked tendency to after having prepared the will and made the witnesses sign, allowed sometime
rise, notwithstanding the fact that there was no signature with which she might to elapsed before forging the testatrix's signature, which supposition is not all
interfere if she continued to write in a straight horizontal line. Furthermore, if, probable, nor has it been explained.lawphi1.net
as the opposition alleges, the testatrix's signature is not genuine and was placed
At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the
there by another person, it is strange that the latter should have done so in such
attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they
a way as to write it above Gabriel's signature while following the horizontal line,
signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial importance,
when this could have been avoided by simply putting it a little higher. And this
considering that this will was signed two years before the date on which these
may be attributed to carelessness in the first case, but it cannot be so explained
witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this
in the second.
reason alone.
Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds of ink used by the
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial of
testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. Really an examination
this case, showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a
of these signature reveals a somewhat deeper intensity of ink in the signature of
lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to reject their testimony,
the testatrix than in those of the attesting witnesses. It is alleged that this
and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying, and that they falsified the
circumstance cannot be reconciled with the declaration of the attesting
will in question.
witnesses that they used the same pen and ink as the testatrix. But, only one of
these witnesses declared this. The other one was not sure of it and said that he Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving
said that he did not perfectly remember this detail. The third scarcely made anything to the principal opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews
reference to this particular. At all events, this apparent difference in ink may be and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate during life. But as to the
merely affectionate relations between the deceased and the opponents, only the
due supposing that the same ink and pen were used to the difference in opponent Rita Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on good terms
pressure employed in writing these signatures, as is reasonable to suppose when with her sister during the latter's lifetime; that the said sister used to give her a
we consider that the testatrix was a paralytic and wrote with her left hand; or it sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a little money; that she held all her
may have been due to the fact that the attesting witnesses dipped lightly in the nephews and nieces in equal regard. But even supposing that this were so, there
ink while the testatrix dipped the pen so as to take up the ink from the bottom is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her
of the well. To bring out this irregularity, the opposition presented the expert
having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, The Honorable Court a quo erred in imputing as theory of the
who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it not strange, but it seems oppositors "that the deceased did not know how to write except with
reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the testatrix when the former her right hand and that due to sickness of paralysis during the last few
was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death had never years of her life she became physically unable to hold the pen and to
been separated from her. write her name and surname.
The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the SECOND ERROR
signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the
The Honorable Court a quo erred in finding that the three disputed
other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed that
signatures on the two pages of Exhibit A are signatures of Florencia R.
these signatures are genuine. But, over the testimony of these experts, we have
Mateo based on mere "possibility," and in not holding them spurious as
the categorical and positive declaration of veracious witnesses who affirm that
shown by specific, unrebutted findings of Drs. Charles S. Banks and Jose
these signatures were written by the testatrix herself.
I. del Rosario.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
THIRD ERROR
ordered.
The Honorable Court a quo erred in giving credit to the testimonies of

Johnson, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
the so-called instrumental witnesses in Exhibit A.
FOURTH ERROR
The Court a quo erred in admitting Exhibit A to probate.
Hence, the only questions presented are question of fact. Time and experience
Separate Opinions has taught us that but little, if anything, is ever accomplished by writing a
dissenting opinion on such questions. Be that as it may, this is one case in which
we feel that it is our duty to dissent and to state the reasons why.
JOHNS, J., dissenting:
The decisive question in this case is whether or not the signatures of Florencia
Appellants assign the following errors: R. Mateo both to the body of the will and on the margin of the pages are true
and genuine. It must be admitted that if it be a fact that her signature to the
FIRST ERROR
body of the will is true and genuine, and that her signatures on the margin of margin of the will were made over and above and, hence, appear the signature
the pages are not true and genuine, then the will in question is null and void. of the witness J. Gabriel.
In the trial of the case in the court below, much evidence was introduced for the It is true that the will upon its face appears to have been executed with all of the
oppositors tending to show that neither one of the signatures of Florencia R. required legal formalities and that the witnesses to the will testified that the
Mateo appearing on the will were true and genuine, and both Drs. Charles S. signatures of the deceased were true and genuine. Be that as it may, both
Banks and Jose I. del Rosario so testified and gave their reasons why. Enlarged chemistry and photography are an exact science, and all of that oral evidence is
photographs of her signatures were introduced in evidence which were flatly contradicted by that of both chemistry and photography, in addition to all
admitted to be true and genuine, and of her signatures to the will, and a which, it is apparent to the naked eye and without the aid of either science, that
comparison and detailed analysis was made of the differences between them, the signatures in question were not made at the same time, and that the two
both as to the character and formation of the letters of her name, the length and signatures appearing on the margin of the will were made after, over and above
height of the letters, and the space between them, and the length and the slant the name of the witness J. Gabriel.
of the signatures, from which Doctor Banks, in particular, testified that
The will recites that Florencia R. Mateo is "sixty-eight years of age," and it
signatures of Florencia R. Mateo to the will were forgeries, and that her three
purports to have been executed on February 6, 1923, and the record is conclusive
respective signatures on the will were not made at the same time or with the
that she was born February 22, 1850, and that at the time of the alleged
same pen or ink. In that particular, his testimony was corroborated by that of
execution of the will, she was nearly 73 years of age. It also appears that the will
Jose I. del Rosario.
in question was prepared by attorney Perfecto Gabriel, was executed in his
We have been taught that mathematics, chemistry and photography are exact office, and that by its terms, he was named as the sole executor, and that
sciences. It appears from an ocular inspection and without the aid of even a although he was called as a witness on a minor point, he was not questioned and
magnifying glass that there is a very marked difference between the signature of did not testify as to how and when the will was executed, or by whom it was
Florencia R. Mateo to the body of the will and as it appears on the margin of the signed or as to the genuiness of either of the signatures of Florencia R. Mateo,
pages of the will, both as to the character and the height, length and slant of the all of which are the very storm center of this contest. Perfecto Gabriel having
signatures, all of which can be seen and detected with the naked eye without the prepared the will which was executed in his own office, it is strange, indeed, and
aid of an expert or a photographic enlargement of the letters. It is also apparent to say the least very suspicious, that he was not called as a witness to testify
to the naked eye that the three respective signatures of Florencia R. Mateo about the questioned signatures and as to whether or not they were true and
appearing on the will were each made with different ink, and that they were all genuine.
made with different ink than that used by the witnesses to the will. It is also
apparent to the naked eye that each of her signatures as they appear on the
We are not prepared to say as to whether all of the signatures of Florencia R.

Mateo as they appear on the will are forgeries, but we are clearly of the opinion
that her signatures as they appear on the margin of the pages of the will are not
true and genuine, and that they were not made at the same time or place or by
the same person as her signature which appears to the body of the will. In either
event the will in question was never legally executed by Florencia R. Mateo, and
is therefore, null and void.
For such reasons, we are forced to dissent.

There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a
Gonzales vs. CA (May 25, 1979)
widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her
FIRST DIVISION place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been
born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979 Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the
deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her
vs.
death.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, respondents. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog,
appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages,
Angel A. Sison for private respondent. including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of
the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel
appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.
GUERRERO, J.: The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
1
Division, promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and
mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng
allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel
aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na
Gabriel. *
ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages)
filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT
Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan
the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing
beneficiary and executrix. testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na
dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner,
margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the
sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng following grounds:
nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito. 2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by
law;
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures
of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported
same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age
Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for and sickness; and in the second alternative
the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and
other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon"
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page
beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic
trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions
Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic
of which read:
Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any,
be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the
Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and oppositor, this Court finds:
nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all
surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, 1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that
Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, the purported will of the deceased was procured through undue
who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;
named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention
estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix
that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will,
name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
5
the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and Memoranda, and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First
6
sickness; Division, by Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of
the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of
executed and attested as required by law; Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because
the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document
not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental
presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win
witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her,
and attested by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961. The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate
have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence
as the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is
of record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the
here by DISALLOWED. 7
decision of this Court sought to be set aside.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent

In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends
Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in
that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals,
its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial
upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the
court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due
decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and
course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents
executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the
to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon
three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya,
consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in
signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of 8
the petition, as well as the Comment of private respondent thereon, We denied
each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate. 9
the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, the question raised being
3
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration of the factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent
4
aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed by petitioner-appellant Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective

Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a
10
Motion for Reconsideration which private respondent answered by way of her
11
Comment or Opposition filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue
Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to importance to the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly
the petition. executed.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors: VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions,
evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary)
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit
presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court
"F" was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no
erred in rejecting said testimonies.
proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call
the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and
for an exercise of the power of supervision.
coincidental.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously
admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the
furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable
deceased Isabel Gabriel.
him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three
substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan"
must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this
were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all
jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the
present in the same occasion.
same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30,
12
incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA
13
any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso. 393), and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July
30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that
25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case ofChan vs. CA, this Court
Matilde Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was
said:
allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other
witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an
Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will
brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness,
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his
specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first
Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends
the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ... that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may
be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by
credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the
substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of
term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and
the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because
well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a
its premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and
kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the
what is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving
qualifications of witnesses.
factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil
at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while
Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These
contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in Articles state:
order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen
We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will
to consider petitioner's assignments of errors. mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and (1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require.
document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7,
initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses
and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by
for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the
the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of
formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that
the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be
the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character
shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him,
witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental
that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are
reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by
good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any
attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that
by the opposing party. anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or
cannot read or write.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible"
as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a
Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another,
naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code
they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the speak of the competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first
period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas
irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses,
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just
being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme
Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805. Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that
any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a
blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet
execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of
not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show
1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative
that the instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are
to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The
of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession
main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications
and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso
as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be
Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a
credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a
housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the
long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or
financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental
testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin
Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788). County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010.
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more
credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will
mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me.
of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins
"credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means "
means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law
competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme
to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art.
Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in
8283.Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W.
existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still
2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a
those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied). will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means
competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are
legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the
attested by subscribing the will, the competency being community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy
determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
the timr it is offered for probate,Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be
256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.) competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the
probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills,
that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent
means competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not
proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they
legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason
have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and
of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or
reliable.
other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or
rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of
matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding
152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343) that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not
coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to
names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such
a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas
data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three
his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were
belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in
left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present
the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-
in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated
22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a
the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde
witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that
Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the
the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as
deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria
a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter
Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture
decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the
takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the
rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown
grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses
to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the
(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is
worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing
down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they
which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the
sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged
office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was
unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty.
correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started
Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the
from the Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel
preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty.
Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in
Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of
Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the
Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of
Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about
her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no
ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to
prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any
Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested
him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous
based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the to the day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had
morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if
when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her she really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the
will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty.
husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact
and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence,
are recited in the respondent Court's decision. the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the
presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was
his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit
not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
"F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued
at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously
No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable
Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails
that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day,
as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the
Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words
respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel
by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961
testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence
Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates
for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty.
15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to
given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961. close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago
as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and
in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of
residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very
title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment
for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the
Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are
attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him,
And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could
the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso,
and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-
document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe
expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of
these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the
preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary
pointed by petitioner in the case at bar. capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and
review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the
Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum
three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and
appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on
"tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting
record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her
witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because
business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business
ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the
Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of
deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause
known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such
agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she
note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same
witnesses and the notary public himself. before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which
Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both
preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the
testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court,
execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is
overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was
made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts
signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very
the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde
(Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
Orobia was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on
April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in
The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as
to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the
1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as
present to witness the will on that day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria
did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.,
Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not
1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact
could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza
she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was
presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph
and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso
afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal." Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave
undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of
that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that
only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other
witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to
witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of
Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of
along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous." questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a
demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-
incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their
taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was
impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the
explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the
contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was
admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not
important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court
occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the
conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture- course of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-
taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will. established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and
reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and
evidence has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have
misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial
been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been
court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said
misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by
contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such
trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose
discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which
evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes
he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in
peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin
should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of
of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by
Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts
Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.
and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said
these are indeed unimportant details which could have been affected by the
that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel
lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves
dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial
court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she
signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at
Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso
is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every
undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that
that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the
record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the
occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso
only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the
duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts. of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria
Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of
judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be
Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among
notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial
the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken
when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm
on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing
that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia,
Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to
Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a
bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her
car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in
witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting
the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical
witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April
certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon
15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in
arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be
his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any
made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be
lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in
Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible
her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or
document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not
incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the
on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the
supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence.
any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts.
witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-
and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no established rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact
note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it
itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without
memory when she executed her will. qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the
resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but
assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to
Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as
third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and We find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not
P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call
nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the for the exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We
amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial
Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the
types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she deceased Isabel Gabriel.
willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and
properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on
evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of
a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel
(Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola
Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty.
Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R.
Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel
No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days
following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another
photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she
wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good.
The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed
but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was
performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the

testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions,
inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three
instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will making have
testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it,
one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized
it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from
the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been
identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much
less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the
herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court
cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152)
successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed
EN BANC by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On
the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on
G.R. No. L-21755 December 29, 1924 the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the
margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the
In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA
attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not
NAYVE, petitioner-appellee,
appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the
vs.
signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.
LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants.
The defects attributed to the will are:

Manuel M. Calleja for appellants.
Felix U. Calleja for appellee. (a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each
and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document
not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not
ROMUALDEZ, J.: state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact
that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presence of
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal
the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in
instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by
the presence of the testator and of each other.
Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased.
As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above stated, that the third page
The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the
actually used was signed by the testator, not on the left margin, as it was by the
objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the
witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that the
document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal,
fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the
executed in accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal,
testator, but about the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation
assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will to probate and
clause.
overruling their opposition.
In this respect the holding of this court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and
The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter
Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), is applicable, wherein the will in question was signed
on only side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or
by the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right, margin. The rule laid
down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on
(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to
each page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded
be his last will and testament in the presence of each of us,
against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was
and at the request of said testator Don Antonio Mojal, we
sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate.
signed this will in the presence of each other and of the
Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page testator.)
used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact
PEDRO CARO
that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not
SILVERIO
detract from the validity of the will.lawphi1.net
MORCO
Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the sheets of ZOILO
the document are not paged with letters, suffice it to cite the case of Unson vs. MASINAS
Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals
As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will.
and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is
It is true that in the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was
just as valid as paging with letters.
held that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages
As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the number of composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not
sheets or pages of the will, which is the third defect assigned, it must be noted stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper, so that no
that the last paragraph of the will here in question and the attestation clause, proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can
coming next to it, are of the following tenor: be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of
sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to
In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the
prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or
town of Camalig, Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of
decreased.
November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of
four sheets, including the next: With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator does not
appear to have signed on all the sheets of the will in the presence of the three
ANTONIO witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed on all the sheets in the
MOJAL presence of the testator and of each other, it must be noted that in the
attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will "in the
presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed"in the presence of each
other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting
witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and
sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the
testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the
will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is
stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause
now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having
signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the
document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as
it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law
tries to avoid, does not exist.
Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses
signed each and every page of the will is proven by the mere examination of the
signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does not
invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.
The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
este testamento a ruego y bajo la libre y voluntaria direccion personal de la

In Re Estate of Saguinsin, (41 Phil 875)
misma testadora.) (Sgd.) Lino
EN BANC Mendoza "Attesting witnesses." (Testigos del testamento.) Then come three
signatures.
G.R. No. L-15025 March 15, 1920
These three signature together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also
In the matter of the estate of REMIGIA SAGUINSIN, deceased. on the left margin of the firs page or folio and on the third page or second folio,
ARCADIO DEL ROSARIO, applicant-appellant, but not on the second page or reverse side of the first page where, as is seen, the
JOSE A. DEL PRADO, ET. AL., legatees-appellants, manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the date
vs. and the and of the manuscript.
RUFINA SAGUINSIN, opponent-appellee.
Under these, conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged
Fernando Manikis and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for applicant and appellant. testatrix and after the taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures
No appearance for legatees and appellants. which appear three times and in different parts of the manuscript, the court
Claro M. Recto for appellee. declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a
will.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Certain person who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the
There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for
lawyer for the petitioner.
allowance an instrument which the petitioner calls the will of Remigia
Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and three witnesses And upon considering the case on appeal, this court decides:
on October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which says: "I, the testatrix, sign in the
presence of the witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my request That, in conformity with Act No. 2645, amendatory to section 618 of the Code of
and under my direction." (Yo, la testadora, firmo en presencia de los testigos Civil Procedure, the concluding part of the will does not express what that law,
este testamento que ha escrito D. Lino Mendoza a mi ruego y bajo mi under pain of nullity, requires. Section 618, as amended, says: "The attestation
direccion.)--Then follows a signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix shall state the number of sheets or pages used upon which the will is written . . .
signed in our presence and each of us signed in the presence of the others." (La ." None of these requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the
testadora ha firmado en nuestra presencia y cada uno de nosotros en presencia document presented. The second page, i.e.,what is written on the reverse side of
de los demas.) "Witness who wrote this will at the request and under the free the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written thereon was ordered
and voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself." (Testigo que escribio written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently added by the same hand
that drew the first page and the date that appears on the third. With this non- This is a defect so radical that there is no way by which what is written on the
fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it is impossible to allow the so-called will reverse side of the first folio may be held valid. It is possible that this document
which violates said law. consists of only the two folios numbered 1 and 2, and that on the reverse side of
number 2 nothing may have been written upon the order of the testatrix, the
That besides this violation there is another as evident as the preceding. Said Act
testament ending at the foot of the first folio with the legacy "To my nephew
No. 2645 provides: "The testator or the person requested by him to write his
Catalino Ignacio, pesos 200" (A mi sobrino Catalino Ignacio doscientos pesos)
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign, as aforesaid,
and from that part then immediately follows folio No. 2 "Manila a tres de
each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
Octubre de mil novecientos diez y ocho.--Yo la testadora firmo en presencia
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet." The
etc." (Manila, October 3, 1918, I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of etc.)
English text differs from the Spanish text: the former say only pages (paginas)
There is nothing which guarantees all the contents of page 2. The margin of this
while the latter puts (hojas). "Hoja," according to the Diccionario de la
page is absolutely blank. there is nothing which gives the assurance that the
Academia, "is with respect to books or notebooks folio." According to the same
testatrix ordered the insertion of all the contents of page 2. It may very well be
dictionary "pagina (page) is each of one of the two faces or planes of the leaf of a
that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a
book or notebook; that which is written or printed on each page, for example I
result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the
have read only two pages of this book." Two pages constitute one leaf. One page
signature on each page and not merely on each folio was provided for by law.
represents only one-half of one leaf. The English text requires that the signature
This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the left
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves;
hand margin of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in
three pages having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be
the upper part This requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is,
guaranteed with the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses. The
on the reverse side of the first. According to the old method of paging "folio 1. y
English text which requires the signing of pages and not merely leaves or folios
su vto." that is, first folio and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the
should prevail. it is so provided in section 15 of the Administrative Code (Act
second page would then have been included in the citation. By the failure to
No. 2711).
comply with this requisite the law has been obviously violated. In the English
text the word "pages" does not leave any room for doubt and it is invariably used
in the text of the law, whereas in the Spanish text, "hoja" and "pagina" are used
indifferently as may be seen in the following part which says: "el
atestiguamiento hara constar el numero de hojas o paginas utiles en que esta
extendido el testamento." This failure to comply with the law also vitiates the
will and invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity.
Marcela Gonzalez filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that
Avera vs. Garcia (42 Phil 145)
she be inscribed as the owner of the three parcels of land described in her
EN BANC petition. The Insular Government, being represented by the Attorney General,
appeared and opposed this registration on the ground that the lands formed a
DECISION
part of the public domain. Guillermo Crisostomo and Isabel Angeles also
November 20, 1917 appeared and opposed the petition on the ground that they were the owners of
certain portions of the land sought to be inscribed.
G.R. No. 15566
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, Judgment was rendered in he court below supporting the opposition of
vs. Crisostomo and Angeles as to the portions of the lands described in their
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors respective oppositions. The opposition of the Government was overruled and
Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants. judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner as to all of the land except that
as to which the said two oppositions were sustained. From the decree of the
Aguedo Velarde and Ambrosio Santos, for appellant.
court sustaining these two oppositions the petitioner alone appealed. The only
Mariano Crisostomo, for appellees.
questions to be resolved relate to this appeal.
Johnson, J.:
[[ ]]
This court, in the per curiam opinion filed September 1, 1911, 1 said: The important part of the judgment appealed from is the following:
Without prejudice to a filing of a more extended opinion hereafter discussing more
Therefore, the possession given to Revilla of the lands situated in Umanat and
fully the facts and the law of the case, the judgment appealed from is hereby
Tumama, respectively, was wholly unauthorized and illegal. Hence, he has not
reversed in so far as it sustains the opposition of respondents, the opposition to
enjoyed the same continuously and peacefully, at least with reference to the lands
the registration of the property described in the complaint is overruled, and the
in Umanat, in regard to which he was compelled to institute an action for the
land described in the petition is ordered registered as therein prayed. No finding as
recovery of the same against one Guillermo Crisostomo. Even assuming that such
to costs.
possession was continues and peaceful since the year 1887, when the land was
The respondent Guillermo Crisostomo and Isabel Angelo having been notified awarded to him, his clam could not be established under any provision of law. The
of this judgment filed a petition on the 19th of September, 1911, asking the court title which was subsequently issued in December, 1889, for the above mentioned
to suspend the time in which the judgment ordered entered should become lands was completely invalid. The grant to him being gratuitous, as it were, must
final until the court filed its extended opinion. It now becomes necessary to have been necessarily made upon one of these two grounds, to wit: an
enter into an examination of the testimony and he law governing this case. uninterrupted possession for ten years with just little in good faith (sec. 4,
regulations of June 25, 1880); or, if such a title was lacking, possession of a period
of twenty years provided the lands were under cultivation, and of thirty years if the Guillermo Crisostomo opposed the registration of parcels A and B on the
lands were uncultivated. (Sec. 5 of the same regulations.) Neither of these two ground that there was included in parcel A 2 hectares 66 ares and 40 centares,
conditions obtained at the time the title, through an error or flaw, was granted, and in parcel B 8 hectares 55 ares and 5 centares, of his lands. Isabel Angeles
and secondly, because, considering the date upon which the title was issued and opposed the registration of the same two parcels on the ground that there was
the date upon which the grantee took possession, it could not have had effect with included in parcel A 4 hectares 87 ares and 59 centares of her property, and that
regard to Eulogio Revilla. The lands situated in Umanat were held and occupied by all of parcel B except that claimed by Guillermo Crisostomo was her land.
Crisostomo and Angeles, according to the evidence of record.
The petitioners title to these lands is based upon a purchase made by her from
The three parcels of land sought to be inscribed are, according to the petition, Eumelia Eleizegui and Salud Revilla, as appears on a public document duly
situated in Calumpang, Umanat, and Tumama, barrio of San Marcos, executed on the 2d of November, 1907, and inscribed in the registry of property,
municipality of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, and are respectively described as Eumelia Eleizegui acting for herself and as guardian of the minors Eulogio,
follows: Manuel, Pilar, and Jose, surnamed Revilla. These vendors are the window and
children of the deceased Eulogio Revilla, husband of Eleizegui and the father of
Parcel A. Bounded on the north by the lands of Pantaleon de los Santos, Pedro
the other vendors.
Flores, Honorata Bayan, Juan de los Reyes, and Eugenio Su?ga; on the east by
the lands of Leon Rueda; on the west by the lands of Guillermo Crisostomo; and Sometime prior to the year 1880, Jose Perez Rubio filed in the Court of First
on the south by the lands of Generoso Tiongson; containing 221,115 square Instance, Quiapo, Manila, a civil suit against Gregorio Rivera and Maria Soledad
meters (22 hectares 11 ares 15 centares). Cruz for the purpose of recovering certain fees for professional services.
Subsequently thereto judgment was entered and execution issued against the
Parcel B. Bounded on the north by the lands of Donato Bayan, Faustina Torres,
defendants. By virtue of this execution the lands of the defendants situated in
Antonio de Leon, Benito Espiritu, Pablo Bundoc, Felipe de Leon, Felipe Balares,
Calumpit were levied upon, and on the 23d of February, 1880, sold at public
and Luis Sinkak; on the east by the lands of Guillermo Crisostomo; on the south
auction. On the 13th of November of that same year, Rubio by means of a public
by the lands of the Insular Government; and on the west by the lands of
document executed by the clerk of the court, sold all his right, title, and interest
Guillermo Crisostomo, Felix Bautista, Sabino Ma?io, Pedro Flores, and Fruto
in and to such lands to Eulogio Revilla for the sum of 2,000 pesos. This sale was
Rojas: Containing 194.747 square meters (19 hectares 47 ares 47 centares).
approved by the court. On the 12th of February, 1887, the purchaser, Revilla, was
Parcel C. Bounded on the north by the Quingua River; on the east by the lands placed in possession of one parcel of land. Revilla, believing that he had not
of Antonio de Leon and Luis Sinkak; on the south by the lands of Luis Sinkak, been placed in possession of all the lands purchased by him from Rubio, made
Tomas Lacsamana and Donato Bayan; and on the west by the lands of Antonio application to the court to be placed in possession of two other parcels which he
Tiongson; containing 52,852 square meters (5 hectares 28 ares 52 centares. claimed were included in the execution sale and the purchase made by him. The
appellant now insists that Revilla was, on the 18th of March, 1887, placed in The foregoing instrument was provisionally recorded in the absence of the old
possession of these two parcels by order of the court, and that the document of indices, at pages 241, 244, and 246, volume 1, of the Calumpit Distric, Properties
this purchase and sale, including the three parcels of land, was duly executed by Nos. 105, 106, 107, entry letter A, Bulacan, September 12, 1892.
order of the court on the 12th of April, 1889.
The final registration was made November 2,1908.
The appellees insist that the possession of the two parcels of land, one in
The opponents lay no claim to that parcel of land described in paragraph C of
Umanat and the other in Tumama, given to Revilla by the Court of First
the petition, neither do they claim to be the owners of all of parcel A, as it will
Instance of Quiapo was illegal and void, for the reason that the said lands in
be seen that this parcel contains 22 hectares 11 ares and 15 centares, according to
Umanat and Tumama were not included in the execution sale of February 23,
the petition, whereas the appellees together claim only 7 hectares 53 ares and 99
1880, as shown by the description of the lands then levied upon; and that the
centares. This leaves undisputed 14 hectares 57 ares and 16 centares of that
lands in the order of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Quiapo
parcel. It is insisted that a portion of parcel A was the only land included in the
are described as follows:
order of execution issued in 1880. This contention is based upon the description
Certain lands which they (the judgment debtors) possess in the jurisdiction of of the land given in that order and its actual area, which appears to be three
Calumpit, bounded on the north by the lands of Lorenzo de los Reyes; on the qui?ones, more or less. Notwithstanding the fact that it is stated that this parcel
south by the lands of the town of Barosuain; on the east by the lands of Jose contains three qui?ones, more or less, it appears from the boundaries given that
Tiongson; and on the west by the lands of Guillermo Crisostomo; containing all of the land in that parcel was included. The statement containing three
three Qui?ones, more or less. qui?ones, more or less is a mere estimate and it was not intended to be
accurate. While it is true that parcel A was the only description in the order of
The appellees further insist that the lands described in their respective
execution, it is nevertheless a fact that all of the lands owned by the judgment
oppositions have been adjudged to their property by a court of competent
debtors in that case were levied upon and the sale went forward on this theory.
jurisdiction, and that the said judgments have long since become final.
The judgment creditor purchased all of the lands owned by his judgment
Eulogio Revilla obtained on the 4th of December, 1889, a state grant for the debtors within the jurisdiction of that barrio at this execution sale, and he
three parcels of land described in the petition. The ownership of this land was transferred to Revilla all of the lands thus purchased; but when the authorities
adjudged to him on that date by the State and the title ordered registered. The proceeded to put Revilla in possession of the lands purchased by him and placed
registrar, on the 12th of September, 1892, made the following entry in the him in possession of the one parcel only, he immediately made application to
property register: the court for the possession of the other two parcels, and upon this application
he was given judicial possession of the said two parcels, one in Umanat and the
other in Tumama. This fact was found by the trial court.
The appellee Crisostomo presented Exhibit No. 1, which is a copy of a judgment The second witness presented was Juan Borja, 70 years of age and a resident of
rendered in the case wherein he was plaintiff and Antero Coronel and Maria Calumpit. This witness stated that he was well acquainted with the deceased
Soledad Cruz were defendants. In this case the plaintiff sought to recover Revilla; that he (Revilla) was in possession for a number of years of three parcels
possession of two parcels of land. This action was commenced in 1878, judgment of land situated in Calumpang, Umanat, and Tumama; that Revilla and the
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in 1892, and this judgment was executed in parties from whom he acquired these lands were in possession of the same since
the same year over the opposition of Revilla. The execution of this judgment 1887; that he knew this to be a fact because he was one of the laborers of the
which resulted in temporarily placing Crisostomo in possession of these two deceased and assisted in cultivating these lands; that he was present and
parcels took place long after the State grant had been seen issued to Revilla and pointed out to the commissioner Vicente Enriquez, clerk of the court, the
long after Revilla had been judicially placed in possession of these lands. Revilla location and the bouderies of these three parcels when this commissioner
was not a party plaintiff or defendant in that case, nor in any other case upon placed Revilla in possession of all three parcels; that Revilla continued in
which the appellees rely. Consequently, the judgment rendered in those cases possession of the same until his death, after which his wife and daughter
could not be binding upon Revilla. remained in possession up to the time of the revolution, when they were
dispossessed of a portion of these lands; that he accompanied the surveyor when
With reference to who was actually in possession of these two parcels of land
said lands were surveyed. This witness also gave the bounderies at that time.
prior to the insurrection against the American authorities, it might be well to
examine the oral testimony also. The third witness called also Donato Bayan, who testified that the deceased
Revilla was in possession of the three parcels of land in question from 1891 and
The first witness presented by the petitioner was Francisco Mavia, 40 years of
1892 up to the time of his death; that during all these years Revilla cultivated the
age, residing in Malolos, Bulacan. This witness testified that he knew the
three parcels; that he had personal knowledge of these facts because he, in 1891,
deceased, Eulogio Revilla; that before his death the deceased was in possession
owned lands joining one of these parcels.
of the three parcels of land within the jurisdiction of the town of Calumpit; that
one of these parcels is in Tumama, one in Calumpang, and one in Umanat; that The fourth witness for the petitioner was Emeterio Manlapit, 47 years of age, a
he was the encargado or administrator of these lands for Revilla from 1891 up laborer, and resident of Calumpit, who testified that he knew the deceased
until the commencement of the revolution; that every year during his Revilla; that the deceased owned and possessed three parcels of land situated in
administration, all of these three parcels of land were cultivated; that during the Umanat, Calumpang, and Tumama; during the ten years in which the deceased
revolution Guillermo Crisostomo took possession of one parcel and a man called possessed these lands he was one of the laborers who cultivated the same for the
Ninoy took possession of another one. This witness then proceeded to give the deceased; that the latter was never interrupted in the possession of said lands
name of the owners of the land adjoining these three parcels at that time. during that time; that upon the death of Revilla, his wife and daughter
continued in the possession and cultivation of these parcels of land; that some
time after the deceased died a man by the name of Ninoy (Saturnino Letingco), The foregoing testimony considered together with the documentary evidence,
against the will of the widow, took possession of a part of these lands. establishes the fact that the deceased Revilla was in continues possession of all
the three parcels of land sought to be inscribed for some time prior to the
The appellee Guillermo Crisostomo, 74 years of age, laborer, resident of Malolos,
issuance of the State grant and up to the time of his death. This testimony also
testifying as witness in his own behalf, pointed out on the plan the two parcels
establishes the fact that after the death of Revilla, his widow and children
in Umanat and Calumpang and stated that these two parcels were his property,
continued in the peaceful possession of these three parcels of land up until they
having acquired a part of the same by purchase and the other part by
were dispossessed by the appellees, sometime during the insurrection.
inheritance from his parents, Jorge Crisostomo and Gervasia Dimaliuat; that he
had had five lawsuits over these two parcels; that during the proceedings which Whether or not a State grant of the character of the one issued to Revilla can be
resulted in the issuance of a grant by the State to Revilla, he signed the annulled at the instance of a private person, we find it unnecessary to decide;
expediente as owning land on the south of those parcels for which title was but before this can be done, if it can be done at all, the testimony of the person
sought; tat his sister Escolastica Crisostomo did not sign this expediente for the seeking such relief, before it can overcome the acts of the officials who carried
reason that she was single and consulted him about all her acts. on the proceedings which resulted in the issuance of the State grant, must be
clear, positive, and conclusive. The testimony of the appellees in this case falls
The next witness presented for the opposition was Saturnino Litingco, husband
far of these requirements.
of the Appellee, Isabel Angelo, 66 years of age, residing of the barrio of San
Vicente, Malolos , Bulacan. After pointing out on the plan the lands claimed by We conclude that the trial court erred in its findings of fact and conclusions of
his wife, he stated that these lands were inherited by his wife from her father, law and we therefore ordered the judgment rendered in accordance with the
Hermogenes Angelo; that he and his wife have been for more than thirty years above short decision.
and are now in possession of these lands; that his father-in-law had a lawsuit
with Maria Soledad over the possession and the title to these two small parcels
in 1878, and that the court in that suit, by a final judgment, decreed possession
and title to his father-in-law; that after the death of his father-in-law, they had
another suit over the same lands with Maria Soledad with the same result; that
since the termination of these suits they have quiet and peaceful possession of
these lands without interruption; that it is true that he and his wife sold certain
lands inherited by his wife from her father, located in Umanat, to Felix Bautista
and Fruto Roxas.
con el contendido del testamento, ella rogo a Bonifacio Mioza, que

Estate of Tampoy vs. Alberastine, (Feb. 25, 1960)
escribiera su nombre al pie del testamento, en la pagina segunda, y asi
EN BANC lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza, y despues ella estampo su marca digital entra
su nombre y apelido en presencia de todos y cada uno de los tres
G.R. No. L-14322 February 25, 1960 testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon
Omboy y de Bonifacio Mioza, y despues, Bonifacio Mioza firmo
In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE OF PETRONILA TAMPOY,
tambien al pie del todos y cada uno de lo tres testigos arriba
deceased,
nombrados. La testadora asi como Bonifacio Mioza parte de la primera
vs.
pagina del testamento qeu se halla compuesto de dos paginas. Todos y
DIOSDADA ALBERASTINE, petitioner-appellant.
cada uno de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio
Agustin Y. Kintanar for appellant. de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, firmaron al pie de la clausula de
atestiguamiento que esta escrita en la pagina segunda del testamento y
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
en la margen izquierda de la misma pagina 2 y de la pagina primera en
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and presencia de la testadora, de Bonifacio Mioza, del abogado Kintanar y
testament of one Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in de todos y cada uno de ellos. El testamento fue otorgado por la
accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral and testadora libre y expontaneament, sin haber sido amenazada, forzada o
documentaryevidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the intimidada, y sin haberse ejercido sobre ella influencia indebida,
left hand margin of the first of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the estando la misma en pleno uso de sus facultades mentales y disfrutando
testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the Court of Appeals certified de buena salud. La testadore fallecio en su case en Argao en 22 de
the case to us because it involves purely a question of law. febrero de 1957 (Vease certificado de defuncion Exhibito B). La heredera
instituida en el testamento, Carmen Alberastine, murio dos semanas
The facts of this case as found by the trial court as follows:
despues que la testadora, o sea en 7 de Marzo de 1957, dejando a su
De las pruebas resulta que Petronila Tampoy, ya viuda y sin hijos, rogo a madre, la solicitante Diosdada Alberastine.
Bonigfacio Mioza que la leyera el testamento Exhibito A y la expicara
The above facts are not controverted, there being no opposition to the probate
su contenido en su casa en al calle San Miguel, del municipio de Argao,
of the will. However, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the
provincia de Cebu, en 19 de noviember de 1939, y lasi lo hizo Bonifacio
first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner
Mioza en presencia de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K.
now prays that this ruling be set aside for the reason that, although the first
Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, y despues de conformarse
page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however
expresses her true intention to givethe property to her whose claims remains three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any to the opposition fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.
to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both
costs.
pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact
that the petition for probate is unoppossed, the three testimonial witnesses
testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and
voluntary will of the deceased.
This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision

of the law. Thus, Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator
sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses,
and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the
attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it
is fatal to the validity of the will (Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has
been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the
execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097,
'A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective
execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd
other conditions or dispence with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506;
Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the
law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any
Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152) see earlier case under Article 805
attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the
presence of each other.
Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil 494),
Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the
EN BANC
contestants, and ordered the probate of the will, Exhibit A, and the inventory,
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922 Exhibit A-1, holding that both documents contained the true and last will of the
deceased Josefa Zalamea.
In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased.
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee, From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed, and in
vs. their brief they assign three errors, which, in their opinion, justify the reversal of
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants. the judgment appealed from.
Crispin Oben for appellants. The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court below is its
Pedro Guevarra and Carlos Ledesma for appellee. finding to the effect that Exhibit A, said to be the will of the deceased Josefa
Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities required by the law.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first
On July 19, 1918, Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was assignment of error tend to impeach the credibility of the witnesses for the
residing in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last proponent, specially that of Eugenio Zalamea. We have made a careful
will and testament with an attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and examination of the evidence, but have not found anything that would justify us
A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said in disturbing the finding of the court a quo. The attesting witnesses, Eugenio
documents. The testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the record Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify that together with the other witness
shows, the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and every page of the will and of
First Instance of Laguna on the 19th of January of the same year an application the inventory in the presence of each other and of the testatrix, as the latter did
for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the inventory in their presence.
administration in his favor.
In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not
To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia signed by the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the execution of the
Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of will, that is, on the 19th of July, 1918, basing their contention on the testimony of
the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the
Aurelio Palileo, who says that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one the contestants and their attorney, and has refused to hold any conference with
of the pages of the will had not been signed by the witnesses, nor by the the attorneys for the proponent. In reply to this, the attorney for the
testatrix on the day of its execution. Palileo's testimony is entirely contradicted contestants, said to the court, "without discussing for the present whether or
by Gonzalo Abaya not only in the direct, but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. To not in view of those facts (the facts mentioned by the attorneys for the
our mind, Palileo's testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting witnesses, petitioner), in the hypothesis that the same are proven, they are relieved from
Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea. The appellants impeach the credibility of producing that witness, for while it is a matter not decided, it is a recognized
Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a sworn declaration before the justice of the rule that the fact that a witness is hostile does not justify a party to omit his
peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before the trial of this case, to the effect that he testimony; without discussing this, I say, I move that said statement be stricken
was really one of the witnesses to the will in question, which fact was out, and if the proponent wants these facts to stand to stand in the record, let
corroborated by himself at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's testimony in him prove them." The court a quo ruled, saying, "there is no need."
connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a nephew of his, in
To this ruling of the court, the attorney for the appellants did not take any
whose success he was interested, and infer from this fact the partiality of his
exception.
testimony. We deem this allegation of little importance to impeach the
credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially because his testimony is In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), recently decided by
corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo Abaya, and by attorney this court, in deciding the question whether a will can be admitted to probate,
Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament at the instance of the testatrix. The where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without
foregoing is sufficient for us to conclude that the first assignment of error made producing or accounting for the absence of the other two, it was said; "while it is
by the appellants is groundless. undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of
only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs.
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will to
Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate examination of
probate notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce one of the
the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the
attesting witnesses.
attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of
At the trial of this case the attorneys for the proponent stated to the court that the court.
they had necessarily to omit the testimony of Pedro de Jesus, one of the persons
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all
who appear to have witnessed the execution of the will, for there were
three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable
reasonable grounds to believe that said witness was openly hostile to the
reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of
proponent, inasmuch as since the announcement of the trial of the petition for
this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for
the probate of the will, said witness has been in frequent communication with
the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion
the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for of the Court of First Instance upon the point there presented and makes
the proponent, believing in good faith that probate would not be the appellate court in effect a court of first instance with reference to
contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the second
witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the
incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and from
postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is placed, while
attesting witnesses. they are engaged in other discussions more simulated than real. These
considerations are, we think, decisive.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were
not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be
expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now understood as laying down any hard and fast rule that would prove an
to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in the
case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved future. In one way or another we are constantly here considering
by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses. aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have escaped the
attention of all persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is
It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in
necessary if this court is to contribute the part due from it in the correct
the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for
decision of the cases brought before it. What we mean to declare is that
determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the
when we believe that substantial justice has been done in the Court of
motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that
First Instance, and the point relied on for reversal in this court appears
this question cannot now be raised for t he first time in this court. We
to be one which ought properly to have been presented in that court,
believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must
we will in the exercise of a sound discretion ignore such question upon
be declared not to be well taken. This exact question has been decided
appeal; and this is the more proper when the question relates to a defect
by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the
which might have been cured in the Court of First Instance if attention
appellant, and we see no reason why the same rule of practice should
had been called to it there. In the present case, if the appellant had
not be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
raised this question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a
There are at least two reasons why the appellate tribunals are motion for a new trial, that court would have had the power, and it
disinclined to permit certain questions to be raised for the first time in would have been its duty, considering the tardy institution of the
contest, to have granted a new trial in order that all the witnesses to the
will might be brought into court. But instead of thus calling the error to witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that
the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the will has been duly executed. Wherefore, we find that the non-production of
the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late. the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for by the attorney for the
proponent at the trial, does not render void the decree of the court a quo,
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains
allowing the probate.
nothing inconsistent with the ruling we now make, for it appears from
the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had obtained an But supposing that said witness, when cited, had testified adversely to the
order for a republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of application, this would not by itself have change the result reached by the
presenting the two additional attesting witnesses who had not been court a quo, for section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a will
previously examined, but nevertheless subsequently failed without any can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not
apparent reason to take their testimony. Both parties in that case were remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence
therefore fully apprised that the question of the number of witnesses adduced that the will has been executed and signed in the manner prescribed by
necessar to prove the will was in issue in the lower court. the law.
In the case at bar, we do not think this question properly to have been raised at The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of the
the trial, but in the memorandum submitted by the attorney for the appellants inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no attestation clause
to the trial court, he contended that the will could not be admitted to probate in it, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters.
because one of the witnesses to the will was not produced, and that the
In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, Exhibit A-
voluntary non-production of this witness raises a presumption against the
1, and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea says:
pretension of the proponent. The trial court found that the evidence introduced
by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of the two attesting witnesses and In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the
the other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of the page containing the signatures and the attestation of the witnesses; I
preparation of the will and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1, was sufficient. As have likewise signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten
announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, the general rule is that, where folios in the presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea,
opposition is made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippine
produced. But there are exceptions to this rule, for instance, when a witness is Islands, this 19th of July, 1918.
dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for truth
And the attestation clause is as follows:
has been questioned or he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. In such
cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of said
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the
we have affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory of the properties witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the
of Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doa Josefa Zalamea y same. In other words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of
Abella, and the latter affixed her name to the last, and each and every the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures.
page of this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our presence; And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the
and she declared this to be her last will and testament and at her testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and
request we have affixed hereunto our respective signatures in her the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the holding of this court
presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the will and in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might as well be repeated:
the inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I.
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA, close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills
EUGENIO ZALAMEA, and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore
PEDRO DE JESUS. the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
of it, we find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and
makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the inventory.
unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere disregarded."
to the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (p. 378, ante),
In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause
recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of the will was assailed
on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way, and it was
on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of
held: "In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. It was held that this way of numbering
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either
witnesses, and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also
one of these methods indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to
at the bottom by the three witnesses it is not necessary that both sheets be
prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It
further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged."
might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in
letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all
This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of paging does totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several
not necessarily render the testament invalid. pages; and in the case of Re Estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875) a will was
likewise declared void which contained the necessary signatures on the
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on
margin of each leaf (folio), but not in the margin of each page
the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be placed in the lower part,
containing written matter."
would the testament be void for this sole reason? We believe not. The law also
provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no
the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would importance. But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the pages,
this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three, etc., as well
in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phi., 145): as by writing A, B, C, etc.
"It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the paging is
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in question. So that,
page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan,
all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully and followed in Aldava vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the
complied with. The same execution for wills must be fully complied solemnities of a will, we find that the judgement appealed from should be, as is
with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided hereby, affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
by this court."
"Still some details at time creep into legislative enactments which are so
trivial that it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could
have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the
effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written
on the left margin of each page rather than on the margin seems
to be of this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will,
and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether
the names appear on the left or on the right margin, provided they are
on one or the other. In Craig vs. Tatlonghari (G. R. No. 12558, decided
March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was
The errors assigned by the appellant are two, to wit: That each and every folio
Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil 378),
of the said testament is not paged correlatively in letter, and that the said will
EN BANC lacks the attestation clause required by law.
DECISION We have examined document Exhibit 4 which is the will in question and we find
at the end thereof the following in Tagalog which translated into English reads:
May 22, 1922
This document expresses my last and spontaneous will, and is my last will and
G.R. No. 17304
testament, which was drawn by the lawyer, Don Vicente Platon, at my direction,
In re will of Maria Roque y Paraiso, deceased. CEFERINO ALDABA,
and everything contained in this testament has been ordained and directed by
petitioner-appellee,
me to said Vicente Platon in order that it might be embodied in this testament,
vs.
and after this testament has been drawn up, I directed him to read it so that I
LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.
might hear all its contents, and I have heard and understood all the contents of
Lucero and Tengo for appellant. this document which is my last will, wherefore, and not knowing how to write, I
Vicente Platon for appellee. have requested Don Vicente Platon to write and sign my name in my stead
VILLAMOR, J.: hereon; I declare that this testament is composed of four sheets, actually used,
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y that the sheets are paged with the letter A, B, C, and d, and above my name I
Paraiso, the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio of Mambog, have placed the thumb mark of my right hand in the presence of the subscribing
municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed her last will and witnesses, and that all the witnesses have signed in my presence and of each
testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the other here at Malolos, Bulacan, this 9th day of the month of July, 1918; and I also
presence of three witnesses who signed the attestation clause and each of the declare that at my request Don Vicente Platon has written my name on the left
four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when margin of all pages of this testament, in the presence of the witnesses, and all
her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the witnesses have also signed all the pages of this testament on the left margin
the ground that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the in my presence and that of each other.
requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
X (Her thumb mark)MARIA ROQUE Y PARAISO,Per VICENTE PLATON.(Sgd.)
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by REGINO E. MENDOZA, Witness.
its decision rendered on February 27th of the following year, pronounced the
(Sgd.) IGNACIO ANIAG,Witness.
testament in question valid, and ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino
Aldaba as the administrator of the estate.
(Sgd.) CEFERINO ALDABA. Witness. thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the holding of this court in
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil, 476), might as well be repeated:
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the
points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on
provides that: the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
unnecesary, useless, and frustrative of the testators last will, must be
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
disregarded.
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other. In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause
on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way; and it was
In regard to the other assignment of error, to wit, that each of the folios of the
held:
said testament is not paged correlatively in letters one. two, three, etc., but
only with the letters A, B, C, etc., we are of the opinion that this method of In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
indicating the paging of the testament is a compliance with the spirit of the law, dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
since either one of the two ways above-mentioned indicates the correlation of the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom
the pages and serves to prevent the loss of any of them. It might be said that the by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does
testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the
not necessarily render the testament invalid.
difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other
words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on
C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signature. And as in the the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower part,
present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, would the testament be void for his sole reason? We believe not. The law also
consisting in the signatures on the left marging of the testament and the paging
provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of the solemnities of a testament, we decide that the judgment appealed from must
the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145):
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same
doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court
Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial
that it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have attached any
decisive importance to them. The provision to the effect that the signatures of
the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page
rather than on the right margin seems to be of this character. So far as
concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no
possible different whether the names appear on the left or on the right margin,
provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No. 12558,
decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was
totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and
in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil. 875), a will was likewise declared
void which contained the necessary signature on the margin of each left (folio),
but not on the margin of each page containing written matter.
We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no
importance. But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the pages,
we hold that this object may be attained by writing one. two, three, etc.,
well as by writing A, B, C, etc. Following, therefore, the view maintained by this
court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, supra, as regards the appreciation of
2. Si procedia y procede la legalizacion como testamento o disposicion de

In Re: Pilapil (72 Phil 546)
ultima voluntad del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, del documento obrante en autos
EN BANC como Exhibit A que es un duplicado al carbon del Exhibit C.
G.R. No. L-47931 June 27, 1941 Los hechos pertinentes que hay que tener en cuenta al resolver las cuestiones
propuestas son, segun se desprenden de la decision apelada y de los mismos
Testamentaria del finado Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil. ADRIANO documentos que el Juzgado declaro ser testamento y ultima voluntad del finado
MENDOZA, solicitante y apelado, P. Eleuterio Pilapil, los que a continuacion se relatan:
vs.
CALIXTO PILAPIL Y OTROS, opositores y apelantes. El P. Eleuterio Pilapil, siendo Cura de la parroquia de Mualboal de la Provincia
de Cebu, fallecio en la ciudad de este nombre el 6 de diciembre de 1935. No
D. Filemon Sotto y D. Numeriano G. Estenzo en representacion de los apelantes. habiendose presentado ningun testamento suyo despues de su muerte, por lo
Sres. Alonso y Alonso en representacion del apelado. menos hasta principios de febrero de 1939, su hermano Calixto Pilapil promovio
el dia 6 de dichos mes y ano,el expediente de intestado No. 399 para pedir que
DIAZ, J.:
fuesenombrado administrador de los bienes relictos de el. Recibida a prueba la
Las cuestiones principales que los opositores nos presentan para su resolucion, solicitud que habia presentado para elindicado fin, previas las publicaciones de
al apelar de la decision del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cebu, dictada en el los avisos presritos por la ley, y oyendo el Juzgado previamente a los
expediente de testamentaria No. 407 de dicho Juzgado, pueden reducirse a las quecomparecieron para oponerse a la misma, entre los cuales estaban el mismo
siguintes. apelado y Simeona Pilapil, el Juzgado se la concedio, nombrandole acto seguido
administrador de dicho Intestado. A los pocos dias, o sea el 4 de marzo de 1939,
1. Si el Juzgado de Cebu podia nombrar el 4 de marzo de 1939, al apelado como
el apelado promovio a su vez el expediente No. 407 de que antes se ha hecho
administrador especial de los bienes relictos del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil
mencion, para pedir la legalizacion como testamento del finado P. Eleuterio
(expediente de testamentaria No. 407), estando como estaba entonces actuando
Pilapil, del Exhibit A que es el duplicado al carbon del Exhibit C. Hay entre las
como administrador de los mismos bienes desde el 7 de febrero de 1939, el
clausulas de dichos dos documentos, las que se insertan a continuacion por su
apelante Calixto Pilapil, que promovio un dia antes, el Expediente de Intestado
pertinencia a las cuestiones planteadas y tambien por la importancia que tienen
del mismo finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, en dicho Juzgado (expediente No. 399,
Juzgado de Cebu); y Yo, Eleuterio Pilapil, Sacerdote de la Iglesia Catolica Apostolica
Romana, de sesenta y ocho aos de edad, natural de Liloan,
actualmente, Cura Parroco de la Parroquia de Mualboal, Provincia de
Cebu, I.F., gozando de salud y en PLENO USO DE MIS FACULTADES Cebu, Cebu, I.F., hoy dia 27 de noviembre de 1935.
MENTALES, por la presente, publico, declaro y otorgo lo siguiente
como MI TESTAMENTO Y ULTIMA VOLUNTAD: (Firmado) ELEUTERIO PILAPIL
Testador;
ART. PRIMERO: Instituyo y nombro al Sr. Adriano Mendoza, mi
sobrino politico, casado, mayor de edad y vecino del Municipio de al final de los mismos (exhibits A y C), hay esta clausula de atestiguamiento:
Liloan, Provincia de Cebu, I.F., ALBACEA-EJECUTOR de este mi
Al que leyere:
Testamento y Ultima Voluntad: Entendiendose, Que en case de
imposibilidad, negligencia u otra causa con que se cohibe hacer cumplir SALUD,
este mi Testamento y Ultima Voluntad, mediante fianza, dispongo y
ordeno que sea sustituido en el cargo de albacea-ejecutor de este mi Nosotros los que abajo firmamos, hacemos constar: Que el pre-inserto
Testamento y Ultima Voluntad, por mi Primo, Jose Cabatingan, casado, Testamento y Ultimo Voluntad, ha sido suscrito, declarado y jurado por
mayor de edad, residente del Municipiop de Mualboal, Provincia de el Testador, Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil en presencia de todos nosotros y a
Cebu, I.F., quien se encargara y hara que se cumplan estas mis ruego de dicho Testador, firmamos cada uno de nosotros en presencia
siguientes disposiciones: de nosotros, aqui en Cebu, Cebu, I.F., hoy dia 27 de noviembre de 1935.
xxx xxx xxx (Firmados) WENCESLAO PILAPIL

Testigo
2. Dispongo y ordeno que este mi Testamento y Ultima Voluntad No se
ventile en el Juzgado, toda vez que este Testamento y Ultima Voluntad, MARCELO PILAPIL
simplemente corrobora, afirma y asegura la legitimidad de los Testigo
documentos de compraventa de mis bienes;
EUGENIO K. PILAPIL
xxx xxx xxx Testigo
ART. SEGUNDO: Por la presente, hago constar que este Mi Testamento

Los dos documentos, exhibits A y C, constan de tres paginas; y en el margen
y Ultima Voluntad, que corrobora, afirma y asegura la legitimidad de
izquierdo de cada una de las dos primeras; aparecen las firmas que se ven al final
documentos por mi otorgados a los compradores consta de dos
del cuerpo principal de dichos documentos y de su clausula de atestiguamiento;
articulos; contiene dieciseis disposiciones y esta escrito en tres paginas;
y que son, segun las pruebas, firmas del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, y de los
xxx xxx xxx testigos Wenceslao Pilapil, Marcelo Pilapil y Eugenio K. Pilapil.
En el lugar de la fecha tanto de los dos documentos como de su clausula de (e) Que ninguno de los dos se ha preparado, firmado y atestiguado de
atestiguamiento, aparece escrita la palabra "Cebu" sobre que se trato de raspar conformidad con las disposiciones del articulo 618 del Codigo de Procedimiento
pero que aun puede verse que decia "Mualboal"; y aparecen tambien el guarismo Civil.
"27" y el nombre de mas: "Noviembre", escrito este ultimo sobre una palabra
Con respecto a la primera cuestion, debe decirse que, segun nos lo dice la misma
raspada que aun puede verse tambien sin ninguna dificultad, por lo menos en el
Pieza de Apelacion de los apelantes, los dos expedientes Nos. 399 y 407 se
Exhibit A, que dice: "Octubre". En el ultimo parrafo de la pagina 2 cuya
promovieron en dos Salas distintas del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cebu. El
continuacion aparece en las dos primeras lineas de la pagina siguiente, (pagina
primero fue promovido en la Sala III; y el ultimo, en la Sala II. Al enterarse el
3), que es la ultima, hay la mencion expresa siguiente: "contiene dieciseis
Juez de una de dichas Salas que habia una relacion directa entre unto y otro,
disposiciones y esta escrito en tres paginas". Al pie de las paginas (1) y (2) hay
dispuso que los dos se conociesen por un solo Juez; de ahi que ambos se
respectivamente estas notas: "Pase a la 2. pagina"; "pase a la 3. pagina". Y debe
consideraran como uno solo para evitar lo que el mencionado Juez dijo:
notarse que tanto en el uno como en el otro de los aludidos Exhibits A y C, no
"incompatibilidad en la administracion de los bienes de dicho difunto",
hay mas que dos articulos ("Art. Primero" y "Art. Segundo"), y dieceseis
refiriendose a; finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil.
disposiciones.
Indudablemente no le falto razon al Juzgado de Cebu para nombrar

