7. MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted
to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961
for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or
before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in
his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration
or his authorized representative might properly
allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for
injunction. At the hearing which took place one
and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak
either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto
became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as
Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the
wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the
same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is
absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own citizenship settled
and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya
Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen of 25 January 1962.
8. COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently
naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United
States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for
registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for
re-election sought to cancel Coquillas certificate
of candidacy on the ground that his statement
as to the two year residency in Oras was a
material misrepresentation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision,
elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001,
COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered
the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he
represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of
candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two years at the time he
filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at
bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidates qualification for an
office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a
material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a
Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10,
1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
Despite his naturalization, he applied for and
was issued Portuguese Passport by
the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981.
Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.
He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically,
the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.
filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation
case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court
en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition.
When his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Clarification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acts constitute
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and
legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for
a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such
in official documents even after he had become
a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption
or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not
a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court
of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or
not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not
a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient.