STAT CON: CHAPTER 3 BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (1995)

FACTS: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case praying for damages against her
employer Ester Garcia, after a heated confrontation in the latters office wherein
Ramirez was allegedly humiliated, such act being contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. To corroborate her accusation, Ramirez submitted a
transcript of the confrontation, which was derived from Ramirezs recording of
said incident. Garcia, in turn, filed a criminal case against Ramirez for the
violation of RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law for recording their encounter
without her consent. Ramirez argued that since she was one of the parties, she
was allowed to record the communication. She added that private
conversations is different from communication as defined by law and is not
encompassed by the laws definition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramirez could be penalized under the Anti-Wiretapping

Law.

HELD: YES. The law clearly states that any recording of any communication
without the consent of all the parties is prohibited, regardless whether the person
who recorded the communication is one of the parties or not. Furthermore, the
term communication in the law is broad enough to include verbal and non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts.

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC and Salazar (1992)

FACTS: Private respondent Imelda Salazar charged GMCR with illegal dismissal
after she was relieved from her work as a systems analyst, after failing to submit
an affidavit that explained her conduct in relation to her friend Delfin Saldivars
alleged thievery and connivance against the company. Saldivar was found to
have been engaging in transactions with one of the companys clients and using
their air-conditioning units for his personal use. Salazar was witness to the said
transactions and was knowledgeable of the stolen air-conditioning units, but did
not report to her employer. She was subjected to a one-month preventive
suspension, giving her three days to file an answer to the allegations, but instead
she filed an illegal suspension case before the Labor Arbiter. She modified her
complaint into an illegal dismissal when she was laid off from work because of
failing to submit her affidavit. The Labor Arbiter, and subsequently the NLRC,
ruled in favor of Salazar, ordering her reinstatement and payment of backwages
accrued since the time of her dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar is entitled to reinstatement and payment of

backwages pursuant to Art. 279 of the Labor Code.

HELD: YES. The Labor Code is clear that an employee unjustly dismissed is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
to his full backwages. While acts of disloyalty from employees are not
condonable, neither should they be dismissed based solely on suspicion. GMCR
has not given sufficient data to support her dismissal, but merely relied on
suppositions of her knowledge of Saldivars questionable activities because of
her close relation to him.

Basbacio vs. DOJ (1994)

FACTS: Felicito Basbacioconvicted of murder and of two counts of frustrated

murder along with his son-in-law Wilfredo Balderrama for killing Federico Baylon
and wounding two others over a land disputesought for compensation under
Section 3(a) of RA 7309, which provides compensation for those unjustly
convicted and imprisoned but on appeal were released. Basbacio was released
because prosecution failed to provide evidence of conspiracy, because his mere
presence at the crime scene is insufficient to prove said accusation. The
complaint was filed before the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, and
subsequently before the Secretary of Justice himself, both of which denied the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Basbacio is entitled to compensation under RA 7309.

HELD: NO. Just because Basbacio was acquitted, it does not necessarily mean
that it is because he is innocent. He was released merely because prosecution
failed to provide the right quantum of proof needed to declare him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The law is clear that only those unjustly convicted and
eventually released are entitled to compensation. There is emphasis on the word
unjustly, because if it were not so, then anyone acquitted would have been
presumed innocent. Moreover, there was no evidence that the trial court acted
with malice, negligence, or ignorance when it initially pronounced Basbacio guilty
and eventually released him for lack of evidence. His conviction was simply a
result of an erroneous decision and not an act of injustice or bias on the part of
the judge.
 JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC and De Los Santos (1993)

FACTS: JMM questioned the validity of the NLRCs decision to dismiss their
appeal in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on the
ground of their failure to post the required appeal bond. Said requirement is
stipulated in Article 223 of the Labor Code and Rule IV Section 6 of the new
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. According to petitioner, NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in applying these rules to POEA. They contended that the
appeal bond is not necessary because Section 4, Rule II of the POEA Rules
already requires the payment of a license fee, cash bond, and surety bond. They
have also paced in escrow an amount of P200, 000 in compliance with Section
17, Rule II, of the same Rule. The Solicitor General agrees with the appeal bond
requirement but said the rules cited by NLRC are applicable only to decisions of
the Labor Arbiter and not POEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should pay an additional appeal bond pursuant
to Rule IV Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the POEA.

HELD: YES. Petitioners argument would render Section 6 as a superfluity and

should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The appeal bond intends to further insure the payment of the monetary
award in favor of the employees if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the
NLRC, while the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the
payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer. It is plainly showed
that, aside from payment of surety bonds and escrow money, an appeal bond is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. IAC (1991)

FACTS: On March 1980, petitioners gained a levy on attachment on the

properties of private respondents Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan. Four months
later, July 1980, three creditors filed a petition for involuntary insolvency against
the private respondents. The creditors filed a motion to issue insolvency order,
prohibiting the Sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real
properties of the debtors, only to find out that some of the properties were
already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba. Judgment was rendered declaring the
insolvency of respondents-debtors. On December 1980, respondents were
ordered to pay petitioners and their properties were sold to petitioners as well.
The Sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final deed of sale in favor of
petitioner. On May 1984, the creditors averred that subject motion is improper
and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings.
IAC denied the petition. Petitioners Radiola-Toshiba, meanwhile, contend that its
lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not
dissolved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is

dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses
commenced four months after said attachment.

