I. Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914.

July 31, 2002

Petitioner: Teodulo M. Coquilla
Respondent(s): The Hon. Commission on Elections and
Neil M. Alvarez
Ponente: MENDOZA, J [En Banc]

II. FACTS
Coquilla was born and grew up Oras, Eastern Samar on 1938 of Filipino parents until 1965
where he was naturalized as a US citizen by joining the US Navy. In 1998 he took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making trips to the US.
Eventually, he applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved Nov. 7,
2000, took oath on Nov. 10, 2000 as a citizen of the Philippines and was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on that same day.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
However the incumbent mayor, Neil Alvarez who was running for reelection, sought the
cancellation of COquillas certificate of candidacy on the ground that he had made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for
two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since he took oath on Nov.
10, 2000.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.

III. ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year
before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

IV. RULING
NO. The Supreme Court said that the term residence in the qualifications for candidates is
to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home and no
matter where he/she may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.
In this case Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. Moreover the court says that from then on and until November
10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship petitioner was an alien without any right to
reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or
as a resident alien.
Thus the COMELEC did not erred in cancelling his certificate of candidacy for he made a
false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate
liable to cancellation. Furthermore he cannot invoke Frivaldo v. COMELEC for the question there is
citizenship and not residency. The COMELECs cancellation of his candidacy was justified.
The petition for certiorari was DISMISSED and the order of the COMELEC was
AFFIRMED.
LABO vs. COMELEC
176 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He
was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According
to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia
because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other
allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited
by the COMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides
that those sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by the COMELEC that
the petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted
probation by the MTC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.

Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property
received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime of
moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists
and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
MERCADO V. MANZANO AND COMELEC
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The
Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines?

Held: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the
other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty
to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

259 SCRA 296, 1996

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon
in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez,
Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private
respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand
theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/
ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that
Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court.

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or
of a promulgated judgement of conviction.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC

Facts: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office,
the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed
the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.

Issue: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

Held: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of
the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections
was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-
2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the
petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos
disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted
that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that
the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.