Las razones en que los apelantes se apoyan para sostener que no procede la
administrador especial en el expediente No. 407, al apelado, porque en los
legalizacion de ninguna de los dos expresados documentos como testamento del
documentos que alli se trataban de legalizar como testamento y disposicion de
finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, son estas:
ultima voluntad del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, consta el encargo expreso de que
(a) Que contienen raspaduras y alteraciones que el apelado dejo de explicar; lo fuese. Ademas, no habia ni hay ninguna ley que prohiba a los Tribunales que
conocen de un expediente de testamentaria o de intestado, nombrar a mas de
(b) Que no se ha probado que el finado, prescindimiento de lo que consta en
un administrador; y, en el caso de que se trata ocurrio que se dejo sin efecto el
los referidos documentos exhibits A y C , era de edad competente para testar;
nombramiento del apelante como administrador, luego que se fundieron los dos
(c) Que tampoco se ha probado que el finado poseia el espaol que es el referidos expedientes. Mas todavia; si el proposito de los apelantes al proponer
lenguaje en que aparecen escritos los referidos documentos; la cuestion de que venimos hablando, es dejar sin efecto el nombramiento
expedido a favor del apelado como administrador especial, vano es y vano ha de
(d) Que en una de las clausulas de dichos documentos hay la prohibicion de que
ser dicho proposito, porque el insistir en el equivale a estar apelando de una
se ventilen en losa Tribunales;
orden del Juzgado que nombra a un administrador especial; y la ley no permite
apelacion contra ordenes de dicha naturaleza. Es terminante la disposicion de
ley que dice: "No se permitira la apelacion contra el nombramiento de dicho Al prepararlos el, estando en Mualboal, no era mas que natural que expresase en
administrador especial". (Art. 660, Ley No. 190.) los mismos que alli fueron preparados, y dejase en blanco la fecha pero sin dejar
de poner el nombre del mes en que se pusieron en limpio, es decir, octubre de
En adicion a todo esto debe decirse que, si hubo algun error en el
1935.
nombramiento del apelado como administrador especial, por la razon de que
otro en propiedad ya estaba nombrado por el Juzgado, el error, si tal puede Cuanto a la edad del testador y cuanto a si hablaba el espanol que es la lengua
llamarse, no ha sido de tal naturaleza que haya causado perjuicio alguno a nadie, en que aparecen redactados los dos exhibits, o no, debe decirse que siendo
y menos a la Testamentaria del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil. sacerdote y Cura de la parroquia de Mualboal, Cebu, debe presumirse
fundademente que tenia la edad competente para testar, y que entendia y
Las raspaduras y alteraciones que se notan en los exhibits A y C constituyen
hablada el espanol, pues, es de conocimiento general que para ser Cura de una
unos hechos a los que ahora, por primera vez, y en esta instancia, se quiere llamr
parroquia, uno debe ser sacerdote, y para serlo, son necesarios muchos anos de
la atencion, cuando ello debio haberse hecho mientras la causa se hallaba
estudio en seminarios donde se habla el espaol que es una lengua tan oficial
todavia en el Juzgado de su procedencia. No podemos tenerlos en cuenta en el
como la inglesa. Por otra parte, no consta que se haya probado que el testador
presente estado de las actuaciones porque, suponiendo que entonces ya existian,
no entendia dicha lengua.
puede y debe decirse, aunque no lo dijo en terminos expresos el Juzgado de
Cebu, que considero que no viciaban dichos documentos; pues es La disposicion del testador de que su "Testamento y Ultima Voluntad no se
presuncion juris tantum que "todos los hechos relacionados con los puntos ventile en el Juzgado", no puede despojar a los Tribunales de su autoridad para
discutidos en un juicio fueron expuestos al juzgado y apreciados por el". (Art. determinar si su referido testamento es legalizable o no. No son las partes
334, par. 16, Ley No. 190.) Y no lo viciaron en efecto, porque se desprende de las interesadas en un sentido u otro en un asunto, las que pueden conferir o quitar
mismas circunstancias del caso, que se hicieron precisamente para poner las jurisdiccion y autoridad a los Trubunales para resolver y decidir lo que la misma
cosas en su verdadero lugar. Los dos exhibits A y C fueron preparados por el ley quiere que se resuelva y se decida. Debe tenerse presente que la ley manda
finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil en Mualboal donde era Cura Parroco, antes de ser bajo pena, que se entreguen al Juzgado los testamentos otorgados por un
transladado para ser tratado de su enfermedad que le causo la muerte, al testador, luego que este muera, por la persona a quien su custodia se haya
Southern Islands Hospital de Cebu, donde murio. Fundandose el Juzgado en encomendado, con el fin indudablemente de que se pueda determinar si
estos hechos que se probaron en juicio, declaro lo siguiente: "La intervencion de procede su legalizacion y se pueda al propio tiempo disponer de sus bienes
los tres testigos instrumentales del documento tuvo lugar de una manera casual, segun lo manda en los mismos; o si por el contrato, debe declararse muerto
en ocasion en que los mismos fueron a visitarle a Eleuterio Pilapil que estaba intestado, por no ser susceptible de legalizacion el que hubiese otorgado. (Arts.
enfermo en el Southern Islands Hospital, y alli el hoy finado les rogo que 626 al 631, Ley No. 190.) Ademas, no siendo abogado el testador, no es de
actuaran de testigos del documento que ya tenia entonces preparado".
extranar que haya consignado en su testamento la prohibicion de que, y a renglon seguido, se afirma tambien por los mismos testigos que:
usando sus mismas palabras , "se ventile en el Juzgado".
a ruego de dicho Testador, firmamos
Y cuanto a que los exhibits A y C no pueden ser legalizados porque no se cada uno de nosotros, aqui en Cebu, Cebu,
prepararon ni se firmaron de conformidad con la ley, diciendose que sus paginas I.F., hoy dia 27 de noviembre de 1935.
no estan numeradas con letras; y porque en su clausula de atestiguamiento no se
La fraze "a ruego de dicho Testador", unida a la de que suscribio y firmo su
expresa que los mismos fueron firmados por los tres testigos instrumentales, en
testamento en presencia de los testigos instrumentales, permite y justifica la
presencia del testador, baste llamar la atencion al hecho de que al pie de la
inferencia de que el testador estaba presente cuando los ultimos estamparon alli
primera pagina hay en letras la nota que dice claramente: "Pase a la 2. pagina"; y
sus respectivas firmas.
al hecho de que, al pie de esta segunda pagina, hay esta otra nota: "Pase a la 3.
pagina"; y baste llamar tambien la atencion a las dos primeras lineas de dicha El proposito de la ley al establecer las formalidades que se requieren su
tercera pagina que es la ultima, donde, para completar la disposicion que se autenticidad, es indudablemente asegurar y garantizar su autenticidad contra la
encierra en el ultimo parrafo de la pagina anterior, o sea segunda, se dice lo mala fe y el fraude, para evitar que aquellos que no tienen derecho a suceder al
siguiente: testador, le sucedan y salgan beneficiados con la legalizacion del mismo. Se ha
cumplido dicho proposito en el caso de que se viene hablando porque, en el
. . . consta de dos articulos; contien
mismo cuerpo del testamento y en la mismo pagina donde aparece la clausula
dieciseis disposiciones y esta escrito
de atestiguamiento, o sea la tercera, se expresa que el testamento consta de tres
en tres paginas,
paginas y porque cada una de las dos primeras lleva en parte la nota en letras, y
lo cual concuerda fielmente con los verdaderos hechos tales como aparecen en en parte la y segunda paginas del mismo. Estos hechos excluyen evidentemente
los referidos dos exhibits, porque contienen efectivamente dos articulos y todo temor, toda sospecha, o todo asomo de duda de que se haya sustituido
dieciseis disposiciones, y no mas, y no menos. alguna de sus paginas con otra.
En la clausula de atestiguamiento en una y otra copia del Testamento objeto de Algo mas que en el caso de Nayve contra Mojal y Aguilar (47 Jur. Fil., 160), que
cuestion, se afirma por los tres testigos instrumentales que la firmaron, que fue aclarada mediante la causa de Gumban contra Gorecho y otros (50 Jur. Fil.,
31), hay en el presente caso porque alli no habia mas que las notas: "Pag. 1"; "Pag.
el pre-inserto Testamento y Ultima Voluntad,
2"; "Pag. 3"; y "Pag. 4" en la cara respectiva de las cuatro paginas de que se
ha sido suscrito, declarado y jurado por
compone, y en el presente hay los datos ya mencionados y hay ademas la
el Testador, Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil
constancia inserta en las dos primeras lineas de la tercera pagina de los exhibits
en presencia de todos nosotros;
A y C, de que los mismos estan compuestos de tres paginas, y contienen dos

articulos y dieciseis disposiciones.
Son por consiguiente de perfecta aplicacion al caso de que se trata lo que

dijimos en las causas de Rodriguezcontra Yap, R.G. No. 45924, mayo 18, 1939; y
Dichoso contra De Gorostiza (57 Jur. Fil., 456). Dijimos en dichas causas,
respectivamente, lo siguiente:
La redaccion de la clausula de atestiguamiento en este testamento no

esta tecnicamente libre de reparos, pero, es sustancialmente un
cumplimiento de la ley.
Mantenemos el criterio de que debe exigirse el cumplimiento estricto

de los requisitos substanciales del testamento, para asegurar su
autenticidad, pero, al mismo tiempo creemos que no deben tenerse en
cuenta defectos de forma que no pueden afectar a este fin y que, por
otra part, de tenerse en cuenta, podrian frustrar la voluntad del
testador. (Rodriguez contra Yap, supra.)
No debera permitirse que las formalidades legales obstaculicen el

empleo de buen sentido comun en la consideracion de testamentos y
que frustren los deseos de los difuntos solemnemente expresados en sus
testamentos, en cuanto a cuyo otorgamiento no hay ni siquiera sombra
de mala fe ni de fraude. (Dichoso contra De Gorostiza, supra.)
Por todo lo expuesto, hallando arreglada a derecho la decision apelada del

Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cebu, por la presente, la confirmamos,
condenados a los apelantes a pagar las costas. Asi se ordena.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
Fernandez vs. de Dios, (46 Phil 922)
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.

EN BANC
(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of
G.R. No. L-21151 February 25, 1924
each other, nor with knowledge on the part of the testator that they
In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased. were signing his will.
RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,

(f ) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants,
the testator.
vs.
FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees. (g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of
the will and was attached to the will after the death of the testator.
Jesus Ocampo, Reyes & Imzon, Camus & Delgado and Gibbs & McDonough for
appellants. (h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not
Eusebio Orense & Antonio M. Opisso for appellees. authentic.
ROMUALDEZ, J.: The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to
the testator, the latter's mind was perfectly sane and he understood it: that he
The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a will,
signed all the pages of the will proper, although he did not sign the page
which was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and contested by
containing the attestation clause; that while he did not personally call the
Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio Rustia, the court of
witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as such in his
First Instance of Manila having denied its probate.
presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to
The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court request the witnesses to attest his will. It was also sufficiently established in the
in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void. record, beside being stated in the attestation clause, that the testator signed the
will in the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit: in the presence of the testator and of each other, the testator knowing that the
witnesses were signing his will; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of
before the death of the testator; that this clause, with the names of the witnesses
the will.
in blank, was prepared before the testator signed the will, and that the sheet
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will. containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, was a loose sheet, and
that all the four sheets of which the will Exhibit A was actually composed were of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will, includingsaid sheet, has
kept together and are the very ones presented in this case; and finally, that the four sheets. This description contained in the clause in question constitutes
signatures of the testator on page 3 of said exhibit are authentic. substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed by the law regarding
the paging. So it was held by this Court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40
It thus appearing from the record that there are no such defects as those
Phil., 476), where the sheet containing the attestation, as well as the preceding
mentioned by the opponents, and it having been proven that the testator
one, was also not paged. Furthermore the law, as we shall see later on, does not
executed said will in a language known by him and consciously, freely and
require that the sheet containing nothing but the attestation clause, wholly or in
spontaneously, it would seen unnecessary to go further, and the matter might
part, be numbered or paged. Consequently this lack of paging on the attestation
be brought to a close right here, by holding the will in question valid and
sheet does not take anything from the validity of the will.
allowable to probate, were it not for the fact that the trial court and the
opponents questioned the sufficiency and validity of the attestation clause Turning now to the question whether or not in this clause it is stated that the
because the sheet on which it is written is not numbered, and it is not stated testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will, in the presence of the
there that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other, let us see what is said in
presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter signed it is the presence of the said clause on this point, and to this end its pertinent part is hereinafter
testator and of each other, and specially because said attestation clause is not transcribed and is as follows:
signed by the testator either at the margin or the bottom thereof.
* * * and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in
As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that our presence and we at his request did the same in his presence and in
it does not appeal on the upper part of the sheet, but it does not appear in its that of each other as witnesses to the will, and lastly, the testator, as
text, the pertinent part of which is copied hereinafter, with the words, having well as we, as witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of
reference to the number of sheets of the will, underscored, including the page each sheet. (Emphasis ours.)
number of the attestation:
The underscored phrase "in the same manner" cannot in the instant case mean,
* * * We certify that the foregoing document written in Spanish, a and it in fact means nothing, but that the testator and the witnesses signed on
language known by the testator Antonino Vergel de Dios, consisting the left margin of each sheet of the will "in the same manner" in which they
of three sheet actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this sheet . signed at the bottom thereof, that is, the testator in the presence of the
... witnesses and the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other. This
phrase in the same manner cannot, in view of the context of the pertinent part,
If, as stated in this clause, the foregoing document consists of three sheets,
refer to another thing, and was used here as a suppletory phrase to include
besides that of the clause itself, which is in singular, it is clear that such a sheet
everything and avoid the repetition of a long and difficult one, such as what is clause, nor was such point discussed there, which was the point at issue in the
meant by it. The same section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to case of Abangan vs. Abangan, supra.
avoid the repetition of the same long phrase about the testator having signed in
The appellees, however, argue that such clause in the case of Abangan vs.
the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other,
Abangan begins at the bottom and on the same sheet in which the testamentary
resorts to a similar expression in the second paragraph and says, "as aforesaid."
provision terminated, that is to say, the will properly speaking. Even then if it is
Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet intended to commit misrepresentation or fraud, which are the things that with
containing the attestation clause, this point was already decided in the above the requirements of the law for the making and attesting of wills it is intended
cited case of Abangan vs. Abangan, where this court held that: to avoid, it is just the same that the clause; as in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, begins at the bottom of the will properly speaking, as, like the case
The testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause
before us, it is wholly contained in a separate sheet. The fact is that this separate
because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and
sheet, containing the attestation clause wholly or in part, is not signed any place
not to the testator.
by the testator in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, as it is not in the present
In that case of Abangan vs. Abangan it was held that the signature of the testator case.
is not necessary in the attestation clause, but the theory is not announced that
Section 618 of the code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, contains
such a clause is unnecessary to the validity to the will.
three paragraphs, of which the first enumerates in general terms the
For this reason such doctrine does not annul the judgment in the case of Uy requirements to be met by a will executed after said Code took effect, to wit,
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), where in effect the doctrine, among that the language or dialect in which it is written be known by the testator, that
others, was laid down that the attestation clause is necessary to the validity of it be signed by the latter or by another person in the name of the testator by his
the will. One of the points on which greatest stress was laid in that case Uy express direction and in his presence, and that it be attested and signed by three
Coque is that the requirements of the law regarding the number of the pages or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
used, the signing of the will and of each of its pages by the testator in the
These general rules are amplified in the next two paragraphs as to the special
presence of three witnesses, and the attestation and signing of the will and of
requirements for the execution of the will by the testator and the signing thereof
each of its pages by the witnesses in the presence of each other cannot be
by the witnesses, with which the second paragraph of the section deals, and as
proven aliunde but by the attestation clause itself which must express the
to the attestation clause treated in the third and last paragraph of said section
complaince of the will with such requirements. But it was not held in that case
618.
of Uy Coque that the signature of the testator was necessary in the attestation
For this reason the second paragraph of this section 618 says:
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the From this analysis of our law now in force it appears:
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
First. That the will must have an attestation clause as a complement,
every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
without which it cannot be probate and with which only
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.
not aliunde (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca , supra) may the requirements
These are the solemnities that must surround the execution of the will properly to be stated in its text be proven. The attestation clause must be
speaking, without any reference whatsoever to the attestation clause not treated prepared and signed, as in the instant case, on the same occasion on
in this second paragraph. It is in this second paragraph which deals only with which the will is prepared and signed, in such a way that the possibility
the will (without including the attestation clause), that the signature or name of of fraud, deceit or suppression of the will or the attestation clause be
the testator and those of the witnesses are mentioned as necessary on the left reduced to a minimum; which possibility always exists, as experience
margin of each and everyone of the sheets of the will (not of the attestation shows, in spite of the many precautions taken by the legislator to insure
clause), as well as the paging of said sheet (of the will, and not of the attestation the true and free expression of one's last will.
clause which is not yet spoken of).
Second. That the will is distinct and different from the attestation,
Now, are the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will also necessary although both are necessary to the validity of the will, similar, in our
in the attestation clause? Let us see the last paragraph of this section 618 of the opinion, to a document which is not public so long as it is not
Code which already deals with the requirements for the attestation clause. This acknowledged before a notary, the document being a distinct and
last paragraph reads thus: different thing from the acknowledgment, each of which must comply
with different requisites, among which is the signature of the maker
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which is necessary in the document but not in the acknowledgment and
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
both things being necessary to the existence of the public document.
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the Third. That the will proper must meet the requirements enumerated in
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the the second paragraph of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Fourth. That the text of the attestation clause must express compliance
As may be seen this last paragraph refers to the contents of the text of the with the requirements prescribed for the will.
attestation, not the requirements or signatures thereof outside of its text. It does
In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the requirements
not require that the attestation be signed by the testator or that the page or
prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for it, as such
sheet containing it be numbered.
attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements prescribed by the law

for it.
The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does
not affect its validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require that it be
signed by the testator.
We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the

validity of Act No. 2645, which is valid. For the purposes of this decision, it is
not necessary to reason out this conclusion, it being sufficient for the
adjudication of this case to hold the first error assigned by the appellants to
have been demonstrated.
The foregoing conclusions lead us to hold, as we do here by hold, that the

documents Exhibit A, as the last will and testament of the deceased Antonio
Vergel de Dios, meets all the requirements prescribed by the low now in force
and therefore it must be allowed to probate as prayed for by the petitioner.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court
proceed with the probate of the will Exhibit A in accordance with law, without
express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su

Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) see earlier case under Article 804
ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de
nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) see earlier case under Article 804
presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio
Leynez . El testamento consta de los (2) paginas solamente.
Tenafrancia vs. Abaja (87 Phil 139) case not found!
The question presented is, under section 618, as amended, of the Code of
Leynez vs. Leynez (68 Phil 745) Civil Procedure, is this attestation clause legally sufficient? The pertinent
portion of this section of the Code is as follows:
EN BANC
. . . the attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used,
G.R. No. L-46097 October 18, 1939
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
TEOFILA ADEVA VIUDA DE LEYNEZ, petitioner, will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
vs. name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
IGNACIO LEYNEZ, respondent. an the later witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
Conrado V. Sanchez and Ambrosio Padilla for petitioner.
Ilao and Enriquez for respondent. The alleged defect in the attestation clause of the controverted will is that
it fails to state that the testator and the three witnesses signed each and every
page of the will in the manner prescribed by law, because it merely states
"firmanos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la
LAUREL, J.:
del mismo testador Valerio Leynez." In deciding this question the Court of
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court Appeals, however, ruled:
of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro
A la luz de las jurisprudencias arriba citadas en la clausada de
denying probate of the will of the deceased Valerio Leynez, on the ground that
atestiguamiento discutida en el asunto de autos no encontramos un
its attestation clause does not conform to the requirements section 618, as
cumplimiento sustantial del requisito exigido por la ley, de que en ella
amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
se haga constar que el testador y los testigos han firmado unos en
The attestation clause of the will is worded as follows: presencia de otros, todas y cada una de las paginas usadas del
testamento, requisito que no se puede establecer por medio de su on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of
pruebaaliunde. the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala ([1930], 55
Phil., 150), sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the
Against this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, petitioner puts forward
other direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil.,
the contention that it has decided a question of substance in a way not probably
476), oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." It is fairness to recognize the
in accord with the law and the applicable decisions of this court (Rule 47,
existence of opposing currents of legal thought, a situation which perhaps has
paragraph e [1] of Supreme Court.) The rule of liberal construction of the
brought about a certain degree of confusion in this field. It is also fairness to
applicable law should, petitioner avers, be held to apply in the case at bar, and
avow, however, that a more careful examination of the cases will show that,
in support of her content on she invokes a long array of cases (Abangan vs
while the two tendencies mentioned in easily discernible, the conflict in many
.Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145;
cases is more apparent than real, and the variance, if at all, in the application of
Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs .Abella, 43 Phil., 494;
the principles involved was due in some instances to the marked differentiation
Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152; De
of facts and the consequent personal or collective criteria in particular
Gala vs .Gonzalez, 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartagena, 56 Phil., 282; Dichoso de
cases.lwphi1.nt
Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, 57 Phil., 437; Sebastian vs. Paganiban, 59 Phil., 653; De
Guzman vs. Celestino, G.R. No. 35273, April 25, 1932; Policarpio vs. Baltazar, G.R. We have taken pains to examine the numerous cases relied upon by the
No. 36349, November 14, 1932; Malate vs. Olea, G.R. No. 36154, December 16, petitioner and those relied upon by the respondent, and while we do not deem
1932; In re Estate of Jennings, 1933, G.R. No. 38758). To this line of cases those of it necessary to make a detailed comparison between them, we find no difficulty
Rodriguezvs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939, and Grey vs. Fabie, G.R. No. in selecting what we consider is the reasonable rule to apply in this case at bar.
45160, May 23, 1939, may perhaps be added. Respondent, on the other hand, It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible,
equally invokes a number of cases wherein, he contends, the rule of strict which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and
construction was made to prevail. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; In circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given
re Estate of Neuark, 46 Phil., 841; Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will,
Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481; and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance
Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150.) with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
This Court has already taken notice of these different views within,
although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or
in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza(57 Phil., 437, 439-440), it frankly made the
other non-essential defect. This, in our opinion, is the situation in the present
following observation : "The truth is that there have been, noticeable in the
case, and we, therefore, hold that the requirement that the attestation clause,
Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills the one being planted
among other things, shall state "that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
in the presence of the testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied with, to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
it appearing that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
the will according to the stipulation of the parties. (Record on Appeal, Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way
stipulation, pp. 10, 14, 15); and this fact being shown in the will itself, and there as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
being, furthermore, no question raised as to the authenticity of the signature of must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
the testator and the witnesses. restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent
form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may
disregarded.
still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2 ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not
be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. The law- It follows that the writ of certiorari should be, as it is hereby, granted and
making body, in recognition of the dangers to which testamentary dispositions the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, with the result that the
are apt to be subject in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded controverted will, Exhibit A, of the deceased Valerio Leynez, shall be admitted
the execution of the wills with every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard to probate. So ordered, with costs against the respondent-appellee. So ordered.
it. This purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the exclusion of
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
evidence aliunde to prove the execution of the will. We should not, however,
attribute the prohibition as indicative of a desire to impose unreasonable
restraint or beyond what reason and justice permit. It could not have been the
intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the
execution of a will to shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which
the law recognizes and holds sacred. The pronouncement of this Court
in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), expresses the sound rule to which
we have recently adhered in principle. (Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924,
promulgated May 18, 1939; and Grey vs. Fabie, G.R. No. 45160, promulgated May
23, 1939):
and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the
Taboada vs. Rosal (November 5, 1983)
three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
FIRST DIVISION
Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 requirement of publication, the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted
DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner, his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses
vs. to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due execution.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the
Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),respondent.
questioned order denying the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a
Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition. formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to
submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so
Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.
that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the summary
settlement of the estate.
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.: Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a
manifestation and/or motion, ex partepraying for a thirty-day period within
This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of
which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the
Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the
will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the
Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased;
names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.
Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion
for reconsideration and the motion for appointment of a special administrator. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
probate of the will. However, the motion together with the previous
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner
manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon
attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written
C. Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said
in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page
motions or incidents were still pending resolution when respondent Judge
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom
Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent
of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3)
court.
instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
administrator. which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
the manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the
the instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and
motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise denied
signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the
because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to
testator and of one another.
submit the names of' the intestate heirs and their addresses.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code interpreted to them.
require that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses
The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require
sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs
another?
at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides: place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because
the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the
another. extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses
should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
human nature.
We find the petition meritorious. testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or
of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective
signed at its end by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
execution of a will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103).
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another. Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that
were not for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation
found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take
note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the
execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the
other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when
paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911). the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or
substitution behind the questioned order.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered
view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause
the purpose of Identification. failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have
been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page
the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first
but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed
departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises
authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449). the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself
states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective
page".
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a
observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation similar liberal approach:
clause must state the number of pages used:
... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign
as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident
attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
upon which the win is written, which requirement has been testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The
held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to
possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is witness over whose conduct she had no control where the
intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the testament
Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional
50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites.
seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz.
statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may
and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation
invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by clause.
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the
will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
respondent court which denied the probate of tile will, the motion for
attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages
reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a
upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the
special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the
body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of
probate of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this
eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case
decision. No pronouncement on costs.
out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the
realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has SO ORDERED.
been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations.
Vicente Foz, Marciano Almario and Leonardo Abola for petitioner-appellant.

Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489) see earlier case under Article 805
Leodegario Azarraga for oppositor-appellant.

Payad vs. Tolentino (62 Phil 848):
EN BANC GODDARD, J.:
DECISION Both parties in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying the
probate of the alleged will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased. That court found that
January 15, 1936 the will in question was executed by the deceased on the date appearing
thereon, September 7, 1933, one day before the death of the testatrix, contrary to
G.R. No. L-42258
the contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her death. The court,
In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino. VICTORIO PAYAD,
however, denied probate on the ground that the attestation clause was not in
petitioner-appellant,
conformity with the requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the
vs.
testatrix caused Attorney Almario to write her name at her express direction.
AQUILINA TOLENTINO, oppositor-appellant.
The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure of the
Vicente Foz, Marciano Almario and Leonardo Abola for petitioner-appellant.
trial court in not finding that the will in question was executed after the death of
Leodegario Azarraga for oppositor-appellant.
Leoncia Tolentino, or that she was mentally and physically incapable of
Goddard, J.:
executing said will one day before her death. After a careful examination of the
LEONCIA TOLENTINO. VICTORIO PAYAD vs. AQUILINA TOLENTINO
evidence on these points we find no reason for setting aside the conclusion of
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila the trial court as set forth above. The assignments of the oppositor-appellant are
therefore overruled.
EN BANC
As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the trial court

G.R. No. L-42258 January 15, 1936
denied probate of the will on the sole ground that the attestation clause does
In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino. VICTORIO PAYAD, petitioner- not state that the testratrix requested Attorney Almario to write her name.
appellant,
The last paragraph of the questioned will reads in part as follows:
vs.
En prueba de todo lo cual, firmo el presente testamento con mi marcha digital,
AQUILINA TOLENTINO, oppositor-appellant. poque no puedo estampar mi firma a causa de mi debilidad, rogando al abogado
M. Almario que poga mi nombre en elsitio donde he de estampar mi marcha

digital . . ..
The evidence of record established the fact that Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by
Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and every age of time
questioned will and the said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the
place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did
not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing her thumb mark on each and
every page thereof A statute requiring a will to be signed is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testators mark. (Quoted by this court from 28 R.C.L.,
p, 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil. 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that
it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the
testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the
testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.
The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned will of
Leoncia Tolentino, deceased, is hereby admitted to probate with the costs of this
appeal against the oppositor-appellant.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645 reads:
Jallores vs. Interino (L-42463) case not found!
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to

Uy Coque vs. Sioca
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
EN BANC be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed
by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
G.R. No. 17430 May 31, 1922
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque, deceased. three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
ANDREA UY COQUE, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his
vs. name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
JUAN NAVAS L. SIOCA, special administrator of the estate of Geronima aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said
Uy Coque, deceased,opponent-appellant. pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
Crossfiled & O'Brien for appellant.
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
Ruperto Kapunan for appellees.
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
OSTRAND, J.: write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar, thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
admitting a will to probate.
The formal deffects of the will in question occur in its attestation clause which,
The validity of the will is attacked on the ground that the testatrix was mentally in translation, read as follows:
incapacitated at the time of its execution and on the further ground that it was
not executed on the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil We, the undersigned witnesses of this will, state that it has been shown
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, to us by the testatrix as her last will and testament. And as she cannot
sign her name, she asked that Mr. Filomeno Piczon sign her name in
The transcript of the testimony taken in the probate proceedings not appearing the presence of each of us, and each of us, the witnesses, also signed in
in the record, we cannot review the findings of the court below as to the sanity the presence of the testatrix.
of the testatrix. This leaves for our consideration only the question as to
whether the omission of certain formalities in the execution of the will are fatal
to its validity.
It will be noted that the attestation clause does not state the number of pages legislator and not that the testator; the latter's intention is frequently defeated
contained in the will nor does it state that the witnesses signed in the presence through non-observance of the statue.
of each other. Neither do these facts appear in any other part of the will.
The purpose of the Legislature in prescribing the rather strict formalities now
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are required in the execution of a will are clearly revealed by comparing section
very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be 618, supra, as originally enacted with the amended section quoted above. The
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely original section reads:
void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispose
be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name
with those enumerated in the statutes."
This court has also frequently held that a will should not be probated unless in direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
its execution there has been a strict complaince with all the requisites witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Produre. It is true that in the case attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused
of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476) the court upheld the validity of a will it to be signed by some other person, at this express direction, in the
consisting of only two pages, the first containing all the testamentary presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it is
dispositions and being signed by the testator at the bottom and by both the his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such
testator and the witnesses in the margin, the second page containing only the form of attestation shall not render the will in valid if it is proven that
attestaiton clause with the signatures of the witnesses at the bottom but without the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
marginal signatures. The decision was based on the ground that it could not
The amendments or changes introduced by Act No. 2645 are (a) that the will
have been the intention of the legislator to require, as an essential to the validity
must now be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator; (b) that
of the will, that all the signatures appear twice on the same page as such a
the testator and witnesses must sign each page on the left margin; (c) that the
requirement would be entirely purposeless. This decision is no doubt sound;
pages be numbered correclatively; (d) that the attestation clause shall state the
that in statutory construction the evident intent of the legislator controls will
number sheets or page used in the will and (e) that it must appear from the
probably not be disputed.
attestation clause itself that the testator and witnesses signed in the form and
But it must not be forgotten that in construing statutory provisions in regard to manner required by law and that is this can no longer be proven by evidence
the formal requisites of a will, we are seeking to ascertain the intent, of the aliunde.
The changes mentioned under (d) and (e) are the only ones which need be
considered in the present case. The purpose of requiring the number of sheets
to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so
prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary
dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the
numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the
total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the
document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forgoing of the
signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with
much greater difficulty.
The purpose of the new requirement that it must appear in the attestation
clause that the testator and the witnesses signed in the presence of each other
and that the fact cannot be proved by evidence aliunde is, perhaps, less obvious,
but, in view of the well-known unreliability of oral evidence, it is clear that a
statement in the attestation clause will afford more satisfatory evidence of the
fact to be proven. In any event, the fact that the old rule in regard to
admissibility or oral evidence to prove that the testator and witnesses signed in
the manner prescribed by the law evidently had been found unsatisfactory and
was deliberately varied by amendment shows that the Legislature attached
importance to the mater. If so, the courts will not be justified in enervating the
amendment by too liberal a construction.
We therefore hold that the two defects noted in the attestation clause of the
alleged will renders it null and void and that it cannot be admitted to probate.
The order appealed from is reversed with the costs against the appellee. So
ordered.
each other. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), this court
Sao vs. Quintana
has held that the requirement that the attestation clause must contain the
EN BANC statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other is imperative
and non-comfort in said case in support of this doctrine may be adduced for
G.R. No. L-24556 December 18, 1925
holding that the will is also null and void when in the attestation clause it does
In re will of Victoria Quintana, deceased. EMILIANO S. SAO, petitioner- not appear that the witnesses to the will signed it and every page thereof on the
appellee, left margin and in the presence of the testatrix. In order to insure the
vs. authenticity of a will, which is the object of the law, it is just as important, if not
MAMERTO QUINTANA, ET AL., opponents-appellants. the most important, that the witnesses should sign in the presence of the
testator and of each other.lawphi1.net
Singzon, Salazar & Veloso and Ruperto Kapunan for appellants.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the probate of the will of Victoria
Emilio Benitez for appellee.
Quintana is denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
The judgment appealed from allowed the probate of the will of the deceased
Victoria Quintana executed on March 22, 1924. Without going into discussion of
the points raised by the parties as to the formalities of this will we find a
sufficient reason for reversing the judgment appealed from and denying the
probate thereof.
In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to the will have
signed on the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of the testatrix.
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645, provides that he
attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed the will and all the
pages thereof, or caused another persons to place his name thereon at his
expressed direction in the presence of the three witnesses to the will, and that
the latter signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of
cases beginning with Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil. 476), continuing
Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil 30)
through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43 Phil. 378), andFernandez vs. Vergel de
EN BANC
Dios ([1924], 46 Phil. 922, and culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar([1924],
DECISION 47 Phil. 152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if possible, conciliate,
the last two decisions cited by opposing counsel, namely, those of Sao vs.
March 3, 1927
Quintana, supra, and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.
G.R. No. L-26135 In the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause
In re will of Eustaquio Hagoriles.<br/>PETRONILO GUMBAN, petitioner- which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page
appellee, thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a
vs. defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was cited, but the
INOCENCIA GORECHO, ET AL., opponents-appellants. case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is
the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held that the
Powell and Hill for appellants. attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the witnesses
Padilla, Treas and Magalona and Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellee. reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the
Malcolm, J.: mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the
This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, and eighteen other fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will
opponents, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo probating the can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the
document presented by Petronilo Gumban as the last will and testament of the document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate
deceased Eustaquio Hagoriles. Among the errors assigned is included the the will.
finding of the trial court that the alleged will was prepared in conformity with It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; seldom do they
the law, notwithstanding it did not contain an attestation clause stating that the admit inconsistency in doctrine. Yet here, unless aided by casuistry of the
testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will. extreme type, it would be impossible to reconcile
the Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are fundamentally at variance. If we rely
In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-mentioned,
on one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse.
appellants rely on a series of cases of this court beginning with in the Matter of
In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three outstanding points may
the Estate of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil. 875), continuing with in In re Will of
be mentioned. In the first place, the Mojal decision was concurred in by only
Andrada ([1921], 42 Phil. 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca ([1922], 43 Phil. 405),
four members of the court, less than a majority, with two strong dissenting
and In re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil. 841), and ending with in Sao vs.
opinions; the Quintana decisions was concurred in by seven members of the
Quintana([1925]), 48 Phil. 506). Appelle counters with the citation of a series of
court, a clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second place, express pronouncements on the two important questions relating to the
the Mojal decision was promulgated in December, 1924; the Quintana decision language of the will and the testamentary capacity of the deceased are required.
was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the third place, the Quintana
The order appealed from will be reversed, and the document Exhibit A disallowed
decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the
as a will, without special pronouncement as to costs in either instance. So
law.
ordered.
The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law
of the case is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended.
It is part provided in section 618, as amended, that No will . . . shall be valid . . .
unless . . . . It is further provided in the same section that The attestation shall
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Codal section 634 provides that The will shall be disallowed in either of the
following cases: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided. The law
not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and
makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not within the
province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and
clearly expressed.
We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, and,
to the extent necessary, modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar, supra.
It may not be said here that our ruling is predicated on technicality or injustice.
The will in question was formulated in a medley of three languages, Visayan,
English, and Spanish. Suspicious circumstances surrounded the making of the
will by the bedridden old man, who is alleged to have signed it. However, no
signed by the testators in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter
Quinto vs. Morata
signed the same in the presence of the testators and in the presence of each
EN BANC other.
G.R. No. L-31732 February 19, 1930 Upon the issue thus raised, and after hearing the evidence, the court rendered a
judgment denying the petition on the ground that the attestation clause did not
Estate of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo.
state that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testators, or that
CARMEN QUINTO, applicant-appellant,
both the testators and the witnesses signed the will and each and every page
vs.
thereof in the presence of each other. In this connection the lower court said:
MARGARITA MORATA, in substitution of Mateo Pueblo,
deceased, contestant-appellee. . . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se
hace constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de
Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellant.
los tres testigos instrumentales y que estos firmaron el testamento los
Augusto de la Rosa and Angel Arigo for appellee.
unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos
JOHNSON, J.: testigos firmaron el testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que
estos y aquellos firmaron today y cada una de las paginas del
This is an appeal from a decision of the Honorable Manuel V. Moran, judge of
testamento los primeros en presencia de los segundos y vice-versa.
the Court of first Instance of Cavite, denying the application of Carmen Quinto
for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo, her husband. En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del
alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y
The application for probate was filed on October 26, 1928 by Carmen Quinto,
se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado.
executrix of said will. It was a joint and mutual will of Gregorio Pueblo and his
said wife Carmen Quinto and contained a provision that the surviving spouse From the judgment the petitioner appealed and now contends:
shall take charge of the properties therein described and that they shall pass to
That the lower court committed an error in denying the application of the
the heirs and legatees at the time of the death of the surviving spouse.
petitioner for the probate of the will of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo.
To said application an opposition was filed by Mateo Pueblo, a brother of the
The attestation clause of the will in question (Exhibit A-1) reads as follows:
deceased, on the following grounds: (1) That the attestation clause of said will
does not state the number of pages of which the will is composed, and (2) that Nosotros los que firmamos al final de este testamento, Florentino Joya,
the attestation clause does not state that each and every page of the will was Aguedo Soriano y Teodoro Bleza damos fe, de haber visto o presenciado
el acto de firmar en esta escritura o testamento de los esposes Gregorio appear on the face of the, will itself. Prior to its amendment, section 618
Pueblo y Carmen Quinto; lo firmaron ellos en nuestra presencia, y que contained the following saving clause: "But the absence of such form of
nosotros los testigos, lo firmamos en presencia de cade uno de nostros, attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
hoy 3 de noviembre de 1920. Este testamento esta compuesto de tres signed and attested as in this section provided."
fojas utiles.
The most outstanding feature of the amendment of said section 618 by Act No.
As will be noted, the attestation clause contravenes the express requirements of 2645 is the elimination of said saving clause and the greater emphasis laid on
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645, in two ways: First, it the formalities as to signatures and the attestation clause. There can be no
fails to state that each and every page of the will was signed by the testators and doubt, therefore, that the intention of the Legislature, in eliminating said clause,
the witnesses; and, second, it fails to state that the witnesses signed each and was admitted without opposition, it should not be given effect and thus defeat
every page of the will in the presence of the testators. the manifest intention of the Legislature in amending said section 618.
In the case of Sao vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that "an Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation.
attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and In the case of Uy Coque vs.Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405) this court, speaking of
each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is the construction to be given to said section, said:
defective, and such defect annuls the will." This doctrine was restated and
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).
wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A
It is vigorously contended on behalf of the appellant, that the alleged defect of will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
the attestation clause has been cured by oral evidence, which was admitted otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
without opposition on the part of the appellee. This contention cannot be importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the
sustained. The doctrine of this court with reference to statute of frauds is not defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them,
applicable to wills. The statue of frauds relates to contracts and agreements. The either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated
subject of will and testaments and the formalities surrounding their execution in the statutes." (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407.)
are governed by separate and specific provisions of Act No. 190. The judgment appealed from, disallowing the will of Gregorio Pueblo, is in
confirmity with the facts and the law, and the same should be and in hereby
An examination of section 618 of Act No. 190, prior to, and after its amendment affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
by Act No. 2645, shows clearly that the Legislature intended to exclude evidence
aliunde, tending to establish that the will has been executed and attested in
conformity with the requirements of the law, where such compliance does not
The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower

Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784)
without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last
SECOND DIVISION will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa.
The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a
1
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993 notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. It was
declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola,
CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO,
Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and
SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA 2
Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his
Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition
represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of
and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The
vs. probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special subsequent scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. On
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard
3
by the probate court. On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees
Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners.
named in the will, sough his appointment as special administrator of the
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents. testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so
4
appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981.
Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the

REGALADO, J.:
testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R,
on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the attestation clause contained in before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October
the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate proceeding
requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code. consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in
5
the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero, on the
ratiocination that:
Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known
as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as . . . The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the
special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an oppositors cannot overcome the positive testimonies of Atty.
order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the
archives since the testate proceeding for the probate of the will had to be heard Court that indeed Mateo Caballero executed the Last Will and
and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled and eventually Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978.
assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo Caballero who initiated
6
until the conclusion of the probate proceedings. the probate of his Will during his lifetime when he caused the
filing of the original petition now marked Exhibit "D" clearly
In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners
underscores the fact that this was indeed his Last Will. At the
appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testator's will on
start, counsel for the oppositors manifested that he would want
the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in
the signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a
the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same.
handwriting expert of the NBI but it would seem that despite
Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of
7
their avowal and intention for the examination of this signature
the testator therein.
of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the because they abandoned the idea and instead presented Aurea
notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator executed the will Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses for the
in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and oppositors.
that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good
All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last
health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.
Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it was
Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will 9
executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law.
in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting
8
witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing as the had died by then. Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the
case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19669. They asserted therein
that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause
is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and presence of the testator and of one another." If not completely
that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the or ideally perfect in accordance with the wordings of Art. 805
testator and of one another. but (sic) the phrase as formulated is in substantial compliance
11
10
with the requirement of the law."
On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision affirming that
of the trial court, and ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court,
12
Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus: but the same was denied in the latter's resolution of January 14, 1992, hence
this appeal now before us. Petitioners assert that respondent court has ruled
The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in
upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled
question may be considered as having substantialy complied
jurisprudence on the matter and are now questioning once more, on the same
with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What
ground as that raised before respondent court, the validity of the attestation
appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim to
clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero.
be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by
him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter,
the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the after some prefatory observations which we feel should be made in aid of the
acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters rationale for our resolution of the controversy.
of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is
Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof,
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand 13
the disposition of his estate after his death. Under the Civil Code, there are
margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of 14
two kinds of wills which a testator may execute. the first kind is the ordinary
each and all of us (emphasis supplied).
or attested will, the execution of which is governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the
To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence Code. Article 805 requires that:
need be presented to indicate the meaning that the said will
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
was signed by the testator and by them (the witnesses) in the
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
presence of all of them and of one another. Or as the language
testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
of the law would have it that the testator signed the will "in the
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one
and of one another. that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. This kind of
will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A common
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as 17
have been executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need
letters placed on the upper part of each page. not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not
form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in
The attestation should state the number of pages used upon
the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed 18
witnesses. The last paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the
19
testator and of one another. manner of the execution the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of
the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
witness, it shall be interpreted to them. 20
formalities required by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of
In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by a preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution
15
testator and the attesting witness. hence it is likewise known as notarial will. of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting
21
Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved.
personally read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two
Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of
persons who would read the will and communicate its contents to him in a 22
which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of
practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should
the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or
be read to him twice; once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again,
16
expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence
by the notary public before whom it is acknowledged.
of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the
signing by the testator of the will and all its pages,and that said witnesses also
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and
another. improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with
29
which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. . . .
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
23
2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that
the pages; whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the
it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively,
attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification,
with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the
and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the
24
testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the
testator and attested to by the witnesses.
testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on
25
the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the
30
attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. Since it is the proverbial
26
execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference:
to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by
27
We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences
them. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will
and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective
as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in
28
names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by
the absence of the testator and its witnesses.
him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published
In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES,
requiring the formalities to be followed in the execution of wills, in the including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered
following manner: correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his
Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
provisions on the law on wills in this Project consists in the
hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in
presence of each and all of us.
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and
subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
"Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to
The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the
subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the
31
testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the
names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.
words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words
32
In Taboada vs. Rizal, we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must,
things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence
the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed
the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and
identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical
involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a
in the attestation.
fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of
It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously
of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language
attesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to
the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree. wit:
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue
assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in
fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis
the requirements of article 805" (Emphasis supplied.) ours.)
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end 3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections
thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language
certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid
their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance
since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner of proving the due
establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination
attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.
of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally
testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various
33
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will
combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
35
in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect
34
We believe that the further comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total
Article 809, wherein he urged caution in the application of the substantial absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in
compliance rule therein, is correct and should be applied in the case under the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the
consideration, as well as to future cases with similar questions: present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the
questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the
. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that
attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will
the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All theses are facts Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions revoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements
were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. make a will, hence when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, 37
disregarded. The subsequent cases ofAvera vs. Garcia, Aldaba vs.
since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis 38 39 40
Roque, Unson vs. Abella, Pecson vs. Coronel, Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios,
whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private 41 42
et al., and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al. all adhered to this position.
respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw
the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the
of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same formalities that should be observed in the execution of wills are mandatory in
and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent cases
43 44
directly. of In the Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin, In re Will of Andrada, Uy Coque
45 46 47
vs. Sioca, In re Estate of Neumark, and Sano vs. Quintana.
4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a
48
divergence of views as to which manner of interpretation should be followed in Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al., provided the Court with the occasion to clarify the
resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in seemingly conflicting decisions in the aforementioned cases. In said case
the execution of wills. The formal requirements were at that time embodied of Gumban, the attestation clause had failed to state that the witnesses signed
primarily in Section 618 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure. Said section the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of
was later amended by Act No. 2645, but the provisions respecting said the testator. The will in question was disallowed, with these reasons therefor:
formalities found in Act. No. 190 and the amendment thereto were practically
In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-
reproduced and adopted in the Civil Code.
mentioned, appellants rely on a series of cases of this court
One view advance the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first laid beginning with (I)n the Matter of the (E)state of Saguinsin
36
down in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, where it was held that the object of ([1920], 41 Phil., 875), continuing with In re Will of Andrada
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against [1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca [1922], 43
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to Phil., 405), and In re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil., 841),
guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject and ending with Sano vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506).
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. Appellee counters with the citation of a series of cases
Nonetheless, it was also emphasized that one must not lose sight of the fact that beginning with Abangan vs. Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476),
continuing through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43 Phil., 378), decisions. They are fundamentally at variance. If we rely on
and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios ([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse.
culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil.,
In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three
152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if possible,
outstanding points may be mentioned. In the first place, the
conciliate the last two decisions cited by opposing counsel,
Mojal, decision was concurred in by only four members of the
namely, those of Sano vs. Quintana,supra, and Nayve vs. Mojal
court, less than a majority, with two strong dissenting opinions;
and Aguilar, supra.
the Quintana decision was concurred in by seven members of
In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an the court, a clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the
attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses second place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in
signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left December, 1924, while the Quintana decision was promulgated
margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a in December, 1925; the Quintana decision was thus subsequent
defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, in point of time. And in the third place, the Quintana decision
was cited, but the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions
was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. of the law.
Mojal and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held that the
The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by
attestation clause must estate the fact that the testator and the
statute. The law of the case is here found in section 61 of the
witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, and in
act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is
section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. It is in part
not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the
provided in section 61, as amended that "No will . . .shall be
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the
valid . . . unless . . .." It is further provided in the same section
will can be proved also by the mere examination of the
that "The attestation shallstate the number of sheets or pages
signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission
used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
to state such evident facts does not invalidate the will.
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; other person to write his name, under his express direction, in
seldom do they admit inconsistency in doctrine. Yet here, the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
unless aided impossible to reconcile the Mojal and Quintana signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that
"The will shall be disallowed in either of the following case: 1. interpretation of wills. Said rule thus became what is now Article 809 of the
If not executed andattested as in this Act provided." The law Civil Code, with this explanation of the Code Commission:
not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously
The present law provides for only one form of executing a will,
goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce
and that is, in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly
No. 2645. The Supreme Court of the Philippines had previously
expressed.
upheld the strict compliance with the legal formalities and had
We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. even said that the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary, modify the Procedure, as amended regarding the contents of the
decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. attestation clause were mandatory, and non-compliance
(Emphases in the original text). therewith invalidated the will (Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil.
405). These decisions necessarily restrained the freedom of the
But after the Gumban clarificatory pronouncement, there were decisions of the
testator in disposing of his property.
Court that once more appeared to revive the seeming diversity of views that was
49
earlier threshed out therein. The cases of Quinto vs. Morata, Rodriguez vs. However, in recent years the Supreme Court changed its
50 51 52
Alcala, Enchevarria vs. Sarmiento, and Testate Estate of Toray went the way attitude and has become more liberal in the interpretation of
53
of the ruling as restated in Gumban. But De Gala vs. Gonzales, et al., Rey vs. the formalities in the execution of wills. This liberal view is
54 55 56
Cartagena, De Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, Sebastian vs. Panganiban, Rodriguez enunciated in the cases of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924,
57 58 59 60
vs. Yap, Grey vs. Fabia, Leynez vs. Leynez, Martir vs. Martir, Alcala vs. De May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R. No. 46097, October 18,
61
Villa, Sabado vs. 1939; Martir vs. Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June 21, 1940; and Alcala
62 63 64
Fernandez, Mendoza vs. Pilapil, and Lopez vs. Liboro, veered away from the vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April 18, 1941.
strict interpretation rule and established a trend toward an application of the
In the above mentioned decisions of our Supreme Court, it has
liberal view.
practically gone back to the original provisions of Section 618 of
The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment by Act No.
the undeniable inclination towards a liberal construction, recommended the 2645 in the year 1916. To turn this attitude into a legislative
codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be in declaration and to attain the main objective of the proposed
accord with the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the
Code in the liberalization of the manner of executing wills, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of
article 829 of the Project is recommended, which reads: respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R
"Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith, forgery,
(Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero)
or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate
influence, defects and imperfections in the
Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with
form of attestation or in the language used
the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and SO ORDERED.
attested in substantial compliance with all the
65
requirements of article 829."
66
The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano, "does not offer
any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The
later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line
with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of
the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself.
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought
to banish any fear of dire results."
It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation
67
of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of

Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032)
First Instance of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by
EN BANC
Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.
DECISION
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally
April 29, 1953 defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
G.R. No. L-5826
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
appellee, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The
Paras (Edgardo), J.:
attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
will required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
EN BANC the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
G.R. No. L-5826 &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp April 29, 1953 The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on
the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-
appellee, their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said
signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on
vs. the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the
three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy
PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
Clouduallo Lucero and Vicente C. Santos for appellants. testator and any or all of the witnesses.
Marciano Chitongco and Zosimo B. Echanova for appellee. Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the will in
question denied. So ordered with costs against the petitioner and appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a

Azuela vs. CA (G.R. NO. 122880, April 12, 2006)
comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will.
THIRD DIVISION Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of
the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the
vs. testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
G. CASTILLO, Respondents.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the
DECISION Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix
Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which
TINGA, J.:
was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed decedent.
by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read
In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the
in full:
Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in
the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
the Civil Code.
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila,
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective.
ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali
And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-
is just aching for judicial rejection. ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat
(Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa
akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng
pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang kasulatan ito.
panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng
address: 500 San Diego St.
karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24,
Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang QUIRINO AGRAVA
pasubalit at kondiciones; address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-
lagak ng piyansiya. LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
1981.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
(Sgd.)
JUANITO ESTRERA
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: City Court Compound,
(Tagapagmana)
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Maynila.
Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa
(Sgd.)
ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10
1 6
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-8 August 1992. The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three
(3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more
7
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the freedom in expressing his last wishes;" and from this perspective, rebutted
decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in
alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and accordance with law.
that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the
2
decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a
purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic
usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
3
properties of the decedent. It also asserted that contrary to the representations
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end
of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely
of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made
her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died
4
in 1965, and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who "Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
5
predeceased her mother by three (3) months. ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling
Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and
sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon,
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature
sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng
petition.
kasulatan ito."
9
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the the dismissal of the petition for probate. The Court of Appeals noted that the
acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus
10
with the requirements of the law. rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the Hence, the present petition.
subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the
"the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is
will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the
merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he
bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and 11
termed as "the substantial compliance rule."
attestation of the will.
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered
Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation
did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the another.
testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
not a fatal defect.
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix
8 written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
and the due execution of the will.
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the
interpreted to them. signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with
16
much greater difficulty."
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was
sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of 17
pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal." It was further observed that "it
the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an
cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against
examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen
18
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."
12
number of pages of the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with 19
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v.
this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of 20
Hon. Rosal, wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein
pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the
despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of
requisite was left uncomplied with.
the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases,
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing and made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and
13 14
in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca and In re: Will of Andrada. In Uy which we adopt with approval:
Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the
failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the
attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is
15
will. In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made
written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The
purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel
is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada]
sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still
and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not
numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case
the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the
attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause
however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will: failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have
been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from
"x x x
the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first
Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by
of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed
held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises
interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself
heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this
42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not
The ratio decidendiof these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must
stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and 21
acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated.
that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will
if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal
While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon requirement of wills was Section
which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a
22
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages
takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the
23
of the will is extant from Section 618. However, the enactment of the Civil
realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from
considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the: pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that
"x x x
the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
requirements of article 805." attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages,
and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission,
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only
which stated that "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the 29
check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of
the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its
[freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the
[modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply
24
wills." However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will
Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their
such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
30
the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and other, the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation
25
influence upon the testator." cannot be lightly disregarded.
26
Caneda v. Court of Appeals features an extensive discussion made by Justice Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that
Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly,
27
attestation clause in wills. Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However,
several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
28
construction. However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
31
liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article itself." Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed
809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual
Article 809 should be applied: examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses
signed in one anothers presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied 32
attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.
by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law
in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an
is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that
33
pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state should necessarily lead to its rejection.
the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the
of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to.
left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the
clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been 36
Cagro v. Cagro is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the
no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
37 38
number of pages which comprise the will. hand margin." While three (3) Justices considered the signature requirement
had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with
Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed,
the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the
rendering the will fatally defective.
inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article
805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
34
intercalation of notarial wills. Compliance with these requirements, however
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The
picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the
attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the
35 will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
manner established in the will. The transcendent legislative intent, even as
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
admission of wills to probate.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on
the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as
their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which
signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page
the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that
to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the
39
testator and any or all of the witnesses. attestation clause.
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition
by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two
should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be
classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to
the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article
the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of
contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is
Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in
separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation
compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed
the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod
40
since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly ng Maynila." By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as
different avowal. an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case 41
act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually
signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page
declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary
containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental
that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is
the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully
42
by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are
document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, no longer material to the
the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document.
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the
Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of
instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin,
and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would
except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only
44
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is signature appearing at the so-called "logical end" of the will on its first page.
that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but
will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as
45
own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another mandatory. Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be
all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive
free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as
43
act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article
to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to 805 by whoever executed the will.
the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from
pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who
makes the probate denial inexorable.
participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those
SO ORDERED.
persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is
under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
probate of said alleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole heir.
Article 806 Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog,
Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the
Azuela vs. CA (G.R. NO. 122880, April 12, 2006) see earlier case under Article
805 petition on the ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that
the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; and
Garcia vs. Gatchalian (G.R. No. L-20357. November 25, 1967.) that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the
time of the alleged execution of said will.
EN BANC
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document
G.R. No. L-20357 November 25, 1967
Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New
OF GREGORIO GATCHALIAN, deceased. PEDRO REYES Civil Code that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
GARCIA, petitioner-appellant, testator and the witnesses.
vs.
An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same was
FELIPE GATCHALIAN, AURORA G. CAMINS, ANGELES G. COSCA,
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental
FEDERICO G. TUBOG, VIRGINIA G. TALANAY and ANGELES G.
witnesses.
TALANAY, oppositors-appellees.
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

E. Debuque for petitioner-appellant.
E. L. Segovia for oppositors-appellees. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
DIZON, J.:
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia from the decision of the Court of
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the
First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2623 denying the allowance of
above legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a
the will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian, on the ground that the attesting
notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its
witnesses did not acknowledge it before a notary public, as required by law.
validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is
municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of obvious that the same may not be probated.
the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above named court for the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

where the issue was concentrated into three specific questions: (1) whether the
Javellana vs. Ledesma (97 Phil 258)
testament of 1950 was executed by the testatrix in the presence of the
EN BANC
instrumental witnesses; (2) whether the acknowledgment clause was signed and
DECISION the notarial seal affixed by the notary without the presence of the testatrix and
the witnesses; and (3) if so, whether the codicil was thereby rendered invalid
June 30, 1955
and ineffective. These questions are the same ones presented to us for
G.R. No. L-7179 resolution.
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD JAVELLANA,

The contestant argues that the Court below erred in refusing credence to her
petitioner-appellee,
witnesses Maria Paderogao and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of
vs.
the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that on March 30, 1950, they
DOA MATEA LEDESMA, oppositor-appellant.
saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform the
Fulgencio Vega and Felix D. Bacabac for appellant. deceased that he had brought the testamento and urge her to go to attorney
Benjamin H. Tirot for appellee. Tabianas office to sign it; that Da. Apolinaria manifested that she could not go,
, J.: because she was not feeling well; and that upon Yaps insistence that the will
By order of July 23, 1953, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate had to be signed in the attorneys office and not elsewhere, the deceased took
the documents in the Visayan dialect, marked Exhibits D and E, as the the paper and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and returned it with the
testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma statement that no one would question it because the property involved was
Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with exclusively hers.
Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The
Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for reversing
contestant, Da. Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said
the trial Courts rejection of the improbable story of the witnesses. It is squarely
deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not
contradicted by the concordant testimony of the instrumental witnesses,
executed in conformity with law. The appeal was made directly to this Court
Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon Tabiana, and his wife Gloria Montinola, who asserted
because the value of the properties involved exceeded two hundred thousand
under oath that the testament was executed by testatrix and witnesses in the
pesos.
presence of each other, at the house of the decedent on General Hughes St.,
Originally the opposition to the probate also charged that the testatrix lacked Iloilo City, on March 30, 1950. And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage,
testamentary capacity and that the dispositions were procured through undue that either Tabiana or Yap should have insisted that Da. Apolinaria, an infirm
influence. These grounds were abandoned at the hearing in the court below, lady then over 80 years old, should leave her own house in order to execute her
will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for the purpose. understood by the testatrix, it appearing in evidence that those terms are of
Moreover, the cross-examination has revealed fatal flaws in the testimony of common use even in the vernacular, and that the deceased was a woman of wide
Contestants witnesses. Both claim to have heard the word testamento for the business interests.
first time when Yap used it; and they claimed ability to recall that word four
The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that signing of
years later, despite the fact that the term meant nothing to either. It is well
the certificate of acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to the Codicil in
known that what is to be remembered must first be rationally conceived and
Visayan, Exhibit E. Unlike the testament, this codicil was executed after the
assimilated (II Moore on Facts, p. 884). Likewise, Maria Paderogao was positive
enactment of the new Civil Code, and, therefore, had to be acknowledged before
that Yap brought the will, and that the deceased alone signed it, precisely on
a notary public (Art. 806). Now, the instrumental witnesses (who happen to be
March 30, 1950; but she could remember no other date, nor give satisfactory
the same ones who attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had
explanation why that particular day stuck in her mind. Worse still, Allado
been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the
claimed to have heard what allegedly transpired between Yap and Da.
same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On
Apolinaria from the kitchen of the house, that was later proved to have been
the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil
separated from the deceaseds quarters, and standing at a much lower level, so
to his office, and signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily
that conversations in the main building could not be distinctly heard from the
imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears
kitchen. Later, on redirect examination, Allado sought to cure his testimony by
rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in
claiming that he was upstairs in a room where the servants used to eat when he
recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs
heard Yap converse with his mistress; but this correction is unavailing, since it
slightly from it (II Moore on Facts, p. 878; The Ellen McGovern, 27 Fed. 868,
was plainly induced by two highly leading questions from contestants counsel
870).
that had been previously ruled out by the trial Court. Besides, the contradiction
is hardly consonant with this witness 18 years of service to the deceased. At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed
the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the
Upon the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889
witnesses urged upon us by the contestant-appellant, concerning the presence
(Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator,
or absence of Aurelio Montinola at the signing of the testament or of the codicil,
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of
and the identity of the person who inserted the date therein, are not material
Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and
and are largely imaginary, since the witness Mrs. Tabiana confessed inability to
witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that
remember all the details of the transaction. Neither are we impressed by the
every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
argument that the use of some Spanish terms in the codicil and testament (like
witnesses (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the
legado, partes iguales, plena propiedad) is proof that its contents were not
authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in

executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in the case before us. The
subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the
testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the
acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses can not be said
to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption
(Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil. 643), or, as the Roman maxim puts it, uno
codem die ac tempore in eadem loco, and no reversible error was committed by
the Court in so holding. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code
does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should
acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.
The decision admitting the will to probate is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the
Cruz vs. Villasor (November 26, 1973)
case hinges, is whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz
FIRST DIVISION (Exhibit "E") was executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and
806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to
attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973 witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr.,
vs. Dr. Francisco Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named,
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents. have been acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was attested
and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the
Paul G. Gorrez for petitioner.
testator and of each other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must
Mario D. Ortiz for respondent Manuel B. Lugay. appear before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third witness is
the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the
ESGUERRA, J.: other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed
executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least
allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them,
Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as
opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed pertinent, reads as follows:
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said
instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the against the purely technical reason that one of the witnesses
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. required by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the
will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course. execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are 130). There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in nonetheless makes him a witness thereon (Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S. E. 2d.
question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before 346; In Re Douglas Will, N. Y. S. 2d. 641; Ragsdal v. Hill, 269 S. W. 2d. 911, Tyson
whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third Utterback, 122 So. 496; In Re Baybee's Estate 160 N. 900; W. Merill v. Boal, 132 A.
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having 721; See also Trenwith v. Smallwood, 15 So. 1030). But these authorities do not
signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue
Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to aforecited cases
to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. (The merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not
New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, p. 72; Funk & as acknowledgingwitnesses. He the notary public acted not only as attesting
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252; Webster's witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805
New International Dictionary 2d. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness of the Civil Code which reads:
were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another with
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a
the office of the Clerk of Court. [Emphasis supplied]
situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
any illegal or immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of
instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the validity
Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment,
result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the
which is to minimize fraud (Report of Code Commission p. 106-107), would be
notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be
thwarted.
duly in observed.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in
addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized.
(Mahilum v. Court Appeals, 64 0. G. 4017; 17 SCRA 482; Sawyer v. Cox, 43 Ill.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is
declared not valid and hereby set aside.
Cost against the appellee.

