Ursabia, Angelo Francis G.

Land, Titles and Deeds

Bar Questions and Answers

1. Angel filed a petition for registration of a parcel of land on June 22, 1994 claiming that he has been in actual,
open, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner over the same. It appears that he
likewise filed a foreshore lease application over the same land in 1977. During the trial, the court ordered the
LRA and the CENRO to file with it a report on the status of the subject land. The court thereafter rendered a
decision on May 3 1995 granting the petition. The said decision became final and executory. The Office of the
Solicitor general subsequently filed a petition for annulment of the above judgment on the ground that based on
the report of the LRA which was received by it on June 22, 1995, the land applied for is foreshore land.

a) What is the nature and classification of foreshore land?

b) Will the action of the Republic through the OSG prosper?

ANSWERS:

a) NO. Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet
and dry to the flow of the tide. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternatively covered and left
dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by
lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is
not capable of private appropriation.

b) YES. Even if the decision of the RTC has become final and executory, the action for annulment of judgment should
be sustained since it is impressed with public interest. The State has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by,
or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, mush more, non-suited as a result thereof.
Furthermore, Angel had in fact filed a foreshore lease application in 1977 and paid the corresponding fees thereon.
There is therefore doubt to Angels claim that he had been in actual, open, notorious, and continuous possession in
the concept of an owner.

(Republic vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 126316, June 25, 2004)

2. On December 27, 1976, Francisco filed a petition for registration of the three parcels of land. He alleged therein
that there were hardly any big trees in the subject property and that he and his predecessors-ininterest even
planted bananas, cassava, coconut trees and camotes on the same. He further alleged that he had been in
actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. The application was
opposed by the Director of Lands on the ground that the subject property was forest land and was only
reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973.

a) Should the petition for registration be granted?

 b) Is the absence of big trees conclusive as regards to the classification of a parcel of land as not belonging to
forest land?

ANSWERS:

a) NO. Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No.141, the classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. The rule on the
confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Francisco failed to adduce in evidence any certification from the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Forestry to the
effect that the property is alienable or disposable. Furthermore, since the property was reclassified as alienable and
disposable only on April 16, 1973 and Francisco filed his application only on December 27, 1976, he irrefragably
failed to prove his possession of the property for the requisite thirty (30)-year period.

b) NO. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by Kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest Lands do not have to be in
the mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. (Zarate vs Director of Lands,
GR No. 131501, July 14, 2004)

3. The spouses Zulueta obtained from GSIS various loans secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land.
The spouses Zulueta failed to pay their loans which prompted GSIS to foreclose the real estate mortgages. During
the auction sale, some of the mortgaged properties were awarded to GSIS. However, some lots which were
covered by the mortgaged titles were expressly excluded from the auction since those that were sold were
sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. This notwithstanding,

GSIS included the excluded lots when it executed on November 25, 1975 an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership on the basis of which, certificates of title over the same were issued in the name of GSIS. Zulueta
thereafter transferred his rights over the excluded lots to Eduardo in 1989 who consequently demanded from
GSIS the return of the said excluded lots. Eduardo then filed on May 7, 1990 a complaint for reconveyance of real
estate against the GSIS.

a) Can GSIS legally claim ownership over the excluded properties on the basis of the certificates of title over the
same which were issued in its name?

b) Has the action for reconveyance prescribed?

 ANSWERS:

a) NO. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the GSIS, still it could not legally claim
ownership and absolute dominion over them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not
attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by GSIS in the form of concealment
of the existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their exclusion from the
foreclosure sale made GSIS holders in bad faith. It is well settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title
is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.

b) NO. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides: If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The
general rule that the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property
because it is considered a constructive notice to all persons does not apply in this case. The case in point is
Samonte vs Court of Appeals where the Supreme Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of the
action based on implied trust from the actual discovery of the fraud. Santiago came know of GSIS fraudulent
acts only in 1989 and the complaint was filed in 1990. Following the Courts pronouncement in Samonte, the
institution of the action for reconveyance was thus well within the prescriptive period. (GSIS vs Santiago, GR No.
155206, October 28, 2003)

4. In August 1950, the Republic of the Philippines filed an application with the cadastral court claiming ownership
over certain properties which covered Lot 4329. Guillermo filed an answer claiming therein a right over Lot 4329.
Guillermo died during the pendency of the case. Gregorio, who claimed to be the only son of Guillermo,
substituted the latter, and to him, Lot 4329 was adjudicated by the court. The decision became final and
executory. On July 8, 1985, OCT No. 0-6,151 was issued in the name of Gregorio. Sometime thereafter, the
brothers and sisters of

Guillermo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Gregorio, alleging that Guillermo
died single and without issue and that Gregorio obtained title to the property through fraud deceit and gross
misrepresentation. They prayed that Gregorios title be cancelled and the property be reconveyed to them. After
the trial, the court declared that Gregorio has not sufficiently proved that he is the son of Guillermo but ruled
that he has the right of possession of the disputed property.

A) Is Gregorio entitled to the possession of the disputed property?

ANSWER:

A) YES. Gregorio was able to obtain a title in his name over the questioned property after the cadastral proceedings
instituted by the Republic. This Torrens title is now a conclusive evidence of his ownership of the subject land.
After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration, the said certificate of
title became incontrovertible. In fine, whether or not his title was obtained fraudulently is beyond the
competence of the Supreme Court to determine. The issue should have been raised during the proceeding
before the cadastral court. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, the issue on the validity of title, i.e.
 whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
The prayer for the cancellation of Gregorios title and the reconveyance of the same to brothers and sisters of
Guillermo is legally impossible. To sustain the said action would be inconsistent with the rule that the act of
registration is the operative act that conveys a parcel of land to its registered owner under the Torrens system.
What we are emphasizing is that, although Gregorio has not sufficiently proved his filiation to the late Guillermo,
the fact that he has a legal title over the subject land entitles him to possession thereof, pending the final
determination of the validity of the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding.

5. WHAT EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO PROVE OWNERSHIP?

Documentary evidence must not only prove the identity of the land but also genuineness of title (Republic
Cement Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA).

a. Tax declaration and real tax payments not conducive proof of ownership but indicia of possession (Ordoez vs. Court
of Appeals, 188 SCRA; Director of Lands vs. IAC, 195 SCRA).

b. Presidential issuance and legislative acts (RP represented by Mindanao Medical Center vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA;
International Hardwood & Veneer Corp. vs. University of the Philippines, 200 SCRA).

c. Spanish title already inapplicable and may not be used as evidence (Intestate Estate of Don Mariano de San Pedro,
265 SCRA where P.D. 892 was applied).

2. Testimonial evidence showing among others possession and occupation of the land in the manner and period
prescribed by law.

PROOFS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PRIVATE RIGHTS OR OWNERSHIP 1. Compromise agreement among the parties
where they agreed that they have rights and interest over the land and allocated portions to each of them.

2. Survey plan approved by Director of Lands (RP vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA).