9/5/2017 G.R. No.

193340

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ThirdDIVISION

January11,2017

G.R.No.193340

THEMUNICIPALITYOFTANGKAL,PROVINCEOFLANAODELNORTE,Petitioner,
vs.

HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Sharia District Court, 4th Judicial
District,MarawiCity,andHEIRSOFTHELATEMACALABOALOMPO,representedbySULTANDIMNANGB.
ALOMPO,Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA,J.:

TheCodeofMuslimPersonalLawsofthePhilippines1(CodeofMuslimPersonalLaws)vestsconcurrentjurisdiction
uponShari'adistrictcourtsoverpersonalandrealactionswhereinthepartiesinvolvedareMuslims,exceptthose
forforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainer.ThequestionpresentediswhethertheShari'aDistrictCourtofMarawiCity
has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose
mayorisaMuslim.Therespondentjudgeheldthatithas.Wereverse.

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint2 with the Shari'a District Court of
Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal,
Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the
constructionofthemunicipalhallandahealthcenterbuilding.Theagreementallegedlyimposedaconditionupon
theMunicipalityofTangkaltopaythevalueofthelandwithin35years,oruntil1997otherwise,ownershipofthe
landwouldreverttoMacalabo.PrivaterespondentsclaimedthattheMunicipalityofTangkalneitherpaidthevalueof
thelandwithintheagreedperiodnorreturnedthelandtoitsowner.Thus,theyprayedthatthelandbereturnedto
themassuccessorsininterestofMacalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss3 on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction.Itarguedthatsinceithasnoreligiousaffiliationandrepresentsnoculturalorethnictribe,itcannotbe
considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of
landisarealaction,itshouldhavebeenfiledintheappropriateRegionalTrialCourtofLanaodelNorte.

InitsOrder4datedMarch9,2010,theShari'aDistric.tCourtdeniedtheMunicipalityofTangkal'smotiontodismiss.
It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action involving
Muslims,hence,thecourthasoriginaljurisdictionconcurrentlywiththatofregular/civilcourts."Itaddedthatvenue
wasproperlylaidbecausetheShari'aDistrictCourthasterritorialjurisdictionovertheprovincesofLanaodelSur
andLanaodelNorte,inadditiontothecitiesofMarawiandIligan.Moreover,thefilingofamotiontodismissisa
disallowedpleadingundertheSpecialRulesofProcedureinShari'aCourts.5

TheMunicipalityofTangkalmovedforreconsideration,whichwasdeniedbytheShari'aDistrictCourt.TheShari'a
DistrictCourtalsoorderedtheMunicipalityofTangkaltofileitsanswerwithin10days.6TheMunicipalityofTangkal
timelyfileditsanswer7andraisedasanaffirmativedefensethecourt'slackofjurisdiction.

Withinthe60dayreglementaryperiod,theMunicipalityofTangkalelevatedthecasetousviapetitionforcertiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order8 (TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its
earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the Shari' a District Court has no jurisdiction since one party is a
municipalitywhichhasnoreligiousaffiliation.

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9
IntheirComment, privaterespondentsarguethatundertheSpecialRulesofProcedureinShari'aCourts,apetition
forcertiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the district court is a prohibited
pleading.Likewise,theMunicpalityofTangkal'smotiontodismissisdisallowedbytherules.Theyalsoechothe
reasoningoftheShari'aDistrictCourtthatsinceboththeplaintiffsbelowandthemayorofdefendantmunicipality
areMuslims,theShari'aDistrictCourthasjurisdictionoverthecase.

In the meantime, we issued a TRO10 against the Shari'a District Court and its presiding judge, Rasad Balindong,
fromholdinganyfurtherproceedingsinthecasebelow.

