17 20

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Doctolero

G.R. No. 34386. February 7, 1991.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias ECOY, CONRADO C.
DOCTOLERO alias CONDRING, and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias VERGEL, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Credibility of witnesses; As between the positive declarations of
the prosecution witness and the negative statement of the accused the former deserves more credence.The
trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission
of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
633
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 633

crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the
effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed. Appellants
pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile
appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from
a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to grave suspicion. This
uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the
principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and
the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on
the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit. And when
there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an
incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith.As correctly explained by the
People, the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness
pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in
relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to
the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons
who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses
should disagree on minor details.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.In fact,
inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer to minor details
cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. And where the prosecution
634

witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies were,
on the whole, consistent on material points, the contradictions become insignificant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law
enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof
to the contrary.Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted
the investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is accorded to
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this
prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other than that of accomplishing his mission.
Same; Accomplices; Where one goes with the principals and in staying outside of the house while the others
went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid
making him guilty as an accomplice.We have held that where one goes with the principals and in staying
outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.
Same; Same; Same; One can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the
principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a
consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This
pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime
intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. This is a doctrine that dates back to
the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of
forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to
commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
APPEAL from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Br. 2.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor Generalfor plaintiff-appellee.
Hermogenes S. Decanofor accused-appellants.
635
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 635
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero,
charged with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the
crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of
the court a quo the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and
his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of
Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in
inflicting physical injury on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other
circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto
mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day
of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty
of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita
de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion
temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months
of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Epifania Escosio, in the sum of P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of
P12,000.00; and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-
fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the
_______________
1 Original Record, 239-240.
636
crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring together and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and
with extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and
strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the same
accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting
upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death. 2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its
decision, the trial court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman were killed
in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they
were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly
injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial
Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital
but he died on the way. x x x
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all
surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in
inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with their father and co-
accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the
latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-
Diamoy. According to
_______________
2 Ibid., 50.
637
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 637
Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and
Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They
came from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo. Binday
they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left
shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow
and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo
of the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her
uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed
Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for
the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw
the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her. She told
them: Why cant you be patient and forget? But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo
Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house of
Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them
why they cant be patient and forget, but the three accused replied Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you.
Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero
arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the
accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of Maria Oviedo-
Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom
she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house and called to all the men in the house to come
out. She was about to go to their house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she
heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying Enieng, your children. Then she saw the
three accused coming down from the house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom
they also boloed several
638
times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all
left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo.
Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio
Oviedo and the latters wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being
the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were
on their way home. (p. 8, ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: Where have you been cousin. (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio
Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that.
The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left
hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They
watched each others step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the
back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his
brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by
boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and
Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal, together with his
small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating
his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might meet something
bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father
asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins, Juanito and
Cresencia Doctolero. As he came
_______________
3 Ibid., 215-218.
639
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 639
near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He
went to Marcials house calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that
Marcial Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial Sagun
went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing
him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree, thinking
that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to
move, but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it
was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out
however, that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He
asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, because of your
foolishness and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at
the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick
and pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo
Doctolero unsheathed his bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed
him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the
child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then
taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below
established that
x x x nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx
1. (1)Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead.
There is fracture of the underlying skull.
2. (2)Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the
_______________
4 Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 3-6; Rollo; 110.
640
1. lst wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
2. (3)Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
3. (4)Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right
eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
4. (5)Incised wound3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the mouth towards the lower
border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.
5. (6)The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
6. (7)Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level of
the middle finger.
7. (8)Incised wound1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm, left.
8. (9)Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, stab wound around 3 cms. long and 4
inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the sternal bone. (Exh. C). And nine (9)
wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx
1. (1)Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal bone at
the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
2. (2)Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
3. (3)Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.
4. (4)Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the right
frontal portion of the head.
5. (5)Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.
6. (6)Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony portion,
left.
7. (7)Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
8. (8)Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
9. (9)Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right.
There was fracture of some
641
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 641
of the underlying bones. 6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: Stab
wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm,
right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There
was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right. He further testified that the
child was admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely
healed fifteen (15) days later.7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero,
on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal 8 and entry of
judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day. 9 In a resolution dated
June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-appellants, dated
May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate
attached thereto as Annex A.10Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of
appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an
accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having
participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending
that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed. Appellants pretension,
however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other
erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible,
such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as
it is subject to grave suspicion.11This uncorroborated denial of his
_______________
7 TSN, January 12, 1971, 5-7.
8 Rollo, 149.
9 Ibid., 150.
10 Ibid., 171.
11 People vs. Aquino, 57 SCRA 43(1974).
642
participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the principal
witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution
witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. 12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants.
The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants
occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as
shown by the following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic) your
relationship with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail to see you
in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that Maria Sagun (wife of
Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed
Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While
Maria Sagun may have a grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that
previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should
also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime. 14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of
the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit. 15And
when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved,
and his
_______________
12 People vs. Macabenta, 170 SCRA 203 (1989).
13 TSN, February 18, 1971, 58.
14 Original Record, 228.
15 People vs. Samson, 176 SCRA 710 (1989).
643
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 643
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain
inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to destroy their
credibility. As correctly explained by the People, the seeming contradictions and minor
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the appellants
in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in relating his
own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in
regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of
good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner
and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.18 And where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the
appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent
on material points, the contradictions become insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted
the investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings.
Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for
it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing
proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was
motivated by an improper motive other than that of accomplishing his mission. 20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of
San Fabian, Pangasinan
_______________
16 People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989).
17 Brief for the Appellee, 39; Rollo, 135.
18 People vs. Lamosa, 173 SCRA 518 (1989).
19 People vs. Baysa, et al., 172 SCRA 706 (1989).
20 People vs. Mahumanding, 174 SCRA 237 (1989).
644
shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros were
involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came
with bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21 In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified
objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to be accorded to his findings
was properly addressed to the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as
accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree
with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary
substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the
house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were
doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after
which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants
Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was
brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan
Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the many
wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-l), it could not have been possible for
Ludovicos two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear
either the screams of pain of their brothers victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their
bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times, x x x Under these
circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going
on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother
Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe
that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was
murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence
of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
_______________
645
VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 645
Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous
crimes against two defenseless women and a child. 22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house
while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. 23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or
impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be
rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime
intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.24 This is a doctrine
that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices therein
consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the
resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to
the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants
Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only
with regard to the extent of their participation. There, being ample evidence of their
criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should
favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere
accomplices,26 no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on
Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the
liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries pun-
_______________
22 Brief for the Appellee, 42-44; Rollo, 135.
23 People vs. Balili, et al., 17 SCRA 892 (1966).
24 People vs. Largo, et al., 99 Phil. 1061 (1956).
25 2 Phil. 514 (1903).
26 People vs. Torejar, 43 SCRA 158 (1972); People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 481 (1988).
646
ished with arresto mayorunder Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed
for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated
only his criminal liability but not his civil liability. 27 Also, while the death indemnity has been
increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same should not apply to Ludovico
Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the
trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences often (10)
years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical
injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio
Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of
heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera(Chairman), Paras, Padillaand Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
Note.Certain flaws in the prosecution evidence do not impair its essential credibility.
(People vs. Marnita Jr., 180 SCRA 723.)
o0o
_______________
27 People vs. Garachico, et al., 113 SCRA 131 (1982); People vs. Pamintuan, et al., 126 SCRA 5(1983); People vs.
Salig, et al., 133 SCRA 59 (1984).
647
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

