The European Legacy

Toward New Paradigms

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The Gift of Philosophy: Between otium and

negotium

Daniel White

To cite this article: Daniel White (2016) The Gift of Philosophy: Between otium and negotium, The
European Legacy, 21:1, 71-78, DOI: 10.1080/10848770.2015.1097138

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2015.1097138

Published online: 26 Nov 2015.

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The European Legacy, 2016
VOL. 21, NO. 1, 7178
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2015.1097138

REVIEW

The Gift of Philosophy: Between otium and negotium

A Written Republic: Ciceros Philosophical Politics. By Yelena Baraz (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2012), x + 252 pp. $46.95 cloth.

Daniel White

Wilkes Honors College, Florida Atlantic University, 5353 Parkside Drive, Jupiter, FL 33458, USA

That man most distinguished in character and learning, Plato, thought that republics would
be prosperous, finally, if learned and wise men began to lead them, or if those who lead put
all their effort in learning and wisdom and judged this conjunction of power and wisdom
manifestly to be possible for the health of the state. (Cicero, Letters to his Brother Quintus)1
Nor do I doubt that there are many things that might have escaped my attention, for I am only
human and, occupied by duties, must take care of those things [scholarly pursuits] in my spare
time, that is, at night lest someone think that they are conducted on your time. Days I devote to
you, I sleep only enough for my health, and am content in this reward alone, as M. Varro says,
that while we muse on those [pursuits] we live more hours, for life is vigilance. (From Pliny
the Elders Preface to the Natural History, dedicated to the Emperor Vespasians son Titus)2
Radical changes are occurring in what democratic societies teach the young, and these changes
have not been well thought through. Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems
of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive. If
this trend continues, nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful
machines, rather than complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticize tradition, and
understand the significance of another persons sufferings and achievements. The future of the
worlds democracies hangs in the balance. (Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy
Needs the Humanities)3

Plinys open letter to Vespasians son and emperor-to-be Titus, by way of a preface to his
famous Naturalis Historia, dramatizes a Stoic theme that structured both his and before
him Ciceros works and days. The continuous demands of public service were expected
to be foremost concerns of a Roman intellectual, whether statesman or scholar or, as was
Cicero, both. Thus philosophia and scientia, as Pliny confesses to the Emperor, were con-
sidered important yet ancillary pursuits. In advanced industrial societies governed in fact,
if not in theoria, by a hierarchical, authoritarian, narrowly-purposive, technically efficient
machinery of profitability, better known in neoliberalism as the bottom line,4 justifying
educatio (education) in the humanities can be, as were obliged to say, a hard sell. Yet it is
precisely this problemhow to present Greek theoretical learning, the pursuit of knowl-
edge and wisdom as valuable dimensions of public and private life, to a power-oriented
audiencethat Cicero typically feels obligated to address at the outset of theoretical works.
For to convince educated Romans, of all people, that scholarly pursuits are important, that