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. An

Conejos vs. Yves (11 C.A. Rep. 945) Case not Found!
instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be
Gonzales vs. CA (May 25, 1979) see earlier case under Article 805 stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be
Gabucan vs. Judge Manta (21 SCRA 1056, January 28, 1980)
recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of
SECOND DIVISION transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court
until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980 thereto and cancelled.
JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant, No notary public or other officer authorized to administer
vs. oaths shall add his jurat or acknowledgment to any document
HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and NELDA G. subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper
ENCLONAR, respondents-appellees. documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
Ignacio A. Calingin for appellant. The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is
subject to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed in section 225 of the
Tax Code, now section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code.
AQUINO, J.:
Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner's
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp to the
the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp. original of the will. (See Mahilum vs. Court of Appeals, 64 O. G. 4017, 17 SCRA
482, 486.)
The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its "decision" of December 28, 1977 in
Special Proceeding No. 41 for the probate of the will of the late Rogaciano The case was brought to this Court by means of a petition for mandamus to
Gabucan, dismissed the proceeding (erroneously characterizes as an "action") compel the lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from its decision. In this
Court's resolution of January 21, 1980 the petition for mandamus was treated in
The proceeding was dismissed because the requisite documentary stamp was
the interest of substantial and speedy justice as an appeal under Republic Act
not affixed to the notarial acknowledgment in the will and, hence, according to
No. 5440 as well as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the
of Court.
Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code, which reads:
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no
documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to
probate" and, consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed".
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or
proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the
notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-
admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary
stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled."
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the
taxable document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena 49 Phil.
749). If the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court
should have allowed plaintiff's tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs.
Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the documentary stamp on a document
does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet
12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar 16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's dismissal of the petition for probate is reversed
and set aside. It is directed to decide the case on the merits in the light of the
parties' evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will
Article 808 entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son
(petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the
Alvarado vs. Gaviola (226 SCRA 317)
time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz,
FIRST DIVISION Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by

private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner, testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four
vs. followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO them.
QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices,

Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on
Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI
9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled
MA. RINO, respondents.
"Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na
Vicente R. Redor for petitioner. may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some
dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation.
Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.
Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was
BELLOSILLO, J.: private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the
1 three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 of the First Civil
public who followed the reading using their own copies.
Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
2
which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the
3 4
Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament with codicil of testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the
the late Brigido Alvarado. Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan,
5
Laguna. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied
the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; with?
that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido
at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was
Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed.
executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by
However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet"
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who
by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years
stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the
and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on
signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
14 December 1977.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify
in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an
Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that
the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him
Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by
required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term
the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the
will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the
6
requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), the contents of
were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise
7
and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the was admitted by private respondent. Dr. Roasa explained that although the
instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either
followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first
8
making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served. consultation.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony,
purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were
9
executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." Since the testator and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had
was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 been complied with.
need not be complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall
We agree with petitioner in this respect. be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the
notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable
known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before
of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and
signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his
this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his
10 11 12
instructions.
"poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision making it necessary for private
respondent to do the actual reading for him. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary
public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who
13
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez provides an insight into
drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud
the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as
that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand,
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental
accordance with his wishes . . .
witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir)
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be
will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his
denied.
will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor,"
"defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is
conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being
is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so
14
confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there
the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
17
signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner account, may only defeat the testator's will.
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate
made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect
Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following
to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that 18
pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, to wit:
Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The
uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the
even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
15
precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently.
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O.
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician)
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
asked the testator whether the contents of the document were of his own free
16 entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will,
will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. With four persons following the
must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the
testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms
affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to
appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his
consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered
the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the
Ranieses) being known to him since childhood. incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been
accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose

has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent

Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of
time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate of a will
Garcia vs. Vasquez (32 SCRA 490) Case not Found!
alleged to have been executed by one Gregoria Villaflor who died in the
municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on October 7, 1925. The
Article 809
petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the
Alvarado vs. Gaviola (226 SCRA 317) see earlier case under Article 808 deceased. Pilar Villaflor, Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do
not appear in the record, contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That
it was not signed by the alleged testatrix personally though she was able to do so
at the time of the execution of the document; (2) that said testatrix did not
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784) see earlier case under Article 805
authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name; (3) that both before and
after the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various
documents by thumb marks; (4) that although it is true that the testatrix
Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032) see earlier case under Article 805
requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless refused to sign it because it
was contrary to her desires and instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date
upon which the alleged will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several
Taboada vs. Rosal (November 5, 1983) see earlier case under Article 805 occasions stated that it was not her testament; (6) that the alleged will was not
executed or signed in conformity of the law.
The grounds upon which the court below based the rejection of the document
Villaflor vs. Tobias (53 Phil 714)
are thus stated in this decision.
EN BANC After a careful examination of all the evidence of record, this court is of opinion
that it has been sufficiently proved that Claro Lazo, the person who is alleged to
G.R. No. L-27440 December 24, 1927
have written the name of the testatrix in her behalf and by her express direction,
JOSE VILLAFLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS, ET subscribed the name and surname of the testatrix and signed the will in
AL., oppositors-appellees. question without Rufino D. Soliven, one of the attesting witnesses, signed it; and
lastly, when Rufino D. Soliven signed the will the witness Vicente Tacderas was
Simeon Ramos and Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant.
not present.
Vicente Foz and Antonio Directo for appellees.
OSTRAND, J.:
Besides the foregoing defect, which the court believes fatal, it also finds that the and the attesting witnesses were Vicente Tacderas, municipal president, Rufino
will in question, marked Exhibit B of the applicant, was typewritten on eight D. Soliven, chief of police, and Mariano Pizarro, municipal treasurer, all of the
catalan sheets, one separated from the others; that the attestation clause was town of Santo Domingo. The finding of the court below that the witness Soliven
written on a separate sheet, marked page 9, when said clause could not have was not present when Claro Lazo signed the name of testatrix and when Vicente
been written totally or partially on page 8, since one-half of this latter page is Tacderas signed as witness, is based on the fact that, in testifying in this case,
blank. Claro Lazo upon being asked to enumerate the names of the persons present at
the time of signing of the document, omitted the name of Soliven. But it appears
In the opinion of the court, all this circumstances tend to make the authenticity
from the transcript of the testimony that he afterwards corrected his original
and due execution of the will in question very doubtful and suspicious. And if
statement and testified that Soliven, as well as the other witnesses to the will,
the testimony of the witnesses for the opposition should be taken into account
was present while all of the signatures were fixed. This is in harmony with the
as well as the circumstance that the testatrix Gregoria Villaflor has neither
testimony of all of the instrumental witnesses and is undoubtfully true; there is,
signed or subscribed the alleged will, notwithstanding the fact that it has been
indeed, nothing strange or unusual in a mistake such as that made by Lazo. It
proven in the record, that on July 12, 1923, the day in which it is alleged that said
may be noted that it is not disputed that the lawyer Gallardo was present during
will was executed, the testatrix was, in good and sound health, although she
the whole proceeding and as he appears to have possessed full knowledge of the
could not walk on her own feet inasmuch as she was then suffering from
formal requirements for the execution of the will, it is highly improbable that he
rheumatism or partial paralysis of the lower extremities, and that on July 27, and
would have allowed the will in question to be signed without the presence of a
May 25, 1923, the testatrix Gregoria Villaflor used to mark with her thumb, if she
testatrix and of all the witnesses.
did not sign, the document she executed, as it was proven during the trials by
Exhibit 1 and 2 of the opponents, the doubt and suspicion which this court That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on
entertains in regard to the authenticity of the will in question, becomes a the last page of the body of the document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor
certainty that said testament is false. importance and is explained by the fact that if the clause had been written on
the eight page of the will in direction continuation of the body thereof, there
We are reluctant to set aside the findings of the court below but they are, in our
would have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses
opinion, so clearly without sufficient support in the record that we are
to the clause. It is also to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon
constrained to reject them. The will in question is dated July 12, 1923, and was
which the attestation clause is written, bear the signatures of all the witnesses
prepared by a lawyer, Eustaquio Gallardo, and as far as appearances go, was
and that there is no question whatever as to the genuineness of said signatures.
executed in strict compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for the execution of wills. The testatrix's name was signed by
one Claro Lazo, a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer of Santo Domingo,
The fact that the name of the testatrix was written by another person, and that
she did not sign by thumb mark, is easily explained and is evidently due to an
attempt on the part of the lawyer Gallardo to comply strictly with the following
clause in the Spanish text of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Excepto
en el caso a que se refiere el articulo anterior, no sera valido para la transmision
de bienes muebles e inmuebles, ni los gravara y afectara, ningun testamento a
menos que este escrito y que haya sido firmado por el testador, o que lleve el
nombre de este, escrito por otra persona en su presencia y bajo su direccion
expresa, . . . ." The making of a finger mark is not "escribir" and it may be noted
that Gallardo apparently is a good Spanish scholar, that it does not appear that
he knows the English language;. and that he therefore probably used the
Spanish text of the Code.
There is some testimony on the part of the contestants to the effect that the
testatrix on various occasions, subsequent to the execution of the will, had
stated that it was not in conformity with her instructions and that it was not her
will. Assuming that such statements were made, we can give them but little
importance. The testatrix was an old woman and might have well made the
statements by way of justification in conversation with persons who considered
themselves wronged by the provisions of her will, but expressions of that kind
cannot, of course, work the revocation of the document. The testatrix lived for
over two years after the will was made and had ample opportunity to make
another will if she was dissatisfied with the first.
For the reasons stated the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and it is ordered
that the document in question be admitted to probate as the last will and
testament of the deceased Gregoria Villaflor. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus,
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781/784) see earlier case under Article 805
Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R.
Article 810
Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
Roxas vs. De Jesus, Jr. (Jan. 28, 1985)
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator.
FIRST DIVISION After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered
to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator,
JESUS, petitioners,
he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on
vs.
pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners. Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I
want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus. Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter
dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de
Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: her signature. They further testified that their deceased mother understood
English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C.
"FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.
Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI
disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to
de Jesus. probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because
a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force,
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and
(c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
execution.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic
the probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted
in accordance with law. the phrase Ao mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should
be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter
Will should prevail.
alia that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was
not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported
requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution holographic Will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil
and that this should be strictly complied with. Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution.
The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order
Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code
and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word
whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes
"dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The
the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic
dispositive portion of the order reads:
Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the petitioner cannot
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes
Will of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills
having been executed as required by the law. The order of are strictly construed.
August 24, 1973 is hereby set aside.

We agree with the petitioner.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills.
with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the

The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the xxx xxx xxx
provisions of the law on wigs in this Project consists in the
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in
record are to be considered in the application of any given rule.
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution
wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent
of the wilt and the instrument appears to have been executed
the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and
substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law,
improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of although the document may suffer from some imperfection of
the Code Commission, p. 103) language, or other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68
Phil. 745).
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v.
Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that: If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites,
although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose
xxx xxx xxx
sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator followed by the testator.
expressed in his last will and testament on the ground that any
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been
disposition made by the testator is better than that which the
expounded by this Court inAbangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing
more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
decedent. is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
and authenticity. ...
order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies
has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator
the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1
should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus, Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of
bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and
Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix
herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the
genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection
interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic
Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic
Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is
no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the
date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
On February 9, 1979, Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay, widow and special

Labrador vs. CA (180 SCRA 120)
administratix of the estate of the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay, brought before
THIRD DIVISION the then Court of First Instance of Olongapo an action against Artemio
Panganiban, Subic Land Corporation (SUBIC), Filipinas Manufacturer's Bank
G.R. No. 58168 December 19, 1989
(FILMANBANK) and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. In her complaint, she
CONCEPCION MAGSAYSAY-LABRADOR, SOLEDAD MAGSAYSAY- alleged that in 1958, she and her husband acquired, thru conjugal funds, a parcel
CABRERA, LUISA MAGSAYSAY-CORPUZ, assisted be her husband, Dr. of land with improvements, known as "Pequena Island", covered by TCT No.
Jose Corpuz, FELICIDAD P. MAGSAYSAY, and MERCEDES MAGSAYSAY- 3258; that after the death of her husband, she discovered [a] an annotation at
DIAZ, petitioners, the back of TCT No. 3258 that "the land was acquired by her husband from his
vs. separate capital;" [b] the registration of a Deed of Assignment dated June 25,
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ADELAIDA RODRIGUEZ-MAGSAYSAY, 1976 purportedly executed by the late Senator in favor of SUBIC, as a result of
Special Administratrix of the Estate of the late Genaro F. which TCT No. 3258 was cancelled and TCT No. 22431 issued in the name of
Magsaysay respondents. SUBIC; and [c] the registration of Deed of Mortgage dated April 28, 1977 in the
amount of P 2,700,000.00 executed by SUBIC in favor of FILMANBANK; that the
foregoing acts were void and done in an attempt to defraud the conjugal
FERNAN, C.J.: partnership considering that the land is conjugal, her marital consent to the
annotation on TCT No. 3258 was not obtained, the change made by the Register
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reverse and set aside
of Deeds of the titleholders was effected without the approval of the
1
[1] the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July l3, 1981, affirming that of the
Commissioner of Land Registration and that the late Senator did not execute
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City which denied petitioners'
the purported Deed of Assignment or his consent thereto, if obtained, was
motion to intervene in an annulment suit filed by herein private respondent,
secured by mistake, violence and intimidation. She further alleged that the
and [2] its resolution dated September 7, 1981, denying their motion for
assignment in favor of SUBIC was without consideration and consequently null
reconsideration.
and void. She prayed that the Deed of Assignment and the Deed of Mortgage be
Petitioners are raising a purely legal question; whether or not respondent Court annulled and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT No. 22431 and
of Appeals correctly denied their motion for intervention. to issue a new title in her favor.
The facts are not controverted. On March 7, 1979, herein petitioners, sisters of the late senator, filed a motion
for intervention on the ground that on June 20, 1978, their brother conveyed to
them one-half (1/2 ) of his shareholdings in SUBIC or a total of 416,566.6 shares
and as assignees of around 41 % of the total outstanding shares of such stocks of corporation and that it appears that they are more vitally interested in the
SUBIC, they have a substantial and legal interest in the subject matter of outcome of the case than SUBIC.
litigation and that they have a legal interest in the success of the suit with
Viewed in the light of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court
respect to SUBIC.
affirms the respondent court's holding that petitioners herein have no legal
On July 26, 1979, the court denied the motion for intervention, and ruled that interest in the subject matter in litigation so as to entitle them to intervene in
petitioners have no legal interest whatsoever in the matter in litigation and their the proceedings below. In the case of Batama Farmers' Cooperative Marketing
4
being alleged assignees or transferees of certain shares in SUBIC cannot legally Association, Inc. v. Rosal, we held: "As clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of
entitle them to intervene because SUBIC has a personality separate and distinct the Rules of Court, to be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party
from its stockholders. must have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as to be
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals found no factual or legal justification to
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the
disturb the findings of the lower court. The appellate court further stated that
custody of the court or an officer thereof ."
whatever claims the petitioners have against the late Senator or against SUBIC
for that matter can be ventilated in a separate proceeding, such that with the To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in
denial of the motion for intervention, they are not left without any remedy or the matter in litigation, or otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must be
judicial relief under existing law. given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant recourse.
separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not
5
Petitioners anchor their right to intervene on the purported assignment made more important than the second.
by the late Senator of a certain portion of his shareholdings to them as

2
The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties
evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1978. Such transfer, petitioners
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character
posit, clothes them with an interest, protected by law, in the matter of litigation.
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
Invoking the principle enunciated in the case of PNB v. Phil. Veg. Oil Co., 49 effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties of the action could be
3
Phil. 857,862 & 853 (1927), petitioners strongly argue that their ownership of allowed to intervene, proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated,
6
41.66% of the entire outstanding capital stock of SUBIC entitles them to a expensive and interminable. And this is not the policy of the law.
significant vote in the corporate affairs; that they are affected by the action of
The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of
the widow of their late brother for it concerns the only tangible asset of the
action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in a legal position to
litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which Magsaysay v. Panganiban, etc.; Concepcion Labrador, et al. Intervenors", seeking
7
plaintiff could not recover. to annul the purported Deed of Assignment in favor of SUBIC and its
annotation at the back of TCT No. 3258 in the name of respondent's deceased
Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect,
husband; [3] SEC Case No. 001770, filed by respondent praying, among other
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the very least,
things that she be declared in her capacity as the surviving spouse and
their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in the
administratrix of the estate of Genaro Magsaysay as the sole subscriber and
management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and in the
stockholder of SUBIC. There, petitioners, by motion, sought to intervene. Their
properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate
motion to reconsider the denial of their motion to intervene was granted; [4] SP
debts and obligations.
No. Q-26739 before the CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, petitioners herein filing a
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the contingent claim pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86, Revised Rules of
9
property of the corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof with any legal Court. Petitioners' interests are no doubt amply protected in these cases.
right or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate property being
Neither do we lend credence to petitioners' argument that they are more
equitable or beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners
interested in the outcome of the case than the corporation-assignee, owing to
of corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal
the fact that the latter is willing to compromise with widow-respondent and
8
person.
since a compromise involves the giving of reciprocal concessions, the only
Petitioners further contend that the availability of other remedies, as declared conceivable concession the corporation may give is a total or partial
10
by the Court of appeals, is totally immaterial to the availability of the remedy of relinquishment of the corporate assets.
intervention.
Such claim all the more bolsters the contingent nature of petitioners' interest in
We cannot give credit to such averment. As earlier stated, that the movant's the subject of litigation.
interest may be protected in a separate proceeding is a factor to be considered in

The factual findings of the trial court are clear on this point. The petitioners
allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention. It is significant to note at this
cannot claim the right to intervene on the strength of the transfer of shares
juncture that as per records, there are four pending cases involving the parties
allegedly executed by the late Senator. The corporation did not keep books and
herein, enumerated as follows: [1] Special Proceedings No. 122122 before the CFI 11
records. Perforce, no transfer was ever recorded, much less effected as to
of Manila, Branch XXII, entitled "Concepcion Magsaysay-Labrador, et al. v.
prejudice third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the
Subic Land Corp., et al.", involving the validity of the transfer by the late Genaro
corporation to affect third persons. The law on corporations is explicit. Section
Magsaysay of one-half of his shareholdings in Subic Land Corporation; [2] Civil
63 of the Corporation Code provides, thus: "No transfer, however, shall be valid,
Case No. 2577-0 before the CFI of Zambales, Branch III, "Adelaida Rodriguez-
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the
transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares
transferred."
And even assuming arguendo that there was a valid transfer, petitioners are
nonetheless barred from intervening inasmuch as their rights can be ventilated
and amply protected in another proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco Azaola testified

Article 811 that he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the
death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife; that the
Azaola vs. Singson (109 Phil 102)
witness testified also that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the
EN BANC holographic will (Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce
DECISION said statement, witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of
the attorney (Exh. F), and the general power of attorney (Exh. F-1), besides the
August 5, 1960 deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there
were further exhibited in court two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to
G.R. No. L-14003
show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said witness,
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid documentary
vs.
evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the
F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant. testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the
Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee. testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that
, J.: the holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix. apparently it must
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 have been written by her (t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page 16 on the same
by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q- transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by
2640, involves the determination of the quantity of evidence required for the counsel if he was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting of the deceased
probate of a holographic will. Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he answered positively in the affirmative and when he
was asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the previous answer as
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from (Rec.
appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers (testatrix), he answered, I
App. pp. 22-24):
would definitely say it is hers; that it was also established in the proceedings
Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that on that the assessed value of the property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon City,
September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of P7,000.00.
known to be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the
herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will
will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
(Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the
the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the
instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
the will. been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law
(Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code,
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and
witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of
because the lone witness presented by the proponent did not prove sufficiently
the testator and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not
that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.
so express) that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more testator. There may be no available witness of the testators hand; or even if so
than one witness because the wills authenticity was not questioned; and familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an
witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article
its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party. 811 prescribes that -
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph,
and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least
one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be
the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
resorted to. (691a). presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived
from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not
Phil. 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742). But it can not be ignored that the
contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if
requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary
the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805).
Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo apartado, (siempre que
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no testigos y dudaran o no estos
absurd results are to be avoided. respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los sucesos
words if the Court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems y de su significacion, para responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya
essential is that the Court should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Where de dictar.
the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no
their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
unfavourable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to offer expert
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or
evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony
none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should,
of the lay witnesses.
resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil
that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Code of Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been
1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would
remarks: be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to
adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, should the Court deem
La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho
them necessary.
precepto induce la conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte
de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records
la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten insertas en los autos ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in
del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La prudencia con que el Juez debe conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record shall not be
de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y retaken. No costs.
peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de
todos los interes comprometidos en aquel.
En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion facultativa del
dicho profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que
pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y
Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in

Icasiano vs. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422) see earlier case under Article 805
the instant case.
Azaola vs. Singson (109 Phil 102) see earlier case under Article 811
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment
Codoy vs. Calugay (312 SCRA 333 (1999)) rendered allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator
2
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
FIRST DIVISION
The facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
vs.
de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA 3
petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on
PATIGAS, respondents.
January 16, 1990.
PARDO, J.:
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on
1
Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling: August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed
in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal
4
holographic will has been established and the handwriting and property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.
signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will.

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the 5
opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a
holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff
forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third
has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a
hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seo Vda. de
motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon
Ramonal executed the holographic will.
the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion
is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who
executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where
at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the presented bear the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for
part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1wphi1.nt the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting of the
testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.
6
whom the evidence is offered.
Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence,
claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to
the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters'
Ramonal. affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer
available.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads: Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to
lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969.
Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for
During those eleven (11) years of close association the deceased, she acquired
probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic
familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her
Will of the late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for
7
(deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.
tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In
8
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, and in support of addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting
their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her
following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde creditors.
Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6)
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of
Evangeline Calugay.
Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978,
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased
account of their testimonies. and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will,
were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of 2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.
Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her
late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the August 30, 1978
latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not
be sure. 1. Eufemia Patigas
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the 2. Josefina Salcedo
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that
3. Evangeline Calugay
she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was
familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the signed documents in her (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.
August 30, 1978
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived
with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a 4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to
long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She Evangeline R. Calugay
testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and
genuine signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
August 30, 1978
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as
follows: 5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of
Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I
Instruction
am no longer around.
August 30, 1978

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
August 30, 1978

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with
the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
August 30, 1978
That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article 811
Gene and Manuel: prescribes that
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully. in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
Mama
resorted to.
Matilde Vda de Ramonal

As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness
9
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision ruling that the ma be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and
Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
the Court of Appeals held:

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had)
are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL
to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered
probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the
execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is
new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of holographic, no witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring
the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if
any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting absurd results are to be avoided.
and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course,
Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the
even if the law does not express) "that the will and the signature are in
words "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law
the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced
and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and
may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the
hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein,
convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to and allowed the will to probate.
handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. The petitioners raise the following issues:
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the (1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil.
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses the case.
to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
respondents had been able to present credible evidence to that the date,
holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three
text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand
witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the
of the testatrix.
court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust
all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the (3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are
still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement
10 for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal testator.1wphi1.nt
Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that
the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code
herself. is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that
"shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the A. Collecting rentals.
11
word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.
Q. From where?
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or
A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez
mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give 12
streets.
effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility
that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat xxx xxx xxx
the wishes of the testator.
Q. Who sometime accompany her?
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to
A. I sometimes accompany her.
determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective
consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
testator.
13
A. Yes, sir.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified
xxx xxx xxx
explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of
Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he
Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one
merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court.
you are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic was that of the deceased. A. Yes, sir.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose
to identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not signature is that Mrs. Binanay?
even produced as it was no longer available.

A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided
A. I am familiar with her signature.
with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the
court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde
keep herself busy that time? vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
A. Yes, sir. Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing
to you a document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are
Q. Why do you say so?
referring to?
A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of

A. Yes, sir.
Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.
Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon",
Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?
whose handwriting is this?
14
A. In handwritten.
A. My Aunt.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of 16

A. Because I am familiar with her signature.
tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire
familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal? What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased,
which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw
A. Posting records.
the deceased sign a document or write a note.
Q. Aside from that?

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the
A. Carrying letters. fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but
was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Letters of whom?
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if
A. Matilde.
the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
Q. To whom?
A. Yes, sir.
15
A. To her creditors.
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
xxx xxx xxx

A. I.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?

A. It was in my mother's possession. in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it
only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly
Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was
person is that correct?
originally in the possession of your mother?
17
A. Yes, sir.
A. 1985.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk
xxx xxx xxx
agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your correct?
mother left that will to you and therefore you have that in your 19
A. Yes, sir.
possession?
xxx xxx xxx
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador
when she died. Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you
know that there are retracings in the word Vda.?
Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
A. I presented it to the fiscal.
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
Q. For what purpose?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Just to seek advice.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in
Q. Advice of what?
Matilde is continued towards letter D.
18
A. About the will.
A. Yes, sir.
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put
20
A. Yes, sir. Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the
questioned signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked
xxx xxx xxx
as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?
holographic will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. 21

A. Yes, sir.
This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from
August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and
Ramonal is beautifully written and legible? signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted. Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde
and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was
the services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was
exhausted? A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and
then to her transactions.
A. In writing.
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not
present and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying
apparent inconsistencies? taxes and to her lawyer.
A. That was I think. (sic). Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year A. I used to be her personal driver.
as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of
no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a
the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here
refers to one of the petitioners? A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir. Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
22
A. Because I lived with her since birth.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession?
dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will Where?
you tell this court whose signature is this?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de
Q. Why do you say that is her signature? Ramonal?
23
A. I am familiar with her signature. A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?
never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which
26
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that: was under the court before.
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal? xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory
godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity. which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there
appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal,
Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?
whose signature is this?
24
A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.
A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Matilde Ramonal have legitimate children? 27
Ramonal.
25
A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case Q. Why do you say that?
No. 427 what were the other assistance wherein you were rendering
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if
28
signature is this?
there are documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall.
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they
xxx xxx xxx
29
are similar.
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly
xxx xxx xxx
go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are
familiar with the handwriting contained in that document marked as Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of
exhibit "S"? Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the
signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs.
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature
Matilde vda de Ramonal.
because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de you have made?
Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this? 30
A. That is true.
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will
partition.
to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested
31
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs.Singson, ruling that the
can you tell the court whose signature is that? requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
32
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of the
vda de Ramonal. solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
33
their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit
34 35
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing
that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
by the deceased.
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one
adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic
of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the
will of the deceased Matilde Seo vda. de Ramonal.1wphi1.nt
testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as
early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased. No costs.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the SO ORDERED.
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her
during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-
examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with
that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former
lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature
in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were
uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on

Rodelas vs. Aranza:.
the following grounds:
FIRST DIVISION
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982 a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the
death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
Rules of Court;
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-
appellant, (2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not
vs. contain a disposition of property after death and was not
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a
SUMULONG, intervenor. will
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant. (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or

RELOVA, J.: otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was
granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases,
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court
the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the
of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will
probate of the will. They argued that:
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded
and before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's
petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979. On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground
that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the
committed the following assigned errors:
ground that the order was contrary to law and settled
pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the THEREOF;
petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
court said:
DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
the original.
APPELLANT'S WILL.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot
Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is
be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no
was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been
the time of the execution of the will to the death of the lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten

statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it
says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even
a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B.
Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that
Rivera vs. CA (182 SCRA 322)
2
he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate.
FIRST DIVISION
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990 later appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto
found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different
JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose
vs.
estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J.
children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the
RIVERA, respondents.
decedent was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to
3
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner. probate.
Regalado P. Morales for private respondent. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate
4
Appellate Court. Its decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges
the reversal of the respondent court.
CRUZ, J.:
In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there sought to show that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was
two? his mother. He submitted for this purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of
the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the couple was
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named
indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who
Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only
testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio
surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of 5
and Jose together several times. Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered
letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this
him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they met.
petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of
He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children,
the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die 6
sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson.
1
intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court
to Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as
of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as
such for many years. He explained that he could not present his parents'
marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit
7 SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
6. He also submitted his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
and Yolanda Rivera, who were each described therein as the legimitate children
8
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
of Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years
of age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and xxx xxx xxx
Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the Japanese occupation that
9 (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his wife. To prove that there were
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
in fact two persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered
Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were Magno By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio
10
Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, as contrasted with the marriage certificate was described therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the
submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the
11
the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. He also denied kissing Jose's son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is not
12
hand or recognizing him as a brother. conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may
nonetheless be considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
and Florencio are one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate a person to be called by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no
because, as he explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is
registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could still rely on the more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the
presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found
Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven in the cases at bar.
children in all during that time.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code: the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when
his father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported himself and
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
presumably also his mother Maria Vital as a gasoline attendant and driver for
family. Thus every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town and
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
obviously prospering and available for support. His alleged father was openly
bonds, the legitimacy of children, ... .
living with another woman and raising another family, but this was apparently "cumulative," but this Court does not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's
accepted by Jose without protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the burden of proving
If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no that serious allegation.
reason why the father did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in
himself as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a
holding that the Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the
comfortable life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand,
same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose
especially if it is considered assuming the claims to be true that Jose was
belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family
the oldest and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no
Venancio's legitimate wife if indeed she was she should have objected evidence linking the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera
when her husband abandoned her and founded another family by another was the head of both.
woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria Jocson
Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid
were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and
because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator
neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not
himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was
better treatment, from his legitimate father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to
no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because
say nothing if she is deserted in favor of another woman and for a caring mother
the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
not to protect her son's interests from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is
that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were
husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged partners in crime and sin. Maria Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of
Vital was completely passive and complaisant. the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both
proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even
Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the
presented at the trial to support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's
respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as
lawful wife. Jose says this was not done because she was already old and
follows:
bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of her deposition in
her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
vital to the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of
the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is
not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence,
being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills
as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is

AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City,
Article 814 being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be
my last will and testament.
Kalaw vs. Relova (132 SCRA 237)
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa
FIRST DIVISION
City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984 hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable
monument to perpetuate my memory.
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of
the Civil Code reading:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or

alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be
the same by his full signature.
the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given
her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968. effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows: After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197
3, reading in part:
My Last will and Testament
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National
In the name of God, Amen.
Bureau of Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that
the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions
and the initial were made by one and the same person. that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no
Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, necessity for interpretation."
Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win,
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order
Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate although the
dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for
alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned
Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not theoriginal
were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix
unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the
pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends
Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,
that the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art.
should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
814 on the ground that they themselves agreed thru their
counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ...
nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
in estoppel. particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical
commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento,
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of
segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the 2
1895."
insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
"C". another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication
by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after
holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.
that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be
SO ORDERED. given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But
that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the
efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida
Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the en este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
whence Article 814 of the new Civil Code was derived: testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia
de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688)
olografo por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del
la sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento 3
guarismo ultimo del ao en que fue extendido (Emphasis
olografo que contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre
ours).
renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun
previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent
omision solo puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa
SO ORDERED.
disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las
condiciones necesarias para la validez del testamento olografo,
ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que
pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la
parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular
este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de
entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de
la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras
matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro
no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando
las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no
tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de
ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and
Ajero vs. CA (236 SCRA 488, 1994)
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand,
SECOND DIVISION Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their
children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
vs. influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners. testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del
PUNO, J.:
Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
1
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's
portion of which reads;
holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must
November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
decide only the question of identity of the will, its due
SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED.
execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this
No costs.
probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by
2
94, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November
25, 1982.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix,
question is different from the will actually executed by the (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind
that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at
which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and or around which time the holographic will in question was
not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient
to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her
the identity of the will presented for probate must be bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will
accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of
be the will actually executed by the testatrix. the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and
square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects
xxx xxx xxx
of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in considering that she had even written a nursing book which
the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession,
petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the
the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, character of the testamentary act.
dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3)

In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due
witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the
execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to
handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
submitted herein.
which the holographic will in question was written to be the
genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason
the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was
holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with. pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any
xxx xxx xxx
instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on
the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her dispositions.
independence of character and to some extent, her sense of
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration
superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the
in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same
unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly
by his full signature.
pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the
undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the
will herein. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in
any of the following cases:
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the
law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession (a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that
no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable
disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the to make a will, at the time of its execution;
aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or
3
probate. (Citations omitted.)
threats;
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other
4
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the
person for his benefit;
decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which
read, as follows:
5
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in
trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved
will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the
6
cases; will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
(1) If the formalities required by law have not In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne
been complied with; Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It
held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution; We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479
(1919), that:
(3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
pressure and influence, on the part of the
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
beneficiary or of some other person;
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
by fraud; that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
intend that the instrument he signed should be whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
his will at the time of affixing his signature entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
thereto.
last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la
salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator 8
1985." (Citations omitted.)
7
himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely 9
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator 10
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
result in disallowance of such changes.
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis
supplied.) It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and
signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten
of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles
by the testator.
678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result
himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article
is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
688.
render the whole testament void.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
full age.
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw
vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held: In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped
paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have
statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie
the testator must identify them over his signature. Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own
language. SO ORDERED.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in
Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a
holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly
dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its
entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to
11
do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent
herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property
is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose
Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly
held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property,
which she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the
entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit
Venura vs. Ventura (106 Phil 1159) Case not Found!
A), apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following
Guevarra vs. Guevarra (74 Phil 479) bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150
and a gold chain worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth
EN BANC
P180 and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943 the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi
hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth P120; to his stepson Piuo Guevara,
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various
vs.
pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-
appellees. He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M.
Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio,
Primacias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for appellant.
apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its improvements situate in the town
Pedro C. Quinto for appellees.
of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at
P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter
nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of the large
OZAETA, J.: parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-66618. He also devised
to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of complete
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter,
settlement of her usufructurary right.1awphil.net
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their
inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by
by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to
strict ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased to wit, a pay all his pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of his family us
portion of 423,492 square meters of a large parcel of land described in original to the time of his death.
certificate of title No. 51691 of the province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of
Ernesto M. Guervara and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following manner:
year as damages for withholding such legitime from her. The defendant
(d). Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la
answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff
extension superficial aproximada de ciento veintinueve (129) hectareas
might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.
setenta (70) areas, y veiticinco (25) centiares, con todas sus mejoras
existentes en la misma, dejo y distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido con
herederos como sigue: anterioridad."
A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land
ocho (8) areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte que registration case No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and
colinda al Oeste de las cien (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de pursuant thereto original certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was
este parrafo del testamento, como su propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en issued on October 12 of the same year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the
la cual extension superficial estan incluidas cuarenta y tres (43) whole parcel of land described in the deed of sale above referred to. The
hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42) centiareas que le registration proceeding had been commenced on November 1, 1932, by Victorino
doy en concepto de mejora. L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario, among others,
as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as
A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas,
applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their
sesenta y un (61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas, que es la parte
opposition, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto
restante.
M. Guevara alone.
Duodecimo. Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a

On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament,
mi hijo Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de fianza. Y una vez
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any
legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que los
administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate.
herederos y legatarios aqui nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente
Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their
mis bienes de conformidad con mis disposiciones arriba consignadas.
respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said
Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed whereby he will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively
conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L.
theretofore disposed by the will above mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed
P1 and other valuable considerations, among which were the payment of all his the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed
debts and obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses. As to the
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will
northern half of the same parcel of land, he declared: "Hago constar tambien
and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. guevara como dueo de la mitad
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her
norte de la totalidad y conjunto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos comprado
as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal
her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by her
Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. The person who has the
husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for
custody of a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of
the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case
the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to
that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
the executor named in the will.
probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had
acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. A
she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or person named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he
assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for knows of the death of the testor, or within thirty days after he knows
which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing
of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial of the death of the testor, present such will to the court which has
court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory. jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court,
and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the
trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.
procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2)
the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title Sec. 628. Penalty. A person who neglects any of the duties required in
issued to the defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara. the two proceeding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the
court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
I
Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. If a person having

We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara,
custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without
it being in our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to
reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction,
circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Code
after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of
of Civil Procedure, which was in force up to the time this case was decided by
the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close
the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions:
confinement until he delivers the will.
Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of
will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940.
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same
to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, criterion (Leao vs. Leao, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1
legatees, and devisees of the testator (section 630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides
Rule 77). Altho not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of
and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any
disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or suitable process or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears
fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the
will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.
signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will
Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74
devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance
provides as follows:
must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies.
(Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.) Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed
held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
procedure adopted by the respondent for the following reasons: administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads
ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, as follows:
incovenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that
Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings.
therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they
Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age
themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for
and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the
debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be
court. done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate
the word "legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
a deceased person's estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made
under the conditions specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the
Rule 74 and apply it here, as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had
sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less the knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under
nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to present it to the the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account
court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for
against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial probate.
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration."
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the
It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the
divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that
letters of administration are two different things, altho both may be made in the
"no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed
same case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary
in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a
or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without
proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other
necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and
designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in
no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the
the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide
will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the
the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of
personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court
the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away
approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition,
with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action conclude that the lower court had some evidence to support its
for reinvindicacion or partition. conclusion.
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and
Court of Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent. decided in that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the
unprecedented and unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby
The case of Leao vs. Leao (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like
she seeks to prove her status as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent
section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the
by his will and attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary dispositions
properties left by a decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate.
made by him by not presenting the will to the court for probate and by claiming
In that case one Paulina Ver executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on
her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the basis of intestacy; and that
November 1, 1902. Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and
in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring her to present
was approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In the meantime,
the will to the court for probate.
and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead and divided the properties
among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and disposed of their In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court
shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that departed from the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly
case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or approved by this Court in the Leao case, by holding that an extrajudicial
that they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated partition is not proper in testate succession. In the Riosa case the Court,
September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the partition, and one of the heirs, speaking thru Chief Justice Avancea, held:
Cunegunda Leao, appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said:
1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE
The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an SUCCESSION. Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
error in deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Da. authorizing the heirs of a person who dies intestate to make
Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves. extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without going
into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate
In resolving that question this Court said:
succession, and therefore excludes testate succession.
In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there
2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. In the instant case,
had been a voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and
which is a testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial partition
legatees, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, we must
of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding for the probate
of the will and the administration of the estate. When the time came for
making the partition, they submitted to the court the extrajudicial not complaining of inconvenience, delay, and expense, but on the contrary he is
partition previously made by them, which the court approved. Held: insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff.
That for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action
created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property
instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding
must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the
relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent
extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was
notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him and solely because
approved by the court. (Syllabus.)
said will has not been probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian
The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law.
procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor
not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode
in said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate
of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of
and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required
the said Rules. That provision is not applicable here for the simple reason that
by section 3 of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure),
the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction
because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in
is specifically pointed out and prescribed in detail by Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the
litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by
Rules of Court.
the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.
The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing
II
of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much
expense to the parties." We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the
violate but to comply with the law. On the contrary, an injustice might be efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of titled
committed against the other heirs and legatees mentioned in the will if the issued to the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have
attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for litigated here in vain insofar as that question is concerned, we deem it proper to
probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and expense, the decide it now and obviate the necessity of a new action.
plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the will and she
The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and
violated the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which
Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into
command her to deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding
two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the
P2,000 and of imprisonment for contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is
southern half of Victorino L. Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in
consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations therein mentioned; and that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia, to
(b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of
northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own money from repurchase. The defendant, acting for his father, received the money
Rafael T. Puzon. and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in question, and
instead of executing a deed of redemption in favor of Victorino L.
A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M.
Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant.
Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all
the debts of the deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration
efficacious because: "(a) it has not been proven that the charges imposed as a of the land in the name of the defendant, because of the latter's promise
condition is [are] less than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been that after paying all the debt of their father, he would deliver to her and
proven that the defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon to the widow their corresponding shares. As their father then was still
him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of Appeals found" "It alive, there was no reason to require the delivery of her share and that
appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father. To was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting on the reliability
accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the above- and sincerity of her brother's promise. The evidence shows that such
mentioned land. And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is promise was really made. The registration of land under the Torrens
proven that they have exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of system does not have the effect of altering the laws of succession, or the
the deed of July 12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the inheritance." rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and other
The finding of the Court of Appeals on this aspect of the case is final and cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way any other rights
conclusive upon the respondent, who did not appeal therefrom. and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec.
70, Land Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor
B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of
can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked against her claim. Under
law made by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
these circumstances, she has the right to compel the defendant to
The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought deliver her corresponding share in the estate left by the deceased,
from Rafael Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the Court a quo, Victorino L. Guevara.
after considering the evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such
In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the
conclusion is well founded. The acknowledgment by the deceased,
foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said
Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions, which was inserted
court are final and not reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals
incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied by the fact
found that the money with which the petitioner repurchased the northern half
of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in
being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to Silvestre effect that notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of
P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her opposition to title No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described
the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's in said certificate of title belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the
promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of
and to the widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the
the interested parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any relief to the respondent Rosario
name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on account of Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the parties herein
which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the proper court for
shares after all the debts of the original owner of said land had been paid. Such probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the
finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of registration, provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties
which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approved and allowed by
intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfill the the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara,
promise by virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 the heirs and legatees therein named may take such action, judicial or
of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking
of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited. into consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No
finding as to costs in any of the three instances.
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the northern half of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original
certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino
L. Guevara. In the event the petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any
portion thereof, he is under obligation to compensate the estate with an
equivalent portion from the southern half of said land that has not yet been
sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still belongs one half
of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be
taken from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other
half having been lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased.
the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
Article 817 failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery
of the deceaseds business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil 867)
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
EN BANC
The appellants opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
DECISION puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimos will which are not in
November 1, 1927 accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
G.R. No. 22595 things, provides the following:
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator,
petitioner-appellee, Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
vs. succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant. country in which it may be situated.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.: But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
this case. not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472.)
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not
having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceaseds business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5)
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into laws of the Philippines.
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings
this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national
has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions
receiving his legacy.
in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied
with and executed. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous. Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as
such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testators
the last part of the second clause of the will, which says: national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and oppositor.
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
being contrary to law.
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests
are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the testators national law.
the instituted legatees must respect the testators will to distribute his property,
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since

Testate Estate of Suntay (JULY 31, 1964) see earlier case under Article 16
childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the
Article 818
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the
Dela Cerna vs. Potot (12 SCRA 576) two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered
by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio
EN BANC
Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964 died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to
probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners, of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and there being
vs. no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el documento Exhibit
APPEALS, respondents. A como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna
con derecho por parte du su viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra
Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.
testadora al propio tiempo segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de
Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.
los terranos descritos en dicho documents; y habido consideracion de la
REYES, J.B.L., J.: cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion sumaria de los
mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals,
previa prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la sum de
Sixth Division (C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First
P500.00 para responder de cualesquiera reclamaciones que se
Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action
presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe de la Serna de los aos
for partition.
desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Serna) Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another
Court of Appeals (Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4): petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was
concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and
No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of
Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local
the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to
dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired
appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on
during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be
March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party
the Will of Gervasia Rebaca). (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was
an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the
affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint
decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the
wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.
the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court
demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become
of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
final at some definite date fixed by law.Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium (Dy
Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However,
concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that
this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has
being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on
continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint
Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken
last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a
with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of
Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except
their action for partition was correct.
to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as
was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future
Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of
mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint will in question is valid." the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition
of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de
whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
la Cerna.
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated
1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la during the testator's lifetime.
Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the
fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills,
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was
concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a
joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the
holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia
Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our
decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding
inMacrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her
death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless
some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir
intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in

common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently
invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and
no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code
of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
session of the municipal council of Piddig as a member thereof. Third: That as