People vs. De Vera
G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y
GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused. EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera, the trial
court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the following
facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the victims car; the victim was clearly struck with a
blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it
was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendos dark design on Roderick. We
disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Same; Same; Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not
on mere surmises or conjectures.Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation
later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot
the victim in the head moments later. Cacaos testimony
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
641
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 641

People vs. De Vera
contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act
was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit
murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly
stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacaos
testimony does not establish appellants culpability.
Same; Same; Requisites; Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the
accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.The Revised Penal Code provides that a
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites:
(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a
crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon. Except in the case of the mastermind of a
crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and
community of interest.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Accomplice, Defined; Elements.The Revised Penal Code defines
accomplices as those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts. The Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not
rendered, the crime would be committed just the same. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must be present: (1) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) the performance of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Conspirator and Accomplice, Distinguished.The distinction between the two concepts
needs to be
642

People vs. De Vera
underscored, in view of its effect on appellants penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and
not individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one
degree lower than that of a principal. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and
agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached
the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
Same; Same; Same; Where an accused knew that the other malefactors had intended to kill somebody and he
cooperated with them but did not himself participate in the decision to kill, joining them only after the decision
to kill had already been agreed upon, he could only be considered as an accomplice.In the present case,
appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated
with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by
Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed
upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy among the accused, creating doubt
whether they had acted as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, the question would be
resolved in their favor by holding them guilty of the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere
accomplices.In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made after the decision
to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held: [L]ack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of
the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by holding x x x that they were guilty of the
milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.
643
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 643
People vs. De Vera
Same; Constitutional Law; Extrajudicial Confessions; If an extrajudicial confession meets all the requirements
set out in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given
freelywithout coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promisesand credibility, i.e., if it was consistent
with the normal experience of mankind.Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional
requirements. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. x x x x x x x x x (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him. If the confession meets these requirements, it is subsequently tested
for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freelywithout coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
Same; Same; Same; When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order.When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the
Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward.
Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Same; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Corpus Delicti; Elements.Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
provides that [a]n extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. In the present case, the prosecution presented other
evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been provenfor example, a man
has died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible. It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and
that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired with the other
accused to
644

People vs. De Vera
commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the
prosecution eyewitness in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers
testified to the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely
requires that there should be some other evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from
the confession.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Abuse of Superior Strength; Treachery absorbs abuse of
superior strength. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was
attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to
qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower court
explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with deliberate
forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also
proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the
criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers
took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons. We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating
two generic aggravating circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. Hence, there is
only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of
the Death Penalty Law.
Same; Same; Accomplices; Penalties; The penalty of an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a
principal.In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a
principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Same; Damages; The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages,
which must be duly proven.We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be
awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as compensa-
645
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 645

