CATEGORIES OF EMPTINESS

According to Ngrjuna's Mahprajpramit-stra

Tadeusz Skorupski

Copyright: T. Skorupski

London, SOAS, University of London, 2008

1
 CONTENTS

PART ONE
Preliminary Considerations
Notion of emptiness in the canonical stras 3
Sovereignty of samdhi 11
Interpretation of the middle path 11
Treatment of emptiness in the Hnayna schools 12
Pudgalavdins 13
Realists: Theravda and Sarvstivda 13
Sautrntikas 14
Nominalists: Prajaptivdins 15
Emptiness according to Madhyamaka 15
Rejection of realism 16
Refutation of nihilism 18
Emptiness and the middle way 19
Progress towards silence 20
Mental peace and beatitude 22
Emptiness in Prajpramit texts 24
Two, seven, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen categories of emptiness 24
Definitions of sixteen categories of emptiness 25
Four categories of emptiness 26
PART TWO
stra Exposition of the Eighteen Categories of Emptiness
1-3. adhytma, bahirdh & adhytmabahirdh-nyats:
emptiness of internal dharmas,
emptiness of external dharmas,
emptiness of both internal and external dharmas 29
4. nyatnyat: emptiness of emptiness 34
5. mahnyat: great emptiness or emptiness of the ten directions 35
6. paramrthanyat: emptiness of the absolute 36
7-8. saskta and asaskta nyat:
emptiness of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas 37
9. atyantanyat: absolute emptiness 40
10. anagranyat: emptiness of dharmas with no beginning 42
11. avakranyat: emptiness of dissipation 45
12. praktinyat: emptiness of essence 46
13. svalakaanyat: emptiness of inherent characteristics 49
14. sarvadharmanyat: emptiness of all dharmas 51
15. anupalambhanyat: emptiness of nonperception 55
16-18. abhva-svabhva-abhvasvabhva-nyat:
emptiness of inexistence, of inherent nature, of both inexistence &
inherent nature 56

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 CATEGORIES OF EMPTINESS
(nyat) 1

Preliminary note
This paper provides a synopsis of chapter forty-eight of tienne Lamottes French
translation of Mahprajpramitstra attributed to Ngjuna, and translated into
Chinese by Kumrajva in 404 or 405 CE. Chapter forty-eight of this treatise
provides a comprehensive exposition of eighteen categories of emptiness. Part One
of this paper sums up Lamottes preliminary notes to his translation of this chapter.
Part Two recapitulates Ngrjunas stra exposition of the eighteen categories of
emptiness.

PART ONE
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The full interpretation of emptiness as presented in the Prajpramit texts and in
the Mdhyamika school represents the final stage in the long process that started in
the early canonical texts. It is in fact the concept of emptiness (nyat) that
constitutes one of the fundamental differences between the two vehicles, namely
between rvakayna and Mahyna. While rvakayna teaches only the emptiness
of beings (sattvanyat), Mahyna teaches the emptiness of beings and the
emptiness of phenomena (dharmanyat). The second important difference is of
course the attitude towards nirva: while the arhat realises the path and passes into
nirva, the bodhisattva accomplishes the path without entering nirva.
Notion of emptiness in the canonical stras 2
The term emptiness of beings (sattvanyat) denotes inexistence of such entities
as being (sattva), soul (tma), man (purua) or person (pudgala). All these
terms are considered to be mere designations (prajapti) or conglomerates of
compounded entities.
The canonical stras clearly show that the Buddha and his immediate disciples were
fully aware of different philosophical and religious concepts taught by different
ramaa and brhmaa groups of their time.3 Among different concepts that the early
Buddhist tradition rejected with particularly uncompromising determination was the
Brahmanical notion of tman, self or soul, conceived of as being permanent (nitya),
stable (dhruva), everlasting (vata), and immutable (aviparima).4
The emptiness of beings (sattvanyat) asserts that a permanent entity, whether
called tman, purua or pudgala, does not exist in reality. This notion of emptiness

1
.Source: . Lamotte. Le Trait de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Ngrjuna
(Mahprajpramitstra), Tome IV. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1976. Chapter XLVIII; 1995-
2151.
2
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 1995-2013.
3
. See Brahmajlasutta Dgha, I, 31-34.
4
. The existence of the tman was attributed ignorant people to the great Brahman: Dgha, I, 18-20; to
certain deities: Dgha, I, 19-20; to themselves or others: Majjhima, I, 8, 135, 137; Sayutta, III, 98-
99, 144, 183. Apart from the term tman, there are also other terms which denote the same
meaning: sattva, jva, purua, kart, jnaka, vedaka, pudgala etc.
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must be understood within the context of the fundamental assumptions of Buddhism
with regard to the basic nature of phenomena of existence called dharmas.
Dharmas are unconditioned (asaskta) or conditioned (saskta). Asaskta
dharmas are not subject to causes and conditions (hetupratyaya). They are free from
the three major characteristics of saskta dharmas, namely origination (upda),
duration-alteration (sthityanyathtva) and disappearance (vyaya).5 On the other hand
saskta dharmas, also called saskras, arise and perish due to their causes and
conditions in conformity with the principle of dependent origination
(prattyasamutpda), and are endowed with three characteristics, namely
impermanence, suffering, and impersonality/insubstantiality.
The canonical texts provide three major classifications of saskta dharmas, namely
five aggregates (skandhas),6 twelve bases (yatana),7 and eighteen elements
(dhtus).8 Any of these three classifications encompasses all existing phenomena
(dharma), which are also collectively called everything that there is (sarvam), world
(loka), or suffering (dukha).9 The inherent nature of all formations (saskra) is
characterised by the so-called four seals of Dharma (dharmamudr)10 according to
which all formations are impermanent (anitya), all formations are painful (dukha),
all dharmas (whether saskta or asakta) are selfless (antman), and calm (nta)
is nirva.11 Asaskta dharmas are also impersonal in the same way as saskta
dharmas. It is due to the five aggregates of attachment that there arises the notion of
a self. However, there is nothing in the five aggregates or in the other two groups that
can be identified as a permanent self, which controls or takes charge of the
aggregates.12 All conditioned dharmas conglomerate, perdure and disappear in
accordance with the law of dependent origination. It is because they are impermanent
and painful that dharmas are deprived of any inherent self or anything appertaining
to the self. The human life is short and abounds in suffering and torments. It is
similar to a turbulent river that flows rapidly and carries everything away. There is
no immortality for any person that is born in this world.13 There is no self in the
formations (saskra) that are impermanent, fragile (adhruva), and unworthy of any

5
. See Aguttara, I, 152; L. La Valle Poussin, Nirva, 180-187.
6
. 1. matter (rpa), 2. sensation (vedan), notion, (saj), 4. volition (saskra), 5. consciousness
(vijna); Sayuta, II, 47-48, 100, V, 60-61.
7
. The six internal bases (dhytmika yatana): 1. eye (cakus), 2. ear (rotra), 3. nose (ghra), 4.
tongue (jihv), 5. body (kya), mind (manas); and the six external bases (bhya yatana): 7. matter
(rpa), 8. sound (abda), 9. smell (gandha), 10. flavour (rasa), 11. tangible (spraavya), 12. dharma.
See Dgha, II, 302; III, 102, 243; Majjhima, I, 61.
8
. In addition to the previous list there are six categories of consciousness relating to the sense
faculties: 13. consciousness of the eye (cakurvijna), 14. consciousness of the ear (rotravijna),
15. consciousness of the nose (ghravijna), 16. consciousness of the tongue (jihvvijna), 17.
consciousness of the body (kyavijna), 18. mental consciousness (manovijna). Sayutta, II,
140.
9
. Sayutta, IV, 15 (sarvam); Sayutta, IV, 52, 54 (loka), Sayutta, IV, 28 (dukha).
10
. Discussed in this stra on page 1369.
11
. Sayutta, III, 132, 133, 134: all saskras are anitya, and all dharmas are antma. Aguttara, I,
286: all saskras are anitya and dukha, all dharmas are antma. The Pli postcanonical texts
provide three characteristics: anitya, dukha, antma.
12
. Majjhima, I, 138-39; III, 19-20; Sayutta, II, 124-25; III, 88-89, 94, 138, 148-49 (skandhas);
Sayutta, II, 244-46 (yatanas); Majjhima, III, 271-73 (dhtus).
13
. Aguttara, IV, 136-37.
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trust (anvsya).14 Similarly the human mind, whether called citta, manas, or
vijna, arises and disappears in constant flax.15
There are three fundamental characteristics of sufferings, namely suffering as
suffering (dukhadukhat), suffering due to formations being conditioned
(saskra-dukhat), and suffering stemming from transformation (viparinma-
dukhat).16 As all psychophysical phenomena of existence are governed by causes,
they are liable to disappearance, and consequently the whole of existence is nothing
but suffering.17 Everything that is felt (vedayita) is suffering (Sayutta, IV, 216;
stra, 1159, 1446), everything that is born is nothing but suffering, and everything
that is destroyed is nothing but suffering. All processes of existence evolve without
any self, as there is no self to exert any control. None of the five aggregates can be
identified with any permanent self.18 If they were the self they would not be subject
to torments (bhdha). Since they are conditioned (saskta), the aggregates arise,
perdure for a short period, and then vanish. They evolve in this way from timeless
beginning in a series of cyclic existences (bhavacakra) in conformity with the
immutable law of dependent origination. This law of dependent origination was
discovered by Buddha, but not invented by him or created by any agent (kraka). It
operates independently: whether the Tathgatas appear or not in this world, the
dharma-nature (dharmat) remains fixed.19 This law is inherent in conditioned
dharmas. The series of the aggregates that evolves across the spectrum of three
existences constitutes the law of dependent origination, which comprises twelve
links. The individual links of this causal nexus are impermanent (anitya), conditioned
(saskta), arising in dependence (prattyasamutpanna), and doomed to destruction,
disappearance, detachment, and suppression.20 One cannot find an agent or a soul
within the law of dependent origination. There is karma and its retribution (vipka),
but there is no agent (kraka).21
Inexistence of the tman presupposes inexistence of what belong to it ("mine"), and
vice versa. If the self existed, there would also be a mine. However, since they do
not exist, it is a folly to believe that this world (loka), understood as the five
aggregates, is the self, or to assume that after death one will persist as permanent
(nitya), stable (dhruva), eternal (sassata), and immutable (aviparimadhamma), and
that as such one will abide in eternity.22 Conditioned dharmas, whether understood as
the five aggregates or this world, are decisively declared to be empty of any self or
mine.23 The early texts postulate the emptiness of entities mainly under this dual
denial of self (tman) and mine (tmya), but there are also other terms, mainly
synonymous, which convey the same meaning.24

14
. Sayutta, II, 191, 193).
15
. Sayutta, II, 94-95. See this stra 1165.
16
. Dgha, III, 216; Sayutta, IV, 259, V, 56.
17
. Sayutta, IV, 28
18
. Sayutta, III, 66-67.
19
. See this stra, 157, Koa III, 60, 66.
20
. Sayutta, II, 26.
21
. See this stra, 2136; Bimbasrastra in E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstcke buddh. Stras, 131,
Mahvastu, III, 448.4-6.
22
. Majjhima, I, 138.
23
. Majjhima, I, 297.37, II, 263.26-27, Sayutta, IV, 296.33, IV, 54.5-6.
24
. The canonical texts mention four, six, eight, ten, twelve, and even forty-two different aspects
(kra): Cullaniddesa, 278-80, Visuddhimagga, ed Warren, 561-62.
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The emptiness of beings counteracts the deadly belief in personality (satkyadi).
This belief in personality constitutes wrong view, which erroneously attributes a self
to the five aggregates of attachment (updnaskandha).25 Being led astray by this
wrong view, ignorant people consider the aggregate of matter (rpa) as being the
tman or the tman as being in possession of matter or again as the tman being
present within matter. Similar assumptions are made with regard to the remaining
aggregates.26 They maintain four kinds of prejudice (abhinivea) with regard to each
of the five aggregates; it is said to be a mountain with twenty summits of the belief in
personality.27
The concept of personality (satkyadi) as such does not constitute an impure view
(klia) in the sense that it is not a direct cause of evil or hells. People who believe in
the tman aspire to be happy after their death, and to that extent they practise
generosity and observe morality. Their good actions secure them rebirths in the
world of man or in some heavens.28 But the notion of "I" remains incompatible with
the Buddhist perception of spirituality, elimination of desire, and attainment of
nirva.29 Taking a pellet of dung, the Buddha told a certain bhiku that the belief in
the existence of permanent, stable, eternal, and immutable tman, even the size of
that pellet, will utterly destroy the religious life that leads to utter destruction of
suffering.30 It is the view of personality (satkyadi) that sparks off the sixty-two
erroneous views mentioned in the Brahmajlasutta.31 Wrong views (mithydi), and
views of personality (satkyadi) and substantiality (tmnudi), are directly
interlinked, and in order to destroy them, it is necessary to treat all conditioned
dharmas as being impermanent, painful, and selfless.32
Despite the fact that the canonical and paracanonical texts ceaselessly debunk the
existence of a permanent self, there are also passages, which express somewhat
compromising or modified opinions. There is a whole range of terms such as tman,
jva, pudgala, kraka and so on that have been employed with reference to the soul as
if an apparent and existent reality. In certain situations, the Buddha seemingly
affirmed the existence of the tman while in other circumstances he has denied it.
This apparent contradiction has preoccupied Buddhist commentators who have come
up with various solutions.33
There are passages in the canonical texts in which the Buddha expresses himself in a
modified manner with regard to the self. Using expressions such as tma, sattva, jva,
pudgala, he occasionally speaks of the soul as an apparent reality, and on other
occasions, he confirms its existence to some disciples and denies it to others.
In order to provide a satisfactory interpretation of this seemingly contradictory
approach, the Buddhist tradition makes a distinction between the Buddha's
discourses that follow conventional views, and those that unfold true interpretations.

25
. Sayutta, IV, 259, III, 185.
26
. Majjhima, I, 300, III, 17; Sayutta, III, 3-4, 16-17, 42-43, 113-114; 164-65; Sayutta, IV, 287,
395; Aguttara, II, 214-15; Mahvyutpatti, 4685-4704.
27
. Divyvadna, 52.24-25, 549.16; Avadnaataka, I, 385.12.
28
. Abhidharmakoa, V, 40.
29
. Sayutta, IV, 259.
30
. Sayutta, III, 144. See also Majjhima, I, 137-38.
31
. Sayutta, IV, 287.
32
. Sayutta, IV, 147-48.
33
. Exposition and critique in La Valle Poussin's Nirva, 1925, 85-129.
6
When speaking in terms of worldly perceptions (laukika siddhnta), this
stra34explains, about the soul, that the Buddha adopts the position current in the
world and expresses himself using conventional language or the language of the
world (laukika). At times the term tman denotes a substantive and spiritual
principle, but also very often it is employed as the reflexive pronoun. In many
scriptural passages the Buddha employs the term soul without any philosophical
significance or implications, but in the ordinary sense of the word implying a
person35 in conventional sense as used by ordinary people. Such cases include the
following passages:
Dhammapada, verse 160, Udnavarga, XXIII, verse 11 etc: att hi attano ntho
each one is his own proper refuge.
Dgha, II, 100; III, 58, 77; Sayutta, III, 42; V, 154, 163; Sanskrit Mahparinirva,
200: attadp viharatha attasara anaasaraAbide by having yourselves as
islands, by having yourselves as refuge and no-one else as refuge.
Dgha, I, 82; Majjhima, I, 23, 348; II, 21; Mahvastu, 283; Lalitavistara, 344: so
dibbena cakkhun... satte passati cavamne upajjamne... With the divine eye he
sees men being born and passing away.
Aguttara, I, 22: ekapuggalo loke uppajjamno uppajjati bahujanahitya... katamo
ekapuggalo? tathgato araha sammsambuddho.The only one born in the world
is born for the benefit of many men. Who is it? The Tathgata, arhat, and perfect
Buddha.
The applications (samodhna) which conclude the Jtaka stories, and in which the
Buddha identifies the personages of the past events (attavatthu) with the people of
the present (paccupannavatthu), do not constitute any affirmation of the self.
Although it is said that such and such a person of the past is this particular person of
the present, it does not imply any real person, because the person of the past was just
that. The Abhidharmakoa (IX, 272) further explains that the Buddha intended to
indicate that the aggregates, which constitute the present self, appertain to the same
series (ekasatna) as the aggregates, which constituted the personage of the past;
just as one say that the fire has arrived here while burning. The same chapter of the
Koa and Rahula's L'enseignement du Buddha, 81-96, contain other passages in
which the term tman and its synonyms do not denote any metaphysical significance.
In the Bhrasutta of the Sayutta, III, 25-26, the Buddha explains to his monks the
burden (bhra), the taking up of the burden (bhrdna), the laying down of the
burden (bhranikepaa), and the bearer of the burden (bhrahra). The burden is
constituted by the five aggregates of attachment (updnaskandha), the taking up of
the burden is craving which produces rebirth (t paunarbhavik), the laying down
of the burden is the extinction of craving (t praha), and the bearer of the
burden is this particular person (pudgala), this venerable named so and so, who
comes from such and such family and clan, who has such and such share of
happiness and suffering, who lives such and such number of years, and who lives for
such and such period of time. The Vtsputryas employ this text to assert an
ineffable pudgala. However, Vasubandhu (Koa, IX, 257) rejects their view and
states that it was merely said in conformity with the world that this venerable named
so and so comes from such and such family and clan. For him it is obvious that the
pudgala is impermanent and without inherent nature; it is not an entity.

34
. stra 29-38 etc.
35
. In chapter nine of Abhidharmakoa there are listed scriptural passages in which the term tma and
its synonyms don't have any metaphysical or philosophical implications.
7
In the Natumhkasutta, (Sayutta, III, 33-34; IV, 81-82, 128-29; Majjhima, I,
140.33-141.19), the Buddha tells his disciples to reject what is not theirs (na
tumhka), namely the five aggregates. He advises them that by doing this, they will
acquire happiness. They should reject the five aggregates, which are neither a self
nor a mine. The Mahniddesa, II, 438-39, parallels this story of the Jetavana with a
comparison of the cart, which does not exist outside of its parts (Sayutta, I, 135),
and the famous saying: suo loko attena v attaniyena v (Sayutta, IV, 54). This
stra (2108) indicates that the Buddha instructs his disciples to reject the aggregates
not only because they are empty of the self and mine, but also because they are
empty of their inherent nature and characteristic.
In summary, the Buddha did not hesitate to use the term tman or similar terms that
were in use during his time, but at the same time he also clearly indicated that they
were merely worldly designations (lokasamaa), expressions (lokaniruttiyo), turns
of speech (lokavohr), and designations (lokapaattiyo), which the Tathgata uses
but without misapprehending them (Dgha, I, 202). Such terms do not imply the
existence of an entity, which is permanent, stable, eternal, and immutable. They are
merely etiquettes to designate the complex of impermanent, painful, and impersonal
saskta dharmas.
Depending on individual viewpoints (prtipauruika) and on therapeutic
requirements (prtipakika), the Buddha modified his teachings in accordance with
aspirations (aya) and needs of his listeners. Thus to some people he taught the
existence of the tman and to some its inexistence. The disciples who entertained
nihilistic tendencies (ucchedadi), and had doubts about survival and retribution of
good and bad actions, were taught that wherever there evolves a personality
(tmabhva) in that very place its actions mature, and it experiences retribution in
this or future lives (Aguttara, I, 134). Those who were attracted to eternalistic views
(vatadi), they assumed to pass from one existence to another, to abandon one
body for another, and to experience the consequences of their actions, and although
they sustained the principle of morality, they still maintained the deadly belief in
personality (satkyadi), which constitutes the source of desire and false views. In
the case of such people, the Buddha taught that the mechanism of retribution
operates perfectly well without any agent and any transmigrating entity. The Buddha
affirms in the Paramrthanyatstra (see page 2136) that there are actions and their
retribution, but there is no agent to abandon the present aggregates and to take on
new ones. When asked as to who touches and who feels, the Buddha responds by
saying that the question is badly formulated, and that one should ask concerning the
condition (paccaya) of touching and feeling, and that in the latter case he would
explain that touch has as its condition the six yatanas, and that sensation has touch
as its condition (Sayutta, II, 13; stra 32, 1683-84).
The affirmation of existence and inexistence of a substantial self constitutes an
apparent contradiction although both options are valid. The Buddha denied the tman
more often than affirmed it. He did it because people have instinctive tendencies
towards preservation and aspire towards an eternal survival rather than a total
annihilation. Had people opted for annihilation, the Buddha would have certainly
insisted on the survival and preservation. Thus both options are true, although the
contradictory propositions do not have the same potential of truth. From the position
of the Hnayna, the no soul position (antmavda) is upheld as absolute truth
(paramrtha), because the five aggregates alone exist. The soul position (tmavda)
appertains to conventional or provisional truth (savtisatya), so far as it corrects the
error of nihilism. This stra (2101) says that a useful opinion is never false.