II

In its petition, the Municipality of Tangkal acknowledges that generally, neither certiorari nor prohibition is an
available remedy to assail a court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss. But it cites one of the
exceptionstotherule,i.e.,whenthedenialiswithoutorinexcessofjurisdictiontojustifyitsremedialaction. 11In
rebuttal,privaterespondentsrelyontheSpecialRulesofProcedureinShari'aCourtswhichexpresslyidentifiesa
motiontodismissandapetitionforcertiorari,mandamus,orprohibitionagainstanyinterlocutoryorderissuedbythe
courtasprohibitedpleadings.12

AlthoughtheSpecialRulesofProcedureinShari'aCourtsprohibitsthefilingofamotiontodismiss,thisprocedural
rulemayberelaxedwhenthegroundreliedonislackofjurisdictionwhichispatentonthefaceofthecomplaint.As
weheldinRulonaAlAwadhiv.Astih:13

Insteadofinvokingaproceduraltechnicality,therespondentcourtshouldhaverecognizeditslackof
jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its
proceedingswouldbe,astheywere,afutileandinvalidexercise.Asummaryruleprohibitingthefiling
ofamotiontodismissshouldnotbeabartothedismissaloftheactionforlackofjurisdictionwhenthe
jurisdictionalinfirmityispatentonthefaceofthecomplaintitself,inviewofthefundamentalprocedural
doctrinethatthejurisdictionofacourtmaybechallengedatanytimeandatanystageoftheaction.14

Indeed,whenitisapparentfromthepleadingsthatthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,itisduty
boundtodismissthecaseregardlessofwhetherthedefendantfiledamotiontodismiss. 15Thus,inVillagraciav.
FifthShari'aDistrictCourt,16weheldthatonceitbecameapparentthattheShari'acourthasnojurisdictionoverthe
subjectmatterbecausethedefendantisnotaMuslim,thecourtshouldhavemotupropriodismissedthecase.17

Anorderdenyingamotiontodismissisaninterlocutoryorderwhichneitherterminatesnorfinallydisposesofacase
asitleavessomethingtobedonebythecourtbeforethecaseisfinallydecidedonthemerits.Thus,asageneral
rule,thedenialofamotiontodismisscannotbequestionedinaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariwhichisaremedy
designedtocorrecterrorsofjurisdictionandnoterrorsofjudgment. 18Asexceptions,however,thedefendantmay
availofapetitionforcertiorariifthegroundraisedinthemotiontodismissislackofjurisdictionoverthepersonof
thedefendantoroverthesubjectmatter,19orwhenthedenialofthemotiontodismissistaintedwithgraveabuseof
discretion.20

The reason why lack of jurisdiction as a ground for dismissal is treated differently from others is because of the
basic principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action21to the extent that all proceedings before a court without
jurisdictionarevoid.22Wegrantcertiorarionthisbasis.Aswillbeshownbelow,theShari'aDistrictCourt'slackof
jurisdiction over the subject matter is patent on the face of the complaint, and therefore, should have been
dismissedoutright.

III

The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws,specificallyinArticle143.23Consistentwiththepurposeofthelawtoprovideforaneffectiveadministration
and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims,24 it has a catchall provision granting Shari' a district
courtsoriginaljurisdictionoverpersonalandrealactionsexceptthoseforforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainer.25The
Shari'adistrictcourts'jurisdictionoverthesemattersisconcurrentwithregularcivilcourts,i.e.,municipaltrialcourts
andregionaltrialcourts.26Thereis,however,alimittothegeneraljurisdictionofShari'adistrictcourtsovermatters
ordinarilycognizablebyregularcourts:suchjurisdictionmayonlybeinvokedifbothpartiesareMuslims.Ifoneparty
isnotaMuslim,theactionmustbefiledbeforetheregularcourts.27

The complaint below, which is a real action28 involving title to and possession of the land situated at Barangay
Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari' a District Court pursuant to the general
jurisdictionconferredbyArticle143(2)(b).IndeterminingwhethertheShari'aDistrictCourthasjurisdictionoverthe
case, the threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private
respondents,asplaintiffsbelow,areMuslims.Theonlydisputeiswhethertherequirementissatisfiedbecausethe
mayorofthedefendantmunicipalityisalsoaMuslim. 1wphi1

