SECTION 16:
Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-
Avelino vs Cuenco
Facts:
Sen. Tan ada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session. However, on the next session day, Avelino delayed the opening of the
session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tan ada, Cuenco, Sanidad
and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together
with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tan ada from
delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tan ada et al were being blocked by
Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tan ada and Sanidad, among others, as
being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the
disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to
be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair
and he was immediately followed by his followers. Sen. Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Sen. President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tan ada was
subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads
Resolution that Cuenco be elected as the Sen. President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Sen. President.
ISSUES: Can Avelino be declared as the rightful Sen. President and Cuenco be
ousted?
RATIO:
No. The Court actually refuses to take cognizance of the case in view of the
political nature of the controversy. Supposing the Court has jurisdiction, it opines
that there was quorum in the voting for Cuenco to be the Sen. Pres. because when
the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, the House does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". A minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. There were 23
senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding
three senator. quorum is based on those actually present or capable to attend the
session
Santiago v. Guingona - 298 SCRA 756
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those
who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan
M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
-- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following
days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter
from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized
Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is
that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions
of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the
Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise
of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be
the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot
be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown
to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Osmena vs Pendantun
Facts:
House Resolution No. 59 was issued expressing that due to Rep. Osmenas
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, an investigative body was
created to seek the truth in the charges against the President of the Philippines,
and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmen a, Jr., to
appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or
subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmen a, Jr., fails
to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House. Osmena alleges the Resolution is a violation of his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Issue:
Whether or not the Resolution is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best
but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmen a conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The House has
exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
CASE DIGEST: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF
THE WHOLE
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which
directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion
of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the
election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee
was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the
Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted
the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations
before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then
chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the
Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole,
which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed
amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to
publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
1. Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an
indispensable party in this petition?
2. Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort?
3. Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole violative of Senator
Villar's right to equal protection?
4. Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to due process
and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the
Constitution?
5. Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required
for their effectivity?
HELD:
1. An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an
indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she
has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the
issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the
Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator
Madrigal's interest.
2. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues
presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal
questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
3. While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority
effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to
nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy
undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members
of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal protection.
4. The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The
Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has
been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings."
5. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members
are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published,unless such
rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect.
Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules
expressly mandate their publication.
PARTIALLY GRANTED
US vs PONS
34 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer
Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine.
The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5
barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that
the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained
tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and
introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the
sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the
Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case,
Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but
the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said
Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with
the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be
given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill in this particular case.
CASCO vs GIMENEZ
FACTS:
The Central Bank promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from payment of a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions, pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609 or the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law. Petitioner, which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, bought foreign exchange for the importation
of urea and formaldehyde, which are the main raw materials in the production of
resin glues. Petitioner sought for refund of margin fee paid relying on Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Monetary
Board refused to approve the refund because separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde are not in accordance with RA 2609.
ISSUE:
whether or not urea AND formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of
the margin fee.
HELD:
No. Sec. 2 of RA 2609 expresses that items exempt from the payment of the
margin fee include: urea formaldehyde, not urea AND formaldehyde. While
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues, the National Institute ofScience and Technology has
expressed, through its Commissioner, that urea formaldehyde, when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. This means that is clearly a
finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
Even if petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Also, the enrolled bill which uses
the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President.
ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS
Facts:
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No.
9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila
However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as
the version approved by the Senate.
Due to this, the Senate President, presiding officer, withdrew his
signatures from the House Bill No. 9266.
ISSUE:
If the presiding officer repudiate his signature in the enrolled bill, will the
enrolled bill prevails over the journal?
HELD:
NO.
Absent the attestation as a result of the repudiation of the presiding officer,
consequently there is no enrolled bill to speak of, and hence, the entries in the
journal should be consulted. In other words, in such a case, the journal must be
accepted as conclusive.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
[including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read
with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based
on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject
to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained
the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
[i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed
in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment
of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in
the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow
the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold
special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize
the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms
of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their
term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term
is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot
do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress
could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we
have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC,
on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This
Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without
the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional
or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on
very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not
to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should
have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in
the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during
the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem
is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to
be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character
of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

SECTION 17
Robles v. HRET
FACTS
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were
candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in
the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed
the winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1 st Dist. of
Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an elec. contest w/ HRET (electoral fraud &
irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation of votes. Santos, filed
Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his
Previous Motion. 1st Motion not acted upon by HRET, 2 nd Motion granted. Robles
claimed that the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion thus giving the Supreme Jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal,
does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an
established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal
retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes
effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a
party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is
dismissed.