8
Frequently the Buddha takes recourse to silence (tbhva) concerning certain
questions, and his silence in fact constitutes an answer: sthpanyavykaraa
response by not replying. He refuses to state his position with regard to the existence
of tman and its diverse modalities.
In the nandasutta of the Sayutta (IV, 400-01), the Buddha remains silent when
the mendicant Vatsagotra poses a double question about the existence or inexistence
of the tman. When asked as to whether the tman exists (atth' att) the Buddha
remains silent. Then again when Vatsagotra inquiringly states that the tman does
not exist (natth' att), the Buddha also remains silent. When Vatsagotra left without
receiving any explanation, the Buddha explains to nanda the reason for his silence.
He said that had he replied that the tman exists, he would have affirmed the position
of eternalism (vatavda) and thus prevented Vatsagotra from accessing the
knowledge (jna) that all dharmas have no self. On the other hand had he negated
the existence of tman, he would have affirmed the position of nihilism
(ucchedavda).
The existence of tman also constitutes an integral part of the fourteen reserved or
difficult questions, which the Buddha refuses to answer on the grounds that the
knowledge of such things does not stimulate the progress on the path of spiritual life,
because it is not conducive to peace and enlightenment (Dgha, I, 188-89; III, 136;
Majjhima, I, 431; Sayutta, II, 223). The fourteen questions concern the eternity and
infinity of the world (loka) and the tman, the survival of the Tathgata (or
emancipated people) after death, and the relationship between the living principle
(jva) and the body.
Since everything is devoid of tman and tmya, there is no tman, and there being
no tman, it is absurd to inquire as to whether tman is eternal or transient, finite or
infinite, identical or different from the body. It is futile to comment on the son of a
sterile woman and a eunuch, or on the length of a tortoise's hair, or on the colour and
smell of a space flower. (See this stra pages 155-58, 423, 913-19; 1684). The
stra concludes that antman is true and that one cannot grasp its characteristics.
The law of dependent origination, which explains the operation of karma and its
retribution without any substantial entity, constitutes the profound truth which is
difficult to understand, sublime and beyond all dialectics, and which is
comprehensible only by the wise (Vinaya, I, 4; Mahvastu, III, 314, Lalitavistara,
392). The notion of emptiness is not applied exclusively to tman but to the whole
world (sarvalokavipratyanka).
The Buddha foresaw that in the future certain monks would decline to understand the
Buddha's profound discourses on emptiness (Sayutta, II, 267; V, 407; Aguttara, I,
72; III, 107). This is certainly the prophecy that became fully actualised. During the
first centuries after the Buddha's demise several schools, in particular Vtsputryas
and Samityas, professed personalistic opinions (pudgalavda) in such a way that it
is questionable whether they were still Buddhist. (See Koa's chapter IX, 228). There
were constant tendencies during the course of Buddhist history to introduce the
tman of the Upaniads, or of the Vednta, into Buddhist doctrines. Some
contemporary scholars believe that the Buddha denied that saskta dharmas are the
tman.
The conversations between riputra and Yamaka (Sayutta, 111-12), and between
the Buddha and Anurdha (Sayutta, IV, 383-84), concerning the existence of the
Tathgata (this term designates not the Buddha, but in a general manner a holy
person emancipated from desire) clearly show that the Tathgata is not identical with
the five aggregates, that he is not found within them or outside them, that he is not
9
the totality of the five aggregates, and yet he is not separate from them. The
discussion concludes: ettha ca te vuso yamaka dih' eva dhamme saccato thetato
tathgato anupalabbhiyamno. This is correctly translated by Poussin (Le
Bouddisme, 1925, 172) as: Thus, my friend, even now, you do not perceive the
Buddha existing really, truly; or: Thus, Yamaka, in this world, the Tathgata is not
perceived, verified, as true, real (Nirva, 1925, 104). Oldenberg (Buddha, 296) sees
in this phrase the transcendent and Upaniadic tman, and Poussin sees the negation
even of the Tathgata about whom one cannot say that he perishes at death, since in
order to perish one must exist. On the controversies among the western scholars see:
K. Bhattacharya L'tman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien, Paris, 1973, 67. The
Indian scholars tend to agree with Oldenberg and Frauwallner that this and other
texts intend to say that the tman, the absolute, cannot be an object of apprehension...
but what escapes apprehension is not inexistent, as its objective inexistence is, by
contrast, its metaphysical existence par excellence, and its non-apprehension is its
apprehension par excellence.
The Buddha recommended to his disciples, saying: That which I have not declared,
uphold it as undeclared, and that which I have declared, hold it as declared
(Majjhima, I, 431): abykata ca me abykatato dhretha, bykata ca me bykatato
dhretha. This stra states (page 747): if one searches for the tman in heavenly
abodes or on earth, within oneself (adhytman) or without oneself (bahirdh), in the
triple time (tryadhvan) or in the ten directions, nowhere will one find it. It is solely
the encounter between the twelve bases of cognition (dvdayatana), namely the six
internal sense organs and their respective objects, that produces the six kinds of
consciousness (vijna). An encounter between three things (trisanipta), namely
between the organs, their objects, and their corresponding kinds of consciousness, is
named contact (spara). Contact produces sensation (vedan), ideation (saj), act
of volition (cetan), and other mental dharmas (caitasika). According to the Buddhist
system, it is the force of ignorance (avidy) that induces the belief in personality
(satkyadi). It is due to that belief that the existence of tman is affirmed. The
belief in personality is destroyed by the vision of the truth of suffering
(dukhasatyadarana): the dharma-knowledge relative to suffering (dukhe
dharmajna) and the subsequent knowledge of suffering (dukhe 'nvayajna).
Once the belief in personality is destroyed, one no longer perceives the existence of
the tman.
The early scriptures predominantly teach the emptiness of beings, but they also
occasionally teach the emptiness of phenomena (dharmanyat).36 Dharmas are said
to be empty of inherent nature (svabhva), and also of their characteristics (lakaa),
and resemble illusions. The teaching concerning the notion of emptiness is stated in
some of the stras of the Tripiaka, in theories attributing to concentration (samdhi)
a total sovereignty over dharmas, and certainly in the interpretation of the middle
path (madhyam pratipad).
The early text treat conditioned dharmas arising from causes and conditions as being
impermanent, painful, and impersonal, but in principle do not undermine their
reality. Dharmas are attributed inherent nature and definite characteristics. There are,
however, certain stras, which depart from this realistic perception of dharmas, and
tend to express both emptiness of being and emptiness of dharmas, or just emptiness
of dharmas. On two occasions this stra (1079-90) provides an incomplete list of
such texts: Mahnyatstra, Brahmajlastra, Pasrastra, (2141-2144)

36
. Mahprajpramitstra, 2005.
10
reikaparivrjakastra, Drghanakhastra, Mahnyatstra, Sattvastra,
Kolopamastra, and occasionally the stra of Pryaa and of Arthavarga.
Candrakrti also affirms that the world devoid of reality was taught in the stras
setting forth the rvaka path, and gives as an example the Pheasutta (Sayutta, III,
140-43), and the Ktyyanvavda (Sayutta, II, 17; See Madhyamvatra, 22,
Muson, 1907, 271).
Sovereignty of samdhi 37
The path of nirva represents the path of deliverance and detachment from the
three worlds, renunciation of the five objects of sense enjoyment, through the
practice of dhynas and samdhis that are distributed among the Rpadhtu and the
rpyadhtu. The detachment constitutes the result of pure knowledge (praj
ansrav) that cannot be attained without relying on samdhis, which are described
in this stra, chapters XXXI-XXXVIII. The samdhis aim to detach the mind (citta)
from contingencies. The meditator who practises them acquires mental mastery
(cetovait), mental aptitude (cittakarmayat), that renders him capable of
beholding things in the way he wants to see them, and even to transform them at will.
The power of instigation (adhimuktibala) certainly becomes manifested in the
meditation on the horrors (aubhabhvan), the four immeasurables (aprama), the
eight liberations (vimoka), the eight dominations (abhibhvyatana), and the ten
totalities (ktsnyatana). It is due to the power of being able to disperse and to
manipulate objects at will that the meditator reaches the stage of discovery that these
objects are empty of proper characteristics (svalakaa), specific marks (nimitta), and
unworthy of being taken into consideration (apraihita). These factors constitute the
three portals of deliverance (vimoka-mukha), which directly lead to the destruction
of the three poisons and to nirva. At this stage the rvaka achieves practically the
same perception as the bodhisattva in the knowledge of the true character of
dharmas, which is the absence of any character. (All this is treated in the stra,
pages 1213-1232).
One of the Buddha's disciples, known in both Pli and Sanskrit texts, has found
instinctively the formula of proper meditation. The Sathaktyyanastra says that
he has destroyed every notion with regard to every single thing (sarvatra
sarvasaj) and that he meditated on nothing (na sarva sarva iti dhyyati). The
gods congratulated him, as they did not know on what he was meditating.
Interpretation of the middle path 38
The rvaka and bodhisattva agree on the philosophical interpretation of the middle
path, with the difference that the bodhisattva attributes to it an unlimited extension.
In his first sermon (Vinaya, I, 10; Majjhima, I, 15-15; III, 231; Sayutta, IV, 330; V,
421; Mahvastu, III, 331; Lalitavistara, 416), the Buddha taught a middle path that
leads to appeasement, knowledge, and nirva. The middle path opposes two
extremes: hedonism (kmasukhalliknuyoga) and mortification (tmakla-
mathnuyoga); between the extremes of saying that everything exists and that
everything does not exist (sabba atthti aya eko anto sabba natthti ay dutiyo
anto; Sayutta, II, 17.21-23, 76.23-27; III, 135.12-13). The one who perceives
exactly through right wisdom the origin of the world, for him that which in the world
is called inexistence (nstit), that does not exist (na bhavati); and the one who sees
through right wisdom the destruction of the world, for him that which is called
existence (astit) that does not exist (Sayutta, II, 17.10-13). The wrong view of

37
. Mahprajpramitstra, 2006.
38
. Mahprajpramitstra, 2007.
11
existence, eternalism, does not occur in the person who perceives through right
wisdom the causal origin of saskras, and the wrong view of inexistence, nihilism,
does not occur in the person who perceives through right wisdom the causal
destruction of samskras. (Mahvastu, III, 448.8-10).
In the Acelasutta (Sayutta, II, 19-22) the Buddha denies that suffering (dukha;
meaning the world of suffering) is produced by itself (svayakta) or by something
else (parakta). Those who assert that it is made by itself fall into the false view of
eternalism, and those who assert that it is made by something else fall into the false
view of nihilism. For the same reasons, one cannot say that one who acts is identical
with one who feels, or that one who acts is different from one who feels, or that
sensation itself is different from one who feels. Avoiding such extremes, the Buddha
teaches the conditioned co-arising of phenomena.
According to the Avijjpaccay (Sayutta, II, 61), assertion that a living being (jva)
is identical with the body, and assertion that it is different from the body (arra),
constitute two extreme views, which render impossible the practice of religious life
(brahmacaryavsa).
Thus avoiding all possible extremes, the Buddha teaches the middle path. The stra
affirms that the practice of the middle path in conformity with the Prajpramit
implies the rejection of all extremes: eternalism (vata) and nihilism (uccheda),
suffering (dukha) and happiness (sukha), emptiness (nya) and reality (tattva),
tman and antman, material things (rpin) and immaterial things (arpin), visible
(sanidarana) and invisible (anidarana), resistant (sapratigha) and not resistant
(apratigha), conditioned (saskta) and unconditioned (asaskta), impure (ssrava)
and pure (ansrava), mundane (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara), ignorance
(avidy) and appeasement of ignorance (avidykaya), old age and death
(jarmaraa) and the suppression of old age and death (jarmaraanirodha),
existence (astit) and inexistence (nstit) of dharmas, the bodhisattva and six
pramits, the Buddha and bodhi, the six internal faculties (indriya) and the six
objects (viaya), perfection of wisdom and imperfection of wisdom.
The reason in the early texts for speaking predominantly about emptiness of beings is
given in the stra (2061), which says that the Tripiaka is addressed to the rvakas,
who have weak faculties and comprehend more easily emptiness of beings, and not
so promptly emptiness of dharmas. The second important reason is that living beings
become attached more readily to the belief in eternalistism and happiness, and less
promptly to impermanence and suffering. The ordinary person is geared towards
eternal happiness of after death survival rather than the annihilation at death (stra
2102). Thirdly, for the pedagogical reasons: the doctrine of antman serves as an
introduction to that of emptiness of dharmas (stra 2138).
Treatment of emptiness in the Hnayna schools 39
The stra (106-8) gives a short rsum of the history of the first centuries of
Buddhism. When the Buddha was in the world, the Dharma did not meet with any
obstacles. When the Buddha passed away, and when the Dharma was rehearsed for
the first time, the situation remained the same as at the time of the Buddha. One
hundred years later, the emperor Aoka convoked a great quinquennial assembly and
grand masters of the Dharma engaged in discussions. Due to their disagreements
there arose distinct sects (nikya). Each school or sect set forth its specific opinions
in Abhidharma texts, which they treated as having the canonical status, and in
treatises (stra) authored by celebrated masters. Comparing the doctrines of the

39
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2009-13.
12
Strapiaka, recognised by most of the schools, with the teachings of the Abhidharma
and stras, the stra (1095) asserts that whoever does not grasp the Prajpramit
system is liable to numerous contradictions in the interpretation of the Dharma. If
one subscribes to the Abhidharma, one falls into realism; if to the teaching on
emptiness, one falls into nihilism; if to the teachings of the Strapiaka, one falls at
times into realism and at times into nihilism.
Although the stras teach emptiness of beings and occasionally emptiness of
dharmas, the Abhidharma texts explain emptiness of beings, but remain silent about
emptiness of dharmas; thus they fall into realism.
The totality of the early eighteen schools can be divided into three major groups:
personalists, realists, and nominalists.
The Personalists (Pudgalavdins), predominantly Vtsputrya/Samitya,
affirm the existence of personality. Their teachings are broadly known from the
criticism of their opponents, and from a treatise known as the Smitya-
nikyastra. They admit the existence of a pudgala, an individual or a person, which
is not neither identical nor different from the five aggregates. It is not identical with
the aggregates because it would be liable to annihilation (uccheda), and it is not
different from the aggregates because it would be eternal (vata) and consequently
asaskta. (Koa, IX, 234). The Pudgalavdins asserted that the pudgala is the only
dharma that transmigrates (sakrmati) from this world to another world. At death
the pudgala abandons the aggregates of the present existence in order to assume the
aggregates of the future existence. At the termination of its transmigration process,
the pudgala abides in nirva about which one cannot say that it truly exists. (See
stra, 43, 424).
The Realists. This epithet renders imperfectly the position of the Theravda of Sri
Lanka and the Sarvstivda-Vaibhika schools. These two schools have produced
independently a similar body of doctrinal texts: the seven books of the Abhidhamma
and Visuddhimagga, and the Abhidharma with six branches (apda) authored by
Ktyyanputra and others, and the Mahvibh. These two schools reject the
existence of an eternal and immutable tman, and admit the reality of dharmas. They
admit the existence of the five aggregates. The stra predominantly speaks of the
Sarvstivda approach (109-10, 111, 245, 285, 377, 424, 614, 616, 786, 787, 1383,
1697, 1715 etc).
The Sarvstivda school recognises two categories of dharmas: dharmas existing
merely as designations (prajaptisat) within the category of conventional truth
(savtisatya), and dharmas that truly exist (dravyasat or vastusat) within the
category of absolute truth (paramrthasatya); Koa, II, 186, 214. The term
designation implies conventional names given to conglomerates and grouped entities
that consist of component parts: such as forest refers to trees; cart does not exist as
such, but is only a designation of its parts assembled. The term tman implies the
group of the five skandhas, the twelve yatanas, or the eighteen dhtus. There exist,
however, dharmas that have their inherent nature (svabhva) or characteristics
(lakaa). Such dharmas are for instance the atom of colour that cannot be broken,
sensation, notion, and mental activities of consciousness: each one forming an
indivisible entity.
The Sarvstivda adepts, without ignoring the classifications of the canonical texts,
have produced a list of seventy-five dharmas divided into five integral groups
(pacavastuka):
1. Three unconditioned (asaskta) dharmas: space (ka), which does not impede
on matter (rpa) but is impeded by matter; cessation with enlightened knowledge
13
(pratisakhynirodha); cessation without enlightened knowledge (aprati-
sakhynirodha).
The remaining seventy two dharmas are conditioned (saskta), and are divided into
four groups:
2. Eleven material (rpa) dharmas: five sense faculties (indriya), five objects
(viaya), and non-information (avijapti).
3. One citta or mind, also called manas or vijna: pure consciousness without any
content.
4. Forty-six mental concomitants (caittas): mentations or psychic factors concomitant
with the citta and co-operating with it.
5. Fourteen dharmas dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayukta-saskra).
The seventy-two conditioned dharmas constitute all phenomena (sarva), suffering
(dukha), or the world (loka) of suffering. Being causes and caused, impermanent,
painful, devoid of the self or mine, they form a series (satna), which evolves from
existence to existence across the whole spectrum of the three worlds. This series
becomes stained by or purified from ignorance and defilements, and karma. These
dharmas are real, but in conformity with their general character and their conditioned
characteristic, their manifestation does not persist but lasts only for moments, so
short that they perish the very moment they arise, and this renders the movement
impossible. It is due to the recognition of dharmas as having veritable characteristics
that the Sarvstivda school is considered as professing realism, but by limiting the
duration of the dharmas and rejecting the tman, they fall into phenomenalism and
thus endanger their system.
The Sautrntikas attack the Sarvstivda explanation of dharmas as real.
As the stra does not mention Vasubandhu's Koa, the latter seems to be later than
the stra, although the stra is well versed with the Sautrntika position as it uses
their critique against the Sarvstivda school (eg: the criticism of the triple world on
pages 1690-94). The Sautrntikas combat the realism of the Sarvstivda and reject
the Sarvstivda affirmation that the three times exist, because if past and future
dharmas really existed, dharmas issued from causes (saskta) would always exist
and would be eternal. But the scriptures and reason declare them impermanent.
(Koa, V, 50-65; Poussin, Documents d'Abhidharma, MCB, V, 1936-37, 7-158). The
Sautrntikas also reduce the list of the seventy-five dharmas. For them the three
asasktas are false, because space constitutes a mere absence of matter, and
nirva, after the destruction of defilements and dharmas of existence, constitutes the
absence of their recurrence. Nirva constitutes the outcome, negative and unreal, of
dependent production, which is positive and real; it is a pacd abhva, inexistence
subsequent to existence, a nirodha or cessation (Koa, II, 282-84). The Sautrntikas
admit the existence of the citta but reject all or parts of mental concommitants
(caitta) (Koa, II, 150). Finally they consider the fourteen dharmas dissociated from
the mind (cittaviprayuktasaskra) as pure inventions. In particular, they insisted
that the four characteristics (birth, duration, old age, and the impermanence) of
conditioned dharmas are not real dharmas in themselves, distinct from dharmas that
arise and perish, but simple modifications of the series which starts, persists,
becomes modified, and perishes (Koa, II, 226-38). The destruction is spontaneous
(kasmika): every dharma ceaselessly perishes by itself, becomes constantly reborn
by itself in normal conditions. Dharma-cause produces dharma-effect, just as one
arm of scale goes up, the other arm lowers down. (Koa, IV, 4-8). In addition to
reducing the number of dharmas, the Sautrntikas also assert that dharmas are
momentary (kaika), in the sense that they perish as soon as they arise. In order to
14
distance themselves from the Sarvstivda adepts, the Sautrntikas quote a stra in
which apparently the Buddha said that five things are mere names and designations
or conventions, namely passed things, future things, space, nirva, and pudgala
(Koa, IV, 5n2). Although they postulate that certain things were mere names, the
Sautrntikas still maintain that certain things were real, such as rpa and citta, and
admit, as nature of things, the mechanism of dependent origination.
The Nominalists. According to ancient stras, the assemblage of conditioned
dharmas, as the five skandhas or the twelve yatanas, constitute reality called sarva
(Sayutta, IV, 15), loka (Sayutta, IV, 52, 54), or dukha (Sayutta, 28). It is on
this realistic basis that the Sarvstivda and Sautrntikas built their systems. By
contrast another sect, derived from the Mahsghikas, named Prajaptivdins,
asserted that the five skandhas, the twelve yatanas, and the eighteen dhtus were
merely mental or reasoned entities without any reality. Vasumitra who is said to have
lived in the fourth century after nirva, in his Samayabhedoparacanacakra,
attributes to Prajaptivdins the following three theses: 1. dukha is not the five
skandhas, 2. the twelve yatanas are not truly real, 3. saskras (mental formations),
which evolve in mutual interdependence and succession, are metaphorically called
dukha. This position simply denies every reality of conditioned dharmas and their
conditioned production. The Prajaptivdins also produced a list of ten nyats. It is
stated in the Mahvibh that they had the following list of nyats:40 1. adhytma-
nyat, 2. bahirdh-, 3. adhytmabahirdh-, 4. saskta-, 5. asaskta-, 6.
atyanta-, 7. prakti-, 8. apravtti-, 9. paramrtha-, 10. nyat-nyat. They
assert this number of nyats in order to counteract (pratipaka) twenty beliefs in
personality (satkyadi). These beliefs constitute the root of all defilemennts
(klea), persist in sasra, and do not conclude in nirva. As they constitute serious
defects, the Prajaptivdins speak of the above categories of nyat as their
countercurrents.
Emptiness according to the Madhyamaka 41
The Theravda and Sarvstivda schools, assuming that they interpreted correctly the
canonical doctrines, made a distinction between dharmas existing only as
designations (prajaptisat, nmamtra), and dharmas existing in reality (dravyasat,
vastusat), among which some were conditioned (saskta) and arising due to causes,
and some were unconditioned (asaskta) and having no causes.
The canonical stras established three categories of conditioned dharmas, namely
skandhas, yatanas, and dhtus. While preserving these three classifications, the
Tharavda school established a list of 81 saskta dharmas and one asaskta
dharma, and the Sarvstivda produced a list of 72 conditioned dharmas and 3
unconditioned dharmas.Conditioned dharrmas (also named saskras) are endowed
with three or four characteristics (sasktalakaa): origination (utpda), duration-
alteration (sthtyanyathtva), and disappearance (vyaya). Although they do not exist
by themselves, they are real (dravyasat) so far as they possess inherent nature or
characteristic (svabhva=svalakaa; Koa, VI, 159), and common characteristics
(smnyalakaa): they are impermanent (anitya), painful (dukha), impersonal
(antman), and empty (nya). Relying on the stras, the Theravda and Sarvstivda
schools assert, in their respective Abhidharma texts, the non-existence of the self
(nairtmya, sattvanyat or pudgalanyat). The tman is understood as an entity,
which is permanent (nitya), stable (dhruva), eternal (vata), and immutable