People vs. De Vera
tory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented, moral damages is also
warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm
the payment of interest. However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such
indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. In this case, the trial
court merely presumed the amount of Capulongs earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence of
the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 96.
The Solicitor Generalfor plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente D. Millora for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction
between the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal,
which assails the March 12, 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 96) in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused
Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged
with murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons
who were subsequently identified during the trial as
______________
1 Penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.
646
People vs. De Vera
Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring [and]
confederating [with] and helping x x x two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and
there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5)
pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat
in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon. 2
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the
Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong.
The trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring [and]
confederating [with] and helping x x x two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and
there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5)
pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him between his
eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon. 3
_______________
2 Information, p. 1; rollo, p. 12.
3 Amended Information, p. 1; records, p. 31.
647
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 647
People vs. De Vera
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera4and Roderick Garcia5pleaded not guilty. The
other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and
Garcia. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA and RODERICK
GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and they are hereby
accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, including all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs
of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
1. a)P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
2. b)P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
3. c)P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
4. d)P500,000.00, as moral damages;
5. e)Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information until full
payment; and,
6. f)Costs of suit.6
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,8 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts: 9
______________
4 Assisted by Atty. Raymundo de Cadiao.
5 Assisted by Atty. Domingo Floresta.
6 Assailed Decision, p. 35; rollo, p. 84.
7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 27, 1998, upon the receipt by this Court of the
Appellees Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary
period.
8 Signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega and Associate Sol. Thomas M. Laragan.
9 Appellees Brief, pp. 3-12; rollo, pp. 195-204.
648
People vs. De Vera
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino Cacao, a resident of
Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was
residing at Filinvest II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992 in the
house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak branch in Caloocan City, while his wife served as
secretary of the homeowners association.
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a car passing by,
driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers. He knew the victim by name who
was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as Kenneth Florendo and
Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then he heard
unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose
entrance and exit were through the same point (ibid., p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao
walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already parked. Moments later, he saw the
victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid., p.
13). Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between the
eyes. After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a sketch of the crime
scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative position at the time of the incident. While
testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation Division, Station 5,
Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the shooting incident from a security guard of the
subdivision. The officer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando Garcia, PO3
Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13,
1993). A security guard guided the team to the corner of Denver and Doa Justina Streets, site of the shooting,
where they discovered blood stains and damaged grass(ibid., p. 6). The guard informed them that the victim
649
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 649
People vs. De Vera
was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security guards. The policemen then found a color red
sports car with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its doors opened. They recovered inside the car
several class cards and a license belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came upon a person wearing
muddied maong pants and white t-shirt standing and walking around near the clubhouse of the subdivision.
When asked his name, the person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Explaining the mud
stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the
policemen brought appellant to Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989, was assigned to investigate
the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3
Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue Medical Center where he
saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving medical treatment. The victim was unconscious.
After conferring with the victims parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On his arrival, the
desk officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was told that appellant was picked up near the crime
scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his participation in the shooting, he was reluctant
at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his conscience would bother him less if he
would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated the crime, and
implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group of policemen to the residence of
Garcia, which turned out to be at Doa Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3
Guspid informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He was then invited to the station to
shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
650
People vs. De Vera
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the interview, Garcia revealed
the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and black cap. According to Garcia, Florendo asked them
to wear black t-shirts. With the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together
with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to a grassy portion near the boundary of
Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of
Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber revolver, black t-shirt
and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993). While there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch
of the crime scene to reflect the explanations and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their
questions. As identifying marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials OG (acronym for his first name and family
name) between the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining
of the black cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where SPO3 Guspid asked them if
they were willing to give their written statements, to which they assented. Consequently, they were brought to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. They were
then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that
time were appellants relatives, including his mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty. Sansano, a competent lawyer.
They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two conferred with Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the suspects [i]n his office,
he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step outside the building in order to assure that no
pressure would be exerted on the suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After
they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of their rights
under the constitution and inquiring from them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary statements. To the
query, the suspects answered positively. They also affirmed their earlier declaration that they were willing to
be assisted by the IBP (ibid., pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during the investigation to answer
or not to answer the questions which they
651
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 651
People vs. De Vera
thought would incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty. Sansano requested the
suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily harm.
Finding no such signs, he then summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators readied
two typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as the lawyer of the suspects,
cautioning them against answering questions that they did not understand, and to seek x x x a clarification, if
needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single separate room from where his
five staff members were visible. He sat between the two tables used by the investigators for typing the
questions and answers, involving himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the signing of the
statements. He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with [the] standing policy of the IBP
to properly safeguard the rights of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then informed the suspects
before starting the investigation about their rights under the constitution, specifically, the right of the suspects
to have a lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who would assist them;
that they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The investigators also asked him if he was willing to
serve as counsel of the suspects. They also asked the suspects if they were willing to accept him as their
counsel. They agreed expressly by saying: Oho.
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They conducted the question and
answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of appellant was marked as Exhibit O and that of Garcia was
marked as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking the statements of the
suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before
proceeding, he reminded appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4) questions under the
heading Paunawa, to which the latter gave positive answers. The statement was signed by appellant and Atty.
Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
652
People vs. De Vera
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: both hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive
results [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo gave
negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates.
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the victim to get her own
statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution Office
which was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation Division. During the
inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his other companion, Elmer
Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who
had shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and
Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latters request. A few hours after the shooting
incident, appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him
into signing his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court summarized appellants
evidence in this wise:10
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already close friends for
about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latters house at No. 106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own residence
at the time was at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro, his
and Kenneths friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneths house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went home at 7:00 am of
June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by Edwins house to invite him
________________
10 RTC Decision, pp. 10-13; rollo, pp. 59-62.
653
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 653
People vs. De Vera
back to [the formers] house that morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend,
and Deo, who were then with him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another
friend of Kenneths.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneths house at 11:00 am. Kenneth, his girlfriend, and Deo
were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to
Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend.
Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the four of them
Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deolater proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneths car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The
time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of them alighted in
front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait
near the car because they were going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom
Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him personally before then. From his
conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing (x x x x parang
nagtatalo sila). The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a
gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not used to
hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His singular thought while running was
to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 pm when he was already outside of Filinvest subdivision in front
of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4) persons in civilian attire tortured him by forcing him to
lie down on a bench, tying his feet together and binding his hands from his back with handcuffs, and then
covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water was poured little by little into his face and mouth,
while one of them sat on his thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted
him to admit something and to name my companions but he refused to admit or to name anyone. They next
took
654
People vs. De Vera
him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At one point during the torture, a
policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to
escape, but he did not escape because he could see that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could x x x get a lawyer[;] instead, one of them, whose name he [did]
not know, told him that I should listen only to them and not to anyone else. He claimed that he saw one [of]
his tormentors in court, and he identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his torture,
because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not drunk or under the influence of drugs,
but Guspid seemed to be under the influence of drugs when he took his statement because of his troubled
appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his request to contact his
relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation continued (x x x x puro pananakot and ginawa nila sa
akin). After his torture at the mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he remained
until the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him once in the upper body
upon instruction of a policeman. He was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and brought to the IBP office by
police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were Deo Garcia and two other police officers. At the IBP
office, the officers talked with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be Atty. Sansano only
after the lawyer was introduced (present) to him and Deo. That was the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk or not. Edwin could not
make any comment because wala po ako sa sarili ko. Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin substantially that:
Alam nyo ba na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan, referring to the statement taken from
Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 pm until 9 pm on the day before (June 8, 1992) at the police station.
He was not assisted by counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid appeared to be like drunk or tipsy, when
he took down Edwins statement that night.
At the IBP office, Edwins and Deos statement were taken separately by Guspid and Selvido, respectively. At
the time, Edwin
655
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 655
People vs. De Vera
and Deo were about six (6) meters from each other, but he could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid
asked the questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were given in Tagalog. All the while,
Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was about seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were
situated. The office of Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty. Sansano
was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he was not able to read. He did not see
Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore
to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the precinct in
the evening of June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were given under
coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was
indeed Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted
appellant as a principal, however, because the scientific and forensic findings on the
criminal incident directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the
four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick
Garcia.11
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS BERNARDO CACAO HAD TESTIFIED
TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
________________
11 Assailed Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 157.
656
People vs. De Vera
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM
AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO- CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT O, ALLEGED STATEMENT OF APPELLANT; AND IN NOT
DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH
IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT PROVED THE
APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT. 12
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, (2) the admissibility of appellants extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of
his liability.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not
as a principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellants Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be
discussed jointly.
_______________
12 Appellants Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 98-99. This was signed by Atty. Vicente D. Millora.
657
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 657
People vs. De Vera
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera,
the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its
conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the
victims car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was
unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera
and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendos dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt.13 In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and
shoot the victim in the head moments later.
Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that
he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy.14 Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions,
and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such
suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly
stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.
_______________
13 People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305, 314, January 16, 1997; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129, March 6,
1998; People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, January 14, 1998; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20,