Article 821 to the other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of
land to him by the testator, and he being thereby an interested party his
Cruz vs. Villasor (54 SCRA 31) see under Article 806
testimony could not be believed.
We do not believe that any of the objections are well founded and the judgment
Article 824 refusing its probate must, therefore, be reversed.
Caluya vs. Domingo (27 Phil 330). Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
EN BANC No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and
DECISION
signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other person in
March 27, 1914 his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . .
G.R. No. L-7647
DOMINGO CALUYA, petitioner-appellant, It is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to write, the fact that
vs. his signature was written by some other person, at his request and express
LUCINA DOMINGO, respondent-appellee. direction, should appear in the body of the will itself. In the case of Barut vs.
Cabacungan (21 Phil. Rep., 461, 463) we held the following:
Lucas Paredes for appellant.
From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the
Julio Adiarte for appellee.
will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix
MORELAND, J.:
signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of three
of Ilocos Norte denying the probate of a will.
witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
The learned court below based its judgment upon three grounds. The first one presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a
was that, although the testator had signed by mark, it nowhere appeared in the practical matter that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; but
will who had written the signature or that it had been written at his request. The that is not essential to the validity of the will. Whether one person or another
second, that the witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really have signed the signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as
attestation clause because, at the time it was executed, he was attending a the validity of her will is concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that
the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay it down, is absolutely
unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is
statute relating to the execution of wills do not in any sense require such a proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
provision. From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw from the
Not only does the attestation clause comply with the requirements of this
words of the law the inference that the person who signs the name of the testator
section, but it appears clearly proved in evidence that the name of the testator
must sign his own name also. The law requires only three witnesses to a will, not
was signed by another person at his request and under his direction and in his
four.
presence and in the presence of the witnesses to the will. Moreover, as appears
Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name of a from the last clause of the section, if the attestation clause is defective, or even
person who is unable to write may be signed by another, by express direction, to absent, the will is nevertheless valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it
any instrument known to the law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as the was in fact signed and executed as provided by law.
validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who writes the name of the
As to the second objection, namely, that Antonino Pandaraoan could not have
principal in the document to sign his pen name also. As a matter of policy it may
signed the will as a witness thereto, as stated in the attestation clause, because
be wise that he did so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would enable a
he was attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig at the time the
person proving the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the
will is alleged to have been executed, we believe this also to be without merit. It
principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the document, it is unnecessary.
does not appear in the evidence of the opposition that the witness Pandaraoan
The main thing to be established in the execution of the will is the signature of the
was attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig from something like
testator. If that signature is proved, whether it be written by himself or by another
10 oclock till 12.30 oclock of the day on which the will was executed ands that
at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of such signature can be proved
the will was executed sometime between 10 and 12 oclock. To much weight,
as perfectly and as completely when the person signing for the principal omits to
however, can not be given to the testimony relative to the precise time of the
sign his own name as it can when he actually signs. To hold a will invalid for the
execution of the will. The barrio of Piddig is only a short distance from the
lack of the signature of the person signing the name of the principal is, in the
house in which the will was executed and it would have taken but a short time
particular case, a complete abrogation of the law of wills, as it rejects and destroys
to cover the distance. the witness Pandaraoan himself testified directly and
a will which the status expressly declares is valid.
positively that, after having left the meeting of the municipal council, he went to
The section above quoted also provides that the attestation clause shall state the house of the testator by appointment and there signed the will as stated in
the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other the attestation clause. The other witnesses to the will support this declaration.
person, at his express direction, in the presence of the witnesses, and that they Not only this, but the notary public who drew up the will and who translated it
attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But to the testator and who was present at the time of its execution, declared and
testified that the witnesses whose names appear upon the will were present at
the time it was executed by the testator and that they signed the same at his personal estate, is given by such will, such devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far
request and in his presence and in the presence of each other. All of the only as concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent or child of such
witnesses to the will unite in declaring that they were there present at the time person, or anyone claiming under such person or such wife or husband, or parent
the will was executed and that they signed as witnesses in the presence of the or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will,
testator and of each other. The mere fact that there was a session of the and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise,
municipal council of Piddig about the same time that the will was executed is legacy, or interest had not been made or given. But a mere charge on the real or
not necessarily conclusive against the fact that Antonino Pandaraoan was personal estate of the testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his
present and signed as a subscribing witness as he declares. Mistakes in time are creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.
easily made among witnesses who measure time not so much by clocks or
As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us
watches as by the sun. Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal
relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest therein as
council began its session about 10 oclock; that in order to attend the execution
falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind was created
of the will, as he had agreed with the notary public he would do, he was obliged
by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or transfer of any
to leave the session before it terminated; that he so left the session, mounted a
interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already consummated, a sale already
horse and arrived at the house of the testator at about 12 oclock, in time to take
made. Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it
part in the execution of the ill as stated in the attestation clause.
would not have been for that reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying
We do not believe that the clear and positive testimony of the witnesses to the an interest to him would have been void; the remainder could have stood and
will and of the notary public is overcome by the evidence offered in opposition would have stood as a valid testament.
to the probate.
We are confident from a thorough examination of the record that a fair
As to the third ground upon which the court based its decision; namely, that the preponderance of the evidence is in favor of the proponents, and there being no
will having mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to Segundino Asis, one of legal impediment to the probate the court erred in refusing it.
the witnesses to the will, while not rendering the will entirely invalid, throws
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the cause remanded to the
great doubt upon the legality of its execution and especially the testimony of
court whence it came with instructions to legalize and probate the will in
said witness relating thereto.
accordance with the petition.
Section 622 provides:
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or
parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or
April 30, 1970. Complaining against the dismissal, again, the petitioners came to
Article 828 2
this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. Acting on the said petition, we
set aside the trial court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. CA
merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already been
revoked by the testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The
petitioners appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate
SECOND DIVISION
Court which, on June 7, 1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988 reconsideration of the adverse decision proved to be of no avail, hence, this
petition.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO,petitioners, great help.
vs.
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and
MALOTO, respondents.
the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the
deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of
SARMIENTO, J.:
their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of
This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. However, while the case
other cases directly related to the present one and involving the same parties was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the parties Aldina,
1
had already been decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, which was a Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial
petition for certiorari and mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the
dismissed the petition ruling that the more appropriate remedy of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the
petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question. extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the
Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners commenced in the then Court of court did on March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the
First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.
disputed will, which was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo
and Felino both surnamed Maloto. The trial court dismissed the petition on
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The
associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the
document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty.
January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her
Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For
going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even considered
Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had
First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are been effectively revoked.
still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due
much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they
execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier
the will was revoked by Adriana.
signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them
being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in
Purificacion Miraflor. Article 830.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for
(1) By implication of law; or
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the
allowance of the will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner (2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided
came to us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders in case of wills: or
3
of the trial court . As we stated earlier, we dismissed that petition and advised
that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the (3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with
appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person,
whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if
was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized
revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in
destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation
according to the Rules of Court. (Emphasis Supplied.) appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before
us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned
does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative
destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so.
that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document
performed by another person but under the express direction and in
was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is
the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document
double hearsay.
destroyed must be the will itself.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be
that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise,
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice.
the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very
"Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective 4
foundations ...."
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his probate instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred by res
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned to appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the
by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying their (petitioners')
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the therein and to allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were is untenable.
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy.
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will
For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
were burned.
concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
private respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between
the first and the second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of by the private respondents are extraneous to this special proceeding, they could
5
cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated only be appropriately taken up after the will has been duly probated and a
requisites. certificate of its allowance issued.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE
probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of
Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate the respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of
settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any Adriana Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.
manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the
action for probate. This is understandably so because the trial court, in the SO ORDERED.
intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the
6
contested will . After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the
presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and
validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of
estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left
no will. Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in
intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it
would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-
30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the
late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be
inferred from the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties
mentioned in the will had been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the
properties remained at the time of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore,
more valuable properties have been acquired after the execution of the will on
7
January 3,1940." Suffice it to state here that as these additional matters raised
A) and another executed on June 20, 1939. (Exhibit I). The later will executed in
Article 832 1918.
Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951 On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a petition, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 8022 seeking
EN BANC
the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951 no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein
oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN
the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their
VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the
vs.
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
accordance with law.
Claro M. Recto and Serafin C. Dizon for appellants.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on
Delgado & Flores for appellee.
February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: the deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding No.
56, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting
petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from
to probate the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi
seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in
executed on August 17, 1918. The oppositors-appellants brought the case on
the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.
appeal to this Court for the reason that the value of the properties involved
But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and
exceeds P50,000.
the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible because
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its
ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946,
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors- similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based
appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition. Then, the
legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. case was set for trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court issued an order admitting
Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit
the will to probate already stated in the early part of this decision. From this was a "disposicion captatoria". These circumstances, counsel for the appellants
order the oppositors appealed assigning six errors, to wit. contend, constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by petitioner with a view
to insuring the realization of her plan of securing the probate of the 1918 will
I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner
which she believed would better safeguard her right to inherit from the decease.
voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June
20, 1939, in special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection
the probate of another alleged will of Molo dated 191. with special proceedings No. 8022, now closed and terminated, are vigorously
met by counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise them in these
II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now
proceedings which are entirely new and distinct and completely independent
estopped from seeking the probate of Molo's alleged will of 1918.
from the other is improper and unfair as they find no support whatsoever in any
III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come evidence submitted by the parties in this case. They are merely based on the
to court with "unclean hands" and as such is not entitled to relief. presumptions and conjectures not supported by any proof. For this reason,
counsel, contends, the lower court was justified in disregarding them and in
IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo's alleged will of
passing them sub silentio in its decision.
August 17, 1918 was not executed in the manner required by law.
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this
V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918
contention. There is indeed no evidence which may justify the insinuation that
was deliberately revoked by Molo himself.
petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was the deceased to enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere
subsequently revoked by the decedent's will of 1939. conjecture drawn from the apparently unexpected testimony of Canuto Perez
that he went out of the room to answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio
In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the Reyes was signing the will and the failure of petitioner later to impeach the
probate court erred in not holding that the petitioner voluntarily and character of said witness in spite of the opportunity given her by the court to do
deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order to so. Apart from this insufficiency of evidence, the record discloses that this
enable her to obtain the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August failure has been explained by petitioner when she informed the court that she
17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and circumstances with their opinion indicate was unable to impeach the character of her witness Canuto Perez because of her
that petitioner connived with the witness Canuto Perez in an effort to defeat inability to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation stands
and frustrate the probate of the 1939 will because of her knowledge that said will uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, it is not now,
intrinsically defective in that "the one and only testamentory disposition thereof for us to determine. It is an incident that comes within the province of the
former case. The failure of petitioner to present the testimony of Artemio Reyes clear and bade her to take the only proper step possible under the
at the hearing has also been explained, and it appears that petitioner has filed circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for the probate of
because his whereabouts could not be found. Whether this is true or not is also the 1939 will. This she did and the will was admitted to probate. But then the
for this Court to determine. It is likewise within the province and function of the unexpected happened. Over her vigorous opposition, the herein appellants filed
court in the former case. And the unfairness of this imputation becomes more a petition for reopening, and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted
glaring when we stock of the developments that had taken place in these and the case was reopened. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Is it her
proceedings which show in bold relief the true nature of the conduct, behavior fault that the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order admitting the will
and character of the petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in disrepute by the to probate was set aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never
oppositors. expected. Had appellants not filed their opposition to the probate of the will
and had they limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of said will, their
It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will executed
plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased would have
on June 20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941, by the petitioner. There being no
perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their strategy. If said will was
opposition, the will was probated. Subsequently, however, upon petition of the
denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad faith
herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting said will to probate was set
petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to protect her own interest
aside, over the vigorous opposition of the herein petitioner, and the case was
and prevent the intestacy of the deceased to happen.
reopened. The reopening was ordered because of the strong opposition of the
oppositors who contended that he will had not been executed as required by Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did not
law. After the evidence of both parties had been presented, the oppositors filed commit the second and third errors imputed to it by the counsel for appellants.
an extensive memorandum wherein they reiterated their view that the will Indeed, petitioner cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent
should be denied probate. And on the strenght of this opposition, the court her from seeking the probate of the 1918 will simply because of her effort to
disallowed the will. obtain the allowance of the 1939 will has failed considering that in both the 1918
and 1939 wills she was in by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would
charged with bad faith far having done so because of her desire to prevent the
make the testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because
intestacy of her husband. She cannot be blamed being zealous in protecting her
it is a "disposicion captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through
interest.
consultation with a lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of
filing the petition for the probate of the will. She could accomplish her desire by The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in
merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps 1939 will of the deceased which was denied probate. They contend that,
leading to the probate of the will executed in 1918. But for her conscience was
notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid and authorities is cited in support of this contention. And these authorities hold the
still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918. view, that "an express revocation is immediately effective upon the execution of
the subsequent will, and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a
Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid down
probate proceeding". (p. 63, appellants' brief .
in the case of Samson vs. Naval, (41 Phil., 838). He contends that the facts
involved in that case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence, the While they are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for
doctrine is that case is here controlling. oppositors, and that view appears to be in controlling the states where the
decisions had been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in line with
There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved in
the assertion that is now the prevailing view in the United States. In the search
the Samson case we are indeed impressed by their striking similarity with the
we have made of American authorities on the subject, we found ourselves in a
facts of this case. We do not need to recite here what those facts are; it is
pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions
enough to point out that they contain many points and circumstances in
contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of
common. No reason, therefore, is seen by the doctrine laid down in that case
wills. But the impression we gathered from a review and the study of the
(which we quote hereunder) should not apply and control the present case.
pertinent authorities is that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having good law. On page 328 of the American Jurisprudence Vol. 57, which is a
been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity revision Published in 1948, we found the following passages which in our
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to opinion truly reflect the present trend of American jurisprudence on this matter
the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous affecting the revocation of wills:
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)

SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument.
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that, while Ordinarily, statutes which permit the revocation of a will by another
they do not disagree with the soundness of the ruling laid down in the Samson writing provide that to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be
case, there is reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated executed with the same formalities which are required to be observed in
and runs counter to the modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence. the execution of a will. Accordingly, where, under the statutes,
They maintain that said ruling is no longer controlling but merely represents attestation is necessary to the making of a valid will, an unattested non
the point of view of the minority and should, therefore, be abandoned, more so testamentary writing is not effective to revoke a prior will. It has been
if we consider the fact that section 623 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which held that a writing fails as a revoking instrument where it is not
governs the revocation of wills, is of American origin and as such should follow executed with the formalities requisite for the execution of a will, even
the prevailing trend of the majority view in the United States. A long line of though it is inscribed on the will itself, although it may effect a
revocation by cancellation or obliteration of the words of the will. A It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account
testator cannot reserve to himself the power to modify a will by a of not being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute,
written instrument subsequently prepared but not executed in the or where the testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a
manner required for a will. will or the will is procured through undue influence, or the such, in
other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not revoke
SEC, 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil.
the first will or affect it in any manner. Mort vs. Baker University (193-5)
A will which is invalid because of the incapacity of the testator, or of
229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S.W. (2d), 498.
undue influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will.
Moreover, a will is not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in
Nor is a will revoked by a defectively executed will or codicil, even the Samson case is predicated. They reflect the opinion that this ruling is sound
though the latter contains a clause expressly revoking the former will, in and good and for this reason, we see no justification for abondoning it as now
a jurisdiction where it is provided by a controlling statute that no suggested by counsel for the oppositors.
writing other than a testamentary instrument is sufficient to revoke a
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides
will, for the simple reason that there is no revoking will. Similarly where
that a will may be some will, codicil, or other writing executed as proved in case
the statute provides that a will may be revoked by a subsequent will or
of wills" but it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will
other writing executed with the same formalities as are required in the
within the meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in
execution of wills, a defectively executed will does not revoke a prior
the case of wills", simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be
will, since it cannot be said that there is a writing which complies with
regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is
the statute. Moreover, a will or codicil which, on account of the manner
authority for holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot
in which it is executed, is sufficient to pass only personally does not
have the effect of revocation. (See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
affect dispositions of real estate made by a former will, even though it
may expressly purport to do so. The intent of the testator to revoke is But counsel for oppositors contemned that, regardless of said revocatory clause,
immaterial, if he has not complied with the statute. (57 Am. Jur., 328, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that it
329.) was deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors contend that
the testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in
recovatory clause contained said will, himself deliberately destroyed the original
1939. On page 1400, Volume 123, there appear many authorities on the
of the 1918 will, and for that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate
"application of rules where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is
in these proceedings is only a duplicate of said original.
the following:
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the
destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
clause contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our
that when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle
the original and copies to the testator himself and apparently they remained in of "dependent relative revocation".
his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is
was denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her
usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A)
an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason.
of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he The doctrine is n limited to the existence of some other document,
gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799).
likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected
duplicate copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that
with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that
because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was
the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy
executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that
of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition;
exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we
and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute
may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no
is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full
direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the
force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a

Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed
new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation
by the testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first,
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions,
could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed
and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent
by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he
to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not
had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that
render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; appellants.1wphl.nt
Gardner, p. 253.)
Paras, C.J. Feria, Pablo Bengzon, Tuason and Jugo JJ., concur.
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner
to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the
prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief
that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed
two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove the due execution of the will.
The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses,

Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. The first two witnesses
died before the commencement of the present proceedings. So the only
instrumental witness available was Angel Cuenca and under our law and
precedents, his testimony is sufficient to prove the due execution of the will.
However, petitioner presented not only the testimony of Cuenca but placed on
the witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public who prepared and notarized
the will upon the express desire and instruction of the testator, The testimony of
these witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the manner required
by law. We have read their testimony and we were impressed by their readiness
and sincerity. We are convinced that they told the truth.
allowance of which is asked, could not be allowed, because of the existence of

NAVAL vs NAVAL G.R. No. L-11823, February 11, 1918
another will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by the same
EN BANC Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed
subsequently by her during her lifetime, and further, because sail will has not
G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
been executed with the formalities required by existing laws. Trial having taken
CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION place, at which evidence was adduced, the court on February 8, 1916, issued an
EUGENIO, petitioners-appellants, order, admitting said second document and ordering its allowance as the last
vs. will and testament o said deceased. From said order the opponents appealed to
MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL, objectors- this court and transmitted to us the corresponding declarations. Tow of the
appellants. opponents, that is, Rosa and Cristina Naval, assigned, as errors committed by
the court, the following:
Guillermo Lualhati for appellants.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellees. 1. The finding of the court that the will of October 31, 1914, has not been revoked
by that of February 13, 1915;
ARAULLO, J.:
2. The act of the court in permitting the petitioner to institute and proceed with
On September 20, 1915, attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of First
the proceedings relative to the last case for the allowance of the will, No. 13579,
Instance of the city of Manila for allowance as the will of Simeona F. Naval, who
notwithstanding that proceedings had already been had in the other case No.
died in said city two days previously, a document executed by her of February 13,
13386 and final judgment rendered therein; and
1915, and in which he was appointed executor. The case was recorded as No.
13386 and, after hearing the petition for allowance filed by said executor, it was 3. The act of the court in denying the motion for continuance of the trial on the
denied on the ground that said document was not duly executed by the allowance of the will of October 31, 1914, which motion was presented for the
deceased as her last will and testament, inasmuch as she did not sign it in the sole purpose of introducing evidence to show the falsity of the signature
presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not sign it in the presence appearing in said will and submitting said signature to the Bureau of Science for
of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased filed in analysis.
the same court for allowance as her will, another document executed by her on
The other opponent, Monica Naval, assigned, besides the first two errors already
October 31, 1914, and, consequently, the case was registered under another
mentioned, the finding of the court that the disallowance of the will of said
number, which was No. 13579. The petition for allowance was opposed by
deceased, dated February 13, 1915, on the ground that is was not executed in such
Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval on the ground that the will, the
form that it could transmit real and personal property, according to section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, also had the effect of annulling the revocatory and could not have been revoked by the first, and the court was not in error in
clause in said will. so holding in the order appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add a single
word mere or cite well-known doctrines and opinions of jurists in support of
From the evidence it appears, as we have already stated, that the trial court
what has already been stated.
declared that the first document presented by the executor of the deceased,
Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13, 1915, and which was As to the second error assigned by the opponents, we believe it sufficient to
the subject-matter of case No. 13386 of said court, could not be allowed, on the refer to what the court below stated in the judgment appealed from. It is as
ground that it was not executed with the requisites and formalities prescribed follows:
by law. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is by operation
The court finds no incongruency in the presentation of a prior will
of law revoked by another valid subsequent will, if the testator does not state in
when another will of subsequent date has been disallowed.
the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or partly. In
Disregarding the fact that the petitioners in this case were not those
harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code
who presented the will in No. 13386, in which the petition was
of Civil Procedure, which provides that no will shall be revoked, except by
presented by the same D. Perfecto Gabriel as executor, it is proper to
implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other writing
take into account that the object of a petition for allowance is to ask for
executed as provided in case of wills.
an order declaring that a will has been executed in accordance with the
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the will of February 13, requisites and formalities required by law. This is a question for the
1915, that is, the first document presented as the will of the deceased Simeona F. court to decide and is out of the control of the party who presents the
Naval, could have the effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by will. The allowance or disallowance of a will by a competent court
the petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31, 1914, that is, on depends upon whether the evidence adduced at the trial shows or does
a date previous to the execution of the first, it was necessary and indispensable not show that the formalities required by law have been complied with,
that the later will, that is, that first presented for allowance, should be perfect or and this cannot be determined in advance, as a general rule, by the
valid, that it, executed as provided by lay in case of wills. person who presents the testament. for he has not always concurred in
or seen the execution of the will.
It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves maintained that
said later will, that is, that of February 13, 1915, was not perfect, or executed as If, therefore, the personal who presents a will and asks that if be allowed
provided by law in case of wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila has so does not secure its allowance, and he has in his possession another will,
held in disallowing said documents as the will of the deceased. So that it very or has information that another exists, he does not contradict himself
evident that the second will presented, that is, that of October 31, 1914, was not by asking for the allowance of the will of earlier date merely because the
later will was declared invalid by the proper court. If in this case there is its discretional power and thereby prejudiced the essential rights of the
any who adopts a contradictory position, it is the respondent himself, respondents, which is not the case here.
inasmuch as in case No. 13386 he alleged, as a ground for the
The error which, in addition to the first two already mentioned, has been
disallowance of the will then presented, that it was not executed in
assigned by the opponent and appellant, Monica Naval, and refers, according to
accordance with the law, and now he maintains the contrary, for he
her, to the court's action in declaring that the disallowance of the will of the
claims that said will revoked that which is now presented.
deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, for the reason that it was
With respect to the third error, it is beyond doubt that the court did not commit not executed in such manner and from that it could transmit real and personal
it, for it appears that when the examination of the witness, Cristina Samson, was property, according to the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
finished and the court told Attorney Lualhati, counsel for the respondents, to Procedure, also had the effect of annulling the revocatory clause of said will.
continue adducing his evidence, he said he had no more proof, although he
First of all, it is not true that the court made such statement in the terms given
added that he would ask the court to grant him permission to send the will of
in said assignment of error, that is, it is not true that the court declared that,
1914 to the Bureau of Science, which petition was objected to by the attorney for
because said will was not executed in the form required by law in order that it
the proponents and denied by the court. Immediately thereafter the attorney for
may transmit real and personal property, according to the provisions of section
the opponents asked for the continuance of the trial, which was also denied by
618, the disallowance of said will also had the effect of annulling the revocatory
the court, after objection was made by the proponents. The attorney for the
clause therein contained. In the order appealed from there is no declaration or
opponents excepted to said ruling.
conclusion made in these terms. The court did not say that the annulment of
Therefore, the petition of said attorney for the remission of said will to the the revocatory clause in said will was the effect or consequence of the fact that it
Bureau of Science, in the terms in which it was made to the court, after ha had was not allowed on the ground that it was not executed in the form required by
stated that he had no more evidence to present, signified that he left it to the law in order that it may transmit real and personal property. Referring to the
discretion of the court to grant it or not. Furthermore, no exception was taken construction, given by the respondent to sections 618 and 623 of the Code of
to the order to the order denying this motion, and although the attorney for the Civil Procedure, to the effect that a subsequent will may revoke a previous will,
opponents excepted to the order denying the motion for continuance of the although the later will has not been allowed by the competent court, it being
trial, such exception was completely useless and ineffective for the purpose of sufficient that the intention of the testator to revoke the previous will should be
alleging before this court that the trial court erred in that respect, for said clearly expressed, and that, while the requisite of allowance is necessary in order
resolution, being one of those left to the discretion of the court in the exercise of that it may transmit property from one person to another, it is not necessary in
it functions, according to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it could not order that it might procedure other effects, for example, the effect of a
be the subject of an exception, unless the court, in denying said motion, abused revocatory clause, or a clause of aknowledgment of a child, what the court
declared, we repeat, was that although the revocation of a will should have been the court in its decision of November 19, 1915, in case No. 13386, for which
effected, not by means of another will or codicil, but by mans of a document, as reason its allowance was denied, neither may it be maintained that the
authorized by said section 623, which document should have the requisites and revocatory clause contained in said will is the expression of the last will of said
conditions fixed in section 618, the presentation of the document to the court deceased. The disallowance of the ill, therefore, produced the effect of annulling
was necessary in order that the latter might allow it, by declaring that it was the revocatory clause, not exactly because said will was not executed in such
executed with the formalities required by law for the execution of a will, and from that it could transmit real and personal property, as inaccurately alleged by
finally concluding that, just as to, is to be proved that the requisites of section the appellant, Monica Naval, to be the court's finding, upon which said
618 have been complied with in order that a will may be of value through its assignment of error is based, but because it was proved that said will was not
allowance, so without such allowance the revocatory clause like the other executed or signed with the formalities and requisites required by section 618 of
provisions of the will, has no value or effect except to show extraneous matters, the Code of Civil Procedure, a cause which also produces the nullity of the same
as, for example, the acknowledgment of natural children, of some debt or will, according to section 634 of said law; and of course what is invalid in law
obligation. In such case, the document could produce effect, but not as will, but can produce no effect whatever.
simply as a written admission made by the person executing it. And It is beyond
If the instrument propounded as a revocation be in form a will, it must
doubt that the revocatory clause contained in a document, like the present,
be perfect as such, and be subscribed and attested as is required by the
which contains provisions proper of a will, as those relating to legacies and
statute. An instrument intended to be a will, but filing of its effect as
distribution of the properties of the testator after his death as well as the
such on account of some imperfection in its structure or for want of due
appointment of executors, is not matter extraneous to the will, but merely a part
execution, cannot be set up for the purpose of revoking a former will.
thereof, intimately connected with it as well as with the will or wills, the
(40 Cyc., p. 1177, and cases cited therein.)
revocation of which is declared in said clause; in short, the desire of the testator
declared in the revocatory clause is related to the desire of the same testator A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a
expressed in the provisions of the testament in which said clause is found and to general rule, be admitted to probate before the clause of revocation can
that which he might have expressed in the testaments which he may have have any effect, and the same kind, quality, and method of proof is
previously executed. There is such relation between the revocatory clause and required for the establishment of the subsequent will as was required
the will which contains it, that if the will does not produce legal effects, because for the establishment of the former will. (40 Cyc., p. 1178, and cases
it has not been executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, neither cited therein.)
would the revocatory clause therein produce legal effects. And if, in the present
But admitting that the will said to have been executed by the deceased Simeona
case, the so-called will of the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13,
F. Naval on February 13, 1915, notwithstanding its inefficacy to transmit property
1915, was not duly executed by her as her last will and testament, ad declared by
for the reason that it has not been executed, according to the provisions of said In the decision of said case the finding referred to be by the appellant appears
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be considered as executed by not to have been made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
her in order to express her desire, appearing in one of its clauses, to revoke and
The syllabus of said decision says:
annul any previous will of hers, as stated in clause 13, this being the argument
adduced by the appellant, Monica naval, in support of said assignment of error When a will revoking a former will is in existence, it must be
neither could it be maintained that, the allowance of said will having been established in the Probate Court; but when it has been lost or
denied by the court on November 11, 1915, said revocatory clause subsists and the destroyed, and its contents cannot be sufficiently proved to admit it to
intention expressed by the testratrix therein is valid and legally effective, for the probate, it may nevertheless be availed of as a revocation in opposition
simple reason that, in order that a will may be revoked by a document, it is to the probate of the will revoked by it.:
necessary, according to the conclusive provisions of section 623 of said
And in the body of the decision there is a declaration, to which the appellant
procedural law, that such documents be executed according to the provisions
must have desired to refer in her brief, which declaration says:
relating to will in section 618, and the will in question, or, according to the
respondent, the so-called document, was not executed according to the If it can be proved that a later will was duly executed, attested and
provisions of said section, according to the express finding of the trial court in subscribed, and that it contained a clause expressly revoking all former
its order of November 11, 1915, acquiesced in by the opponent herself, and which wills, but evidence of the rest of its contents cannot be obtained, it is
is now final and executory. Therefore, the disallowance of said will and the nevertheless a good revocation; and it can be made available only by
declaration that it was not executed according to the provisions of law as to allowing it to be set up in opposition to the probate of the earlier will,. .
wills, produced the effect of annulling said revocatory clause. .
In support of the argument advanced in her brief said appellant, Monica Naval, The facts of the case in which this decision was rendered are different from the
cites the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Wallis vs. facts of the case at bar. That was a case concerning a will filed by one of the
Wallis (114 Mass., 510, 512)m which, according to the appellant herself, was in the children of the testatrix, Mary Wallis, as her last will, to the allowance of which
following terms: another son objected, alleging that said will had been revoked by another
executed by the same deceased subsequent to the will that was filed, and that it
If it be shown that a later will was duly executed and attested,
had been fraudulently destroyed or taken by his brother, the proponent and his
containing a clause expressly revoking former will nothing else
wife, or by one of them, in order to deprive him of the rights conferred upon
appearing as to its contents, it is nevertheless good as a revocation, but
him by said will. Therefore, the will said to have been subsequently executed by
it can only be made available by setting it up in opposition to the
the testatrix and in which, according to the oppositor, the clause revocatory of
probate of the earlier will.
the former will appeared, was not presented by said oppositor, while the manner provided for making a will." And when an instrument of
previous will was, in the contrary, filed for allowance by the son of the testratrix, revocation is in existence and capable of being propounded for probate,
who appeared to be favored therein, said oppositor having alleged that the its validity should be tried by a direct proceeding instituted for the
subsequent will, that is, that containing the revocatory clause, had been drawn, purpose in the Probate Court. (Loughton vs. Atkins, 1 Pick., 535.)
subscribed and executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, a fact
It results, therefore, that while perfect parity does not exist between the case
which he was ready to prove just as he was ready to prove that it had been
decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, to which the appellant Monica
destroyed or suppressed by the proponent, his brother and his wife, or one of
Naval refers, and that which is not before us, it is wholly unquestionable that,
them. In the case at bar, the subsequent will containing the revocatory clause of
whether the case deals with a subsequent will revocatory of a previous will,
the previous will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval was presented to
which may possibly be presented to a probate court for allowance, or of a
the court for allowance and it was disallowed a fact which gave opportunity
subsequent will, also revocatory of a previous will, which could not be presented
to the legatees of said deceased to present a previous will executed by her on
for allowance, because it has been taken or hidding, or mislaid in order that
October 31, 1914, and said two wills having been successively presented, evidence
such will may constitute a valid revocation and be utilized in the second case,
as to them was also successively adduced for their allowance by the court.
although the remaining provisions may not be proven, in opposition to the
Therefore, the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in allowance of the previous will, it is necessary to prove that it was executed,
Wallis vs. Wallis (supra), to the effect that a subsequent will containing a attested, and subscribed in due form, and, of course, also that it contained a
revocatory clause of previous wills, constitutes a valid revocation and may be clause expressly revoking the previous will, or, what is the same thing, that said
used in objecting to the allowance of the previous will, even when it is not subsequent will has been executed according to the provisions relating to wills,
possible to obtain proof of the remainder of the contents of said subsequent as expressed in section 623 of the procedural law in force. There can be no doubt
will, refers to the case in which the latter had been taken away, destroyed or whatever that this applies when the revocation had been made to appear in a
suppressed, and it was impossible to present it for allowance, but requires for writing or document susceptible of presentation for allowance, like the so-called
that purpose that it be proved that said subsequent will has been executed, will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, and considered
attested, and subscribed in due form and that it contained, furthermore, that by said respondent and appellant as a mere document of revocation, for, as
revocatory clause. This is what said declaration and, in relation thereto, also already seen in said decision invoked by her, the requisite as to signing,
what the syllabus of the decision thereof clearly says. The court, through Chief attesting, and subscribing in the form, required by law for the execution of wills
Justice Gray, in giving its opinion, thus began by saying: in order that it may revoke a previous will, is also required in a will as well as in
a codicil, or in a writing, and in referring to a document of revocation, it is also
By our law, no will can be revoked by any subsequent instrument, other
expressed that its validity should be proved in a direct proceeding, instituted for
than a "will, codicil or writing, signed, attested and subscribed in the
the purpose in a probate court. In the case at bar, the document, executed by
the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as her last will and testament, dated February
13, 1915, has been presented for allowance; it validity has been proved by means
of said procedure in the Court of Probate of Manila, and that court denied its
allowance, on the ground that the document in question had not been duly
executed by the deceased, as her last will and testament, because she did not
sign in the presence of three witnesses, and two of these witnesses did not sign
in the presence of each other, or what is the same thing, that said document has
not be attested and subscribed in the manner established by law for the
execution of will, or, in other words, as provided by law in case of wills, as stated
by section 623 of said procedural law, and this resolution was acquiesced in, as
already stated, by the respondents in this case, and is, therefore, final and
executory.
In conclusions, the doctrine laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, invoked by the appellant, Monica Naval, is in conformity with
the provision of said section 623 of our procedural law and article 739 of the
Civil Code, and the will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval on October
31, 1914, not having been revoked, according to these provisions, by the will
presented and alleged as executed by the same deceased subsequently on
February 13, 1915, the allowance of which was denied by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the court below was not in error in ordering the allowance of
said will, that is, of that of October 31, 1914, as the last will and testament of said
deceased.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Streets and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Metro Manila. The property, known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of
Article 838 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA, CANUTO, and
Spouses Pascual vs. CA (G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003)
VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot
2
FIRST DIVISION 2.
G.R. No. 115925 August 15, 2003 On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight
lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners,
Director of Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, with an area of 670
vs.
square meters, and Lot No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000 square meters, were
COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
placed under CANUTOs name. Three other individuals took the remaining
3
CARPIO, J.: lots.
The Case On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng

4
Bilihang Tuluyan ("KASULATAN"). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his
1
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 31 January 1994 of the Court of
10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION forP2,250.00. The KASULATAN,
Appeals ordering the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, to place
notarized by Notary Public Jose T. de los Santos of Navotas, provides:
TCT No. (232252) 1321 in the name of respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino.
The Decision ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the names of petitioners Na ako, CANUTO SIOSON, mamamayang Pilipino, may katampatang
Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson ("petitioners") in TCT No. (232252) 1321. gulang, kasal kay Raymunda San Diego, at naninirahan sa Tanza,
The Decision also directed petitioners to pay respondent moral and exemplary Navotas, Rizal, sa bisa at pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay
damages and attorneys fees. nagpapatunay at nagpapatibay:
The Facts 1. Na ako ang lubos at tunay na may-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi
hati (10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson ("CONSOLACION") and respondent Remedios S.
No. 2, Plano Psu-13245), na nasa sa nayon ng Tanza, Municipio
Eugenio-Gino ("REMEDIOS") are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of
ng Navotas, Provincia ng Rizal, at ang descripcion o
the late Canuto Sioson ("CANUTO"). CANUTO and 11 other individuals,
pagkakakilanlan ng nasabing lote ay nakasaad sa Certificado
including his sister Catalina Sioson ("CATALINA") and his brother Victoriano
Original, de Titulo No. 4207 ng Oficina ng Registrador de
Sioson ("VICTORIANO"), were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas,
Titulos ng Rizal, gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx ilalim ng isang ganap na panunumpa alinsunod sa batas, ay malayang

nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
2. Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang Dalawang Libo Dalawang
Daan at Limampung Piso (P2,250.00), salaping Pilipino, na sa Na kami ang mga buhay na anak na naiwan ni CANUTO
akin ay ibinayad ni CONSOLACION SIOSON, kasal kay Ricardo SIOSON na nagmamay-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70
S. Pascual, may sapat na gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, at porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, plano
naninirahan sa Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal at ang Psu-13245), na nasa Nayon ng Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, at ang mga
pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga ay aking inaamin at palatandaan nito ay nasasaad sa Certificado Original de Titulo
pinatutunayan, ay aking ipinagbili, inilipat at isinalin, sa No. 4207 ng Tanggapan ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal;
pamamagitan ng bilihang tuluyan at walang pasubali a favor
Na sa lubos naming kaalaman, ay ipinagbili ng aming Ama na si
[sic] sa nasabing si CONSOLACION SIOSON, sa kanyang
Canuto Sioson ang kaniyang buong bahagi na 10/70 sa nasabing
tagapagmana at mapaglilipatan ang lahat ng aking titulo,
Lote No. 2, kay CONSOLACION SIOSON, may-bahay ni
karapatan at kaparti na binubuo ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati
Ricardo S. Pascual, na taga Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal, sa
(10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng loteng descrito or tinutukoy sa
halagang P2,250.00, salaping pilipino, noong ika 16 [sic] ng
itaas nito. (Emphasis supplied)
Septiembre, 1956, sa pamamagitan ng isang KASULATAN NG
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. BILIHANG TULUYAN na pinagtibay sa harap ng Notario
She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the Publico Jose T. de los Santos nang pechang nabanggit, sa
5
corresponding real estate taxes. Navotas, Rizal, (Doc. No. 194, Page No. 84; Book No. IV; Series
of 1956);
On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and
6
Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the Na ang nasabing lupa na ipinagbili ng aming Ama kay
KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual, ay nakikilala ngayong mga Lote
father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision No. 2-A at Lote 2-E ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713; na
Plan Psd 34713. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT reads: pinagtibay ng Assistant Director of Lands noong Mayo 30, 1952;
KAMING sina FELICIDAD SIOSON at BEATRIZ SIOSON, pawang mga Na aming ngayong pinatitibayan ang pagka-pagbili ng bahagi
Pilipino, kapuwa may sapat na gulang at naninirahan, ang una sa Tanza, ng aming Ama kay Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual ng ngayoy
Navotas at ang ikalawa sa Concepcion, Malabon, lalawigan ng Rizal, sa nakikilalang Lote No. 2-A at Lote No. 2-E ng Plano de
Subdivision Psd-34713. (Emphasis supplied)
On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the filing REMEDIOS complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the
JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal ("Register of presentation of the parties evidence during the trial. During the pre-trial stage,
Deeds"). Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to REMEDIOS clarified that she was claiming only CATALINAs 10/70 share in Lot
CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2, or 1,335 square meters, which constitute of the area of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-
8
2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of 2,670 square E. The trial of the case then ensued.
meters.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and
On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case
her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165,
and ordering REMEDIOS to pay petitioners P10,000 as attorneys fees and the
for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
cost of suit. The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is based on
REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because
fraud, covered by the four-year prescriptive period. The trial court also held that
CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and
7
REMEDIOS knew of petitioners adverse title on 19 November 1982 when
testament ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that
REMEDIOS testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had
CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the
filed against their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the complaint of
area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot 2.
REMEDIOS had already prescribed when she filed it on 4 February 1988.
REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance
of another title in her name, and the payment to her of damages. The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against
petitioners because CATALINAs LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
derive her title has not been admitted to probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil
Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should
Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is allowed in probate in
have filed the action within four years from the registration of
accordance with the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
CONSOLACIONs title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19 years later on 4
decision provides:
February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed the motion, claiming that she became
aware of CONSOLACIONs adverse title only in February 1987. CONSOLACION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
maintained that she had timely filed her complaint within the four-year and against plaintiff, ordering:
prescriptive on 4 February 1988.
1. The dismissal of this case;
In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners motion to
2. The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand
dismiss. The trial court held that the reckoning of the prescriptive period for
(P10,000.00) Pesos as and for attorneys fees; and
9
3. The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit. of P20,000[.00] and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 and P500.00 per
10
appearance.
REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
denied their motion in its order dated 15 June 1994.
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the

decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that what REMEDIOS filed
was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when The Issues
CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.
Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors:
Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years, not
four. The Court of Appeals counted this ten-year period from 19 November 1982. I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
Thus, when REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988, the ten-year RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY
prescriptive period had not yet expired. PRESCRIPTION WHICH FINDING IS MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO
LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
The appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated LAST WILL does not
COURT.
preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the
LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted to probate. The dispositive portion II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
of the appellate courts ruling provides: PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS
UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS INVOLVED
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
ASIDE. The Registry of Deeds of Rizal or Metro Manila, District III, is
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PETITIONERS.
ordered to place Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 under the
name of Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino as executor of the will of Catalina III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
Sioson and cancel the names of the Spouses Ricardo Pascual and DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN
Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as owners of the covered GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT IN ORDERING THE
lot. Defendants-appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Sioson are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino NO. (232252) 1321 TO BE PLACED IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
LIMITED ONLY TO ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE PROPERTY,
AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGS her complaint on 4 February 1988 because she allegedly discovered petitioners
TO PETITIONERS. adverse title only on 19 November 1982.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is
PETITIONERS ACTED FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH IN already barred by prescription.
SECURING THEIR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY From Registration of Adverse Title
11
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a
12
REMEDIOS, and (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest. voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-
13
year prescriptive period under Article 1391 begins to run from the time of
The Ruling of the Court
discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
The petition has merit.
In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to annul the KASULATAN.
The Action is Barred by Prescription REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact,
REMEDIOS admits the validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under
The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is one based on fraud.
the KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of 1,335
REMEDIOS action seeks to recover real property that petitioners allegedly
meters is not part of the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the
acquired through fraud. Consequently, the trial court held that the action
removal of this excess area from TCT No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to
prescribes in four years counted from REMEDIOS actual discovery of
CONSOLACION. Consequently, REMEDIOS action is for "Annulment or
petitioners adverse title. The trial court concluded that REMEDIOS belatedly 14
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
filed her suit on 4 February 1988 because she actually knew of petitioners
adverse title since 19 November 1982. REMEDIOS action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she
claims that the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what REMEDIOS filed was a
(232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that
suit to enforce an implied trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual
CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or
notice of the breach of trust, that is, the assertion of adverse title, within which
fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied
to bring her action. The appellate court held that REMEDIOS seasonably filed
trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable
prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under by the cestui que trust. However, the Court, in justifying its deviation from the
Articles 1389 and 1391. general rule, explained:
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained [W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic) in ten years,
15
by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we x x x are not
16
Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article 1144. This ten-year prescriptive prepared to count the period from such date in this case. We note the
period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself
17
trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza["]
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after
with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also.
CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October
(Emphasis supplied)
1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its
dismissal. As the Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case.
18
Borras, Other than asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured
title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E with an area twice bigger than what CANUTO
19
Following Caro, we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance
allegedly sold to CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS did not present any other proof
based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying
of petitioners fraudulent conduct akin to Adille.
the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E through the
KASULATAN executed by CANUTO and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his
The Court of Appeals Reckoning of
surviving children, one of whom, Felicidad, is the mother of REMEDIOS. The
Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice KASULATAN referred to the sale of CANUTOs 10/70 share in Lot 2 without
specifying the area of the lot sold. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT referred to the "Plano
of Adverse Title Not Justified
de Subdivision Psd-34713" without also specifying the area of the lot sold.
In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of However, Subdivision Plan Psd 34713, as certified by the Assistant Director of
20
Appeals invoked this Courts ruling in Adille v. Court of Appeals. In Adille, the Lands on 30 May 1952, showed an area of 2,670 square meters in the name of
Court reckoned the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing implied trusts not CANUTO. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No.
from registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the adverse title (232252) 1321 to CONSOLACION covering an area of 2,670 square meters.
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive period had
fictitious or forged. REMEDIOS even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan already lapsed.
21
Psd 34713 as certified by the Assistant Director of Lands. Moreover, REMEDIOS
Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
has not contested petitioners claim that CANUTO doubled his share in Lot 2 by
22
acquiring VICTORIANOs share. Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a
real party-in-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly
Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335 square meters to 2,670 square
ruled.
meters is a glaring mistake. There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this
increase in area was the result of fraud. Allegations of fraud in actions to enforce The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted
23
implied trusts must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Adille, which or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who
24 25
is anchored on fraud, cannot apply to the present case. stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. If one who is not a
real party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of
At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars 26
action.
REMEDIOS complaint. As executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS
submitted to the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan in Special Proceedings REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half
Case No. C-208 the inventory of all the property comprising CATALINAs estate, portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL.
which included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In a motion dated 7 November 1977, However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order
CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of these lots from the inventory, invoking admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding.
her title over them. REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on 8 November Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No.
27
1977 against which she filed an opposition. Nevertheless, the trial court C-208 is still pending.
overruled REMEDIOS objection. In its order of 3 January 1978, the trial court
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or
granted CONSOLACIONs motion and ordered the exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
and 2-E from the estate of CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not appeal from this
of Court." This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to
ruling.
probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
28
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners adverse title on 8 November thereunder." REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a
1977. Even if, for the sake of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to devisee of CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not
run upon actual notice of the adverse title, still REMEDIOS right to file this suit admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right
has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11 November 1987 within which to file her under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to
seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over Copy of the title is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex
these lots. "B;"
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the 6. Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered that the
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix defendants were able to obtain title in their name of the said parcels of land by
of CATALINAs LAST WILL. This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" allegedly executed by Canuto Sioson
petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots. on September 26, 1956 before Notary Public Jose [T.] de los Santos of Navotas,
Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in her complaint: Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is hereto attached and forms an
integral part hereof as Annex "C;"
3. The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late CATALINA SIOSON
who died single and without any child of her own and who, during her lifetime, 7. The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original sale did not
was the owner of those two (2) parcels of land located at Tanza, Navotas, Rizal specify the parcels of land sold by Canuto Sioson, the defendants submitted an
(now Metro Manila), formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 alleged Affidavit executed by Felicidad Sioson and Beatriz Sioson identifying the
of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, x x x. lots sold by Canuto Sioson to the defendants as Lots 2-A and 2-E of subdivision
plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit dated October 3, 1968 on the basis of which
4. The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the deceased
the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 was issued to the
CATALINA SIOSON, has sole and exclusive claim of ownership over the above-
defendants is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex "D;"
mentioned two (2) parcels of land by virtue of a will or "Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya" executed by Catalina Sioson on May 19, 1964 before Notary Public 8. The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the aforementioned
Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which document the deceased Catalina Affidavit (Annex "D") to the Register of Deeds as the basis of their claim to Lots
Sioson specifically and exclusively bequeathed to the plaintiff the above- 2-A and 2-E in view of the fact that the parcels sold to them by Canuto Sioson,
mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of Psd-34713 approved by the Bureau of Lands on assuming there was such a sale, were different parcels of land, Lots 2-A and 2-E
May 30, 1952. Copy of the "Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya" consisting of four (4) being the properties of the late Catalina Sioson who bequeathed the same to the
pages is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex "A;" plaintiff.
5. Sometime on or about February, 1987, plaintiff discovered that the above- xxxx
mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now registered or
12. Because of the defendants fraudulent actuations on this matter, plaintiff
titled in the name of the defendants under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
suffered and continious [sic] to suffer moral damages arising from anxiety,
(232252) 1321 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, now Metro-Manila District III.
shock and wounded feelings. Defendants should also be assessed exemplary
damages by way of a lesson to deter them from again committing the fraudulent
acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which they were able to obtain title to
29
the parcels of land involved in this case x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in her Comment to this
petition, REMEDIOS continued to pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-
half of the disputed lots.
Other Matters Raised in the Petition
The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors petitioners
assigned concerning the award of damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS.
Such award assumes that REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest and that she
timely filed her complaint. As earlier shown, this is not the case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 31 January 1994 and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang

Maninang vs. CA (114 SCRA 478)
and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have
FIRST DIVISION found peace and happiness with them even during the time
when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to
vs. appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me
Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents. do things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the
Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate
(Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L.
Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son,
Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta". claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc.
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for brevity).
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered
Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which
consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
are quoted hereunder:
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the
xxx xxx xxx
ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In
Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited the cases of Neri
personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs.
1
Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878).
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable
is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is only by appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.
limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will;
2
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
in this wise: 4
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court finds meritorious, the
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L. Maninang and 5
right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit ... The authentication of a will decides no other question than
and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor
that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of
the trust. " the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions relating to
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the
6
after the will has been authenticated ....
Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of
reconsideration (December 19, 1980). Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions
3
of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court denied certiorari and ruled that the trial
its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate 7
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to
avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court committed
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a
8
Nuguid , reading: resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically
inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case,
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the
testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has are two diverse concepts.
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
should meet that issue. (Emphasis supplied)
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri vs.
9
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez had a similar thrust: Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
legitimate for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed.,
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always "voluntary",
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
"involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court 10
edition, Volume 2.o p. 1131).
should meet the issue.
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule.
The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before ... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the those of disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854 of the
parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This
validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court
such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19,
but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", 1980, are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated and
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
11
illegally deprived. SO ORDERED.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that

controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent
Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of
the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
12
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso
... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported

will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise,
the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken
to its foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our
finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a
13
Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And
even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that
in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against the petitioner

Atilano Mercado vs. Santos (66 Phil 216)
herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated. The
EN BANC petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and engaged the
services of an attorney to undertake his defense. Preliminary investigation of the
G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938
case was continued twice upon petition of the complainant. The complaint was
ANTILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner, finally dismissed, at the instance of the complainant herself, in an order dated
vs. December 8, 1932. Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor
ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondents. charged the petitioner for the second time with the same offense, presenting the
ROSARIO BASA DE LEON, ET AL., intervenors. complaint this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. The
petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and
Claro M. Recto and Benigno S. Aquino for petitioner.
engaged the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after
Esperanza de la Cruz and Heracio Abistao for respondents.
investigation, was also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant
Sotto and Sotto for intervenors.
herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health. That was on April 27,
LAUREL, J.: 1933. Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the same
intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense.
On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of
The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the justice of
Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa.
the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a
Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F. Gabino, one of
bond of P4,000, and engaged the services of defense counsel. The case was
the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27,1931, admitted the will to
dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation, on the ground that the will
probate. Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein
alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was no
moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing
court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the
thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the
motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with notice to
authenticity of the signature aforesaid. Dissatisfied with the result, the
the adverse party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on
provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in the Court of First Instance of
May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on July
Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted on May 23,
26, 1935. (Basa vs. Mercado, 33 Off. Gaz., 2521.)
1934, and, for the fourth time, the petitioner was arrested, filed a bond and
It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of the engaged the services of counsel to handle his defense. The reinvestigation
will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the dragged on for almost a year until February 18, 1934, when the Court of First
Instance ordered that the case be tried on the merits. The petitioner interposed 1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground that the will alleged to have the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
been forged had already been probated. This demurrer was overruled on person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
December 24, 1935, whereupon an exception was taken and a motion for relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive
reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed. The motion for reconsideration upon the title of the thing,the will or administration, or the condition or
and the proposed appeal were denied on January 14, 1936. The case proceeded to relation of the person Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of
trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the of the testator or intestate.
order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution
xxx xxx xxx
thereof. The motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial (Emphasis ours.)
court from further proceedings in the matter. The injunction was issued and
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due
thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
execution of a probate will. It says.
for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices
dissented in a separate opinion. The case is now before this court for review SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No
on certiorari. will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme
Petitioner contends (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar
Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate
to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will; and, (2) that
shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (Emphasis ours.)
he has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
(In Manahan vs. Manahan 58 Phil., 448, 451), we held:

1. Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of
judgments. . . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the
action or proceeding. Sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure;
Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of
Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentelvs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436;
the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393;
order, may be as follows.
Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil, 156;
Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This court held in the
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Jocsoy vs. Vano, 8 Phil., 119. case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938):
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265),
and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested,
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is
through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the
usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and
Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is
is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at
binding against all of them.
the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the
forgery. (Emphasis ours.) court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said
will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is
As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure
binding against the whole world.
aforequoted, was taken almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the State relative to the effect of the probate In Everrett vs. Wing (103 Vt., 488, 492), the Supreme Court of Vermont held.
of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction. The Vermont statute as
In this State the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem being in form
to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will reads as follows.
and substance upon the will itself to determine its validity. The
SEC. 2356. No will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is judgment determines the status of the instrument, whether it is or is
proved and allowed in the probate court, or by appeal in the county or not the will of the testator. When the proper steps required by law have
supreme court; and the probate of a will of real or personal estate shall been taken the judgment is binding upon everybody, and makes the
be conclusive as to its due execution. (Vermont Statutes, p. 451.) instrument as to all the world just what the judgment declares it to be.
(Woodruff vs. Taylor, 20 Vt., 65, 73; Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713, 715;
Said the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society vs. Eells
Missionary Society vs. Eells, 68 Vt., 497, 504; 35 Atl., 463.) The
(68 Vt., 497, 504): "The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
proceedings before the probate court are statutory and are not governed
thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due execution against the
by common law rules as to parties or causes of action.
whole world. (Vt. St., sec. 2336; Fosters Exrs. vs. Dickerson, 64 Vt., 233.)"
(Holdrige vs. Holdriges Estate, 53 Vt., 546, 550; Purdy vs. Estate of
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of Purdy, 67 Vt. 50, 55; 30 Atl., 695.) No process is issued against anyone in
notice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive such proceedings, but all persons interested in determining the state or
notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the conditions of the instrument are constructively notified by the
publication of notice as required by G. L. 3219. forging a will, the probating of the same is conclusive evidence in the
(Woodruff vs. Taylor, supra;In re Warners Estate 98 Vt., 254; 271; 127 defendants favor of its genuine character. Reference is made, however, to the
Atl., 362.) cases of Rex vs. Gibson, 168 English Reports, Full Reprint, 836, footnote (a),
decided in 1802, and Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, 168 English Reports, Full
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an
Reprint, 836, decided in 1818, which establish a contrary rule. Citing these later
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be
cases, we find the following quotation from Black on Judgments, Vol. II, page
conclusive.
764.
SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. The following presumptions or

A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally
deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular
although the will was forged; and a payment to the executor named
facts, are deemed conclusive.
therein of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same,
xxx xxx xxx notwithstanding the spurious character of the instrument probated. It
has also been held that, upon an indictment for forging a will, the
4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be
probate of the paper in question is conclusive evidence in the
conclusive.
defendants favor of its genuine character. But this particular point has
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory lately been ruled otherwise.
that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however
It was the case of Rex vs. Buttery, supra, which induced the Supreme Court of
strong. (Brant vs. Morning Journal Assn., 80 N.Y.S., 1002, 1004; 81 App. Div., 183;
Massachussetts in the case of Waters vs. Stickney (12 Allen 1; 90 Am. Dec., 122)
see, also, Joslyn vs. Puloer, 59 Hun., 129, 140, 13 N.Y.S., 311.) The will in question
also cited by the majority opinion, to hold that "according to later and sounder
having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to
decisions, the probate, though conclusive until set aside of the disposition of the
overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
property, does not protect the forger from punishment." This was reproduced in
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to bolster 28 R.C.L., p. 376, and quoted in Barry vs.Walker (103 Fla., 533; 137 So., 711, 715),
up its conclusion that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding and Thompson vs. Freeman (149 So., 740, 742), also cited in support of the
upon the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness of the will majority opinion of the Court of Appeals. The dissenting opinion of the Court of
insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of Appeals in the instant case under review makes a cursory study of the statutes
punishment of a crime." The cases of Dominus Rex vs. Vincent, 93 English obtaining in England, Massachussetts and Florida, and comes to the conclusion
Reports, Full Reprint, 795, the first case being decided in 1721, were cited to that the decisions cited in the majority opinion do not appear to "have been
illustrate the earlier English decisions to the effect that upon indictment for promulgated in the face of statutes similar to ours." The dissenting opinion cites
Whartons Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show that the probate of a such action becomes res adjudicata, and is binding and conclusive upon
will in England is only prima facie proof of the validity of the will (Op. the parties to that action and upon any person who may subsequently
Cit. quoting Marriot vs. Marriot, 93 English Reprint, 770); and 21 L.R.A. (pp. acquire the title from either of those parties; but the decision has no
686689 and note), to show that in Massachussetts there is no statute making effect upon other parties, and does not settle what may be called the
the probate of a will conclusive, and that in Florida the statute(sec. 1810, Revised status or character of the will, leaving it subject to be enforced as a valid
Statutes) makes the probate conclusive evidence as to the validity of the will will, or defeated as invalid, whenever other parties may have a contest
with regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The cases decided by depending upon it. A probate of a will of personal property, on the
the Supreme Court of Florida cited by the majority opinion, supra, refer to wills contrary, is a judicial determination of the character of the will itself. It
of both personal and real estate. does not necessarily or ordinarily arise from any controversy between
adverse claimants, but is necessary in order to authorize a disposition of
The petitioner cites the case of State vs. McGlynn (20 Cal., 233, decided in 1862),
the personal estate in pursuance of its provisions. In case of any
in which Justice Norton of the Supreme Court of California, makes the following
controversy between adverse claimants of the personal estate, the
review of the nature of probate proceedings in England with respect to wills
probate is given in evidence and is binding upon the parties, who are
personal and real property.
not at liberty to introduce any other evidence as to the validity of the
In England, the probate of wills of personal estate belongs to the will.
Ecclesiastical Courts. No probate of a will relating to real estate is there

