Castro vs. Pabalan
RESPONDENTS CLAIMS: Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing
Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite
failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the
offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of
the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when
required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed
and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co Ling
are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil,
Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio.
No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual
search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.
Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution
and the Rules of Court because the two basic requirements are not
complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b)
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a
general warrant. However, things seized cannot be returned and shall
be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five
bottles of Streptomycin.
CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., et. al vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU
PETITIONERS CLAIMS: Petitioners contend that the products seized
from their respective stores cannot be the subject of the search
warrants and seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of any
crime, infringed product nor intended to be used in any crime; that they
are legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the same, since
those genuine top gel products bore the original trademark/tradename
of TOP GEL MCA, owned and distributed by Yu. Petitioners also claim
that despite the RTC's order to release the seized TOP GEL products,
not one had been returned; that one or two samples from each
petitioner's' drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need to
present them in a criminal prosecution, and that confiscation of
thousands of these products was an overkill. Petitioners also argue that
the issue that the RTC erred in applying the rules on search and seizure
in anticipation of a civil action was never raised in the
RTC.
business under the name and style WorldwidePharmacy, is the sole
distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE
OF A LEAFpapaya whitening soap for a period of ten years from 2003.
Respondent claims that the petitioners in this casewere selling
counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of
their products. There was aninvestigation, which led to seizures of the
petitioner's products because the NBI ruled that it was
counterfeit.ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal
of the assailed search warrantsRULING:- The applications for the
issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections
155 and 168,both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual PropertyCode of the
Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark
infringement; while Section168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes
unfair competition. The SC agrees with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-
SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and
Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement ofIntellectual Property Rights, is
not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied
based thereon,but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of
intellectual property rights under RA 8293. - It was established that
respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation
and search warrantimplementation for possible apprehension of several
drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GELT.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to
support his application for theissuance of the search warrants, NBI
Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as
relevantevidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted."
Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of CriminalProcedure applies. - The
affidavits of NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling,
clearly showed that they are seekingprotection for the trademark "TOP
GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF" registered to respondent by the
IPO on2003. While petitioners claim that the product they are
distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOPGEL MCA and
MCA DEVISE, it was different from the trademark TOP GEL T.G. and
DEVICE OF A LEAFsubject of the application
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
FACTS:
The present case involves consolidated petitions that assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 (RA 10175) otherwise known
as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of
the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable
the government to track down and penalize violators.
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known
as spam is entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To
prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz
Facts:Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardofiled
against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank Circular
265 and RA 1937 claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious
intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously
brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal"
Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey,
also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper
authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry
which did not declare the said articles.Respondent Judge assumed
jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and
on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with
prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the amount of
P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1)
box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty
(40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles
of Johnny WalkerScotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).Armed with said order,
private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the
articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the
order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon." The
refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open
Disobedience" under Article 231 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.Hence, this
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and
set aside the order dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent
Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal
complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal
"with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary
investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return of
articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.In
these six cases, one common legal issue is whether a Circuit Criminal
Court possesses the powerto conduct preliminary investigations which
is significant to determine whether items may be returned or not.
Issue: WON the items seized may be returned
Held: NO. The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the
stage of preliminary investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution
and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same
becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order would
virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence
indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the
privaterespondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the
customs official.Respondent Judge ignored the established principle
that from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or
control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with
seizure and forfeitureproceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of
enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of
Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court. Such exclusive
jurisdiction precludes the Court ofFirst Instance as well as the Circuit
Criminal Courtfrom assuming cognizance of the subject matter and
divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the
conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.
Enrile vs. Salazar
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The
warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose
from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino.
There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime
charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile
later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and
alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He
insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of
People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper
crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion
which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against him. He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour
and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the
warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous
record of the case from the prosecutions office that being, the
constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest
after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not
been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez
ruling should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable
cause in the case at bar.
Held: Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only
took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the
case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted
quite a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it
conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice
to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. L-64261. December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.
Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.
Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, law enforcement officers searched the offices of the
We forum and Metropolitan Mail newspapers. During the course of
the search, the law enforcement officers seized office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used
in the distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that
the seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of
real properties, which cannot be validly conducted under the strength of
a search warrant. It must be noted that real properties are not
susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal
which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties
of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real
property were invalidly seized under the disputed warrants.
Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article
415(5) of the civil code, machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are
considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court,
in which the abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In
the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
Tabujara vs People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008
Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA
in CAGR 63280 denying its petition for review and directing the MTC of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to proceed with the trial of criminal cases
nos.99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October 23, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that
the orders of the courts hould be annulled for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion because the finding of probable cause was
based solely on the unseen statement of Mauro de Lara who never
appeared during the preliminary investigation.
Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a
statement of awitness whom he did not personally examine under oath?
Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall
beissued only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by
the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant andthe witnesses he/she may produce and particularly
describing the person tobe seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico
gravely abused his discretion inissuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and
July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold petitioner liable for
trial and to issue warrant of arrest because it was based solely in the
statement of witness de Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally
examine and under oath; neither did he asked propound questions. He
merely stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he overlooked
that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conducting a
personal examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de
Laras allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this
falls short of the requirement imposed by the Constitution.
Delos Santos-Dio vs CA
the Court illumined that a clear-cut case of lack of probable cause exists
when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the
crime charged, viz:
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to
the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge
may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause x x x.
Ponsica vs Ignalaga
When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere
generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive statements of
particular acts, the warrant is not valid
HPS Software and Communication Corporation vs. PLDT
G.R. Nos. 170217 & 170694; 10 December 2012; Leonardo-de
Castro, J.
SUMMARY
The case is a consolidation of 2 petitions for review on certiorari each
seeking to annul a ruling of the CA setting aside an RTC ruling which
directed the immediate return of seized items to HPS and another CA
ruling which a rmed an RTC order to release the seized equipment. The
controversy originated from 2 search warrants for violation of RPC308
for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of PD401 for
unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipment
following the complaint of PLDT accusing HPS of conducting ISR or
unauthorized sale of international long distance calls. The warrants
were issued by the TC to seize instruments of the crime after being
satis ed with the a davits and sworn testimony of the complainants
witnesses that they saw telephone equipment inside the respondents
compound being used for the purpose of conducting ISR. After the
implementation of the warrants, the motions to quash the warrants and
return the things seized were led which were granted by the RTC.
There were 5 issues for the SCs resolution. Firstly, on whether PLDT
possessed the legal personality to le the petition in light of respondents
claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the SolGen which has the exclusive
and sole power to le appeals in behalf of People, SC held that PLDT [5] The quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not
did because the petition led did not involve an ordinary criminal action, the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond
nor a civil action, but a special criminal process. Secondly, on whether reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be
PLDTs petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright by subsequently led.
the CA since no MR was led before the RTC order, SC held that [6] A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
despite the non-ful lment of the requirement of MR ling, the peculiar searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid,
circumstances surrounding the case o ered exceptions to the rule, that otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by
is, PLDTs deprivation of due process when the RTC expeditiously both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
released the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants
without waiting for PLDT to le its memorandum and despite the fact
that no motion for execution was led by respondents which was
required. Thirdly, on whether PLDT was engaged in forum shopping
when it led a petition for certiorari despite the fact that it had previously
led an appeal from the RTC order, SC held that no, PLDT did not
because the 2 motions posed di erent causes of action, i.e., the appeal
that PLDT elevated to the CA was an examination of the validity of the
trial courts action of quashing the search warrants that it initially issued
while, on the other hand, the petition for certiorari was an inquiry on
whether the TC judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered the release of the seized items subject of the search warrants
despite the fact that the RTC order had not yet become nal and
executory. Fourthly, on whether the 2 search warrants were improperly
quashed, SC held that yes, they were because: (1) evidence presented
were su cient to show probable cause to issue subject warrants; and (2)
subject warrants werent general warrants because the items to be
seized were su ciently identi ed physically and their relation to the o
enses charged were also speci cally identi ed. Lastly, on whether the
release of the items seized was proper, SC held that no, it wasnt
therefore agreeing with one of the CA ruling that there was indeed
grave abuse of discretion.
DOCTRINES
[1] An International Simple Resale (ISR) activity is an act of subtraction
covered by the provisions on Theft, and that the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service is personal property, which can
be the object of Theft under Article 308 of the RPC.
[2] A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a
civil action, but a special criminal process.
[3] Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant,
is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper.