CONTRARY TO LAW.

4
TOPIC: Rule 113 - B. Warrantless Arrests (Sec.5)
In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
Republic of the Philippines charged.5 Trial ensued. Meantime, Saraum was released on bail.6
SUPREME COURT
Manila
PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the defense presented
THIRD DIVISION
no witness other than Saraum.

January 25, 2016

According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis
regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was
G.R. No. 205472 then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and
PO1 Julius Anion against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur-buyer
AMADO I. SARAUM,1 Petitioner, accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team
vs. as the perimeter security. PO1 Anion coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. regarding the operation. After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report
and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse the
Decision2dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 elated December 19, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the judgment of conviction against petitioner
Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal
Case No. CBU-77737.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which
was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who
were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered
from Saraums possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis
confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A"
for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the
paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over to
the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.

Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without being
authorized by law, did then and there have in his possession the following:
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date
and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law
when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were
his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of
the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
1 = One (1) lighter Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a fine of Php20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper insolvency.

3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, SO ORDERED.8
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition. We deny.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on the findings
of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive
and binding.9 Besides, a review of the records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the
accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law.10 In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that
Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and
lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in
flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.12
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraums statement that he was not committing a crime at the time
of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding
a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand,13 while they
were in the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding
arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the
illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the
vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless,
lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses
of the items to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a
laboratory examination and finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
any illegal substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the
crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found.1wphi1 In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraums arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and
seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when
he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise the objection is deemed waived."15 In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection
to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the
formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.16
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the ones
actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided
in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165;17 and (b)
there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated
items.18
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must immediately conduct
a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance therewith is not fatal as
long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.19 While nowhere in the
prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the police operatives involved in
the buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and taking a photograph of the drug
paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground" will remain
unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to specifically challenge the custody and
safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial
court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged non-compliance
with Section 21 for the first time on appeal.20
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for
the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court.21 Section
1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines
chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items should be established,
thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.23
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible.25
x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a
law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted
subject only to the evidentiary weight that will be accorded it by the courts. x x x
Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked
or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed because it has the advantage
of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case.34 In this case,
the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum's guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been
sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did not rely on the weakness of the
defense. 'The prosecution was able to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision elated September 8, 2011 and
Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which
sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-77737, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Republic of the Philippines
Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but SUPREME COURT
of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the Manila
courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.26

FIRST DIVISION
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.27 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015
the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in
the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they were brought
to the court for examination. Even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,
inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the vs.
items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the police as to the required PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items. The succession of events established by
evidence and the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals all show that the evidence DECISION
seized were the same evidence subsequently identified and testified to in open court.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation are generally
accorded full faith and credit in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and the
and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that could be attributed to them.28 The defense failed to
Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which
show any odious intent on the part of the police officers to impute such a serious crime that would put in
affirmed in toto the Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person. Saraums mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales
and categorical identification and declarations of the police officers. The defense of denial, frame-up or
(Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section
extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
Act.30 As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the
various aspects of the crime committed.31 To merit consideration, it has to be substantiated by strong, The Facts
clear and convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do for presenting no corroborative evidence.32
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of Section justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was
11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit: carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found
that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be
presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.13
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing
0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was
The CA Ruling
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous
drug.
In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03 Calag
had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing
6
CONTRARY TO LA W.
a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla.
According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu,
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there.15
(Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle,
patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a
Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10
Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18
meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing
and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached The Issue before the Court
Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police
officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 8

In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic
thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal. 19
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.9

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule,
drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs. 20
along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have
confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they
The Court's Ruling
failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 10
The petition is meritorious.

The RTC Ruling

Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through
or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence
In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine
(2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained
in the amount of 300,000.00.12
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two
(2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause to
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. 23
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. 25 Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests,
as follows:
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing
around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to
the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct
examination is revelatory:
Pros. Silao:

SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were you?
arrest a person:

A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxxx

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112. Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that happened if
any?
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
xxxx
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. 26
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already
identified?
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or within A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.28

A: They were quite facing me then.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he
0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo,
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29
Mandaluyong City?
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am. Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.

Q: And who was driving the motorcycle? Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?

A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am. Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa kanila?

Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do? Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?

A: We stopped ma'am. Witness: Wala po.

Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less? xxxx

A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am. Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic
sachet?

Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two male
persons? A: From his hand ma'am.

A: They were surprised, ma'am. Q: Left or right hand?

xxxx Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan, no problem.
Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30

Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?
A: They were surprised.
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?
A: They were stunned.
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple Lang ng tanong ko sa
yo eh. Did you say anything?
Court:
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that
he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule
amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion
were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have
been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen
his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal
drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the
factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime
had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33 which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits
"umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at
all will not result in a reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain
"stop and frisk" searches: In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.1wphi1 These circumstances are
not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason"
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search
enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of
in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers
the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of
xxxx
Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other
reason.
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
SO ORDERED.
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
Republic of the Philippines
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but
it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
SECOND DIVISION
exception:

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
 DECISION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
SERENO, J.:
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos ( 300,000.00).
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its
proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case

SO ORDERED.6
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are
as follows:
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning,
1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a
he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving
said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it;
that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel- (ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to
open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath (iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which COMPROMISED.
turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.3
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT
(sic).7
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
ensued.
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a
citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers
drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had
Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash
been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense
thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged
of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis
Decision held:
on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was
actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other
words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be
lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission
is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions
of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall
not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen
days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any
of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner
was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner
had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation,
nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime
either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention
of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting
while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the
end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an
ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and
in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed
officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the
situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at
least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character
of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us
to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that
the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be
fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here
be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a
fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody,
the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance
(or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid
arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the
custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible
to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning
of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested
for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza,
this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against
a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20 a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding
and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening
the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.24