ABBAS vs SET
166 SCRA 651 Political Law The Legislative Department Electoral Tribunals
Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-
elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was
at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members
from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy
and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas
suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring
the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified,
the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms
and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial
and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no
Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the
way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light
of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
LAZATIN VS HRET
FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office,
assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of
Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge
of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that
the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed
COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued
a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the
instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid.
The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to
proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election
Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board,
to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging
that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply
corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final
resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself,
against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction.
HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due
course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner
has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against
him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged
invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the
COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and
despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is
also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral
Tribunal.
BONDOC vs PINEDA
FACTS
On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a
letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein?
HELD:
NO. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for
the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura
from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a
grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.
GUERRERO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000
FACTS:
Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Farin as as a
candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte.
Ruiz alleged that Farin as had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman
in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for
said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the election, Farinas filed his
certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on
April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle
Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an
independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a
member of the House of Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR on the
ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUES:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farin as
is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives?
HELD:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held
that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of
respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of
candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and
assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the
COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning
candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman
is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is
self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
LAYUG vs COMELEC
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug filed pro se a Petition to
Disqualify3 (SPA No. 10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the
May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee.
He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai,
which is a religious sect.
it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 79415, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother
Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual
leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector
xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 88076, the Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections.
In their Answer, thereto,
Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a
religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a
party-list. Composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the
handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. Nominees from a political
party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
COMELEC Second Division found Layug to be a phantom petitioner by seeing or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that the
to it that pleadings, orders and judicial notices addressed to him are not received
by him because the address he gave and maintains is fictitious. Accordingly,
Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the Resolution
dated June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within
the reglementary period, said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was
entered, in the Book of Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010.
Proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of
Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not
proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to question the declaration of Velarde(SON)
AND Teing over questions of qualifications in which the House of Representatives
Tribunal has sole jurisdiction?
RULING:
the Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
(1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and
(2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to
its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C.
Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives.
Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-
List.
It is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.
Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they
sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution2 and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, that has
jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
SECTION 18
DAZA vs SINGSON
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments
in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis
of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the
petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from
the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal
from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution
providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President
of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from
their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body
pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
COSETENG vs MITRA
Facts:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse
political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives
formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that
as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority
membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson,
LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary
Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election
of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission
on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on
Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is
justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators,
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of
the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160
members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership
(which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded
out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were
apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in
the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis
of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit
in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity
of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.
Facts:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.
To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the
CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a
formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members
for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority
floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to
8 and that Tan ada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the
CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one
LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-
NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
Issue:
whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
representation in the Commission on Appointments
Held:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with
its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every
2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties
in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally
claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in
order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party
may have affiliations with the other party.
SECTION 21
Arnault v. Nazareno
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in
the New Bilibid prison. Denied.
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through
the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and
Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000
was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H.
Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H.
Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan
de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both
instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete
his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an
abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine
Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949,
as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a
special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The
special committee created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total
sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he
opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National
Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on
the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which
he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine
National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself
cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum
of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the
recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for
contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in
this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being
questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by
its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to
any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is
no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not
be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power
and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded,
Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important
question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000,
were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he
knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to
him unknown. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a
refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction
was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance
with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain
his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government
with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of
several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres.
Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look
into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six
(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One
of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the
Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to
probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already
earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by
the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.
Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an
individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature
of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and
produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and
if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the
Constitution.
Negros Oriental v. Sangguniang Panglungsod
155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an
investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of
public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac.
NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city.
Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the
power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power
lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions
performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the
LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses
and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or
legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for
the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant
of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance
of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative
agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process
and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to
punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of
said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the
subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for
being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect
for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right
to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.G.R. No. 180308, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are nominees
of the government to the board of directors of Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and Andal are also
directors and corporate of cers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By
virtue of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has also
substantial interest in PHC.
The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses
because of its huge operating expenses. In view of the losses and to protect the
governments interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the conduct of
an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and
PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors.