The intervenors, on the other hand, attempt to show that the English law on
necessary. The real estate, upon the death of the party seized, passes
wills is different from that stated in the case of State vs. McGlynn, supra, citing
immediately to the devisee under the will if there be one; or if there be
the following statutes.
no will, to the heir at law. The person who thus becomes entitled takes
possession. If one person claims to be the owner under a will, and 1. The Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will. 4 E 1 Vict. c. 26).
another denies the validity of the will and claims to be the owner as heir
2. The Court of Probate Act, 1857 (20 and 21 Vict. c. 77).
at law, an action of ejectment is brought against the party who may be
in possession by the adverse claimant; and on the trial of such an 3. The Judicature Act, 1873 (36 and 37 Vict. c. 66).
action, the validity of the will is contested, and evidence may be given
The Wills Act of 1837 provides that probate may be granted of "every
by the respective parties as to the capacity of the testator to make a will,
instrumental purporting to be testamentary and executed in accordance with
or as to any fraud practiced upon him, or as to the actual execution of it,
the statutory requirements . . . if it disposes of property, whether personal or
or as to any other circumstance affecting its character as a valid devise
real." The Ecclesiastical Courts which took charge of testamentary causes
of the real estate in dispute. The decision upon the validity of the will in
(Ewells Blackstone [1910], p. 460), were determined by the Court of Probate Act or questioned by any other court, either incidentally or by any direct
of 1857, and the Court of Probate in turn was, together with other courts, proceeding, for the purpose of impeaching it, and that so long as the
incorporated into the Supreme Court of Judicature, and transformed into the probate stands the will must be recognized and admitted in all courts to
Probate Division thereof, by the Judicature Act of 1873. (Lord Halsbury, The be valid, then it will be immaterial and useless to inquire whether the
Laws of England[1910], pp. 151156.) The intervenors overlook the fact, however, will in question was in fact genuine or forged. (State vs. McGlynn, 20
that the case of Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, supra, upon which they rely in Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118, 121.).
support of their theory that the probate of a forged will does not protect the
Although in the foregoing case the information filed by the State was to set
forger from punishment, was decided long before the foregoing amendatory
aside the decree of probate on the ground that the will was forged, we see no
statutes to the English law on wills were enacted. The case of State vs.McGlynn
difference in principle between that case and the case at bar. A subtle
may be considered, therefore, as more or less authoritative on the law of
distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a decree of probate,
England at the time of the promulgation of the decision in the case of
and declaring a probated will to be a forgery. It is clear, however, that a duly
Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra.
probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without disturbing in a way the
In the case of State vs. McGlynn, the Attorney General of California filed an decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a will should be
information to set aside the probate of the will of one Broderick, after the lapse regarded as genuine for one purpose and spurious for another.
of one year provided by the law of California for the review of an order
The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question
probating a will, in order that the estate may be escheated to the State of
as to whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the
California for the review of an probated will was forged and that Broderick
alleged forger of the probate will. We have examined some important cases and
therefore died intestate, leaving no heirs, representatives or devisees capable of
have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard maybe adopted or drawn
inheriting his estate. Upon these facts, the Supreme Court of California held.
therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory provisions
The fact that a will purporting to be genuine will of Broderick, devising obtaining in different jurisdictions. It behooves us, therefore, as the court of last
his estate to a devisee capable of inheriting and holding it, has been resort, to choose that rule most consistent with our statutory law, having in view
admitted to probate and established as a genuine will by the decree of a the needed stability of property rights and the public interest in general. To be
Probate Court having jurisdiction of the case, renders it necessary to sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment
decide whether that decree, and the will established by it, or either of of culprits deserving of the severity of the law in cases where, as here, forgery is
them, can be set aside and vacated by the judgment of any other court. If discovered after the probate of the will and the prosecution is had before the
it shall be found that the decree of the Probate Court, not reversed by prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance seems inclined in
the appellate court, is final and conclusive, and not liable to be vacated favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law surround the
execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require probate to be it would not be a greater assumption to deny the general rule that
made after an elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113, not to speak of courts of chancery may set aside judgments procured by fraud, than to
section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an adequate remedy to deny the exception to that rule in the case of probate decrees. We must
any party who might have been adversely affected by the probate of a forged acquiesce in the principle established by the authorities, if we are
will, much in the same way as other parties against whom a judgment is unable to approve of the reason. Judge Story was a staunch advocate for
rendered under the same or similar circumstances. (Pecson vs. Coronel, 43 Phil., the most enlarged jurisdiction of courts of chancery, and was compelled
358.)The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court to yield to the weight of authority. He says "No other excepted case is
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court known to exist; and it is not easy to discover the grounds upon which
has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, this exception stands, in point of reason or principle, although it is
surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of clearly settled by authority. (1 Storys Eq. Jur. sec. 440.)"
first instance when that court refuses to grant relief. (Banco Espaol (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118, 129. See, also,
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921; Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Tracy vs. Muir, 121 American State Reports, 118, 125.)
Phil., 810; Samia vs. Medina, 56 Phil., 613.) After a judgment allowing a will to be
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of
probated has become final and unappealable, and after the period fixed by
our Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression
against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court
of the legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
of competent jurisdiction.
. . . The court of chancery has no capacity, as the authorities have
The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the case.
settled, to judge or decide whether a will is or is not a forgery; and
However, the other legal question with reference to the denial to the accused of
hence there would be an incongruity in its assuming to set aside a
his right to a speedy trial having been squarely raised and submitted, we shall
probate decree establishing a will, on the ground that the decree was
proceed to consider the same in the light of cases already adjudicated by this
procured by fraud, when it can only arrive at the fact of such fraud by
court.
first deciding that the will was a forgery. There seems, therefore, to be a
substantial reason, so long as a court of chancery is not allowed to judge 2. The Constitution of the Philippines provides that "In all criminal prosecutions
of the validity of a will, except as shown by the probate, for the the accused . . . shall enjoy the right . . . to have a speedy . . . trial. . . . (Art. III,
exception of probate decrees from the jurisdiction which courts of sec. 1, par. 17. See, also, G.O. No. 58, sec. 15, No. 7.) Similar provisions are to be
chancery exercise in setting aside other judgments obtained by fraud. found in the Presidents Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission (par.
But whether the exception be founded in good reason or otherwise, it 11), the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 (sec. 5, par. 2) and the Jones Act of August
has become too firmly established to be disregarded. At the present day,
29, 1916 (sec. 3, par. 2). The provisions in the foregoing organic acts appear to In People vs. Castaeda and Fernandez, supra, this court found that the accused
have been taken from similar provisions in the Constitution of the United States had not been given a fair and impartial trial. The case was to have been
(6th Amendment) and those of the various states of the American Union. A remanded to the court a quo for a new trial before an impartial judge. This step,
similar injunction is contained in the Malolos Constitution (art. 8, Title IV), not however, was found unnecessary. A review of the evidence convinced this court
to speak of other constitutions. More than once this court had occasion to set that a judgment of conviction for theft, as charged, could not be sustained and,
aside the proceedings in criminal cases to give effect to the constitutional having in view the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution to
injunction of speedy trial. (Conde vs. Judge of First Instance and Fiscal of every person accused of crime, entered a judgment acquitting the accused, with
Tayabas [1923], 45 Phil., 173; Conde vs. Rivera and Unson[1924], 45 Phil., 650; costs de oficio. We said.
People vs. Castaeda and Fernandez[1936]), 35 Off. Gaz., 1269; Kalaw vs.Apostol,
. . . The Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17, guarantees to
Oct. 15, 1937, G.R. No. 45591; Esguerra vs. De la Costa, Aug. 30,1938, G.R. No.
every accused person the right to a speedy trial. This criminal
46039.).
proceeding has been dragging on for almost five years now. The accused
In Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, supra, decided before the adoption of our have twice appealed to this court for redress from the wrong that they
Constitution, we said. have suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least one of them,
namely Pedro Fernandez alias Piro, had been con-fined in prison from
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
July 20, 1932 to November 27, 1934, for inability to post the required
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy
bond of P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The Government
trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the
speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been
administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this
deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
an end and that they be immediately dis-charged from the custody of
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent,
the law. (Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 651.)
is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By
the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, the petitioner invoked and this court applied and
the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal gave effect to the doctrines stated in the second Conde case, supra. In granting
preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial the writs prayed for, this court, after referring to the constitutional and statutory
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. provisions guaranteeing to persons accused of crime the right to a speedy trial,
said:
Se infiere de los preceptos legales transcritos que todo acusado en causa hechos, que al recurrents se leprivo de su derecho fundamental de ser
criminal tiene derecho a ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. Juicio juzgado prontamente.
rapido significa un juicioque se celebra de acuerdo con la ley de
Esguerra vs. De la Costa, supra, was a petition for mandamus to compel the
procedimiento criminal y los reglamentos, libre de dilaciones vejatorias,
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal to dismiss the complaint
caprichosas y opersivas (Burnettvs. State, 76 Ark., 295; 88S. W., 956; 113
filed in a criminal case against the petitioner, to cancel the bond put up by the
AMSR, 94; Stewart vs. State, 13 Ark., 720; Peo. vs. Shufelt, 61 Mich., 237;
said petitioner and to declare the costs de oficio. In accepting the contention
28 N. W., 79; Nixon vs. State, 10 Miss., 497; 41 AMD., 601; State vs. Cole,
that the petitioner had been denied speedy trial, this court said:
4 Okl. Cr., 25; 109 P., 736; State vs. Caruthers, 1 Okl. Cr., 428; 98 P., 474;
State vs. Keefe, 17 Wyo., 227, 98 p., 122;22 IRANS, 896; 17 Ann. Cas., 161). Consta que en menos de un ao el recurrente fue procesado
Segun los hechos admitidos resulta que al recurrente se le concedio criminalmente por el alegado delito de abusos deshonestos, en el
vista parcial del asunto, en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Samar, Juzgado de Paz del Municipio de Cainta, Rizal. Como consecuencia de
solo despues de haber transcurrido ya mas de un ao y medio desde la las denuncias que contra el se presentaron fue arrestado tres veces y
presentacion de la primera querella y desde la recepcion de la causa en para gozar de libertad provisional, en espera de los juicios, se vio
dicho Juzgado, y despues de haberse transferido dos veces la vista obligado a prestartres fianzas por la suma de P1,000 cada una. Si no se
delasunto sin su consentimiento. A esto debe aadirse que laprimera da fin al proceso que ultimamente se ha incoado contra el recurrente la
transferencia de vista era claramente injustificadaporque el motivo que incertidumbre continuara cerniendose sobre el y las consiguientes
se alego consistio unicamente en laconveniencia personal del ofendido molestias y preocupaciones continuaran igualmente abrumandole. El
y su abogado, no habiendose probado suficientemente la alegacion del Titulo III, articulo 1, No. 17,de la Constitucion preceptua que en todo
primero de quese hallaba enfermo. Es cierto que el recurrente habia proceso criminalel acusado tiene derecho de ser juzgado pronta y
pedido que, en vez de sealarse a vista el asunto para el mayo de 1936, publicamente. El Articulo 15, No. 7, de la Orden General No. 58 dispone
lo fuera para el noviembre del mismo ao; pero,aparte de que la razon asimismo que en las causas criminales el acusado tendra derecho a ser
que alego era bastante fuerte porquesu abogado se oponia a comparecer juzgado pronta y publicamente. Si el recurrente era realmente culpable
por compromisos urgentes contraidos con anterioridad y en tal del delito que se le imputo, tenia de todos modos derechos a que fuera
circunstancia hubiera quedado indefenso si hubiese sido obligado a juzgado pronta y publicamente y sin dilaciones arbitrarias y vejatorias.
entraren juicio, aparece que la vista se pospuso por el Juzgado amotu Hemos declarado reiteradamente que existe un remedio positivo para
proprio, por haber cancelado todo el calendario judicial preparado por los casos en que se viola el derecho constitucional del acusado de ser
el Escribano para el mes de junio. Declaramos, con visto de estos juzgado prontamente. El acusado que esprivado de su derecho
fundomental de ser enjuiciado rapidamente tiene derecho a pedir que
se le ponga en libertad, si estuviese detenido, o a que la causa que pende prosecution of offenses is a matter of public interest and it is the duty of the
contra el sea sobreseida definitivamente. (Conde contra Rivera y Unson, government or those acting in its behalf to prosecute all cases to their
45 Jur. Fil., 682; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U. S. vs. Fox termination without oppressive, capricious and vexatious delay. The
[1880], 3 Mont., 512; Kalaw contra Apostol, R. G. No. 45591, Oct. 15, 1937; Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only
Pueblo contra Castaeda y Fernandez, 35 Gac. Of., 1357.) where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It
does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.
We are again called upon to vindicate the fundamental right to a speedy trial.
Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
The facts of the present case may be at variance with those of the cases
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized
hereinabove referred to. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, under the
to be commenced. In any event, even the actuations of the fiscal himself in this
circumstances, we should consider the substance of the right instead of
case is not entirely free from criticism. From October 27, 1932, when the first
indulging in more or less academic or undue factual differentiations. The
complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, to
petitioner herein has been arrested four times, has put up a bond in the sum of
February 2, 1934, when the provincial fiscal filed his information with the justice
P4,000 and has engaged the services of counsel to undertake his defense an
of the peace of Mexico, one year, three months and six days transpired; and
equal number of times. The first arrest was made upon a complaint filed by one
from April 27, 1933, when the second criminal complaint was dismissed by the
of the intervenors herein for alleged falsification of a will which, sixteen months
justice of the peace of Mexico, to February 2, 1934, nine months and six days
before, had been probated in court. This complaint, after investigation, was
elapsed. The investigation following the fourth arrest, made after the fiscal had
dismissed at the complainant's own request. The second arrest was made upon a
secured a reinvestigation of the case, appears also to have dragged on for about
complaint charging the same offense and this complaint, too, was dismissed at
a year. There obviously has been a delay, and considering the antecedent facts
the behest of the complainant herself who alleged the quite startling ground
and circumstances within the knowledge of the fiscal, the delay may not at all be
that the petitioner was in poor health. The third arrest was made following the
regarded as permissible. In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, we observed that the
filing of an information by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, which information
prosecuting officer all prosecutions for public offenses (secs. 1681 and 2465 of
was dismissed, after due investigation, because of insufficiency of the evidence.
the Rev. Adm. Code), and that it is his duty to see that criminal cases are heard
The fourth arrest was made when the provincial fiscal secured a reinvestigation
without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays so that the courts of justice
of the case against the petitioner on the pretext that he had additional evidence
may dispose of them on the merits and determine whether the accused is guilty
to present, although such evidence does not appear to have ever been presented.
or not. This is as clear an admonition as could be made. An accused person is
It is true that the provincial fiscal did not intervene in the case until February 2, entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. (Sutherland on the Constitution, p.
1934, when he presented an information charging the petitioner, for the third 664; United States vs. Fox, 3 Mont., 512.) He cannot be oppressed by delaying he
time, of the offense of falsification. This, however, does not matter. The commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings
pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It is not to be alleging, among other things, "Que por estas continuas acusaciones e
supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the investigaciones, el acusado compareciente no obstante su mal estado de salud
prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities desde el ao 1932 en que tuvo que ser operado por padecer de tuberculosis ha
cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the part of the tenido que sostener litigios y ha sufrido la mar de humiliaciones y zozobras y ha
prosecutor or the court. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, incudo en enormes gastos y molestias y ha desatendido su quebrantada salud."
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and The foregoing allegation was inserted on page 6 of the amended petition
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not for certiorari presented to the Court of Appeals. The constitutional issue also
preclude the rights of public justice." (Beavers vs. Haubert [1905], 198 U. S., 86; appears to have been actually raised and considered in the Court of Appeals. In
25 S. Ct., 573; 49 Law. ed., 950, 954.). the majority opinion of that court, it is stated:
It may be true, as seems admitted by counsel for the intervenors, in paragraph 8, Upon the foregoing facts, counsel for the petitioner submits for the
page 3 of his brief, that the delay was due to "the efforts towards reaching an consideration of this court the following questions of law: First, that the
amicable extrajudicial compromise," but this fact, we think, casts doubt instead respondent court acted arbitrarily and with abuse of its authority, with
upon the motive which led the intervenors to bring criminal action against the serious damage and prejudice to the rights and interests of the
petitioner. The petitioner claims that the intention of the intervenors was to petitioner, in allowing that the latter be prosecuted and arrested for the
press upon settlement, with the continuous threat of criminal prosecution, fourth time, and that he be subjected, also for the fourth time, to a
notwithstanding the probate of the will alleged to have been falsified. Argument preliminary investigation for the same offense, hereby converting the
of counsel for the petitioner in this regard is not without justification. Thus after court into an instrument of oppression and vengeance on the part of the
the filing of the second complaint with the justice of the peace court of Mexico, alleged offended parties, Rosario Basa et al.; . . . .
complainant herself, as we have seen, asked for dismissal of the complaint, on
And in the dissenting opinion, we find the following opening paragraph:
the ground that "el acusado tenia la salud bastante delicada," and, apparently
because of failure to arrive at any settlement, she decided to renew her We cannot join in a decision declining to stop a prosecution that has
complaint. dragged for about five years and caused the arrest on four different
occasions of a law abiding citizen for the alleged offense of falsifying a
Counsel for the intervenors contend and the contention is sustained by the
will that years be competent jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals that the petitioner did not complain heretofore of the
denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This is a mistake. When the From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the
petitioner, for the fourth time, was ordered arrested by the Court of First criminal proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of
Instance of Pampanga, he moved for reconsideration of the order of arrest,
Appeals is hereby reversed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So

ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

possession and to reimburse the latter the net gain in the proportion that
Alsua-Betts vs. CA (July 30, 1979)
appertains to them in the properties from the date of the firing of the complaint
FIRST DIVISION up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's
fees and costs.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
the following.
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners, On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella,
vs. both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson,
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents. agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present
and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents. are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to wit: t.hqw
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the

properties of the Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97
GUERRERO, J.:1wph1.t
pages, all of them signed by the spouses and all the above
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- named heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo primers).
G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties
Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special
described in the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties
Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after
with the exception of five parcels of land Identified with the
declaring the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The
figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock
1
respondent court denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two
which are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a Tinay
sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to
(segundo parafo).
pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of
nine children but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. t.hqw
tercero y cuatro).
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the and admit that the totality of the properties allotted and
Civil Code (old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among adjudicated to the heirs as described in the preceding
their children concerning the inheritance they are entitled to in paragraph, constitute one half of the properties described in
the event of death of one of them they have decided to Annex "A", including any amount of cash deposited.
effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the properties
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the
described in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and
properties assigned to them as their hereditary portion
conditions: (Parafo quinto):
represent one-half not only of the conjugal properties but
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the includes the paraphernal properties waiving now and forever
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages any complaint or claim they have or they may have concerning
1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. the amount, value, extension and location of the properties that
meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00. are allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any claim
they have or they may have over the remaining portion of the
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real
properties, which spouses reserved for themselves.
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-
20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. (c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and
meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00. everyone of the heirs acknowledge that the properties which
are left in the possession of the surviving spouse, including any
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the
amount in cash, are even less than the one- half that should
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages
correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate
20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of 6,639,810
participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they
sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
waive any claim that they have or may have over said portion of
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all said properties or any amount in cash during the lifetime of the
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from surviving spouse, including any right or claim they have or they
may have over the paraphernal properties of Do;a Tinay in the On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a Tinay
event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus. separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly
them, the surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have
provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
over the properties assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under
properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to
and by virtue of this deed. The properties which were reserved
constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial
for them (the spouses) should be considered as his or her
Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future acquisitions
legitimate participation in the conjugal properties and the fair
of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would belong to the other
compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the
spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children. The
surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be
holographic will of Do;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as
distributed in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her
translated: t.hqw
death unless said properties of some of them have been
disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. TESTAMENT
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married
of the provision contained herein shall be under obligation to to Don Jesus Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the
pay to the other heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in
the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees. the full possession of my mental and physical faculties freely
and spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the
my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish
herein heirs.
language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
assigned or adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall and in which I ordain and provide:
be considered as his share or participation in the estate or as his

First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my
inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the
husband Don Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him,
absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under this
four (4) of whom are still living and they are Francisco Alsua,
deed.
Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in
(5) died during their minority, single and without children. equal parts.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua
and during our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts without having to post any bond.
and industry, we were able to acquire conjugal properties
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting
consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands and urban lands
this testament on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the
registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.
Philippines. t.hqw(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
following- my spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my
properties, real and personal, and the other half, to my children As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar
Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and
Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo conditions as the above will of his wife.
Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the Court
understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as
of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their
legitime to my above named children have already been given
respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings No.
to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25, 1949 and
484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina
ratified on the same day, month and year before Notary Public
Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner).
Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of 1949)
enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their
comply with each and every clause contained in the said mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective
document. holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that
one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the
disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the
execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned
"Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for
among my spouse and above named children or the children
themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not
mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is, one-
disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition,
and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my
participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired husband Don Jesus Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua,
subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my
spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would aforecited children all the properties described in the above
be divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils mentioned Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949
that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was which correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits)
designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the expressed in the same, and in the event that the properties
properties reserved for themselves. granted to one or any of my children should exceed in quantity
or value those corresponding to another or others, I hereby
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as
declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my
translated: t.hqw
children as their inheritance from the free portion of my
CODICIL property.
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws
That my spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which
which we have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
correspond to me covers all the properties that I have Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed
partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. above stated, including all those properties which we shall
Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) acquire after the execution of this document.
(and) even as the properties which by reason of this testament I

In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby
leave to my husband as his share and the other half that
declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that
corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that
pertain to me or would pertain to me, which have not been
up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally
lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay
among my above-mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay,
and in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion
Philippines, August 14,1956. t.hqw
that I bequeath to my husband as his inheritance and his
legitimate.
( L
S S
G U
D A
.
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed
F also a separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as
L the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the
O spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental
R petitions for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings
E earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the
N codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
T
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
I
executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on
N
October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus,
A
he took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
R Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his
A holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
L Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with
L their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was
A then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This

D notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
E had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all
the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
A August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his properties donated to
his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his
1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo
estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened
of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956,
may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond. which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a Tinay
had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated
for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and November 14, 1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate
which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an
holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the oppositors
the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the therein (the private respondents now) did not include some properties
proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay. appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached
thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According to the oppositors, these
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots with a total
named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a
new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi City including the lot and the
following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an assessed
the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of
under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were
improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of
person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also
secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory of the estate
formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over the same,
alleging that she bought the properties from their father and presenting the two
Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show (P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred
the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs.
price of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the
of the four urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the
appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive
oppositors filed Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two
portion of which states, as translated, thus t.hqw
deeds of sale, with damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then
jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself
Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959. constrained to set aside as it hereby sets aside the decision
appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance
Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby
of Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of
denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles
which states: t.hqw
issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay
rendered, to wit: to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed damages, the sum of
P5,000.00 and to render an accounting of properties in their
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and
possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain, in the
ALLOWS the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay,
proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of
on November 14, 1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A,
litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of
consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made
this complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties
the basis for division and distribution of the estate of said
pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New
testator;
Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as
and holds that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale attorney's fees, and the costs.
on November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four
accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The
assigned errors, to wit: t.hqw
Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly and severally to
pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand findings of the probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that
private respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will, are in eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of
estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus Appeals, and We quote: t.hqw
Alsua.
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding application therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the
that testator Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will. ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on
policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of
speculation, surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross
the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if,
misapprehension of facts.
and only if, executed conformably to law.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of

The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's
August 26, 1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
Will, 300 N.Y.S., 502: t.hqw
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not
the same is of no moment. The controversy as to the competency or
to establish the existence of the right of any
incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by
living person, but to determine whether or not
acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in formally
the decedent has performed the acts specified
agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their
by the pertinent statutes, which are the
father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their
essential prerequisites to personal direction of
mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla
the mode of devolution of his property on
de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus
death. There is no legal but merely a moral
Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which petitioners
duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to
claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of
validate the wishes of the departed, and he
the private respondents from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
may and frequently does receive no personal
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid benefit from the performance of the act.
down in the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo,
One of the most fundamental conceptions of
et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an
probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with
the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the
a deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt influence of fear, or threats;
262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208,
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div.,
person;
733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of
Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
additional party to every litigation affecting the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
disposal of the assets of the deceased. Matter
his signature thereto.
of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295,
298, N.Y.S., 219.' The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the
respondent court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court
due execution of the questioned will and testament of Don Jesus,
erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus
declaring: t.hqw
Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The ... and going back to the previous question, whether the
Civil Court is very clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be questioned will and testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A,
disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows: t.hqw was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil
Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning accepts the
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
findings of the inferior court concerning the
cases:
question, t.hqw
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at
with;
Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks after said death of
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a
of making a wilt at the time of its execution; new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his
previous holographic will which he made on
January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated
August 14, 1956. In the presence of his Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him,
bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, and after making a few minor corrections, he
he crossed out in ink each and every page of instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the
said page he wrote on each page the word win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon Imperial that the signing of the will should be
(Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and at his home in Ligao, in the morning of
including Exh. V-14). He then instructed November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses
Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register
their corresponding descriptions. of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a
friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his
sort of employee of Don Jesus.
lawyer, Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the
latter came accompanied by his son, Atty. Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959,
Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a Don Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial,
judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi
City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed
lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and the latter that Don Jesus was requesting him to
accordingly gave more detailed instructions as be one of the attesting witnesses to his will.
to how he wanted to divide his properties Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don
among his four children. He handed to them a Jesus, considered it an honor to be so asked,
list and on the left he indicated the name of and gladly went with the Imperials. They
the child to whom the listed properties shall arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;
pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the
Spanish is his major language, as in fact his latter requested them to be seated at the usual
conversations with Don Gregorio are always in receiving room on the ground floor while he
Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came
semi-final draft of the will and after reading it down, carrying with him the will to be signed
placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted rni ultimo voluntad y

Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial testamento que ha sido
and immediately joined them in conversation. preparado por el abogado Sr.
Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose Gregorio Imperial segun mis
residence is just across the road from the instrucciones cuyo documento
house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already tengo aqui conmigo y
informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact encuentro que, despues de lo
of signing the will that morning, and so, on he leido, esta
being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials satisfactoriamente hecho
had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to segun mis instrucciones,
the residence of Don Jesus, without much Como saben ustedes tengo
delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.'
coming back of Gaya, there were now six (pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of
people gathered in the living room, namely: December 7, 1967, Sarte.
Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to
Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose
the big round table on another part of the
Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses
same sala for convenience in signing because
who testified for the petitioner declared that
there were chairs all around this table. The will
Don Jesus was in bright and lively conversation
which consisted of nine pages, with a
which ran from problems of farming and the
duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round
merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock,
table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S.
Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about
Imperial assisting each person signing by
time to do what they were there for, and this
indicating the proper place where the
was followed by a more or less statement from
signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as
Jesus, who said: t.hqw
testator, signed first. After signing the original
'Preisamente es por lo que he and the two other sets, the three sets were
Hamado a ustedes que esten then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed
presentes para ser testigos de as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose
Madarieta signed next as another attesting for the entire province of Albay, notarized the
witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat which
signing all the three sets, the same were passed seal he brought along that morning. After all
to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third the three sets were notarized, they were all
attesting witness. On each of the three sets, given back to Don Jesus who placed them
Don Jesus signed ten times, one on the inside the same folder. At that moment, it was
margin of each of the nine pages, and at the already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited
end of the instrument proper. Each of the all of them to lunch, which invitation was
three attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp. 474-480,
and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-
one on the margin of each of the nine pages, R)
one at the end of the instrument proper and
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite
one below the attestation clause. The original
difficult to conclude that the same had not complied with the
will was marked as Exh. A (or set A); the
requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA
duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate
Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and
Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of
Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It the lower court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the
was also clearly established that when Don formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding
Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same.
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and Hence, there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower
witnessed said signing, and that when each of court and the respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts
these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and such facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in
and the two other attesting witnesses were the conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly executed in
present and Witnessing said Signing. The accordance with law. We rule that the questioned last will and testament of Don
signing by the testator and the attesting Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements of the law.
witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge
S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property
details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so
things and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded
executed the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which
from the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of
divided the conjugal properties of the spouses between the spouses themselves
contracts.
and the children under the terms and conditions and dispositions herein before
stated and to implement its provisions, Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to
executed separately their respective holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955 future inheritances, except those the object of which is to make
and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article
reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been 1056.
probated thereafter and upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be
appointed executor of the will and in due time the partition of the properties or
the subject- matter of contract.
estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by the probate court on July 6, 1960.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25,
the law may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts
1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the
inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In
surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring
other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to
him from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
include in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
August 14, 1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and
testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and
elevated to this Court. new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a
little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the
partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056
Code. The court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the
in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto.
partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates,
These Articles provide as follows: t.hqw
citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court
held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition of November 14, 1949 was
ratified in the holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their
codicil of August 14, 1956. lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part
of their property;
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article
will before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and We 1271 makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that
quote the pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the
division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056,
partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her
it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion
nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid and
that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
enforceable.
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides: conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of
the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property
provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so
they simply provide for the division of the estate during the
far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, upon the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the
1903, laid down the following doctrine: partition of the estate among the persons interested.
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
interpreted to mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos,

A distinction must be made between the disposition of property
partition his property referred to in the section wherein said
and its division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing
article is found, without the authority of a testament containing
the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by
an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for,
last will, must be understood in accordance with this
otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to
distinction. The Idea is to divide the estate among the heirs
making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor
designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the
included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially,
disposition of the properties to take effect after his death, and
to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the
the expression of the testator's last will and must be extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was
surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the
part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of
and the testator may make this division in the same will or in August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who
another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words, the law, executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions
in article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall hereafter of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he
examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs.
partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule,
purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don
accompany every testament or last will are not necessary. Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party
Neither is it necessary to observe the special for. realities to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions
required in case of donations, because it is not a matter of thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple
disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is
which already have been legally disposed of. an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and
inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the
involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos
learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of
of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without 1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule
a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos
of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been
necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of
heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided
not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties
"testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one were not specifically described in the public instrument, an essential
who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows: t.hqw
it by will to take effect after his death.
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on
must be made by public instrument in which the property joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only
donated must be specifically described and in the amount of her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a Do;a Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay expressly
separate public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free
made during the lifetime of the donor. portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of
her children as heirs was made in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument,
wit: t.hqw
authentic notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this
proceeding shall be noted in both instruments. Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de
otorgado este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses
mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la
which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like
misma proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra
in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision
mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes iguales.
enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs
or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that
Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only "Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the same
one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against their shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the
legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half
remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts." From the
respective shares. above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don
Jesus whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion
her will.
was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955
and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil, share in the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the
independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him codicil: t.hqw
on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate
que se sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos of Do;a Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress
bienes de los que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally to the
la escritura de reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la children, upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing him.
mitad de gananciales que le corresponds tal como arriba
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on
declare, incluyendo todos aquenos bienes que se adquiriesen
November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did
por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the children, it
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under
esposo declaro que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de her holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by
todo genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no any condition obligation or proviso.
dispuestas aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of
herederos mencionados despues de mi muerte.
November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Do;a
states: t.hqw Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was
not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such,
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his
would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear:
inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which
"A win may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver
have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made
Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed
on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously
1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at
above stated, including all those properties which we shall
bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first
acquire after the execution of this document.
place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are
declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777,
pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have not been New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the
among my above-mentioned heirs after my death.

forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed meet head-on the time of the validity of the provisions of the
that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested. will in question. ...
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
to the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and
resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone, and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties
after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account
holographic will and codicil, by making another win expressly cancelling and in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and
revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his
the provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo
that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon the
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties
intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated. Thus We
distributed to the children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under
declared inNuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: t.hqw
the contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the former had in fact been
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the included in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed that the intention of
will should be allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the Don Jesus in his last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the
case is the intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion of the
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which he received as his
authenticated. ... inheritance from Do;a Tinay. The legitimes of the forced heirs were left
unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt
otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be
wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to
protracted and for ought that appears in the record, in the
whomsoever he may choose.
event of probate or if the court rejects the will probability exists
that the case win come up once again before us on the issue of If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time, as in fact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule
considerations that induce us to a behalf that we might as well in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: t.hqw
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to years of age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual
advance its own Idea of a just distribution of the property in the administration of his properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for
face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by his part received instructions from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts.
the testatrix in the latter will. ... According to the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not legally
tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation
follows: t.hqw
of a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an
equitable division of the estate of a deceased person. The only Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
functions of the courts in these cases is to carry out the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
intention of the deceased as manifested in the wig. Once that that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered
intention has been determined through a careful reading of the by disease, injury or other cause.
will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
violated, it is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed
into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The
of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
court should not sit in judgment upon the motives and
testamentary act,
sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated,
nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere
property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does
there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward process not render a person incapable of making a will. t.hqw
of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory
toward those who expected her bounty. ...
which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity,
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental
would have been entitled to an equal share under the extrajudicial partition of capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held
1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease
honor and would not snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
other as one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had been making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid
diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten
whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound presentes para ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento
and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente
not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or hecho segun mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo
of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163). cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun
essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and implications thereof.
under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other
absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the
details which, in the words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile
respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of
with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus
the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the
had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements of
1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is
the law. But more than that, gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed
concerned, he had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his
decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally
lifetime, the alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by
incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by
Don Jesus in the properties under question to petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts
private respondents. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don
when the same properties had already been bequeathed to her in the will of
Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted
November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the
to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties
basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his other children with less
should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his
favor, and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the
lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will
former depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the
at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the
latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to
conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-
violate his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial
made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses
partition, Exh. 8."
was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or
gathering, to wit: t.hqw
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found respondent court to set aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial court
difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere that the two sales were valid.
conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the
disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous
to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same principle applies even if
holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere
the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight
speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the
of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should
testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of
not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable
"findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the
consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the
record or those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid
motives of the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or
down by the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the
conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the
the wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for
general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the
selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already assigned
Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the
the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus
Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
desired to have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the
sale instead of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or 1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna
as difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a
vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for
annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and 4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing,
petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents mainly L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no actual
consideration paid. They further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact 5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April
and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme 30, 1957); and
Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No.
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging the receipt of
appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in
Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289). payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are
convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in fact,
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion
Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total
as to the nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the evidence on
consideration of P150,000.00.
record and adduced during the trial.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U,
being without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon
a deed of sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus
which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that there was no
in favor of Francisca for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos
need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was
(P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as
nothing in the evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his
a forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not
mind as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children. The two
assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit
contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by
"W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for the
Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any
consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also
time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the
bears the signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a
consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the
document dated August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as
receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the private
witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in
respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment
the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny
was involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which
the genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine
show that the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given
Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the amount of
to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically
P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-
Exhibit "A" in the annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used
1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated
Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the
November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable
estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ", endorsements on the back of the last
two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures thereon were not assailed. (7)
Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the
inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a
contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was
fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not
find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience,
considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the
subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is

hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special
Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs
against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.

Lim vs. CA (January 24, 2000)
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving

SECOND DIVISION
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a
5
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the
6
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis
7
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents. decedent.
8
BUENA, J.: In an order dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in
this wise:
the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari,
1
lift, expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP
2
Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is
No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 1995 , 12
3 4
hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as
September 1995 and 15 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494,
City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.
363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose
SO ORDERED.
estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334,
9
entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition which contained
George Luy, Petitioner".1wphi1.nt the following averments:
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the
Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are following business entities, to wit:
corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in

Business
Address: business with the public as corporations, all their capital, assets
Entity
and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y
xxx xxx xxx Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers appearing in
Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF the respective articles of incorporation of the above business
entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were
Marketing, Inc. Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. listed therein only for purposes of registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
Speed
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
Distributing
Highway, Bacoor, Cavite. Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
Inc.
Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other
xxx xxx xxx banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, 5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of
TBA Corp. Quezon City. the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his
marriage with petitioner, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Corporation Title Location
Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Distributors, Homes, Paraaque, Metro xxx xxx xxx
Inc. Manila.
k. Auto Truck TCT No. Sto. Domingo TBA
xxx xxx xxx 617726 Corporation Cainta,
Rizal
Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy,
Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc- q. Alliance
TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila
Arthur Highway Valenzuela Marketing
Bulacan.
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
12
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W". In an order dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private
respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate
during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.
veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided
submit to this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary by the regular court was whether the corporation involved therein was
documents covering the same as soon as possible. the mere extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the
Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an
10
order , thus: A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the
SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who,
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been
as his instrumentalities.
deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
51282. SO ORDERED.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
13
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petitioner, issued an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
petition.
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
SO ORDERED. enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators, through this
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their
11
administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special
respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and
administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration
other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-
were accordingly issued.
mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late
savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
court order. arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the
clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
xxx xxx xxx
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty
SO ORDERED. as special administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said
Rules.
14
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari , with an urgent
prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued
court.
by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private

15
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
respondents, rendered the assailed decision , the decretal portion of which
jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
declares:
17
The provisions of Republic Act 7691 , which introduced amendments to Batas
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action
Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by
respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank follows:
accounts and records are concerned.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
SO ORDERED. exclusive jurisdiction:
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina xxx xxx xxx
Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
16
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross
error :
value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or,
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters
of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
or should not be included in the inventory.
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
proceedings.
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
18
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, held:
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
determining whether a certain property should or should not be
(P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest,
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and
resolve title.
costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
19
fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS :
causes of actions between the same or different parties,
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not
same or different transactions;
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which
xxx xxx xxx may be instituted by the parties.
20 21
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE , We practice which may be waived. . . .
made an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should
should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim,
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
22
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO , We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr.
23 the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced
Justice Andres Narvasa : 24
in BOLISAY vs., ALCID is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence
Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and
purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property
manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include,
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .
thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question
of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in . . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor
in the persons named in the title. . . . of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents'
ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting
deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is
as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in
Title, hence: the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally
the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority
xxx xxx xxx
conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or individual case.
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its
categorically stated: eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory

Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
persons of their possession and ownership of the property. . . .
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned
Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant
25 26 27
case. Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F" and "G" of the petition for Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily,
others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly
30
included on the list had no actual and participation in the organization and separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a
names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where
incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed
badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is
any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have been merely asked by
sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity
the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
31
should come to naught.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that
veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete
of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
28
stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud
corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The
aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
29
loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS , We enunciated: 32
corporate veil".
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly 33
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the
law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
34
merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . . presumed.
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court,
of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the
SO ORDERED.
hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented
during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for
this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate
from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with
the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

35
vs. LEONIDAS finds pertinence:
Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
36
As to the order of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted
without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to
demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent
corporations.
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of
In Re Estate of Johnson (39 Phil 159) that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636
EN BANC of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
DECISION Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen
or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the
November 16, 1918
law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might
G.R. No. L-12767 be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect
JOHNSON, applicant-appellant, as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant. The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees. publication of notice was ordered in the Manila Daily Bulletin. Due
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibaez de Johnson, personally and as guardian, publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916,
and for Simeona Ibaez, appellees. witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March
Street, J.: 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and
citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated John T. Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly
September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor Johnson was
estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic instrument, appointed sole administrator.
being written in the testators own handwriting, and is signed by himself and
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred
two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the
shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his
Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity
father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum of P75 per
of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section 618.
month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testators five children
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On October 31,
the case are these: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and
which country he emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917, this motion was
from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has been
Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a perfected.
soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result of relations between
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is
Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few
to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration,
months after their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of
thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as
the Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16, 1898.
the sole legitimate heir of her father.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in
he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the
number and may be stated, in the same sequence in which they are set forth in
wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him in the Circuit
the petition, as follows:
Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A little later Johnson
appeared in the United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a (1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the
certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have gone State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed;
to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
which he appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter,
State of Illinois;
Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in Sweden. When
this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered (3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the
in business and continued to live until his death. petitioner; and
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra (4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Ibaez, by whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903;
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential
Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9, 1907.
jurisdiction over the probate of wills. The fourth proposition above stated must,
The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by
accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must be considered as
Simeona Ibaez.
a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and fourth
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more fundamental
attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and
implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the contentions of As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), the proceeding as to
the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions: the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things
the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the
constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has
court and void because made without notice to the petitioner;
absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due
because the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state,
not in conformity with the laws of that State. upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was
unreasonably short.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in
this cae in the order last above indicated. Upon the question, then, of the In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the
jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of the time of the testators death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance and
proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and oppose
prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect and the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was nevertheless held
that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal requirements. that publication in the manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of
This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made the order
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under
of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in the United
the laws of California, the petitioner had a full year within which she might have
States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the
instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was stated as one of the
probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed
reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by statute was
a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the
sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in OCallaghan vs.
petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that
OBrien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. This
the failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an
case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a
infringement of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
will had been there probated without the notice of application for probate
property shall not be taken without due process of law.
having been given as required by law. It was insisted that this was an
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court States. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that the statutory
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
right to contest the will within a year was a complete refutation of the argument the word party, used in this section, means any person having an interest in
founded on the idea of a violation of the due process provision. the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the
judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the
States of the American Union, contain no special provision, other than that The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section
allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of any sort cited, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that
can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly allowing or she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by
disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a general nature conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will
authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any judgment, to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows: authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true
that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of time within
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal
which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate
representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him
with the proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries.
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That
Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application was
application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding
inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved
six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared
The use of the word judgment, order or other proceeding in this section in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to
indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude to probate.
the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case,
restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
above cited, the proceedings in the court below were conducted in such manner
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal
as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by which the
service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from the order
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though the period within
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was both
provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to promote its object and to possible and practicable.
assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the intention thus
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting
exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and we hold that
the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely
because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under
original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question. Whether the laws of the State of Illinois.
the result would have been the same if our system of procedure had contained
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the
no such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we need not
outset of this discussion, which raises the question whether the order f probate
here consider.
can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition,
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the
another matter which may be properly discussed at this juncture. This relates to will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.
the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites,
The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only to wills
among other things:
of liens; and in this connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph
of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was
fact that the word state in the body of the section is not capitalized. From this a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of
it is argued that section 636 is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the Cook, and that the will in question was executed in conformity with the
United States residing in these Islands. dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of
the most reasonable interpretation of the language used in the statute, the the will the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was
words another state or country include the United States and the States of the executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last point the
American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator was a
aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken
of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United
against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the States.
epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being nothing more than a convenient index
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to
to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative
the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should have
words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at
resided at least five years in the United States and for one year within the State
the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois,
or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is held; and in
his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine Islands,
the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person
naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites
as well as of the United States. is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is
conclusive. (Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to
Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11
the Constitution of the United States declares, in its opening words, that all
Phil. Rep., 395; Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has
been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of
other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or defect in
this will does not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date
the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court
when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is he was never
upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never been called upon to
a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a
decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief
resident of the city of Manila, etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is
could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such question is now
compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the
presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce
allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an
an entirely different factor in the cae. In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep.,
attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of the probate of a will were procured by fraud.
Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State,
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was
the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. And how is it possible
executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the
to evade the effect of these findings?
testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an unassailable
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the allowance basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the judgment is
by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had not contained
execution. these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission of the
will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters,
the order of probate.
such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document
by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the As was said by this court in the case of Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37
instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who Phil. Rep., 921), There is no principle of law better settled than that after
jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction
shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every upon which the original judgment was based. To permit this would operate
judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their unduly to protract the right of appeal.
initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the
U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
point of view of the petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence submitted
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that
upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of the petition, in
such fact was properly brought to its knowledge.
order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court was
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition contains any
there is no difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this
of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court therefore connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the petition was
necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of
admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the Civil Procedure.
judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling is,
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence
however, necessary on this point.
adduced upon this point in the trial court consists of the certificate of
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook
as an attack upon the order of probate for error apparent on the face of the County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the
record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it being asserted oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof
that the findings of the trial court especially on the question of the citizenship that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and
of the testator are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a moments inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial
reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is not possible court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he
to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the trial court took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he came as a
are unsupported by the proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he
which a review of the evidence can be secured is by appeal, and the case is not remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no
before us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United
present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his
herein is from the order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal from an permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of naturalization itself
order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not possible to review the evidence recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such citizenship
and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of citizen with respect but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine Islands,
to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of which any demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the
person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the
Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had so allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify any relief
desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political whatever.
status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with
true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois
the statutes of the State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear
along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would be novel doctrine
from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness
to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they
was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the
lose their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois,
takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtiss Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed.,
immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice,
States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United
necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United
loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision,
in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor
extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language,
which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in the used in the same action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice
Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere of matters of public knowledge similar to those therein enumerated. The
change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him. proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing
any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of
probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any
judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the law
now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the
from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic
court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois
the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil
prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon Code it is declared that legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the
application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to
procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the
was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate.
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to
the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are
the court below on October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the
cited to no authority in the appellants brief which might tent to raise a doubt as
setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether said petition
to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore,
be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or
that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this
properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which cannot be latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not
given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands; and it is presented within the time allowed by law.
suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought.
deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing
The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to say
that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions,
the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the
will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil.
Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara,
11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon
Leviste vs. CA (169 SCRA 580)
the probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).
In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as

FIRST DIVISION Del Rosario's counsel:
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989 (1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and
succession;
BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner,
vs. (2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST affidavits;
INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE
(3) Filed the petition for. probate is Special Proceeding No.
GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN,
58325;
JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
(4) Made the proper publications;

Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.
(5) Presented at the trial the following witnesses:

Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de Guzman.
a) Eleuterio de Jesus
b) Lucita de Jesus
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
c) Purita L. Llanes
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a
contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite d) Rita Banu
his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.
e) Jesus Lulod.
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing
written agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her
him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting
counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C.
interest." This consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral obligation
Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila,
to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del
was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee
Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as
lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will testified that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of
(Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo). Maxima Reselva.
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The
Rights to Fees for Professional Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.) private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
petitioner was not a party in interest.
In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the
ground that he had "not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a
attorney's lien." (p. 3, Rollo.) direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked
that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del
On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for
Rosario.
Attorney's Fees and Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the
court's order of December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64, Rollo). On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's
motion for substitution.
Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final,
petitioner continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R.
of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was No. 41248) praying that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his
submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence. appeal and to grant his motion for substitution.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix- On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being
legatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del insufficient in form and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the
Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De proper party to appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex 1, p.
Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit 77, Rollo).
all the properties left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by
In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the certiorari to this Court, assigning the following errors against the Court of
petition for being contrary to public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo). Appeals' resolution:
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the 1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner
legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses appears not to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Sp.
Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
2. Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
mandamus; and
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of
Sp. Proc. No. 58325 denying the probate of the holographic will her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any
of the late Maxima C. Reselva, said decision being patently part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her
erroneous. name.
Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the
contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to
under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides: the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs.
Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is
ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the
simply a basis for thecomputation of said fees."
prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court
to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for
while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent
probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess,
for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be
should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer,
observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated.
but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance
Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in
with the rules established in this Code, it may belong.
the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw
he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the probate petition was inconsequential.
the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had
attorney's fees.
no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35
this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in
Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will.
... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting
the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from
learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons
with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244,
246.)
Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in
holding that notice of an attorney's lien did not entitle the
attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It
only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his
services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,
Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12, (1999)) see earlier case under Article 798
1
filed a petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged
that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee
SECOND DIVISION
and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000 his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, 2
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the
vs.
petition for probate.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61
-----------------------------
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, copies of
vs. which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official de los Reyes Phillips (Officer's Return, dated 04 September 1995
Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever
de Santos, respondents. filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his
evidence in support of the petition.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through "free
and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine
petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will.
de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of
parties and some of the issues raised are the same. sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue
influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or
forced nor influenced by any other person in signing it. threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and
understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced
subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament
and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed
(Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9
the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator
Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will
has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of
and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses,
affixing his signature thereto.
namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16",
"A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de
"A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L.
Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3"). claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park,
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of
Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner's
letters of administration in his name.
properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2
million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
to serve as such without a bond.1wphi1.nt designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has
withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
substantially established the material allegations contained in his
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)
petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and 3
still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.
attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution of
the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will;
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning
hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a
letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 said court. The order reads:
and assigned to Branch 65.
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court,
Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is
issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch
Dr. De Santos's estate. 65 with the information that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to
Branch.
set aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He
reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during
accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already
of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.
true worth of the testator's estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final,
special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of
herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE
administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M- withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the
4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate
Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ." case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her
motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on
August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
4
matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision promulgated on February before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the
13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention. order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that
the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for
Rules of Court. intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion
was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases 6
of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision setting aside the
must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or
5 interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, Judge Abad Santos appeared
firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate
proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of 1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court Makati,
the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings
and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court Makati,
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters
61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo
must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of
de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance
all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned
of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch
(Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if 4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in
only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional
Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court. Trial Court Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate
proceedings involving the same restate estate of the decedent is still
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the
pending with the Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 61.
Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon.
Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-
Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor. Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr.
7
De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban andTagle
8
v. Manalo, he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully
distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as
Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
65 could not lawfully act upon private respondent's petition for issuance of
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during
letters testamentary.
the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its
The contention has no merit. due execution.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor,
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
9 devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
formalities prescribed by law.
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for
cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts
the allowance of his will.
cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the
10
principle of ambulatory nature of wills. The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has
been explained by the Code Commission thus:
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate
of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides: Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary
capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
Court.
mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore,
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life,
testator's death shall govern. therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is
probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may
remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to the should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the
12
intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of probate court.
course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites
will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are
Rule 73, 1 which states:
rare cases.
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death
11
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
would be in order.
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the
jurisdiction appears on the record.
probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall
continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
13
allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that it was held:
the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of
meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of
suspended until the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction
subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one
began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for
not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over
method, of convenience to the parties.
Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00
issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as
(in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as
the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region
14
material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.
proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of
petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar
the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of
latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can
the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v.
15
inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has
Ramolote:
left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not
17
immediate. merely incidental or contingent.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence. succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the
estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
ground cited in the private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor.
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of
legitimate of said heirs.
the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true
value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's
16
estate.
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
Rule 79, 1 provides: parents and ascendants;
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons
(3) The widow or widower;
named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing
upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will fiction;
annexed.
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
18
Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by
been preterited in the testator's will. private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of
securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on
the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the
his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted
filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the
or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no
19
desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:
identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to
are hereby AFFIRMED.
appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his
wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be SO ORDERED.
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give
20
bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping

when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-
4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending.
According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs
prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a
judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed
by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will.
Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.1wphi1.nt
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449 (1966))
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
Manila
oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
EN BANC line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966 On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
preterition.
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees. On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.1wph1.t
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
Court on appeal.
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers
and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and 1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance
of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November
with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to
17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be
be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
issued to her. 1
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the (Sgd.) Illegible
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only
2
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on part, provides:
the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before as they are not inofficious. ...
us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of
of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied,
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the
3 thus
issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the
the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study
4
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not
of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
inofficious. ...
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law
Nov. 17, 1951 becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le
of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte
Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su
signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero,
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article
9
su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa. 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner
as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b)
therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
testamento.
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective
existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el
of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the
articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de
word annul:
heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe,
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
6
A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484. articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al
10
817.
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect;

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero
to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden
por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la
7
vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.
apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los
no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos
8
W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774. instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad
del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no 11
pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ...
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition
in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que
12
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential el legislador quiere establecer.
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
the rule of interpretation, viz:
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component
se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the
supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and
institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se
13
como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . As Manresa puts it, annulment throws
hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre
14
obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion.
sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the
no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no
institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and
aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que
void. And, intestate succession ensues.
sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria,
dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya 4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance
15
institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor rather than one of preterition". From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that
a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate
para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly 5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are
16
disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
17 24
" In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye extent of said legitimes.
la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
18
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
denomina pretericion." Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating
the Neri case heretofore cited,viz:
that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is
19
presumed to be "involuntaria". Express as disinheritance should be, the same But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in
20
must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
from preterition.
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution,
different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at
Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
"insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was Code.
21
omittedin the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a
is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments,
illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights
and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814,
of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal
which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it
disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a
22 23
must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a
todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, el caso.
thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately
treated in said article but because they are in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is
undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be
25
taken as a legacy.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete
nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of
heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review
is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
Pastor, Jr. vs. CA, (G.R. No. L-56340. June 24, 1983)
allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First
FIRST DIVISION Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The
will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some
PASTOR, petitioners, mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
vs.
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT
after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO
estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or affected by the holographic
QUEMADA, respondents.
will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P
Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners. 5,000.00.
Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents. On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against
PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the
estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in
PLANA, J.: the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
I. FACTS:
inheritance. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the
This is a case of hereditary succession. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to
1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special
1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia administrator.
Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will
of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen,
to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order
having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a
was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the
Filipino by his mother's citizenship.
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in
COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978. Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued
the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA
ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy
filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the
to QUEMADA was not inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim
properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these
in the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved
pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another
the issue of ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic
branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted
validity of the holographic will.]
upon by the PROBATE COURT.
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a
On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic
written acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60%
validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and
interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to
SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was
PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25%
held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit
belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus
their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was
directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due
entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA
decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself
submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect
as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for payment
showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still
of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of
premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980.
PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the
ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid
accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which
to the Pastor Group of tsn from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February
amounted to over two million pesos.
1980. The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by
ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows: The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a
Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980,
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0% the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the
ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of
QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will. In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of garnished and that as regards PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was
all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after resolution of just the transfer of its possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT
oppositors' motion for reconsideration. through the special administrator. Further, the Order granted QUEMADA 6%
interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless,
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR,
the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.
JR., this time joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y
writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP- 11373-R). They assailed the injunction, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18,
Order dated August 20, 1980 and the writ of execution and garnishment issued 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980, November
pursuant thereto. The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed
(1) that its filing was premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the by a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
questioned Order was still pending determination by the PROBATE COURT;
In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for reconsideration is prerequisite
the lifting of which was denied in the Resolution of the same Division dated
for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed is
October 18, 1982, although the bond of petitioners was increased from
"legally valid. "
P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of
Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed seven
the Court of Appeal's decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the
successive motions for early resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed
appellate court to another order of the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980
for the resolution of the question as to whether or not the petition should be
(i.e., while their petition for certiorari was pending decision in the appellate
given due course.
court), by which the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate
Court's Order of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11 Order declared On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that
that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the "the petition in fact and in effect was given due course when this case was heard
mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated by the final on the merits on September 7, (should be October 21, 1981) and concise
and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments on the merits of the case
and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit for were filed by the parties pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and
reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It denied in a resolution dated December 13, 1982, private respondent's "Omnibus
clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5% motion to set aside resolution dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter
share which he had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be
of due course to the present membership of the Division; and to reassign the the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged
case to another ponente." implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982 Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The Probate
Resolutions, the Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the questioned Order of 1972 having become final and executory, how can its implementation
resolutions insofar as hey resolved that the petition in fact and in effect had (payment of legacy) be restrained? Of course, the question assumes that
been given due course. QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy was finally adjudged in the Probate
Order.
II. ISSUES:
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of
December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic
execution and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders
validity. A negative finding will necessarily render moot and academic the other
subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate Order of December 5,
issues raised by the parties, such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to
1972, to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980 declaring that the Probate Order of
conclusively resolve title to property, and the constitutionality and
1972 indeed resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will,
repercussions of a ruling that the mining properties in dispute, although in the
and reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the Order of
name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the decedent despite the
December 17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA
latter's constitutional disqualification as an alien.
representing the royalties he should have received from the death of PASTOR,
SR. in 1966 up to February 1980. On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a
means to assail the validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ.
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in
probate, is not questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for III. DISCUSSION:
having acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
1. Issue of Ownership
issued the assailed Orders. Their argument runs this way: Before the provisions
of the holographic win can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the (a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of
resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the position taken by the Probate Court sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
in 1980 i.e., almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972 the prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a
Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will and testament
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has been
in a separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court executed with all the formalities required by law; and (c) Did
(1980 ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.] the late presentation of the holographic will affect the validity
of the same?
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was
Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the ex- parte appointment of the petitioner as special
the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any indispensable
judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of necessity for the estate of the decedent to be placed under
Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs. Timario. 107 Phil. 809.) administration? (3) Whether or not petition is qualified to be a
special administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the
properties listed in the inventory (submitted by the special
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of
administrator but not approved by the Probate Court) are to be
ownership of the disputed mining properties. The said Probate Order
excluded.
enumerated the issues before the Probate Court, thus:
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1)
the probate of the holographic will (2) the intestate estate Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves
aspect; and (3) the administration proceedings for the some of the problems and issues presented in these
purported estate of the decedent in the Philippines. proceedings, as follows:
In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are (a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate
being impugned by the oppositors on jurisdictional grounds, proceedings as it hereby allows and approves the so-called
i.e., that the fact of the decedent's residence and existence of holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on July
properties in the Philippines have not been established. 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate
solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a certificate of its
proceedings are: (a) whether or not the holographic will
allowance be prepared by the Branch Clerk of this Court to be
signed by this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the 2. To administer and to
Court, and thereafter attached to the will, and the will and continue to put to prolific
certificate filed and recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of utilization of the properties of
the will and of the certificate of allowance thereof be sent to the decedent;
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
3. To keep and maintain the
Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu or
houses and other structures
of Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.
and belonging to the estate,
(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary since the forced heirs are
or of administration for as a matter of fact, no regular executor residing in Spain, and prepare
and/or administrator has been appointed up to this time and - them for delivery to the heirs
the appointment of a special administrator was, and still is, in good order after partition
justified under the circumstances to take possession and charge and when directed by the
of the estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in Court, but only after the
Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are decided and the payment of estate and
regular executor and/or administrator appointed. inheritance taxes;
(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator (d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
and later on an executor and/or administrator in these ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil
proceedings, in spite of this Court's declaration that the Case No. 274-T before Branch IX of the Court of First Instance
oppositors are the forced heirs and the petitioner is merely of Cebu,the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed,
vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the extent of the unless, however, it is duly proven by the oppositors that debts of
bounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will not the decedent have already been paid, that there had been an
prejudice the legitimes of the oppositor for the following reasons: extrajudicial partition or summary one between the forced
heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner
1. To submit a complete
does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that
inventory of the estate of the
the respective shares of the forced heirs have been fairly
decedent-testator Alvaro
apportioned, distributed and delivered to the two forced heirs
Pastor, Sr.
of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., after deducting the property willed to the
petitioner, and the estate and inheritance taxes have already implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
been paid to the Government thru the Bureau of Internal administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to
Revenue. be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the
estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as
legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the
special administrator or administrator of the other properties of
Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain
the estate of the decedent, which properties are not directly or
as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will,
indirectly affected by the provisions of the holographic will
"considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely
(such as bank deposits, land in Mactan etc.), will be resolved in
as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
another order as separate incident, considering that this order
aforestated will. "
should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the
issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. (c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the
(Emphasis supplied.) properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the
issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of
that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was
not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, (d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court
and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters
allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, properly adjudged in the said Order.
the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated August
solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate
20, 1980, the Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the
administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for
basis for its conclusion that the question of ownership had been formally
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in
resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the findings in the latter Order that (1)
Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although
during the lifetime of the decedent, he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2)
the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how
he had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the
ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for
mine prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3)
purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the
PASTOR, JR. was only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a
estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?]
Spaniard.
Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched. ... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of
the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the
the Branch Clerk of this Court."
mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator (d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as
to pay the legacy in dispute. of December 5, 1972.
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will - (e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the
forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his
two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to (f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine
liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather
in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an
the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the
death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972,
will in other respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5,
there had been no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and
1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court
his wife.
scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
3. Propriety of certiorari
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory
of his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the
not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially validity of the disputed Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is
approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by appeal, not
in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court. certiorari.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected.
the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident
December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court ordered that- in the actuations of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties have become liable to contribute for the payment of such debts
compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of
not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the their several liabilities, and order how much and in what
intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution
Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private as circumstances require.
respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of
Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders
estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those
for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation of the
against whom execution is authorized to be issued.
dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of
basis. ... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate
court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior
supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of
refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the
the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and
executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of
resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such,
Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies
therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the
that the probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts
National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of estate tax before delivery
of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees
to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate (Section 107 [c])
and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule
(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3,
purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads: Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees,
mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius,
or heirs have been in possession. Where devisees, legatees,
that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of
or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the estate
execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)
before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid and
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject
but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be of the execution was then still being litigated in another court in a reconveyance
executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with
of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to
the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for
defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final
reconsideration of the execution order was still pending resolution by the
judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with grave
Probate Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of
abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced
income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for
(PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the
reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the
order of execution.
execution order. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of remedy.
execution which varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is
not find support in the dispositive part of the latter, there are circumstances in
reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20,
the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.
1980, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, particularly the
holder in her own right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of Orders dated November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside;
conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper
party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.
Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the
SO ORDERED.
issuance of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-
petitioner husband seek in the petition for certiorari states against requiring her
to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to intervene in the
probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the
challenged order of execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or
garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the
duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not
have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no
1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the

Lim vs. CA (323 SCRA 102, January 24, 2000) See Earlier Case also under
Article 838 property in question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in
favor of her co-defendants;
Coronado vs. CA, (G.R. No. 78778. December 3, 1990)
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent
SECOND DIVISION
transactions involving the same property null and void ab initio;
[G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.]

