UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO.

81567; 3 OCT 1991]

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about
a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00
o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later
that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando
Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature
of continuing crimes.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible.
Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed.
This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint
and after a trial free from error.
DISSENT:
(Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The searches andarrests
made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delictoor
in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions
People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks
such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and
found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police
authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into
the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently,
certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol
of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and
claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his
alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his
person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that
the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the
trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to
GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm
and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton
violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the
state, however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where
his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he
wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle,
and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to

commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the
ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of
any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was
plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is
that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to
suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the
arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the
process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that
the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming
they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of
his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant
is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject
firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion.
Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the government should continue to repel the
communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it
should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the
framework of our Constitution and our laws.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]
Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in
Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda
Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City.
Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team
proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal
peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four
marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos stall yielded 20 sticks of
marijuana cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the
wares she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos
executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal.
The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory
(PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends
however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after
search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that
she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to
be the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her
money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscals Office after investigation,
where she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the
investigation, neither during the time she signed the document at the Fiscals Office. Two
informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for
possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73)
found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA
6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA
6425 and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the
decisions with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where
illegal drugs were found, under her control.

Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her
legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash
can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the
contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual
possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But this
is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for
conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be
constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and
control over the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where the
prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact,
the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramps to stand so
that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in
such a way that it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was
obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in
evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.
NAZARENO v. STATION COMMANDER

Facts:
In the early morning of Dec. 14, 1938, Bunye was killed by a group of men in Alabang. One of the
suspectsin the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on Dec. 23, 1988 (2
weeks later). Upon questioning,Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the
killing. In view thereof, the police, without a warrant,picked up Nazareno and brought him to the
police headquarters for custody.

Issue:
W/N the arrest was valid? When an offense has just been committed, what is just been
committed? Howsoon was just?

Held:
Yes, it was a valid warrantless arrest. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the
police withoutwarrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) Rule 113, after he was positively implicated by his co-
accused Ramil Regala in thekilling of Bunye and after investigation by the police authorities.As
held in Pp. vs. Ancheta: The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of
a crime does not presuppose as anecessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable
existence of a rime. For the detention to be perfectlylegal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds tobelieve the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe thatthe person
sought to be detained participated therein.
GO VS. CA

FACTS:
Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-way street in San Juan, Metro Manila.
Rolito Gos car and Maguan nearly bumped into each other in an intersection. Because of this, Go
shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard of a nearby restaurant saw the incident and took
down the plate number of Gos car. Police investigators were able to get Gos picture through the
credit card that Go used when he dined in restaurant near the crime scene the witness positively
identified Go as the gunman. Hence, a manhunt was launched. Several days thereafter, Go went
to the police station where the witness identified him as the suspect. The police detained Go. A
complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by the police to the Provincial prosecutor. Go was
informed of his right to demand preliminary investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver. Meanwhile, Maguan died. Hence,
prosecutor filed am information of murder without conducting preliminary investigation. Go posted
cash bond and was released after approval of the same by the court. The prosecutor filed for
leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation and to prayed for the suspension of court
proceedings pending the preliminary investigation. The same was granted and arraignment of Go
was suspended. The following day, the court recalled its approval and cancelled the bail of Go.
Hence, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the SC, which was
remanded to CA. Arraignment took place as scheduled and Go refused to enter his plea. Hence, a
plea of not guilty was entered for him. Then, CA issued its decision dismissing the petition of Go
on the grounds that Go was validly arrested without a warrant and Go already waived his right to
preliminary investigation. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE 1:
Where or not Go was validly arrested without a warrant.

HELD:
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, among others, that a
peace officer or private person may without warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and the arresting person has personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the incident. Hence, at the time of his
arrest, the crime has not just been committed. It would have been different if Go committed a
continuing crime. In addition, the police officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Go was he gunman. The police arrested Go by relying on the statement of the witness. Finally, the
plate number of the car that was taken down by the witness did not point to Gos car but to his
wife.

ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary investigation.

HELD:NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory and not constitutional, it is a
component of due process of criminal justice. It is a substantive right. To deprive an accused of
this right is to deny due process. Generally, said right is invoked before entering a plea; failure to
invoke the same amounts to waiver.
In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary investigation be conducted upon the filing of the
information before the court. The fact that he posted bail did not amount to waiver of said right as
he asked for it when he filed for the approval of the cash bond. The court granted his prayer for
preliminary investigation before the approval of the bond. Go even filed before the CA for such
relief. Hence, Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation. But since the trial had already
commenced, the trial should be suspended and preliminary investigation should be conducted.
Participation of Go during the trial did not amount to waiver also as he was merely forced to do so
to avail his other rights.
People vs Tonog, Jr.

G.R. No. 94533February 4, 1992

Facts:Dumaguete City Police Station received a report that a lifeless body was found who was
later identied as Efren Flores. Based from the investigation, a motorcab stopped near the place
where the deceased was found. It was also revealed that Ignacio Tonog, Jr. was the one who
wasresponsible for his death and that prior to the incident, there were grudges
between the two.Without warrant, police ocers went to Bacong, Negros
Oriental, and upon being invited forquestioning, voluntarily went with the law enforcers
unaccompanied by a counsel. While theywere on their way to the police station, it was noticed that
there were blood stains the theaccuseds pants and when asked about it, he said that it was
from a pig. He was then requestedto take o his pants for examination.At the station, he
confessed his guilt but was not recorded. After a month, the pants andthe knife found were
brought to the Cebu crime lab and found that the blood was the same asthe victims.One of
the witnesses, Liberato Solamillo, testied that
while drinking with the accusedand a certain Allan. The
accused left with certain Biyok. At around 11pm, Liberato and Allanrode a motorcab to look for the
accused. They then saw the victim and requested to convey
himto Dumaguete. Allan left and when it fauled to return, Liberato decided to ride a pedicab. Onhis
way, he saw the motorcab, and when he proceeded to the motorcab, he saw Tonog withinside
and noticed the blood stains on his pants.All the facts were denied by the accused and that he
only confessed because he was toldto do so. Charged with three others, Ignacio Tonog was
convicted of murder.

Issue:Whether the trial court faulted in admitting the pants and knife as evidence since theywere
taken during a warrantless arrest?

Rule:The "acid-washed maong" pants

were admissible in evidence, They were taken fromAccused-appellant as an incident of his
arrest. It may be that the police ocers were not armedwith a
warrant when they apprehended Accused-Appellant. The warrantless arrest, however,was
justied under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providingthat a
peace ocer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an oense has
in fact just beencommitted, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested hascommitted it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in eecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, hadknowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his
investigation indicating thatAccused-appellant was one of the perpetrators
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for
search warrant. The search warrant wassought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents
were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the
quashal of the search warrant and the validityof which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served notonly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.

ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an
offense committed outside its territorialboundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a
place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction

HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction asan order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him tosearch for personal
property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ
of discovery. It isa special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a
public necessity.A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant , subpoena, or other formal writing issued by
authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a searchwarrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, orin anticipation
thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expresslyor impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability.
Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for theenforceability of warrants of arrest, and although
within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon mustbe made to the
issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is
enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where
the criminal case is pending in one court and the searchwarrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:1. The court wherein the criminal
case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes
of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and
compelling circumstances that theapplicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or
may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing
the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, withoutprejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds andobjections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwisethey shall
be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested
party may move in the court wherethe criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the
personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein forsaid purpose. Since two
separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search
warrant and amotion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shallconsequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during theproceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion
tosuppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4. Where the
court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented
from furtherproceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case ispending, with the necessary safeguards and
documentation therefore. 1 MylaRuth N.Sara 5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the
same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed intwo or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall
have beenresolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications
for search warrants incident to the criminalcase. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is DENIED
People v. Manlulu
FACTS:
Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinkingcompanions,
Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. PatrolmanPerez arrested
Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with theaccused and the
victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casiowristwatch said to
belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and without informing Manlulu of his rightto counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.