40
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2013.
41
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2013-27.
15
(aviparimadharman). Thus conditioned dharmas (whether skandhas etc) are
impermanent, persist for a short time, and constantly change, and thus they are not an
tman; they are empty (nya) of the tman and tmya. Being causes and being
issued from causes and conditions (hetu-pratyayasamutpanna), they are constrained
within the cyclic sasra that has no beginning. The five aggregates form a series,
which appears and disappears from moment to moment according to the law of
dependent origination. The arising and disappearing aggregates are present at each of
the twelve links of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda; Koa, III, 60, 66).
Dependent origination (prattyasamutpda) constitutes the true nature (dharmat) of
conditioned dharmas: whether the Tathgatas appear or not there remains stable this
dharma-nature (dharmat) of dharmas. Unconditioned dharmas constitute the
opposite of conditioned dharmas. The Theravda admits one unconditioned dharma,
namely nirva, and the Sarvstivda school admits three, namely space (ka), and
the two categories of cessation. Unconditioned dharmas are without origination,
duration or dissipation (Aguttara, I, 152), and escape the law of dependent
origination. However, all dharmas are antman, and there is no-one to enter nirva.
The Sarvstivda scholasticism is a grand but fragile edifice. The Sautrntikas
combat the Sarvstivda schotasticism, but it is the Mahyna, in particular
Mdhyamikas, Ngrjuna and others, who dismantle the philosophical structure of
the Sarvstivda Abhidharma. The Mdhyamikas employ the method of negation,
deny causality, and substitute transcendence by silence. The whole system relies on
the distinction between two levels of truth, namely conventional (savti-satya)
tainted by realism, pluralism, determinism, and constructed by ignorance, and
absolute (paramrtha-satya) that rejects realism, avoids falling into nihilism and
affirmation, and asserts a middle path between negation and affirmation, the path that
leads to a complete stoppage of the mind (citta) and mental discourses.
Rejection of realism 42
The doctrine of emptiness is applied to all dharmas (sarva-dharma-nyat) without
any exception (atyantanyat). Dharmas are empty of inherent nature
(svabhvanyat), essence (praktinyat) and inherent characteristic
(svalakaanyat). They are also devoid of common characteristics, and are not
subject to causality. Dharmas do not really exist, since they are designations
(prajapti) and mere names (nmamtra). There is no longer any distinction between
internal, external, and both internal and external dharmas, nor between conditioned
and unconditioned dharmas.
Without attempting to be complete, the atashasrik (930-36) attempts to provide a
list of empty dharmas. All possible things imagined by ordinary people (pthagjana)
or by noble persons (rya) are empty: skandhas, yatanas, dhtus, twelve links of
dependent origination, six pramits, eighteen nyats, thirty seven bodhipkikas,
and other dharmas complimentary to the path, four noble truths, four dhynas, four
apramas, four rpyasampattis, eight vimokas... six abhijs, 112 samdhis, 43
dhramukhas, all buddhadharmas (balas etc), in short all imaginable dharmas from
matter (rpa) to omniscience (sarvkrajt) are empty.
Dharmas are not made empty by means of emptiness, but they as such are emptiness,
and emptiness itself is dharmas.
When one surveys this universal emptiness, one reaches the following five
conjectures.

42
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2015.
16
1. Conditioned dharmas are empty of inherent nature (svabhva), essence (prakti) or
iherent characteristic (svalakaa). Matter is empty of matter, and the same holds for
all other dharmas. Matter is deprived of the characteristic of matter. If dharmas truly
had inherent nature, existence in itself, that nature would be unborn (nija) non-
artificial (aktrima), independent of other things (parnapeka), permanent (nitya),
and immutable (aviparima-dharma); Mla-krik, XIII, 1-3; Prasannapad, 262-
63. However, the nature of dharmas appears to be caused, artificial, subject to
conditions, impermanent and mutable; (stra, 2112). Thus the inherent nature of
dharmas is non-nature (Pacaviati, 137.2-3) and this holds valid for all dharmas,
including the limit of reality (bhtakoi), which is empty of the limit of reality.
(Pacaviati, 137.9-11).
2. Conditioned dharmas, being empty of inherent nature, are equally deprived of
their common characteristics (smnya-lakaa): impermanence, suffering, and
selflessness. Since they are applied to the natures that are not within conditioned
dharmas, the common characteristics are without any substratum. It is futile to seek
in conditioned dharmas impermanence (aniyat), suffering (dukhat), selflessness
(antmat), calmness (ntat), emptiness (nyat), signlessness (animittat), and
wishlessness (apraihitat). Thus impermanence of matter or rpa is empty of
impermanence of rpa, and so on for all the common characteristics applied to the
aggregates and the rest. Dharmas have one unique characteristic, namely the absence
of characteristics (stra, 1376, 1382, 1694, 1703).
3. Conditioned dharmas do not issue from causes (prattyasamutpda), but they
merely arise in conformity with conventional truth. They are dharmas, empty of
inherent nature and characteristic, which arise from empty dharmas also empty of
inherent nature and characteristic (Prattya-samutpdahdayakrik, verse 4).
The ancient sources (Sayutta, II, 25; Aguttara, I, 286) consider the dharma-nature
of dharmas to be the causal nexus with its twelve links evolving across the whole
spectrum of sasra. This nature of dharmas, they call dharma-nature (dharmat),
dharma-stability (dharmasthitit), dharma-certainty (dharma-niymat), limit of
reality (bhtakoi), truthfulness (satyat), reality (tattvat), etc.
In fact what is born from causes and conditions is not born in realty; it is not truly
produced. What depends on conditions is declared to be empty.
Dependent origination operates in emptiness. It is ineffectice in itself and in its
twelve links. In effect ignorance is empty of ignorance, and so on with all the
remaining links. The alleged dharma-nature of dharmas that is called suchness
(tathat), dharma-nature (dharmat), dharma-realm (dharmadhtu), dharma-law
(dharmaniyamant), and limit of reality (bhtakoi), is also empty of its inherent
nature. It does not exist and it is not perceived.
Ngrjuna declared that dependent origination (prattyasamutpda) is emptiness
(nyat). Emptiness, being a dependent designation, is itself the middle way.43
Whatever arises in dependence (prattyasamutpda), is without destruction
(anirodha), without production (anutpda), without interruption (anuccheda), without
permanence (avata), without identity (anekrtha), without multiplicity
(annrtha), without coming (angama), without going (anirgama). These are
Ngrjuna's eight negations, stated at the beginning of his Mlamadhyamakakrik.
Since dependent origination is empty, the realm of sasra, as a succession of
rebirths and deaths due to defiled actions, has never commenced. By this very fact,
nirva, which marks the stoppage of sasra, is secured from eternity. As an

43
. Mlamadhyamakakrik, XXIV.18.
17
interruption of a process, which has never started, nirva is empty of nirva's
characteristic: there is emptiness of the absolute. The absolute stands for nirva and
this nirva is empty of nirva. It is in emptiness that sasra and nirva are
identical; there is no slightest difference between them (Mlamadhyamakakrik
XXV.19).
4. If the conditioned dharmas have no characteristics that make them conditioned,
namely production, duration and destruction, then they should be the same as
unconditioned dharmas, which are defined as not having such characteristics. Indeed
by the application of the polarity of opposites, whereby if one opposite does not
exist, its contrary does not exist either. Conditioned dharmas, being deprived of
production, duration, and destruction, do not exist. Consequently their opposite,
unconditioned dharmas, do not exist either.
5. Thus whether conditioned or unconditioned, dharmas do not exist, and they are not
perceived. They are appeased from the beginning, non-produced and nirvnic by
their essence. Candrakrti says that inherent nature has been defined by the Buddha
as non-artificial and independent. But this inherent nature of things consists in their
non-production; being nothing at all, being mere non-existence, this inherent nature
is inherent non-nature (asvabhva). Thus inherent nature of things does not exist.
Whether one discourses in negative or positive terms, this does not affect or change
anything in the thing itself. In the perfection of wisdom texts, inherent nature is
called non-origination (anupda), non-destruction (anirodha), non-contamination
(asaklia), non-purification (avyavadna), non-manifestation (apradurbhva), non-
accomplishment (anabhisaskra), and also purity (viuddhi). The true characteristic
of dharmas is the absence of characteristics. It is in the eighth stage (bhmi) that the
bodhisattva acquires the knowledge of non-production, and thus cognises the true
characteristic of dharmas.
Refutation of nihilism
The Mdhyamikas refute both realism and nihilism. Thus, they separate themselves
from radical negativism of the nihilists (nstika), and semi-negativism of the
Theravda and Sarvastivda schools.
The Nstikas deny production by way of causes, fall into the pit of false views
(mithydi), negate future life, cause and effect, and action and retribution. They
cut off the wholesome roots (kualamla), which are inborn in all men, and which
enable one to do good and to avoid evil (Abhidharmakoa IV.170). Thus, they turn
away from nirva and fall into hells.
The Theravda and Sarvstivda schools affirm that conditioned dharmas are real and
subject to momentary causality. However, they deny the self, and proclaim
conditioned dharmas to be empty of the self and mine. They attribute to these
dharmas an aspect of voidness, and thus they profess a kind of mitigated nihilism,
but still it is nihilism.
The Mdhyamikas do not accept the above position. Rejecting the views of existence
and inexistence, they obliterate every subject of predition, and thus render impossible
both negation and affirmation. The predicate presupposes a subject, but when the
subject is absent, it loses all significance. This is the reason why the Mdhyamikas
do not affirm, and cannot affirm any characteristic mark (nimitta) whether real or
empty.
In his Mlamadhyamakakrik (V.8), Ngrjuna states: Fools who perceive
existence and iexistence of objects do not see the pacification of the empirical
world. In his commentary, Candrakrti strengthens this stanza with a quotation from

18
the Samdhirja-stra: To say it is, and to say it is not, these are two extremes.
Pure and impure are also two extremes. Thus, avoiding these two extremes, the wise
also protects himself from assuming the middle position. It is and it is not induce
controversies (vivda). Pure and impure also induce contraversies. In the case of
controversy, suffering does not subside, and in the absence of controversy, it
becomes destroyed.
By refraining from affirmation, nagation, and false escape, the Mdhyamikas assume
a neutral ground, where they cannot be attacked.
Emptiness and the middle way
The Prajpramit defines itself as non-affirmation and non-rejection of all
dharmas. Similarly, nyat, as avoidness of the extremes of existence and non-
existence, denotes the rejection of all erroneous views. nyat serves as an
instrument to purify one's mind. But when it has accomplished its role, it must be
rejected like a raft after crossing a river.
The emptiness, which serves as a means of escaping from erroneous views, does not
denote an absolute that could become an object of erroneous view: view of
emptiness. In the Kyapaparivarta, the Buddha declares: It is not by emptiness that
dharmas are made empty, but dharmas as such are empty It is good this
consideration that is called the middle way. In effect, those who grasp emptiness and
take refuge in it, I declare them to be completely lost in terms of my teaching. It is
better to entertain the view of personality (pudgaladi), uplifted as high as Sumeru,
than to adhere to the wrong view of emptiness (nyatdi). Emptiness is an
expedient to escape all kinds of erroneous views, but the one who upholds emptiness
as a belief, I declare him incurable.
The danger is so high that, in order to prevent this disease, apart from the kinds of
emptiness precluding dharmas, the Prajpramit stras distinguish the emptiness of
emptinesses (nyatnyat) that precludes all others.
Moreover, the absolute that is called tathat, suchness, dharmadhtu, fundamental
element, and so on, is empty of inherent nature of the absolute. Pacaviati, 132.4-
5, states: Tathat is empty of inherent nature of tathat, and this emptiness of tathat
is not tathat; apart from tathat there is no emptiness; tathat itself is emptiness;
emptiness itself is tathat.
Ordinary people are taken aback by the notion of emptiness, and search for an
absolute, nirva, to which they could become attached. Since the views of existence
and inexistence are defective, they aspire to find nirva in a system superior to
being and non-being. However, in this case, the transcedency path (via eminentiae)
ends in absurdities. The Buddha said that existence (bhva) and inexistence (abhva)
must be destroyed, but that nirva, deliverance (moka), must be maintained. If
nirva were at the same time being and non-being, one would have to
simultaneously destroy and maintain it. Nirva as nirva would be real, non-
produced by causes and unconditioned, but as a synthesis of being and non-being, it
would be unreal, produced by causes and conditioned. Thus the ordinary people
misconceive emptiness, the unique expedient that could appease their minds, and
turn away from the middle path.
The only absolute that is effective, but does not exist, is the emptiness of all dharmas.
In his commentary (Pajik, 427) on the Bodhicaryvatra, Prajkaramati says that
all things (bhva) have two natures (rpa): one superimposed and one not super-
imposed. The superimposed nature inspired by ignorance is common to all mankind.
It is not through the perception of this nature that one can gain deliverance from

19
impurities; otherwise all foolish people would be Tathgatas. The only absolute or
reality (tattva) that is not superimposed and gained through nonperception is
conducive to the destruction of impurities and ignorance. This absolute discerned by
wisdom refers to nonperception of any dharmas. It is the emptiness of all dharmas,
which is able to destroy all mental obstacles and troubles.
Progress towards silence
The Bodhisattva career essentially evolves in four phases redistributed among ten
stages. It is in the fourth phase and in the eighth stage, in which the Bodhisattva
realises that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharma-knti), and thus gains access
to the category of silence that constitutes the philosophy of the sages (rya-
tbhva). Without entering into details, the present note attempts to demonstrate
how the Bodhisattva reaches the desired goal by textual study, negation of apparent
reality, and spontaneous elimination of that negation.
Textual study. In order to penetrate into the foremost samdhis on emptiness, one has
to pass through a restricted portal of expediency (upyamukha): one has to absorb,
recite, retain, and applied the Prajpramit-stras. The study of this voluminous
body of literature is the condition for success. Other Mahyna texts appertain to the
same category, and also promiss invaluable spiritual and material advantages.
Negation of apparent reality. One must comprehend that dharmas, as they
appear to ordinary people and to noble persons, exist only in terms of conventional
truth (savtisatya), and that in terms of absolute truth (paramrthasatya), they are:
impermanent; empty of self and mine; empty of self-existence and true
characteristics, and hence without production (utpda) or destruction (nirodha). This
radical critique begins with an assertion of impermanence of all phenomena. The
canonical texts repeatedly assert that what is impermanent, is not the self and does
not appertain to the self. The emptiness of all dharmas constitutes a logical
culmination of the antma doctrine.
Just as the emptiness of personality (pudgala-nyat), the emptiness of phenomena
(dharma-nyat) affects all dharmas, without allowing any exception. It
encompasses everything, including the dharmas of the path of nirva. Viewed from
this perspective, the four noble truths acquire a new interpretation.
The Buddha taught the truth of suffering (dukha), its origin (samudaya), its
cessation (nirodha), and the path (mrga) of its cessation. He said:
a. All is suffering. All, namely, skandhas, yatanas, and dhtus are suffering, and this
suffering must be known in a perfect manner.
b. Origin of suffering is craving (t). According to the immutable process of
dependent origination, existence is conditioned by karma, and karma is
conditioned by defilements (klea). This craving as the origin of suffering
must be destroyed.
c. Cessation of suffering is nirva. The destruction of suffering that marks the
stoppage of dependent origination is nirva. This destruction must be
realised.
d. Path leading to destruction of suffering. The path that leads to the destruction of
suffering is the path of nirva, and this path must be cultivated.
Influenced by the doctrine of selflessness, the rvakas modified the above formula
of the four noble truths. In his Visuddhimagga 436, Buddhaghosa states:
a. There is suffering but nobody suffers.
b. There is no agent but actions exist. (In other words, the dependent origination
functions in the absence of personal agent.)
20
c. There is extinction but no-one becomes extinct. (Nirva exists but nobody
realises it.)
d. There is a path, but no person treads on it.
The Mahyna adepts produced their own interpretation of the four noble truths on
the basis of emptiness of both person and dharmas. In his Prasannapd 517,
Candrakrti quotes a sutra:
a. The person who grasps that no single dharma is produced, understands suffering in
a perfect manner.
b. The person who perceives that no single dharma arises, for him the origin of
suffering is destroyed.
c. The person who grasps that all dharmas are appeased has realised the destruction.
d. The person who sees that all dharmas are absolutely empty has cultivated the path.
Putting it in a different way:
a. Sasra, or the world of suffering, has never existed; the truth of suffering.
b. Dependent origination that regulates the production of sasra and its destruction
has never functioned; the truth of origin.
c. Nirva that marks the end of sasra has been forever attained; the truth of
destruction.
d. Without actullly the path to nirva having been traversed; the truth of path.
Thus, out of the three Dharma seals or fundamental Buddhist principles (all
saskras are impermanent, all dharmas are selfless, peaceful is nirva), it is
peaceful nirva that retains validity, but here nirva denotes a simple absence of
characteristics. Although it is said in the Mahyna that dharmas do not arise, do not
perish, and have only one characteristic, namely the absence of characteristics, this
absence of characteristic stands for peaceful nirva. Nirva is the object of the
concentration on the commemoration of Dharma, the object of knowledge that
exhausts all Bodhisattva qualities.
Spontaneous elimination of negation. If the Madhyamaka merely attempted to
destroy the idea of existence by the idea of inexistence, he would not dinstinguish
himself from perverted nihilism. However, the idea of inexistence arises only by
opposition to the idea of existence, and when the idea of existence disappears, the
idea of inexistence does not apply to anything, and disappears by itself, without the
need to combat it. All Mdhyamika adepts agree on this way of reasoning.
Ngrjuna (Mlakrik XVIII.7) states: When the object of the mind has been
destroyed, all predication is eliminated. In effect, the nature of phenomena
(dharmat) is unborn, undestroyed like nirva.
Another stanza says: Eliminate the concepts of existence and non-existence, and the
mind will extinguish itself naturally and internally.
In his Bodhicaryvatra,44 ntideva says: When one assumes and becomes
permeated with the notion of emptiness, the notion of existence disappears, and later
due to the habit of this thought that nothing exists, the notion of emptiness also
disappears. In effect, when one no longer perceives the notion of existence, which
could be negated, then how could inexistence, being deprived of support, present
itself before the mind? And when existence and inexistence do not spring up before
the mind, then since there is no other mode of action, grasping no objects, the mind
becomes appeased.

44
. Chapter IX, verses 33-35.
21
Thus vanishes into smoke, this reality (tattva), imagined by ordinary people, seen by
noble person, and which the Buddha himself occasionally pretended to admit
(Itivuttaka 37-38), doing so out of compassion for beings and without intending to
frighten them. Inevitably, by having repudiated nyat, and by using it, the
Mahyna adepts reach the point of no longer conceiving of emptiness, and even less
discoursing about it. There is nothing to state about it, because something that is not
an object of the mind cannot be discussed.
The wise men perceive reality by not perceiving it (adaranayoga), and not
perceiving it, they say nothing. This philosophical silence observed so perfectly by
Vimalakrti,45 is the prerogative of the omniscient Buddhas and of the bodhisattvas of
the eighth stage upward, who have attained the utter conviction that dharmas do not
arise. Instead of the most lofty discourses, silence is buddha-activity, and converts
beings. This, of course, holds valid only as apparent truth, and is open to all kinds
illusory fantasies. In terms of absolute truth, nothing passes or has ever passed.
In his Madhyamakvatra 111, Candrakrti quotes a stra, which says that the
absolute truth cannot be taught, because the teacher, the listener and what is taught,
do not really arise. Unborn things cannot be taught by unborn things. In his
Madhyamaka-vtti 537-38, Candrakrti employs the same argument with reference to
nirva. Nirva could be taught, if some dharma existed as inherent existence
(svabhva), if there were some beings to listen, and if there were some Buddha to
teach it. As this is not the case, nirva is not amenable to verbal discourses and the
mind; and the absence of the knowable (jeya), and of the cognising knowledge
(jna), is beatitude (iva).
Philsophical knowledge is not merely a simple silence: it is closely related to the
abstention of practices, and the Mahhyna gladly defines itself as the stoppage of
every discourse and every practice. It is true that a considerable part of the
Bodhisattvas career is dedicated to the practice of the six perfections, and nobody
would consider to blame him. But still if bad practices are reprehensible, good
practices are hardly any better, because in the last analysis they are fatal. So long as
they are poisoned, foods, whether repugnant or appetizing, are to be avoided. Thus
the Buddha terms the noble practice (ryacarya) as abstention from practices,
because it is highly compatible with the true nature of dharmas.
Mental peace and beatitude
If any concept has occupied a primary position in Buddhism, it the concept of
intellect (citta), mind (manas) or consciousness (vijna). In the early period, the
stras and the Abhidharma texts class vijna as the fifth skandha and the last six
dhtus. The citta is treated as a conditioned dharma, because it arises by relying on
dharmas as its object (viaya) and on the manas as its support.46 The citta constantly
arises and disappears, but ordinary people hold it to be eternal, which is a fatal
misconception (viparysa), which must be counteracted by fixing the attention
(smtyupasthna) on the citta. However, according to the same texts, the citta exerts
extraordinary force and power, because it regulates the destiny of living beings.
Sasra exists due to actions (karma), which are deliberate and intentional. Karma is
volition (cetan), which directs mental, vocal and bodily activities. Karma produces
its retribution as sensations in the five destinies (gati) during the course of the
present, future, or later existences. Happy or unhappy existences are retributions of
intended actions, good or bad. "The world is guided by the citta, manipulated by it;

45
. Vimalakrtinirdea, Lamotte's translation, 317-18.
46
. Sayutta, II, 72; IV, 87.
22
all obeys this one dharma, the citta."47 On the opposite side of sasra there is
nirva which is not conditioned (asaskta) and does not constitute the fruit of
retribution, but still its acquisition presupposes the pacification of actions and the
appeasement of the citta by the suppression desire, hared, and delusion (rga, dvea,
moha). In fact nirva constitutes this suppression.48
The above way of interpretation is accepted by the Mdhyamikas but only as
conventional truth. They are, however, critical about the doctrine that merely treats
the citta as being conditioned by causes and conditions, impermanent and hence not a
self, and devoid of I and mine. In contrast, for the Mdhyamikas a dharma deprived
of I and mine is devoid of inherent nature and of dharma characteristics, and from
the perspective of the ultimate truth it is without origination or destruction. The
perfection of wisdom texts (Pacavimati 121-22) do speak of the citta's luminosity
(cittaprabhsvarat), but they at once explain that the unborn citta is non-citta (citta
acitta), and that in the absence of citta (acittat), the existence or non-existence of the
citta is not established or perceived. As Mahyna adepts, the Mdhyamikas say that
they also cultivate the mindfulness of the citta (cittasmtyupasthna), but they
discover that the citta represents the fruit of misconception (viparysa) and error
(bhrnti). For them the citta is empty (nya), without self (antma), without mine
(antmya), impermanent (anitya), and non-existent (asat). In order to understand that
the character of the citta is without origination, one needs to penetrate into the
dharmas that do not arise. It is so because the citta is without origination, without
inherent nature, and without characteristics. Although the wise considers the nature
of the citta's origination (utpda) and destruction (nirodha), he finds no real
origination or destruction. Without making any distinction in the citta between
defilements (saklea) and purification (vyavadna), he perceives the luminosity of
the citta, the luminosity due to which the citta is not stained by adventitious
defilements.
The rvakas practice the absorption of the cessation of perception and sensation
(sajvedayitanirodha), and realise it in the body. They also submerge into the
three absorptions of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness (nyatni-
mittpraihita), and thus traverse the portal of deliverance (vimokamukha), or
nirva. The Mdhyamikas concur on this point with the rvakas, but they also
voice their difference. The result that the rvakas aim to achieve, the Mdhyamikas
consider it to be achieved from the beginning. For them nirva consists in the
appeasement of the citta or, stating it more explicitly, in the mental state immune to
thinking (acittat). What holds true for the citta also applies to all dharmas: the true
characteristic of dharmas is the absence of characteristics.
Finally, Candrakrti (Madhyamakavtti 351) says that being established in the vision
of emptiness, the yogins no longer perceive the five skandhas and the eighteen
dhtus as real entities. Without perceiving them as things, they do not fall into
pointless mental proliferations (prapaca) about them. Without falling into pointless
discourses about them, they do not fall into mental imaginations (vikalpa). Being
without mental imaginations, they do not generate this multitude of defilements
stemming from the belief in personality (satkyadi), which originates from
attachment to I and mine. Being free from defilements headed by the belief in
personality, they refrain from actions (karma). Without accomplishing actions, they
no longer experience the transmigration (sasra) called birth, old age and death.

47
. Sayutta, I, 39.
48
. Sayutta, IV, 251.
23
Thus, upon reaching emptiness that appeases all mental proliferations (prapaca),
there is for them a complete disappearance of mental imaginations and proliferations.
The disappearance of mental proliferatiopns leads to the abolition of mental
imaginations. This in turn leads to the abolition of all actions and defilements,
followed by the abolition of rebirth. Thus emptiness as such, being charactirized as
the abolition of all mental proliferations, is called nirva.
Since it dispels all mental proliferations (prapaca), emptiness is nirva. It is truly
the middle path taught by the Buddha in his first discourse: This middle path
discovered by the Tathgata, the path that opens the eyes, generates knowledge and
concludes in appeasement, higher knowledge, enlightenment, and nirva. (Vinaya
I.10). The rvakas, being endowed with feeble faculties, believe that this middle
path is to be traversed. The Bodhisattva, grasping the profound intention of the
Buddha, knows that this path is already traversed, that nirva is gained by all,
eternally, because there is no sasra. Nirva is nothing else than the appeasement
of the citta in the vision of emptiness, and when this vision itself disappears, the
appeasement is complete.
Emptiness in Prajpramit texts 49
According to the perfection of wisdom texts, dharmas do not truly exist (na vastu, na
dravya). They are mere names (nmamtra), or designations (prajapti). They are
without self (antma), without mine (antmya), without inherent nature
(nisvabhva), without marks (animitta), without origination (anutpda) and without
destruction (anirodha). So far as they are imagined, they are countless but their
definitions are false. Emptiness, being an escape from all false notions or views
(sarvadnm nisaraam), represents the means or method (upya) to destroy all
notions, but emptiness itself does not have any reality. It is a predicate, which does
not apply to anything, or an attribute without a subject.
There are as many categories of emptiness as there are dharmas to be destroyed. The
doctrine of emptiness of all dharmas is too broad and not very convincing.
Enumeration of all categories of emptiness is practically impossible, and quite
bewildering to the mind. In such situation a choice has be mind. Opting for a middle
way, the Adaa, Pcaviati, and other perfection of wisdom texts show
preference for a set of eighteen categories of emptiness, to which they devote
complete sections, but without providing their full list in any context. In conformity
with the treated subject, they provide partial lists of two, seven, fourteen, or sixteen
kinds of emptiness. The paragraphs below tabulate some partial lists, and then study
the list of the eighteen categories of emptiness.
Two categories of emptiness: emptiness of beings (sattvanyat) and
emptiness of phenomena (dharmanyat).50 This is the principal and most frequently
mentioned list. Occasionally it appears as 1. emptiness of dharmas with no end or
beginning (anavargranyat), 2. absolute emptiness (atyantanyat).
Seven kinds of emptiness: 1. prakti-nyat; 2. svalakaa-; 3. sarvadharma-;
4. anupalambha-; 5. abhva-; 6.svabhva-; 7. abhva-nyat.
Fourteen kinds of emptiness:51 1. adhytma-nyat; 2. bahirdh-; 3. adhytma-
bahirdh-; 4. mah-; 5. nyat-; 6. paramrtha-; 7. saskta-; 8. asaskta-; 9.
atyanta-; 10. anavargra-; 11. anavakra-; 12. praki-; 13. lakaa-; 14. sarvadharma-
nyat.

49
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2027-2044.
50
. Adaa, II, 35.
51
. Adaa, I, 132.
24
Sixteen kinds of emptiness:52 1. adhytma-nyat; 2. bahirdh-; 3.
adhytmabahirdh-; 4. mah-; 5. nyat-; 6. paramrtha-; 7. saskta-; 8.
asaskta-; 9. atyanta-; 10. anavarga-; 11. anavakra-; 12. prakti-; 13. lakaa-; 14.
sarvadharma-; 15. abhva-; 16. abhvasvabhva-nyat.
Eighteen categories of emptiness.53 Like other perfection of wisdom texts, the
Pacaviati (24, 195) contains a developed list of eighteen nyats, followed by a
condensed list of four nyats. It provides definitions of only the first sixteen kinds
of emptiness, followed by definitions of four kinds of emptiness.
List of the eighteen kinds of emptiness: 1. adhytma-nyat, 2. bahirdh-, 3.
adhytmabahirdh-, 4. nyatnyat-, 5. mahnyat, 6. paramrtha-, 7. saskta,
8. asaskta-, 9. atyanta-, 10. anavargra-, 11. anavakra-, 12. prakti-, 13.
sarvadharma-, 14. svalakaa-, 15. anupalambha-, 16. abhva-, 17. svabhva-, 18.
abhvasvabhva-nyat.
Definitions of the first sixteen kinds of emptiness 54
1. adhytma-nyat, emptiness of internal dharmas. These are the internal sense
organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. The eye is empty of the eye because
it is neither eternal nor transitory (akasthvinit). It is so because such is its
nature/essence (prakti). The same holds for the remaining sense organs.
2. bahirdh-nyat, emptiness of external dharmas. These are the external sense-
objects: colour, sound, smell, tangible, and dharmas. The colour is empty of colour
because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is its essence.
3. adhytmabahirdh-nyat, emptiness of internal and external dharmas. The six
internal bases (yatana), and the six external bases of cognition, are called internal
and external dharmas. Internal dharmas are empty of external dharmas because they
are neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is their essence. In a similar
way external dharmas are empty of the internal dharmas.
4. nyatnyat, emptiness of emptiness. This emptiness of dharmas is empty of
emptiness itself, because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is its
essence.
5. mahnyat, great emptiness. The eastern region is empty of the eastern region,
the southern region is empty of the southern region, the western region is empty of
the western region, the northern region is empty of the northern region, the region of
the nadir is empty of the region of the nadir, the region of the zenith is empty of the
region of the zenith, and the intermediate regions are empty of the intermediate
regions. They all are empty because they are neither eternal nor transitory. It is so
because such is their essence.
6. paramrtha-nyat, emptiness of the absolute. It is nirva that is meant here.
Nirva is empty of nirva because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is so
because such is its essence.
7. saskta-nyat, emptiness of the conditioned. The term conditioned stands for
the threefold world (Kmadhtu etc.). These three worlds are empty of themselves,
because they are neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is their essence.
8. asaskta-nyat, emptiness of the unconditioned. The unconditioned stands for
what has no origination, no alteration, no duration, and no destruction. The

52
. Madhyntavibhgabhya, ed. Nagao, 24; Madhyntavibhgak, ed. Yamaguchi, 52 ff.
53
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2029-31.
54
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2037-39.
25
unconditioned is empty of the unconditioned, because it is neither eternal nor
transitory. It is so because such is its essence.
9. atyanta-nyat, absolute emptiness. A thing that has no limit (anta) is absolute.
The absolute is empty of the absolute because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is
so because such is its essence.
10. anavargra-nyat, emptiness of (dharmas) with no beginning or end. A dharma
with no perceived beginning or end has neither departure nor return. A dharma
without beginning or end is empty of the absence of beginning and end, because it is
neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is its essence.
11. anavakra-nyat, emptiness of non-dispersion (varients: avakra-, dispersed
dharmas, and avakrnavakra- emptiness of dispersed and non-dispersed dharmas).
Non-dispersion stands for the lack of dispersion. Non-dispersion is empty of non-
dispersion because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is its
essence.
12. prakti-nyat, emptiness of essence. The essence of all conditioned and
unconditioned dharmas is not created by the rvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas
or Buddhas. The essence is empty of essence because it is neither eternal nor
transitory. It is so because such is its essence.
13. sarvadharma-nyat, emptiness of all dharmas. All dharmas means matter
(rpa), sensation (vedan), perception (saj), formation (saskra), and
consciousness (vijna); eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; colour, sound,
smells, taste, contact, and dharma; eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose
consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mental
consciousness; eye contact, ear contact mind contact; sensation issued from eye
contact sensation issued from mind contact; material dharmas and immaterial
dharmas; conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. All dharmas are empty of all
dharmas because they are neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because such is their
essence.
14. svalakaa-nytat, emptiness of particular characteristic (variants:
svasmnya-lakaa-, emptiness of particular and common characteristic). The
characteristic of matter is liability to breakage, that of sensation is feeling or
experience, that of perception is grasping characteristics, that of mental formations is
the fact of conditioning, that of consciousness is apprehension. Whether it concerns
the characteristic of conditioned or unconditioned dharmas, all these dharmas are
empty of their particular characteristics because they are neither eternal nor
transitory. It is so because such is their essence.
15. anupalambha-nyat, emptiness of non-perception. It is non-perception of
neither the past, nor the future, nor the duration of the present. Non-perception is
empty of non-perception because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is so because
such is its essence.
16. abhvasvabhva-nyat, emptiness of nonexistence and of inherent existence.
There is no inherent nature that could be a combination (syogika) (of being and
non-being), because all dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Such
combination is empty of combination, because it is neither eternal nor transitory. It is
so because such is its essence.
The four kinds of emptiness:
1.bhvo bhvena nya, being is empty of being. The term bhva denotes the five
aggregates (skandha). The five aggregates are empty of the five aggregates.

26
2. abhvo 'bhvena nya, nonbeing is empty of nonbeing. The term abhva denotes
the unconditioned (asaskta). The unconditioned is empty of unconditioned. Thus
nonbeing is empty of nonbeing.
3. svabhva svabhvena nya, inherent nature is empty of inherent nature. The
term svabhva denotes true essence (avipart prakti). The emptiness of true essence
is not produced by knowledge or by vision (of the holy persons). This is called
emptiness of inherent nature.
4. parabhva parabhvena nya, other existence is empty of other existence. What
is it? Whether the Tathgatas appear, or whether they do not appear, this stability of
dharmas, dharma-nature, dharma-element, dharma-certainty the limit of reality,
remains stable. Consequently, the fact that these dharmas are empty (of intervention
from) outside or external factors is called emptiness of other existence.
The expresion that dharmas are neither eternal nor transitory (aktasthvinit
updya) is explained in the Mahprajpramitstra in the following manner.55
The people who do not exert themselves in the practice of emptiness fall into one of
the two extremes (antadvaya) of eternalism (svata) or nihilism (uccheda). The one
who pursues the practice, being troubled by existence (bhva), takes recourse to
emptiness in order to destroy existence. After achieving the destruction of existence
he venerates emptiness. However, the person who becomes attached to it falls into
the position of nihilism. On the other hand the application of emptiness to destroy
existence without becoming attached to emptiness enables one to avoid the two
extremes, and to follow the middle path. The eighteen kinds of emptiness inspired by
the thought of great compassion serve to save living beings. It is for this reason that
the texts use this expression "neither eternal nor transitory." All kinds of emptiness
are comprised in the eighteen kinds of emptiness. When the Buddha teaches at
length, he discourses on the eighteen categories of emptiness, and when he teaches in
short, he talks of the four kinds of emptiness.
The lists of the eighteen and four nyats are not the same but differ in the various
recensions of the perfection of wisdom texts in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese.56
According to this Mahprajpramitstra, the Pacaviati has two lists, one long
of eighteen categories of emptiness and one short of four, both having the same
meaning; one is developed and one is condensed. The Yogcra-Mdhyamika-
Svtantrika establioshed a list of twenty nyats, which are graded and fitted into
the various stages of the bodhisattva career. This stratified classification appears for
the first time in Maitreyantha's Abhisamaylakra (I, verse 47) and in
Haribhadra's commentary Abhisamaylakrloka (ed. Wogihara, 95, 5-96, 29).
This is further taken up in the Yogcra texts such as the Mahynasagraha,
Madhyntavibhga, and Vijaptimtratsiddhi.
The twenty kinds of emptiness are related to the tenfold charmadhtu or tathat,
sarvatraga and other terms, and serve to counteract ten different kinds of ignorance,
pthagjanatva, etc. (Mahynasagraha, E. Lamotte's translation, 196-199;
Madhyntavibhga, ed. G.M. Nagao, 34-36; Siddhi, 639-76).
The practice of the twenty kinds of nyat and of the tenfold dharmadhtu is
pursued at all stages of the bodhisattva's career. See loka, 95.5-96.29; E.
Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamaylakra, 126-43; E. Conze, The Large Stra
on Perfect Wisdom, 144-48:

55
. Mahprajpramitstra, 2039.
56
. On page 2041 Lomotte provides a table in which he lists the various texts where nyats are dealt
with.
27
1. In the adhimuktricarybhmi, stage of the practice of adhesion: adhytma,
bahirdh and adhytmabahirdh nyat.
2. In the prayogamrga, preparatory path: nyatnyat.
3. In the first bhmi: mahnyat.
4. In the second bhmi: paramrthanyat.
5. In the third bhmi: sasktanyat.
6. In the fourth bhmi: asasktanyat.
7. In the fifth bhmi: atyantanyat.
8. In the sixth bhmi: anavargranyat.
9. In the seventh bhmi: anavaknyat.
10. In the eighth bhmi: prakti- and sarvadharmanyat.
11.In the ninth bhmi: lakaa- and anupalambhanyat.
12.In the tenth bhmi: abhva- (1) and bhvanyat.
13.In the buddhabhmi: abhva- (2), svabhva and parabhvanyat.

28
 PART TWO
STRA EXPOSITION
OF THE EIGHTEEN CATEGORIES OF EMPTINESS
Stra (Pacaviati 24.10-17): The Bodhisattva Mahsattva who wishes to become
established in 1. adhytma-nyat, 2. bahirdh-, 3. adhytmabahirdh-, 4.
nyatnyat-, 5. mahnyat, 6. paramrtha-, 7. saskta-, 8. asaskta-, 9.
atyanta-, 10. anagra-, 11. avakra-, 12. prakti-, 13. svalakaa-, 14. sarvadharma-,
15. anupalambha-, 16. abhva-, 17. svabhva-, 18. abhvasvabhva-nyat, he must
practice the perfection of wisdom.

The first three nyats 57

1. adhytmanyat: emptiness of internal/subject (or dharma);
2. bahirdhnyat: emptiness of external/object (or dharma);
3. adhytmabahirdh-nyat: emptiness of both internal/subject and
external/object, or of internal and external dharmas.58
Internal dharmas (the eye etc, the six internal yatanas) are empty of the internal
dharmas, because there is no tma and no tmya in them, and there are no internal
dharmas. Similarly, external dharmas (colour etc., the six external yatanas) are
empty of the external dharmas. There is no self (tma) and no mine (tmya) in them,
and there are no external dharmas.
Internal and external dharmas (twelve yatanas) are empty of the internal and
external dharmas for the same reason as the two previous categories of emptiness.
Why there are eighteen categories of emptiness? Dharmas are innumerable and the
kinds of emptiness that correspond to them are also innumerable. When the notion of
emptiness is discussed in brief, one speaks of one emptiness, namely emptiness of all
dharmas. When it is discussed at length, one postulates emptiness for each dharma
individually. The number of the eighteen categories of emptiness has been
established by following the simile of a correct dose of medicine. When one speaks
of one single emptiness, it is too limited (the dose of medicine is too small) and if
one speaks of an infinite number of emptinesses, they become too numerous (the
dose of medicine is too big and may be poisonous). The number eighteen is adequate
to cure all kinds of false views and defilements. Apart from that the wholesome
(kuala) and unwholesome (akuala) dharmas have been defined and numbered.
Relationship between the perfection of wisdom and the eighteen kinds of emptiness.
So far as the question of identity and difference between the perfection of wisdom
and the eighteen kinds of emptiness is concerned, they are identical and different for
certain reasons.
So far as differences are concerned, the following applies. The perfection of wisdom
(prajpramit), being named true characteristic (bhtalaka) of dharmas,
eliminates all considerations with regard to dharmas. The eighteen kinds of empti-
nesses represent eighteen different ways of considering dharmas as empty. It is
through the training in the true characteristic of dharmas that the Bodhisattva
produces eighteen kinds of emptiness.