3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject
parcel of land;
191 SCRA 814
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to

LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO
surrender possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)

DECISION
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a
parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more
particularly described as follows:: nad
PARAS, J.:
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan,
province of Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio
respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo
"Juana (Bueno) Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing an area of two
of the lower court, the decretal portion of which reads:: nad hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, more or less. Assessed at
P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private (Ibid.).: nad
respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two
Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the
parcels of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's
other hand.
successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one
portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita
executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-
inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other 17).
grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera.
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for
Parcel G is described as follows:
brevity) claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly
naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled
Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa
"Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid.,
Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
p. 105). JUANA, together with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created their opposition, however, the Will was allowed by the then Court of First
by the Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said decision was
two portions, one on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F.
street. Parcel G was divided by the heirs in the following manner; the land was Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-
divided into two portions, the northern portion of which was adjudicated in favor appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not
of the Formenteras and the southern portion was given to JUANA and Doming said decision has already become final and executory.
Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an
Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the
action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO
Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto
in the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz,
Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo
Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
was later sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of IV
JUANA.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121)
Hence, this petition.:-cralaw
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors: (Ibid., p. 105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).
I The petition is devoid of merit.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate
A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND court's finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE APPLICABLE land by acquisitive prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation
PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS to Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA
HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108) had already foreclosed whatever right or legal title she had over the property in
question, the reason being that Monterola's continued possession of the said
II
property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute ownership
(Ibid., p. 112).
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY
The argument has no factual basis.
ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SAID Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114) cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the
III
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE
committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are
OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING
totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as
FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL
to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the
COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her
documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers possession to that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the
Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no subject property, even against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are
convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule. purchasers for value and in good faith, is a foregone or settled issue, the
respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this wise:
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership
over the property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation "It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land
executed by Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the in question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by
boundary owner on the property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the prescription or by some other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription
reason why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had in her own name. It was only in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that
always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or produce of the said she asserted her claim of ownership adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having
property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 that Leonida knowledge that she had no title over the land in question, she must be deemed to
Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18).:- nad have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and
other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And even
the said property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to
granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in good
constitute the fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil
faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land
Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession
by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have
under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent
possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her.
of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one
The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint
who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno,
below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the
running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which
Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989). JUANA inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga,
was never probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower
considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of
court, never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much
Act No. 190, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
less his possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have
and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
acquired said property by acquisitive prescription.
The contention is without merit.chanrobles virtual law library will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v.
proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped
will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of
from questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding
1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio
her having objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which
Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property.:-cralaw
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice
petition is weak for want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's
the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33
position lies in the fact that she did not only fail to identify the subject land, but
[1986])
also failed to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is
claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled
to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is
The contention is unavailing.
bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were
related to each other. The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped
immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the
from questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question
property in question. Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to
having failed to raise the same in the estate proceedings in the trial court and
support the conclusion that the property in question is the same property
even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO
has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are
The contention is likewise without merit.
conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not determine nor SO ORDERED.
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the
the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related

Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984) see earlier case Under Article 16
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged
Solivio vs. CA (G.R. No. 83484. February 12, 1990) the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
FIRST DIVISION
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire
estate property, including but not limited to, specific items
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990 already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting
of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall
vs.
belong to plaintiff;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents. c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of
MEDIALDEA, J.:
the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.
of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia
affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
of which reads as follows: Esteban Javellana, Sr.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
and against defendant: marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban,
Jr. was born.
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be
divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-
half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second 4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
up Esteban, Jr. the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being
the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they
in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother,
(petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
having set up the foundation. administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased;
and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do
the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to
place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She
Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the
by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's
1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the
stated: disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her 1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540)
caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir"
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27,
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record).
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them;
Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year
and
and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for 4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been
13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
formed and properties of the estate have already been
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment transferred to it.
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting
I. The question of jurisdiction
of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia
averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention
were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration. Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR
2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same
CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division,
court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this
petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate reared him and with whom he had always been living with [sic]
to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record). during his lifetime.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to xxxxxxxxx
the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S.
duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and
Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz,
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
Iloilo City.
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16,
proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
Record)
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions
of the order are quoted below: In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of
First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of
declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was
appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the
properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied
publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other
her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the
year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We
only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana
hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
who died on February 26, 1977.
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
died single, without any known issue, and without any
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of
surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111,
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
the estate of her mother: terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia,
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate
not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution,
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or
already been closed, and not through an independent
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
action,which would be tried by another court or Judge which
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate
the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil.
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity
730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107,
of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-
(Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of supplied)
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the

In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael
independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436) woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April
the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled
order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714).
the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or
will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
(p. 378). upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the
manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed
there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if
and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of
through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a
partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the
litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her
from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the
right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may
aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in
of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v.
Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting

A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
II. The question of extrinsic fraud litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.
by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one
alleged for the first time.
that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling
act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons: 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing
of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp.
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter
182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the
would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and
proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint
Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
alleged:
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of
of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and October 27, 1978:
the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about
defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the
five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole
payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything
heir. ... .
else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the
estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been
denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their duly published as required by law, despite which the present
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for
Record; emphasis supplied) sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a
She stayed away by choice.Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of
probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors
the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v.
published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of
Dean 132 So. 20)
Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition
was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
within the third degree on hismother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative and who belong to the line from which said property came.
on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
defeating and inconsistent with her claim ofsole heirship if she stated in her
petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not 1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the
constitute extrinsic fraud. ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such 2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW the line from which the property came.
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit
estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956
The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her Ed.)
own.
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
III. On the question of reserva troncal property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncalprovision of the
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
the Civil Code which provide:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
the following articles. decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which
are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
supplied)
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate. she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
blood.
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National
each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31,
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478;
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so
by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record). appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible.
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was
Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of
established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission
his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be
under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of part of this provision.
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source,
of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be
who has the religious vocation to become a priest. necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote 7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,
the advancement and enrichment of the various fields of mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest,
educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and
provided for by this foundation may be named after its personal property of every kind and description or any interest
benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their herein.
contributions.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
to determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
or totally said needs. protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise
of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo) Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has
honored hers.
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3)
and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is
of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1)
declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his
from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir,
graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other
Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and
most outstanding student teacher.
the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the
High School for Region VI. probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased
preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who
would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier SO ORDERED.
Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation

likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives
yearly donations to help poor students who want to become
Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for
Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.

Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
On October 31, 1961, private respondents, the Heirs of Eligio Magallanes,

Ajero vs. CA (236 SCRA 488) See under Article 814
namely: Maria San Buenaventura, Godofredo Magallanes and Carmen
Magallanes vs. Kayanan (Jan. 20, 1976) Magallanes de Ingente filed their opposition and motion to dismiss the
"Solicitud" claiming title and ownership over the parcels of land in question and
FIRST DIVISION
raising the issue that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction to resolve the issues
G.R. No. L-31048 January 20, 1976 raised in the pleadings.
LUCENA MAGALLANES, petitioner, On July 12, 1968, the private respondents filed a petition for summary judgment
vs. on the pleadings praying that their absolute right of ownership over the
HON. UNION KAYANAN, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, CFI, Quezon and properties in question be recognized and confirmed. Petitioner files her
the HEIRS OF ELIGIO MAGALLANES, respondents. opposition to the petition for summary judgment on the ground that in a
summary settlement of an estate, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass finally
Abelio M. Marte and Clemente T. Alcala for petitioner.
and definitely upon the title or ownership over the properties involved therein;
Eufemio E. de Mesa for private respondents. and that summary judgment is not proper, there being a genuine issue or
material controversy raised by the pleadings of the parties.
On March 21, 1969, the lower court, rendered a summary judgment on the
MARTIN. J.: pleadings submitted by the parties confirming the private respondents' (Heirs of
Eligio Magallanes) absolute and exclusive right of ownership and possession
The validity of a summary judgment rendered in the Court of First Instance of
over the whole of Lot No. 2657 and the one-half undivided portion of Lot No.
Quezon, in Special Proceedings No. 3913, entitled Re: Summary Settlement of
3465 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel the
the Estate of Filomena Magallanes, Lucena Magallanes, petitioner, versus Heirs of
Notice of Lis Pendens on Original Certificate of Title No. 1091 covering Lot No.
Eligio Magallanes, oppositors, is the main issue in this petition for review.
2657.
On August 4, 1960, petitioner Lucena Magallanes filed a "Solicitud" praying that
On April 22, 1969, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Lot No. 2657 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1091 and one-half () of
summary judgment and/or new trial but the lower court on June 19, 1969 denied
Lot No. 3465 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6447, both of the
the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma and declared its decision
Register of Deeds of Tayabas (Quezon) be partitioned and distributed among
dated March 21, 1969 to be final and executory. Accordingly, a writ of execution
the heirs of the deceased Filomena Magallanes.
was issued and served upon the petitioner on July 14, 1969. However, even
before said date, petitioner was able to perfect her appeal on June 30, 1969, with THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING THE DECISION
the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. DATED MARCH 21, 1969 THROUGH SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
WITHOUT TRIAL, WHERE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES
In her brief, petitioner presses upon the lower court the following errors:
AND MATERIAL CONTROVERSY, THE PETITIONER
I CLAIMING IN HER PLEADINGS THAT SHE AND HER CO-

HEIRS OWN THE REALTIES IN QUEZON BY INHERITANCE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PASSING UPON FINALLY AND
FROM THE DECEASED FILOMENA MAGALLANES WHILE
DEFINITELY THE TITLE TO OR OWNERSHIP OF LOT 2657
THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER THE
OF THE LUCENA CADASTRE, COVERED BY ORIGINAL
AFORESAID REALTIES BY PURCHASE FROM THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1091 OF THE REGISTER OF
DECEASED FILOMENA MAGALLANES DURING HER
DEEDS OF TAYABAS AND ONE-HALF () OF LOT NO. 3465
LIFETIME.
OF THE LUCENA CADASTRE, COVERED BY CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 6447 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF IV
TAYABAS, WHEN IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO SO ACT,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD IN ITS ORDER
THE PETITIONER HAVING CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO
OF JUNE 19, 1969 THAT THE MOTION FOR
SUBMIT THAT ISSUE TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL
RECONSIDERATION DATED APRIL 21, 1969 IS PRO FORMA
COURT.
AND DID NOT SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD
II TO APPEAL.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MERELY DETERMINING V
IN THE DECISION DATED MARCH 21, 1969 WHETHER OR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DECISION
NOT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION SHOULD BE
DATED MARCH 21, 1969 FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY ASSUMING THE
AFORESAID DECISION RENDERED THROUGH SUMMARY VI
JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AND REGULAR.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE
III OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THE SAME ORDER OF JUNE
19, 1969.
VII the issue of ownership or title decided in the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. It was therefore erroneous for the lower court to
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF
resolve the question of title or ownership over the properties in said proceeding.
EXECUTION DATED JUNE 19, 1969 WHICH IS VOID AND OF
It could only pass upon such a question in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
NO EFFECT.
in an ordinary action.
We find merit in the petitioner's argument that the lower court has no
Petitioner faulted the lower court for rendering summary judgment on the case.
jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon the title or ownership of the
Summary judgment can be availed of where no genuine issue as to any material
properties involved in the summary settlement of the estate of the deceased 4
fact is raised in the pleadings. Where there is an issue or issues of fact joined
Filomena Magallanes instituted by the petitioner. Well established is the
by the parties or where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
doctrine that the property, whether real or personal, which are alleged to form
contested, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment to take the
part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by another to be his property 5
place of a trial. Summary judgment can be rendered only where there are no
by adverse title to that of the deceased and his estate and not by virtue of any
questions of fact in issue or where the material allegations of the pleadings are
right of inheritance from ' the deceased, cannot be determined by the probate
not disputed.
court. Such questions must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the
1
exercise of its general jurisdiction to try and determine ordinary actions. The An examination of the pleadings in this case clearly shows that there is a
probate court may do so only for the purpose of determining whether or not a genuine issue or material controversy raised therein. Thus, petitioner claims
given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased, that she and her co-heirs have the right to inherit the properties in question as
but such determination is not conclusive and is still subject to a final decision in they form part of the estate of Filomena Magallanes. On the other hand, herein
2
a separate action to be instituted between the parties. Likewise, the probate private respondents contend that they acquired the ownership over the said
court may also determine questions of title to property if the parties voluntarily properties by purchase from Filomena Magallanes during her lifetime. In the
3
submitted to its jurisdiction and introduced evidence to prove ownership. face of the conflicting claims of both petitioner and respondents a factual
dispute certainly arises which can only be properly settled by means of a trial on
In the case at bar, the action instituted by the petitioner was not for the purpose
the merits. Summary judgment was, therefore, uncalled for in the premises.
of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the
inventory of the estate of the deceased. The action was for partition and Petitioner also assailed the order of the lower court denying her motion for
distribution of the properties left by the deceased. Neither have all of the parties reconsideration of the summary judgment in question as pro forma. A motion
voluntarily submitted the issue of ownership for resolution by the court. As a for new trial or reconsideration on the ground that the judgment is contrary to
matter of fact the petitioner opposed the petition of private respondents to have law, which does not point out the supposed defects in the judgment is pro forma
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court requires the movant for the new trial to 1. Declaring the decision of the lower court dated March 21, 1968 and the writ of
point out the findings of fact or conclusions of law supposed to be insufficiently execution dated June 19, 1969 null and void; and
6
borne out by the evidence or contrary to law. A reading of the motion for
2. Remanding the case to the lower court as a court of general jurisdiction to
reconsideration of the aforesaid summary judgment show's specifically the
settle the title and ownership over the parcels of land in question between
conclusions reached by the lower court which are contrary to law, the lack of
Lucena Magallanes who claims to have inherited the same from Filomena
jurisdiction on the part of the lower court to resolve the issue of ownership and
Magallanes and-the heirs of Eligio Magallanes who claim to have purchased
possession of properties left by a deceased person in the settlement of his estate
them.
proceeding and the propriety of the rendition of the summary judgment on the
pleadings submitted by the parties. Although the former pleadings of the Costs against the private respondents.
petitioner already contained allegations on the question of jurisdiction and the
SO ORDERED.
propriety of the summary judgment, this fact does not make the motion for
reconsideration pro forma because it expressly made reference to what portion
of the lower court's conclusion are contrary to law and to established
7
jurisprudence. In a case the Supreme Court held that the motion for new trial
or reconsideration cannot be considered as simply pro forma where t not only
states that the decision is contrary to law but also explains in detail relevant
facts for seeking its revocation. Since the motion for reconsideration is not pro
forma the filing of the same on time stopped the running of the period within
which to appeal the decision. It was therefore an error on the part of the lower
court to issue a writ of execution of the decision in question before it has
become final and executory.
Finally, private respondents claim that the trial court erred in approving
petitioner's record on appeal after it had lost jurisdiction over the case. There is
no need to resolve the assigned error. It is elementary that in a petition for
certiorari like the case before Us, the submission of a record on appeal is not
necessary.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will
Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Leonidas ( April 27, 1984)
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of
SECOND DIVISION himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines.
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate
vs.
situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of
country, the testator said: t.hqw
Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA
GRIMM, respondents. I purposely have made no provision in this will for my
daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents. each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine
property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38(after a City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
probate in the Utah district court).

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third
the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was
second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between
Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E.
Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel
divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo). Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and proceeding No. 113024for the settlement of his estate. She was named special
Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother administratrix.
Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of
the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as
the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and
moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court
by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley
a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58
Grimm.
to 64 of the record.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p.
estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the
78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators.
the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated
Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate
allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the
and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was
buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her
executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate
husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-
for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p.
three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first
135, Record).
marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children),
Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed
onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and
four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had
will in that order. previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it
filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco
copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer
with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval
Limqueco.
of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering
that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8,
149, Record). 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and
Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was
Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved
no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan
by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that
Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale
Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to
with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies
account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine
she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
(pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine paid
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement
P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to
was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and
the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the
that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no
merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari
movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm
and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate
or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch
properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate
20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be
be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98
Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous
that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to
dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is

dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental,
Vda. De Kilayko vs. Judge Tengco (G.R. No. L-45425. March 27, 1992)
denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976
THIRD DIVISION filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution
of defendants' motion to dismiss.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and 2
"Testamento" which contains among its provisions, the following:
REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO,petitioners,
vs. DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido
LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se
LIZARES, respondents. adjudique, como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina
Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
caso de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of sin descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda.
the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners, Minuluan se adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me
vs. sobrevivan.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO,
UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de
ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE
todas mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones,
GUINTO, respondents.
derechos e intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las
Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278,
1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental), y
ROMERO, J.:
"Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del
1 Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders dated September 20, 1976,
January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el
Occidental, Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice of lis pendens filed by resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of Negros
4
Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452.
no heredadas de mi difunta madre Da. Enrica A. Vda. de
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been
Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
made, in due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the will
Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos
probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria
los demas bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me
5
Lizares.
pertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por
6
el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares, hija de On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by the
mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court
citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the
ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta. project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the
Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas las estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and every
obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and
adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of the real properties to said
que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada ao en heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different
sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the
7
de mi difunto Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares.
de Deciembre de cada ao, respectivamente, y mande celebrar
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings
todos los aos la fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como lo hago
in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the
hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia
partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and
Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y
correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia
dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una sexta parte
certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar
(1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota de
quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were
azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano
9
not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament.
antes mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda.
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said
3 de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario
"testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. On
Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition and
February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate
subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the
1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It
10
T-65008. observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew that the court had
jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any
appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said
11
descendant. In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed
order was erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the same could
joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants could have
11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but
substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also
14
Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, elapsed.
et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said
testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a 15
order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said
substitute administrator be appointed; that the order dated January 8, 1971 be
movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real
reconsidered and amended by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda.
property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares,
Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form an aggregate area
Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the
of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such 16
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. On the same
amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of
date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court
title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said
12
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros
properties, and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 17
Occidental.
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia
L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora
Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity),
Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the
no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as
subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action was barred by prior
the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions 18
13
judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. This motion was
sought to be enforced are null and void.
opposed by the plaintiffs.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis
of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and the lending
circumstances which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal
19
that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. The latter opposed said grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the
motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for
20
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that
cancellation of notice of lis pendens.
since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative
21
for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The court simultaneously held in defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the merits of the case.
28
abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition
22
11639. Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative for certiorari, prohibition and/ormandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
23 24
defenses. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion. injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for
interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the
25
the reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. The joint
26
adjudication of her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in
administrators having filed an opposition thereto, on January 7, 1977 the lower
27
Special Proceedings No. become final and unappealable long before the
court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. It held that while a
complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and unappealable long
notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a particular property
before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause
was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the
of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver
properties involved was not necessary because such properties, being in custodia
that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over
legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the court. Moreover,
the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by
the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort of the estate
will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's
to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation and
will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a
production of sugar to which the properties were planted.
fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil code, they
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
lower court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
29
11639. After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
and submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases were each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
consolidated. heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
30
unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
obligations within such time as the court directs.
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
31 33
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, and Torres v.
34
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with Encarnacion, the Court said:
those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a
32 . . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the
will.
entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is provision, within the estate proceeding, said proceeding being
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads: the most convenient one in which this power and function of
the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the
of requiring the parties to undergo the incovenience and
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
litigate an entirely different action.
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the
on application of the executor or administrator, or of a person jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v.
35 36
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the Gerona, and Benedicto v. Javellana, this Court said:
same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
authentication thereof, and everydemand or claim which any
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or
judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate
any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in
shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when
law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition,
the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and
39
agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a
adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .
piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the
(Emphasis supplied)
inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated
the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its
37 40
entitled . . .. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. The question of
the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the
makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled partition and became a closed matter.
38
thereto.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots
estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution
1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the pursuant to the decree of partition has already been carried out. Moreover, it
complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the
assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree
with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and
Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the
Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore,
executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left
whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of
553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. the very same properties subject of such partition.
T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken altogether
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order
the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted
corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is in said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered
like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the
or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that
41
becomes irrelevant. was directed against the whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties in Special Proceedings
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of
No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators of Eustaquia being
public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matter
become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit
involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is
litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end
42
identity of causes of action because in the first action there was a declaration of
to controversies." The only instance where a party interested in a probate
the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the 45
been satisfied.
opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead
of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639,
court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional
43 46
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares is not
meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once,
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
44
considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and
provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed,
there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in
construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but L-45425.
47
it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. In this case,
SO ORDERED.
the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there
can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties
involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances,
the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by
operation of the law of intestacy.
With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties
involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary
notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having
48
jurisdiction over it at any given time. Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
49
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." In
this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal
reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the
supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia
legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L.
Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned out that their claim
to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED

but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-45965 is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued
prior to the execution of the aforementioned donation. On July 29, 1948,

Arancillo vs. Peaflorida
Carmen Ubalde, the registered owner, liquidated her mortgage
indebtedness to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and executed a
new mortgage in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now
EN BANC
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the owner's copy of Torrens Title
G.R. No. L-4602 August 31, 1951 No. 41448 covering Lot No, 7679 has been in the possession of the
mortgage. On October 13, 1948, movants-appellants requested the
JOSEFA PEAFLORIDA VDA. DE ARANCILLO and VICENTE
oppositor-appellee to lend them the owner's copy of Torrens Title No.
ARANCILLO, movants and appellants,
41448 covering Lot No. 7679 in order that they could register the
vs.
aforementioned deed of donation without prejudice to the right of the
REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION, oppositor-appellee.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as mortgagee of the property in
Fulgencio Vega and Emilio Eligio for appellants. question. The oppositor-appellee refused; and, hence, on November 19,
Rizal R. Ortiz for appellee. 1948, appellants filed a motion in court, praying that the said
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation be compelled to deliver the owners
FERIA, J.:
copy of the Torrens title aforementioned to the Register of Deeds of
The facts in this case as stated in appellants' brief and accepted as correct by the Iloilo in order that the deed of donation could be registered (Record
appellee are the following: Appeal, pp. 1-5). Said motion, which was opposed by appellee (Record
Appeal, pp. 6-7 was denied by the Court of first Instance of Iloilo in its
On February 19, 1947, Carmen Ubalde executed a deed of donation inter order dated November 29, 1948 (Record Appeal, pp. 8-9). Movants-
vivos in favor of Asuncion Arancillo, predecessor-in-interest of Josefa appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Peaflorida Vda. de Arancillo and Vicente Arancillo (herein movants- lower in its order dated December 20, 1948 (Record Appeal, pp. 22 27.)
appellants), involving a certain parcel of land identified as Lot No. 7669
of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo, and covered by Original The appellants in their first and second assignments of errors, submit the
Certificate of Title No. 41448 of the land records of the province of following arguments:
Iloilo. Dr. Asuncion Arancillo the donee, died on June 18, 1948, in the
(a) In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bank
city of Manila was succeeded in all his property rights by herein
of the Philippine Islands vs. Ty Camco Sobrino et al., the refusal of the
movants-appellants. Lot No. 7679 was mortgaged to the to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to surrender the owner's copy of the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, predecessor-in-interest of appellee,
Torrens title to the Register of Deeds or its opposition to the
registration of the deed of donation in question is equivalent to the Vendor of his obligation to the Agricultural & Industrial Bank; on
questioning the validity of said donation which can only be done in an the contrary, both Vendor and Vendee shall be jointly and severally
ordinary action. liable for said mortgage obligation. (Record on Appeal, pp. 22-23.)
(b) The validity of the prohibition contained in the mortgage contract The question involved in the present case is not the validity of the donation but
in the case at bar to the effect that the mortgagor shall not sell, dispose whether or not the appellee may be compelled against its will to give its consent
of, or encumber the mortgaged property without the consent of the to the registration of said donation, in view of the above quoted stipulation. The
mortgagee is not in issue. appellees does not and can not question the validity of the transfer by donation
to the appellants or their predecessor in interest of the property mortgage,
(c) The prohibition mentioned in the preceding paragraph must be
because said property, being registered in accordance with the Torrens System
interpreted and construed in relation to the other stipulation of the
or Act No. 496, can not be considered as transferred until and unless said
same contract which state that in cast the property mortgaged is sold or
transfer has been registered.
conveyed in spite of the prohibition, the vendee shall assume the
mortgage together with the vendor. In the case of Philippine Industrial Co. vs. El Hogar Filipino and Vallejo, (45 Phil.
336, 339, 341), this court held that the prohibition in a mortgage contract against
(d) In view of the principles interpretation of contracts laid down in
the encumbrances sale or disposal of the property mortgaged not contrary to
Articles 1284 and 1285 of the Civil Code and sec. 59 of Rules 123 of the
law, morals or public interest (sec. 1255 of the Civil Code). Such prohibition
Rules of the Court, the aforementioned stipulation qualifying the
being valid, it follows that the appellee cannot be compelled by the courts to
prohibition must be made applicable to the instant case. (Appellants
give its consent to the registration of the deed of donation of the property
Brief, pp. 12, 13.)
mortgage by delivering for that purpose the transfer certificate of title in its
The mortgage contract executed by the appellants' predecessor in interest in possession. Otherwise the mortgagor may circumvent the prohibition by
favor of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank and now the appellee, compelling the mortgagee to do what the latter has to the sale or disposal or
contains the following proviso: encumbrances of the mortgaged property.
The Mortgagor shall not sell, dispose of nor in any manner encumber to The decision in the case of Bank of the Philippines Islands vs. Ty Mamco, et
the mortgage property, without the written consent of the mortgagee. If al. (57 Phil., 803) is not applicable to the present case. In said case the second
in spite of this stipulation the property is sold, the Vendee shall assume mortgage had already been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
the mortgage in the terms and conditions under which it is constituted, when the motion to cancel such registration was filed. And this Court held that
it being understood that the assumption by the Vendee shall not release the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan was correct in holding that the
cancellation of the registration of said second mortgage involves the question of which cases the transfer or second mortgage may have the opportunity of
validity thereof; and the said court had no jurisdiction to pass upon that effecting the registration of subsequent instrument of transfer or second
question. However, in deciding said question upon the request of the parties, encumbrances, without the consent of the mortgagee.
this Court held that the second mortgage in said case was valid because the
As to the appellant's third assignment of error, the lower court was right in
mortgage the right to treat the second mortgage as null and void, but only to
holding that "It is neither for this Court nor for the movants to inquire into the
immediately foreclosure the mortgage as penalty for such violation. This Court
reasons why the mortgagee does not welcome nay change in the position of the
did not pass upon the validity of an agreement made expressly in a contract,
mortgage debtor. It is enough that the agreement prohibiting the disposition of
giving the mortgage the right to treat such second mortgage the right to treat
the mortgaged property by the mortgagor without the consent of the mortgagee
such second mortgage or disposal without the mortgagee's consent as null and
is valid and binding." Besides, as the appellee's attorney says in connection with
void, as a penalty for such violation. While, in the present case the donation has
this particular case: "On this point, we wish to state that in the matter of
not been yet registered and therefore the question of validity of the transfer by
granting loans the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation does not consider the
donation of the property mortgaged to the appellants is not and can not be the
sufficiency of securities alone. As government institution, it is guided by certain
question in issue.
policies designed to accomplish a government program. It is in pursuance of
The decision in the case of Ty Camco has not reversed or modified the ruling those policies that it has seen fit to include certain conditions in the mortgagee
laid in the case of Philippine Industrial Co. vs. El Hogar Filipino (45 Phil., 336), contract which if violated might hamper such program."
which held valid the prohibition to sell, dispose of, or any manner encumber the
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against
mortgage property such as the one contained in the above quoted paragraph of
the appellants.
the mortgage contract under consideration.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Although the owner's certificate of title has been delivered by the mortgagor to
the mortgagee and is in the possession of the latter, it is still possible that the
mortgagor may sell, dispose of or in any manner encumbrances the mortgaged
property, and register the sale, transfer or encumbrance in the owner's
certificate of title, without the written consent of the mortgagee; for as the
attorney for the appellee says, the certificate of title may be borrowed by the
mortgagor from the mortgagee for a purpose other than the registration of
document of transfer or second encumbrance, or it may be accidentally lost and
found by another person, or it may be stolen and delivered to the mortgagor, in
4
spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was
Caiza vs. CA, (G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997)
later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her
THIRD DIVISION legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
5
The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out
G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza
AMPARO EVANGELISTA,petitioner, already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing
vs. health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the
his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA,respondents. Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do
so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they . . (were) enriching themselves at the
expense of the incompetent, because, while they . . (were) saving money by not
paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . (was) losing much money as
NARVASA, C.J.:
her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen was "filed within one (1) year from the date of of first letter of demand dated
Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of February 3, 1990."
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared

In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been
1
incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful
2
107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter
3
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical
had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she
infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
6
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor, the
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On
Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00 by way
September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the
of attorney's fees.
Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the
8 15
But on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, the
9 10
Court, Branch 96. By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, the RTC held Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been obtained
is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation . . demanding by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by Section 1,
adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be
first instance by the Regional Trial Court." deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became
unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21,
11
deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the
1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision promulgated on June 2, 1993, the
property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which
12
Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the
"occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of
proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the
postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them
subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been
from the disputed premises.
there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what
16
purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs the aforementioned
unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew,
17
basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire respectively were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.
on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the
in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening
appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in
incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or
13 dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as
authority to drive the defendants out."
Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an
Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue
Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion
I
interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged
14
holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case." It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the
18
character of the relief sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended the premises, and they are up to this time residing in the said
19
complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order. place;
20
The amended Complaint alleges: 13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date
of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent
6. That the plaintiff Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute
by the plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal guardian
owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City,
Amparo Evangelista;
which property is now the subject of this complaint;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of
xxx xxx xxx
the possession of the house in question, they are enriching
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons- themselves at the expense of the incompetent plaintiff because,
in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in the house while they are saving money by not paying any rent for the
of plaintiff Carmen Caiza, for free, out of her kindness; house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could
not be rented by others;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly
notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but 15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house
the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the defendants urgently, so that funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
refused to vacate the same. . . her support, maintenance and medical treatment;
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo 16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at
Evangelista, made another demand on the defendants for them No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her
to vacate the premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for justice, and she
Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was 21

Its prayer is quoted below:
reached. A photocopy of the Certification to File Action dated
July 4, 1990, issued by said Barangay Captain is attached, WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of
marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof; law, plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, represented by her legal guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this Honorable Court,
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty
to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
(30) days to vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate
defendants as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons- defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
22
in-law and other persons claiming under them, to vacate the sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that
house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
23
that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff Carmen necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Caiza; and
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00; Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
In essence, the amended complaint states: to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend
that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance
of any contract, express or implied" they having been, to repeat, "allowed to
having been "allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free,
live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Caiza's) kindness" in no sense
out of . . (Caiza's) kindness;"
could there be an "expiration or termination of . . (their) right to hold
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for
. . (was) failing and she . . (needed) funds . . to meet her forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived
expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment;" (Caiza) of the possession of . . (her property) by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the
Estradas several times, orally and in writing, to give back The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
possession of the house; occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no
the house to Caiza, to her continuing prejudice; and less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of
returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance
demand to vacate.
or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
24
The situation is not
much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will
occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory
25
to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the
26 27
leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs.Court of Appeals, where a will is duly probated.
company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had
buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment
no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance,
despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . .
or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that
(its) continuing possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful
had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing
detainer filed by the
from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been bequeathed to them an event which still has to take place; in other words,
more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be
28
for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the premature and inefficacious.
reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on
29
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Now,
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the
one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is
possession de jure.
inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990,
well within one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate. II
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging
30
be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward"
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
31
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's
maintenance of ward. A guardian must manage the estate of
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate,
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.
of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of
32 Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the
Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary
33 the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
for the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it became
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and
competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the issue of
spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in 38
34
possession."
preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and III
personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession
35 As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this
or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that
ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it
36 Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista
from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be
37 lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to
needful for this purpose.
represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
39
ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
promulgated on June 2, 1993 affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment
other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
40
and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari is REVERSED and SET
Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section
41
Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Costs against private respondents.
Sec. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is
SO ORDERED.
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did
42
not extinguish the desahuciosuit instituted by her through her guardian. That
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975) See
under article 779 she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo
Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will reads:
IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang

Cruz vs. Villasor (54 SCRA 31) see earlier case under Article 806 loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, may sapat na
gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO
Camaya vs. Patulandong (G.R. No. 144915. February 23, 2004) ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga
sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA
THIRD DIVISION 288-A NT-47089 Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2
G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004 3348-A 100629 Poblacion (2) p. 2
CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and 3349-B 100630 Poblacion (3) p. 2
ANSELMO MANGULABNAN,petitioners
1
xxx (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
vs.
BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent. The testatrixs son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was
in the will appointed as the executor.
DECISION
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision
2
By Order of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for the Probate of the
Codicil (Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted
Carolina G. Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya." paragraph five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva accordance with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by
Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT- the plaintiff:
47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.MANGULABNAN,
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should
(Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina
he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die
BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong
before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings
PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa
after the testators death would be in order."
magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking
question should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be
HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
3
x x x (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988, the
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija
testatrix died. 5
a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the 6
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order setting the petition for
title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of
hearing and ordering the publication of said order.
the codicil which modified the testators will.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan

Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the
caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT
Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the
7
No. NT-215750 was issued in his name.
partition case).
4
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, the 8
of Sale dated February 19, 1991. TCT No. NT-215750 was thus cancelled and TCT
dispositive portion of which reads:
9
No. NT-216446 was issued in the name of the Camayas.
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the 10
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting
defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.
the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the
that the partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in
following manner:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan PROBATE COURT.
dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in
2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY
favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed
WILL BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A
Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
CIVIL CASE WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS
216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-
FINALITY AND THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A
named intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
QUESTIONABLE CODICIL.
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of
3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE
Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino,
OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE
married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF
Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San
SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of 13
VALUE.
legal age, Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
14
Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and By Decision of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial
residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo court.
Mangulabnan with full personal circumstances stated herein to the
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following
extent of one fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of
11 issues:
Rufina Reyes dated June 27, 1973.
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared

The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and
null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and
Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision but
12 the deed of sale; and
it was denied by Order of February 28,1996.
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter
the codicil.
referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court
1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE
has no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and
FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
15
titles of petitioners; and that the probate court can only resolve the following of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
issues: denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x
will and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
identity[;]
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the
declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had
formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due
the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
execution[; and]
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
16
execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity. SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
17
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
probate court, to wit:
petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it
be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed
18
parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine by law; and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy
19
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
Petitioners first argument does not persuade.
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
partieshave to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the
decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil."The rights
xxx
of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the probate of the codicil.
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of
petitioners titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of

petitioners Camayas claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy
the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No.
53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35,
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and
void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the
February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the
intervenors - herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of
the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and
reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan
R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R. Patulandong
Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each
pursuant to the approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent
and his co-heirs ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doa

Article 847 Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left tow daughters called Maria Rosario,
widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried; Maria Romualda Uson, widow of Estanislao
Nable vs. Unson (27 Phil 73)
Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puson; Eufemia Uson, now
deceased, who is survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo,
and Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried,
EN BANC issued had by our deceased after Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez,
alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good
DECISION
sisters and relatives.
March 10, 1914
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only
G.R. No. L-8927 that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, at the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal
vs. parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sister should take
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth,
each one- sixth to be divided among said children equally.
Ramon Salinas for appellants.
Pedro M.a Sison for appellees. This appeal is taken from the judgment entered upon that finding, appellants
MORELAND, J.: asserting that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first above-quoted the property should be divided equally between the living sisters
and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read as and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the
follows: same share that a sister receives.
First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, We are of the opinion that the appellants contention is well founded. We see no
referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, words appellants in the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to the
Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said property exists at my husbands death, construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned court below. On the
it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him other hand, we find expressions which seem to indicate with fair clearness that
as heirs. it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her
sisters and nieces. The court below based its construction upon the theory that
the other construction would be an admission that the testatrix desired to favor
her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three children, more than her other that the testatrixs intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary
deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
be more favored than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the
married at the time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had
property passing under the codicil herein above referred to, the living sisters
children.
and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts,
As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
paragraph thereof, declares that after her husbands death she desires that my
sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs.
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the
codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each one of the
persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among
those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are
referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the
second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the
same conditions.
In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second paragraph
of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the
first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the
last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take
under her will be name so that they must take and enjoy the property in equal
parts as good sisters and relatives.
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires
shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among
them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the sisters. We have also the
final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces
shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us
Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others
Article 850 who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was,
however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
Austria vs. Reyes (31 SCRA 754)
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass
EN BANC on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto
Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by
Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate,
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without
MOZO, petitioners, bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will,
vs. notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that
CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners. Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with
law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and
Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners. without any right to succeed as heirs.
De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz. Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the
estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.
December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in
Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria,
et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."
CASTRO, J.:
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or

On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance
lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the
of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners
documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of
examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June
to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document
4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners'
examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The
intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary
petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the
dispositions.
adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The
petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the
have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben
two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings. Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of
nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene,
the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters,
the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing
Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-
the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz,
Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom
et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived,
claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the
however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance
controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it
separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a
bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the
petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the
the will of the decedent. tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to
have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both
question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor
sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower
decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in
court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to
question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless
the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.
succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which
thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same reads:
court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of
succeed. the will of the deceased which recite:
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate III
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay
with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na
niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be pawang may apelyidong Cruz.
prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest
xxx xxx xxx
is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to
that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana
of the adoption acquires relevance. ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na
estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at
squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang
efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng
decedent is false. aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro
Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which
Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng
reads:
parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na
be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang
that the testator would not have made such institution if he kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon,
had known the falsity of such cause. Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind
that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is
bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the
the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of
known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the guesswork or uncertain implications.
respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted
were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law
cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to
commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these
intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the
respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from
registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore
will? whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution
of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of
institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late
heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false;
Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known
and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the
point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were
law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs
indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not
instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute
make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the
indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way
legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she
she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for
would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to
legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion)
their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well
which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and
indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like
the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order
her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the
enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act
land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend
petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
6
petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et justices. That the court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners'
7
al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court.
would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these
explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
1
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
2
whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle
that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to
prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of
3
giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late
Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last
will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this
4
situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can
be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the
5
subject of a collateral attack.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made

Article 854 as to costs.
Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) see earlier case under Article 838 The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
Acain vs. IAC (October 27, 1987)
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late
EN BANC Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and
vs. Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents. English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by
private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of
debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the
executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will
PARAS, J.:
provided:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties.
of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p.
house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife
108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB
Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother
and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money
properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent
City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his
Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII
(Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p.
laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain. 177).
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the remedy under the premises;
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain
inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal
probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof
capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3)
before it is admitted to probate;
the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said
motion was denied by the trial judge. (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be
admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower
of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs
court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission
Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985
shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition
will be the law;
and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code,
that suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985
there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at
(Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, should be in violable.
p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the
standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child
pretirited. and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied
that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the
the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right legitimes are concerned.
of representation.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code
478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and
heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the
not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be
opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda.
proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is
the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said
executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v.
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v.
petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings
Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate
No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court
Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. said:
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD
this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in
Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are,
the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A
the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there
case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited
by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
court's order of dismissal. provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v.
Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss
prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent
Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case,
the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of
Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests
of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of
Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the
Appeals, supra).
following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August
court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. vs. Antonio Balansag (G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005)
3
Teves (Pedro).
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and
SECOND DIVISION fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which
was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian
G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005
and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner, Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties
vs. involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
4
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents. entitled "Josefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." Milagros
Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter,
DECISION 5
the parties to the case entered into aCompromise Agreement which embodied
TINGA, J.: the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of
th
between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12 Judicial District, rendered
6
decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties a Decision dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land
should go to which set of heirs. known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
1
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the 7
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were
2
Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional
given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property,"
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder
The factual antecedents follow. of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute,
Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter
(Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974,
their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and
14
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein. On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily
of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other established their home and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros
words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
15
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) Estate dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to
shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino.
Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in
Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by
16
Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate dated 9 November 1983.
Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.
8 17
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Thus, they failed to register the deed.
(petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
9
45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-
Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This
375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their
instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment
18
names, plus damages.
transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of
10
petitioner. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the
registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this
11
order cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia Court finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the and thus hereby orders:
12
name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the
13 (1) That complaint be dismissed;
subject lot.
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession
as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
375; Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her
children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs. 26
Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby

19
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot
ordered dismissed.
No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of
20
interpretation of paragraph 13 of theCompromise Agreement. It added that the extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the
direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents exercised prudence before
only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the
21
Emilio. Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No.
adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of
27
petitioner, the trial court added.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and
Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The decretal
well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. part of the appellate decision reads:
Thus, upon Don Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring
adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in theCompromise Agreement. As such, the
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T.
properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla
Agro, Inc. as null and void.
Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and
Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its
22
properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children. Manager, Julian L. Teves.
28
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the SO ORDERED.
adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision
and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian
23 24
dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated
during his lifetime. It cited paragraph 14 of the Compromise Agreement in
25
and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate
support of his conclusion. With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don
29
except as regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. The
two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties Appeals in favor of respondents.
respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise
could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the
30
Agreement has to be quoted again:
CFI decision constitutes res judicata. Don Julian could have disposed of only his
31
conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. 13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only
the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian
their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them
the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner of
of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other
TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location where the said title was registered
words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
or transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious
32
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
and of dubious origin."
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely,
a petition for review oncertiorari, raising pure questions of law. Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children
Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the
legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino
appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated
Donio Teves." (Emphasis supplied)
and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to
dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
heirs from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; (c) that adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became
the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement,
second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of
33
spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No. respondents.
While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of the Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime
appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian.
34
nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined
future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which
....
are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
the partition is made by an actinter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the
cases expressly authorized by law.
38
Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition
public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a
donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not
ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is
will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the
that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the 39
35
physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
40
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 of
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been
36
the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347,
act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for
where the following requisites concur:
a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will
41
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened; with all the formalities provided by law.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
37
right which is purely hereditary in nature.
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It
derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
42
of the forced heirs. but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the 44
of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise 45
from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the
compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him
property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by
at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without
its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which
expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
43
it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. 46
case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a
47
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak
Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it
legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from
had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
48
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs
that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly
disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a imaginable as it is unfounded.
prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner
Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the petition
contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is
would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don
well-founded.
Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer
thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The
corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such sections read, thus:
transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
SEC. 53. Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate.
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which
No voluntary instrumentshall be registered by the Register of Deeds
necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and
unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented with such
detailed examination.
instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied)
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
49
....
therein. A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed
50
owner. of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall
thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a
the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owners duplicate
sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be
certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and
adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens
duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
title. Thus, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, the appearance of a mere
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a
thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in the Supplemental
reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and
Deed would not affect the validity of petitioners title for this Court has ruled that
51
the owners duplicate of the grantors certificate shall be stamped
a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.
"cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of
Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should
established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both
have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its
titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to
name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on
secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be
the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented
presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of
theSupplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a reference to
said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may
that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since
blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance. what was lost is the owners copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owners copy could
Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in
and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a issuing not just a reconstituted owners copy of the original certificate of title but
valid transaction. a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if
the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
certificate of titleeven designating the very number of the new transfer
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC. certificate of title itselfthe order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot
legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which
CONDITIONS: Lost owners duplicate is hereby cancelled, and 53
has not been lost, as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss
null and void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per
merely of the owners duplicate of the OCT
Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M. the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so
constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
52
(Emphasis supplied)
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses
that the assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:
What the entry indicates is that the owners duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a
petition for the reconstitution of the said owners duplicate was filed in court, ....
and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate and
its replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
th
title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with Escao at Dumaguete City on 16 day of November 1972 and ratified in
the Registry of Deeds had not been lost. the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and
entered in the latters notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17; Book
No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao, instrument does not represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don
transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value ofall the nineteen
and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of (19) properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one,
December 31, 1971. that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner. Consequently, the
55
testimony of petitioners accountant that the assignment is supported by
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the
consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in
Decision made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
th
theSupplemental Deed.
12 Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case
No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948
Teves. We quote. mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the
56 57
consideration for the assignment. However, the said annotation shows that the
From the properties at Bais
mortgage was actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves 58
not of petitioner. Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the
.... Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no showing that petitioner
itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the consideration for
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with
the assignment to petitioner.
all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract,
....
namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is
order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation. established.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they
INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph
59
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine (2). The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which
Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become normally should be supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by
54
absolute upon signing. (Emphasis supplied) Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact
that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the
President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal
60
existence of consideration established by law. objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits
63
are worth pursuing at all times. Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of
have ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or
the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the
64
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it just resolution of the pleaded issues. Specifically, matters not assigned as errors
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property on appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
65
dispensing piecemeal justice.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e.,
during the lifetime of the donor. whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying
controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in 66
the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, this
both instruments.
Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as
61
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al., this Court declared that title to immovable it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.
property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T.
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same
Agro, Inc.
instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document,
it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the SO ORDERED.
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate

instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public

62
document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a
separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
Seangio vs. Reyes (G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006) see under
Article 784
Article 857
PCIB vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 266) see earlier case under Article 16
Article 859
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under Article 776
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez (G.R. No. L-
27952, February 15, 1982) See under succession in General
Article 863
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez (G.R. No. L-
27952, February 15, 1982) see under succession in General
PCIB vs. Pablico (56 SCRA 266) see earlier case under Article 16
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) see under Article 776
Article 882
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) See under Article 776

Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land,

Article 888 situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740
and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to
Francisco vs. Francisco (354 SCRA 112, March 8, 2001)
his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the
FIRST DIVISION possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
3
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001 After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title
from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners,
on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed
vs.
of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby
PARDO, J.: for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No.
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased 4
T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his
illegitimate children? On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint
5
against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the
signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na
1
Court of Appeals declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land conveyed
Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of
respondent, his sole legitimate daughter. In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial
2
The facts are:
court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of reads:
spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and
(Exh."G") executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
favor of the defendants;
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T- merit.
59.585 (Exh. "I") issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 9
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees."
(Exh. "H") issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and
10
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for
6
damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit." The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual
7 8
findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
In time , respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.
before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to
decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads: analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is 11
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
"G") is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T- 12 13
Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule.
59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
14
(Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.
Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract
cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M)
of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that
and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160
Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in
both in the name of Gregorio Francisco.
1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in
15
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly 1991.
and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
20
operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was
and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful
share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not
informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those According to Article 888, Civil Code:
deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was
16
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-
P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.
half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw,
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights
earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the
17 of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.
provided."
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00,
involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would
in cash for the land.
deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to
21
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper
whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.
testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir
They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove
can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
receipt of the purchase price.
22
prescribed by law.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a
18
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
simulation and hence, null and void.
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil
19
No costs.
Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The
sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the SO ORDERED.
Family Code.
Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua
Article 891 contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a
child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving
Chua vs. The Court Of First Instance Of Negros Occidental (G.R. No. L-
29901, August 31, 1977) any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage
and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In
FIRST DIVISION Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15,
1
1931 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977 the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la
Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS
second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor
CHUA, petitioners,
of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said
vs.
2
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) dated April 28,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V
1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre
and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the
and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners. succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on
March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of
MARTIN, J.: which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was
issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the
intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua,
her brother and sisters.
et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion
de la Torre" In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S.
dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his
3
quo (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion
7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within
Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua
which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo
Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit
of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of
4
of reserva troncal whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito
individually the complaint of petitioners
Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the point, the respondent Court said:
complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides: property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No.
from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
question is not subject tot a reserva troncal,under Art. 891 of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must
and belong to the line from which said property came.
fail.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in
with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that
question is not subject to areserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.
the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a
It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval
brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an
in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by
issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters
law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
5
not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges;
from which said property came. In the case before Us, all of the foregoing
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of
mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931.
part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
6
nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure
essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of
pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York
evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua
No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But
Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
7
Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. There is nothing mentioned in the
Choo, estas propiadades: decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the
present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate
14483
Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever beenprobated. With the
la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact
cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to
equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their
costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
este jusgado inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second
marriage.
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without
personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his
one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the
condition that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the
Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from
whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of

Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed
when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered
that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time
the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners
therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399,
they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside.
The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are
declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre
and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre,
1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and
Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena
Gonzalez vs. CFI of Manila (G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981)
Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila]
SECOND DIVISION on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven
children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
vs.
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
Benito F. Legarda.
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943.
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially
LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y
to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA
Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1wph1.t
Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y (a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with
LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, a credit balance of P3,699.63.
and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery,
Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to
Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting,
80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of
reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the
deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben,
48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija
Manila registry of deeds; Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario'
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry
of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de
described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio; terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa;
TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos
and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
(Sgd.)
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila FILOMENA
registry of deeds (Streets); ROCES
LEGARDA
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551
of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero): 6 Marzo 1953
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
of deeds of T0ayabas. surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in
the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena
Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children. Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda.
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter,
de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course
filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's to the petition for review.
estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court
should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and
resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject
not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20,
factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass
1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said
properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085). Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren
to the exclusion of her six children.
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from
that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the
reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code. reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the
reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of
error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first
acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her impression. lt was resolved inFlorentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in theFlorentino case and
la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription. of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in
Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the and who belong to the line from which said property came.
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title
certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic
property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is
oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property
fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable. descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said
property came.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title
Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
difficult to resolve. descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now
favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions
article 891, which reads: 1wph1.t
precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp.
parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la 198-9).
linea de donde los bienes proceden

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de
Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-
property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who
by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.
belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor. Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six
children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101
the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by
Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901,
Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of
August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin
Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion
vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos
Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs.
azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
322;Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the
that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians.
one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso,
property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs.
inherited from him the two parcels of land.
Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother,
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro
Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo
Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens
Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of
Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees.
vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
They cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to
relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480). The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta
de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject
to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065). condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are
reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship
there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title
and relationship by affinity are excluded.
would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs.

