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MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a
the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave
oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and
ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four
(4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay
Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley
Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he
led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United
States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin,
mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka
rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo
chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as
Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations
between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister
requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col.
Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that
the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain
Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange,
Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that
they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured
him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the
demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The
colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using
his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate
the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they
were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they
boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led
behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite
City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by
it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his
pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade
left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other
demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lwphi1.et
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave
threats and grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of
Cavite City), as follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats,
as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal
The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses
Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with
the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the
presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory
remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin,
Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial.
On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594
for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion
on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the
amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was
allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict
of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal
by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court
allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been
arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats
without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting
petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him
in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats
when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats
only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that
of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be
amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court).
Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2
were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon
his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject
to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the
aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient
of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused
threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or
modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General,
petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of
Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word
"orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented
during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court
committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to
enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not
substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats
and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting
him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the
commission of light threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the
fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in
trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof,
culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that
the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened
the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his
safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed
while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and
not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month
before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's
conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo".
This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that
is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the
threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the
case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to
threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so
they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the
libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion
in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense
committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole
letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the
statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for
which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part
of the more important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de
oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and
affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1
ART. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit,
if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even
though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have
attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been
made subject to a condition.
FIRST DIVISION
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINESand April 10, 2006
YOLANDA CASTRO,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and Vice-Mayor of
a town, both holders of exalted government positions, became slaves to their
human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they
were ordinary men in the streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst lead
to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this case, which should have been
avoided if only they have imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and
convictions that consciousness to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let
them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the public they serve. This is
the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.[1]
At bar is a petition for review assailing the decision[2] dated 28 March 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 which affirmed with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise
affirming with modification the joint decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, convicting petitioner of the crime
of Grave Oral Defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94 and Slander by Deed in
Criminal Case No.140-94. Also assailed is the resolution[3] dated 9 October
2003 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.
On September 12, 1994 on or about 10:00 in the morning at the SB Office in the
Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, in the presence of several persons and
again in the afternoon on or about four thirty (4:30 PM) at the Old Session Hall of
the Municipal Building in my presence and in the presence of several persons,
defendant NOEL L. VILLANUEVA, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of
everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and
insulting manner at the undersigned complainant the following words:
[]Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca[] and Balamu mansanas cang
malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat (You are pretending to be clean
and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red
apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty), which utterances are
serious and insulting in nature, tending to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt of
undersigned complainant and causing her extreme mental anguish, wound (sic)
feelings, besmirched reputation and serious anxiety for which she is entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the
honorable court. Contrary to law.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on both counts and trial ensued. The
prosecution witnesses presented were the complainant and her two witnesses.
The MCTC restated the facts as presented by the prosecution evidence as follows:
On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 oclock in the morning, two utility men came to
complainants office, bringing with them the application for monetized leave
of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case. The
application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by
complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her
secretary.[5]
The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayors Office and he
allegedly said: E ano kung wala sa mood, e ano kung galit sya.[6] These utterances
of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then entered the
complainants office bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave. The
accused addressed the complainants secretary: Malou, pag atiu ne keng mood,
papirma mu ne. The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a very
sarcastic manner.[7]
Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her in and out files and
while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on the floor. When she was about to
pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at complainants
face, but she was able to evade it. Accused then said: Ibuat daka ken, inabu daka
keng awang, e baling masukulnaku. (I will lift you from there and I will throw you
out of the window and I dont care if I will go to jail). Then the accused went out of
the office and before leaving, he pointed a dirty finger at complainant, prompting
the latter to stand and get an empty bottle of coke to shield her face. Accused
proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor. Because accused was still
frothing invectives, complainant purportedly rolled the empty bottle of coke
towards him. The incident was witnessed by so many people numbering about 20
to 30 who were then at the municipal hall.[8]
The defense, on the other hand, presented six witnesses. From their
testimonies, the MCTC gathered that on 12 September 1994, accused requested
Flora Calayag to prepare the application for monetized leave and asked her to have
it approved by the complainant. Because the application remained unsigned by the
latter, it was Joel Cecilio who in the afternoon went to her office for the approval
of the monetized leave, but again, to no avail.[12]
This angered the accused and he said to complainant, [i]s this the actuation
of the high government official? The complainant replied, Bolang (Insane). A
verbal squabble ensued and the complainant allegedly said, nung munta kayo keng
municipiyong ayni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala nakong depatan nung-
e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau.(When you go to the municipal building as if
you are a king, you did nothing except to make money, the people no longer
believe in you.)[14]
Complainant, at that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at petitioner and hit one
of the Barangay Captains then present.[15]
After trial, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and
Serious Slander by Deed in a joint decision dated 26 February 1998. The MCTC
held that the statements uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty finger
constitute an affront on complainant who, as Vice Mayor and a lady, deserves
greater respect. The MCTC posited that the defense interposed by the petitioner
that complainant brought the havoc upon herself when she refused to approve his
application for accrued leave credits monetization cannot be considered as valid to
obviate or obliterate the crime or damage done unto the complainant. The MCTC
then held:
With these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence against the accused and
as such this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a charged
(sic) of Grave Oral Defamation punishable under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal
Code and Slander by Deed punishable under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code. x
x x The complainant although she can estimate the value of the moral damages is
entitled to the sum of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 and P1,000.00 as
appearance fee plus litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
offenses or charges mentioned above, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of
FOUR (4) MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in each case which the
accused shall served (at the same time), and to pay by way of moral damages the
sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
litigation expenses and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance
fee.[16]
Both parties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed petitioners conviction,
but modified the penalty and the manner of serving accuseds sentence, and with a
substantial increase in the award of damages. The fallo reads:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with
the modification that the award of exemplary damages was deleted because
according to the Court of Appeals it was shown from the records that the
petitioner himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion for refusing, for
no reason at all, to approve petitioners application for monetization of his
accrued leave credits. The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:
As petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise met with failure, petitioner,
in a last stab at absolution, lodged the present petition for review on the following
arguments:
I.