57
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2044. These three kinds of emptiness are already mentioned in the
Mahsuata-sutta of the Majjhima, III, 112, where the twelve yatanas are declared to be empty of
self and a mine.
58
. E. Conze, The Large Large Stra on Perfect Wisdom, Berkeley & London, 1975, 144-48.
29
So far as their identity is concerned, the following norm should be applied. The
eighteen kinds of emptiness are empty and unreal (asadbhta-lakaa); the praj-
pramit itself is also empty and unreal. Concurrently, the eighteen kinds of
emptiness and the perfection of wisdom represent the rejection of characteristic
marks (nimittaparityga); they do not refer to any characteristics; to exert oneself in
the perfection of wisdom is to exert oneself in the eighteen kinds of emptiness.
The first three nyats and the four foundations of mindfulness.59 There are
similarities between the first three nyats and the four foundations of mindfulness
(smtyupasthna). The four smtyupasthnas consider internal and external dharmas,
and both internal and external dharmas in a similar way to the first three categories
of nyat, except that the first smtyupasthna establishes the lack of the self and of
the mind, and the three kinds of nyat establish that dharmas are deprived of their
inherent nature, characteristic, and that consequently they are without production or
destruction.
In the world there are four misconceptions60 (viparysa), which are eliminated by the
cultivation of twelve considerations that are inherent in the four smtyupasthnas.
The twelve considerations consist of examining the body (kya), sensations (vedan),
the mind (citta), and dharmas in themselves, which means internally (adhytma),
then as external (bahirdh) to onself, and as both internal and external to oneself
(adhytma-bahirdh).
When one considers the internal body, consisting of thirty-six elements (dhtu),61 one
discovers that it is impure, repugnant, and deprived of pure characteristics. It is this
absence of pure characteristics (ucilakanupalabdhi) that is called emptiness of
internal dharmas.
When one considers the external body of other people as an object of attachment,
one discovers that what one perceives as beautiful and attractive, is also truly
deprived of the characteristic of purity. This absence of pure characteristic
constitutes emptiness of external dharmas.
Next, when one considers the body of other people and one's own body, one realises
that both external and internal bodies are the same: both of them are impure. It is the
absence of pure characteristic that constitutes both internal and external emptiness.
The mindfulness with regard to the body (kyasmtyupasthna) is concerned with
material dharmas (rpadharma). One considers material dharmas as impermanent
(anitya), painful (dukha), empty (nya) and selfless (antma).

59
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2047.
60
. Misconceptions of 1. taking impure for pure, 2. painful for happy, 3. impermanent for permanent,
and 4. nonself for self.
61
. stra, III, 1297. The Sanskrit texts of the Hnayna, and of the Mahyna, refer to thirty-six
elements of the body. The Pli canon refers to thirty-one (Dgha, II, 293; Majjhima, I, 57. In the
Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, 205-19, one finds thirty-two. The lists in the Pacaviati are full of
mistakes. The list of the Visuddhimagga: (head) hair (kesa/kea), 2. (bodily) hair (loma/roman), 3.
nails (nakha), 4. teeth (dnta), 5. skin (taca/tvac), 6. flesh (masa/msa), 7. sinew (nhru/snyu),
8. bones (ahi/asthi), 9. marrow (ahamij/asthimajjan), 10. kidneys (vakka/vkka), 11. heart
(`hadaya/hdaya), 12. lever (yakana/yakt), 13. pleura (kilomaka/kloman), 14. spleen
(pihaka/plhan), 15. lungs (papphsa/pupphusa), 16. intestines (anta/antra), 17. mesentery
(antagua/antragua), 18. stomach (udhariya/udara), 19. excrement (karsa/karsa), 20. brain
(atthaluga/mastuluga), 21. bile (pitta), 22. phlegm (semha/leman), 23. pus (pubba/pya), 24.
blood (lohita), 25. sweat (seda/sveda), 26. grease (meda/medas), 27. tears (assu/aru), 28. marrow
(vas), 29. saliva (khea/khea), 30. macus (sighik/sighaka), 31. synovia (lasik), 32. urine
(mutta/mtra).
30
When one makes an act of reflection (manasikra), one becomes aware that it is due
to pleasant sensations (vedan) that one becomes attached to both internal and
external body. The contact of the six objects (viaya) and the organs (indriya)
engenders happiness, which is called external happiness (bahirdhsukha). The desire
that penetrates one engenders happiness that is called internal happiness. To put it
differently, happiness conditioned by internal dharmas is called internal happiness,
and the one conditioned by external dharmas is called external happiness; or again
happiness associated with the first five kinds of sense consciousness is called
external happiness, and the one associated with mental consciousness (manovijna)
is called internal happiness. Similar distinctions apply to the painful and indifferent
sensations.
When one considers internal happiness, one perceives that it does not really exist,
and that it is suffering (dukha) that one considers as happiness (sukha). It is so
because this kind of happiness, issued from causes and conditions, engenders the
fruit of retribution that is also suffering. Happiness with which one is never satisfied
is suffering. One considers happiness as suffering, and suffering as an arrow piercing
the body. One considers impermanent and changing characteristics (anitya-
viparimalakaa) of that which is neither happiness nor suffering. After
considering in this way the triple sensation, one rejects it mentally, and this is
emptiness of internal sensations. One applies similar considerations to both internal
and external sensations.
Next, one considers as to who or what experiences happiness and suffering, and one
realises that it is the mind (citta). One wants to discover whether citta is true or false.
One knows that citta is impermanent and has as its characterics production (utpda),
duration (sthiti), and disappearance (vyaya). Citta of pleasant sensation, citta of
unpleasant sensation, and citta of indifferent sensation: these three kinds of sensation
constitute three different moments (kaa). When pleasant citta disappears,
unpleasant citta arises, persists for a moment, and disappears. Next indifferent citta
arises, persists for a moment, and vanishes. As these three sensations are
impermanent, the citta is also impermanent. One knows that there are cittas of desire
or non-desire (rga / arga), hatred or non-hatred (dvea / advea), delusion or non-
delusion (moha / amoha), distracted (vikipta) or concentrated (saghta), confined
(baddha), free (vimukta), and one also knows that thoughts have their different
characteristics. One realises that the citta is not eternal or permanent but
impermanent (anitya). The citta experiencing happiness or suffering depends on
causes and conditions, and when these cease to exist the citta also disappears. It is in
this manner that one considers the impermanent characteristics of internal, external
and both internal and external cittas.
When ones citta and manas are developed, one knows that the body has impure
characteristic, sesation has painful characteristic, and that citta is without duration
and has the characteristic of impermanence. However, without breaking the fetters
(sayojana), one still has an awareness of oneself (ahakra). Here one reflects as
to who perceives the citta and on whom the citta depends, who is its master, and to
whom all dharmas appertain. After an analysis, one recognizes that there is no master
as a separate (bhinna) entity. It is due to one's grasping an entity, an tma or a purua
within the five aggregates. It is through the notion of tma that the notion of tmya
arises, and from that the notion of existence (bhva). With regard to people who
benefit one, one experiences desire (rga), towards those who contradict one, one
experiences hatred (dvea), and these two kinds of attitude do not arise due to

31
knowledge (jna), but due to delusion (moha). This triple poison (rga, dvea,
moha) is the root of all defilements (klea).
It is through self-conceit (ahakra) that one accomplishes meritorious actions
(puya) so that one can later cultivate the auxiliary dharmas of the path and obtain
liberation (moka). The initial seizure of characteristics (nimittodgrahaa) is called
perception aggregate (sajskandha). Then due to ahakra one produces moral
fetters (sayojana) and good mental formations, which are the formation aggregate
(saskraskandha). These two aggregates constitute mindfulness of dharmas
(dharma-smtyupasthna).62 One does not find tma in the perception and formation
aggregates, because all dharmas issue from causes and conditions are conditioned
and without solidity (sra). The formation aggregate is like a tree with its parts
within which one does not find anything solid, and the perception aggregate is like a
mirage. Such are the considerations of internal, external, and both internal and
external dharmas. Whichever dharma is investigated one finds in it no tman.
The first three nyats and samdhi. Are these three nyats empty by the force of
concentration, or are they empty dharmas as such? They are empty by the force of
concentration. It is said that the three samdhis, or the three portals of deliverance
(vimokamukha), consist of emptiness (nyat), signlessness (nimitta), and
wishlessness (apraihita). The concentration of emptiness focuses on the body,
sensation, mind, and dharmas. As it apprehends neither self nor mine, it is said to be
emptiness.
Four general characteristics of conditioned dharmas and four views of the foundation
of mindfulness. The four foundations of mindfulness should treat empty dharmas as
impermanent, painful, empty, and selfless. But why they treat the body as impure,
sensations as painful, mind as impermanent, and dharmas as having no self? They all
treat these four things as impermanent and so on. However, in the case of the body,
beings embrace the misconceptions (viparysa) of taking impure for pure (body),
painful for happy (sensations), impermanent for permanent (mind), and antman for
tman. It is for this reason that (in the course of the four foundations of mindfulness)
one treats the body as impure, sensations as painful, and so on.
Furthermore, in the case of internal emptiness and external emptiness, there is no
dharma that is definitely internal or external, because being dependent as mutual
causes (sahabhhetu), they cannot be declared to be internal and external. Thus, what
ones neighbour treats as external, one treats as internal, and vice versa. It depends
on the subject (not on the object) that an internal dharma is internal, and it also
depends on the subject (not on the object) that an external dharma is external. When
the yogin considers internal and external dharmas, these dharmas have no fixed
characteristic (niyatalakaa), and hence they are empty.
Internal and external dharmas possess no inherent nature (svabhva), because they
arise due to a combination of causes and conditions. But these dharmas are not found
in assembled causes and conditions in any way. And as they do not exist in their
causes and conditions, internal and external dharmas do not exist somewhere else.
The causes and conditions of internal and external dharmas do not exist. Since causes
(kraa) and effects (krya) are inoperative, internal and external dharmas are empty.

62
. Rpaskandha is the object of kyastyupasthna; vedan of vedansmtyupasthna; and saj
and vijna-skandhas of cittasmtyupasthna. Dharma-smtyupasthna can consider any of the
skandhas, because it includes all dharmas.
32
Is the body identical with or different from its parts?63 The body (as a whole) is one
unique thing, while its causes (as parts) are multiple. But unity (ekatva) does not
make plurality (nntva), and plurality does not make unity. One cannot pretend that
outside of its parts, there is a special dharma called body, as this would be in
contradiction with the entire world. Thus, one cannot say that the body is identical
with its parts, or that it is different from its parts. This is the reason why there is no
body, and as the body is inexistent, the foot, and the rest, does not exist. This is what
must be understood by internal emptiness. External dharmas, houses and so on, are
also empty in the same way. But the Buddhist stras do speak about internal and
external dharmas as really existent, namely the six internal organs and the six
external objects. Why is it asserted here that they do not exist? These internal and
external dharmas are conglomerates existing as designations (prajaptisat), as mere
names, just as is the case with the body or houses.
Emptiness in the two Vehicles (yna).64 Stated succinctly, there are two kinds of
emptiness: emptiness of beings, and emptiness of dharmas. The rvaka, being taught
the emptiness of beings, becomes liberated from such notions as tman and tmya,
and remains unattached to anything else. The Mahyna adept, being taught the
emptiness of dharmas, immediately comprehends that sasra is forever empty and
identical with nirva.
For the rvaka internal emptiness stands for inner dharmas as having no tma or
tmya, no eternal entity, no agent (kraka), no knower (jnaka), or experiencer
(vedaka). A similar interpretation applies to external emptiness. However, internal
and external dharmas are not taught as being empty of their respective
characteristics. The Mahyna adept asserts that internal dharmas lack the
characteristic of internal dharmas, and that the same holds for external dharmas.
The perfection of wisdom texts (Pacaviati 128) say: Form is empty of the
characteristic of form; sensation, perception, formation, consciousness, are empty of
their respective characteristics of sensation, and so on.
The rvaka destroys the causes and conditions of his egotism (ahakra), no longer
generates defilements (klea) and eliminates the thirst for dharmas. But since he is
afraid of the sorrows of old age and death, and of evil destinies (durgati), he does not
investigate the source or termination of desire (kma), and does not destroy dharmas
completely. For him it is deliverance (vimukti) that matters.
The Mahyna adept destroys the bonds of the three worlds (traidhduka), defeats
the armies of Mra (mrasen), shatters the fetters (sayojana), and eliminates the
traces of karmic permeations (vsan). He knows clearly the beginning and end of all
dharmas, and his penetrations (prativedha) face no impediments (nvaraa). He
destroys and disposes of all dharmas so perfectly that for him sasra and nirva
are identical and mingled with tranquillity (upaama) and cessation (nirodha). He
gains enlightenment (bodhi), guides living beings, and induces them to abandon the
three worlds (traidhduka).
Method of teaching emptiness.65 Which method is employed by the Mahyna
to destroy dharmas? In the Pheasutta the Buddha says that matter (rpa) arising
from multiple causes and conditions does not have solidity (srat). The state of
matter is like water waves producing foam that disappears as soon as it is

63
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2058-59.
64
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2060-61.
65
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2061-63.
33
perceived.66 When the four great elements (mahbhta) of the present existence and
the karmic causes and conditions of the previous existences become united, they
produce matter, but when the causes and conditions disappear, matter disperses with
them.
The ascetic who follows the path of impermanence (anityatmrga) gradually
penetrates the portals of emptiness (nyatmukha). Dharmas that perish as soon as
they arise, do not have any duration (sthiti), and without any movement of duration
they are not grasped. Due to the characteristics of conditioned dharmas
(sasktalakaa), at the moment of production (utpda) there is disappearance
(vyaya), and at the moment of disappearance there is production. If dharmas are
already produced, production does not serve any purpose. If they are not produced,
production does not produce anything.67 There can be no difference between dharmas
and production. It is so because if production possessed the characteristic of
production (utpdalakaa), there would have to be in it production of production
(utpdotpda), and that production would have to have production, and so on:
regression into infinity.68 If production of production did not have its production,
then the initial production would not have any production either. If the initial
production had no production, then dharmas too would not have it either. Thus
production does not exist (nopalabhyate) and disappearance (vyaya) does not exist
either. Therefore dharmas are empty, without production (anutpda), without
destruction (anirodha); such is the truth.
If dharmas exist, they end up in nonexistence. But what becomes later inexistent
must be also initially inexistent. Thus they are empty. Dharmas are empty. But as the
consequence of the misconception of taking nonbeing for being, one becomes
attached to the six internal organs. The yogin destroys this misconception and this is
what is called internal emptiness. Similar arguments apply to external emptiness and
both internal and external emptiness.
4. nyatnyat: 69 emptiness of emptinesses70
By means of the fourth emptiness one destroys emptiness of internal dharmas,
emptiness of external dharmas, and emptiness of both internal and external dharmas.
Since this emptiness destroys the first three kinds of emptiness, it is named emptiness

66
. Pheasutta of the Sayutta, III, 140-41.
67
. Madhyamakakrik, VII, 2.
68
. Madhyamakakrik, VII, 3.
69
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2064-67.
70
. Apart from the three samdhis (nyat, nimitta, apraihita) constituting the portals of deliverance
(vimokamukha), Abhidharma masters refer to three kinds of meditations named
nyatnyatsamdhi, aparaihitparaihitasamdhi, and nimittnimittasamdhi, which mark a
progression on the three samdhis. The nyatsamdhi refers to the last two aspects (kra) of the
first noble truth. It considers dharmas as nya and antma (Koabhya, 400, 449). By empty
dharmas are meant the dharmas that contradict the view of mine (tmyadivipaka), and that are
deprived of the inner activity, individuality, and of tma (rahita). The nyatnyatsamdhi
considers the nyatsamdhi of arhats as empty and not as nonself, because the nyat disgusts
more than antma (Ko, VIII, 188). The Pli tradition also has suasum (Paisambhid, II,
178): the six internal organs are empty of atta, attaniya, nicca, dhuva, sassata, aviparimadhamma.
Thus the Abhidharma masters consider emptiness in itself as a privation of self and mine, admitting
the emptiness of beings. But they did not deny the reality of dharmas, which they held as real and
having svabhva, lakaa, and nonself as one of their common characteristics. Dharmas had the
nimitta of antma qualified by nya but this emptiness had its substratum (raya) in dharmas.
For the Mahyna dharmas are not only sattvanya but also dharmanya, and are deprived of their
nature and characteristic. They cannot be grasped. The emptiness applied to them applies to
nothing. Thus there is also emptiness of emptiness.
34
of emptinesses. First one employes the first three nyats of dharmas to destroy
internal and external dharmas, and next one employs this fourth nyat to destroy
the first three nyats.
In addition, by means of the three concentrations of emptiness (nyatsamdhi), the
yogin considers the emptiness of the five skandhas, gains the noble eightfold path
(rygamrga), destroys defilements (klea), and attains nirva with remainder
(sopadhiea-nirva). Next due to karmic causes and conditions of previous
existences, at the dissolution of the body after death, the yogin abandons the
eightfold path, and produces a concentration of the emptiness of emptiness
(nyatnyat-samdhi), which is called emptiness of emptinesses.
The nyatsamdhi induces a feeling of disgust for sasra. The
nyatnyatsamdhi, which follows the previous one, induces the disgust for the
dharmas of the path. It is through the knowledge and vision of deliverance
(vimuktijnadarana) that he knows that his pursuit of the path of the destruction of
suffering has been accomplished (mrgo me bhvito na punar bhavitavya).
Difference between nyats and nyat of nyats. Once the three nyats have
destroyed all dharmas, there is nothing left except for those nyats, and now these
nyats must be also rejected. That's why there is the need for this fourth nyat of
nyats. The nyats refer to all dharmas, and the nyat of nyats refers solely
to the nyats. One uses medicine when one is ill, but once cured, one discontinues
the use of medicine. Finally, as this last emptiness destroys the other seventeen kinds
of emptiness, it is called nyatnyat.
5.mahnyat: 71 great emptiness or emptiness of the ten directions
In the rvaka system it is the dharmanyat that denotes mahnyat.72 In certain
stras it is said that old age and death have birth as their condition. A man endowed
with old age and death is empty of being (sattvanyat), and old age and death is
empty of dharmas (dharmanyat). In contrast, Mahyna stras say that the ten
directions are empty of the characteristics of the ten directions, and that this
constitutes great emptiness.
The directional regions, the east and so on, are called great, because they are
limitless and omnipresent, because they encompass all material things, because they
exist forever, because they favour the world (loka), and because they prevent beings
from becoming disoriented. It is for this reason that the emptiness capable of
destroying them is called great emptiness. The other kinds of emptiness, which
destroy dharmas issued from causes and conditions (prattyasamutpanna),
conditioned and gross dharmas that are easily destroyed, are not called great. By
contrast the directions are neither dharmas issued from causes and conditions, nor
conditioned dharmas, but constitute dharmas that are subtle and difficult to destroy.
Thus, the emptiness that destroys them is called great emptiness.
In fact in Buddhism there is no question of the directions. They are not placed among
the unconditioned dharmas, along with space (ka), and the two cessations
(nirodha). Why here, the directions are spoken of and defined? Within the rvaka
system the regions are not found, but in the Mahyna they exist in terms of
conventional truth (savtisatya), but from the perspective of absolute truth
(paramrthasatya) they do not exist. Just as the five aggregates are metaphorically
called "being", in the same way, the matter derived from the great elements
(mahbhta), where distinctions between locations are made, is metaphorically

71
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2067-72.
72
. Nidnasasayukta, edited Triph, 152-57; Sayutta, II, 60-63: Avijjpaccay.
35
named region. The place where the sun rises is the eastern region, and where it sets
is the western regions: these are the regions. The regions exist forever and thus do
not issue from causes and conditions. It is not the question of any actual existence
preceded by a prior inexistence, or the question of any posterior inexistence preceded
by an actual existence. They are not formations (saskra), and are not known by
direct perception but constitute subtle (skma) dharmas. The regions exist in terms
of conventional truth (savtisatya), but in terms of absolute truth (paramrthasatya),
they are destroyed. Thus one does not fall into the false view of the two extremes:
nihilism (uccheda) or eternalism (vata). Affirming that they exist in term of
conventional truth, one avoids the extreme of nihilism, and by affirming that they are
destroyed in terms of absolute truth, one avoids the extreme of eternalism. In
summary, this is what great emptiness stands for.
6.paramrtha-nyat: 73 emptiness of the absolute or of nirva
It is nirva that is meant here.74 The absolute (paramrtha) is the true characteristic
of dharmas (dharmn bhta-lakaa or dharmat), because it is indestructible and
inalterable. But this true characteristic of dharmas is also empty, because with regard
to it there is no grasping (updna) or attachment (abhinivea). If it existed one could
grasp it and attach oneself to it. But since it truly does not exist, one cannot grasp it
or attach oneself to it. If one does, it is an error.
The supreme (parama) dharma among all dharmas is called nirva. In nirva there
is no characteristic of nirva, and emptiness of nirva is emptiness of the absolute
(paramrtha).
However, if nirva is empty and without its proper characteristic, why the noble
persons (rya) enter the three Vehicles (triyna), and enter nirva? It is said that all
teachings of the Buddha conclude in nirva, just as rivers flow into the sea. The
answer is that there is nirva (asti).75 It is the supreme jewel (apramaratna), the