HELD: NO. There is a cut-off period. Section 32 of the Insolvency Law states
that insolvency proceedings shall dissolve any attachment levied within one
month of its commencement, and shall vacate and set aside any judgment
entered in any action 30 days before the start of said proceedings. Section 79,
relied upon by private respondents, states that the plaintiff may prove the legal
costs and disbursements of the suit if it were proved to be against the estate of
the debtor. There is no conflict between the two provisions. Because Radiola-
Toshiba had full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, the deed of
sale issued in their favor was done in bad faith and not equitable for the creditors
of the insolvent debtors.

De Guia vs. COMELEC (1992)

FACTS: De Guia assailed the validity of COMELECs enforcement of Resolution

no. 2313 which apportions, by district, the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Bayan in Metro Manila. He
claims that paragraph (c) of the present law RA 7166 (An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefore, and for Other Purposes) does not specify
when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district,
whereas paragraph (d) states that those municipalities outside Metro Manila
would still be elected at large on the May 1992 elections, and shall be elected by
district come 1995. Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification to the COMELEC
regarding the matter, to which the response was that the apportionment should
take effect on May 1992. De Guia then filed a complaint that members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan should be elected at large in
the May 1992 elections, in accordance with RA 7166.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of electing members of sanggunian at large

applies on the May 1992 elections pursuant to RA 7166.
HELD: NO. The law is clear, according to paragraph (d) of RA 7166, that election
at large on May 1992 only applies to municipalities outside Metro Manila. Section
3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is
to reduce the number of positions to be voted for the May 11, 1992 elections.
Municipalities outside Metro Manila will be elected by district in 1995, for the full
implementation of the law.

Salenillas vs. CA (1989)

FACTS: Petitioners Elena and Bernardino Salenillasdaughter and son-in-law of

Florencia and Miguel Enciso respectively, and legal heirs to a land the Encisos
ownedassailed the decision of the trial and appellate courts dismissing their
right to repurchase their land that was put into public auction after failing to pay
for their mortgage at the Philippine National Bank Inc. in Daet. Private
respondent William Guerra was the highest bidder at the said auction. However,
as the trial court granted writ of possession to respondent Guerra, petitioners
Salenillas refused to vacate the land and instead offered to repurchase it under
Section 119 under the Public Land Act. This was dismissed by the CA because
their right to repurchase within five years has already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested
property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act

HELD: YES. Three classes of persons (applicant-patentee, a widow, or a legal

heir) have the right to repurchase, and the Salenillas, as the daughter and son-in-
law of the patentees Encisos, are considered legal heirs. The law does not make
distinctions when talking of legal heirs. Furthermore, it is presumed that the
legislative intent of the law is for the homesteader to have every chance to
preserve for himself the land he has acquired. Allowing the Salenillas to
repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. The
bank argued that because of the previous sale between Encisos and Salenillas,
the latter could not be considered as legal heirs.

B/Gen. Jose Commendador, et al. vs. Gen. Renato De Villa, et al. (1991)

FACTS: The petitioners, who are members of the AFP, were facing charges for
their alleged participation in a failed coup detat on Dec. 1-9, 1989, violating
Articles of War (AW) 67 Mutiny, 96 Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman, and 94 various crimes in relation to Article 248 of the RPC. The
four consolidated cases are as follows: GR 93177 questioning the conduct of
the pre-trial investigation (PTI) panel constituted to investigate the charges and
the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them; GR 96948
certiorari against the GCM ruling denying petitioners right to peremptory
challenge granted by Article 18 of Com. Act no. 408; GR 95020 assailing the
RTC for lack of jurisdiction over GCM 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents; GR 97454 certiorari against the RTC
decision in a petition for habeas corpus that directed the release of private
respondents. In GR 96948, petitioners manifested that they were exercising their
right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
no. 14. They were subpoenaed, but upon the schedule of their hearing instead of
submitting counter-affidavits, petitioners challenged the proceedings so they
were asked to fill their objections in writing. The PTI panel denied the motion, and
petitioners verbally moved for its reconsideration. GCM no. 14 ruled that
peremptory challenges were discontinued under PD no. 39.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may exercise their right to peremptory

challenges according to Article 18 of Com. Act. No. 408.

HELD: YES. President Marcos issued GO no. 8 on September 1972 to create

military tribunals, and subsequently PD no. 39 to prohibit peremptory challenges
on November 1972. When he issued Proclamation no. 2045 terminating martial
law, it also revoked GO no. 8, therefore automatically ceasing the existence of
PD no. 39. The old rule Article 18 of Com. Act no. 408 was thus revived and
should allow peremptory challenges.

Chua vs. CSC (1992)

FACTS: Petitioner Lydia Chua claims that she is entitled to benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization under RA no. 6683. Section 2 of the
act states that those qualified are appointive officials and employees of the
national government, government-owned and controlled corporations, and
personnel of all LGUs. However, the National Irrigation administration and the
CSC denied her request because her work in the government is co-terminous, or
they are considered employees for the duration of a special project, which is also
non-career and contractual in nature. The act only covers those on a casual,
emergency, temporary, or regular employment status and not contractuals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lydia Chua is entitled to benefits under RA no. 6683.
HELD: YES. The Court does not see reason why casual and temporary
employees, who are deemed non-career employees, are allowed retirement
benefits while co-terminous employees are not. The legislature must have made
a specific enumeration to restrict the laws meaning and confine its terms and
benefits to those expressly mentioned. Moreover, the law violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution if it denies a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. Under the doctrine of
necessary implications, no statute can provide all the details involved in its
application, so the gaps in legislation develop as the law is enforced.