1998; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52, September 26, 1994;People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 93, April 29,
1994; People v. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215, 230-231, November 18, 1994; Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 238
SCRA 655, 695, December 5, 1994.
14 People v. Campos, 202 SCRA 387, October 3, 1991; People v. Saavedra, 149 SCRA 610; May 18, 1987; People
v. Madera, 57 SCRA 349, May 31, 1974.
658
People vs. De Vera
Clearly, Cacaos testimony does not establish appellants culpability.
Appellants Extrajudicial Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Veras
extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendos malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang maging
kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.15
Second, appellants companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the
unmistakable plan of the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,] sina Deo
at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang baril niya
kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing
himself at a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is
clear from the following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw ng June
08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw ak-
______________
15 Sworn Statement of Edwin De Vera, p. 2; records, p. 10.
659
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 659
People vs. De Vera
ong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pag-karaan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick
Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na kaysa raw
maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na
kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay
sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at
pagdating nila ay x x x lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at
pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit
itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay
kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar
doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa
lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo. P[a]gkaraan ng
ilang minuto ay sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar
upang tignan kung mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at
kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong si
Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang
kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba
sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay
lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng
mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at
Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.16
_______________
16 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
660
People vs. De Vera
Appellant an Accomplice, Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellants presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to
kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a
lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus
criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not
make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 17 To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) that two or
more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of
a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon. 18Except in the case of
the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of
a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts
of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. 20
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not
being included in Article
_______________
17 Article 8. See also People v. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39, 45, March 1, 1995; People v. Cayanan, 245 SCRA 66, 77,
June 16, 1995.
18 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., p. 133.
19 People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
20 People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 306, July 28, 1998; People v. Andres, G.R. No. 122735, September 25,
1998, 296 SCRA 318; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213,
January 24, 1996; People v. Salison, Jr., 253 SCRA 758, February 20, 1996; People v. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547,
December 16, 1996.
661
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 661
People vs. De Vera
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.22 The
21
Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal
and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered,
the crime would be committed just the same.23To hold a person liable as an accomplice,
two elements must be present: (1) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellants penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual.
The act of one of them is deemed the act of all.25 In the case of an accomplice, the liability is
one degree lower than that of a principal.
______________
21 Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 17. Principals.The following are considered principals:
1. 1.Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. 2.Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. 3.Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not have been accom-plished.
22 Article 18, Revised Penal Code.
23 People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465, 472, March 26, 1997, per Bellosillo, J.; citing People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12,
November 29, 1955;People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71, May 14, 1993; People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289, October
30, 1972.
24 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., p. 515. See also Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., p. 557;
Padilla, Criminal Law, 1987 ed., p. 700; People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289; People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38,
November 17, 1922.
25 People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
662
People vs. De Vera
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors
of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,26 the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that their concerted
action in going armed and together to their victims house, and there, while one stayed as a
lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together
afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy. It may be noted further
that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three of them, together with some others,
had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat, et al.,27the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for
conspiring with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their
arrest, they disclosed that they had intended to rob the victims store and that they did so in
accordance with their plan. In that case, it was clear that all three of them, including the
lookout, were the authors of the crime.
_______________
26 11 SCRA 699, August 31, 1964, per curiam.
27 126 SCRA 362, December 21, 1983. See also People v. Evangelista, 86 Phil. 112, April 12, 1950.
663
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 663
People vs. De Vera
In People v. Loreno,28 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they
had acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the
other conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to
commit the crime of robbery and rape.
Upon the other hand, in People v. Corbes,29 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the
criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the
vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a
conspirator, the Court observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who
was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to
commit a robbery. When his services were requested, the decision to commit the crime had
already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,30the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some
appellants who knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and
distracting his attention. The Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-
conspirators, [i]n the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them.
In People v. Suarez, et al.,31 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was
merely an accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he took
part in the planning or execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from
the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his part.
In People v. Balili,32 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that in going
with them, knowing their
_______________
28 130 SCRA 311, July 9, 1984, per Concepcion, J.
29 Supra.
30 27 SCRA 726, March 28, 1967, per J. B. L. Reyes, J.
31 267 SCRA 119, January 28, 1997, per Regalado, J.
32 17 SCRA 892, August 5, 1966, per Makalintal, J.
664
People vs. De Vera
criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went
inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with material and
moral aid, making him guilty as an accompliance. The Court noted that there was no
evidence that he had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in
the commission of the crime.
In People v. Doble,33 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when
he looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: Neither
would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that
would commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had
enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which
needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other,
which [was] not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and
provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill
Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate
in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He
joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was
there because nagkahiyaan na. This is clear from his statement, which we quote again for
the sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang maging
kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.34
________________
33 114 SCRA 131, May 31, 1982, per De Castro, J.
34 Sworn Statement of Edwin De Vera, p. 2; records, p. 10.
665
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 665
People vs. De Vera
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted
further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and
Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made
after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has
held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as principals or
accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by
holding x x x that they were guilty of the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.35
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
______________
35 People v. Riveral, 10 SCRA 462, March 31, 1964, per Bengzon, C.J.;People v. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158, January
31, 1972; People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514, 519, August 31, 1971; People v. Ablog, 6 SCRA 437, October 31,
1962; People v. Ubina, 97 Phil. 515, August 31, 1955; People v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726; March 28, 1969.
666
People vs. De Vera
If the confession meets these requirements, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false
promises; and credibility, i.e.,if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.36
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made
in the presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid
Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their
extrajudicial Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them,
at the time. Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellants claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at
any time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police insofar as
custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the rights of the
accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire interrogation.37
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera,
and Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were
doing.
_______________
36 People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443, December 22, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also People v. Muleta, G.R. No.
130189, 309 SCRA 148, June 25, 1999.
37 TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 15.
667
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 667
People vs. De Vera
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself that no
pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers during my
personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of people brought
before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing and sight of any
police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to interview the
two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their own
statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against them for a [sic]
in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they were never threatened
by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements. Casually I asked the two boys
to raise their upper clothes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm committed on
the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of
668
People vs. De Vera
their [personal] assurances x x x, verbal assurance that they were never hurt. 38
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the
use of duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. 39In the
present case, the Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of
this constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellants allegations of torture must be
disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of
solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth
and conscience.40 The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of
force, duress or promise of reward.41 Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming
prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that [a]n extrajudicial confession made
by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti. In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove
the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been provenfor example, a man
has died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible.42 It is indubitable that a crime has
been committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that
_______________
38 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 7-11.
39 People v. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425, 434, May 29, 1995; People v. Rous, 242 SCRA 732, March 27, 1995.
40 People v. Montiero, 246 SCRA 786, July 31, 1995; People v. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364, September 5, 1991.
41 People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549, April 28, 1993.
42 People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, January 26, 1995, per Davide, J. (Now C.J.).
669
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 669
People vs. De Vera
appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself does not
deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in
the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to
the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely
requires that there should be some other evidence tendingto show the commission of the
crime apart from the confession.43
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was
attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these
was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating
circumstances. The lower court explained that the evidence established evident
premeditation, for Florendos group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven,
because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution
of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength,
because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances,
because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.44 Hence, there is only one generic
aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed
before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that
of a principal, which in
_______________
43 Ibid.
44 People v. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1, April 1, 1996; People v. Torrefiel, 265 SCRA 369, April 18, 1996.
670
People vs. De Vera
murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as
compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented,
moral damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed
by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the payment of interest.45 However, the grant of
P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of
the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven.46 In this case, the trial court
merely presumed the amount of Capulongs earnings. Since the prosecution did not present
evidence of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be
rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as
an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a)
P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory damages and (c) interest of six
percent per annum on these two amounts. The award of moral damages is however
REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
_______________
45 Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides: In crimes and quasidelicts, interest as part of the damages may, in a
proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
46 Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433, March 13, 1997.
671
VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 671
People vs. De Vera
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I share the ponencia of my colleagues in its affirmance of the conviction of appellants
except, with all due respect, insofar as it has concluded that appellant De Vera is guilty
merely as an accomplice.
There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised penal Code when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy, of course, by itself is legally inconsequential unless the criminal plot is, in fact,
carried out. Once the offense is perpetrated, the responsibility of the conspirators is
collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of
their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the
others, in the commission of the felony. An accomplice, under Article 18 of the same Code,
is one who, not being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in the execution of the act, (b)
directly forces or induces others to commit it, or (c) cooperates in the commission of the
offense by another act without which the offense would not have been accomplished (per
Article 17 of the Code), collaborates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.
In the case at bar, De Vera, knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the
three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby.
He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime (ponencia).
I cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms to decide, on the
one hand, and to concur or to assent, on the other hand, in defining, i.e., whether as a
conspirator or as an accomplice, the specific criminal liability of the criminal offender. Where
there is concurrence or
672
People vs. De Vera
assent by one to a plan, even when previously hatched by another or others, to commit a
felony which concurrence or assent is made prior to the actual perpetration of the
offense, and he then actually participates in its commission, regardless of the extent of such
participation, his liability should be deemed, in my view, that of a conspirator rather than
that of an accomplice. I would equate the liability of an accomplice to one who, knowing of
the criminal design, but neither concurring nor assenting to it, cooperates in the execution
of the crime short of taking a direct part in, and short of taking an indispensable act for, the
commission of the offense. In the last two instances (taking a direct part in, or taking an
indispensable act for, the commission of the felony), his participation would be that of a
principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.
When appellant De Vera, aware of the plan to kill the victim, agreed to be the lookout
during the commission of the crime which, in fact, so took place as planned, he rendered
himself liable no less than that incurred by his co-accused.
Appeal partially granted.
Note.The cooperation in the commission of a crime, which results in fixing upon the guilty
agent the responsibility of an accomplice, requires acts, either prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the crime, that constitute an aid to and protection of the person or
persons guilty of the actual commission of the crime. (People vs. Manambit, 271 SCRA
344 [1997)
o0o
673
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 827