73
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2072.
74
. Asaskta dharmas differ from saskta dharmas by not being subject to utpda-origination,
vyaya-disappearance, sthityanyathtva-duration/modification. For the Sarvstivda there are three
asaskta dharmas: ka, pratisakhynirodha, and apratisakhynirodha. The
pratisakhynirodha, destruction due to knowledge, represents separation from impure dharmas
(ssrava) acquired by a category of knowledge. It is the knowledge of the four noble truths. The
apratisakhynirodha is also a suppression but different from the previous separation. It
represents an absolute obstacle to the production of future dharmas. It is not gained by the
knowledge of the truths, but by the insufficiency of causes and conditions. (Koa, I, 9-10). The
Sarvstivda school accepts the three asasktas as real and existent, and they can be realised by
arhats. They are entities, real, good and eternal (Koabhya, 92). The Sautrntikas see space
(ka) as the absence of the tangible (Koa, II, 279); the pratisakhyanirodha or nirva is the
suppression of defilements, and rebirths already produced; it is the absence of the production of
new defilements and rebirths; the apratisakhynirodha, independently from the comprehension of
the truths, and by virtue of the insufficiency of causes and conditions, represents the absence of the
production of dharmas. Being defined as absences, the Sautrntikas deny them as realities. For
the perfection of wisdom, saskta and asaskta dharmas are devoid of their inherent nature and
escape any predication, they are neither grasped nor rejected.
75
. All Buddhist masters admit that nirva exists, but as usual there is the question of how it exists.
The Sarvstivda tradition admits that as asaskta it is existence (bhva). The Sautrntikas
consider it nonexistent (abhva). But they explain that they are not saying that the asaskta does
not exist, but that it is such (tadda yath) as it has been described by them. There is an anterior
and posterior inexistence of sound, but it is not established whether this inexistence is existence.
The same holds for the asaskta. However, there is a certain praiseworthy inexistence that exists
(bhavati): it is the absolute inexistence of all suffering. The verb to be does not mean to exist.
Ngrjuna's Mlamadhyamakakrik (XXV) explains the notion of nirva. Candrakrti comments
(Vtti, 524): the non-process of the continuity of birth and death in the absence of all relations and
36
supreme (anuttara) dharma, and it is of two kinds: nirva with remainder of
conditionality (sopadheanirva) and nirva without remainder of conditionality
(nirupadhieanirva). The nirva with remainder constitutes the elimination of all
defilements, craving and the rest. The five aggregates still remain, but they are free
from defilements. The nirva without remainder represents the extinction of the five
aggregates in the present life; these aggregates will not reassemble into a new life.
This nirva is the extinction of the five aggregates acquired by the holy persons in
the present existence, and the fact that these aggregates will not be acquired again.
Thus, it is impossible to assert that there is no nirva. However, people upon
hearing of nirva form a wrong view and become attached to the sound (ghoa) of
nirva, and initiate vain discussions with regard to its existence or inexistence. It is
in order to destroy such prejudices that emptiness of nirva is taught. If one
becomes attached to existence, one becomes attached to sasra. And again when
one becomes attached to inexistence one becomes attached to nirva. One must
destroy the nirva perceived by ordinary people (pthagjana), but one does not
destroy the nirva acquired (upalabdha) by the holy persons. It is the case, because
the holy persons do not perceive any characteristics in any dharma.
Craving and other defilements are metaphorically called fetters. If one cultivates the
path, one destroys the fetters, and one gains deliverance (vimukti) called nirva.
Finally, dharmas are not apart from the absolute (paramrtha), and the absolute is not
apart from the true characteristic (bhtalakaa) of dharmas. Therefore, it is logically
apparent that the emptiness of the true characteristic of dharmas is the emptiness of
the absolute.
7&8. saskta-asaskta-nyat: 76 emptiness of the conditioned and
emptiness of the unconditioned
Conditioned dharmas are those dharmas, which issue from causes and conditions,
namely the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases (yatana), and the eighteen
elements (dhtu). Unconditioned dharmas are the dharmas, which are without causes
or conditions, eternal (nitya), unborn (anutpanna), unsuppressed (aniruddha), and
similar to space (ka).77
Twofold emptiness of the conditioned. Conditioned dharmas are empty for two
reasons. 1. They are empty because they have no tman and no tmya, and because
they lack permanence (nitya) and immutability (aviparimadharma). 2. Conditioned
dharmas are empty of the characteristic of conditioned dharmas, they do not arise, do
not perish, and do not exist.78
Conditioned dharmas are empty of the characteristic of conditioned dharmas,
because as there is no being (sattva, tma), these dharmas have no foundation or
support (apratihna). As they lack eternity, they have no time of duration
(sthitikla), and having no duration-time, they are inexistent. This lack or emptiness
of eternity denotes the emptiness of being (sattva, antman). This lack of eternity

dependencies is established as nirva. The continuity of birth and death, namely sasra, has
never functioned, because all is empty, and nirva must be understood as the nonprocess of
sasra that has never proceeded. Thus nirva cannot be considered as being bhva or abhva,
nor their synthesis. It escapes all metaphysical considerations. See R. Grousset, Les Philosophies
indiennes, Paris, 1931, 261-63.
76
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2077-85.
77
. Aguttara, I, 152; Nidnasayukta, 139.
78
. This refers to the twofold emptiness: sattva and dharma nyat.
37
also introduces the emptiness of dharmas. The emptiness of the aggregates is the
emptiness of dharmas.79
When one considers the true characteristics (bhtalakaa) of conditioned and
unconditioned dharmas, one realises that as they don't have any agent (kraka) and
exist in dependence on causes and conditions, they are false and mistaken. They arise
from recollections and imaginations (anusmaraavikalpa). They are not found on the
inside, on the outside, or in between the two. They simply exist due to erroneous
visions of ordinary people. The wise does not find particular characteristics
(svalakaa) in conditioned dharmas. They are no more than mere metaphors
(prajapti) in order to guide simple-minded people. One recognises in them
falsehood, no reality, non-arising, and inactivity, and one does not attach oneself to
them. The noble person who does not seize conditioned dharmas gains the fruit of
the path (mrgaphala). As he considers emptiness of conditioned dharmas, he does
not attach his thought to them.
There are no unconditioned dharmas apart from conditioned dharmas. It is so
because the true characteristic of conditioned dharmas is unconditioned (asaskta),
and this unconditioned characteristic itself is not conditioned. It is merely an
imaginary expression derived from misconceptions of beings. The characteristic of
conditioned dharmas is production (utpda), disappearance (vyaya), duration-
alteration (sthityanyathtva). The characteristic of unconditioned dharmas is non-
production, non-disappearance, non-duration and non-alteration. This constitutes the
first gateway into the Buddha's Dharma. But if the unconditioned possessed such a
particular characteristic, they would be conditioned. The characteristic of production
of conditioned dharmas constitutes the truth of the origin of suffering (samudaya),
and their characteristic of disappearance (vyayalakaa) constitutes the truth of the
destruction of suffering (nirodhasatya).80 However, if in fact conditioned dharmas are
not produced, they remain inactive, and if they are inactive, they are not destroyed.
Consequently, they are unconditioned; just like the true characteristic.
On finding the true characteristics of dharmas, one does not fall into the error
concerning the characteristics of production, disappearance, duration and alteration.
From now on, one does not perceive any relation between conditioned and
unconditioned dharmas, or between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas; one
does not enter them. Non-conditionality consists in not grasping any specific marks
(nimitta) in conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. If one imagines conditioned and
unconditioned dharmas one meets with obstacles. But when one eliminates
recollections and imaginations, one destroys all objects (lambana) and through the
true knowledge exempt from objects (anlambana-bhtajna) one does not fall into
the series of rebirths, but obtains peace (yogakema), nirva, and lasting happiness.
Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are treated together, because they are inter-
dependent (anyonypeka). There are no conditioned dharmas apart from
unconditioned dharmas, and vice versa. These two categories comprise all dharmas.
When one considers the defects of conditioned dharmas as being impermanent,
painful etc., one understands the advantages of unconditioned dharmas. This is why
in this section, these two kinds of emptiness are treated together.

79
. The Sarvstivda theory of dharmas as being eternal is rejected.
80
. For Mahyna adepts there exists a direct parallelism of the vision of emptiness of saskta
dharmass, and the penetration of the four noble truths comprising the three revolutions (parivarta)
and 12 aspects (kra) by reason of four aspects for each of the three revolutions. Vinaya, I, 11;
Catupariatstra, 142-52 or 445-46; Mahvastu, III, 332-33; Lalitavistara, 417-18. The vision of
the emptiness of saskta dharmas corresponds to the aspects 9 to 12 of the noble truths.
38
Emptiness of unconditioned dharmas. It is possible that the conditioned dharmas
issued from causes and conditions are without inherent nature (nisvabhva), and
therefore empty. But unconditioned dharmas are indestructible (akya), inalterable
(abhedya), constant (nitya), and similar to space (ka). How can they be empty?
Apart from conditioned dharmas there are no unconditioned dharmas, and the true
characteristic of conditioned dharmas is precisely unconditioned. Conditioned
dharmas being empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty, because the two are
without any difference. Some people on hearing of the defects of conditioned
dharmas become attached to unconditioned dharmas, and due to their attachment
they contract fetters (sayojana).81 It is stated in Abhidharma texts that among the
ninety eight anuayas (proclivities), eighty nine have conditioned dharmas as their
objects (lambana), and six have unconditioned dharmas as their objects. The
remaining three anuayas are modified: the anuayas of ignorance (avidy) that
belong to the Kmadhtu, and that are to be destroyed by the truth of the destruction
of suffering (nirodhasatyaheya), have as their objects at times conditioned and at
times unconditioned dharmas.
Anuayas that have conditioned dharmas as their objects are the anuayas of
ignorance (avidy), which is to be destroyed by the truth of destruction
(nirodhasatyaheya), and which is associated with anuayas that have conditioned
dharmas as their objects.
Anuayas that have unconditioned dharmas as their objects are the anuayas of
ignorance that is to be destroyed by the truth of destruction, and that is dissociated
from anuayas that have unconditioned dharmas as their objects.
The same applies to the types of ignorance concerning the realms of Rpadhtu and
rpyadhtu.
Due to the fetters (sayojana), one commits evil actions on account of which one
falls into the three unhappy destinies (durgati). It is for this reason that the perfection
of wisdom stra declares emptiness of unconditioned dharmas.
Anuayas that have unconditioned dharmas as their objects are doubt (vicikits),
wrong view (mithydi) and ignorance (avidy). It is doubt that questions the
existence or inexistence of nirva. Wrong view represents a certain calculated
judgement and a declaration that nirva does not exist. Ignorance associated with
such doubt and wrong view, and also independent avidy82 all united together
constitute the anuaya of avidy.
There is a difference between emptiness of unconditioned dharmas and wrong view
(mithydi). People with wrong views do not believe in nirva, and consequently
formulate a judgement and declare the inexistence of nirva. Emptiness of
unconditioned dharmas does not seize the characteristic of nirva; and this is the
difference. People who reject conditioned dharmas become attached to
unconditioned dharmas (by giving them various attributes, such as non-production
etc.), and due to their attachment, they transform unconditioned into conditioned
dharmas. That's why the destruction of unconditioned dharmas by not grasping in
them any characteristic is not wrong view. This is what is called emptiness of
conditioned and unconditioned dharmas.

81
. For the 98 anuayas seen Abhidharmakoa, V, 13, 71.
82
. Koa, III, 84, 88; V, 31: venikyavidy.
39
9. atyantanyat: absolute emptiness83
The emptiness of conditioned dharmas and emptiness of unconditioned dharmas
destroy all dharmas to the extent that there is nothing left (niravaea): this is
absolute emptiness. The arhat whose impurities are destroyed (ksrava) is
absolutely pure (atyantaviuddha), but the angmin who eliminated desire (rga) up
to the sphere of nothingness (akicanyyatana) is not absolutely pure.84 Here we
have a similar situation. There is emptiness of internal dharmas, emptiness of
external dharmas, emptiness of both internal and external dharmas, emptiness of the
ten directions, emptiness of the absolute, emptiness of conditioned dharmas,
emptiness of unconditioned dharmas, and in addition the fact that there exist no other
dharmas that are not empty constitutes absolute emptiness. It denotes the fact that
from the very beginning there has never been any single dharma that is not empty.
Some might postulate that actually something is now empty, but originally it was
not: there were gods, creation, obscurity, and subtle atoms. It is not like this. All this
was empty. It is so because if the effect (krya) is impermanent, the cause (kraa)
also must be the same. Space is neither cause nor effect, and the same holds for the
gods and subtle atoms etc. If they were eternal (nitya), they would not produce
impermanent (anitya). If the past has no defined characteristic (niyatalakaa), the
future and the present do not have it either. In the three times (tryadhvan) there is no
single dharma, which is really non-empty (anya). This is what constitutes absolute
emptiness.
If everything is empty in this triple time, including subtle atoms (paramu), if
nothing has existed even for a moment, this is a great matter of fear (bhaya-sthna).
Seeing the happiness of the dhynas and sampattis, the wise men renounce worldly
happiness, and seeing the happiness of nirva, they renounce the dhyna and
sampatti happiness. But if in absolute emptiness, there is no happiness of nirva,
on which dharma do they rely in order to renounce nirva? People attached to
egotism (ahakra) distinguish in dharmas the characteristic of unity (ekatva) and
the characteristic of multiplicity (nntva). These people experience fear; it is the
fear of the inexistence of tman and tmiya. Conditioned dharmas as tributaries of
the triple time, due to their impurity (ssravadharma), constitute the factors (sthna)
that engender attachment. Nirva constitutes the destruction of craving (t).85
Why should one seek to renounce nirva?
However, it seems inaccurate to say that all dharmas are absolutely empty. Why?
Dharmas of the triple time and of the ten regions do conclude in the nature of
dharmas (dharmat), the persistence of dharmas (dharmasthitit), which are
obviously true.86 Since there is the truth of dharmas, there are other dharmas that are
false. If there were no such truth, there would be no false dharmas. The answer to
this argument is that nothing concludes in the truth of dharmas. It is so because if
such truth existed, it would be either conditioned or unconditioned. If it is
conditioned, such possibility was already rejected in connection with emptiness of
conditioned dharmas; if it is unconditioned, this was also rejected by emptiness of
unconditioned dharmas; if it is worldly (laukika), this was rejected by emptiness of
internal and external dharmas, and by emptiness of both internal and external

83
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2085.
84
. Abhidharmakoa, VI, 227.
85
. Dgha, II, 36, 37; Majjhima, I, 167; Sayutta, I, 136.
86
. This refers to the statement saying that whether the Tathgats appear or not in the world, the
dharma-nature (dharmat) persist. Sayutta, II, 25.
40
dharmas, and by great emptiness; if it is supramundane (lokottara), it was rejected
by emptiness of the absolute. Material (rpin), immaterial, impure (ssrava) and pure
(ansrava) dharmas are debunked in the same way.
But if dharmas are absolutely empty, absolute emptiness is also empty. It is not so
because emptiness does not imply anything existent; there is no interdependence
(anyonypekat) between falsehood and truth. Absolute emptiness destroys all
dharmas without anything left. If there was anything left it could not be named
absolute emptiness.
One could argue that dharmas are not completely empty, postulating that dharmas
issued from causes and conditions are empty, but their causes and conditions are not
empty. No. Causes and conditions are also empty because they are indeterminate
(aniyata). For instance consider the relationship between father and son. While one is
born from a father one is called son; and while one engenders a son, one is called
father. Ultimate causes and conditions don't have any support (apratihita). Thus
mountains, rivers, trees, and different categories of beings have their support on the
earth, the earth rests on the water, the water rests on the wind, and the wind rests on
space, but space does not rest on anything. If there is no point of support at the
beginning, there is no point of support at the end either. This is the reason why all
dharmas are absolutely empty.
What is the difference between emptiness and impermanence?87 When one treats
absolute emptiness, why one talks about impermanent things? Absolute emptiness is
presently empty, whereas impermanence is presently existent and later empty. Reply.
Impermanence is the first portal of emptiness. When one understands impermanence
correctly, all dharmas are empty. It is for this reason that the rya first considers the
four aspects of the world's impermanence (loknityat): anitya, dukha, nya, and
antman. 1. He sees as impermanent the things to which he is attached. 2.
Impermanence engenders suffering: due to this suffering, he mentally experiences
disgust (nirveda). 3. Having the characteristic of emptiness (nyalakaa),
impermanence cannot be apprehended: it is like a magic display; this is what is
called emptiness. 4. External things being empty, their internal master is also empty;
this is what is called antma.
Absolute emptiness is true emptiness. There are two kinds of people: greedy
(tcarita) and rational (dicarita). Greedy people easily attach themselves to
things, but as such things are impermanent, they experience suffering. Such people
are told that the cause of their suffering is impermanence of things. If the things to
which they become attached cause pain, they should not adhere to them: this stands
for teaching the portal of deliverance called wishlessness (apraihitavimokamukha).
Rational people attempt to analyse dharmas, but as they don't know the truth, they
fall into wrong views. It is to them that absolute emptiness (atyantanyat) is
explained in a direct manner.
All affirmations (vda) are susceptible to be refuted, and since they can be refuted,
they are empty. Visions are empty, and the master of visions is also empty: this is
called absolute emptiness.
It is taught that the things apprehended by the ryas are definitely true dharmas.
However, the appropriate thing for the ryas is to destroy the three poisons (trivia).
It is not by misconceptions and false statements that they can lead beings to escape
from old age and death, and to reach nirva. The dharmas that are called true, are in
fact issued from causes and conditions. Not existing before, they exist now, and

87
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2093.
41
existing now, they will not exist in the future; they can be neither seized nor adopted.
Therefore they are empty and untrue.
The Buddha said that good dharmas must be destroyed and a fortiori bad dharmas.
Finally, for the ryas, conditioned dharmas and pure dharmsas (ansrava) arise from
impure dharmas. These impure dharmas are false and arise from false conditions.
How could they be true? Outside of conditioned dharmas, there are no unconditioned
dharmas, as already explained. The true characteristic of conditioned dharmas is to
be unconditioned; that is why since all dharmas are inexistent (anupalabdha), there is
absolute emptiness.
10.anagranyat: 88 emptiness of dharmas without beginning89
The world or sasra, whether it denotes beings (sattva) or phenomena (dharma),
has no beginning (agra). The present life exists due to the previous existence, the
previous existence in turn is due to its preceding existence, and so on. Thus, there is
no beginning for living beings, and the same applies to dharmas. It is said in the
Madhyamakastra90 that if birth preceded, and if death succeeded, birth would not
come about because of death, and one would be born without being dead. If death
preceded, and if birth succeeded, death would have no cause, and without being born
one would die. That's why all dharmas are without beginning.
The Buddha declared that living beings have no beginning; no beginning can be
discerned in these beings enveloped by ignorance (avidy), pervaded by craving
(t) and wandering in transmigration.91
It is in order to destroy these dharmas without beginning that the perfection of
wisdom stra postulates the emptiness of dharmas without beginning.
Question. Dharmas without beginning are true and cannot be refuted. It is so,
because if one holds that living beings and dharmas have a beginning, one falls into
the wrong view of asserting extremes (antagrhadi), and one also falls into the
wrong view of asserting the absence of causality (ahetukatvadi). In order to avoid
such errors, one must affirm that beings and dharmas have no beginning. However, if
one refutes dharmas without beginning by means of anagranyat, one falls once
more into the wrong view of admitting the existence of a beginning.
Reply. It is true that dharmas without beginning are destroyed by anagranyat, but
this does not imply falling into the wrong view of admitting the existence of a
beginning. One rejects dharmas without beginning, but at the same time one does not
admit the existence of dharmas with a beginning; acting in this way, one follows the
middle path.

88
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2094-2105.
89
. While other Mahyna stras read anavargra-nyat (emptiness without end or beginning),
Kumrajvas Chinese translation of Pacaviati reads anagranyat (emptiness without
beginning). The Mahprajpramitstra explains accordingly. The beginningless world
engenders the notion of self and must be eliminated first.
90
. Madhyamakakrik, XI, 3-4: if birth preceded and old age and death succeeded, birth would exist
without old age and death, and one would be born without there being death. If birth followed and
if old age and death came first, then how old age and death, deprived of a cause, could be able to
affect one who is not born. Madhyamaka-vtti, 221: sasra has no beginning (di), middle
(madhya) or end (avasna), and since it does not exist, there is a relationship between birth and
death in terms of anteriority (prva), posteriority (parama), or simultaneity (sahakrama).
91
. There are two forms of this statement in scriptures. The old form denies the initial point
(prvakoi) of sasra and of sattvas: Sayutta, II, 178-193; III, 149, 151; V, 226. More recent
form denies the initial and final points (prvparakoi): Mahvastu, Lalitavistara (Edgertons
Dictionary 21); Divyvadna, 197.
42
Why dharmas without beginning are rejected?
They are rejected because they would be non-delimited (anavastha), and being non-
delimited they would not have an end (avara). Being non-delimited and without an
end, they would not have a middle (madhya).
The absence of a beginning would eliminate the omniscient one (sarvaja). It is so
because if samsra were non-delimited, one would not know its beginning, and
without knowing its beginning there would be no omniscient one. If there is an
omniscient person there can be no question of dharma without a beginning.
Certain people grasp the characteristic of a living being (sattvanimitta), and also
grasp in dharmas singularities (ekatva/pthaktva) and alterities (anyatva). Due to
these singularities and alterities, they deduce from the present existence an anterior
existence, and from the anterior existence they deduce a further anterior existence,
and so on. Without being able to find the beginning in living beings or dharmas, they
come up with the view of dharmas without beginning. This view is wrong since it
has singularities and alterities as its source, and consequently it must be rejected.
Emptiness of conditioned dharmas destroys conditioned dharmas. But since this
emptiness is still problematic, there is recourse to emptiness of unconditioned
dharmas to destroy unconditioned dharmas. In this case one uses dharmas without
beginning to destroy dharmas with beginning. But as these dharmas without
beginning are still problematic, one asserts emptiness of dharmas without beginning
to destroy dharmas without beginning; this is called the emptiness of dharmas
without beginning.
However, if this is the case, why did the Buddha teach that the starting point of living
beings wandering in transmigration is not known? The Buddha's intention was to
indicate that beings should know that sasra, in which they wander for very long
time, represents great suffering, and that they should develop towarts it the mind of
disgust (nirvedacitta).92
The starting point of living beings, who during innumerable kalpas sustain sufferings
of sasra is not discernable; this is the reason why the mind experiences fear
(bhaya) and eliminates the fetters (sayojana).
Although the doctrine of impermanence (anityatdi) is an extreme view
(antagrhadi), the Buddha made use of impermanence to save living beings.93 The
same holds for the doctrine of beginningless sasra, even if it is an extreme view.
In order to save living beings and to inspire in them a feeling of disgust for sasra,
he postulates a sasra without beginning, but this is not true. It is so because if
there were a sasra without beginning, the perfection of wisdom94 stra would not
speak of emptiness of dharmas without beginning.