HELD:
The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one oclock in the morning. The
arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven oclock that evening,some
nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid
warrantlessarrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that thearresting officer
must have personal knowledge nor was the offense in fact just beencommitted. While Pat.
Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to thearrest of Manlulu, that is
not enough. The law requires personal knowledge. Obviously,personal gathering of information
is different from personal knowledge. The rule requires thatthe arrest immediately follows the
commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.However, the flaw, fatal as it may be,
becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which the Court found credible. In
spite of the nullification of the arrest of accusedManlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, as
well as his extra-judicial confession which wastaken in violation of the Constitution, still the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of theaccused beyond reasonable doubt
Sanchez v. DemetriouCruz, J. | November 9, 1993 | Arrest (generally)

FACTS:
On July 28, 1993, pursuant to the request of the PresidentialAnti-Crime Commission, the Panel of State
Prosecutors of theDepartment of Justice conducted a preliminary investigationwith regard to the charges to
be filed against several persons,including petitioner Mayor Antonio Sanchez. Petitioner, alongwith others,
was alleged to be involved in the killing of oneAllan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmienta.Petitioner was not present during the preliminary investigation but was represented by his
counsel, instead.Thereafter, he was served an invitation on August 13, 1993 tothe investigation in Camp
Vicente in Laguna. At theconfrontation, he was identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPOIII Vivencio
Malabanan, who both executed confessionsimplicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and
the killing of Gomez. He was then put on arrest status
andwas taken to DOJ. Following the hearing, warrant of arrestwas issued by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas in
connection withthe cases for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, ofR.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards forPublic Officials and Employees) Sanchez was forthwith takento the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame. Respondent prosecutors filed complaint in RTC Manila for the crime
ofspecial complex crime of rape with homicide for the rape andkilling of Sarmienta, aggravated with the
killing of Gomez.Subsequently, warrant of arrest was served to six otheraccused.

ISSUE/S:
WON the arrest of Mayor Sanchez was valid

YES
RULING/RATIO:
August 13, 1993 illegal detention (invitation constituted aninvalid arrest) was cured by subsequent
issuance of a validwarrant of arrest.Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court defines arrest as thetaking of
a person into custody in order that he may be boundto answer for the commission of an offense. Under
Section 2of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint ofthe person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to thecustody of the person making the arrest.Application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,required.
It is enough that there be an intent on the part ofone of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
onthepart of the other to submit, under the belief andimpression that submission is
necessary. Invitation camefrom a high-ranking military official and the investigation ofSanchez was to be
made at a military camp. Command or anorder of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected todefy.
In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he wentwithout protest (and in informal clothes and slippers
only)with the officers who had come to fetch him. Note that
underR.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation"are applicable even to a person not
formally arrested butmerely "invited" for questioning.
Petitioner was right when he contended that such arrest wasnot under those included in valid warrantless
arrest underSection 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court because only thetestimonies were relied upon
regarding the identifcation of petitioner, so that arresting officer had no personal knowledgenor were
present during the commision of the crime. Neither ithas just been committed because arrest took place 46
daysafter the crime was perpetrated. However,
even if the originalarrest was illegal, the RTC later on acquired jurisidticonon his person by virtue of
the warrant issued to him andco-accused.
Even on the assumption that no warrant wasissued at all, the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdictionover the person of the petitioner.
Filing of charges, and theissuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against aperson invalidly
detained will cure the defect of thatdetention or at least deny him the right to be releasedbecause of
such defect
Other points:
1. There were seven informations charging seven separatehomicides because the homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of thespecial complex crime of
rape with homicide. Therefore, therewill be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there arerapes
committed.
2.Petitioner s contention that he wa not accorded roght to present counter-affidavit was negated by the fact
that hiscounsel manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit. And despite
the reminderreminder from the court that he could still present such, he stilldid not do so.
People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 216 SCRA 431, December 11, 1992