CONTACT Daniel White dwhite@fau.edu

2015 International Society for the Study of European Ideas
72 Daniel White

impractical learning is worth pursuing, required careful prefacing. It is this kind of intro-
duction, offered by the great Roman orator and statesman, which is the subject of Yelena
Barazs revelatory study.
An interesting subtext, intended or not, of A Written Republic is very close to that of
Martha Nussbaums statement quoted above. Ciceros wish to discover istam ipsam rem
publicam quam laudas qua disciplina quibus moribus aut legibus constituere vel conservare
possimus, by what discipline, what customs and laws, we might be able either to constitute or
preserve that very republic which you, [Tubero says to Scipio], praise (De Re Publica.264),5
remains unrealized and the Republic (take your pick) seems as divided now as it was then.
For we who inhabit the advanced capitalist order of thingsthe transnational reign of
les mots et les choses, words and reified and commoditized things to which they are in
popular metaphysics thought to correspond, as Michel Foucault put it6are increasingly in
need of justifying to our bosses what, mutatis mutandis, we moderns and post-moderns
can learn from the ancients even if the profit we gain from them is not obviously quanti-
fiable. Ciceros Republic under Caesar was on the verge of Imperium, while ours may be
rolling toward the global arrangement that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call Empire.7
So Ciceros thoughts on the relevance of philosophy to the polis seem timelier than ever,
even if he himself, as Baraz argues, would in the end forgo the love of wisdom as a principal
concern in favor, fatefully, of power politics. Hence Plinys comment above follows Ciceros
in due course: he must justify his use of time to the Imperial family.8
To reveal the educational perspective that Cicero sought to present and defend dur-
ing Caesars rule, Baraz focuses on Ciceros use of the philosophical preface, the general
remarks that begin the work but stand outside it in order frame or condition the audience
reaction to his text so as to shape the reception of the the corpus of philosophical works
that Cicero produced under Caesar as a whole, a coherent project (7). Thus the prefaces
are to be read, in Barazs analysis, as paratextual9 commentaries on Ciceros philosophical
project. She provides two initial chapters, one on prefaces that formed the literary context
for Ciceros writing, particularly in the work of Sallust, and the other on Ciceros letters, to
gauge the intellectual resistance to philosophy on the part of the Roman elite, with which
he had to contend, as well as his personal musings on the role of philosophy in shaping
human character and action.
Of particular importance here is the place of philosophia amidst otium (leisure), negotium
(the business of res publica), and officium (public duty): how to defend the expenditure of
time on philosophy of a citizen whose primary obligations are perceived, by most readers,
as lying in the realm of a vita occupata, a life occupied with public and military affairs. Based
on Ciceros letters, Baraz brings out key aspects of his personal life as he saw it in terms of
the Roman tradition, his understanding of his relationship to the younger generation he
hoped to influence, and his view of the value of philosophy as a medicament or aid to
the health (salus) of the Republic as well as to the improvement of ones psychological
well-being. So Cicero writes about the wayward nephew, as Baraz aptly calls him, Quintus,
whom Cicero had in common with Atticus. In a missive which the nephew was supposed
to deliver and hence into whose contents he might be expected to snoop after a stay at
Ciceros home, Cicero comments in a partly disingenuous (in regard to Quintus himself),
but partly quite serious (in regard to Ciceros hopes of influencing the younger generation)
accolade: For he is so entirely transformed both by certain writings of mine and by
my uninterrupted discourse and teachings that he will have such disposition towards the
 The European Legacy 73

republic as we desire him to have (65).10 Baraz carefully analyzes Ciceros Latin diction
and phrasing to reveal his intellectual and pedagogical priorities. As she points out, The
arrangement of the three elements [Cicero says have influenced Quintus] in a descending
tricolon puts the most weight on the first element. Thus the oratio [discourse/conversation]
and the praecepta [teachings] in question must be related to, and follow from, the content
of whatever works(s) Cicero gave Quintus to read [his scriptaescriptis meis/ my writings
as he puts it in the text] (66).
A second example from Barazs insightful analysis of Ciceros correspondence reveals his
view of philosophys personal and political therapeutic potential. Cicero repeatedly points to
his study of philosophy as a remedy for the enforced idleness or leisure (otium) imposed
on him by exile or other political exigencies under the dictatorship of Caesar and during
the Civil War. Here, as mentioned above, he repeatedly considers the role of philosophy in
the life of a statesman, and whether it may be honorably pursued in its own right outside
of ones duties to the republic. Thus he asks his correspondent Varro, For who would not
grant us the following, that, at a time when the state either cannot or is not willing to make
use of our services, we return to that life [the pursuit of philosophy in private] which many
learned men, perhaps not correctly, but many of them, nonetheless, thought was to be
preferred to public life? (76).11 Baraz comments perceptively, as the opening quotation
by Cicero from De re publica attests, that Cicero is flatly unwilling to choose philosophical
pursuits over those of public service. Rather, his repeatedly expressed desire is to bring
the two spheres, politics and philosophy, together in a harmonious whole (77). Even when
in private mourning for his deceased daughter Tullia, moreover, Cicero finds the remedies
for personal suffering parallel to those of public morbum (dis-ease). In response to a letter
from Lucceius censuring him for dwelling too long away from public affairs, immersed in
his grief over Tullia, Cicero decides, as Baraz comments, to foreground writing as a new
kind of remedy, one appropriate to the new political circumstances in which they find
themselves. Cicero says,
The remedies that ought to have been there for such a great wound do not exist. For what shall
I do?. our age has fallen into such a state that, at a time when we ought to be flourishing,
it is shameful even to be alive; for what could be a refuge for me, stripped of all the sources of
pride both private and public? (92)12
Ciceros refuge, and as he says, medicina (medicine or relief ) in his wretchedness, is
literature, but it is only a temporary respite from maladies private and public. For he
thinks, as he says,
of this, so great, an evil [the general danger to the republic], although the learned men say
many things, I nonetheless fear that no true consolation can be found except that, which is
only so great as strength and vigor of each mans spirit: for if thinking well and acting properly
is sufficient for a good and happy life, I fear that it is not right to call that man wretched who
can sustain himself by the consciousness that his intentions were of the best kind. (90)13
Thus Ciceros consolation of philosophy14 is, in part, to connect his private and public
lives with one remedy: For what should I say about the Consolatio? Which certainly heals
me to some extent, and in a similar way I think it will be of much benefit to the rest (94).15
As in writing his Republic, modeled on Platos, Cicero finds solace both for his psyche and
for his role as a public intellectual by the pursuit of an enduring and fully realized republic:
Only let this be fixed: to live together in our pursuits, from which before we sought only pleas-
ure, but now also safety. if no one should make use of our labor, nonetheless both to read
74 Daniel White