Garces vs. People
G.R. No. 173858. July 17, 2007.*
ERNESTO GARCES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Rape; Forcible Abduction; Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of
the accused is to rape the victim.Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape because the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the
real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. Based on the evidence presented, the accused intended to rape
the victim when he took her to the tobacco barn. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Nocturnity; The mere fact that the rape was committed at
nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance.Nocturnity is aggravating when it is deliberately
sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape. The mere fact that the
rape was committed at nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, other
than the fact that the crime was committed at night, there is no other evidence that the peculiar advantage of
nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Uninhabited Place; The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise
be appreciated in the absence of evidence that the accused actually sought an isolated place to better execute their
purpose.The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise be appreciated in the absence of
evidence that the accused actually sought an isolated place to better execute their purpose. The records do not
show that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and appli-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
828

Garces vs. People
cable to the latter.Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Courts ruling that the crime committed is
simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall apply to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Same; Denials and Alibis; Requisites.As regards petitioners complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over
complainants positive identification of her assailants. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute
self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration
of credible witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime. Petitioner alleged he was watching television at Aurelio Piras house, which is
about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to
reach the barn from the house. Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.
Same; Witnesses; Affidavits; Complainants failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was
covered by petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn statement to
provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her testimonyevidence in criminal cases is
not limited to the declarations made in open court, and it includes all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of
the witnesses, and other supporting evidence.Complainants failure to testify during her direct examination that
her mouth was covered by petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn
statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her testimony. As held in People
v. Servano, 406 SCRA 508 (2003): Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it
includes all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. It
comprehends something more than just the mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn statement has been
formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution evidence which
829
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 829

Garces vs. People
should not be ignored for it complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is
a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths.
This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during
trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless
and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the sworn
statement should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the
open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough
determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the trial
should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like
manner, the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In
every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It
should not confine itself to oral testimony during trial. x x x
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it
is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed
judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. Such an appeal confers upon the
appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
Same; Accomplices; Elements; Accessories; In the case of one who knew of the criminal design, but there is
insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy, and thereafter acted as a lookout, he is liable as an accomplice and not
merely as an accessory.The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before
complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and when he brought her to the
barn. He positioned
830