WhenArticle143(2)(b)qualifiestheconfermentofjurisdictiontoactions"whereinthepartiesinvolvedareMuslims,"
theword"parties"necessarilyreferstotherealpartiesininterest.Section2ofRule3oftheRulesofCourtdefines
realpartiesininterestasthosewhostandtobebenefitedorinjuredbythejudgmentinthesuit,orareentitledtothe
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availsofthesuit.Inthiscase,thepartieswhowillbedirectlybenefitedorinjuredaretheprivaterespondents,as
real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real party defendant. In their complaint, private
respondentsclaimthattheirpredecessorininterest,Macalabo,enteredintoanagreementwiththeMunicipalityof
Tangkalfortheuseoftheland.TheircauseofactionisbasedontheMunicipalityofTangkal'sallegedfailureand
refusaltoreturnthelandorpayforitsreasonablevalueinaccordancewiththeagreement.Accordingly,theypray
for the return of the land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would undoubtedly be
beneficialtothemcorrelatively,itwouldbeprejudicialtotheMunicipalityofTangkalwhichwouldeitherbedeprived
possessionofthelandonwhichitsmunicipalhallcurrentlystandsorberequiredtoallocatefundsforpaymentof
rent.Conversely,ajudgmentinfavoroftheMunicipalityofTangkalwouldeffectivelyquietitstitleoverthelandand
defeattheclaimsofprivaterespondents.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a
representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a
representative, that representative is notand neither does he becomea real party in interest. The person
representedisdeemedtherealpartyininterest29therepresentativeremainstobeathirdpartytotheaction.30That
Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement
underArticle143(2)(b)thatbothpartiesbeMuslims.Tosatisfytherequirement,itistherealpartydefendant,the
MunicipalityofTangkal,whomustbeaMuslim.Suchaproposition,however,isalegalimpossibility.

TheCodeofMuslimPersonalLawsdefinesa"Muslim"as"apersonwhotestifiestotheonenessofGodandthe
ProphethoodofMuhammadandprofessesIslam."31Althoughthedefinitiondoesnotexplicitlydistinguishbetween
naturalandjuridicalpersons,itnonethelessconnotestheexerciseofreligion,whichisafundamentalpersonalright.
32
Theabilitytotestifytothe"onenessofGodandtheProphethoodofMuhammad"andtoprofessIslamis,byits
nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33 They are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The
MunicipalityofTangkalfallsunderthiscategory.UndertheLocalGovernmentCode,amunicipalityisabodypolitic
andcorporatethatexercisespowersasapoliticalsubdivisionofthenationalgovernmentandasacorporateentity
representingtheinhabitantsofitsterritory.34

Furthermore,asagovernmentinstrumentality,theMunicipalityofTangkalcanonlyactforsecularpurposesandin
ways that have primarily secular effects35consistent with the nonestablishment clause. 36 Hence, even if it is
assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally
proscribedfromadopting,muchlessexercising,anyreligion,includingIslam.

TheShari'aDistrictCourtappearstohaveunderstoodtheforegoingprinciples,asitconcededthattheMunicipality
of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian."37 Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the
mayortothemunicipality.ThisismanifesterroronthepartoftheShari'aDistrictCourt.Itisanelementaryprinciple
thatamunicipalityhasapersonalitythatisseparateanddistinctfromitsmayor,vicemayor,sanggunian,andother
officers composing it.38 And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious
considerationsas the Shari' a District Court has donewithout running afoul the inviolability of the separation of
ChurchandStateenshrinedintheConstitution.39

Inviewoftheforegoing,theShari'aDistrictCourthadnojurisdictionunderthelawtodecideprivaterespondents'
complaintbecausenotallofthepartiesinvolvedintheactionareMuslims.Sinceitwasclearfromthecomplaintthat
therealpartydefendantwastheMunicipalityofTangkal,theShari'aDistrictCourtshouldhavesimplyappliedthe
basicdoctrineofseparatejuridicalpersonalityandmotupropriodismissedthecase.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City in Civil
CaseNo.20109areREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Accordingly,CivilCaseNo.20109isDISMISSED.