II.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SAID COURTS GAVE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT ONLY TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, BUT FAILED
TO GIVE PROBATIVE VALUE TO AND ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND THAT OF HIS
WITNESSES.
IV.
The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94,
and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of
petitioner for serious slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94.
Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the
offended party are also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was
grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman,
Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President,[23] for which
no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of the compass of grave oral
defamation.[24] However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of
the offended party constitutes only a light felony.[25]
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the
position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party
was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such
scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as
found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid
justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of
petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm.
The already existing animosity between them does not vest in the
complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner a right to which he was
legally entitled. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right. They are designed to permit the court to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress
the wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be invoked as a matter of right. x x x [26]
Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use
of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all
possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our
considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as
slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a
light felony.[31]
The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioners act of
poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed.
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if
the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense
while considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and
was in reaction to a perceived provocation. The penalty for serious slander
by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.
In Mari, the Court found petitioner guilty of serious slander by deed defined
and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to
pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
deed involved was the banging of a chair in front of complainant and choking her.
Records show that the incident complained of took place at the Board Room
of the D.B.T. Mar Bay Construction Incorporated in the afternoon of August 17,
1984. Present at the meeting were Agustin Tanco, Chairman of the Board; the
President, Donato Teodoro; the accused, Amado Teodoro, as Corporate Secretary;
the complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young who is the Treasurer; and one
Oscar Benares.
xxxx
This Court in Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.
Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the
award of moral damages to P100,000.00 in light of its own finding that petitioner
himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at
all, to approve petitioners application for monetization of his accrued leave credits.
3) The awards for moral damages and attorneys fees are DELETED.
Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it deleted the award
for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
In the Matter of the Alleged Improper Conduct of Justice Badoy, Jr., 443 Phil. 296, 313 (2003).
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Edgardo F.
Sundiam, concurring. Rollo, pp. 51-63.
[3]
Rollo, p. 8.
[4]
Id., p. 52.
[5]
Id., p. 83.
[6]
Id., p. 54.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id., pp. 83-84.
[9]
Id., p. 85.
[10]
Id., p. 95.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Id., p. 86.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id., pp. 86-87.
[17]
Id., p. 145.
[18]
Id., p. 77.
[19]
Id., pp. 28-29.
[20]
Victorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 32836-37, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 645, 652.
[21]
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, Reyes, p. 956 (14th Ed., 1998), citing People v. Jaring, C.A., 40
O.G. 3683.
[22]
Pader v. People, 381 Phil. 932, 935-936 (2000).
[23]
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, supra note 21, citing People v. Boiser, C.A., 53 O.G. 2202.
[24]
Id., citing Balite v. People, 124 Phil. 868, 878 (1966).
[25]
Id., citing People v. De Modesto, 40 O.G., Suppl. 11,128.
[26]
Rollo, p. 63.
[27]
Mari v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 269, 275 (2000).
[28]
Supra note 22.
[29]
Id., pp. 936-937.
[30]
204 Phil. 372, 375-376 (1982).
[31]
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, supra note 31, p. 957.
[32]
Id., p. 959.
[33]
Supra note 27, p. 273.
[34]
Id., pp. 275-279.
[35]
328 Phil. 116 (1996).
[36]
Id., pp. 118-119.
[37]
People v. Delfin, 112 Phil. 807, 818 (1961).
[38]
137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969).
[39]
Mari v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27.
[40]
Domingo v. Quimson, supra note 1.
[41]
Cf. Pader v. People, supra note 22.