Garces vs. People
himself outside the barn together with the other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people
looking for complainant, he entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa. Having known of the
criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an accomplice, there being insufficient
evidence to prove conspiracy, and not merely as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices
are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1)
community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Same; Damages; Civil Liability; If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the court shall determine
the amount for which each must respond to be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
thus, the amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned according to the respective responsibilities of the
accused to be paid by them solidarily within their respective class and subsidiarily for the others.Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, as in this
case, the court shall determine the amount for which each must respond to be enforced in accordance with Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned according to the
respective responsibilities of the accused to be paid by them solidarily within their respective class and subsidiarily
for the others.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Soller, Peig, Escat & Peig Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor Generalfor respondent.
831
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 831
Garces vs. People
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated January 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Judgment2rendered by Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, finding petitioner Ernesto Garces guilty as an accessory
to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Also assailed is the Resolution 3 dated July 27,
2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In an Information dated December 10, 1992, Rosendo Pacursa, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira,
Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner Ernesto Garces, were charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1992, in the evening, at x x x, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with criminal and carnal intent, with lewd design and by means of force, accused Rosendo Pacursa, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, after covering her mouth, forcibly abduct, pull and take away
one AAA while walking to the church to the tobacco flue-curing barn and while inside the barn lie and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge of the offended party; that accused Ernesto Garces later on
covered the mouth of AAA and take her out of the barn; that accused Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and
Aurelio Pira stand guard outside the barn while Rosendo Pacursa is raping AAA; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of: (1) uninhabited place, and (2) nighttime. 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 64-75. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Japar B. Dimaampao.
2 Id., at pp. 28-37. Penned by Judge Charito B. Gonzales.
3 Id., at pp. 93-94.
4 Records, p. 1.
832
Garces vs. People
All the accused, except Senando Garces who is still at large, pleaded not guilty.
The prosecutions version of the incident is as follows:
On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was on her way to the
chapel when the five accused suddenly appeared and approached her. Rosendo Pacursa
covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed. He then
brought her inside a nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard outside. 5
Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail.
Thereafter, Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while, they heard
people shouting and calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered
the barn, covered AAAs mouth, then dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she
reports the incident.6
Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards,
AAAs relatives found her crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was disheveled. They
brought her home but when asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in a
state of shock. After a while, she was able to recount the incident. 7
Rosendo Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as their
defense.
Pacursa testified that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the incident. On
the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. to watch a
televised basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to have a talk with him
so he led her to the tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no one might see them. They
were alone by the door of the barn talk-
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 147.
6 Id., at pp. 147-148.
7 Exhibit C, Records, pp. 14-15.
833
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 833
Garces vs. People
ing, embracing and kissing. They only parted ways when he saw the relatives of AAA. He denied
having sexual intercourse with her. After the incident, he received a letter 8 from AAA asking him
to elope.9
On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testified that they were
watching a televised basketball game at the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the alleged
rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night.10
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of Forcible
Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to the crime.
Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 11
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused ROSENDO PACURSA and ERNESTO GARCES are hereby found guilty
of the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape punishable under the Revised Penal Code committed upon the
person of AAA. The other accused ANTONIO PIRA, JR. and AURELIO PIRA are hereby ACQUITTED as accessory for
the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape.
ROSENDO PACURSA, the principal accused in this case is hereby sentenced to one degree lower than that
prescribed by law for the offense, for being 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime pursuant to Art.
68 of the Revised Penal Code. Taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and
nighttime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 11 years of prision mayor as minimum to
18 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
_______________
8 Exhibit 2, Records, p. 126; TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31, Translated to read as follows: Let us elope, please answer
this to tell me of your decision, the one who wrote Bing.
9 TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.
10 Id., at pp. 2-15.
11 Rollo, pp. 28-37.
834
Garces vs. People
Ernesto Garces, being an accessory to the commission of the crime is hereby penalized two degrees lower than
that prescribed by law for the offense. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4
years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Both accused are jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual
and moral damages plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Both Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However, Pacursa
subsequently withdrew his appeal.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision convicting accused ROSENDO PACURSA as principal and
accused-appellant ERNESTO GARCES as accessory of the crime of forcible abduction with rape is AFFIRMED.
However, accused-appellant Ernesto Garces sentence is MODIFIED in that he is to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum,
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari.
Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show that he
covered the mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.
The petition lacks merit.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 36-37.
13 Id., at p. 75.
835
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 835
Garces vs. People
It has been established that Pacursa forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. The trial court found complainants testimony to be
credible, consistent and unwavering even during cross-examination.
Regarding the letter she wrote to Pacursa asking him to elope with her, she explained that she
felt uncertain at that time and was trying to avoid the possible trouble or scandal the incident
might bring upon her,14 which we find plausible. In pursuing the case, she had to transfer to
another school because of the threats of her assailants and their persistence in settling the case.
Furthermore, no improper motive was shown why she would accuse and testify against Pacursa
who was her boyfriend, and the other accused, who are her relatives. 15
Prosecution witness Grace Liberto likewise corroborated the testimony of complainant when
she testified that she saw the latter crying, wearing only one slipper, and her hair
disheveled,16 immediately after the incident. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Herminio Venus
also showed that there was a laceration in complainants private parts possibly caused by sexual
contact.17
Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape because
the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape
if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim.18 Based on the evidence presented, the
accused intended
_______________
14 TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 30, 32.
15 See People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 97921, September 8, 1993, 226 SCRA 156, 174.
16 Exhibit C, Records, pp. 14-15; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 1315.
17 Exhibt B, not found in the records; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 3-10.
18 People v. Almanzor, 433 Phil. 667, 700; 384 SCRA 311, 338 (2002).
836
Garces vs. People
to rape the victim when he took her to the tobacco barn. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed
in the crime of rape.19
We also note that the trial court failed to make any definitive finding as to the existence of
aggravating circumstances. However, we find that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and uninhabited place did not attend the commission of the crime.
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being
recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape.20 The mere fact that the rape was committed at
nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance. 21In the instant case, other
than the fact that the crime was committed at night, there is no other evidence that the
peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise be appreciated in the
absence of evidence that the accused actually sought an isolated place to better execute their
purpose.22 The records do not show that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Courts ruling that the crime committed is
simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall apply to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court specifically provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter.
_______________
19 See People v. Lining, 433 Phil. 797; 384 SCRA 427, 440 (2002), where accused were convicted for simple rape. In
this case, complainant was dragged towards the ricefield and was forcibly carried to an unoccupied house where
she was subsequently raped.
20 People v. Fortich, 346 Phil. 596, 617; 281 SCRA 600, 620 (1997).
21 People v. Lining, supra at p. 812; p. 440.
22 People v. Fortich, supra at p. 618; p. 621.
837
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 837
Garces vs. People
As regards petitioners complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over complainants positive
identification of her assailants. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-
serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
positive declaration of credible witnesses. 23
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.24Petitioner alleged he was watching
television at Aurelio Piras house, which is about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of
the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to reach the barn from the
house.25 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.
Contrary to petitioners contention, there is proof that petitioner covered AAAs mouth when he
dragged her out of the barn. Complainant executed a sworn statement recounting her
harrowing experience which she identified during her direct examination and offered as Exhibits
A, A-1, and A226 for the prosecution and admitted by the trial court.27 In her sworn
statement, AAA narrated thus:
Q Will you relate carefully the manner by which Rosendo Pacursa raped you?
A x x x Then someone came inside the barn, shut-off my mouth, then brought me out and away
southward and when we reach the house of Florentino Garces he re
_______________
23 People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280, 297.
24 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102, 116.
25 TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.
26 TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 5-6.
27 Records, p. 92.
838
Garces vs. People
leased me and as I walked down the path my uncle Bartolome Florendo was able to light me with his
flashlight
xxxx
Q Who was that person who later came inside the barn who brought you out shutting-off your mouth
then took you away southward?
A Ernesto Garces also from our place, sir.
Q Why, has Rosendo Pacursa other companions?
A He has, sir. They are Ernesto Garces, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira.
Q What did these companions of Rosendo Pacursa do?
A They stayed outside the barn but it was Ernesto Garces who brought me out, sir. 28
Complainants failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was covered by
petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn
statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her
testimony. As held in People v. Servano:29
Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it includes all documents,
affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. It comprehends something more
than just the mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it
forms an integral part of the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes
the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the
document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not
affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence
in open court. This is not to say, however, that the sworn statement should be
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 10-11.
29 People v. Servano, 454 Phil. 256; 406 SCRA 508 (2003).
839
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 839
Garces vs. People
given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court
declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the
merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the trial should not mean
being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner, the court
cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court
should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to
oral testimony during trial. x x x30
Petitioner also faults the court a quo in finding that he threatened AAA while leading her out of
the barn. He argues that complainant failed to positively identify the person who issued the
threats because she vaguely referred to said person merely as they.
The contention lacks merit.
The use of the word they in referring to the person who threatened complainant is of no
moment. When the threats were issued, both Pacursa and petitioner were inside the barn; thus,
it is logical to conclude that the threats came from both of them.
Petitioner likewise cannot take refuge in the acquittal of Antonio and Aurelio Pira. Both were
acquitted because there was no evidence to show their participation in the crime. Complainant
only testified that she heard their voices which the trial court considered insufficient. However,
in the case of petitioner, complainant positively identified him as one of the companions of
Pacursa who remained outside the barn and who eventually entered upon noting the presence
of AAAs relatives nearby. He thereafter covered complainants mouth and led her out of the
barn. All these circumstances demonstrate petitioners complicity.
_______________
30 Id. at pp. 277-278; pp. 522-523.
840
Garces vs. People
We do not agree, however, that petitioner should be convicted as an accessory to the crime.
It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it
is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. Such an appeal confers upon the appellate
court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 31
In finding petitioner guilty as an accessory, the Court of Appeals found that his participation was
after or subsequent to the rape and that his acts were employed as a means of concealing the
commission of the crime and assisting Rosendo to escape.
We find otherwise. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime
even before complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and
when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the
other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he
entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an
accomplice,32 there being insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy,33 and not merely as an
accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, ac-
_______________
31 People v. Las Pias, Jr., 427 Phil. 633, 641; 377 SCRA 377, 383 (2002).
32 Cf. People v. Corbes, 337 Phil. 190, 197; 270 SCRA 465, 473 (1997).
33 See People v. Tulin, 416 Phil. 365; 364 SCRA 10 (2001). As a rule, if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal since any doubt as to the participation of an
individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility.
841
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 841
Garces vs. People
complices are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.34 The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable
as an accomplice are present: (1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2)
performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of
the crime.35
The crime committed in the case at bar is simple rape, the penalty for which under the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua.Since Pacursa was a minor when the crime was committed, the
penalty must be reduced by one degree, to reclusion temporal.36Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the maximum of
the penalty shall be within the medium range of reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. 37
With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime is
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the felony. 38 Since simple rape is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should also be imposed
on petitioner in its medium period in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
_______________
34 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 18.
35 People v. De Vera, 371 Phil. 563, 584; 312 SCRA 640, 661 (1999).
36 People v. Clores, Jr., G.R. No. 130488, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 210, 222.
37 Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 829; 374 SCRA 86 (2002).
38 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 52.
842
Garces vs. People
Law, the imposable penalty should range from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 39 If there are two or more persons
civilly liable for a felony, as in this case, the court shall determine the amount for which each
must respond40to be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
the amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned according to the respective
responsibilities of the accused to be paid by them solidarily within their respective class and
subsidiarily for the others.41
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the complainant in rape cases is entitled to an award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape which is distinct from moral
damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. 42
In determining the civil liability of petitioner, a clarification of the trial courts decision is
necessary. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision held Pacursa and petitioner
jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual
and moral damages plus the cost of suit. For our purposes, we shall treat the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as the civil indemnity ex delictofor which, as an
accomplice, petitioner should be solidarily liable with Pacursa only for one-half of the said
amount, or P25,000.00, and is subsidiarily
_______________
39 Id., Art. 100.
40 Id., Art. 109.
41 People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 194; 373 SCRA 134, 161 (2002).
42 People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.
843
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 843
Garces vs. People
liable for the other P25,000.00 in case the principal is found insolvent. 43
In addition, complainant must be awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, this
additional award should not apply to Pacursa who has withdrawn his appeal as the same is not
favorable to him.44 Hence, the additional monetary award can only be imposed upon petitioner
who pursued the present appeal.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Rosendo
Pacursa guilty as principal by direct participation, and petitioner Ernesto Garces as an accessory,
to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, is MODIFIED. Accused Rosendo Pacursa is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and being a minor at the time the crime
was committed, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Petitioner Ernesto Garces is found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of rape, and is also
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Rosendo Pacursa and Petitioner Ernesto Garces are ORDERED to pay complainant P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto. Being an accomplice, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the
principal only for half of the amount or P25,000.00 and their subsidiary liability shall be
enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is likewise
ordered to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages.
_______________
43 People v. Flores, 389 Phil. 532, 552; 334 SCRA 253, 261 (2000).
44 RULES OF COURT, Rule 122, Sections 11-12. See People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA
632.
45 People v. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354; 366 SCRA 98 (2001).
844
Garces vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., No Part. Filed pleading as Solicitor General.
Petition denied, judgment modified.
Notes.One who cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts is
an accomplice. (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 198[1995])
There can be no question that a court of competent jurisdiction is vested with the authority to
resolve even unassigned issues. (Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450 [2005])
o0o
845
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 19

