Cariaga v. people GR no.

180010

The Case:
Cenita was the Municipal Treasurer of Cabauatan, Isabela with a salary grade of 24, was convicted for three counts of malversation
of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Through counsel, Cenita filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision,
stating that he intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction on Cenitas case.

Cenita elevated his case to the Supreme Court, invoking the liberal interpretation of the rules and admitted the procedural lapse
committed by his former counsel, and requests the Court to transmit the records of the cases to the Saniganbayan in the interest of
substantial justice.

The Issue:
Whether or not the appeal which was wrongly taken to the Court of Appeals, should be given due course and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan
which has appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, 1 as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:2

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade `27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates
against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application
thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.3
In Ulep v. People,4 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory
tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is
unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice
of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably
so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known when
appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and
carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny
petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.5
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require.6 It can not be gainsaid that the case of
petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense as well as a proper application
of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided
scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the
cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is warned against committing the
same procedural error, under pain of administrative sanction.

TIJAM vs SIBONGHANOY GR no. l-21450

January 08, 1963 5 days after the surely received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which
to file a motion for reconsideration. Appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, July 19, 1948 for the recovery
of 1,908.00 Pesos.

RA 296, Judiary Act 1948 Section 88 of which placed within the jurisdiction of inferior court all civil actions where the value of the
subject matter or the amount of demand does not go beyond 2,000 Pesos, exclusive of interest and costs that the Court of First
Instance of Cebu has no Jurisdiction.

The Court is in Opinion that Surety is now barred by laches from invoking the plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

Definition of Laches:

Failure of neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been earlier, it is negligence or commission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitle to assert it has abandoned it or declines to assert it.

Antiporda v. Garchitorena

Facts:
Municipal Mayor Antiporda and others were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos. It was filed with the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads as follows:
That on September 1, 1995, in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jrdid then and there kidnap Elmer Ramos from his
residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle
Sandiganbaya ordered the prosecution to submit an amendment to the Information:
[Sandiganbayan] expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case considering that it was not clear
whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given 30 days to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes necessary
in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged...
The prosecution filed an Amended Information:
That on September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as such and taking
advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo,
Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey,
Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos and detain him illegally at the
residence of Antiporda for more than five (5) days.
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance
of warrants of arrest be deferred.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto denied the Omnibus Motion.
The accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of
Arrest Issued which was also denied "on the ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was
added so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the Amended Information.
Also, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court,
the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time"
The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Sandiganbayan ignored the Motion to Quash since the accused have continually refused to submit themselves to
the jurisdiction of this Court.
A MR was filed wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance of their
counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction over
their persons.
Sandiganbayan denied the MR.
Issues:
a) Can the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction as charged in the original complaint, acquire jurisdiction through the
amendment of Information? NO, petitioners barred by estoppel.
Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
Sec. 4, par (a) of P.D. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office
Criminal Jurisdiction Requisites:
(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of (SUBJECT MATTER)
(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (VENUE OR TERRITORY)
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial (PERSON OF THE ACCUSED)
a) forcibly by warrant of arrest
b) or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
Petitioners:
o Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction since the original information did not allege that one of the petitioners, took advantage of his
position as mayor.
o Court lacking jurisdiction cannot order the amendment of the information.
Court:
o They cannot question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan because they insist that said court acquired
jurisdiction over their motion to quash.
SUBJECT MATTER
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged?
NO. The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related.
BUT, the petitioners are estopped for in the MR filed with the Sandiganbayan, it was they who "challenged the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their MR that the said crime is work connected.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the
amendment of the Information.

b) Can the amended information be allowed without conducting anew a preliminary investigation for the graver offense charged
therein?
Reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. It is proper only if the accused's substantial rights would be
impaired. The amendments merely describe the public positions and where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and but determines
only whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a
reinvestigation should still be conducted.