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p.
right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt
360).
would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property
purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3;
came
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall
revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J.
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of
J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27,
the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to
1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
Phil. l5.)
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living
the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property
the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in
even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as
her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226,
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
237).
survived the reservor.
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but
from the descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife
reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor. Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two
inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by
properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will,
all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this
she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees
of their share therein. The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz
de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties,
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring
inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
Mercedes.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t
be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the sustained by this Court.
death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part
in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes
part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
alone.
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the
heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-
has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to
the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), the other six reservees.
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in
the property, if he has at the same time the right of
this case the doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as
a reservatario (reserves).
during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the
third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to
the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is
nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and
to whom the reservable property should be awarded. there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be
deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the
only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not
predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor
irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case. of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said
properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not
as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the
paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character
remained therein".
due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family,
willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only
of the prepositus.
by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and
bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character.
estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article
or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree. 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate.
(Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby
adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from
her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this

De Papa vs. Tongko Camacho (September 24, 1986)
stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime

FIRST DIVISION gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B',
vs. 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5,
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving
NARVASA, J.:
the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate,
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko- (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles. Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies
of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D.
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as
Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father
(3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children
of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws
shares. on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate,
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land,
single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino
share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received
of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title 11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'. in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7)
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third
intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together
abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child,
with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-
Tongko.
indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
share in the rentals.
Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of
land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, 12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective
claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed
in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be properties involved in this action for the purpose of
borne by the respective parties. 1 determining the legal interests which should be paid to the
plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
question.
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in SO ORDERED. 2
dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled
parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel
by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the
one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the
death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code,
seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently,
which reads:
they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco- Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals. reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
expressly waived all their claims against each other for damages
(811),
including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than
the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject
renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three- to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
3
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, where
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of thepraepositus in
16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The
the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to
also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal
make an accounting of all rents received by her on the
shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces application. In the relations between one reservatario and
of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891
and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
the Court: reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules
of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case
Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
of reserva troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees)
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are
to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of
share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
xxx xxx xxx representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. when there are relatives of the descendant within the third
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios
the return of the reservable property to the third degree over the property which the reservista (person holding it
relatives belonging to the line from which the property subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
xxx xxx xxx
degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is
property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
them as such. the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6,
6th Ed., p. 250):
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right ... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de
whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915) reserva que se crea.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva
double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of 968-980).
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
whole blood should be likewise operative.
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
4
returned; but within that group, the individual right to the effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary Code were cited and applied:
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or
succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or
1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of
as follows: divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one- children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
children to the other half.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of preference among them by reason of the whole blood.
the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of
nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only
brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
per capita, and the latter per stirpes. Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the
nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased,
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis
children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives
the other collaterals.
shall succeed to the estate.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as the reservista, the reservatarionearest to the prepositus (the
long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation
Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated,
the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol.
doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-
6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
5
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands , where it was ruled that different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property
6
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" i.e., the property took a
where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
the reservista over property subject to reserva troncalIdentifies transmission to the reservatario.
the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
rests upon the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set
not true. The reservatario is not
aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable
property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives SO ORDERED.
the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must
be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged
Article 898 between the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint
stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).
Del Rosario vs. Conanan (G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977)
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of

SECOND DIVISION
the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, ROSARIO is the. legitimate surviving wife of the deceased
vs. FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the
Dante P. Mercado for petitioner legally adopted child of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and
DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN
Laig, Ruiz & Associates for respondents.
THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a
MAKASIAR, J.: plane crash and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21, 1973, That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L.
dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate. DEL ROSARIO are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O.
CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said
petition, subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to
who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal (Partial Joint be determined by the court.
Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition. that on the basis of the facts stipulated, the Court declare the
heirs of the deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent portions persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful
of which read: age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to
under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
receive and enter into the possession of the
of Court, which reads as follows:
portions of the estate so awarded to them
Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a respectively. The court shall make such order
deceased person, whether he died testate or as may be just respecting the costs of the
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, proceedings, and all orders and judgment
and that fact is made to appear to the Court of made or rendered in the course thereof shall
First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the
by the petition of an interested person and order of partition or award, if it involves real
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than estate, shall be recorded in the proper
one (1) month nor more than three (3) months registrar's office.
from the date of the last publication of a notice

While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is
which shall be published once a week for three
allowed under the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of
general circulation in the province, and after
which does not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition,
such other notice to interested persons as the
however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties
court may direct, the court may proceed
alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to
summarily, without the appointment of an
P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above-the value of the
executor or administrator, and without delay,
estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the
to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate
there is, to determine who are the persons
proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same
legally entitled to participate in the estate, and
has not been complied with. Based on the foregoing
to apportion and divide it among them after
observation alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.
the payment of such debts of the estate as the
court shall then find to be due; and such
But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition should
as an exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining be dismissed.
and declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the,
Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs.
aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on
Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs,
intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring
De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910) and Gutierrez vs.
with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate
Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held that for
ascendants from succession, ...
the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate
The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in under the rules, the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should
the instant case finds no basis for 'the said article is applicable not exceed P10,000,00 (P6,000.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional.
in cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of
In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty left
the adopted child. ...
by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of P33,000.00
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being which, as the court a quo correctly found, is obviously "over and above the value
included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered allowed under the rules."
as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to
II
be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69
in re action to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the
such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in court a quo in the sense that once wholly sustained, said holding would preclude
interest. petitioner from re-filing the proper action a consequence which, on the
ground of equity and fair play, We cannot allow to befall on petitioner We
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court
deemed it essential, for the guidance of the parties especially herein, petitioner,
hereby DISMISSES THE PETITION WITHOUT
to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict.
PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS (pp, 10-12, rec.).
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343 on
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal
the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
bond (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.).
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New Rules
I
of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case:
A Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341

which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as
The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil Code
though he were a legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
gername to the instant case:
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
inheritance in facor of an adopted person (Report of the Code
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if Commission, p. 92).
he were a legitimate child of the adopted;

It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature; related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally
related to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted;
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate
decending direct line. parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the
latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. This is
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which states:
parents and the other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves
legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343 of onefourth (only) of the hereditary estate.
the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which
directs that: This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted
ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is
more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child. clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.
It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant with The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28, 1973
the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the New (53 SCRA 228) andVillanueva vs. Court of Appeal (No. L-29719, Novemner 28,
Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect. 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the In Villanueva, WE held:
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural
The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in the case
child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". Consequently ,
of Government of the Philippines vs. Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L-
the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child
23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization that after all
should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
what is of vital importance in the requirement fo Section 6,
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and Rule 41 of the Rules of court is that the Record on Appeal shall
illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to show that the appeal was really perfected within the
onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided reglementary period. If it could ascertained from the record of
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so the case that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary
that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, period, although such fact did not evidently appear on the face
the illegitimate children the other fourth. of the record on appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.
B If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected

on time, it should not throw out but assume jurisdiction over it.
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973,
After all, that procedural requirement is only intended to enable
emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data rule
the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its
in that
jurisdiction and nothing more (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,
It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond 68 SCRA 220, emphasis supplied).
were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirment
From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of notice
of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on
of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the expiry date to
appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was
file petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is December 14, 1973.
perfected on time.
Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on July
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule, whenever 10, 1973 or still very much within the reglementary period to perfect an
circumstances and substantial justice warrant. appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal. And
although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact
of record, the veracity of which this COURT does not doubt.
Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules
of Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.
The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends of
substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimental, et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et al., L-
40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of
Appeals, Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.
WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT

PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IS A
COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
Article 912 infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) see Under Article 788
of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court
denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of
Article 960
Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the
Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor vs. Rigor (G.R. issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to
No. L-22036, April 30, 1979) see under Article 789 be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the
Article 962 Court.
Bagunu vs. Piedad (347 SCRA 571, December 8, 2000) In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions
between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or

THIRD DIVISION
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000 and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration
vs.
of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding
VITUG, J.: circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole
1
and the probabilities of the situation."
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to
intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the
a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet
to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even
2
fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus; without going to examination of facts on record."
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the
based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is instant petition for review oncertiorari.
a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us
daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-
set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive
appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a
issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree,
newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of
inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate
Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find
court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of
application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is

"These facts are undisputed.
the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree
falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as a relative of the decedent.
collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost
proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the
complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the
publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would
transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death.
amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question
Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the
as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate
system set out by the Code.
court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to
petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to
court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law is the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent
applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts. that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code
provides:
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence,
nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of "ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when
provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,
maternal lines."
but never in the ascending.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of
sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps
into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but "ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the
from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the representative or
representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or "ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
if he could have inherited." survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
portions."
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded." The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong)
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
if he could have inherited."
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded." 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never
Code gives direction.
in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only
"Article 966. xxx WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent SO ORDERED.
is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin and so forth."
Accordingly----
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.
Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do not at all
support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives
(the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be
observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt
can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt,
being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in
succession to a fifth-degree relative.1wphi1.nt
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the
Article 970 herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of
about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Bagunu vs. Piedad (347 SCRA 571, December 8, 2000) see Article 962
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales vs. Rosales (February 27, 1987)
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
FIRST DIVISION The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial
court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the
ROSALES, petitioner,
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents. (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales
son, 1/4.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
GANCAYCO, J.: estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his
mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders.
The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second
Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving

are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
share of the estate in question final as against the said widow? spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the
1
representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
2
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, or daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are: intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
legitimate parents and ascendants;
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
by right of representation, and if any one of them should have
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall
descendants;
be divided among the latter in equal portions.
(3) The widow or widower;
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or legal fiction;
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
legitimate child.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
another. provided by Article 981 of the Code.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles
proved. 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
to the extent established by this Code. degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
3
The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
inherited.
which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It
does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the
law and not by the person represented. The representative does
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
4
person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis
Salas, to Wit:
supplied.)
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession
in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because
by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father,
it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother,
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his
cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
with her mother-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-
who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not

succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving

spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Article 971 Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show
that:
Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales vs. Rosales (February 27, 1987) see
Article 970
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8,
1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children
Article 975 namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit
F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977)
ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso

FIRST DIVISION (Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children,
Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the
vs.
plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees. are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also

GUERRERO, J.:
on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of
1
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals in accordance her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo
with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959,
jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question. Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the
defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed
father Geronimo Almanza. at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
( B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San

R Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of
o 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by
l Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban
l Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax
o No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo
, Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San

p
Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having
p
an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero,
.
Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by
Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero
2
and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso
-
Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of
3
Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in
)
the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of
half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels
San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by
of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera.
planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of
1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the
by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. name of Cristeta Almanza; and
by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista,

Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit
bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs
of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by
Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax
No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children
( of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c)RFrancisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna
e and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo
Almanza and cEngracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties leftoby Maura Bagsic.
r
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to
d
Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their
o
aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not
n
to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the
A
same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This
p
time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had
p
already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties
e
having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the
a
same to the defendants.
l
After trial, the,court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

p
plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-
p
fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The
.
defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased

Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by
the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to
pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per
annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five
parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest
from the time this decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(
S
G
D
)
J
O
S
E
G
.
B
A
On the other ,hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa
Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of
stipulation of pthe parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic
3
notes that Felipa
. Bagsic died on May 9. 1945.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established
4
in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal
7
question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute matter, hence the appellate court certified this case to Us.
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
respect to the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under
Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of
appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
parcels of land described under letters A, B and C in the complaint which representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
2
defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the
succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules
sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic
laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he
cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall
shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code) intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died
ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the jurisprudence.
New Civil Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ.,
to inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382,
concur.
August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do
not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether
the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without
preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half
blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten
nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is
provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code
(supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share
double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between
whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized
in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27,
1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30,
1969, 28 SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by

Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces
of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based
on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955,
which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she
predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
Article 980 Court of Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992 affirming the July
2
11, 1991 decision of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999)
favor of defendants-appellees.
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the decision of
THIRD DIVISION the lower courts, are as follows:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo,
Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria.
G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999
Andres, however, predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES, TOMAS Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in
ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEA, ROBERTO 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children executed extrajudicial settlements
TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of
MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in
PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements executed
PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES, pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the
EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE present case.1wphi1.nt
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO

On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a
TEVES, VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, petitioners,
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and
vs.
reconveyance of two parcels of land located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT,
769-A and 6409, against the heirs of Asuncion Teves. The complaint was
SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT,
subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia,
FELICITAS IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT,
Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and
JIMMY LERO, DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS
Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as
VAILOCES, CECILIA CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR 3
defendants. Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees, without any
CIMAFRANCA, respondents.
justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to
4
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: plaintiffs their rightful shares.
5
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A, is was in her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga del
registered in the names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share, Marcelina Norte.
Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as
Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Antero Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8)
Exhibit "3" for the defendants, plaintiffs hold
share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share and Julio Cimafranca, one-
that said document is spurious claiming that
eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy involves only Marcelina
the signatures of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves
Cimafranca's one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as Lot 769-A.
and Gorgonio Teves are all forgeries. To
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves support this allegation, Helen T. Osmena,
6
executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale," adjudicating daughter of Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves,
unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were presented as
interests and participations over the same in favor of Asuncion Teves for the witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the
consideration of P425.00. A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement style and character of the handwriting of their
7
and Sale" was signed by Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria parents these witnesses declared unequivocally
conveys her own share over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the that the signatures of their parents appearing
consideration of P80.00. The two settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs on the document are forgeries.
as spurious. The trial court summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent
. . . Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied documents which defendants rely in claiming
having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement ownership to the disputed properties are all
and Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769 nullities and have no force in law and could
claiming that her signature in said document is not be used as basis for any legal title.
a forgery. She disowns her signature declaring Consequently, in their view, they are entitled
that as a married woman she always signs a to the reliefs demanded particularly, to their
8
document in her husband's family name. respective shares of the disputed properties.
Further, she declared that on the date she
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered by OCT
purportedly signed said document in
9
No. 9091 and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his two sisters,
Dumaguete City before the notary public, she
Matea and Candida Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without issue,
causing the entire property to pass to Joaquin Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot 1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is
6409 was adjudicated and divided in equal shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial superimposed with the word "sale" in
10
Settlement & Sale" executed by Joaquin Teves' children Asuncion, Teotimo, handwriting.
Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in
these same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion
11
document is intercalated with the word
Teves took possession of the land and acquired title over the same on March
"hundred" in handwriting.
22, 1972. After her death in 1981, her children, defendants-appellees It-it herein,
extrajudicially settled Asuncion Teves' property, adjudicating unto themselves 3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena,
12 13
Lot 6409. On July 20, 1983 a new transfer certificate of title was issued in the Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are forgeries.
names of Asuncion Teves' children, namely Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime,
4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of
Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On July 2, 1984, the
Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to
It-its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita
14 15 Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and
Nocete-Baylosis for P20,000.00 and a transfer certificate of title was issued in
skilled in writing according to his daughter.
the name of the Baylosis couple.
Aside from these defects which would make said document null
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale
and void, Arcadia Teves who is one of the living sisters of the
covering Lot 6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed in the trial
mother of the principal defendants although confirming the
court's decision as follows
authenticity of her signature averred that in reality no
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and consideration was ever given to her and that her impression of
defendants respectively, is a document denominated as the said document was that she was only giving her consent to
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on December 4, sell her share of the land.
1971 by and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo
Cimafranca. This document which gave birth to TCT No. 5761
Teves, son of Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and
over Lot 6409 registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is
Marcelina, it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial
questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the following
settlement and sale since neither Crescenciano Teves nor his
reasons:
son Ricardo Teves participated in its execution.
xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered or from the issuance of the title. The complaint in this case was filed on May 9,
in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that 1984, exactly 12 years, 1 month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer
said property was later titled in trust for all the heirs of Joaquin certificate of title in the name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus,
Teves and which was used later as basis in effecting a deed of ownership over Lot 6409 rightfully belonged to defendants-appellees It-it.
sale in favor of co-defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both Lots
plaintiffs argue that the sale of said property is a nullity for it
6409 and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public,
was not only attended with bad faith on the part of both the
are public documents, vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves
vendor and the vendee but primarily the vendor had no right at
to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The
all to part with said property which is legally owned by
16
evidence presented by the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was
others.
considered by the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity
18
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants' charges of fraud, defendants-appellees accorded to such documents.
maintained that the assailed documents were executed with all the formalities
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision affirming the validity of
required by law and are therefore binding and legally effective as bases for
the extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It disposed of the case,
acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in question. Furthermore, it is
thus
contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their rights and should now
17
be deemed to have abandoned such rights. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with the modification in that herein
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered judgment
defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot 769-
dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As regards Lot
A and deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-eight
6409, the court declared that the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by
(sic) (1/8) portion thereof corresponding to the share of his
the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca was duly executed with all
deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No costs.
the formalities required by law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of
Asuncion Teves. Moreover, it stated that, even granting the truth of the imputed The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants' biased and interested
infirmities in the deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action for testimonial evidence consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the
partition and reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An action for the disputed instruments is insufficient to prove the alleged forgery and to
annulment of a partition must be brought within four years from the discovery overcome the evidentiary force of the notarial documents. It also ruled that the
of the fraud, while an action for the reconveyance of land based upon an implied plaintiffs-appellants' claim over Lot 6409 was barred by prescription after the
or constructive trust prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed lapse of ten years from the issuance of title in favor of Asuncion Teves, while
their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches since more than 25 years has II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF
intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves and the filing of the present case REGULARITY OF NOTARIZED DEED, DESPITE CLEAR,
in 1984. CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
THAT MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO; THE
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion
NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA OCHOTORENA
Teves did not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was not a signatory to
AND THE SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE
the settlements. It also found that Ricardo Teves, Cresenciano's heir, is in
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON
possession of a portion of Lot 769-A and that defendants-appellees do no not
WITH THE GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. "E";
claim ownership over such portion. Thus, the defendants-appellees It-it were
ordered to partition and convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share over Lot III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION,
769-A.1wphi1.nt INSPITE OF NO OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE
SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS UNILATERALLY INSERTED,
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it was
SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED CONSIDERATION;
found by the appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a signatory
AND
thereto, it held that it could not order the reconveyance of the latter's share in
such land in favor of his heir Ricardo Teves because Cresenciano had IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID
20
predeceased Joaqin Teves. Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by a deed simply CONTRACT.
denominated as "Agreement" executed on September 13, 1955 wherein he was
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin
represented by his mother, authorized the heirs of Joaquin Teves to sell his
19 Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
share in Lot 6409.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate is authorized by section 1 of

Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court's decision upon the following
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part
grounds
that
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
SIGNATURE OF HIS MOTHER, INSPITE OF DEATH OF
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND UNDER THE OLD CIVIL
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
USUFRUCT;
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, . . . purports to divide Joaquin Teves' estate among only six of his heirs, namely
25
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. It does not
xxx xxx xxx
mention nor bear the signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are entitled to a
following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the proportionate share of the decedent's estate. Contrary to the ruling of the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) appellate court, the fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not
the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented mean that he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the
by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation, wherein the
made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and
21 26
Register of Deeds. acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living.
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts' However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action
factual finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is insufficient which Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of their
to overcome the evidentiary value of the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are shares in the property has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance based
public documents and it has been held by this Court that a public document upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten
executed with all the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the
22 27
the recitals contained therein. In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary title. Asuncion Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case
public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from
28
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of the issuance of title.
evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong and
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds. The
convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate.
23
first extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. The appellate 29
Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956 , while the second deed was
court's ruling that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not 30
executed in 1959 by Maria Teves. Cresenciano was not a signatory to either
constitute the clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the
settlement. However, in contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot
positive value of the extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of
6409, the two extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A do not purport to
which are public documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to
24
exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share
great respect by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal.
therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in
equal shares in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the appellees It-it do not claim ownership over his share in the
31
deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs land. Thus, contrary to the appellate court's ruling, there is no basis
who affixed their signatures in the two documents. The pertinent portions of the for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves' share since, in the first
extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of which substantively identical place, there has been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the
provisions are included in the 1959 deed, provide ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769-A.
xxx xxx xxx Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-A
because the two extajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above
such property. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
mentioned inherit and adjudicate unto themselves in equal
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
shares Lot No. 769-A and our title thereto is evidenced by the 32
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. The
O.C. of Title No. 4682-A of the Land Records of Negros
extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in
Oriental.
equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition,
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR which was legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
33
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE (P425.00) PESOS, Philippine property adjudicated to him. Although Cresenciano, Ricardo's predecessor-in-
Currency which we have received from ASUNCION TEVES; interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot
WE, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia, all 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares
34
surnamed Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and convey unto under the law.
Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of legal age and

With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is
resident of and with postal address in the City of
noted that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never
Dumaguete, all our shares, interests and participations over Lot 35
registered. However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court,
769-A of the subdivision plan, Psd, being a portion of Lot No.
interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of an
769 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete, her heirs, successors
oral partition of the decedent's estate and declared that the non-registration of
and assigns, together with all the improvements thereon.
an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in
xxx xxx xxx this case that
It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in [t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document
possession of an undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and defendants- and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors
and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing,
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
38
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors investment. Therefore, although plaintiffs-appellants may regret having
or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter be considered bound by their own contractual acts.1wphi1.nt
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
different from those provided by law.
AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements
SO ORDERED.
involving Lot 769-A are legally effective and binding among the heirs of
Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the time of
her death.
Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both parcels of
land have been and continue to be in the possession of Asuncion Teves and her
36
successors-in-interest. Despite this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-
appellants as to why they instituted the present action questioning the
extrajudicial settlements only in 1984, which is more than 25 years after the
assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A and more than 10 years after the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such
tardiness indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
37
it. Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of
action, they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and
inexcusable inaction.
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
Article 992 married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
Diaz vs. IAC (June 17, 1987)
is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
SECOND DIVISION Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., Felixberta Pacursa.
vs.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI 2
1976 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti
JARDIN, respondents.
Vda. de Santero.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
PARAS, J.: b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the
Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that Santero;
she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not
was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in
Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977. the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980,
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners
from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate
herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17,
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual
1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
Santero and Pablo Santero.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz. succession of petitioners grandchildrenSantero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
relative (Art. 1003);
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of
Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of
3
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father
Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order
grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
4
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision was rendered by the III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son
and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore
and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes
the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased
5
direct descendants and/or grand children; father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)."
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely
and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate
succession; and mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1
and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
as final and executory. intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal
same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other
hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero. the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art.
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers
970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941,
the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which 6
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
the New Civil Code. Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
7
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit: person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already
in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The
maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and
executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore
in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
"is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista (March 25, 1992)
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
SECOND DIVISION
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother
of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
survived by the following:
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
blood of the deceased, to wit:
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-
MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE Manuel C. Pascual
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Jose C. Pascual
Pasig, Metro Manila,respondents. Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
PARAS, J.:
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: deceased, to wit:
1
(a) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
Avelino Pascual
14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-
Isoceles Pascual
Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C.
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in
Virginia Pascual-Ner
effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14,
Nona Pascual-Fernando
1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Octavio Pascual Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to
the full blood of the deceased, to wit: the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood
brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by
Olivia S. Pascual
the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased
Hermes S. Pascual
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
of the deceased and represented by the following:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
Dominga M. Pascual petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
Mamerta P. Fugoso such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
Domiga P. San Diego
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Nelia P. Marquez
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.
Silvestre M. Pascual
(Rollo, p. 108)
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47) The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a
their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of
her late husband (Rollo, p. 47). On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition
reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article
S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987])
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
(Rollo, p. 418).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp.
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article
515-526). and such motion was denied.
992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
decision the dispositive part of which reads:

The petition is devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
petitioners.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for from the illegitimate child.
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. supra, where this Court ruled that:
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
resentment. represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article
Pascual, full blood brother of their father. 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because
Article 992 prohibits absolutely a successionab
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further exception.
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and
answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and
The Court held: in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitationprescribed
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate AFFIRMED.
Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
SO ORDERED.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not
susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110
Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter
by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to
whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in
the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED
LEX).
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles,
Corpus vs. Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco (G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978)
the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona
had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the
aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
SECOND DIVISION
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco
vs. whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A.
RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in
conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be
"conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que
AQUINO, J.:
el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa
years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los
of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of
of the will is quoted in that decision.
partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but
(1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar
Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual
children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no
daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para
Zambales. que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See
Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under
Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L- article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and,
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.) therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased)
and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds
dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was
and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No.
dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.
heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated
Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole
January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court
heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar
because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec.
compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and
17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made
on those dates. Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1)
that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated
legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.
October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco
estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's
of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred
our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17). by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita
Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement
Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in
and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that
Yangco's estate?
agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.
That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate. To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial
court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an
appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in
R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was
Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his
an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful
the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate",
his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
are: the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for
the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and
legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco
Florencio Gonzales Diez
because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas
Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as Corpus.
found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no
that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section
tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o
69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg
madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article
in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second
943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and
marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture
illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in
with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Ed., 455-6). ...
Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the

Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he
proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The
(Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution
said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which
presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil.
hated by the illegitimate child. 29).
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
SO ORDERED.
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged
natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed
to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit
from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their naturalbrothers and sisters in
accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters."
Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho
vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47
Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the
two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's
brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father
in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs.
Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57
Phil. 909).
95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay vs.
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010) make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to
3
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
vs.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and
RESOLUTION five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent,

Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by
PEREZ, J.:
Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio predeceased his parents.
over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
1
Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera. We now find a need to replace the
infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren,
decision.
Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco- Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel
2
Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were
2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive portion Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
thereof reads:
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall finding that:
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional
memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
(September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he continued to II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations
be under observation and treatment. Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a month of
visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabels testimony in court that her
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even 5
grandparents visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.
as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico
subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
understanding of right and wrong.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify over Cristinas estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of
provides: the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedents estate; (2)
as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after
accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings
(sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4)
xxxx the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention
the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
situated to protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6) the probable value
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabels
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration
findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of
4
more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).
Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and parents marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v.
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having
been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on (3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, when required by the court, and
who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
decedent, Cristina.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the 6
issued in his favor.
decedents estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC
No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a
issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently
decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate
revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix
estate:
of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred
7
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED. Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos
of P 200,000.00, conditioned as follows: estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory; Isabel, we considered that:
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and 1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
charge on the same, or dividends thereon; husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
during the subsistence of their marriage;
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio
3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.
with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject
partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his
illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of this
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June
the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from
2010.
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent
is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer. named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
granted:
Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration
cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
thereof. serve;
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
granted to such other person as the court may select. appointment of administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment of
co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically
of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules
8
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns,
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the alone, x x x."

9
estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of 13
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. We
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate,
the determination of a persons suitability for the office of judicial administrator
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to 14
10
of appointment.
administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-
than any other candidate. administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all
15
times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
administration of a decedents estate presupposes the surviving spouses interest
the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the 16
intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
11
decedents estate. Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a
12
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
decedent which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the 17
estate; and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or 18
have another competent person associated with him in the office.
absolute community property.
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of preferred." (citations omitted)
the decedents will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias special
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes
interest in the decedents estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his
instrument who should not be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-
Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of
compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and
Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the
intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management
19
aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to
of the decedents estate.
be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
"inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
22
she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the represent both interests. (Emphasis supplied)
administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to
23
20 In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we maintained that the order of preference
her proprietary interests."
in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate childs appointment as
21
Ventura where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the decedents
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable.
24
distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for
category being preferred, thus: appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
25
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and In Valarao v. Pascual, we see another story with a running theme of heirs
Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents property probate courts refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he
(citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one
the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court
Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or pointed to Diazs being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the
estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as
cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus: this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to
"overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v.
and lack of kinship."
Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision.
Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who as special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion that
would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that
constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the
one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special
among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion. administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals
where we held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual
kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only
circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the
the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to
naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal.
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the
Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best
deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must
to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of
be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive
administration."
status in the selection of another special administrator.
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special
de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand
discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her 26
for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents. (Emphasis supplied)
appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in
Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause,
character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators
administration: may be sanctioned by law.
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed
abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason foregoing survey of cases.
27
therefor.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be
28
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, we expounded on the legal settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus: thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to 31
the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabels unassailable interest in
those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's
the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the
as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether
same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the
an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the 32
sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue 33
circumstances of the case.
of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this
passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco case even as we reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in
29
Angeles. the estate of Cristina.
30
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals, we took into consideration the size of, and
benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
36
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference personal properties, contrary to Section 1, paragraph a, Rule 81 of the
mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a Rules of Court.
choice be made of one over the other.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, settlement of the decedents estate which adjudicated to himself a
on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly
their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as or partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to
37
is immediately interested in the estate; succeed to her estate.
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
the decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the
Cristinas estate, has not looked after the estates welfare and has acted
decedent;
to the damage and prejudice thereof.
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable
individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the
evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator 4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of
38
of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as falsified documents;
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of
Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and
the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as
performing the functions of administrator of Cristinas estate:
evidenced by the following:
1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
34 administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories he filed
35 opposed Emilio IIIs assumption of that office, arguing that "the
therewith properties of the estate including several parcels of land,
decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the
cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other
judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings,
implemented or executed;" from the list of heirs.
2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to Isabels As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an
vociferous objections to Emilio IIIs attempts to act as administrator oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the
while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals; end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The
foregoing circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission and inaction become even
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the
more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it
nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate
settlement of a decedents estate, such that it cannot constitute a
of the decedent, Cristina.
complete and total listing of the decedents properties; and
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel,
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify,
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes
leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao,
highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of
Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio
their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
dismissal of the cases.
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her
While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the blamed siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears
partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedents detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III)
estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as
deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedents estate, we here
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the
39
inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, we mapped out as among
before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons
interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted

to any suitable person.
40
4. Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of
the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet
interest therein;" upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
41
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the
5. Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
decedent.
examination and allowance of the Administrators account "to persons
interested;" Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
42
6. Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the
question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has
43
7. Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to
yet to be settled.
petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
44
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for. Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit: evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate
had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. If an executor
liquidated.
or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according
to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable admonition:
or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies,
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer
the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the of a Special Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed
in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or
45
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
46
shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division who participated in the
Comment of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which issued
rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If
the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the
only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition
Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the Second
of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the
Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the
new ponente.
petition filed by him:
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting
signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified,
separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will
or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration
then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the
or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement
Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting
47
Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is
independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.
appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a
For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
not a different division created by the Supreme Court. Member of the Special Division.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from
2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five
composition, with the advent of Justice Nachuras retirement on 13 June 2011. (5) Members.
Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be
signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him
or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he
or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the

motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the Division
to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be
taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in

48
venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our

Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of

Article 994 action before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.1wphi1.nt
Heirs of Spouses Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. vs. Lina
(351 SCRA 183, February 6, 2001)
The Case
THIRD DIVISION
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
1
G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001 reverse and set aside the Decision dated April 16, 1999 and the
2
Resolution dated January 12, 2000, both promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS
CA-GR CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
SR. -- ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA 3
follows:
SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R.
SANDEJAS, and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. SANDEJAS, "WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder
TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented of the lower court dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of
by ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, petitioners, Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to
vs. the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share of
ALEX A. LINA, respondent. [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the property. The intervenor
is hereby directed to pay appellant the balance of the purchase price of
PANGANIBAN, J.:
the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty (30) days from
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court receipt of this [O]rder and x x x the administrator [is directed] to
approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the execute the necessary and proper deeds of conveyance in favor of
other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the estate of the appellee within thirty (30) days thereafter."
deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the foregoing disposition.
to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, The Facts
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property 4
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:
contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of
the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator "On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP.
the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS, more or
his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July less, with TCT No. 13465;
1, 1981, Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court
2. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision
appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the
plan Psd-21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan
late Remedios Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16).
Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality
Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as
of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO
administrator (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS, more or less,
"On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned with TCT No. 13464;'
and among the records burned were the records of Branch XI of the
3. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision
Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the
case on February 9, 1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On
February 16, 1983, the lower court in its [O]rder granted the said motion
HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
TCT No. 13468;'
"On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and
4. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision
petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging
among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated
himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and
HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with
absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which
TCT No. 13468;'
formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
"The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to

1. 'A parcel of land (Lot No.22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision
[B]uy is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Psd-19508, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the 'Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE
"Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, containing an area of HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Chec[k]
No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x x x as Check No. 319912 dated today and payable to SELLER for
additional earnest money for the following: P1,000.00;
xxx xxx xxx '3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already
deceased and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of
settlement of her estate (Spec. Proc. No.138393, Manila CFI,
Rizal (Makati Branch Office) in the name of SELLER
Branch XI), wherein SELLER was appointed as administrator of
'EL!ODORO SANDEJAS, Filipino Citizen, of legal age, married
said Estate, and as SELLER, in his capacity as administrator of
to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas;' and which undersigned, as
said Estate, has informed BUYER that he (SELLER) already filed
SELLER, binds and obligates himself, his heirs, administrators
a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the above parcels
and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety (all
of land to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to
of the four (4) parcels of land above described, which are
the burning of the records of said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which
contiguous to each other as to form one big lot) to said Mr.
records are presently under reconstitution, the parties shall
Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy all of them, also binding on
have at least ninety (90) days from receipt of the Order
his heirs, administrators and assigns, for the consideration of
authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all
ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO HEREIN
upon such reasonable terms of payment as may be agreed upon
BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90) days
by them. The parties have, however, agreed on the following
upon the request of either of the parties upon the other), within
terms and conditions:
which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above
'1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the parcels of land;
P70,000.00 earnest money already received by SELLER from

'4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or
BUYER, all of which shall form part of, and shall be deducted
not be executed for causes either due to SELLER'S fault, or for
from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once the deed of
causes of which the BUYER is innocent, SELLER binds himself
absolute [sale] shall be executed;
to personally return to Mr. Alex A. Lina the entire ONE
'2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS In
undersigned SELLER also acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex earnest money received from said Mr. Lina by SELLER, plus
A. Lina of the sum of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, fourteen (14%) percentum interest per annum, all of which shall
Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company

be considered as liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the same heirs were given a period of fifteen (15) days from said
share therein of herein SELLER; date within which to move for the appointment of the new
administrator. Compliance was set for October 30, 1985, no
'5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions
appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The aforenamed heirs are
shall be binding on the heirs, administrators, and assigns of
hereby ordered to show cause within fifteen (15) days from
both the SELLER (undersigned MR. ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS,
receipt of this Order why this Petition for Settlement of Estate
SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX A. LINA).' (Record, SP. Proc. No.
should not be dismissed for lack of interest and failure to
R-83-15601, pp. 52-54)
comply with a lawful order of this Court.
"On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an [O]rder granting the
'SO ORDERED.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 273).
intervention of Alex A. Lina (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 167).
"On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the
"On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P.
Regional Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for
Sandejas filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others that the
letters of administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant case with SP.
administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November
Proc. No. R-83-15601 RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP.
1984 in Canada and said counsel is still waiting for official word on the
Proc. No. 85- 33707 entitled 'IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF
fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged, among others
ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER", [for
that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a
letters of administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, pp. 1-7). On
money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas
November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 220). On February 15, 1985, the,
issued an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, with SP. Proc.
lower court issued an [O]rder directing, among others, that the counsel
No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p. 13). Likewise, on
for the four (4) heirs and other heirs of Teresita R. Sandejas to move for
December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued
the appointment of [a] new administrator within fifteen (15) days from
an [O]rder stating that 'this Court has no objection to the consolidation
receipt of this [O]rder (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 227). In the
of Special proceedings No. 85-331707, now pending before Branch
same manner, on November 4, 1985, the lower court again issued an
XXXVI of this Court, with the present proceedings now pending before
order, the content of which reads:
this Branch' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83- 15601, p. 279).
'On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto, Antonio,

Benjamin all surnamed Sandejas were ordered to move for the
appointment of [a] new administrator. On October 16, 1985, the
"On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his "On August 281 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all
appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for
R. Sandejas on the following reasons: [R]econsideration and the appointment of another administrator Mr.
Sixto Sandejasl in lieu of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others
'5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any
that it [was] only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir,
motion on the part of the heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and
expressed his willingness to act as a new administrator of the intestate
Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas, for the appointment of anew
estate of his mother, Remedios R. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-
[a]dministrator in place of their father, Mr. Eliodoro P.
33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his
Sandejas, Sr.;
[M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion alleging that he ha[d] no
'5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as [a]dministrator of the
[p]etitioner is herein Intervenor Alex A. Lina and the instant [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R. Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No.85-
Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in effect are already consolidated, then 15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be also appointed as administrator
the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as [a]dministrator of the of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro P . Sandejas, Sr. (Spec.
Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in instant Sp. Proc. R- Proc. No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases have been consolidated
83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs and also to the (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On March 30, 1987, the
Intervenor; lower court granted the said [M]otion and substituted Alex Lina with
Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc. No.
'5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to
85-33707, p. 52). After the payment of the administrator's bond (Record,
give way at anytime to any [a]dministrator who may be
SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval thereof by the court
proposed by the heirs of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on
long as such [a]dministrator is qualified.' (Record, SP. Proc. No.
January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of the estate of the
R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP.
"On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of
of Alex A. Lina as the new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Administration on the same day (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-

"On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to
15601, pp. 288- 290)
approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-
lntervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982;
(b) to compel the heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
thru their administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of event that prevented the obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If the
[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of sale condition did not happen, the obligation would not arise or come into existence.
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator 7
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable,
filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus
because the lack of written notice to the other heirs showed the lack of consent
motion on December 13, 1993 (Record, SP. Proc. No.83-15601, pp. 591-
of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith was
603).
imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoyed a claim arising from ones own
"On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and good faith,
granting intervenor's [M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner and heir. When he
Earnest Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-lntervention entered into the agreement with respondent, he bound his conjugal and
Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP. successional shares in the property.
Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-654 ). x x x." 8
Hence, this Petition.
The Order of the intestate courts disposed as follows:
Issues
"WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenor's motion for the approval of the Receipt Of
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our
Earnest Money With Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, 1982, is
resolution:
granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to pay the balance of the purchase
price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of "a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to
this Order and the Administrator is directed to execute within thirty convey title to the property referred to in the subject document which
6
(30) days thereafter the necessary and proper deeds of conveyancing." was found to be in the nature of a contract to sell - where the
suspensive condition set forth therein [i.e.] court approval, was not
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
complied with;
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro
"b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith
Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected
despite the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondent
contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the
[bore] the burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d]
intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the sale was obtained
been filed in court;
from the settlement court. That approval was a positive suspensive condition,
the nonfulfillment of which was not tantamount to a breach. It was simply an
"c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest Money
the subject property is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they
latter should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days assert that because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to
from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent; deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a money claim.
and
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased
"d) Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell. Not exactly. In a
converted to a money claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to condition. The vendor's obligation to convey the title does not become effective
10
execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. in case of failure to pay.
9
Sandejas Sr."
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in modifying subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a court approval, not
the trial court's Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of the disputed full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In
properties to respondent, even if the suspensive condition had not been accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed
fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral issues: (1) the settlement court's the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the court's
jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenor's standing to file an application for the approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a conditional sale,
approval of the sale of realty in the settlement case, (3) the decedent's bad faith, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
and (4) the computation of the decedent's share in the realty under
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can
administration. 11
take place only if and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the
This Courts Ruling intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent
resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed
The Petition is partially meritorious.
lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected.
Main Issue: Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfil what they had expressly agreed
upon.
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed
89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot
3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition
adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro
12 14 15
indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can Citing Gil v. Cancio and Acebedo v. Abesamis, petitioners contend that the CA
sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. erred in clothing the settlement court with the jurisdiction to approve the sale
A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the and to compel petitioners to execute the Deed of Sale. They allege factual
effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the differences between these cases and the instant case, as follows: in Gil, the sale
property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's of the realty in administration was a clear and an unequivocal agreement for the
13
permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present support of the widow and the adopted child of the decedent; and in Acebedo, a
conditional sale was imposed only for this reason. clear sale had been made, and all the heirs consented to the disposition of their
shares in the realty in administration.
Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the obligation was
converted into a mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the Receipt, which We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to
petitioners rely on, refers to a situation wherein the sale has not materialized. In proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the
such a case," the seller is bound to return to the buyer the earnest money paid intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale.
plus interest at fourteen percent per annum. But the sale was approved by the Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates
intestate court; hence, the proviso does not apply. (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons,
including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the
(Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to the pro-
of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate court's
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are
ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may
First Collateral Issue: flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the
16
beneficiaries.
Jurisdiction of Settlement Court
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over
obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the
ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel
jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate
performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court;
action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of
and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no
the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate
one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under
estates of the deceased spouses.
administration.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose
19
Sr. and respondent to one that was "not a definite, clear and absolute document of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2); or for authority to sell real
of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition, the or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other
conditional sale became a reciprocally demandable obligation that is binding interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts,
17 20
upon the parties. That Acebedo also involved a conditional sale of real legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an
18
property proves that the existence of the suspensive condition did not remove application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the
that property from the jurisdiction of the intestate court. deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who
should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one
Second Collateral Issue:
.who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled
21
Intervenor's Standing to the avails of the suit.
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator Third Collateral Issue:
is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration.

Bad Faith
Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting
respondent's Motion for Approval.1wphi1.nt Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed
respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
(2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased

We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own
contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was
properties to which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact that he failed to
in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or
obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically imply bad faith
an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose of binding him to
application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to
the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because his being bound to it is, as
convey such property according to such contract, or with such
already shown, beyond cavil.
modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or Fourth Collateral Issue:
administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. x x x."
Computation of Eliodoro's Share
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule,
specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application
Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of the
disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of disputed lots.
Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the
SO ORDERED.
remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's
share should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to
22
this computation.
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale
should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his
one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or
23
a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.
Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one

tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be based only on the remaining
24
half, after deducting the conjugal share.
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further

explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate -
under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally,
with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the
25
deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half
of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We
assume, however, that this preliminary determination of the decedent's estate
has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in
this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed

Decision and Resolution areAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
Article 995 bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
Calisterio vs. Calisterio (April 6, 2000)
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations
THIRD DIVISION of the estate would have been settled.
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000 Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted
vs.
her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.
VITUG, J.: On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,
herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner
Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y
were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico
1
priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Calisterio y Cacabelos.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Appeals, formulating that
Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to
the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the
be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage
New Civil Code was the law in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor- (c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's
of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the
spouse. other half;
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. (d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's
conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be
Teodorico Calisterio. appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the
deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal 3
administrator of the estate.
heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
2
for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal.
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant.
Petitioner asseverates:
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.

It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals
Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
4
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as Court.
follows:
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid; the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be
determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code,
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
5
of the time of the taking; Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
7
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances
with the Civil Code or other laws. to be here extant.
8
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long
the New Civil Code which provides: as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
second marriage.
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
cases until declared null and void by a competent court. institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the 9
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41 , in relation
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage 10
to Article 40, of the Family Code.
is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more
6
spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted
of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been

adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to
them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions one portion going to
the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
11
The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of
the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half.
Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in
the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and
nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters
exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their
parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has
thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its
judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own
mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of
her deceased brother.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.

51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
We are faced once again with an all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy: an

Article 1000 old woman dying without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling
over her properties like the soldiers in Mount Calvary casting lots for the
Del Rosario vs. Conanan (G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977) see under
Article 898 seamless robe of Jesus. The difference in this case is that even before the owner's
death, two of the claimants had already taken over her properties by virtue of
certain supposed transfers which are in fact that reason for this petition.
Article 1003
Baranda vs. Baranda (May 20, 1987) The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated "Bilihan
ng Lupa" and dated January 29 and February 3, 1977, 1 under which Paulina L.
FIRST DIVISION Baranda, a widow, sold five parcels of land to her niece, Evangelina Baranda, and
a sixth parcel to her other niece, Elisa, also a daughter of Pedro Baranda,
G.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987
Paulina's brother. The sales were made, according to the documents, for the
FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON, HERMINIA total consideration of P105,000.00 duly acknowledged as received by the
2
BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE, as Attorney-in- transferor from the vendees.
Fact, TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA VICTORIA as
What made these transactions suspect was a subsequent complaint filed by
Attorney-in-Fact, ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION
Paulina Baranda against her nieces on August 1, 1977, in the Court of First
BARANDA, petitioners,
Instance of Rizal, in which she alleged that she had signed the said deeds of sale
vs.
without knowing their contents and prayed that Evangelina and Elisa be
EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE HONORABLE
3
ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof to her. This complaint was later
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
4
withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated August 2, 1977, under which the
Alarkon and Valero for petitioners. defendants, in exchange for such withdrawal, obligated themselves to "execute
absolute deeds of sale covering the above-mentioned properties in favor of the
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and Delos Angeles for private
First Party," meaning the plaintiff.
respondents.
It was also stipulated in the said agreement that-
c. The FIRST PARTY shall keep possession of the

CRUZ, J.:
aforementioned deeds of sale, as wen as the Transfer Certificate
of Title of the above-listed properties, which are in the hands of discussed presently. The respondent court, in dismissing the complaint, also
the SECOND PARTIES; required the complainants to pay P50,000.00 for attorney's fees, P30,000.00 for
litigation expenses, P20,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary
d. That any time that the FIRST PARTY desires to sell, 7
damages. The petitioners are now before us to challenge that decision.
mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the
abovementioned properties, the SECOND PARTIES shall We address ourselves first to the basic issue, to wit, the validity of the three
execute the proper documents in accordance with the desire deeds of sale allegedly signed by Paulina Baranda without knowing their
and wishes of the FIRST PARTY. contents. The respondent court, rejecting the findings of the trial court, upheld
the questioned deeds, stressing that they were public documents and that their
As it turned out, only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her; Evangelina never
authenticity could further be sustained by the testimony of the private
complied with the agreement; and when Paulina died in 1982, the certificate of
respondents. We disagree.
title over the lots in question were still in the names of Evangelina and Elisa
5
Baranda. While it is true that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without
further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its
This was the factual situation when on April 26, 1982, the herein petitioners, 8
contents, this rule is nonetheless not absolute but may be rebutted by clear
claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the late Paulina Baranda, filed a complaint 9
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Such evidence, as the Court sees it,
against Evangelina and Elisa Baranda in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
has been sufficiently established in this case.
the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the lots, with damages.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs: * a) declaring the deeds of sale The curious part about the supposed deeds of sale is the consideration allegedly
null and void; b) ordering the defendants to execute the necessary instrument to agreed upon, in the amounts of P25,000.00 for lots 4 and 5, P50,000.00 for lots
transfer the lots in question to the estate of the late Paulina Baranda; c) ordering 9, 11 and 6, and P30,000.00 for lot 8 which Evangelina testified as having been
defendants to turn over to the estate of Paulina Baranda the sum of P24,000.00 a actually paid to their aunt on February 3, 1977. Especially intriguing is the source
year from February 1982 until the administrator of said estate takes over the of the said purchase price, in the total amount of P105,000.00, which by the
management of said properties, with interest at 12% per annum; and d) testimony of the private respondents was paid by them in cash to their aunt in
sentencing defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sum of the office of Atty. Galos, who notarized the deeds of sale. 10
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for and as attorney's fees and
6 According to Evangeline, the sum of P100,000.00 was given to her by a
expenses of litigation.
"balikbayan" boy friend, and it was from this amount that she paid her share of
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, ** the decision of the trial court the purchase price of P75,000.00. 11 According to Elisa, her sister Evangelina lent
was reversed and the deeds of sale were held valid and binding, for reasons to be her P15,000.00 and she raised another P15,000.00 from her grandmother in the
province to complete the P30,000.00 due from her for the lot she was significantly, but in the house of Paulina Baranda, with whom she and her sister
buying. 12 At the time of these transactions, neither Evangelina nor Elisa was were themselves living. Elisa did not present any document to prove that her
gainfully employed or had independent sources of income, both being then grandmother did sell her properties to raise the P15,000.00, or, indeed, that she
fresh college graduates aged 25 and 26 years old, respectively. 13 had any property at all to sell. There is no evidence of this whatsoever. At any
rate, it is hard to believe that this old woman would agree to sell her own
The tale of the mysterious and generous "balikbayan" is something "out of this
properties in La Union, where she was presumably making a living, and with her
world," in the language of the trial court, and we are inclined to agree, although
second husband (who was not even related to Elisa and Evangeline) to live off
not in those words. This Court is itself rather perplexed that the respondent
her granddaughters, who were themselves in a way also living off Paulina
court should have accepted this tissue of lies so readily, considering its obvious
Baranda in the latter's house. Paulina Baranda and the grandmother
falsity. The "balikbayan" is a hazy figure, if we go by his own girl friend's
were strangers.
testimony, without even a name at least, let alone other personal circumstances
to give him bone and body. All we can glean from the record is that he is an The sisters made another incredible claim, viz., that from the house where they
exceedingly trusting and generous person who, presumably out of love for and Paulina Baranda were living together they carried the amount of
Evangeline, willingly delivered P100,000.00 in cold cash to her and thereafter P105,000.00 in cold cash to the office of Atty. Galos where they delivered it to
disappeared completely. (Five years later, Evangelina was still Paulina Baranda. 17 Apparently, Paulina then brought it back to the same house
unmarried.) 14 Strangely, this amorphous sweetheart was not even presented at where it came from in the first place, in a preposterous pantomime that invites
the trial to corroborate his beloved, assuming their love was as strong as ever, or laughter, not belief, and would make them out as three silly persons from some
at least to protect his investment. inane nursery rhyme.
Elsa's explanation of how she got her own P30,000.00 is equally imaginative and Why the nieces did not pay the money in the house instead of bringing it all the
was obviously part of the fabric or fabrication woven by her sister to way from the house and back is something that has not been sufficiently
conjure what now appears to be a non-existent fund. As Elisa puts it, half of the explained by the private respondents. They could have shown, for example, that
P30,000.00 she paid came as a loan from Evangelina's boy friend's P100,000.00 Paulina Baranda intended to bring it somewhere else, say, for deposit in a bank,
and the other P15,000.00 was given to her by her grandmother. 15 or for the purchase of some property, such as the ticket to the United States
where she was allegedly planning to migrate. 18 There is no evidence of such
This grandmother was another generous if also improbable figure, if we go by
deposit or purchase, however, no evidence at all of where that money went after
Elisa's testimony this time. According to her, she persuaded her grandmother to
it was supposedly received by Paulina Baranda on the date of the alleged
sell her lands in La Union, to give her the purchase price of P15,000.00, and to
transaction. It also simply disappeared like the "balikbayan" who never
come with her husband to live with her in Manila, 16 not in her own house,
returned.
Paulina Baranda herself denied under oath that she ever sold her lands to There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is claimed
Evangelina and Elisa, alleging in her verified complaint that she "never executed by the private respondents, are not the proper parties to question the validity of
any deed" conveying the title to her properties and "was surprised and shocked the deed of sale. The reason given is that they are not the legitimate and
to learn" later that her transfer certificate of title to her lots had been cancelled compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the challenged
and new certificates of title had been issued in favor of the private transactions.
respondents.19 She withdrew this complaint only after her nieces agreed in
It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct
writing to reconvey the properties to her "in order to preserve family solidarity
20
descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived, however, by
and in order to avoid litigation among the parties."
two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and several nephews and nieces,
The nieces explain away this complaint by saying it was merely simulated, to including the private respondents, as well as petitioners Flocerfina Baranda,
prevent the U.S. government from discontinuing her pension as a war widow on Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda Villarte, children of two deceased
21 22
the ground that she had squandered her property. If that was her only brothers and a sister. The above- named persons, together with Pedro
purpose, one might well wonder why it was necessary at all to commence Baranda, who was not joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the
litigation as a mere resale of the properties would have been sufficient and easily private respondents, and the children of another deceased sister, are the
effected without the asperity of a civil complaint. Considering that, as the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.
private respondents kept insisting, there was never any misunderstanding
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:
between them and their aunt, there would have been no difficulty in their
acceding to her request for a resale of the properties to protect her pension. The Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
fact that the complaint had to be filed shows they were unwilling to reconvey children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
the properties after the aunt demanded their return following her discovery of succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the fake deeds of sale, an unwillingness further manifested when Evangelina the following articles.
refused to comply with this aforesaid agreement and never reconveyed the lots
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
supposedly bought by her.
nephews and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's
By offering this explanation, the private respondents are in effect asking this brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit
Court to condone and approve their attempt to deceive and defraud the per capita, and the latter per stirpes
government of a sister state.
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children Neither can it be argued that the petitioners cannot assail the said contracts on
or brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. the ground that they were not parties thereto because as heirs of Paulina
Baranda they are affected, and adversely at that, by the supposed sales of her
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale
properties. As this Court has held
purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong
to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not A person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily
merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private respondents, but are in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if
deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from contracting parties and can show the detriment which could
the moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, positively result to him from the contract in which he had no
24
they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or intervention.
injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of
The real party-in-interest in an action for annulment or
successional rights.
contract includes a person who is not a party obliged
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties principally or subsidiarily in the contract if he is PREJUDICED
25
in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties.
the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said
Moreover, it is expressly and specifically provided in the Civil Code that:
decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the
23
settlement of the decedent's estate." Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. ...
the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself
of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one As Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in his concurring opinion in Armentia v.
26
else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in Patriarca, speaking of a similar situation, "what petitioners, however, question
the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to is the validity of such transfer or disposition for if it could be established that
benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing such disposition was invalid, the property allegedly conveyed never left the
through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the remaining patrimony of the transferor, and upon the latter's death without a testament,
petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.
such property would pass to the transferor's heirs intestate and be recoverable the prejudice of the real owner of the property registered. We have consistently
by them or by the administrator of the transferor's estate should there be any." ruled that when there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is
deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose
Assuming then that the petitioners are proper parties to challenge the validity of
name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the
the private respondents title to the land in question, may it not be argued that
reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible.
the right to do so had nevertheless already prescribed when they filed the
complaint in 1982? Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least,
of breach of trust, should not be allowed to use a Torrens title
The Civil Code provides in Article 1391 that an action to annul a contract on the
as a shield against the consequences of his wrong doing.
ground of vitiated consent must be filed within four years from the discovery of
(Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620).
the vice of consent. In the instant case, however, we are dealing not with a
voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue influence, violence or An action to compel reconveyance of property with a Torrens
intimidation that can justify its nullification, but with a contract that is null and title does not prescribe if the registered owner had obtained
void ab initio. registration in bad faith, and the property is still in the latter's
name. The reason is that the registration is in the nature of a
Paulina Baranda declared under oath in her complaint that she signed the deeds
continuing and subsisting trust. (Caladiao v. Vda. de Blas, L-
of sale without knowing what they were, which means that her consent was not
19063, April 29, 1964).
merely marred by the above-stated vices, so as to make the contracts voidable,
but that she had not given her consent at all. We are also satisfied that there A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the
was no valid consideration either for the alleged transfers, for reasons already protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for
discussed. Lack of consent and consideration made the deeds of frauds. (Ignacio vs. Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940; Gustilo vs.
27
sale void altogether and rendered them subject to attack at any time, Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
conformably to the rule in Article 1410 that an action to declare the inexistence
As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the
of void contracts "does not prescribe."
name of the person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie
Act No. 496, which was in force at the time the complaint was filed, provided to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. Provided only that
that the action to annul a registration of land under the Torrens system should the property has, as in this case, not passed to an innocent third person for
28
be filed within one year; otherwise, the same shall be barred forever. This is value, such an action is permitted. We have held that the sole remedy of the
not an absolute rule, however, as the Torrens system is not supposed to be used landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
as an instrument for wrongdoing or to validate an illegal acquisition of title to anothers' name is not to set aside the decree after one year from the date
thereof. Respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, he may

nevertheless bring an ordinary action for reconvevance or for darmages if the
29
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
It was in conformity with this doctrine, in fact, that the petitioners filed on April
26, 1982, their complaint against the private respondents for annulment of the
deeds of sale and for reconveyance of the lands subject thereof which were
illegally registered in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda.
We deal with one final matter that should be cause for serious concern as it has
a direct relevance to the faith of our people in the administration of justice in
this country. It is noted with disapproval that the respondent court awarded the
total indemnity of P120,000.00, including attorney's fees and litigation expenses
that were double the amounts claimed and exemplary damages which were not
even prayed for by the private respondents. Such improvident generosity is
likely to raise eyebrows, if not outright challenge to the motives of some of our
courts, and should therefore be scrupulously avoided at all times, in the interest
of maintaining popular confidence in the judiciary. We therefore caution against
a similar recklessness in the future and call on all members of the bench to take
proper heed of this admonition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and

that of the trial court is REINSTATED, with costs against the private
respondents.
SOORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Article 1005
Baranda vs. Baranda (May 20, 1987) see under Article 1003
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
Article 1006 ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,

vs.
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977) see Article 975
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
Article 1008
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977) see Article 975 VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Article 1025
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor vs. Rigor (G.R. 1
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976 , affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
No. L-22036, April 30, 1979) see under Article 789 2
Legaspi City , which rendered inofficious the donation made by Leoncio
Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the legitime
Article 1039 of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to convey to herein private
respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the donated land
Cayetano vs. Leonidas (May 30, 1984) see earlier case under Article 16
proportionate to Victor Imperial's legitime.
Article 1043 Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo vs. Borromeo (July 23, 1987) see
under Article 777 Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to
his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over
the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private
Article 1051
respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute
Imperial vs. CA (G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999) Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.1wphi1.nt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for
Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he further proceedings.
was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute,
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same
however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the Court
3
case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and
of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 , under which terms: (1) Leoncio
Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking
recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land
the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on
donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter
grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was
portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for
alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue
the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that
advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of
4
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
leaving only two heirs the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient
son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was
property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural
substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who
land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised
moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution
the additional defenses of prescription and laches.
was duly granted.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue,
in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his sons,
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a
namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed
portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981,
Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.
Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa
Villalon. The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of
Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint
property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had
for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state that petitioner's
docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground
allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of
5
substantiated by the evidence.
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner: prescribed. In addition, the trial court regarded the defense of prescription as
having been waived, this not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters,
one half of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the free Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision of December 13, 1990 reads:
portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the donation to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale
defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is
otherwise known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series
where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be
of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is
taken.
considered a donation, is hereby reduced proportionately
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child insofar as it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial,
(including the adopted child) in relation to the acknowledged which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent
natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of
natural child getting 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate 10,940 square meters thereof.
(adopted) child, in accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given
Code which provides:
to plaintiffs should include the portion which they are presently
The legitime of each of the acknowledged occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their father
natural children and each of the natural Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from
half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
any other portion that may be agreed upon by the parties,
children or descendants.
otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to undertake
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has the partition.
been taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square
6 The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as
meters while defendant gets 5,420 square meters.
part of his legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years
7
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently
under Article 1141 of the Civil Code , reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the
proved.
writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and
8
that the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. respondents' complaint, it also raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of
donation.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court: (1)
that there was no res judicata, there being no identity of parties and cause of Contrary to petitioner's contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and
action between the instant case and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private could not, form part of Leoncio's cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177.
respondents had a right to question the donation; (3) that private respondents' Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the death of the donor,
action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4) that the donation as the value of the donation will then be contrasted with the net value of the
12
was inofficious and should be reduced. estate of the donor-deceased.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full
and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of of the donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two alternative
9
action. A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as
parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. alleged in Leoncio's complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the
7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his capacity as donor of donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed because the compromise
the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his death, Victor was agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a ratification and waiver on the part
substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter the fact that Victor's of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness and consent may have been
participation in the case was in representation of the interests of the original attendant in the making of the donation. The second cause of action is the
plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of Victor's
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but only of that
10 13
suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate , or his heir, portion diminishing the legitime. It is on the basis of this second cause of
11
as in this case, for which no court appointment is required. Petitioner's action that private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity between Leoncio and
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the
private respondents, being heirs and successors-in-interest of Victor, is
donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code,
unavailing.
thus:
Moreover, Leoncio's cause of action as donor of the property was fraud,
Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to
purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation.
the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask
While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private
for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated
Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner's other assignment of errors.
Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment
Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation,
therein.
we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the
be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real action over an
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents' description of their
the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
compromise agreement. Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action
enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.1wphi1.nt
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a
heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of
14
Appeals , we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or
property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The
authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court
rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration
proceedings. 15
or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be
inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth,
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, 16
appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing 17
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the
so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the
Article 1053: 18
donor to reserve property for his or their support. Interestingly, donations as
19
in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased
for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil
Case No. 1177 did not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law
preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are matters
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 21
that Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer .
Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce
Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a portion of the donated property, and
inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent
could have instituted the action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
least, raised the matter of legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment
22
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, case filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private
29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a respondents' cause that five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a before they filed their complaint with the RTC.
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained
only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
legitimes may be determined.
have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
23
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this abandoned his right or declined to assert it. We find the necessity for the
case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed. application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this case, in order to avoid
an injustice.
As for the trial court's holding that the defense of prescription had been waived,
it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to say that while A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the
the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the matters to be taken up donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of
in trial, it would be the height of injustice for us to adhere to this technicality his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the
when the fact of prescription is manifest in the pleadings of the parties, as well donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the
20
as the findings of fact of the lower courts. property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld by the
Court of Appeals.
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in,
private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be recalled that Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share
Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1)
sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to collation would be
24
added to it.
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the
donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor's
legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the
property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an
immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in
25
property of the same nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the
26
equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; or
(3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other
27
property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of

prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646,
is reversed and set aside. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1wph1.t
Article 1053
1
A Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA-
Imperial vs. CA (G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999) see under Article 1051 G.R. No. 12404-SP) of August 11, 1981, upholding the appointment by the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch VI, of respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as
Article 1058 Special Administrator, although in the Will of his deceased wife, she had
disinherited him, as well as the Appellate Court's Resolution of February 17, 1982
Maloles II vs. Phillips (January 31, 2000) see earlier case under Article 838
denying reconsideration.
Corona vs. CA (G.R. No. L-59821, August 30, 1982)