People vs. Talingdan
No. L-32126. July 6, 1978.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO
BERRAS. PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
Evidence; Minor discrepancies in testimony, as those relative to the time where certain acts were done, will not
affect the credibility of a witness.Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from
vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances
alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on
cross-examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or
after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing her mothers meeting
with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not
the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of
her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and coldbloodedly shooting her father to death. Contrary to the
contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her.
Same; It is hardly conceivable that a 13-year old girl will concoct a false narration of the killing of her father
particularly where she implicates her mother thereto.Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of
the killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13)
years old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a child is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others because he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him because he thinks it is
mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses an opportunity of being right in what
he affirms. (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been offered why she would attribute
the assault on her father to three other men aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother,
were she merely making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
_______________
* EN BANC.
20

Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out
that said testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to
questions directed to her.
Same; Testimony of 13-year old girl in the case at bar is worthy of belief.We feel Corazon was too young to be
affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of
her whole testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of
thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw,
in the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described.
We reject the possibility of her having been brain-washed or coached to testify as she did.
Same; Conspiracy; Where there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy as to one accused, she cannot be held to the
same liability as her co-appellants.True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not
beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she
had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to bo done and did not object. (U.S.
vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or
together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and
conjecture, not really ineludi-ble.
Same; Criminal law; One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the crime, as where she says to
police investigators that she does not have anybody in mind as who killed her husband although she knew the
assailants, can be held guilty as an accessory.But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability.
There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed
by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she
inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she
knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, Dont tell it to
21
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 21

anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she
had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less
passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo
was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Treachery; Murder; Circumstances showing that killing of the victim in the case at bar is murder.As
already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage
of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining their
malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan
made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday
and again in Saturday evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motiveTalingdans taking
up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresaand enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to
proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
Makasiar, J., dissenting in part:
Criminal law; Evidence; Majority opinion erred in holding that wife of the victim was a mere accessory and not a co-
conspirator in the commission of the crime in the case at bar.That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely
an accessory after the fact has been clearly demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who
declared categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the assassination of her own husband whom she
betrayed time and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town
policeman and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa, without a feeling pf shame and
unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of their tender age, deserted several times their family
home of live
22