While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine Constabulary officer patrolling heard gunfire within the
vicinity. When they came upon the source, Rosillo was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the
lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the house, the patrol saw appellants, Evaristo
and Carillo, who were drunk. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol
were told that he had already escaped.
Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillos waist and subsequently frisked him revealing .38
caliber revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had
a valid license to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for
questioning.
Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for entry into the latters house to search for
Rosillo and Evaristo consented.
Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects, which became the
basis for the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
For their part, the appellants alleged that they were forcibly taken into custody. They denied
ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms, contending that these were planted in their
possession by the prosecution witnesses and other police authorities.
Whether the firearms are considered illegally seized evidence? NO.
The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of evidence in plain view, objects inadvertently
falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a the right to be in the position to have that
view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced as evidence.
In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his
house. The officer's purpose was to catch Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge inside.
Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering
the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the firearms as accidental. The plain view
doctrine will apply to the seizure of the firearms and effects because their discovery was
unintentional.
The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based
on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Valid warrantless arrests
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, the second circumstance an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it
is applicable. The peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this
proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident is considered an offense and "an offense
is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT
ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."
As for the existence of personal knowledge, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillos waist, and the
peace officers professional instinct are more than sufficient to grant him personal
knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been committed. Consequently, the firearm
taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest
Pp. vs. Briones

Facts:

In the evening of April 23, 1988, Francisco was tendering his sari-sari store. At about 11:30 p.m.,
accused Javier and Allied came to his store and ordered four bottles of beer. Accused Briones
arrived and was offered beer,but he declined and left. After about 30 minutes, Javier and Allied
also left the store.About 8 meters away from Franciscos store was the house of spouses
Felicismo and Gutierrez, at theground floor of which was also a store. At the street near the store
was a 100-electric bulb.When all his customers had left, Francisco closed his store. Not long after,
he heard the barking of dogsfrom the Gutieerez residence. Feeling that something untoward was
taking place, he went out of his store, and fromthere, he saw Briones, Javier and Allied mauling
Gutierrez who was lying prostrate on the ground. The three laterdragged Mrs. Gutierrez inside her
house and closed the door.In the morning of April 24, 1988, Francisco went to the house
of Gutierrez. He found it in disarray, with thespouses sprawled dead on the first floor. He then
informed the Chief of Police of the incident and a team of investigators proceeded to the scene of
the crime. Subsequently, the culprits were apprehended on separateoccasions.

Issue:

W/N the warrantless arrest of the accused is valid?

Held:

The arrest was unlawful originally but it was cured. It is unequivocally clear that no valid arrest
was madeon the accused, the arrest having been made without any warrant at all. Neither can the
apellants arrest qualify asa lawful arrest without a warrant under Sec. 5 (b) Rule 113 because the
police officer who effected the arrestindubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.It is eyewitness Francisco who has such
personal knowledge. In sum, therefore, the warrantless arrest of theappellant is
illegal.Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality cannot render all the other proceedings, including
the convictionof the accused, void. It cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when
all the facts on record point totheir culpability. In this regard, the case of De Asis v. Romero finds
application. Thus, One of the most important of these settled rules is that any objection to
the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea, otherwise theobjection is
deemed waived.Immediately after their arrest, accused Briones and Javier could have objected to
the legality thereof due tothe failure of the police officer to secure first a warrant for their arrest.
Not only that, without having questioned thelegality of their arrest, they even pleaded,
on arraignment to the information filed against them. Accused actsconstitute a clear waiver of their
right against unlawful restraint of liberty. Besides, it would be impractical, if notridiculous to order
the court to set the appellants free then issue a warrant for their arrest, and try them all overagain
when appellants themselves have waived their right to object ro such irregularity and when their
conviction istruly based on overwhelming evidence.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset
that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount
of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a
waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in
possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and
he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that
time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the
search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been
given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the
cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should
have ample time to secure a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.

HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2
Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that
there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the
early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time,
this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant.
While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he
knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time
they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented
by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time
is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in
rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.