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which
excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and
FIRST DIVISION the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his
G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982
improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground
ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner, for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal
vs. shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L. CASTILLO, Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed
NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO, GUILLERMO Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills
REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, respondents.
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and
N.J. Quisumbing for petitioner. for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena)
is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents Luchangcos, Torres and Polintan.
On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
Ricardo S. Inton for respondents Castillos.
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.
Rufino V. Javier for respondent Vitug.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
& "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and
that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured through merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the
undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the
P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his
appointment of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents filed
legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator
their Opposition. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to a
because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has
Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been
no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order setting aside the appointment
administer.
of Nenita as Special Administratrix and appointing in her stead the surviving
Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also spouse Romarico.
filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate
On August 11, 1981, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on
children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the decedent; (2)
the part of the Probate Court and dismissed the Petition stating that the Probate
Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3) Rodolfo Torres,
Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the Rules; that
Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate children of the
petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the trust and
deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the decedent.
instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that the surviving
On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath of husband has legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the
office before a Notary Public. decedent's estate which is merely part of the conjugal property; and that
disinheritance is not a disqualification to appointment as Special Administrator
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980
besides the fact that the legality of the disinheritance would involve a
appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the
determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which is decidedly premature
surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of
at this stage.
P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the
Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for On March 24, 1982, petitioner elevated the case to this Court for review on
appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the certiorari after her Motion for Reconconsideration was turned down by the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of Court of Appeals.
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to
not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes
serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but
probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest
disqualify him from the trust. settlement.
The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First
they respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion on Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398
the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the surviving pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator,
husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and unavailing as properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special
the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court and Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.
is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as
No costs.
between the surviving husband, who was responsible for the accumulation of
the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct concur.1wph1.t
choice; and that the legality of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot
Gutierrez, J., took no part.
affect the appointment of a Special Administrator.
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account
the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered
opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-
Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator,
considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given
her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest
consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality
and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity
demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving
2
husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they

may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to
the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for
death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the
Article 1061 year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Vda. De Tupas, vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986)
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance,
Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986 First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089) to have
the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,
reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ...
vs.
and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
The complaint also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as might be
OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC.,
proper.
private respondent-appellee.
The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on
Abraham D. Caa for petitioner-appellant. 1
which the parties stipulated, said Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
Jose R. Edis for private respondent-appellee. merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds, viz.:
... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable

because the properties which were disposed of by way of
NARVASA, J.:
donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on
vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties were Epifanio's
instance of the donor's widow. capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being
a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art.
widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a 106 1, C.C.
2
win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980
in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.
Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of
the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of
which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its
3
Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation
6
by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that
excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of
the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable that is, its value is imputable into gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to
the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of give.
determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having
disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as 7
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely
of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil
disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e.,
Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has
it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
been held to be a long-established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals,
4
order to find out whether it is inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the
et al., where this Court said:
rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by
... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908,
aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step
disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as procedure has been correctly outlined:
provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at
collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made
the time of the testator's death;
not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in
favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in (2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which
its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to thus left;
herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and
the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the
the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious
5
or not.
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the
time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting

from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as
8
the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be
measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed
that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is
inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In
this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R.
Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires

appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the production of
evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant

Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated
property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion
of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated.
Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will

Zaragosa vs. CA (341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000)
and was survived by his four children.
SECOND DIVISION
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a
G.R. No. 106401 September 29, 2000 complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino
and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-
of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural
ZARAGOZA, petitioners,
born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further
vs.
alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA
among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to
MORGAN, respondents.
them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while
DECISION her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of
deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an
QUISUMBING, J.:
American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was
1 executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27, 1992
2
in CA - G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and
Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of private respondent's claim
the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied
over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondent in the
knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale
father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot
executed by Flavio Zaragoza covering Lot 943 as valid.
943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are as knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to
follows: Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an
American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
father during his lifetime.
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara,
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead
indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary evidence
court until the case was tried on the merits. presented by private respondent to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943
were inheritance share of private respondent. Specifically, it noted the
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision,
admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private respondent's counsel, that
the decretal portion of which reads: 6
their father had given them their inheritance. Further, public respondent found
WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered, that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and
adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta void. The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different
Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering from his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed from January
7
defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied to February 1957. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
8
by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against defendants over Lot 943 is Resolution dated June 26, 1992.
3
dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each other. 9
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with a supplemental petition,
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties raising the following assigned errors:
during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales; that the
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943
conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his
ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO
4
to be the share of private respondent.
ZARAGOZA HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING
Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal in the THESE TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT;
Court of Appeals docketed as CA -GR CV No. 12587.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT
On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES TO THE
decretal portion of which reads: EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;
appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged
owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF
5
AFFIRMED. SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER
LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF
FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE
DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943
3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE
DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING
GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO
4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS OTHER IN EXH. "M-11-A" APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED
DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUEZ AND NOTARIZED BY FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. "1", FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.
NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.

IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN THE 943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES
11
LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATTER'S OWNERSHIP THEREOF.
PETITIONER'S FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.

Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the partition inter
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943,
ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the
SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the
10 petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE.
delivery of inheritance share.
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992, petitioners
additionally raised: On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the
adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
will support the transfer.
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three
THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS
children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the
not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it, private
American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased,
admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter
These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the
and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in earlier
12
Court of Appeals. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is not
Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
13
Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
14 15
Relations, citing the earlier cases ofConstantino vs. Espiritu and Co vs. Court
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of 16
of Appeals. In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the
were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. Court decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title
and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her
very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the
modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted
validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and
by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we
consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name.
stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the
validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition

for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino
Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for
failure to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSED without prejudice to
the institution of the proper proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
Article 1062 officious.
Buhay De Roma vs. CA (July 23, 1987)\ The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other

compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
FIRST DIVISION
or right which he may have received from the decedent during the
G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987 lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
each heir, and in the account of the partition.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents. heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
CRUZ, J.:
should be reduced as inofficious.
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration *
court, which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed
did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of
by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by 3
Candelaria's estate.
1
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth **
court holding that the deed of donation contained no express
2
P10,297.50. There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil
including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to 4
Rosalinda.
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi
sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the
Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's
kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay intention.
na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the
hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't
free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari we see none.
sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
5
the rule, which is categorical enough.
Disposicion.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution.
said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
7
As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and
na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and
6
failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact
jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded
in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon
the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy
disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years.
Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against

the petitioner. It is so ordered.
respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956,

Article 1078 extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at
Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have
Noceda vs. CA (313 SCRA 505)
an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directo's share was
11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria
THIRD DIVISION
Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the same date, plaintiff Directo donated
625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her
nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina (Exhibit
G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999
D). However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial
RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner, settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff
vs. Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO, respondents. the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and
defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial
settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032
over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks meters (Exhibit C). Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda
to reverse the decision dated March 31, 1995 of the respondent Court of constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff
1
Appeals in CA GR CV No. 38126, affirming with modification the decision of Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in
2
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales, in an action by private the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
respondent against petitioner for recovery of possession and ownership and and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant
rescission/annulment of donation. Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court are as
3 of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo
follows:
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda (c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that
before the lower court. During the trial, the lower court ordered donated portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of
that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted by Engr. Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or
Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the survey of assigns;
Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto Quejada
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside
reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial
the donated portion at the defendant's expense or pay a
settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the
monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency;
actual area of Lot 1121 which is 127,298 square meters. Engr.
Quejada subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied (e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the amount
by third persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road of P5,000.00; and
lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs
(f) To pay the cost.
of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial
with an area of 12,957 square meters was the share of defendant court as follows:
5
Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the
share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING
defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square defendant Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as
meters, went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit E). Lot "C" of Lot 1121 per Exhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff
Aurora Arbizo Directo. Except for this modification, the
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales Decision, dated November 6, 1991, of the RTC-Iba, Zambales,
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby AFFIRMED in
4
follows: all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the following
Court hereby renders judgment: assignment of errors:
6
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
August 19, 1981, valid; HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IDENTIFIED AS LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;
AREA IN EXCESS OF THAT STATED IN ITS its judicial authority when it sustained the lower court's findings that the
TAX DECLARATION. subject property actually contains an area of 127,289 square meters.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN We find the argument unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial court in
HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to have the
PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to determine the actual area
7
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT DATED 17 of Lot 1121. Plaintiff Aurora Directo filed a motion/compliance where she
AUGUST 1981. suggested that Geodetic Engineer Edilberto V. Quejada of the Bureau of Lands,
8
Iba, Zambales be commissioned to undertake the survey said motion was also
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 9
sent to defendant's counsel, Atty. Eufracio Pagunuran for Comment, but Atty.
ADJUDICATING AND ALLOTING LOT "C" AS
Pagunuran however failed to file his Comment within the given period. Thus the
APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN
trial court designated Engineer Quejada to undertake the survey of Lot
PREPARED BY GEODETIC ENGINEER 10
1121. Petitioner Noceda through counsel belatedly filed his Comment without
EDILBERTO QUEJADA TO THE
any opposition to the appointment of Engineer Quejada but proposed that the
RESPONDENT.
latter be tasked to solely (a) re-survey, determine and identify the metes and
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN bounds of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER USURPED areas occupied by the parties therein; and (c) to conduct the re-survey with
AN AREA ADJUDICATED TO THE notice and in the presence of the parties therein and their respective
11
RESPONDENT. counsels. The Comment was not, however, acted upon by the trial court in
view of its earlier Order directing Engineer Quejada to undertake the survey of
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 12
the land. Engr. Quejada conducted the survey with the conformity and in the
REVOKING THE DEED OF DONATION
presence of both parties, taking into consideration the extrajudicial partition
DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
dated August 17, 1981, deed of donation dated June 1, 1981 executed by plaintiff
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the subject lot known as Lot 1121, Aurora Directo in favor of defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual area
13 14
which was registered under Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 under the name of the occupied by the parties, as well as the sketch plan and the technical
late Celestino Arbizo. Petitioner claims that Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 description of Lot 1121 taken from the Records Section of the Bureau of Lands,
15
contains only an area of 29,845 sq. meter; thus the respondent Court exceeded Manila. The report and the survey plan submitted by Engr. Quejada were
16
approved by the Trial Court in an Order dated December 7, 1987. These
circumstances show that the lower court ordered the re-survey of the lot to
determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with the conclusive evidence of ownership of property (Republic vs.
conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area based on Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA 285).
the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both parties, showed a
It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121,
much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration but such
designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. Lot 8,
differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than
17
though part of Lot 1121, was excluded by Engr. Quejada in
not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation. We
determining the respective portions of Lot 1121 occupied by
hold that the respondent court did not err in sustaining the trial court's findings
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo pursuant
that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square meters.
to the extrajudicial settlement which they executed on August
Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly encroaches 17, 1981. The result of the present suit shall not in any way affect
on the rights and claims of third persons who were never impleaded below; that the occupants of Lot 8, since the issues involved in the present
the subject lot was also declared in the name of one Cecilia Obispo and a Free case are the usurpation by defendant Noceda of the land
Patent over the said lot was also issued in her name and that there are several adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety of the
residential houses constructed and existing on Lot 8 of lot 112l, thus these cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of defendant
possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be joined as defendants for their non- Noceda due to his ingratitude to plaintiff Directo.
inclusion would be fatal to respondent's cause of action.
Notably, defendant's counsel requested for the appearance of Cecilia Obispo
We find no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly ratiocinated and despite notice to her to appear in court and bring with her the alleged free
18 19
on this issue as follows: patent in her name, she failed to appear and even failed to intervene to protect
whatever interest and right she has over the subject lot. As to the other
The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name
possessors of residential houses in Lot 8 of Lot 1121, they are not considered as
over Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did
indispensable parties to this case. A party is not indispensable to the suit if his
not make them indispensable parties in the present case.
interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
Defendant Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the
interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment
name of Cecilia Obispo without the alleged free patent in her 20
which does complete justice to the parties in court. Private respondent is not
name. Moreover, no evidence was presented showing that
claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was
Cecilia Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax
adjudicated to her based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and
receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not
which was denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no
need to implead the occupants of Lot 8.
Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be partitioned the parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were
based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement-partition
distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 of August 17, 1981.
stated therein were different from the extrajudicial settlement executed on June
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of
1, 1981; that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to
Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the
the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated that
area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually
they never intended that any of the deeds to be the final determination of the
occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square
portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them; that the extrajudicial settlement-partition
meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report
of August 17, 1981 could not effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned
22
submitted to the trial court where he stated among other things:
only 29,845 square meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic)

We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as
21
that the area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-
follows:
partition in the name of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements computed lots of their actual occupancy as per survey on the
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria ground;
Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the
8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan
latter was intended to supersede the former. The signature of
for ready reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing
defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17,
as per EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic)
1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of
on actual occupancy.
Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact
that defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual
the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion of areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage
the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981
extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. extrajudicial settlement.
Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of
Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a
August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was
third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property
29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found
notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir
out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that
of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as Agripina and Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latter's
a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established. daughter? Besides, at the time of the execution of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and defendant,
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling basis to
they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the
23
disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows:
plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the
In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support
that Maria Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife
Agripina is her half sister with a common father. On this point, and child.
the Court believes the version of the plaintiff. The Court

We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner's claim that there exist no factual and
observes that in the "Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition"
legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private respondent Aurora
(Exhibit "C"), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-heirs of the
Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey plan prepared by Geodetic
defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino
Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17,
Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear
1981, and the actual possession by the parties and the technical description of
in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because
Lot 1121. It was established by the survey plan that based on the actual
according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria
possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs the
Arbizo. And the defendant is one of the signatories to the said
portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was being occupied
Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition acknowledged
by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also shown that it is in Lot C
before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under the
where the 625 square meter area donated by private respondent Directo to
circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant knew
petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private
that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he
respondent as her rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as
well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed the Extra- Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo
Judicial Settlement, he was already an adult since when he since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their
testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old. So that in 1981, predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined since no final
he was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the parties herein;
defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed this hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And
We do not agree.
who could have a better knowledge of the relationship of
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate Lot B; 38,872 sq.m. Maria Arbizo (3/5)
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
Lot C; 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs
24
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general, Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in
is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is
25
among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same
interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion
26 29
supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A
partition of the decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership
30
extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria of the property adjudicated to him.
Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda
We also find unmeritorious petitioner's argument that since there was
(petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on
no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for
August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property
the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding
left by their predecessor-in-interest in the following manner:
ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent
containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters; Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which
belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and
27
occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without
To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion.
the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions indicated by red offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
31
lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage proportion in ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require
the extrajudicial settlement and the actual occupancy of each heir which conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the
28 32
resulted to these divisions as follows: action for revocation.
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m. goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5) Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to
enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by private
respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week of September 1985 to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one
while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed.
than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil
respondent's share in Lot 1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
33
rejected such argument in this wise: preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
34
and a mere allegation is not evidence.
Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted
to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on
advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when
from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial
35
possible for him to bring the action." As expressly stated, the court; for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the
donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of
year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record or the
36
donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this
to institute the said action within the same period. The court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the
concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they
37
defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. We find
Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive no such showing in this case.
period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not
considered the questions of fact raised below and the respondent Court's
from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
conclusions are based on the evidence on record. No cogent reason exists for
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time 38
disturbing such findings. We also note that petitioner in this petition merely
plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in the respondent Court in
possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for
whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to present
revocation of her donation.
any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs against
counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided
appellant.
that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner
SO ORDERED.
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at Barangay Lapnag, Banga,

Article 1079 Aklan, with an area of 770 square meters, more or less; bounded North
by Lazaro Navarra, now Flocerfina Ibit; South by Celsa Retis; East by
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) see Article
980 Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and West by Aklan River, which parcel
of land declared in the name of Marcelino Recasa under Tax Declaration
Heirs of Quirico Seraspi and Purificacion Seraspi vs. CA (April 28, 2000) No. 3721, Series of 1984, with an assessed value of P2,440.00;
PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of 3,648 square meters,
more or less, located in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan; bounded North
SECOND DIVISION
by Concepcion Navarra; South Diosdado Navarra; East by Gabriel Reloj;
G.R. No. 135602 April 28, 2000 and West by National Road; covered by Tax Declaration No. 11079 in the
name of Purificacion Seraspi, Series of 1984, and having an assessed
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R.
value of P1,650.00.
SERASPI, petitioners,
vs. During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his
COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON RECASA, respondents. death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his
intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part
corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
MENDOZA, J.:
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage,
1
This case is here for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the
15, 1998, reversing the decision of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the
Aklan and dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint filed by second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion
petitioners for the recovery of possession and ownership of two parcels of land Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners. Included in this sale was the
in Banga, Aklan. property sold by Patronicio to Dominador.
The facts are as follows: In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on
the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands.
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land described as follows:
However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was
foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently,
the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the possession of the
It appears that Rara, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to property by private respondent, it was held that the action had prescribed.
administer the property.
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino's child by his third wife, facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what
taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by
to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof. prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession may
have been commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with just
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed
title. On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the
a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides:
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the
barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the
Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners' action is barred by extinctive ownership of the two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code
prescription; and (2) whether private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired provides:
ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive prescription.
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may
We rule for petitioners. be ordinary or extraordinary.
The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish the Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
identity of the property as well as the credibility of their title the elements faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
2
required to prove one's claim for recovery of property nonetheless held that
3
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
the action was barred by prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, it
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
held that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an
interest therein can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of possession and ownership prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their years, without need of title or of good faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary marriage, has no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate
or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his father's
4
and with just title for the time fixed by law. Private respondent contends that properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition
he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
through adverse possession for ten (10) years.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor.1wphi1 Good faith
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. As consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
Art. 1129 provides: received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership
6
thereof. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The basis of
right. petitioners' claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but
this by itself is insufficient to make them owners of the property. For while a
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property
contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
through any of the modesrecognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) 7
object of the contract and upon the price, the ownership of the thing sold is
intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in
5
not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the
consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription. 8
property. Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia dominica
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership
through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a of things).
piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not
on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of
been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983,
the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. It must be
the property was in the possession of private respondent.
remembered that in the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the
properties were divided into three parts, each part being reserved for each group However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in possession
of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered into. Since of the property. Petitioners' title to the property prevails over private
the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and respondents' possession in fact but without basis in law. As held in Waite
9
second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third v.Peterson, when the property belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by
another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of
the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the
property, and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED, and private respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the
possession of the contested parcels of land to petitioners as heirs of Quirico and
Purificacion Seraspi.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
1
Court seeking a reversal of the Resolution, dated October 7, 1983, of the former
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. CV-61084.
Article 1080
The facts that matter are as follows:
Zaragosa vs. CA (341 SCRA 309, September 29, 2000) see Article 1061
Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They were blessed with eight (8)
children, namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel,
Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed Crucillo.
Article 1082
Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. Juana Aure died on November 19,
Crucillo vs. IAC (317 SCRA 351) 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left, among other things, two (2) parcels of
unregistered land situated at General Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez, Cavite, with
THIRD DIVISION
a total area of 1,998 square meters under Tax Declaration No.
2
376 of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. He was survived by his
heirs, who became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, entered into
G.R. No. 65416 October 26, 1999
the possession thereof.
CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO, ADELAIDA C. PERENA, LUCIA ROZUL,
It is worthy to note that when the present case was commenced below, the only
PRIMITIVA MENDOZA SUMAGUI, YOLANDA ROZUL, PABLITA ROZUL,
surviving children of Balbino A. Crucillo were Adelaida Crucillo, Miguel
PETRITA ROZUL, ROSALINA ROZUL, MAXIMINO CRUCILLO, NICASIO
Crucillo, and Rafael Crucillo. The other children above-named died, and were
SARMIENTO, MARCIAL SARMIENTO, CIPRIANO SARMIENTO,
survived by their respective heirs, to wit:
CONRADO CRUCILLO, LOURDES CRUCILLO, MIGUEL CRUCILLO,
FELICIDAD CRUCILLO, and MIGUELA CRUCILLO, petitioners, 1. Elena Crucillo-Mendoza
vs.
1.1 Primitiva Mendoza
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, LUCIO PERENA, RAFAEL A.
(daughter)
CRUCILLO, MIGUEL R. PERLADO, FELIX NOCEDA, BENITA GATPANDAN
NOCEDA, and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF CAVITE,respondents. 1.2 Lolita
Mendoza-
PURISIMA, J.:
Rozul
(daughter), 3.3 Marcial Sarmiento

deceased,
3.4 Buenaventurada Sarmiento
with the
following 4. Santiago Crucillo
heirs:
4.1 Conrado Crucillo
1.2.1 Yolanda
4.2 Lourdes Crucillo
Rozul
5. Vicente Crucillo
1.2.2 Pablita
Rozul 5.1 Felicidad M. Crucillo
(widow)
1.2.3 Petrita
Rozul 5.2 Nicolas Crucillo (son-now
deceased)
1.2.4 Lucia
Rozul 5.3 Miguela C. Crucillo (widow
of Nicolas)
1.2.5 Rosalina
Rozul Soon after the death of Balbino A. Crucillo, the following persons occupied and
possessed portions of subject parcels of land:
2. Maximino Crucillo
1. Rafael Crucillo occupied and resided in the

2.1 Carlomagno Crucillo
ancestral house erected on a portion of subject
2.2 Maximino Crucillo, Jr. lots;
2.3 Vicente Crucillo 2. Nicasio Sarmiento, son of Perpetua Crucillo

Sarmiento, caused a residential lot situated at
3. Perpetua Crucillo-Sarmiento
Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite, to be registered
3.1 Nicasio Sarmiento in his name;
3.2 Cipriano Sarmiento

3. Miguel Crucillo possessed exclusively a 9. Miguel Crucillo occupied exclusively an

residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., agricultural land in Pulong Munti and Ulo ng
Mendez, Cavite; Bukal.
4. Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento On March 28, 1969, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo executed and entered into a
6
(daughter of the deceased Perpetua Crucillo- "Patuluyang Bilihan Ng Isang Lagay Na Lupa" with the co-respondents,
Sarmiento), and Atty. Conrado Crucillo (son of spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, whereby Rafael A.
the deceased Santiago Crucillo) owned in Crucillo, for the price of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, sold and
common an agricultural land situated in Sitio conveyed to the spouses Noceda a parcel of land more particularly described:
Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax
3
Isang lagay na lupang (solar) na may luang na APAT AT
Declaration No. 1179;
WALOMPONG (480) metro cuadrados, humiguit kumulang
5. The heirs of Elena Crucillo-Mendoza, (labing dalawang (12) metro and (sic) haba simula sa linderong
Adelaida Crucillo, and Nicasio Sarmiento Ibaba hanggang Ilaya at apat na pung (40) metro and haba
owned in common an agricultural land in simula sa kalye sa Kanluran hangang sa linderong Silangan)
Pulong Munti, covered by Tax Declaration No. bahagui ng isang lagay na lupang nasasaad sa Hoja Declaratoria
4
375; Bilang 376 at kung tuluyang mapahiwalay sa kalihon ay libot na
mga sumusunod na karatig: Sa Ibaba, lupang pagaari ni
6. Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente
Adelaida Crucillo; sa Ilaya, Santiago Crucillo (ngayon,
Crucillo owned in common another property
5
Carlomagno Crucillo); sa Silangan, Crispin Llamado (ngayon,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 663;
Simeon Manalo); at sa Kanluran, Kalye General Luna, sa libot
7. Primitiva Mendoza possessed an agricultural ng bakod na bato at iba pang matitibay na pananda sa panabi.
land in Pulong Munti and in Niko, Mendez,

which parcel of land formed part of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo.
Cavite;
The spouses Noceda delivered the amount of P4,000.00 to Rafael A. Crucillo as
8. Carlomagno Crucillo possessed an
partial payment of the price agreed upon.
agricultural land situated in Sitio Maykiling,
Mendez, Cavite; and On April 15, 1969, the petitioner, Conrado Crucillo, wrote the Register of Deeds
of Cavite requesting the latter to hold in abeyance the registration of the said
land transaction for the reason that the same was done without the knowledge, PU AT LIMANG (245) metros cuadrados, humiguit kumulang
consent and authority of the co-owners of subject property and consequently, nasasaad sa Hoja Declaratoria Bilang ___ at libot ng mga
7
null and void. In connection therewith, petitioner Carlomagno Crucillo and sumusunod na karatig: Sa Ibaba, lupang pag-aari ni Adelaida A.
Anita Perena (daughter of petitioner Adelaida Crucillo) returned to respondents Crucillo; Sa Ilaya, Santiago A. Crucillo, ngayon ay Carlomagno
Noceda the amount of P4,000.00 which the latter had partially paid to their co- A. Crucillo; sa Silangan, Carlomagno A. Crucillo at sa Kanluran,
respondent, Rafael Crucillo.1wphi1.nt Kalye General Trias, at libot ng bakod na bato at iba pang
buhay na bakod at mga panabi o hanganan.
Sometime in February 1971, respondent Rafael Crucillo presented to the office of
the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, Cavite, a "Kasulatan Sa On February 23, 1971, the respondent Provincial Assessor of Cavite, by virtue of
8
Partihang Labas sa Hukuman" dated February 17, 1971, executed by and the "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan" and "Kasulatan sa Partihang Labas sa
10
between petitioners Primitiva Mendoza, Carlomagno Crucillo, Adelaida A. Hukuman", cancelled Tax Declaration No. 376 in the name of Balbino A.
Crucillo, and respondent Rafael Crucillo; dividing the estate into five (5) equal Crucillo and issued in lieu thereof the following new tax declarations:
parts with the following beneficiaries:
11
a. Tax Declaration No. 5413 in the name of
1. Heirs of Elena A. Crucillo the heirs of Elena A. Crucillo;
12
2. Heirs of Maximino Crucillo b. Tax Declaration No. 5414 in the name of
the heirs of Maximino Crucillo;
3. Adelaida A. Crucillo
13
c. Tax Declaration No. 5415 in the name of
4. Rafael A. Crucillo
Adelaida A. Crucillo;
5. Carlomagno A. Crucillo 14
d. Tax Declaration No. 5416 in the name of
On February 19, 1971, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo and the co-respondents Carlomagno A. Crucillo, married to Felicitas de
spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, executed a "Kasulatan Sa Keyser; and
9
Ganap Na Bilihan" whereby Rafael A. Crucillo conveyed and sold to his said co- 15
e. Tax Declaration No. 5417 in the name of
respondents, for and in consideration of the sum of P25,000.00, a parcel of land
the Spouses Felix Noceda and Benita
more particularly described as:
Gatpandan Noceda.
Isang lagay na lupa na nasa poblacion, munisipyo ng Mendez

Nunez, Kabite, may luang na DALAWANG DAAN AT APAT NA
Subsequently, the respondent spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan The petitioners, Primitiva Mendoza-Sumagui, Yolanda Rozul, Pablita Rozul,
Noceda, started possessing the property sold to them by Rafael Crucillo, Petrita Rozul, Lucia Rozul, Rosalina Rozul, Vicente Crucillo, Conrado Crucilio,
occupied the ancestral house standing on the property, and introduced Lourdes Crucillo, Felicidad Crucillo, and Miguela Crucillo, were declared non-
improvements thereon. suited for failure to attend the pre-trial conference on October 2, 1972.
On March 12, 1971, petitioner Carlomagno Crucillo's lawyer, Abraham Sarmiento On October 31, 1975, after trial on the merits, the trial court came out with a
20
(later to become Associate Justice of this Supreme Court) wrote the Provincial Decision, disposing thus:
Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, to request the latter to withhold any
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
future transactions on or transfers of the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5417 until the question of ownership of the land involved shall a) Declaring the Deed of Partition, Exh. "A",
16
have been settled by judicial adjudication. null and void;
On August 14, 1971, the petitioners' counsel wrote respondent Felix Noceda, b) Declaring the defendants-spouses Felix
asking the latter to "stop or refrain immediately from continuing any work or Noceda and Benita Gatpandan to be the true
construction which [you] may have started upon receipt of this letter" and to and lawful owners of the "ancestral house" and
"vacate the portion of land that you have occupied without the consent of all the the lot upon which it is erected, consisting of
17
heirs of Balbino Crucillo . . . ." 249.75 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to
18
Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code however, the
On August 13, 1971, petitioners brought a complaint against the respondents
plaintiffs are hereby given thirty (30) days from
for "Annulment of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Sale, and Tax Declaration
notice to their counsel within which to
Nos. 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416 and 5417 of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
exercise their right of legal redemption;
Cavite, with Damages", docketed as Civil Case No. TG-190, before Branch IV of
the defunct Court of First Instance of Cavite but the same was dismissed for c) Declaring Tax Declaration Nos. 5413, 5414,
plaintiff's failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise, as required by 5415, 5416, and 5417 of the Office of the
Article 222 of the New Civil Code. Provincial Assessor of Cavite (Exhs. "C", "C-1"
to "C-4") null and void, and directing the
On May 4, 1972, when efforts to settle amicably failed, petitioners filed a
Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the
substantially similar Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-204, which
same;
Complaint was amended on August 29, 1972 to implead as co-plaintiffs, the
19
petitioners, Felicidad Crucillo and Miguela Crucillo.
d) Directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite Gatpandan" for a parcel of

to issue new Tax Declaration in lieu of Tax land containing an area of
Declarations No. 376 (Exh. "C-5"), as follows: 249.75 square meters and the
house erected thereon, in lieu
1) To the "Heirs of Elena
of Tax Declaration No. 5417;
Crucillo", for a parcel of land
containing an area of 249.75 6) To the "Heirs of Vicente
sq.m., in lieu of Tax Crucillo" for a parcel of land
Declaration No. 6413; containing an area of 249.75
square meters;
2) To the "Heirs of Maximino
Crucillo" for a parcel of land 7) To the "Heirs of Perpetua
containing an area of 249.75 Crucillo" for a parcel of land
square meters in lieu of Tax containing an area of 249.75
Declaration No. 5414; square meters;
3) To "Adelaida Crucillo" for a 8) To "Miguel Crucillo" for a

parcel of land containing an parcel of land containing an
area of 249.75 square meters, area of 249.75 square meters;
in lieu of Tax Declaration No. all in accordance with the
5415; Sketch Plan (Exhs. "X" and
"Y");
4) To "Carlomagno Crucillo"
for a parcel of land containing e) Dismissing plaintiffs second and third
an area of 249.75 square causes of action;
meters, in lieu of Tax
f) Dismissing defendant's counterclaim for
insufficiency of evidence.
5) To the "Spouses Felix
Noceda and Benita
SO ORDERED. P10,000.00 for actual damages, and P10,000.00

for and in the concept of moral damages;
The petitioners and respondents interposed Motions for Reconsideration on
January 7, 1976 and January 10, 1976 respectively, but the same were both denied 3) Appellees are hereby also directed to pay
for lack of merit in the Order of September 30, 1976. jointly and severally appellants the sum of
P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and cost of
On October 19, 1976, petitioners appealed the trial court Decision to the then
21
the suit.
Intermediate Appellate Court which, in Decision dated May 25, 1983, modified
the judgment of the trial court as follows: SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the judgment Private respondents presented a Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 21,
of the lower court is hereby modified, in conformity with the 1983, of the said Decision of the appellate Court, and acting thereupon, the
above findings. Judgment is hereby rendered: appellate court resolved:
1) Declaring the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B") null WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the decision
and void. Appellees, spouses Felix and Benita of this Court on May 24, 1983 is hereby set aside. Judgment is
Noceda and/all persons claiming under them hereby rendered sustaining the decision a quo declaring the
are hereby directed to vacate the premises of Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B") valid and binding and declaring the
the land subject of the Deed of Sale defendants-appellees Spouses Felix Noceda and Benita
aforementioned, and to surrender peacefully Gatpandan to be the true and lawful owners of the ancestral
the possession thereof to appellants, so that house and lot upon which it is erected consisting of 249.75
the same shall be returned or collated into the square meters more or less. Moreover, plaintiffs-appellants
intestate estate of Balbino Crucillo; have no right of legal redemption since it is not sanctioned by
law and evidence. Except for this modification, the judgment
2) All alterations made by appellees spouses
under appeal is hereby affirmed in toto.
Felix and Benita Noceda in the "ancestral
22
house" and the lot upon which it is erected are SO ORDERED.
hereby forfeited in favor of appellants.
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition for
Appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, theorizing
and severally appellants the amount of
that:
I COMPLAINT, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 43-

46, ANNEX "E" HEREOF), THE RESPONDENT
IN SETTING ASIDE ITS OWN DECISION
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED
PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983, ANNEX "B"
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY
HEREOF, AND RECONSIDERING IT BY SUSTAINING
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
THE DECISION DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975,
AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179, ANNEX "E" III
HEREOF, OF THE COURT A QUO, TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE RESPONDENTS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIOR ORAL
PARTITION OF THE ESTATE INHERITED FROM
THE DECISION DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975,
BALBINO A. CRUCILLO, BY THE HEIRS OF BALBINO
AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179, ANNEX "E"
A. CRUCILLO, THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE
HEREOF, OF THE COURT A QUO, TO THE EFFECT
APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
THAT THE KASULATAN SA GANAP NA BILIHAN,
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
EXHIBIT "B", ALSO EXHIBIT "2" (ALSO ANNEX "C",
WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
COMPLAINT, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 43-
II 46, ANNEX "E" HEREOF) WAS VALID, THAT THE
RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES FELIX NOCEDA AND
BENITA GATPANDAN-NOCEDA ARE THE TRUE
AND LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE LOT SUBJECT
MATTER OF EXHIBIT "B", ALSO EXHIBIT "2", AS
THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DATED
WELL AS OF THE ANCESTRAL HOUSE LOCATED
OCTOBER 31, 1975, AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL,
THEREON, AND THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE NO
158-179, ANNEX "E" HEREOF, TO THE EFFECT THAT
RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION THEREOF, THE
THE RESPONDENT RAFAEL A. CRUCILLO VALIDLY
RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
SOLD THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF
HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
THE KASULATAN SA GANAP NA BILIHAN, EXHIBIT
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
"B", ALSO EXHIBIT "2" (ALSO ANNEX "2"
JURISPRUDENCE.
IV 2) To the "Heirs of Maximino

containing an area of 249.75
PROMULGATED ON MAY 25, 1983, AND AFFIRMING
square meters in lieu of Tax
WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF THE
Declaration No. 5414.
COURT A QUO DATED OCTOBER 31, 1975,
AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL, 158-179, ANNEX "E" 3) To "Adelaida Crucillo", for a
HEREOF, AND SUSTAINING, CONSEQUENTLY, THE parcel of land containing an
FOLLOWING JUDGMENT OF THE COURT A QUO: area of 249.75 square meters,
in lieu of Tax Declaration No.
xxx xxx xxx
5415;
c) Declaring Tax Declaration Nos. 5413, 5414,

4) To "Carlomagno Crucillo",
5415, 5416, and 5417 of the Office of the
for a parcel of land containing
Provincial Assessor of Cavite (Exhs. "C", "C-1"
an area of 249.75 square
to "C-4") null and void, and directing the
meters, in lieu of Tax
Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the
same;
5) To the "Spouses Felix
d) Directing the Provincial Assessor of Cavite
Noceda and Benita
to issue new Tax Declaration in lieu of Tax
Gatpandan", for a parcel of
Declarations No. 376 (Exh.
land containing an area of
"C-5") as follows:
249.75 square meters and the
1) To the "Heirs of Elena house erected thereon, in lieu
Crucillo", for a parcel of land of Tax Declaration No. 5417;

6) To the "Heirs of Vicente
sq.m., in lieu of Tax
square meters;
24
7) To the "Heirs of Perpetua court miscomprehended the facts justifying a review, but the exceptions
Crucillo", for a parcel of land aforecited are inapplicable to the case under consideration, it appearing that the
containing an area of 249.75 appellate court correctly appreciated the facts in arriving at its questioned
square meters; resolution.
8) To "Miguel Crucillo", for a Even granting arguendo that the petition falls under any of the above exceptions
parcel of land containing an justifying a factual review of the respondent court, the petition cannot prosper.
area of 249.75 square meters; The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the assailed Resolution of the
all in accordance with the respondent court has sufficient evidentiary support, on the basis of which the
Sketch Plan (Exhs. "X" and respondent court abandoned its earlier Decision.
"Y");
To begin with, the oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in
25
e) Dismissing plaintiff's second and third common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties.
causes of action;
On the issue as to whether an oral partition, effected by the heirs of Balbino A.
xxx xxx xxx Crucillo of his estate, has been sufficiently established, the Court rules in the
affirmative. It has been shown that upon the death of Juana Aure, the
THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
petitioners and the respondent Rafael Crucillo partitioned the estate among
COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective shares and
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
exercising acts of ownership. Thus, the trial court found:
WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
. . . Thus, aside from the disputed lot, Rafael had sold two other
It is petitioners' submission that the fact that Balbino A. Crucillo's heirs have
lots belonging to the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua
actually occupied, sold, taken possession of their respective shares from Balbino
Crucillo) has caused a residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St.,
A. Crucillo's estate does not suffice to establish a prior oral agreement by and
Mendez, Cavite to be registered in his name alone, Miguel
among the heirs of Balbino Crucillo.
Crucillo is in exclusive possession of a residential lot located at
The petition raises questions of fact which are not proper in an appeal General Trias St., Mendez, Cavite. An agricultural land located
23
on certiorari. Petitioners cited exceptions to the rule as when the factual at Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No.
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed 1179 (Exh. "6"), is owned in common by Vicente Crucillo (now
decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the appellate occupied by his surviving spouse Felicidad M. Crucillo).
Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the deceased Perpetua Crucillo is the ancestral house', which is erected on that portion
Crucillo), Adelaida Crucillo, and Atty. Conrado Crucillo (son of of the said land which Rafael Crucillo sold to the defendants-
the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land spouses; and that the Heirs of Elena Crucillo had constructed a
situated at Pulong Munti, covered by Tax Declaration No. 375 house of strong materials on the northern portion of said land
(Exh. "7"), is owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, fronting Aure St., (of Exhs. "X" and "Y") The Court further
Adelaida Crucillo, and Nicasio Sarmiento. Still another property observed that a hollow block party wall separates the respective
covered by Tax Declaration No. 653 (Exh. "10") is owned in portion occupied by the residential house of Adelaida, the
common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo, "ancestral house", and the clinic of Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo,
whose share was acquired by Miguel Crucillo. Judging from their appearance and condition, the
improvements erected by Adelaida Crucillo, Dr. Carlomagno
Additionally, Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an
Crucillo, and the Heirs of Elena Crucillo are not less than then
agricultural land in Pulong Munti and also in Niko, Mendez,
(10) years old. (Decision, Court of First Instance; see Amended
Cavite, while Carlomagno Crucillo possesses an agricultural
Record on Appeal).
land at Sitio Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite, Miguel Crucillo is
exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulong Munti and From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of Balbino
Ulo ng Bukal, and the remaining portion another agricultural A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among themselves, as
land after the other portion thereof had been sold by Rafael evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of
Crucillo. improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation
purposes their respective shares. These are indications that the heirs of Balbino
xxx xxx xxx
A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among themselves, for why should
When the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the property they construct improvements thereon, pay the taxes therefor, and exercise other
in dispute, it observed that Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo had acts of ownership, if they did not firmly believe that the property was theirs. It is
erected a building of strong materials, which he utilizes as his certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made
clinic, on the southern portion of said land fronting Gen. Luna when their acts showed otherwise. Moreover, it is unbelievable that the
St., that Adelaida Crucillo had constructed her residence, which possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of
is also of strong materials, on the northern portion of said land improvements thereon and the length of time that such improvements have
fronting Gen. Luna St.; that between the clinic of Dr. been in existence. Then too, after exercising acts of ownership over their
Carlomagno Crucillo and the residential house of Adelaida respective portions of the contested estate, petitioners are estopped from
26
denying or contesting the existence of an oral partition.
Anent the second and third issues whether there was a valid conveyance by
Rafael Crucillo of the lot subject matter of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan"
to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, and whether the
latter spouses acquired true and lawful ownership thereof, including the
ancestral house standing thereon, the Court also rules in the affirmative. As the
existence of the oral partition of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has
been well established, it stands to reason and conclude that Rafael Crucillo
could validly convey his share therein to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita
Gatpandan-Noceda who then became the true and lawful owners thereof,
including the ancestral house existing thereon. Petitioners have, therefore, no
right to redeem the same property from the spouses Noceda because when the
sale was made, they were no longer co-owners thereof, the same having become
the sole property of respondent Rafael Crucillo.
As regards petitioners' prayer for an award to them of actual and moral damages
and attorney's fees, the same is denied for want of proper basis in law and
jurisprudence.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated October 7, 1983 of the former Intermediate

Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents his wife Alicia
Non vs. CA (325 SCRA 652)
Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the

THIRD DIVISION Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute
vs. ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO,respondents. ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the
Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).1wphi1.nt
VITUG, J.:
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
property on two documents a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo
basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court
Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado
("RTC") of Queron City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of
Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner
the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found by the
Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their
Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the
share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were
trial court.
executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue
on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado, Leah
influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado
Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments, settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail
although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.
January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting,
property. consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo
Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement,
modification by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a
petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed
quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the
vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should
amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been
be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken
decision of the Court of Appeals. belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the
property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca
The appellate court ruled correctly.
Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, assailed document.
the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs her
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents
1 2
decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until 5
was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents
3
partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and 6
against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale,
completely valid and binding.
4
an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed
of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not
justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief,
as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad
faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall
be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has
thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings
to make the proper valuation of the isarog property and ascertainment of the
amount due petitioner Delia Viado.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May
1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special
pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house
Pada-Kilario vs. CA (G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000)
together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's
children, has been living in that house since 1960.
SECOND DIVISION Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial
partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which
G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000
they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners,
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present
vs.
while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters,
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represented
DE LEON, JR., J.: by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia;
and Higina was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in
1
The victory of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal
this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
2 3
Circuit Trial Court in an ejectment suit filed against them by private
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When
4
respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal by the Regional Trial
Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said
5 6
Court on appeal. They elevated their cause to respondent Court of
property.
7 8
Appeals which, however, promulgated a Decision on May 20, 1998, affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his
father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
The following facts are undisputed:
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of
Maria, was the buyer.
land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte,
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area.
instant controversy. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned
for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end,
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
failed.
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late
of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them
petitioner spouses. Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to
the present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo,
easily transferred in the name of his heirs . . ..
Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of
9
Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and
as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. the genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as
doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the
signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by
attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in
the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of
the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.
the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no
special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial described property long before the sale of said property on November
partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-
described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
spouses. It made the following findings:
Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-
After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as
court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-
ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic] owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-
successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern
10
still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late portion is being [sic] lawful.
Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial
Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the
Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:
above-described residential property . . . as their share of the
inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how
. . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than follows:
40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors
WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment
were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At
earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo
Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:
have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias,
nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if 1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
not laches or estoppel. appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general 2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of
of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period the New Civil Code has to be applied;
sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of
3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their
the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest
occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of
their share of the community property, the question then involved is no
P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until
longer one for partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993
the termination of the present case;
covers a period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-
heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or 4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00
prescription. as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
xxx xxx xxx 5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit.

12
. . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing
brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing
illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft said petition. It explained:
11
of any right in donating the very property in question.
Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have
It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without
inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of paying any rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners
possession . . . . cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by
the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property,
Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the
Maria Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to
land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
possession. A voluntary division of the estate of the deceased by the
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada
heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs
who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee
exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them . . ..
Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial
partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute
was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest
partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought
action was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore,
partition.1wphi1.nt the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle
of laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert
Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . .
facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of 13
petitioners.
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria
Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share . . . . Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said
court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of
motion.
Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of
17
Hence this petition raising the following issues: involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a
I.
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which,
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
18
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs
19
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE. acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
II.
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
20
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE. New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
III.
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title
or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
21
14 accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto
FAITH.
Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria
There is no merit to the instant petition. Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
22
Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed
document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they
23
15
registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised discussed and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is presumed
Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division
for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against
16
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It 24
the estate which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
29
(44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia,
effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to
subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the
Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet
St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
30
Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject realized. More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is
property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of
late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in. value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer
Costs against petitioners.
that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever
paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada SO ORDERED.
25
family. Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as
the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer

tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand,
failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
26
them. Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It
27 28
is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code
which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations ofP43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA (G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999) see Article
980 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibaez (G.R. No. 149926. February On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
23, 2005) 4
agreement, this time in the amount ofP123,156.00. It was intended to pay the
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
SECOND DIVISION
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note
for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
5
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13,
vs.
1980.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ
ARIOLA, respondents. Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
6
will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
DECISION
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April
CALLEJO, SR., J.: 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator
7
of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
1
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed
of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8
2
a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal of the petitioners
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors
complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
City, Branch 63.
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
The antecedent facts are as follows: respectively taken by them.
9
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was
3
M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
10
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement
Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and
and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The
11
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its
No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
information on his address or the date of his return to the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents
12
Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and
Florence S. Ariola. void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
13
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati PROBATE COURT.
14
City, Branch 63. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL
The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
HAS BEEN PROBATED.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack
15 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
of merit.
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
16
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had
was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by
passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence;
the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement
the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A"
apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in
estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before
II.
the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was
not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ
in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
claim in the estate proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money
17 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.
RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under
IV.
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It furt

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SUCCESSION Cases 1 of 1166

Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Leilanie C. Yangyang-Espejo, CPA

Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon .........................................................................................................96

Ramirez v. Ramirez 111 S 82 .................................................................................................... 9 Eastern v. Lucero ................................................................................................................ 100

ARTICLE 728 ............................................................................................................... 13 Emnace v. CA ....................................................................................................................... 105

Jutic v. CA .............................................................................................................................. 16 Bonilla v. Barcena ................................................................................................................ 116

Maglasang v. Cabatingan ..................................................................................................... 21 Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo 152 S 172............................................................................ 119

ARTICLE 774 ............................................................................................................... 30 Gayon v. Gayon ..................................................................................................................... 138

Coronel v. CA ........................................................................................................................ 30 Palicte v. Ramolete ...............................................................................................................140

ARTICLE 776 .............................................................................................................. 42 Locsin v. CA ......................................................................................................................... 145

Alvarez v. IAC ........................................................................................................................73 ARTICLE 780 ............................................................................................................. 183

Caguioa vs. Calderon (20 Phil 400) ................................................................................... 485

ARTICLE 854 ............................................................................................................ 933 ARTICLE 898 ............................................................................................................ 974

ARTICLE 1000 .......................................................................................................... 1043 ARTICLE 1061 .......................................................................................................... 1060

ARTICLE 1003 .......................................................................................................... 1043

ARTICLE 1039 .......................................................................................................... 1050 ARTICLE 1082 .......................................................................................................... 1084

ARTICLE 1083 ............................................................................................................1112

Santos vs. Santos (October 12, 2000) ................................................................................. 1112

ARTICLE 1088 ........................................................................................................... 1123

Garcia vs. Calaliman, (Apr. 17, 1989) ................................................................................. 1123

Alonzo vs. IAC (159 SCRA 259) .......................................................................................... 1133

ARTICLE 1091 ........................................................................................................... 1141

ARTICLE 1104 ............................................................................................................ 1141

Non vs. CA (325 SCRA 652) see Article 1082 ......................................................................1141

ARTICLE 1105 ............................................................................................................ 1141

Mendoza vs. IAC (July 30, 1987) ........................................................................................ 1144

Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. CA (March 7, 2000)................................................ 1149

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

SUCCESSION IN GENERAL A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance,

The petitioners, averred the following in their answer:

Promise to Sell appended as Annex 4 to respondents' brief). The actions of the

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the Court of

presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE

lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ramona) which is reproduced hereunder:

payment; 327403 (Exh. "E"; Exh. "5").

as follows: Estrada, thusly:

between petitioners and respondents. prejudice of the first buyer.

This Court had occasions to rule that:

If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration.

the widow-beneficiary, for lack of cause of action. 3

he continued discharging his father"s work as his statutory successor. 3

speculation or profit by a future assignment of his/their right herein

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

DECISION forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by

defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,

Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages SO ORDERED. 32

reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are

an attempted improvement (the irrigation tank) only in 1970?

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified.

established by circumstantial evidence.

Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cages

In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the