92
. Sayutta, II, 187-88; II, 179-80; II, 180-81, 185; 178.
93
. Eternalism and nihilism are the two extreme views that are opposed to the middle path. Among the
fourteen undetermined questions (avyktavastu), there is the question whether the world and the
soul are eternal (avato loka ctm ca) or not. The Buddha refuses to answer it on the grounds
that it is futile and useless from the view point of deliverance: Dgha, I, 188-189; Majjhima, I, 431;
Sayutta, 223.
94
. The argument is similar to the one concerned with eternity and noneternity of the world. The
Buddha refuses to answer the question concerned with finality of the world and the self (antavn
loka ctmca, anantavn loka ctm ca). To convince living beings and to inspire in them the
salvific fear of sasra, he presented sasra without beginning. But Mahyna texts correct it by
teaching the emptiness of dharmas without beginning, and by rejecting as absurd the notions of
beginning, middle and end. Since he wanted to save living beings, he cannot be charged with
contraditions.
43
Then again, if dharmas without beginning are not true dharmas, how does one
employ them to save livings beings? In truth there is no dharma to teach in order to
save living beings. Dicourses and living beings are conditioned dharmas and false. It
is through the use of salvific expedients that the Buddha speaks of dharmas without
beginning, but with detachment. Those who listen to him, also gain detachment, and
through detachment they feel disgust for sasra.
When one uses the knowledge of previous existences (prvanivsajna), one
perceives that the series of birth and death is unlimited (anavastha), and at that point
it is true. But when one uses the wisdom eye (prajcakus), one perceives absolute
emptiness of beings and dharmas. It is for this reason that at this point emptiness of
dharmas without beginning is taught.
It is said in the Pacaviati (240) that the vision of the eternal (nitya) is not true,
and that the visions of impermanence (anitya), of suffering (dukha), and of
happiness (sukha) are also untrue. However, the Buddha said that the eternal and
happiness are misconceptions (viparysa), and that the impermanent and suffering
are true.95 He taught so because living beings certainly become attached to happiness
and permanence, but not to suffering and impermanence. Thus the Buddha makes
use of the truth of suffering and impermanence in order to destroy the misconception
about happiness and permanence. It is for this reason that he stated that
impermanence and suffering are the truth. But if living beings were attached to
impermanence and suffering, he would certainly say that impermanence and
suffering are empty.
A similar argument applies to dharmas with or without beginning. The notion of no
beginning destroys the misconception about beginning. But as living beings become
attached to dharmas without beginning, the perfection of wisdom stra adds that
dharmas without beginning are empty. This is what is called emptiness of dharmas
without beginning.
Why dharmas with beginning are not explicitly refuted?96 Dharmas with beginning
must also be rejected as false. Why then the perfection of wisdom stra refutes only
dharmas without beginning? It does so because dharmas with beginning are mighty
errors. It is so because if sasra had a beginning, at the initial existence
(prathamabhva) there would be the absence of meritorious or unmeritorious causes
and conditions (pattipuya-hetupratyaya) for the arising in happy or unhappy
destinies. If the initial birth depended on meritorious or demeritorious causes and
conditions, then that birth could not be considered as the initial existence. It is so
because one must commit meritorious (puya) or sinful (patti) actions in order to
pass from a prior existence (prvanivsa) to a subsequent existence (aparabhava).
But as sasra does not have beginning, one escapes such difficulties (doa).
Furthermore, once the theory of dharmas with beginning is refuted by the theory of
dharmas without beginning, there is no need for an emptiness to destroy dharmas
with beginning. Now, wanting to destroy the theory of dharmas without beginning,
the perfection of wisdom stra speaks here only of emptiness of dharmas without
beginning.
However, if dharmas without beginning destroy dharmas with beginning, then
dharmas with beginning must be capable of destroying dharmas without beginning.

95
. The second viparysa is taking painful for happy, and the third is taking impermanent for
permanent.
96
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2103.
44
Why here recourse is made only to emptiness (number 10) to destroy dharmas
without beginning?
Although the two affirmations of dharmas with beginning and dharmas without
beginning are wrong (mithydi), there are differences between them. While
dharmas with beginning are causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) that engender
defilements (kleas) and wrong views (mithydi), dharmas without beginning
engender benevolence (matr), compassion (karu), and right views (samyag-di).
On perceiving that living beings sustain great suffering in sasra that has no
beginning, one experiences thoughts of compassion. But how is this possible?
Knowing that the series of existences evolves uninterruptedly, and knowing that
those existences constitute the fruits of retribution of sins (patti) and merits (puya),
one formulates right view.
If one does not hypothesize the absence of beginning, it is for one a good dharma
(kuala) as a factor conducive to enlightenment (bodhipkika), but if one grasps its
particular mark (nimitta) and attaches oneself to it, it is wrong view.
The situation is similar to the views of eternalism and non-eternalism: the view of
dharmas with beginning, even though it destroys the view of dharmas without
beginning, it does not destroy them absolutely (atyantam), but dharmas without
beginning destroy completely dharmas with beginning; that's why dharmas without
beginning are superior.
Good (kuala) destroys evil (akuala), and evil destroys good, but although they
destroy each other, good alone destroys evil absolutely (atyantam). The person who
gains the state of rya is not subject to evil rebirths. It is not the case with evil
dharmas because their power is attenuated (tanu). Thus the one who has committed
the five heinous offences (pacnantarya) and destroyed the wholesome roots
(kualamla) falls into hells, but does not remain there more than one kalpa,97 after
which he escapes from hells and finally realises the fruit of the path (mrgaphala).
Similarly the force of dharmas without beginning is so powerful that it destroys
dharmas with beginning.
11.avakranyat: 98 emptiness of dispersion (or disconnection /visayoga)99
Emptiness of assembled dharmas. Some dharmas exist as conglomerates (sayoga)
such as a chariot. When all its parts are ussembled, there is a chariot, but when its
parts are dispersed or scattered, the name chariot is lost. When the five aggregates
are united, one speaks of a person (pudgala), but when they are dispersed, the person
does not exist.
Emptiness of dispersed dharmas. It can be argued that when one speaks in this way,
one distroys only the name person, but not the aggregate of matter (rpa). By
dispersing the spokes and wheels, one destroys the name chariot. The same holds
true for emptiness of dispersed things (avakranyat): by dispersing the five
aggregates, one destroys solely the person but not the five aggregates.

97
. Vinaya, II, 202; Majjhima, I, 393; Aguttara, III, 402-3.
98
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2105-09.
99
. In the majority of sources, the 11th emptiness is anavakranyat. (Conze renders it as
"emptiness of non-repudiation". The Chinese version of the Pacaviati by Kumrajva has
avakranyat in the sense of dispersion or dispersed (avakra). It implies dharmas that are
dispersed, disjoint, meaning that avakra dharmas are empty of avakra dharmas. The
Mahprajpramitstra implies that avakira dharmas are dharmas existent as entitites (dravya)
as opposed to dharmas as designations (prajapti).
45
Reply. The aggregates as such are also mere denominations (prajapti),100 and are
destroyed. It is so because these are agglomerated subtle atoms (saghtaparamu),
which are called matter.
However, if one does not admit these subtle atoms, and if one considers what is
visible to be matter, then this matter is true and really existent. Why should it be
dispersed and empty? The answer is that visible matter issues from the union of the
four great elements, and as such is nothing more than a mere name (prajapti). Just
as the winds of the four directions come together, and striking the water they produce
clusters of foam, in the same way the four elements on becoming united produce
matter (rpa); but when the great elements are dispersed there is no matter. Matter in
order to be visible, it must be united with smell (gandha), taste (rasa), visible, and the
four great elements. Apart from this matter there is no isolated matter.101 It is through
knowledge that one distinguishes these diverse constituents, but separately and in
isolation matter does not exist. If matter really existed, there would be a separately
existent matter apart from those conglomerated dharmas, but there is no such
matter.102
Matter as denomination (prajapti) is disperible, but what about the other four
skandhas that are immaterial, are they also dispersible? Yes, they are also mere
deniminations. Due to their birth, aging, duration, and impermanence, they become
dispersed. It is so because the moment of birth, and the moments of old age, duration
and dispersion are different. It is established that in the course of the three times,
they are dispersed and empty. The citta follows its object: when its object disperses
the citta disperses, and when its object is destroyed the citta is destroyed. The four
immaterial aggregates are indeterminate (anityata) because they are born due to
conditions.
Finally, when dharmas are assembled, each of these dharmas has its name, but
ordinary people pursue these names, and produce misconceptions and attachment.
But the Buddha teaches the Dharma so that they see reality, and refrain from
pursuing names: existence and inexistence are empty.
Katyyanvavda: In the person who sees the truth of origin (samudayasatya), there
is no view of inexistence, and in the person who sees the truth of cessation
(nirodhasatya), there is no view of existence.103
For such multiple reasons one speaks of emptiness of dispersion.
12.praktinyat: 104 emptiness of essence105
Notion of prakti. The prakti of the dharmas is forever empty, but as it commandeers
the karmic series (karmaprabandha), it appears not to be empty.

100
. The Vaibhikas postulate two kinds of atoms: 1. monad in a proper sense, dravyaparamu, not
liable to be broken up (rpaa) and never existing in isolation; 2. molecule, saghtaparamu, the
most subtle among the aggregates of matter, and susceptible to deterioration and resistance; Koa, I,
25; II, 144.
101
. Koa, II, 145: in the Kmadhtu, one molecule comprises at least eight substances: 4 mahbhtas,
and the four derived matters (bhautika), visible, odour, savour, tangible.
102
. Sayutta, III, 101; Majjhima, III, 17.
103
. Sayutta, II, 17.
104
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2110-21.
105
. The term prakti appears rarely in the early canonical texts, but it is frequent in Mahyna texts.
The terms dharm dharmat, svarpa, svabhva, prakti are commonly employed to denote
matter which is not artificial (aktrima), independent from other (paranirapeka), immutable
(avyabhicrin).
46
The prakti of water is cold (sta) by itself, but when heated it becomes warm, and
when fire is removed it becomes cold. A similar situation is with the prkti of
dharmas. When the karmic conditions are not present, it is empty and inexistent, like
the prakti of water forever cold. When the conditions are united, dharmas exist like
the water that becomes hot in proximaty of fire. When the conditions become
attenuated or disappear, there are no more dharmas, like hot water becoming cold in
the absence of fire.
It is said in a stra that the eye is empty of I and mine (antma and antmya),
because such is its essence (prakti). The same holds for the remaining senses and
their respective objects. Objection. But this stra says that the twelve bases (yatana)
are empty of tma and tmiya, and hence it refers to emptiness of beings
(sattvanyat) and not to emptiness of phenomena (dharmanyat). Why emptiness
of prakti is asserted here? Reply. According to the rvaka tradition, there is no tma
or tmya in the twelve yatanas. The emptiness proper to the twelve yatanas
consists in the absence of tma and of tmya. According to the Mahyna, the
twelve yatanas being without tma or tmya are empty. The prakti of the twelve
yatanas being inexistent is itself empty of prakti.
In addition, if there is neither tma nor tmya, emptiness of all dharmas is reached a
spontaneous manner. Since people are attached to tma and tmya, the Buddha
speaks only of antma and antmya. Thus, due to this assumption, one necessarily
recognises emptiness of all dharmas. Detachment from the notion of tma and tmya
leads to detachment from other dharmas. Thus, emptiness of beings and emptiness of
dharmas conflate in the same meaning (ekrtha) called here emptiness of essence
(praktinyat).
Finally, the term prakti denotes self-existence (svayabh) independent from
causes and conditions. The things dependent on causes and conditions are
saskra/formation and not prakti/essence. There is no prakti in any dharma,
because all conditioned dharmas arise from causes and conditions. Being born in this
way, they are formations/saskras. If they were not born from causes and
conditions, they would not be dharmas. It is thus the absence (anupalabdhit) of
prakti that is called emptiness of prakti.
Emptiness of prakti and absolute emptiness. It would seem that absolute emptiness
is identical with prakti emptiness. Why to repeat things? But it is not so as there is a
difference between them. Absolute emptiness is the destruction without any residues.
It is similar to space (ka), forever without origination (anutpda), without
cessation (anirodha), without impurity (asaklia), and without purification
(avyavadna). Emptiness of prkti consists in being forever and originally empty. It
is similar to water, which being cold by essence, becomes warm when heated, and
returns to its coldness when one stops heating it.
Dharmas are absolutely empty because their prakti does not exist (anupalabdha).
They are empty of prakti because they are absolutely empty. The Bodhisattva
cultivates emptiness of prakti, and the Buddha practises absolute emptiness. It is so
because in emptiness of prakti there is only a complex of causes and conditions, but
there is no real essence (bhtaprakti). Absolute emptiness is pure in the triple time.
Such is the difference.
Common and particular praktis
Praktis of dharmas are of two kinds: common (smnya) and particular (sva-
prakti). Common praktis are impermanence (anityat), suffering (dukha),
emptiness (nya), non-self (antman), non-production (anutpda), non-cessation
(anirodha), no-coming (angama), no-going (anirgama), non-entry (apravea), no-
47
exit (anisaraa). Particular praktis are, for instance, wet essence for water, hot
essence for fire, intelligent essence for the mind. The person accumulating evil is
called evil essence, and the one amassing good, is called good essence.
Since these praktis are empty, one speaks of emptiness of prakti.
Absurdity of common praktis
Absurdity of impermanent prakti (anityaprakti). If such prakti truly existed, it
would disrupt the retribution of action (karmavipka). It is the case, because
productions, destructions, and the past would have no duration; the six organs would
not grasp their objects; and there would not be accumulated causes and conditions.
This accumulation being absent, enunciation of stras, meditation and the rest would
be impossible. It is for such reasons that one knows that impermanent prakti does
not exist.
Absurdity of permanent prakti (nityaprakti). If impermanent prakti does not exist,
then what can be said about permanent prakti?
Absurdity of painful prakti (dukhaprakti). This prakti does not exist either. If
such prakti were really painful, one would never experience feelings of attachment.
Being pervaded by disgust for and fear of suffering, one would direct the same
disgust and the same fear towards happiness. And again, if everything were really
painful, the Buddha would not have spoken of the three categories of sensation:
painful sensation, happy sensation, and neither painful nor happy sensation.
Abusrdity of empty prakti and of real prakti (nyaprakti, bhtaprakti). The
category of empty prakti does not exist either. If there were empty characteristic
(nyalakaa), there would be no sin and no merit, and in the absence of sin and
merit, there would be no previous existence and no posterior existence. Dharmas
exist in mutual interdependence. Why? If there is empty, it must have reality, but if it
has no reality, it must have empty. In this situation, as empty prakti has no
existence, how can it have reality?
Absurdity of particular praktis. For example, fire burns its appropriated matter, and
it illumunates. When two phenomena (dharma) are combined, one says there is fire.
If apart from these two phenomena, there existed a fire, it would have separately a
distinct function, but in reality there is no distinct function. This is the reason why
one knows that fire is a mere designation (prajapti), and has no reality.
Both common and particular praktis do not exist. Thus, the perfection of wisdom
stra proclaims emptiness of prakti.
Extended duration is not eternity. Emptiness of prakti is empty from the beginning.
Ordinary people assume that what is false does not persist for a long time and is
empty, and what endures for a long time, e.g. Sumeru, is real (bhta) and not empty.
In order to destroy such an error, the Buddha taught that even the things which
perdure for long periods are also empty of prakti. Although the wisdom (praj) of
the holy persons saves living beings and destroys defilements (klea), the praktis of
things are inexistent (anupalabdha), and consequently empty (nya).
Some people say that the skandhas, yatanas, and dhtus are empty. It is only
suchness (tathat), the fundamental element (dharmadhtu), the limit of reality
(bhtakoi) that are true essences (bhtaprakti). To destroy this false notion, the
Buddha speaks not only of the empty aggregates and the rest, but also of suchness
and the rest as being empty. And this is called emptiness of prakti.
Finally, the praktis of conditioned dharmas have three characteristics (lakaa):
origination (utpda), duration (sthiti), and disappearance (vyaya). The praktis of
unconditioned dharmas also have three characteristics: non-origination, non-

48
duration, non-disappearance. If conditioned praktis are empty, what can be said
about conditioned dharmas? And if unconditioned praktis are empty, what can be
said about unconditioned dharmas?
It is for such multiple reasons that praktis are inexistent, and this is what is called
emptiness of praktis.
13.svalakaanyat: emptiness of proper characteristics106
All dharmas have two kinds of characteristics (lakaa): common (smnya) and
specific (svalakaa). As these two kinds of characteristics are empty, the perfection
of wisdom stra speaks of emptiness of characteristics. Common characteristics are
impermanence etc., and specific characteristics are characteristics appropriate to
individual dharmas: solidity for earth, heat for fire etc.
Some people assert that there is no difference in reality (tattva) between prakti and
lakaa, as they are merely two different names. For example, one says that prakti
of fire is the characteristic of heat, and that the characteristic of heat is prakti of fire.
Some other people perceive only small differences: prakti refers to the very nature
(kya) of the dharma, and lakaa refers to its regnised characteristic (vijeya).
Thus in the case of the Buddhas adepts, the undertaking of the precepts
(lasamdna) constitutes the essence, and the actions of shaving of the head and
donning the yellow robes denote the characteristics. Fire has heat for its essence and
smoke for its characteristic.
The characteristics are not fixed (aniyata) and depart from the body but the essence
stands for the reality (tattva) of the thing. When one sees a yellow thing, one believes
it to be gold, but in itself it is copper; on examining it, one discovers that it is not
gold. A man who shows respect and veneration, appears to be a good man, but once
injured his true essence demonstrates itself as anger and rage. Such are the
differences between prakti and lakaa. As all these characteristics are empty, the
texts speaks of emptiness of lakaas.
Common characteristics of dharmas.107
anityalakaa. All conditioned dharmas are impermanent because they arise, perish
and do not persist. Since they did not exist before, they do exist in the present, and
after having existed, they will return to inexistence. They are impermanent because
they depend on causes and conditions; they are mistaken and false, arise from
impermanent causes and conditions; and issue from associated causes and
conditions.
dukhalakaa. Provoking mental and bodily torments, conditioned dharmas are an
aggregate of suffering (dukhaskandha). It is so because the four attitudes (rypatha)
are never without suffering; because the truth of suffering (dukhastya) declares
them to be suffering; because the ryas reject them and do not accept them; because
they never cease to torment; because they are impermanent (anitya). Such is their
characteristic of suffering.
nyalakaa. Being antmya conditioned dharmas are empty. Issued from causes
and conditions they are empty. Being anitya, dukha, nya, antmya, they are
empty. Since they have no beginning or end, they are empty. Since they distort the
mind, they are empty. Since the ryas do not attach themselves to them, they are
empty. Taking into account the two portals of deliverance (vimokamukha), namely
signlessness (nimitta) and wishlessness (apraihita), they are empty. Since the true

106
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2121-26.
107
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2123.
49
characteristic (bhtalakaa) of dharmas is boundless (aprama) and incalculable
(asakhyeya), they are empty. Since the true characteristic destroys all possibilities
of verbal expressions (vdamrga), they are empty. Since the true characteristic
destroys all functioning of the mind, they are empty. Since the Buddhas, pratyekas,
and arhats, who penetrate into the true characteristic never reemerge from it, they are
empty.
antman. Being anitya, dukha, and nya, dharmas are antman. Since they are not
autonomous (asvantantra), they are impersonal. Deprived of a master (asvmika),
they are impersonal. Since no dharmas arise without causes and conditions, but issue
from causes and conditions, they are impersonal. By virtue of the two portals of
deliverance, signlessness (nimitta) and wishlessness (apraihita), they are empty.
Since they are mere denominations (prajapti), they are empty. Since the belief in
personality (satkyadi) is a misconception (viparysa), they are empty. Since one
discovers bodhi by destroying the mind of self (tmacitta), they are empty. It is for
these various and multiple reasons that conditioned dharmas are impersonal.
Specific characteristics of dharmas: svalakaa.108
The earth's characteristic is solidity (khakkhaatva), fire's heat (uatva), water's
humidity (dravatva), wind's motion (raa). The eye's characteristic is the capacity of
being the support (raya) of the visual consciousness (cakrvijna); similar
characteristics are atributed to the remaining senses. The characteristic of
consciousness (vijna) is investigation (vitarka); characteristic of konwledge (jna)
is wisdom (praj); characteristic of praj is jna; characteristic of generosity
(dna) is abandonment (parityga); characteristic of morality (la) is absence of
regret (akauktya) and nonviolence (avihis); characteristic of patience (kanti) is
absence of irritation (akopana); characteristic of energy (vrya) is effort (abhyutsha);
characteristic of dhyna is composure of the mind (citta-sagraha); characteristic of
praj is mental detachment (asaga); characteristic of expedient (upya) is creation
of objects (vastusapdana); characteristic of sasra is spinning (vna) of birth and
death; characteristic of nirva is non-spinning.
Each dharma has its specific characteristic, and that characteristic is empty: this is
called emptiness of specific characteristic (svalakaanyat). The other significant
aspects of this emptiness were covered in connection with emptiness of prkti.
It is important to speak of emptiness of specific characteristic (svalakaa) and not
just of emptiness of characteristics (lakaa), because otherwise when speaking of
emptiness of characteristics alone, the fundamental emptiness of dharmas would be
passed over in silence. Emptiness of specific characteristics refers to the fundamental
characteristics of dharmas.
Every dharma, arising from a complex of causes and conditions, is an empty dharma,
and thus each dharma taken individually is empty. The grouped causes and
conditions form a succession of dharmas, they are also empty.
Due to misconceptions, people become attached to dharmas, and find in them the
characteristics of identity (ekatva), alterity (anyatva), common characteristics
(smnya lakaa) and specific characteristic (svalakaa). It is this that constitutes
the reason for speaking of emptiness of specific characteristic.