PSR No. 455 was referred to Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises (Senate Committee), which conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal
were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons. The Senate Committee
found an overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC, PHILCOMSAT
and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
governments interest in the said corporations.
Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the
jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
Privatization Management Of ce (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF)
and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT. Locsin and Andal led a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the hasty approval of the Senate of the Committee Report No. 312.
ISSUE:Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
HELD:
The Senate Committees power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed
upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, as follows:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees,
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On
this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted
Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct
legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the
very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude
given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled,
otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.
NERI vs SENATE
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA,
was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a
result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential
communications privilege. It pertains to communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique
constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power. - i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
SECTION 24
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred to
the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is
amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630
in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the
text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even
signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution
simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from
the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always
been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form.
There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings
on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third
readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings
on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.
SECTION 25
RIDERS
GARCIA vs MATA
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1600 (Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines) appropriates money for the operation of the Government for the
fiscal year 1956-57, paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy
matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers in the AFP.
Paragraph 11 provides:
...That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned
service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not
be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial
proceedings or upon their request...
Petitioner argues that his reversion to inactive status was in violation of
Paragraph 11 since he served for more than 10 years and was not court-
martialled nor did he request to be reverted.
Respondents contends that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained
therein and is violation of Art VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution,
(provision or enactment must relate to specifically to some particular
appropriation).
ISSUE:
Whether the paragraph 11 is a rider?
HELD:
Paragraph 11 was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation
measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against riders to the general
appropriation act. It was a new and completely unrelated provision attached to
the Appropriation act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more han one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered
inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly
included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly
connected with that subject.
Transfer of Funds
DEMETRIA vs ALBA
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177
(Budget Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the
National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the
Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes
upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President
to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined
by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of
responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic
after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was
enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only
disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public
funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question
null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its
constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power
is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17,
1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It
also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by
the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme
cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for
payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance
with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund,
which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3
on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall
not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA,
and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of
the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of
the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination
when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the
special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy
(e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy
of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related
to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing
the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or
legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve
the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition
on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10),
more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment
the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language
used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended
to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the
intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the
creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and
the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are
issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under
the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.
ARAULLO vs AQUINO
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expose claiming
that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by
the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It
is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment
of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it
is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer
to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end
of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous
projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it
may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the
DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
SECTION 26
SUBJECT and TITLE of BILLS
TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
DOCTRINES:
Validity of law; title of bill The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The
requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title.
Taxation; security against oppressive taxation The power to impose taxes is one
so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture
to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against
erroneous and oppressive taxation.
Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure The tax imposed by the DECREE
is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization
that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum
have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an
additional source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It
was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry,
the tax remains a valid imposition.
Undue delegation of legislative power The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of
authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or
personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the
Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the
grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not
stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
FACTS:
Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board".
P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and
a 30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local
government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this decree is set forth in its
preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced
the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in
the collection of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450
Million annually in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million
per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings
have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry, ...;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will
not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also
provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same
time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram
features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-
being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of the Constitution
for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and
social well-being;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of
the people [AGAIN, READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery
program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; (emphasis
supplied and certain passages omitted)
ISSUES:
The petitioner, among others, raised the following issues:
1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not
germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and
HELD:
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the
title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute
seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of
the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the
title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
and title.
Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of the
video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.
Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of
regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an
untapped source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of this is
evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.
The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to
answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the
rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.
Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the
videogram board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other
agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period,
the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.
This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."
The petition was DISMISSED.
Phil. Judges Association v. Prado
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it
did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O.
207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the
Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee
of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill,
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection
of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices
of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own
public functions.
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The
bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the
members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners
stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of
number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With
regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct
subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence.
In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law
of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met,
the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
FACTS
RA No. 3836, An Act Amending Subsection , Section 12 of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 186. As Amended by Republic Act Numbered 3096, allows a Senator
or a member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age and whose service must be at least
12 years. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. , a non-profit civic organization
duly incorporated under Philippine laws instituted this petition challenging the
constitutionality of the law in question.
ISSUE
Whether or not the little of RA No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter
expressed in the act.
HELD
No. It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of
section 12, subsection c of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to
members of GSIS. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of CA No.
