LIM VS BROWNWELL 107 PHIL 345

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of
Manila, with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last world
war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the
name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140,
On March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two
of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2
On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien
Property Custodian) under the authority of the same statute issued a supplemental
vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the
President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two
formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby
the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the
Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all
claims in relation to the property transferred, which claims are payable by the United
States of America or the Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the United States
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and for all such costs and expenses
of administration as may by law be charged against the property or proceeds thereof
hereby transferred.
On November 15, 1948, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the
property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator On the theory that the lots in
question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that they were mortgaged by her to the
Mercantile Bank of China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was
sold at public auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of
threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her
right of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to the property
because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in the
Philippines by reason of alien age.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee
of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and copy of the decision disallowing the
claim was received by claimant's counsel on the 15th of that month
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate
estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney
General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back
rents. The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) be sued?

HELD:
1.No suit or claim for the return of said properties pursuant to Section 9 or 32 (a) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from the date of
vesting, the later date and the last on which suit could be brought. A condition
precedent to a suit for the return of property vested under Trading with the Enemy Act
is that it should be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or within two years from the date
of vesting, whichever is later, but in computing the two years, the period during which
there was pending a suitor claim for the return of the property of the Act shall be
excluded.
The court states that In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar as it
dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against
the Attorney General of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, is
affirmed, but revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 3 and 4,
as to which the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

SANDERS VS VERIDIANO 162 SCRA 88

Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the
special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo
City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which
includes the said station. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with
permanent residence in the Philippines,as so was private respondent Wyer, who died
two years ago. They were both employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment
had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October
18, 1975.Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance
proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department
of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted
the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time
status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that
Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision.

Issue:
whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they
did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents

Held:
The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of
public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token,
the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability
and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess
of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of
the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of
a foreign state.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly
had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval
Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents type of
employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding
for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to
Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In
fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and
contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the
private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
 Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude
that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the
claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied
not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government
as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its
consent.
Such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

TORIO VS FONTANILLA 85 SCRA 599

October 23, 1978

Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 to
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee was created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage.
A zarzuela troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their
performance on January 22. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla
was pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of
Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the Councils individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized
public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was
an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for
the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipalitys agents in
carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due
care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.

After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive
Committee had exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the
construction of the stage, and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the
committee. Consequently, the defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and
ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente
Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its
attorneys fees; and the costs.

Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

Held: Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective
municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name,
they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political
on the one hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and
political. Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community. These include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality
for the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty,
no recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good
faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation
can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to
suit upon contracts and its tort.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ

136 SCRA 487

Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the
construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules
of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary
acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental
acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its
sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. GUINTO

182 SCRA 644
FACTS: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. In GR No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US
Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them
for contracts for barbering services in the said base.
In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained
after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case
to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between
the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Genoves reaction was to file his complaint against the
individual petitioners.
In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O
Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn
statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers
testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then
filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their
acts that he was removed.
In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against
the herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result
of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to
the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to
them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and
were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to
dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the
suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our
land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine,
as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its
implied consent. In the case o US, the customary law of international law on state
immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no
question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such
waiver may be implied.
It is clear from a study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operations against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued.
As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The
needed inquiry first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented at
the trial.
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. V. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, AND MA VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
G.R. NO. 150605, DECEMBER 10, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by
the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing, influencing or
corrupting them to vote for him.

The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order
delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the
Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the
petitioner through telegram.

At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results
showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.

Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with

the COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second
motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry receipt;
however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.

The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the
Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the office of the
Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the
petition for disqualification.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive
a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to
rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the
summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph order of
the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it was sent
to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of
votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate proclamation of the candidate
who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result, respondent was declared as
having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of office, and
assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4 th district of Leyte. A copy of the
said Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.

The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the
COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared
the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this
decision.
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 th district
of Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives
through respondent De Venecia, but no action was taken by the latter. Hence, this
petition.

Issues:
1. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
2. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc
of jurisdiction to review its validity.
3. WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the
petitioner as the legally elected representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte.

Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading
to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal
in prejudice of his rights is void.

Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.

The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of
the votes cast in his favor.

Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled

doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the
peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times
be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving
him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.

2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not attained
finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th Legislative district of Leyte. For
these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration of oath and the
registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives is
no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the
following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the
COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was
set aside by the COMELEC en banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner;
said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not challenged by the respondent and has
become final and executory.
CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA (OTHER CASE DIGEST)

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case,
the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to
review its validity

Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against
Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the
equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending
so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was
suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was
found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of
Locsins proclamation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of

a Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize
Codilla as the legally elected Representative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxx

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending hisproclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no

jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second

Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once
a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House
of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue
regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is
because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of
respondent Locsin.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of
the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question.
There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent
Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the
elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser,
to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but
nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A

purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents.
The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered theproclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC
en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said
Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed
by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except
the reign of chaos and confusion.

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 PHIL 139

NATURE: Original action in teh Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent against the
election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas.

FACTS: IN the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara and respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Taybas.. On
October 7, 1935 petitioner Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National
Assembly and he later took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3,
1935, the National Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 8 which declared with finality the
victory of petitioner. On December 8, respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara praying that said the former be
declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of the said
position be nullified. On December 20, Angara filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest"
arguing that a) Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of
its member should be presented; b) that aforesaid resolution has for its object and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and c) protest was filed out of the
prescribed period. The Electoral Commission denied petitioner's motion. Thus, this
action in the present case.

ISSUE:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing facts;

2.WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion having
entertained a protest after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which declared
the deadline of filing of protests.

HELD:
1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Not taking
cognizance of said controversy would create a void in our constitutional system which
may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the ingral or constituent units thereof.

2. The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly". Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must
conform to their own prescribed rules and the National Assembly cannot divest them of
any such powers. Wherefore, petition DENIED

Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept 1991

Facts:
I n th e el ec t io n s he ld o n M ay 1 1 , 1 9 8 7 , Ma rc ia n o P in ed a o f t he L DP an d
E m i gd io B o n do c o f th e N P we re candidates for the position of Representative for
the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest
in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5 members b el o n g to t he LD P an d 1 m e m b er i s fr o m
t h e NP ). T he re af te r , a d ec i si o n ha d b ee n r ea c h ed in wh ic h Bo n d o c
w o n o v er Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the
eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him that he wa s al re ad y ex p e ll ed fr o m t he LD P fo r a ll eg ed ly
h el p i n g t o o r ga n i ze th e P ar ti do P il ip in o o f Ed ua rd o Co ju an gc o an d for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day
of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura
to the HRET.

Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, may c h an ge th at p ar ty s re p r es en t at io n in t he H R ET to
t h w ar t th e p ro m ul ga ti o n o f a dec is io n f re el y r ea c h ed b y th e t ri bu n a l i n
a n e le c t io n c o n t es t p e n d in g th er ei n

Held:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the
tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
d et ac h m en t, i m p a rt ia l i ty a n d i n d ep e n de n c e ev e n i n d ep e n d en c e fr o m
t h e p o li ti c a l p ar ty to w hi c h th ey be lo n g . H e n c e , disloyalty to party and
breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

Facts
The wish of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, after having been
exiled, has been barred by President Corazon Aquino, in exercise of her executive
power.

Article 7, Section 1
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Article 7, Sections 14-23

Powers (executive) expressly provided for the Constitution.

Issue (WON)
The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines

Held & Ratio

Yes. The President, who has been expressly granted powers by the Constitution, also has
implied residual powers inherent to the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The President has
powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution. She did not act in grave
abuse of discretion. As long as there is some factual basis for the presidents decision,
there is no grave abuse of discretion.

Notes in class
Exclusive list of powers there are inherent limitations. Executive power is what the
president can/cannot do, restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers. Supreme
court proved that Aquino can prevent Marcos from returning by defining and
establishing that the president has residual powers Residual powers Inherent powers
exercised by the President in accordance with her position, derived from the oath she
has taken during her inauguration. All powers that is not under judicial or legislative.
There should be no gap in the exercise of power

Santiago v Guingona G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.

Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court,
seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate
and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.

The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate
met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
 The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

Held: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.

Ratio: On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as
well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit
that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed

jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;"
and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein
elect a Senate President.

The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members
did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly
within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was
also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." -
1987 Constitution
 Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of
the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

In view of constitutional violation

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.

Definition of minority and majority

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of
votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser
would be the minority.

In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to
be identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and
a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." In this regard, the
Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings."

Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its
internal affairs. However, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for
such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.

In view of usurpation

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and

exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law
thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to
be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by
another.
 In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this
case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.

In view of Fernans recognition of Guingona

"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."

By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader,
he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionalityof Section 19 of

Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees
of the freedom of expressionand of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No.
6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City
of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous
Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally
scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by
virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it

violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent
who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist,
his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and
beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains
that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue
submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to
disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was
granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
there for, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder
may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or
radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a
leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A.
6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate
would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless
required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The
people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is

declared null and void and unconstitutional.

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 211 SCRA 219

FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including
crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission
held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for
consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an
EO which levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter
of imported oil products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to
enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

RULING: The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in
question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the
President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides:The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix
tariff rates and other duties or imposts The relevant Congressional statute is the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent
provisions thereof.

DEMETRIA VS ALBA:
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget
Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly,
parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers
on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for
approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the
petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also
alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec
16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was
where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states
that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of
the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General
Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds
to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial
power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In
exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
MEJOFF VS DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 PHIL 70

FACTS: Herein petitioner, an alien illegally in this country was kept under prolonged
detention while arrangements for his departure are being made filed a petition
for habeas corpus. For two years, the Government has not found ways and means of
deporting the petitioner because no ship nor country would take the latter. It is
insinuated that the petitioner might join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be at
large.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien, not enemy, against whom no charge has been made
other than that their permission to stay has expired, may be detained indefinitely for as
long as the Government is unable to deport him.

HELD: No, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been
formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. He
also has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
human beings. Petitioner is ordered to be released upon the condition of being under
surveillance and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient sureties. The
possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not
justify prolonged detention.

KURODA VS JALANDONI, 42 O.G. 4282

Facts :
Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Imperial Forces of the Philippines was charged before
a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. He had unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a
commander to control the operations of members of his command.

Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization of such military commissions,
established National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing
the trial of accused war criminals.

Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the United States of America
participated in the prosecution of the case in behalf of the United States of America.

Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional.

Held : This court holds that the Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional as
provided in Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution, that - The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.

The participation of the two American attorneys although under our law, they are not
qualified to practice law is valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special
military tribunal governed by special law not by Rules of the Court, which govern
ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels
need to be qualified to practice law in the Philippines. In fact, it is common in military
tribunals that counsels for the parties are usually military personnel.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, although the Philippines was not a signatory of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically
incorporated in Philippine law, thus making war crimes punishable in the Philippines.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order
No 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said
petitioner in its custody, the court will not interfere with the due process of such
Military Commission.
Petition is denied with costs de oficio.

AGUSTIN VS EDU, 88 SCRA 195

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was
an owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it
came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229,
as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order
No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation
commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of
Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD)
on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?
HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as
the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure
of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United
Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law
and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.
Petition is DISMISSED.

REYES VS BAGATSING, 125 SCRA 553

Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta
to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and
foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases
Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutionalrights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken
by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference
was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of
people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to
be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was
heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no
showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could
justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies
within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for
other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble
violated.

Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it
the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled
law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for thepermit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if
it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent
could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still
be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for apermit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner
or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger tests be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given
to applicants for the denial.

KIM CHAN VS VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 PHIL 113

Facts:
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue
the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of thePhilippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas
MacArthur had the effectof invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgements of the courts of the saidgovernments. He also argued that the said
governments during the Japanese occupation were notde facto governments.

Issue:
Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines under the names of
PhilippinesExecutive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupationor regime were de facto governments.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized
byOrder No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government
established by themilitary forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of
the second kind. The sourceof its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a
government imposed by the laws of war.The same is true with the Republic of the
Philippines. Apparently established and organized as asovereign state independent from
any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth andreality, a government
established by the Japanese forces of occupation.

PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHIL VS

DUQUE, GR NO. 173034, OCT. 9, 2007

Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid
as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to
implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom
Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-
2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should
be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the
law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the
RIRR is in accord with intl agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation
(thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere
constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not
treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required
under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law
through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim
reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the
provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part
of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as
obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of
member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions
into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely
prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor
are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take
care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW
non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is
not part of intl law.

Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec.
4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and
young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited
from implementing said provisions.
excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

GONZALES VS HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 230

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of

foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon
A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make
said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by
providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with
the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except
under the conditions prescribed in said Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted
with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may
be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed
importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION GR NO. 139465, JAN 18, 2005

Facts
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various
crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who
Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of
attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the
presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the
documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges
that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such
document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation.
Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.
Issue

1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official
extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or
opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of
time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply
with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its
citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It
is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand,
granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts
should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The
United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective
extradite.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL 115

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate

the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for
aprohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned byforeigners from
engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this
case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of
the Philippines therefore it isunconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between
thePhilippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also
then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a
treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real
and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever
the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of
the police power of the state.

PEOPLE VS LAGMAN AND ZOSA, 66 PHIL 13

Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino
Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these
two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936,
willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and
7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices,
had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny
these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service
because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old
to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced
by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with
the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the
accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend
the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to
defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by
force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against
his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this
country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United
States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property
without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an
office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by
reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as,
in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, incase of need.

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their
duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to
these family responsibilities (secs.65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

PEOPLE VS MANAYO, 78 PHIL 721

FACTS:
The three accused were charged with treason complexed with multiple murder in the
Peoples Court. They participated in the massacre of several citizens who were suspected
to have been helping the guerillas. The accused claimed that they cannot be tried since
the Court has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, they claimed that they had renounced their
Filipino citizenship after joining the Japanese paramilitary Makapili, and then swearing
allegiance to Japan.

HELD/RATIO:
The accused were found guilty. The Makapili is not a part of the Japanese army. It was
an organization of Filipino traitors. Moreover, there is no evidence that the accused
swore to an oath of allegiance when they entered the said organization. Furthermore, it
is the lone prerogative of the State to allow or deny ones change of citizenship.

PAMIL VS TELECOM, 86 SCRA 413

Facts:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol.
Petitioner, also an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for
Gonzagas disqualification based on the Administrative Code provision: In no case shall
there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality." The respondent Judge, in sustaiing Fr.
Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the provision had already been impliedly
repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the other hand argues that there
was no implied repeal.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor,
according to law.

(2) Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is

constitutional.

Held:
The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven
others voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote
overruled the seven. According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the
said provision to be inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Second, said section 2175 is
superseded by the Constitution. Third, section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the
Election Code (1971): Appointive public office holders and active members of the
Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.
Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the
said Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section 2175 of
the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the
Election Code. Also, section 2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to
freedom of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test.

The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not
controlling. The provision of the AdministrativeCode remained operative.

GERMAN VS BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514

Facts:

Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which
adjoined Malacaang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a
petition for mandamus.

Issue:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.

Held:

Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to
conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their
clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to
religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was
reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family,
government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the
Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority
opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the
freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State
has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and
had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of
any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
FACTS : Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started
arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant
to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that
respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that
after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of
injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and
Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide
mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each
country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third
country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu
Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in
accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not
authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.