108
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2125.
50
14.sarvadharmanyat: 109 emptiness of all dharmas
The term all dharmas denotes the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases
(yatana), and the eighteen elements (dhtu).
In their totality dharmas belong to many categories,110 in the sense that all dharmas
have: l. characteristic (lakaa) of existence (bhta); 2. characteristic of knowledge
(jna); 3. characteristic of consciousness (vijna); 4. characteristic of object
(lambana); 5. characteristic of sovereignty (adhipati); 6. characteristic of cause
(hetu) and effect (phala); 7. common and specific characteristics (smnyalakaa
and svalakaa); 8. characteristic of support (raya-lakaa).
1. Dharmas have the characteristic of existence. Among all dharmas there are
attractive and ugly dharmas, internal and external dharmas. All dharmas constitute
for the citta a place of arising, and hence they are said to be existent. If one says that
a dharma is not a dharma, it is because it is opposed to existence and is called
adharma. If there were truly a adharma it would be existent. That's why it is said that
all dharmas have the character of existence.111
2. Dharmas have the characteristic of jna. There is the dharma-knowledge
concerning suffering (dukhe dharmajna), its origin (samudaye dharmajna), its
cessation (nirodhe dharmajna), and the path (mrge dharmajna). And there is the
consecutive knowledge concerning suffring (dukhe nvayajna), its origin
(samudaye nvayajna), its cessation (nirodhe nvayajna), and the path (mrge
nvayajna).
The positive conventional truth knows suffering, its origin, its cessation, the path,
space (ka), and the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisakhynirodha).
3. Dharmas have the characteristic of consciousness.
The eye consciousness perceives colours. The ear consciousness perceives sounds.
The nose consciousness perceives odours, the tongue consciousness perceives
flavours, and the body consciousness perceives the tangible. Finally, the mental
consciousness perceives dharmas, consequently it perceives the eye, colours and the
eyeconsciousness, and so on with the ear and the rest. Finally, it perceives the mind
faculty (manas), dharmas, and the mental consciousness.
Therefore, it is said that all dharmas have the characteristic of consciousness.
4. Dharmas have the characteristic of object.
The eye consciousness and dharmas associated with it grasp colours. The remaining
sense consciousnesses and dharmas associated with them grasp their respective
objects, sounds and so on. The mental consciousness and dharmas associated with it
grasp dharmas, and consequently the eye, colours, the eye consciousness, and so on.
Thus, all dharmas have the characteristic of object.
5. Dharmas have the characteristic of sovereignty (adhipati).
All conditioned dharmas, each one individually, are sovereigns.112 Unconditioned
dharmas are sovereigns in relation to conditioned dharmas.

109
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2126-44.
110
. Saskta dharmas that constitute "all" are susceptible to various classifications; see
Mahprajpramitstra, pages 642-46; 1095-1104; 1748-51.
111
. For the Sarvstivda, only existent dharmas can be objects of consciousness. In contrast, the
Sautrntika asserts that both existence and inexistence can be objects of consciousness. Koa, V, 60-
62.
112
. All dharmas are adhipatis by way of being present (kraahetu) in relation to all other dharmas,
except for themselves. Koa, II, 246.
51
6. Dharmas have the characteristic of cause and effect. Every conditioned dharma is
both cause and effect.
7. Dharmas have common characteristic and particular characteristic. All dharmas
have these two characteristics. For instance, the horse is a common characteristic,
and the horses colour is a particular characteristic.
8. Dharmas have the characteristic of support. Dharmas, separately and jointly,
mutually support each other. For instance, the trees, the mountains, and the rivers
rest upon the earth, and the earth rests on the water. This characteristic of support
encompasses all dharmas.
The above unitary categories of dharmas apply to all dharmas.
Groups of dharmas
Two groups of dharmas encompass all dharmas: material dharmas (rpin) and
immaterial dharmas (rpin); visible and invisible; resistant and non-resistant; pure
and impure; conditioned and unconditioned; internal and external.
The groups of three, four, five, and even infinity of dharmas encompass all dharmas.
All these dharmas are empty: emptiness of all dharmas.
Reason for lists of empty dharmas.113 If all dharmas are empty then why are they
given different names? Ordinary people, due to ignorance or misconceptions, grasp
characteristics in empty dharmas, contract defilements, and commit all kinds of
actions. Then due to their actions they gain different destinies, and endure unhappy
and happy existences. The ryas, by the power of pure wisdom, analyse these
dharmas, all of which are empty from beginning to end. Aspiring to free living
beings, they discourse on the essential focus of attachment, namely the five skandhas
etc. They explain that it is due to ignorance that one gives rise to the five skandhas.
One becomes attached to what one has produced by oneself. If the ryas spoke only
of empty things, living beings would not find enlightenment (bodhi), because empty
things, without being caused by anything, would not induce any disgust (nirveda) for
the world.
Specific characteristics of conditioned dharmas are empty and indeterminate.
Qestion. It is said that all dharmas are empty, this is not quite correct, because all
dharmas are integrated (saghta) into their specific characteristics (svalakaa):
earth has solidity as its characteristic, fire has heat as its characteristic, and so on. As
all dharmas abide in their specific characteristics, why are they asserted to be empty?
Reply. This argument is refuted above in the contexts of emptiness of essence
(praktinyat), and emptiness of particular characteristics (svalakaanyat); and
this needs to be repeated here. Since the characteristics (lakaa) are indeterminate
(aniyata), they are not true characteristics. For instance, such things as cheese or
honey have the characteristic of earth (solidity), but when placed in fire they lose that
characteristic and assume the characteristic of moisture (water). Wisdom has
knowledge as its characteristic, but once it penetrates the true characteristic of
dharmas, it has no discernment and loses its characteristic of knowledge. Thus
dharmas do not possess determined characteristics.
Dharmas don't have determined characteristics, because the characteristic of future
dharmas cannot reach the present without losing its future characteristic. If it reached
the present without losing its future characteristic, the future would be the present,
and there would be no fruit of retribution. Similarly, if the present reached into the

113
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2130.
52
past, it would lose its characteristic of present. If it reached into the past without
losing its characteristic of present, the past would be the present.
Unconditioned dharmas are without characteristics. If unconditioned dharmas existed
in a definite manner, they would have to possess specific characteristics, in the same
manner as fire possesses the characteristic of heat. However, it is the lack of
dependence on any external cause that constitutes the characteristic of unconditioned
dharmas. This is the reason why one knows that unconditioned dharmas, having no
characteristic, are truly inexistent.
If one asserts that the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisakhynirodha) occurs
in the future existence, it would be a conditioned dharma. But there is no conditioned
dharma there. Then again, if one asserts that this cessation has cessation as its
characteristic, this also would be inexact. It is so, because here it is the case of the
characteristic of cessation due to impermanence, and not of the characteristic of the
cessation not due to knowledge.
Even the dharmas known by the holy persons are empty.114
Question. There must be dharmas that are anya/non-empty, because there are
differences between the things known by ordinary people (pthagjana) and the things
known by the ryas. The things known by ordinary people are false and the things
known by the ryas are true. One relies on the true knowledge of the ryas to reject
false dharmas; but one cannot rely on lies to destroy lies.
Response. The destruction of dharmas known by ordinary people constitutes the
knowledge of the ryas. However, in the absence of the dharmas of ordinary people,
there are no dharmas of the ryas, just as in the absence of illness there is no remedy
(bhaiajya). Thus, without the dharmas of ordinary people, there are no dharmas of
the ryas, The true nature of the dharmas of ordinary people denotes the dharmas of
the ryas.115
The rya does not grasp any characteristics (nimitta) in dharmas, and does not attach
himself to them; it is for this reason that the dharmas of the rya are true. But
ordinary people grasp characteristics in dharmas, and become attached to them; that
is why the dharmas of ordinary people are false.
Although the ryas make use of empty dharmas, they do not grasp characteristics in
them, and if they don't grasp characteristics in them, it is because these dharmas are
without any determined characteristics. On the profane level (pthagjanabhmi), one
attaches oneself to dharmas and makes distinctions between dharmas of ordinary
people and dharmas of the ryas. On the rya level (ryabhmi) one does not make
distinctions, and it is solely in order to destroy the illness of living beings that one
says that one thing is false and another thing is true.
Emptiness in the Tripiaka. In the Tripiaka, the Buddha teaches emptiness of both
beings and dharmas. Question. If emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmanyat) is
definitely true, why, in the Tripiaka, did the Buddha speak of dharmas as being
impermanent (anitya), painful (dukha), empty (nya) and impersonal (antman)?116
114
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2134.
115
. See Lamotte's translation of the Vimalakrtinirdea, 143-44, 156-57; Hobgirin, 135 s.v. Bonsh.
116
. Anitya, dukha, nya, antma constitute the frequent formula in the Sanskrit gamas. In the
corresponding formulas in the Pli Nikyas, the term nya does not appear: anicca... dukkha...
ya pannicca dukkha viparimadhamma kalla nu ta samanupassitu: etam mama eso
ham asmi eso me att ti. Majjhima, III, 19-20; Sayutta, II, 124-25. While sua is mentioned in
the Pli suttas, it is often determined by two complementary phrases sua attena v attaniyena
v, thus it is the emptiness of tma and not dharmas. Majjhima, I, 297; II, 263; Sayutta, IV, 54,
296-97.
53
In the Paramrthanyatstra117 the Buddha explains the absolute emptiness
(paramrtha-nyat) in the following manner. The eye when it is born, does not
arise from anywhere, and when it vanishes it does not go anywhere. There is only
action and retribution of action (karmavipka); the agent does not exist. The same
applies to the ear and the rest. This implies that there are no eternal dharmas and
that dharmas are impermanent (anitya); karma and karmavipka alone exist but not
the agent. This is the absolute emptiness (paramrtha-nyat) in the rvaka system.
Why to speak of emptiness of all dharmas?
Answer. The tman is the root of all defilements (klea). First one becomes attached
to the five skandhas as if they were the tman. Next one becomes attached to external
things (bhyavastu) as if they were the tmya. Bound by the tman, one generates
desire and hatred (rga and dvea), and due to desire and hatred, one accomplishes
actions (karma). When the Buddha says that the agent does not exist, he destroys the
tman in all dharmas. His statement about the eye's arising and vanishing affirms the
impermanence (anityat) of the eye. Impermanent things are suffering (dukha), and
suffering is deprived of tman and tmya.118 The tman and tmya being inexistent,
the mind does not attach itself to dharmas, and being detached, the mind does not
give rise to the fetters (sayojana). Once the mind does not give rise to the fetters,
what is the use of preaching emptiness? This is the reason why, in the Tripiaka,
Buddha definitely stresses impermanence, suffering and the rest, and speaks less
frequently of emptiness. However, some people, although they hear about
impermanence, suffering and so on, continue to talk about dharmas, and to them the
Buddha teaches emptiness of dharmas.
The antman tenet logically leads to emptiness of dharmas.
Question. Why did the Buddha assert action and retribution of action? This action
and this retribution are not empty.
Reply. The Buddha's teaching is twofold: he teaches antman and he teaches
adharma. To those who believe in an eternal tman, he teaches that the agent does
not exist. To those who become attached to nihilism (uccheda), he says that there is
action (karma) and retribution of action (karmavipka).
If a person hears that the agent does not exist, he falls into the view of nihilism
(uccheda). It is for this person that the Buddha says: There is action and retribution
of action.
There are people who, while searching for the dharma-nature (dharmat), become
attached to one unique thing: existence, inexistence, eternity, impermanence, and so
on. Being attached to their unique thing, they have craving for their own system, and
hatred for other systems, and then commit evil actions. It is for those people that the
Buddha teaches emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmanyat). When all dharmas
are empty no system is possible.
The Buddha adapts his teaching to intellectual capacities of beings.
There are two categories of living beings: those who cling to the world (loka), and
those who search for the transcendent (lokottara). Those who search for the
transcendent are of three categories: superior with sharp faculties, average with
average faculties, and inferior with feeble faculties.

117
. Translated by Guabhadra in the 5th century and extant in the Sayuktgama, but having no Pli
correspondence, although it is referred to in Abhidharma works. See E. Lamotte, "Trois Stra du
Sayukta sur la Vacuit", BSOAS, 36, 1973, 314-17.
118
. Sayuta, III, 22, 23.
54
To beings with sharp faculties searching for the bodhi of the Buddhas, the Buddha
teaches the six perfections (pramit) and emptiness of dharmas. To beings with
average faculties who search for the bodhi of solitary (prayeka) Buddhas, the Buddha
teaches the twelve links of dependent origination (dvdaanidna) and the conduct of
the recluses (ekacrin). To beings with feeble faculties searching for the bodhi of the
rvakas, the Buddha teaches the emptiness of beings (sattvanyat) and the four
noble truths (ryasatya).
Canonical discourses on emptiness of dharmas. Occasionally there are mendicants
(brahmacrin) with sharp faculties who search for the true character of dharmas, who
do not have any disgust for old age and death, and who adhere to all sorts of
dharmat. It is for them that emptiness of dharmas is taught in some discourses of the
Tripiaka. For example the Mahnyatstra119 speaks of two kinds of emptiness:
emptiness of beings, emptiness of dharmas. The Sattvastra120 says: The aggregate
of matter (rpaskandha), O Rdha, destroy it, break it, reduce it nothing.
Such is emptiness of all dharmas.
15. anupalambhanyat: emptiness of non-perception121
Some say: emptiness of non-perception means that no tma and no permanent
dharmas are perceived in the aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases (yatana) or the
eighteen elements (dhtu).
Others say: if one looks for some dharma in causes and conditions (prattya-
samutpda), one never finds it; just as the fist is not perceived in the five fingers.
This is emptiness of non-perception.
Yet some others say: emptiness of non-perception denotes no perception of all
dharmas and their causes and conditions (dharmanyat).
But if dharmas are not perceived, is it due to the weakness of knowledge or is it
because they do not really exist? It is because dharmas do not really exist that they
are not perceived.
The Buddha said: From the mement of producing the first thought of enlightenment
(bodhicitta), and up to the moment of becoming a Buddha endowed with the ten
powever, I have searched for the reality in dharmas, but without ever finding it.122
This is truly emptiness of non-perception.
What is non-perception of dharmas? As all dharmas up to and including the nirva
without remainder (nirupadheanirva) are unperceived, there is emptiness
consisting of non-perception.
The yogin who acquires this emptiness does not perceive (nopalabhate) the three
poisons (via), the four torrents (ogha),123 the five obstacles (nvaraa),124 the six
kinds of craving (t),125 the seven proclivities (anuaya),126 the eight wrongs

. Included in the Nidnasayukta, 152-57.

119
120
. Sattasutta of the Sayuttanikya, III, 135.
121
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2145.
For the Prajpramitstra there is an anupalambhanyat, which implies that the past and the
future, and the duration of the present are not perceived. This means that dharmas are outside
time, and consequently withdrawn from becoming. The Mahprajpramitstra explains this
emptiness as consisting of non-perception in the sense that all dharmas, gross or subtle, including
nirva escape every perception (upalabdhi), gain (lbha), and not because knowledge is weak.
122
. Adaashasrik, edited by E. Conze, 33.
123
. Dgha, III, 230, 276; Koa, V, 75: ogha or yoga: kma, bhava, di, avidy.
124
. Dgha, III, 278, Koa, V, 98: kma, vypda, stynamiddha, auddhatyakauktya, vicikits.
125
. Dgha, II, 58: t with reference to rpa, abda, gandha, rasa, spraavya, dharma.
55
(mithytva),127 the nine fetters (sayojana),128 the ten unwholesome paths of action
(akualakarmapatha).129 All these evil bonds being unperceived, one speaks of
emptiness of non-erception.
When he cultivates this emptiness, the yogin perceives (upalabhate) morality (la),
meditation (samdhi), and wisdom (praj),130 the four fruits of religious life
(ramayaphala), the five spiritual faculties (indriya), the five aggregates of the non-
trainee (aaikaskandha),131 the six discriminations of equanimity (upekopa-
vicra),132 the seven limbs of enlightenment (sambodhyaga), the nine successive
absorptions (sampatti), the ten properties of the non-trainee (aaikadharma)133 and
other rvaka qualities.
If in addition, the yogin perceives the perfection of wisdom, he accomplishes the six
perfections and the qualities (gua) of the ten stages (bhmi).
It was said above that all dharmas including nirva are not perceived. Why the
yogin perceives morality and the rest?
Although these dharmas are perceived (upalabdha), they all favour emptiness of non-
perception, and due to this they are also said to be unperceived (anupalabdha). So
long as the yogin does not assume them (ndadti) and does not attach himself to
them, they remain unperceived. Similarly unconditioned dharmas, the noble truths,
or absolute truth, all of them are are unperceived.
16-17-18. abhva-svabhva-abhvasvabhva-nyats: 134 emptiness of
inexistence, of inherent nature, and of both inexistence and inherent nature.
First exposition
Some assert that inexistence (abhva) constitutes the destruction (nirodha) of
dharmas, but as such destruction does not exist, the perfection of wisdom stra
speaks of the emptiness of inexistence.
The dharmas arsing from causes and conditions have no inherent nature (svabhva);
there being no svabhva, the perfectipon of wisdom stra speaks of emptiness of
inherent nature.
As it is impossible to grasp the characteristic of inexistence (abhvanimitta) and the
charectiristic of inherent nature, there is emptiness of inexistence and inherent
nature. In addition, the treatment of inexistence and inherent nature as empty is
named emptiness of inexistence and inherent nature. Finally, when the yogin
considers the origination (utpda) and destruction (nirodha) of dharmas, he views
them alternatively from the perspective of inherent existence, and from the
perspective of inexistence. Considering the origination he experiences mental
satisfaction (saumanasya) and considering the destruction, he experiences mental

126
. Dgha, 254, 282; Koa, V, 3: kmarga, pratigha, bhavarga, mna, avidy, di, vicikits.
127
. Dgha, II, 353; III, 254; Aguttara, II, 221; IV, 237: mithydi, mithysakalpa, mithyvc,
mithykarmnta, mithyjva, mithyvyyma, mithysmti, mithysamdhi.
128
. Koa, V, 81-82: anunaya, pratigha, mna, avidy, di, parmara, vicikits, rya, mtsarya.
129
. Dgha, III, 269; Koa, IV, 137.
130
. Dgha, II, 81, 84.
131
. Mahprajpramitstra, 1233, 1349-59.
132
. Dgha, III, 245; Majjhima, III, 239-40; Koa, III, 108: the discrimination of indifference with
regard to rpa, abda, gandha, rasa, spraavya, dharma.
133
. The eight members of the path defined as aaika, perfect freedom (aaik samyagvimikti), and
perfect knowledge (aaika samyagjna).
134
. Mahprajpramitstra, IV, 2149-51.
56
dissatisfaction (daurmanasya). When he discovers the emptiness of origination and
of destruction, he respectively destroys satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It is so
because he establishes that origination is not a gain and destruction is not a loss.
Through the elimination of such mundane thoughts of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction, there is emptiness of inexistence and inherent nature.
Among the eighteen kinds of emptiness, the first three nyats destroy all dharmas,
and the last three nyats also do the same.
The emptiness of inherent nature destroys the time of production and the time of
duration of all dharmas. The emptiness of inexistence destroys the time of
disappearance (vyaya) of all dharmas. The emptiness of inexistence and inherent
nature destroys at the same time production and disappearance.
Second exposition
Some say that emptiness of past and future dharmas is called emptiness of
inexistence; emptiness of present and unconditioned dharmas is called emptiness of
inherent nature. Why? Disappearance (vyaya) and alteration (anyathtva) of past
dharmas end up in inexistence. The future dharmas, whose causes and conditions are
not instigated, are without origination, without existence, without exit, and without
production, and hence they are inexistence. The present and unconditioned dharmas,
since they exist in the present, they are called inherent nature.
As inexistence and inherent nature are jointly empty, one speaks of emptiness of
inexistence and inherent nature.
Third exposition
Some say that since unconditioned dharmas are without origination, duration and
disappearance, they are called inexistence (abhva).
Conditioned dharmas, having origination, duration, and disappearance, are called
inherent nature.
As these two categories of dharmas are equally empty, there is emptiness of both
inexistence and inherent nature.
Thus, the Bodhisattva who aspires to establish himself in the eighteen kinds of
emptiness, starting with the emptiness of internal dharmas and concluding with the
emptiness of inexistence and inherent nature, must train in the perfection of wisdom.

57