SOORDERED.

FRANCISH.JARDELEZA
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

LUCASP.BERSAMIN BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

ALFREDOBENJAMINS.CAGUIOA*
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassigned
tothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

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PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttotheSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,Icertifythat
theconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriter
oftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*
DesignatedasFifthMemberoftheThirdDivisionperSpecialOrderNo.2417datedJanuary4,2017.
1
PresidentialDecreeNo.1083(1977).
2
Rollo,pp.3947.
3
Id.at4853.
4
Id.at57A.
5
EnBancResolutionpromulgatedbytheSupremeCourtonSeptember20,1983.
6
Rollo,p.76.
7
Id.at8489.
8
Idat637.
9
Id.at96105.
10
Id.at122123.
11
Id.at68.
12
Id.at9697,citingtheSpecialRulesofProcedureinShari'aCourts,Sec.13(a)&(f).
13
G.R.No.L81969,September26,1988,165SCRA771.
14
Id.at777.Citationsomitted.
15
RULESOFCOURT,Rule9,Sec.1.
16
G.R.No.188832,April23,2014,723SCRA550.
17
Id.at565566.
18
Republicv.TransunionCorporation,G.R.No.191590,April21,2014,722SCRA273,279.
19
TungHoSteelEnterprisesCorporationv.TingGuanTradingCorporation,G.R.No.182153,April7,2014,
720SCRA707,720.
20
Republicv.TransunionCorporation,supraat279.
21
FrancelRealtyCorporationv.Sycip,G.R.No.154684,September8,2005,469SCRA424,431.
22
Monsantov.Lim,G.R.No.178911,September17,2014,735SCRA252,265266.
23
Art.143.Originaljurisdiction.

(1)TheShari'aDistrictCourtshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionover:

(a)Allcasesinvolvingcustody,guardianship,legitimacy,paternityandfiliationarising
underthisCode

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators/or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property

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(c)Petitionsforthedeclarationofabsenceanddeathandforthecancellationorcorrection
ofentriesintheMuslimRegistriesmentionedinTitleVIofBookTwoofthisCode

(d)AllactionsarisingfromcustomarycontractsinwhichthepartiesareMuslims,ifthey
havenotspecifiedwhichlawshallgoverntheirrelationsand

(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
otherauxiliarywritsandprocessesinaidofitsappellatejurisdiction.

(2)Concurrentlywithexistingcivilcourts,theShari'aDistrictCourtshallhaveoriginaljurisdiction
over:

(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and
commitmentofaninsanepersontoanasylum

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the
partiesinvolvedareMuslimsexceptthoseforforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainer,which
shallfallundertheexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoftheMunicipalCircuitCourtand

(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are
MuslimsorthepropertyinvolvedbelongsexclusivelytoMuslims.
24
CODEOFMUSLIMPERSONALLAWS,Art.2(c).
25
CODEOFMUSLIMPERSONALLAWS,Art.143(2)(b).
26
Tomawisv.Balindong,G.R.No.182434,March5,2010,614SCRA354,364365.
27
Villagraciav.FifthShari'aDistrictCourt,supranote16at566.
28
A real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. RULES OF
COURT,Rule4,Sec.1.
29
RULESOFCOURT,Rule3,Sec.3.
30
Angv.Ang,G.R.No.186993,August22,2012,678SCRA699,708709.
31
CODEOFMUSLIMPERSONALLAWS,Art.7(g).
32
Victorianov.ElizaldeRopeWorkers'Union,G.R.No.L25246,September12,1974,59SCRA54,72.
33
CitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionComm'n,558U.S.310,466(2010),J.Stevens,dissenting.
34
LOCALGov'TCODE,Sec.15.
35
AngladladLGBTPartyv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.190582,April8,2010,618SCRA32,59.
36
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights.
37
Rollo,p.57A.
38
Toriov.Fontanilla,G.R.No.L29993,October23,1978,85SCRA599,615.
39
CONSTITUTION,ArticleII,Sec.6.

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