and write Republics [Politeias] and, if less so in the senate house and forum then in letters
and books, as the most learned of the ancients did, to devote ourselves to the republic and to
explore questions about customs and laws. (84)16
The core chapters of the book focus on Ciceros answer to this question as evidenced in his
prefaces written during Caesars lifetime, leading to a concluding chapter on what Baraz
argues is a change of philosophical direction after his death.
The philosophical project Baraz traces, based on its prefatory rhetorical framework, is
scaled to Ciceros textual and political landscape. Thus she disagrees with Hegel, who in the
opening sentence of his preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit distinguishes the work of the
preface from that of an introduction: An explanation, as it is customarily set out before-
hand in a preface of a text, about the purpose which the author sets for himself, about his
motives and the relations which he believes his work stands to earlier or contemporaneous
treatments of the same subjects, seems in a philosophical work to be not only superficial,
but by the nature of the case also inept and inappropriate.17 Yet it is on exactly those aspects
of paratextuality frowned upon by Hegel that Baraz, following Derrida,18 focuses. It is from,
as it were, the paralanguage of Ciceros philosophy that she reads his works, giving us a view
of his studied philosophical stance at the rostrum of history.
Chapter 3, The Gift of Philosophy, serves as a good example of the way in which Baraz
reads Ciceros paratextual framing of Greek philosophia for a Roman audience. Cicero saw
his philosophical project as a contribution to the Roman republic, providing metaphorically,
as we have seen earlier, a medicine to improve the health of the state which was, under
the reign of Julius Caesar in Ciceros view, in dire condition. But that very authoritarian
regime made it necessary in turn to diminish the claims made on philosophys behalf so
as to make some role available for Greek wisdom in the late-republican and increasingly
autocratic Roman order. Ciceros strategy was to write domesticating translations of Greek
philosophical textsa practice that aims at fluency and the seamless transfer of a source
language text, along with its cultural values, into the target languageso as to effect the
synthesis, adaptation, and rewriting of a multiplicity of Greek philosophical texts and ideas.
His ideal was avowedly classist, conservative, and elitist. What he envisions, as Baraz puts
it, is an incorporation of Greek philosophy, as reconceived by him, into the cultural arsenal
of the Roman elite (97). Nevertheless, his project was creative in its conjunction of Greek
and Roman cultures into a distinctive intellectual architecture.
Key elements of Ciceros construction are illustrated in the following excerpt from the
preface to De Natura Deorum, in which he considers the place of philosophy in the state
now subjected to Caesars rule:
For at the time when I was weary from lack of activity and the state of the republic was such
that it was necessary for it to be ruled through the planning and caring of one man, I thought,
in the first place, for the sake of the republic itself philosophy had to be set forth before our
men, since I think that it is of great importance for the glory and good reputation of the state
to have such weighty and noble matters expressed in Latin. (N.D. 1.78)
Note Ciceros opening with the theme discussed earlier, at a time when I was weary from
inactivity (cum otio langueremus), philosophy became his primary activity during enforced
otium or leisure. The question at hand is how philosophical practice in the form of transla-
tion and interpretation of Greek texts and ideas into Latin could serve the republic. Ciceros
answer is that it is valuable for the glory and good reputation of the state (ad decus
et ad laudem civitatis) to have such weighty and noble matters expressed in Latin (res tam
 The European Legacy 75

gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri). First, as Baraz points out, Ciceros
diction in the passage deftly avoids challenging Caesars rule directly by the phrase it
was necessary (necesse esset) for the state to be ruled by one man. Second, Ciceros use of
decus and laus (glory and good reputation) to describe the cures, or at least palliatives,
philosophy might bring to the failing republic suggest indirectly, without quite saying so,
that the current dictatorship is in fact inglorious and brings ill repute on the Roman state.
In effect, therefore, Cicero is saying that Caesars rule is dishonorable and disreputable and
that philosophy can contribute to the revival of the relevant good qualities in the republic.
Likewise, the semantic convergence of gravitas (weighty) and praeclaras (noble) in the
discussion of res (matters of state) resonates with decus and laus to signify the critical
qualities that the Roman state in its current condition lacks, that is, the philosophical
content of Ciceros treatise. Thus Cicero assimilates Greek learning into Roman concepts
in service of the republic, enabling the state to derive practical benefit from a theoretical
discipline (101). As Baraz goes on to show, Ciceros astute rhetorical sense also allowed
him to shape the contours of his translations to fit the interests and prejudices of particular
Roman constituencies. He thus could appeal to different domestic audiences by appealing
to different Roman values to associate with philosophical education.
Countering Philippa Smiths argument that Cicero combined rhetoric and philosophy in
his writings so as to utilize non-rational strategies of argumentation that undermine reason
and hence philosophy itself,19 Baraz contends in Chapter 4 that Cicero rather establish[es] a
connection between his subject matter, philosophy, and traditional public life in his oratory
(129). This connection, in turn, serves as a legitimizing analogue for the role of the disci-
pline in public life. Thus in keeping with her emphasis on the paratextual and what I have
called the paralanguage of Ciceros texts, she discovers a key role for the non-rational
in shaping the civic role of the philosophical. Baraz examines passages from his prefaces,
again, in which Cicero answers his criticswho seem clearly to view his preoccupation
with philosophy as a dereliction of duty to the stateby explicitly connecting it with what
is clearly a statesmans work: oratory.
In Natura Deorum, for example, Cicero answers his critics by arguing that his involvement
in philosophy has not arisen suddenly (subito), as they seem to think, but is a longstanding
preoccupation that has imbricated itself into his public duties, particularly his oratory, all
along, even in otio or leisure: I was most involved in practicing philosophy at times when
I appeared to be doing the least; which point also my speeches demonstrate given that they
are filled with opinions of philosophers (I.6; 137). Moreover, he argues, And if all teachings
of philosophy are relevant to life, I think that I have exhibited, in both private and public
affairs, those things that my understanding and learning have prescribed (N.D. 7; 139).
His political accomplishments, he goes on to say, have been flowing (manebant) from his
oratory (Tusc. 1.6): For I have often judged that kind of philosophy most accomplished,
he elaborates, which was able to speak about the most significant issues with fullness and
elegance (Tusc. 1.7; 141). He argues, furthermore, in De Officiis, connecting philosophy
and rhetoric in Greek letters so as to suggest that his own Roman example of bringing the
two together might serve as a retroactive ideal: Indeed, I think that both Plato, had he
been willing to practice the public type of speaking, would have been able to speak most
weightily and eloquently, and Demosthenes, if he had mastered those matters, which he
had learned from Plato, and had been willing to present them publicly, would have been
able to do so brilliantly (I.34; 143). Thus Cicero accomplishes a rhetorical inversion of
76 Daniel White