186. The succeeding paragraph of RA. No 3836 refers to members of Congress
and elective in any manner to the subject of CA. No. 186 establishing the GSIS and
which provides both retirement and issuance benefits to its members.
The constitutionality requirement with respect to titles of statutes as
sufficient to reflect their contents is not met by the title of said RA. No. 3836, thus,
void.
Insular Lumber Company v. Court of Tax Appeals
104 SCRA 710 Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill
FACTS: Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a
licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor
fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act
No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax
refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax
refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is
only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to
be effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of
a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund
provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining
concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the
P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in
logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of
P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963
had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.
Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is
An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR
contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial
exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the
Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the
aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an
increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled
that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the
Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption
from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax
on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary
purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that
is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its
complete subject was held by Congress which passed it.
SECTION 27
Item Veto
CIR v. CTA (1990)
Facts:
Herein private respondent, Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock
corporation. True, it maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a
lounge, bar and dining room, but these facilities are for the exclusive use of its
members and accompanied guests, and it charges on cost-plus-expense
basis. As such, it claims it should have been exempt from payment of privilege
taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of R.A. No. 6110,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Tax Law." Section 191-A reads:
Sec. 191-A. Caterer. A caterer's tax is hereby imposed as follows: Xxx
(3) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes
and other eating places which are maintained within the preferences or
compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night
or day club by means of a connecting door or passage twenty per cent of their
gross receipts.
Where the establishments are operated or maintained by clubs of any kind or
nature (irrespective of the disposition of their net income and whether or not they
cater exclusively to members or their guests) the keepers of the establishments shall
pay the corresponding tax at the rate fixed above.
Republic Act No. 6110 took effect on September 1, 1969. By this virtue,
petitioners assessed the club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and
restaurants, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and
fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December
1970 in the amount of P32,504.96. The club protested claiming the assessment to
be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
The veto message reads:Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-(3), Article VI,
of the Constitution, however, I have vetoed the following items in this bill:xxx xxx
xxxpp. 44, SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which imposes a caterer's tax of
[3%] of the gross receipts of proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment
parlors and other eating places; [3%] of gross receipts from sale of food or
refreshment and seven percent on gross receipts from the sale of distilled spirits,
fermented liquors or wines, on proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars,
cafes and other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits, fermented
liquors, or wines are served; and [20%] of gross receipts on proprietor or
operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places
maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse,
cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club, or which are accessible to
patrons of said establishments by means of a connecting door or passage.
The protestation of the club was denied by the petitioner who maintains that
Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotels, motels,
resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels
which is essential to the tourism industry.
The Court of Tax Appeals, upon petition by the club, sustained the latter's
position reasoning that the veto message was clear and unqualified, as in fact it
was confirmed three years later, after much controversy, by the Office of the
President:
...we wish to inform you that Section 42 (which contains Sec. 191-A) of House Bill
No. 17839, now R.A. 6110 was one of the Sections vetoed by the President in his
veto message dated August 4, 1969, vetoing certain sections of the said revenue
bill.
Issue: Whether the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to
the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or proprietors of
restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are
maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses.
RULING:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and
resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. But, as
mentioned earlier also, the CTA opined that the President could not veto words or
phrases in a bill but only an entire item. Obviously, what the CTA meant by "item"
was an entire section. We do not agree. But even assuming it to be so, it would
also be to petitioner's favor. The ineffectual veto by the President rendered the
whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at all and it, therefore, became
law as an unconstitutional veto has no effect,
whatsoever.
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a
particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate.
In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies
the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax
rate. To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie
the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the
expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the
collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be
prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill
would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile.
Gonzales v. Macaraig
191 SCRA 452 (1990)
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress
presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. On 29
December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to
have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a
General Provision, were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution
381 (Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name
of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the
Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special
and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill
of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes) was adopted. On 11 April
1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara,
Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr.,
John Osmen a, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani,
Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tan ada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S.
Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members of the
Committee on Finance of the Senate and as substantial taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by this case, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the
constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to
enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio
Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson,
Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo
Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688.
No Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.s cause is
anchored on the following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and
Section 16 (FY 90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. The Solicitor General, as
counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is a political
question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et
al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a
rider because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits
the Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the
appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the
Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670
(4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto
provisions or other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill.