with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with whom at one time she cohabited for
more than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each time she left the
family abode for the embrace of her lover
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of bra.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with
indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of
P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused therein, namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and
Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate
nor any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be
charged with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant
Teresa Domogma and their children, lived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra,
some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family
home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2)
different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year
old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had
gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a
quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant,
the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again
left their house
23
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 23
and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know
later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum, Abra during that time;
then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had
a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and
sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardos house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused
Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not
without warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock
the following Friday morning, Bernardos daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash
clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400
meters away from the latters house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say
Could he elude a bullet; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her
daughter, she shoved her away saying You tell your father that we will kill him.
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-
year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she
saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met
with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in
the batalan, she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern
what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the
lamp in the kitchen through the open batalan and she knows them well for they are all
residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants
had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long; after about two (2) minutes Teresa
came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby. As supper was tben ready, the child called her parents to eat; Bernardo
who was in
24
the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughters call to supper but continued working
on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to
sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as she was through she again called her
parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs,
but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on
the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly
fired upon from below the stairs of the batalan. The four accused then climbed the stairs of
the batalan carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and
Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but when
Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying You call for help and I will kill you, so
she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazons male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa
came out of her silid later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon
informed her that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she
warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still
later on, other persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim,
Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of
the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The
victims brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the burial, followed by their
mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed
the identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was
somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives
of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led
to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with
Bernardo, was a resident of
25
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 25
the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love
her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her
monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the time of her
husbands violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they moved to
and resided in her husbands place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos
and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place,
separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardos parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the
house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband
never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with
his own mother who wanted that Bernardos earnings be given to her, (the mother) which
Bernardo never did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa You leave me alone.
Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo
for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her
because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were
sending over to her. She never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged
by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only
during those times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB
branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she
had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with
merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always rode back with them to Sallapadan in
the afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned by a resident of
Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a
policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and horses they brought from
Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the matter to the Mayor
who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is Tal-
26
ingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they
are neighbors, the latters home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit
relationship had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their
food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo,
was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the
night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was
ready, she and the children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him
for supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were
about to follow him to the kitchen when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6)
successive gun shots coming from near their batalan. They were all so terrified that they
immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise time that her husband
was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about
three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as
soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did not see the killers of her1
husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in her arms when the
first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of
police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa
not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months
pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and he found
some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the batalan. He also
found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said batalan and on the nothern waitings of
the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of
her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to
Bernardos mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have
left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used
to till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two
27
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 27
(2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after Bernardos remains was
autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she did
not give them any information relative to the identity of the persons who shot her husband
because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanito Bagabag,
arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the
usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresas children under their
custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind
against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the said
child to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies
during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in
Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the
place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of
the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on
June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything
to do with the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs.
Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was
called upon by the chief of police of the place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of
the wife of the victim. The other two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in
the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs.
Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief
of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then municipal secretary, to accompany
him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping. They never left
the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the
killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.
28
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We
have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and
acting in conspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the
supper table in their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing
the offense by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching
her father nearby. They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she
used to see them often before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at
her father after they had climbed the stairs of the batalan, it was Bides who threatened her
that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before
the four appellants went up the batalan, they already fired shots from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazons testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967,
the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her
several times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a
policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to
come down, but the latter refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so,
Talingdan left after shouting to her father that If I will find you someday, I will kill you.
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazons declaration regarding the amorous relationship
between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her
testimony that in the morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the
threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock, she saw all the
herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400
meters away from their house, near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said
occasion she overheard one of them ask Could (sic) he elude a bullet?, We have our doubts,
however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her
29
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 29
approach. You tell your father we will kill him. If it were true that there was really such a
message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she
again saw the said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting talking
together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms. Moreover, it is quite
unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully
reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides
are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said
offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the
offended party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
No mitigating circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital
contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural
circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out,
the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the occurrences
she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he
was shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing her mothers meeting with her co-accused in
the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the
accused were already upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter
the veracity of her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and coldbloodedly shooting
her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the
circumstances related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five
supposed un-
30
natural declarations in her testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she informed him
of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by the prosecuting fiscal, the witness does not
know then the mentality of her father (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared
that the accused conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted
place although there was a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the accused
were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they were talking was lighted or
not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did
not fire their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were privies to the same
criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely
stating an observation on her part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that only three
bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But would this not
merely prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was still able
to talk after he was shot, yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous. It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the doctors opinion could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without
in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed,
there are no evident badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabags testimony. (Pp. 9-
10, Peoples Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were
not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when
she testified, an age when according to Moore, a child is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others because he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him,
because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never
loses an opportunity of being right in what he affirms. (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No
cogent explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three
other men, aside from Telingdan whom she knew had relations
31
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 31
with her mother, were she merely making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for
her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His
Honor pointed out that said testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was
constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her. We have Ourselves read
said testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We
cannot, therefore, share appellants apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the
grave imputation of a mothers infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her
husband, would if consistently impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison
enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with
her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was too young to be affected by the infidelity of her
mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole
testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child
of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand
without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually
witnessed the event she had described. We reject the possibility of her having been
brainwashed or coached to testify as she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious
consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the
Solicitor General are well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance
between the assailants and the deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the
appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was fired, the gunman was about 3-
1/2 meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the defense
that the killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceaseds house.
Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and
32
Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the house of the
deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however,
made the following apt observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime after the deceased had
already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as the surroundings of the house where the deceased
was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the batalan of the house of the
deceased has a siding of about 1-1/2 meters high and that he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall
directly pointing to the open door of the batalan of the house of the deceased. When the court asked the witness
what could have been the position of the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might
have been standing. The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the
batalan because the batalan is only 1-1/2 meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in
relation to the top sidings of the batalan, he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it
is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the batalan, hence, the testimony
of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC
corporal testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging to the same
unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324-325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state that no testimony has been
presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the bullets that were fired during the shooting incident.
Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the accused
shot her father as they came up the batalan of their house. (Pp. 11-12, Peoples Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime
when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was
properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to
show that in the mind
33
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 33
of the defense itself, it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on
it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent
ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a positive and
unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This
is so because, first, according to the three accusedBides, Tobias and Berrasthey were sleeping at 8:00 oclock
that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for
the sake of argument, but without admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00 oclock in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately
between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed the
crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According to
Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the three
accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan the owner of the house where they slept
that night to corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants Brief.)
x x x
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967,
he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez
for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued. They started in Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967
and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house
near the Bangued Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of
the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until
after they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime on the evening of June 22
or anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan on the 26th.
34
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been accompanied by witness-accused
is still living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra,
and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still
living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or
deny the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia, Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement, was presented
as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the
Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia,
Pidigan, Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the
cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his Guide Book where the signature of Gregorio
Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan.
(Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor
General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly
innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no
evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is
no showing of actual cooperation on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts
that led to his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is mere cognizance, acquiescence
or approval thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her
conviction as a co-conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly
that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable
doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she
had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband Neither is it clear that she helped
directly in the planning and
35
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 35
preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not
object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she master-
minded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such
conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really ineludible. After all, she
had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any
need of his complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already
enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to
make to Teresa one time was If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child.
The worst he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record
morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by
her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the
shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father.
When Corazon identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa
did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent
of warning her, Dont tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody. Later, when
the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping
them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In
other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive
in her attitude regarding her co-appellants conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of
her constitute concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime which makes
her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by
treachery. It being obvious
36
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their
victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery
to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that
appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo
Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again
on Saturday evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive
Talingdans taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresaand enough time to meditate, and
desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed the
offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by
treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no
alternative under the law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to
appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable, doubt of the appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder
with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they
are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C. J., concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the
appellant Teresa Domogma as a
37
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 37
co-principal and that she should therefore also be held guilty of murder and sentenced to
death.
Fernando, J., no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the
penal liability of the accused Teresa Domogma is concerned.
Makasiar, J., dissenting in part in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., did not take part.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting in part:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not
merely as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned.
A marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage; because the
presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of the
fact that they had been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of
the child-witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was killed on June 24,
1967 by the accused-appellants, and who was 13 years of age when she testified. They have
other children aside from Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has been clearly
demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that
she plotted with her co-appellants the assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed
time and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a
town policeman and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa, without
a feeling for shame and unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age,
deserted several times their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations
with appellant Talingdan with whom at one time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks.
Her patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each time she left the family
abode for the embrace of her lover.
38
We should believe Corazons statement that between 10 and 11 oclock Friday morning, she saw
her mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut owned by her
father some 300 to 400 meters away from the latters house near the creek where she was then
washing clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say Could he elude a bullet?; that
when her mother noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, You tell your
father that we will kill him; that in the evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967,
while she was cooking supper in their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet
the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from where she was in the batalan; that
she heard them conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize all of them by the
light coming from the kitchen lamp through the open batalan; that she knows all of them very
well as they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them almost everyday; that she
noted that appellants were armed with long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after
about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the house and proceed to her room
while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready she
called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but continued working on a plow
while her mother excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep; that she
(Corazon) ate alone after which she again called her parents to eat; that about this time she
informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her father paid no heed to
what she said; that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door while
Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from below
the stairs of the batalan; that the four accused then went up the stairs of the batalan with
their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias
fired at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned her
saying You call for help and I will kill you; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the
east.
39
VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 39
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the same way that
credence was given to her statement that, upon her mothers inquiry immediately after the
shooting as to whether she recognized the assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told
her mother that she identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits; for
which reason her mother warned her Dont tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody.
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel during which
Bernardo slapped Teresa several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and sought the
help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come
down. When Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and was then armed,
appellant Talingdan left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy
against the life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a paramour of
appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom from her husband, the victim, so that she
could enjoy the company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in deserting her
family and her children for the company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this several
times and continued to do so until the violent death of her husband even as she was carrying a
six-month old baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.An assail on the credibility of witnesses which gives detailed reasons therefor with
page references to the oral evidence in the record deserves more consideration by the trial
court and may not simply be cast aside by a sweeping statement of a general principle of
evidence. (Tagoranao vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 490).
In the absence of improper motives, the testimonies of
40
witnesses may be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168).
The general initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a
criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into a criminal investigation is
common and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility. (People vs. Kipte, 42 SCRA
199).
Direct testimony as to the fact of stabbing of the victim overcomes the absence of real evidence
as to the resulting wounds. (People vs. Jovellano, 56 SCRA 156).
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses may be considered suspicious not only where there is
absolute concurrence and dovetailing as to principal points and paucity of particulars and
details, but also where there was evidence that they were paid and taught what they should
testify to. (People vs. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136).
An admission by an accused made to his friend that he committed the crime charged is
evidence against him. (People vs. Villar, Jr., 58 SCRA 512).
The circumstance that the deceased victim failed to mention the name of the accused in her
dying declaration is of no moment. (People vs. Genoguin, 56 SCRA 181).
Killing is qualified by abuse of superiority when unarmed and defenseless victim was liquidated
by three armed persons. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15.)
The aggravating circumstance of the abuse of disguise in the perpetration of a crime should be
considered against the accused who used a mask to hide his identity. (People vs. Ragas, 44 SCRA
152.)
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not
adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself. (People vs.
Satorre, 74 SCRA 106.)
Where different acts of hacking were performed by different persons, the crimes committed
cannot be considered complex. (People vs. Bakang, 36 SCRA 840.)
Positive identification of the accused by several eyewitnesses that he killed the victim
established accuseds guilt to a moral certainty. (People vs. Cunanan, 75 SCRA 15.)
The killing is murder because of the presence of abuse of discretion, the killing may be regarded
also as treacherous (as concluded by the trial court), treachery, which was not alleged in the
information, cannot be separately appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance. It is merged
with abuse of superiority. x x x The manner in which abuse of superiority was alleged in the
information is sufficient to qualify the killing as murder. What is essential is that it was alleged,
and, having been alleged, it could be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. (People vs.
Cagod, 81 SCRA 110.)
o0o

17 20

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

17 20

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Doctolero

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 7, 1991 633

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 641

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 312, AUGUST 18, 1999 645

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 827

828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 829

830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 19

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 84, JULY 6, 1978 21

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

S-ar putea să vă placă și