the usual claim that the sophisticated Greeks taught the Romans philosophy, as now the
Roman orator is imaginatively teaching the Greeks to connect theory and practice. Hence,
as Baraz concludes the present chapter, Cicero was able to move philosophy from the private
space of otium to the public forum of negotium by skillful analogies drawn from oratory.
After a perceptive study of style and rhetorical strategies, designed to be a guide in read-
ing a Ciceronian Preface, in Chapter 5 Baraz goes on to conclude with a look at Ciceros
projects amidst the political fallout after Caesars assassination. Key works she considers
here include De Senectute (On Old Age), De Amicitia (On Friendship), and De Officiis (On
Duties). There is, she argues, a shift away from the dialogical voice of philosophical exchange
toward the univocal one of authority; even though the first two books are still in dialogue
form, both invoke the voice of a singular traditional authority (Cato the Elder in the first, and
Laelius in the second) and offer a central didactic message. Of particular interest in light of
the theme threading through Ciceros careerthe tension between private otium and public
negotiumis the conjunction of the two in Ciceros idea of friendship in De Amicitia. Thus,
while Cicero dedicates the treatise to his longtime friend Atticus, Baraz argues, he balances
the private with the public interest in the dialogue, addressing his friend: digna mihi res cum
omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est, this subject, in my opinion, is as worthy
of being made known to all as it is of our closeness (Amic. 4; 204). Finally, Baraz concludes,
the tendency to combine public and private in a new meditation on appropriate action(s)
(her preferred translation of the title de officiis and its Greek correlate peri tou kathkontos
by Panaetius) culminates in this dialogue. Here the didactic relationship between father
and son becomes a model for that between authorial persona and society: Ciceros choice
of dedicatees is rarely motivated by personal reasons alone, and accordingly in his fatherly
interest in teaching his son, the public face of the work brings the treatise into the tradition
of fathers dedications to their sons that goes back to Cato the Elder (213). Furthermore,
since Ciceros son Marcus is studying philosophy in Athens, the text also becomes a model
for the presentation of Greek texts to a Latin readership:
Marcus, my son, since I myself have always joined things Greek and Latin to my great benefit,
and do so not only in the sphere of philosophy, but also in the practice of speaking, I advise
you to do the same, so that you attain equal ability in both languages. And indeed to that very
end we appear to have provided a great deal of assistance to our countrymen. (Off. 1.1; 21314)
In this way Cicero brings together the personal and the political, setting a model of indus-
tria (industry) (Off. 3.1; 222), combining not only public and private but also utilitas and
honestas (expediency and integrity):
For there is no part of life, in matters public or private, in the marketplace or at home, that
can be without appropriate action and in cultivating it all integrity in life is found; in neglecting
it, all baseness. (Off. 1.4; 216).
However, Barazs assessment of Ciceros endeavor ends on a sobering note for our collective
history then and now, seeing that He did not succeed in recreating and stabilizing Roman
values, and the republic that was the object of his efforts died (222).
Turning the distant mirror from Ciceros life and letters back to the present, I should note
that Martha Nussbaum criticizes Ciceros restriction of duties of material aid to ones family
or friends or countrymen, based on his rhetorical appeals to the norms of Roman life, as
opposed to claims of duties of justice, which are in his view fully cosmopolitan, extending
to all of humanity. Ciceros universalism is limited, in Nussbaums view, to the rational
aspects of human life respected by a Stoicism that minimizes the role of material goods in
 The European Legacy 77

the achievement of happiness. His nationalism and provincialism, to further complicate

matters, are based on local Roman values that prioritize friendship, family, and country over
wider moral obligations. Nussbaum recognizes the influence of Cicero on the cosmopolitan
ethics of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, as on the history of European foreign policy,
yet also points to the absence of his influence and with it the policy tradition for purposes
of justifying material aid in international development.20 Are our emotional parochial ties
to home and homeland more fundamental than our universal obligations to humanity and
other living beings? Is there a place for philosophys universal reason in our deliberations
about key decisions in our personal and collective lives? And if so, what place should phi-
losophy hold in a curriculum where students may well have interests that are principally
egoistical, familial, provincial, and nationalistic? Cicero seems to have been of two minds
on these questions, pulled toward the local by his Romanitas and to the universal by his
Humanitas. In deciding on these questions for ourselves, in any case, we might do no better
than begin our enquiry with A Written Republic.

Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Latin are by Yelena Baraz.
1.My translation. atque ille quidem princeps ingeni et doctrinae Plato tum denique fore
beatas res publicas putavit, si aut docti et sapientes homines eas regere coepissent aut ii qui
regerent omne suum studium in doctrina et sapientia conlocassent hanc coniunctionem
videlicet potestatis et sapientiae saluti censuit civitatibus esse posse. Cicero,Epistulae ad
Fratrem Quintum 1.1.2930. Abbreviations used below for most Latin texts are, following
Barazs practice, from the Oxford Latin Dictionary; references to the Ciceros Letters are in
keeping with D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, Marcus Tullius: Letters to Atticus (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 196570). See Peter Whites translation of commentary on the
quoted passage in Cicero in Letters: Epistolary Relations in the Late Republic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 106.
2.My translation. nec dubitamus multa esse quae et nos praeterierint. homines enim sumus
et occupati officiis subsicivisque temporibus ista curamus, id est nocturnis, ne quis vestrum
putet his cessatum horis. dies vobis inpendimus, cum somno valetudinem computamus,
vel hoc solo praemio contenti, quod, dum ista, ut ait M.Varro, musinamur, pluribus horis
vivimus. profecto enim vita vigilia est. Pliny (the Elder), Naturalis Historia, Praefatio 4.
Composed from AD 77 and left incomplete at the authors death during the eruption of
Vesuvius in AD 79. Latin text with English translation available at the Perseus Project at:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu; for the Latin with French translation, see Itinera Electronica:
Du texte l'hypertexte: at: http://agoraclass.fltr.ucl.ac.be/concordances/pline_hist_nat_praef/
ligne05.cfm?numligne=1&mot=O.
3.Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.
4.Neoliberalism is a slippery term whose meanings are carefully explored by Taylor C. Boas
and Jordan Gans-Morse in Neoliberalism: From Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan,
open access online: Springer-Link.com. Their first alternative meaning is most relevant
here: A first potential application of the term neoliberalism is as a reference to the unique
characteristics that distinguish modern capitalism from previous models of development. One
of the most striking features of the contemporary era has been the waning or disappearance
of alternatives to the free market. They go on to argue that, second, the term refers to the
perception that economic reforms in the developing world during the past three decades
represent an even more fundamentalist application of liberal recipes than in classic bastions of
laissez-faire such as the United States and the United Kingdom (20). The issue for Nussbaum
is that liberal education has become subjected to the logic of neoliberal economics, in which
all ideas and values are reducible to exchange value, i.e., to money.
78 Daniel White

5.This is the interlocutor Stoic Philosopher Q. Aelius Tuberos objection to Scipio Africanuss
failed attempt to define the discipline Cicero is looking for in the dialogue.
6.Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses: une archologie des sciences humaines [The Order of
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences] (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).
7.Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
8.Pliny was procurator under Vespasian for Transalpine Gaul, Africa, Spain, and Belgica.
Beforehand he served in the military, particularly in Germany, where he became friends
with Titus.
9.Based on Grard Genettes Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane E. Lewin
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10.Cicero: sic enim commutatus est totus et scriptis meis quibusdam quae in manibus habebam
et adsiduitate orationis et praeceptis ut tali animo in rem publican quali nos volumus futurus
sit (Att. 16.5.2; SB 410).
11.Cicero, Fam. 9.6.5; SB 181.
12.Cicero, Fam. 5.15.14; SB 252.
13.Cicero, Fam. 6.1.3; SB 242.
14.Ciceros Consolatio has been lost for the most part to history, like Hortensius, and so its contents
must be inferred or pieced together from other sources.
15.Cicero, Div. 2.3.
16.Cicero, Fam. 9.2.5; SB 177.
17.My translation. Eine Erklrung, wie sie einer Schrift in einer Vorrede nach der Gewohnheit
vorausgeschickt wirdber den Zweck, den der Verfasser sich in ihr vorgesetzt, sowie
ber die Veranlassungen und das Verhltnis, worin er sie zu andern frhern oder
gleichzeitigen Behandlungen desselben Gegenstandes zu stehen glaubtscheint bei einer
philosophischen Schrift nicht nur berflssig, sondern um der Natur der Sache willen sogar
unpassend und zweckwidrig zu sein. (G. W. F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, 1807, at:
http://www.zeno.org).
18.Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1981).
19.Philippa Smith, A Self-Indulgent Misuse of Leisure and Writing? How Not to Write
Philosophy, in Cicero the Philosopher, ed. J. G. F. Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), 30123.
20.See Martha Nussbaum, Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Ciceros Problematic Legacy,
The Journal of Political Philosophy 8.2 (2000): 176206; and Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), for her
fully developed cosmopolitan theory of justice.