MIRANDA vs TULIAO

FACTS:
March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela. September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested.
April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain Boyet
dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of Vicente Buazon and Elizar Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the Court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the Court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed
the resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
ssue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdictionof the
court
Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through
compulsory process, such aswarrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police
or to the court. It isonly when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek
judicialrelief.

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before respondent judge. She alleges that Judge
Fabros granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration after the case had been dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and
her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference. She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the
motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court
that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality
and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging respondent judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion

Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here,
the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the
prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for
reconsideration subject of the present

Criminal Procedure
July 6, 2010
Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor'spermit in the municipality of
Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but itwas denied. She appealed
to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent judge.Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing
that the case filed againsther is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends that
criminalcases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not require preliminary investigationand shall be filed
directly to the court and not in the Prosecutor s office. She also invoked ActNo. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Actsand Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription Shall Begin
to Run . Concludingthat the case should have been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in courtway beyond
the 2 month statutory period.The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor s office itsuspends
the prescriptive period.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was filed on theprosecutor s office?
Decision:
Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor s office is sufficient to interruptthe running of the prescriptive
period except when the case is covered by the Rules onSummary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal s
office; the running of theprescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a penalty of arresto menorit
therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is covered by theSummary Rules, the period
continues. It must be the filing of the case in court which willinterrupt the period from running.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMEPEOPLE V. MA. THERESA

PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:
FACTS:
On 16 Septem ber 19 97, Virg inia C. Malolos filed a n affidavit -com plaint for
estafaa n d v i o l a t i o n o f B a t a s P a m b a n s a ( B P ) B l g . 2 2 a g a i n s t M a . T h e r e s a P a n g i l i n a n (respondent)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaintalleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of NineM i l l i o n S i x H u n d r e d F i f t y -
Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-
T w o P e s o s ( P 9 , 6 5 8 , 5 9 2 . 0 0 ) i n f a v o r o f p r i v a t e c o m p l a i n a n t w h i c h w e r e d i s h o n o r e d u p o n prese
ntment for payment.Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg.
22 we re filed a gainst resp on dent Ma.The resa Pangili nan inthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June
2000, respondent filed anOmnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liabilityhas been extinguished by reason of prescription.In defense of her claim ,
Pangilin an said that the p re vailing la w that governs theprescription of special penal l aw, B.P. 22, is Section 2
of Act No. 3326
(An Act ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts)
where theright to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution office forB.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from
the commission of the crime. The imputedviolation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case
wasf o r m a l l y f i l e d i n t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t , t h e r e f o r e t h e a c t i o n a l r e a d y prescri
bes. RTC granted the motion.On the other han d, the com plainant argued that the filing wit h the office of
cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.
ISSUE:
Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding thatcan interrupt prescription of crime under B.P. 22?
HELD:
YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinctionbetween cases under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and th ose cove red by
speciall a w s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n o f t h e p e r i o d o f p r e s c r i p t i o n ; t h a t t h e in
stitution of proceedi ngs for prelim inary in vestigation i n the office of prosecutoragainst accused interrupts the period of
prescription.Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filingof complaint on September 1997, two (2)
years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore, the action against respondent
Pangilinan did not prescribe.

GR 184800 May 5, 2010

Bonifacio
v
RTC of Makati, Br. 149
Facts:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private
respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co.,
filed a criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article
355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code .
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly
and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity,
character and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for
exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and published in the said
website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article persuading the public to
remove their investments and policies from the said company. This is after the
petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they
obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to
indict the petitioners, filed separate information against them .
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of
in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by
Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was
printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time
the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published, and the
prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended
party accessed the internet-published article.

Issue:
Whether petitioners Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

Held:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication. This is wrong. For the court to
hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. This
goes against the purpose as to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.

Union bank v. people

FACTS:

Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC has no jurisdiction
as the document was submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no crime committed as not all of
the elements of perjury was present.

The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there and
ruled that she was sufficiently charged with perjury.

ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it was notarized or where it was used.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated that criminal action shall be
instituted where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that Tomas did all things in Makati,
thus making Makati the right venue for the case.