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti
evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. calls for the acquittal of the accused.26

We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and
"the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from
police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is
SO ORDERED.
more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest
. . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps
to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1wphi1 It
plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer
safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers
out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype
Republic of the Philippines
search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search
SUPREME COURT
for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the
Manila
driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon THIRD DIVISION
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453
U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,
vs.
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed
DECISION
was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ABAD, J.: The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused
Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no
ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers'
their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.
chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1
The Facts and the Case
Cabutihans credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at
their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full the
accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in absentia. 3
decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The accused is
now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1
Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol
The Issue Presented
car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw
two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the
saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused
Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who
was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. Ruling of the Court
This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and
Cruz.4
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless
arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the
contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers
confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no
National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5
doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug
into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of
traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6 drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming
that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question
the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz
plea of not guilty.12
were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three
armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said, "Dyan ka
lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private
police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.7 committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante
delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.14
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and
four months, and to pay a fine of 10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit. But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house,
of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?
for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers
were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street
opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity
that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

THE COURT:
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the
illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug
door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having
proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
A It was partially open Your Honor. delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17

Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot? One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough
to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open
Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the
by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1 The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and
A We pushed the door, Your Honor. release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a
police officer?

A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may

Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the
interior of the house?
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
A Yes, Your Honor. Manila

Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of FIRST DIVISION
the house?

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014

A Yes, Your Honor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
1 PO2 Trambulo.
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-
164175, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 45.46
grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of
TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized
by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams],
0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams
or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve
(12) transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the
appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-
trial conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties
entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1)
Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2
Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the defense presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant
Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to their office
and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly
claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the
informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a potential
buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito
Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team
and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted
of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo
was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don.
The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome
Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along
for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place with the
informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The
informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was
indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein
she would buy 250 grams of shabu for 250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys
Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys Restaurant. Alias Don
was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she
replied that she had the money with her. She brought five genuine 500.00 bills, which were inserted on
top of five bundles of play money to make it appear that she had 250,000.00 with her. After she showed
the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to
take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Dons apartment at 765 Valdez
St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N.
Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to the target
area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would
signify that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The
team then travelled to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used
were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the
apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out
of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo
told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying
and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which
contained white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the
same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal
the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two
suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody
of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in
the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the genuine 500.00 bills below the name of Benigno
Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The
suspects rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She
learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also
learned that the name of the appellants companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and
brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the
appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being
consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the
contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the
same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She
handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic
chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at
the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of
the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation
were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown
envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed
that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did
not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant
about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime
Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory.
She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets she also
initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo
conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from
the appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo
placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp.
Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the
morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug activities of
alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was
able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that
meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of
the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a
second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay
about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with
five genuine 500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the
genuine bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived
at Cindys Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle
money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias
Don decided that the drug deal would take place in front of alias Dons rented apartment on Valdez St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area.
They then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo
conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting
officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the
consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo
and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned
himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team
parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with
another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but
P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big
brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag
containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he
immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-
bust money from alias Dons male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces
of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked
inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date.
The police officers then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police
headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained possession
thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got
back to their office, the team reported the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested
suspects were booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the
Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the
one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of the drug
specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug
specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp.
Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data
contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered
that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white
crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-
1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos examination revealed that the white crystalline
substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of 12
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets
were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequitos findings were contained in Physical
Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of
the five original 500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory
Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating
that the specimen submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-
1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown
envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-
CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit
EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request
for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16)
Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants brief39 before the
Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses counter-statement of facts. According to
the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics
Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as
well as requests from different police agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also
rendered day and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory
technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial
courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens,
to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00
oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took
a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 oclock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny
San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just
arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door.
Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They
were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his
room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there
were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet
and got drug specimens in [Donalds] possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs
came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned
by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was
intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his
jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing 2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and apprehending
Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit
1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust
money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization
Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6)
List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence
to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present
any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to
charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the
volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal
sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the
possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers. Furthermore, the
RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities
of the appellant prevailed over the latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police, the trial court
pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help from his
Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the
Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy)
executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and
strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be
presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges against
those police officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the
same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated
March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given
weight and credence considering that the said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said
documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no
probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of 5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor of the
government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the
said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that
the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear
and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the
part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been
controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding
appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section
15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in
its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1)
the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his
supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did
not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the
fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch
as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the
NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve to deny this
appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an
arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest
in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise
valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant
of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the
subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements
should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in
a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal
possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust
operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp.
Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags
of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of 250,000.00. She likewise identified
the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were
seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder
contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardos testimony on the
events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward.
She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsels cross-
examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens seized and the
buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12
pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo
conducted a body search on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic
sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply
corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both
police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the
appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the incident
by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the
appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified
that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his
arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is
presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to criminally or
administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing
illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances.
Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate
supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the
appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was
authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of
the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellants case. To the
mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and
categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and
possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the
trial courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual
findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there
is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt
of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3)
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this
Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.
- The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16
of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from
prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. (Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was
found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is
more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition of either reclusion perpetua
or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is
composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in AFFIRMED. No costs.
the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering
that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article
SO ORDERED.
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial courts
imposition of reclusion perpetua. The 5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the appellant is also in
accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, the Court of
Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper imposable penalty.
Indeed, we held in Tira that:

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of
a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as
follows:

QUANTITY
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams
prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams
prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams
reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams
reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant amounted
to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty
on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a regular
employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration
to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.66 Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special
conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged
in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.