RULING : Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an

impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US
personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement,
and in particular, from any political activity.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is
only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting
and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the
context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and
the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat
itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

Bayan v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which
formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US
military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, both
countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement both countries negotiated for its
possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension
of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security. During the term of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA which was the
result of a negotiation on the complementing strategic interests of the US and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 5, 1998, Pres. Joseph Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon, ratified the VFA. The
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA were then
transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The necessary 2/3 votes of the members of the Senate were
gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under Resolution No. 18. On
June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force. The petitioners argue that the VFA is
governed by the provision of Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution considering
that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities should apply in the instant case. Being a special provision,
Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21, Article VII of the
Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no
foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA is
untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not refer to foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as
evidenced by the use of comma and the disjunctive word or. This interpretation which
contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be
either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities and any of the three
standing alone places it under the coverage of Sec 25 is also manifested in the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the said section. Moreover, the
establishment of military bases within the territory of another state is no longer viable
because of the alternatives offered by the new weapons of warfare such as nuclear
weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even
for months and years without returning to their home country. Therefore first requisite
of Sec 25, Art XVIII already satisfied by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second
condition of Sec 25 requires that the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate
should be viewed in light of Sec 21 Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for
treaties or international agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the
approval of the VFA by the Senate through Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec
25, Art XVIII is that the other contracting party acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines,
show that the US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers. Also, the deliberations of the
Consitutional Commission show that,through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we will accept
whatever they say.If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as
far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.. Also through Article 26 of the
Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International law Commission
in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith. This is also known as the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also satisfied.

Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726

The classic case of Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940), tackled the issue of police
power for public welfare, but is remembered because it contains a definition of
social justice.

Facts
A traffic regulation in Manila banned calesas from some streets in Manila during certain
afternoon hours. A citizen challenged this regulation.

Issue
Was the regulation valid?

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power in the
interest of public welfare.
This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel defining social
justice:

Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of all
the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo lex.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE

COCONUT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's
Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of
preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the
Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine
Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While
it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be
limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate
desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the
President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite
follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The
"certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number
of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES:
At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in
which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such
business.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued
under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of
the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on
the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in
question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN
plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA

In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already
mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In
the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect
considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988,
she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

PLDT vs NTC, 190 SCRA 717

G.R. No. 88404
October 18, 1990

FACTS:
a. Petitioner assails two (2) orders of public respondent National Telecommunications
Commission granting private respondent Express Telecommunications (ETCI)
provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System in Metro Manila now ETCI in accordance with specific conditions on the
following grounds;

1. ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its legislative franchise to operate a system-
wide telephone or network of telephone service such as the one proposed in its
application;

2. ETCI lacks the facilities needed and indispensable to the successful operation of the
proposed cellular mobile telephone system;

3. PLDT has its pending application with NTC Case No 86-86, to install and operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service not only in
Manila but also in the provinces and that under the prior operator or protection of
investment doctrine, PLDT has the priority preference in the operation of such service;
and

4. the provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless, uneconomical, and

harmful duplication, among others.

b. After evaluating the consideration sought by the PLDT, the NTC, maintained its
ruling that liberally construed, applicants franchise carries with it the privilege to
operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service. Subsequently, PLDT alleged
essentially that the interconnection ordered was in violation of due process and that the
grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. However,
NTC denied the reconsideration.

ISSUES: Whether or not the contention of PLDT is tenable.

RULING:
a. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
b. There can be no question that the NTC is the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed
with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. In
fact, NTC may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a motion
from an applicant.
c. Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of
constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the entire Philippines radio
stations for reception and transmission of messages on radio stations in the foreign and
domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base, aeronautical and land mobile
stations, ... with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and transmission of
wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony
d. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process
of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right
to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of
the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the
State "upon complaint or otherwise"
(Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), 2 the reason being that the abuse of a
franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have
to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a
franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of
Government.
e. Transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not
Congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of
shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been
met when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI.
f. PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal
Telephone Act of 1989, approved on 8 February 1990, mandates interconnection
providing as it does that "all domestic telecommunications carriers or utilities ... shall be
interconnected to the public switch telephone network." Such regulation of the use and
ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary police power
of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. The 1987 Constitution recognizes
the existence of that power when it provides.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC.,

petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF
TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
 Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M.
Fernando for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant
Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for respondents.

FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts
No.2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional
on the grounds that:
1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents
of liberty and property without due process of Law;
2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency and
3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of
Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard
of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall
furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of
instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and
colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution
guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said
right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum
contending that 1) the matters presented no justifiable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question;2) Petitioners are in
estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.
Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.
180 maybe declared void and unconstitutional?

RATIO DECIDENTI:
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form
they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justifiable controversy presented before the
court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the
judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must
show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore,
the power of the courts to declare law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of
litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the
legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last
resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between
litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual
positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to
satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be
sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation
not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials
entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude
that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners
appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they
fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for
being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for
prohibition

My reflection:
Read full text. The case is about Supervisors and Inspectors who are strict and quite
bully with regards to the Inspection of school facilities. The inspectors did not violate
any law. There is no deprivation of rights, therefore, the petition for prohibition is
dismissed.

At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or
interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the
validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations
"whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant
inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy
is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in
proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no
argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute
does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL,

defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)
Facts:
Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the
beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his
daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora
Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code
and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He
claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance
policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.
Issue:
Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the
proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased.
Ruling:
With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is
affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states
that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the
Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to
the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives.
With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without
any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration.
It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the
State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects
one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in
a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which
are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this
concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as
the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened,
it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto
null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the
plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No.
2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in

the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled
Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of
Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court
that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged
Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1
applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel
is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be
provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither
is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978

Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of
an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having
contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its
company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation
of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.

Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage is valid?

Held: Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost
all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.
Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a
condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under
his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a
valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being
regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat, abhors any
stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code
states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that youre
fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was
verbally instructed to you. Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from
the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over
and on top of that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and
even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege
that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements,
terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital
bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Fact:
A cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES, Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to
all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious
management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government
through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation
for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being
higher than the budget for education.

HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond
to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies
or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

VILLAR VS TIP
FACTS: Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression
against the respondents, in their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the
Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was made to some of the
petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco,
Venecio Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjects in 1983-1985.
However, petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the
first school year, six failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner
Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing grades, one passing grade and one
subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben
Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985
school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment
in view of such failing grades.
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the TIP
Board.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of
the respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their
being barred from enrollment.

HELD: NO, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the
right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to
free speech has likewise be end is regarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which `is
not limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present danger of
substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They do not, to borrow from the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District, `shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners VenecioVillar, Inocencio F.
Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by
respondents in violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is
likewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents from the acts of surveillance,
black listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the coming academic year
1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgrado de
Leon Jr. and
Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

My Reflection:
Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of
such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit
them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom
enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal. 10 (RIGHT OF SCOOL NOT TO
ACCEPT STUDENTS OF SUCH FAIING GRADES & POWER TO DISMISS STUDENTS)

Petitioners Villar,. Salcon, Jr., Guilatco, Jr. and Recites are entitled to the writs of
certiorari and prohibition. (RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM/LIMITATIONS)

a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit,
establish and maintain a system of free public education" 13 up to the high school level
does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at
the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the
case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned,
not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall
be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the
basis of merit." (REGULATION ON RIGHT TO EDUCATION)

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for
the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who
exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so,
then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the
equal protection clause15 being disregarded. (POWER TO DISMISS STUDENTS)

Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing
of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice
of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college
of medicine;
x x x
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the
amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board
of Medical Education;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not
been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of
Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of
a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection
of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the
quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical
colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and
needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and
the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of
our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM

MARGARET CELINEG.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts: Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, a citizen of

India enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral
defense with selected panel members, Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri
Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans
representative. Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of
her dissertation that was lifted from different sources without proper
acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue to with her oral defense. Four (4)
out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to incorporate the
suggestion made by the panel m e m b e r s . D r . M e d i n a d i d n o t s i g n t h e
approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should be
submitted. On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her
graduation pending the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent
submitted the supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained
that suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina
and did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous
meeting that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised
copies were later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr.Medina. Private respondent was
disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with
maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean Paz
against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the
private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for
clarification of her charges against panel members and accusations relating to her
dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was
allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an
academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter
addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent
with plagiarism and recommended for the withdrawal of her
doctoratedegree.D e a n P a z f o r m e d a n a d - h o c c o m m i t t e e ( V e n t u r a
C o m m i t t e e ) t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n d r e c o m m e n d t o Chancellor Dr. Roman to
withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was informed of the charges in a
letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis lifted from other
sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved
and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the re commendation for
withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its actions to study further
for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a copy of findings and in
return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled
to discuss her answer. Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private
respondent for withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the there were
massive lifting from published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of
being guilty of plagiarism. On the basis of the report and recommendation of the
University Council, the Board of Regents send a letter to inform private respondent that
it was resolved by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree. On August 10, 1995,
private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitione
rs had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree
and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages andP1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings.
RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and
ordered to restore her doctorates degree.

Issue/s:
1.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering petitioners to
restore doctoral degree.
2.Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral degree
cannot be recalledwithout violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and
to justice and equity.

Held/Ruling:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.
1.Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was denied of
due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of
UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges,
the privaterespondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing
about the charges and was provided

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.

FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in
the country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest. They further asserted that the rights of
their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the
same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD:
The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or
to be heard. Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

VICTORIANO V ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION 59 SCRA 54 (1974)

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned
from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its
members to become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting
closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that
all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was
amended byRepublic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to
the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by
the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be
dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of
contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing
exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.

Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize
and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the
right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions
provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to joinlabor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refusedemployment or dismissed from their jobs on the
sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this
exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association
but instead reinforces it.

ACCFA VS CUGCO CASE DIGEST

Facts:

ACCFA was a government agency created under R.A. No. 821 amended its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administrative under the Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844).

On Sept. 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement which was to be effective for a

period of one year from July 1, 1961 was entered into by and between the unions and
ACCFA. On October 30, 1962 the unions together with its mother union, Confederation
of Unions in Government Corporation and offices (CUGCO) filed a complaint with the
court of Industrial relations against ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of
unfair labor practice.

At the pendency of the above mentioned case specifically on August 1963 the
president of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural land Reform Code (R.A.
3844) which among other things required Reorganizations of Administrative Machinery
of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administrative changed its name to
Agricultural credit Administration.

ACCFA Supervisors Association and their workers Association filed a petition

for certification election with the court of Industrial Relations praying for exclusive
bargaining agents for supervisors and rank and file employees, respectively in ACA.

ACA in effect challenges the Jurisdiction of Court of Industrial Relations to

entertain the petition of Unions for certification election on ground that ACA is engaged
in governmental functions. The Unions join issue on single point contending ACA forms
proprietary functions.

ISSUE:
Is ACCFA (ACA) performing governmental functions?

RULING:
Yes, Under Section 3 of Agricultural Land Reform Code. ACA established among
other governmental agencies to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture, in
pursuance under Section 2.

Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA E.O 75 placed ACA under Land
Reform Program Administration and by virtue of R.A. 3844. The implementation of
Land Reform Program of government is a governmental function not a proprietary
function.

ACA cant step down to deal privately. It is ministerial and government functions
are exercised by the state as attributes of sovereignty and not merely to promote welfare,
progress, and prosperity.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, petitioner, VS

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondent. G.R. No. 110526
February 10, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's
Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of
preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the
Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine
Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While
it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be
limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate
desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the
President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite
follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The
"certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number
of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES:
At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in
which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such
business.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued
under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of
the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on
the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in
question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN
plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA

In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already
mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In
the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect
considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988,
she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 402, February 1997, En Banc

FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during
bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel
Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per
share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58
per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner of MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per
share followed by a managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS
refused to accept both the bid match and themanagers check. One day after the filing of
the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the
Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987Constitution

COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead
to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice
Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article11 of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in
itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En
Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as
mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark,
therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court
also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage
will fall on the hands of foreigners