Issue:
whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions
of an Appropriations Bill
Held:
 No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27
of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the
President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general
rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto
power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less
than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the
executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of
the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the
Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not
changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the
President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that
any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true
sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation
to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the
entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY
90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the
Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies
dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90)
prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations
disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory
authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The
exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no
means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway
granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned,
the sourcing to come only from savings. More importantly, for such a special
power as that of augmentation from savings, the same is merely incorporated in
the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is one the primary and
specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public
treasury. It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power
of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered
a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure.
Issue:
whether Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions, not
items, in the appropriation bill
Held:
No. Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides: Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in
the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items
are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have
to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the
source indicated by the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office.
Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in
respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labeled as
provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items
for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.
Issue:
whether the Legislatures inclusion of qualifications, conditions,
limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill was
proper
Held:
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is
the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct
items of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds.
Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or
proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The
veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the
items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect
whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real
sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a
separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must
exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. It is not enough that a provision
be related to the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated.
Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must
exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation that they logically
belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness. Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY
90) must also be held to be inappropriate conditions. While they, particularly,
Section 16 (FY 90), have been artfully drafted to appear as true conditions or
limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. Further, neither of them shows
the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason is that
items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the
enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when
compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact,
Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) themselves provide that an item shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation
for the specific purpose is provided in this Act. Herein, there is no condition, in
the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY 89) and
16 (FY 90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings;
in other words, a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an
appropriation bill.
Issue:
whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of
two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1]).
But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.s
argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is nothing to override has lost
force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld. There need be
no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere
to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due
deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other.
Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of governmental powers remains on even keel.
Note:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that,
the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can
be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went
one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY
90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of
the Presidents veto power.
Note: Executive Impoundment
Definition: This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate
budget authority of any type.
Argument against executive impoundment: Those who deny to the President
the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a
specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of
the President to implement the project and to spend the money appropriated
therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution
imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Argument for executive impoundment: Proponents of impoundment have
invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President.
Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly
by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the Presidents role as
Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is
the same provisions invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public
interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of
a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect
the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17,
1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It
also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the
pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by
the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme
cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for
payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance
with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund,
which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3
on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall
not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA,
and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of
the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of
the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination
when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the
special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy
(e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy
of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related
to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing
the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or
legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve
the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition
on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10),
more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment
the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language
used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended
to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the
intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the
creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and
the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are
issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under
the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.

BENGZON vs DRILON
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797)
that were repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices,
and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore
these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government
officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No.
16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that
RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of
those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tan ada v. Tuvera. Hence,
the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was
never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations
Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired
justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress
made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the
judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the
pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that
portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices
to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President
was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension
that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed.
The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme
Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some
portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion
which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
SECTION 28
Uniform and Equitable
Tan v. Del Rosario Digest
Tan v Del Rosario
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the
NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the
following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner
contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being
merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections
21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also
contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due
process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax
power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires
that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike
both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long
as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)
the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law
applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to
increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the
income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present
global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this
classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in
promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory
legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax
treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually
and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.
Commissioner v Lingayen Gulf Electric (1988)
Commissioner v Lingayen Gulf Electric GR No L-23771, August 4, 1988
FACTS:
Lingayen Gulf Electric Power operates an electric power plant serving the
municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, Pangasinan, pursuant to municipal
franchise granted it by the respective municipal councils. The franchises provided
that the grantee shall pay quarterly to the provincial treasury of Pangasinan 1%
of the gross earnings obtained through the privilege for the first 20 years (from
1946) and 2% during the remaining 15 years of the life of the franchise. In 1955,
the BIR assessed and demanded against the company deficiency franchise taxes
and surcharges from the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5%
on gross receipts from 1948 to 1954. The company asked for a reinvestigation,
which was denied. CTA, however, ruled for Lingayen. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court can inquire into the wisdom of the franchise
2. Whether a rate below 5% is violative of the uniformity clause in the
Constitution
RULING:
5. No, the Court does not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of
the Act. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the legislature are in the
nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the
general government. Also, the Court ought not to disturb the ruling of the Court
of Tax Appeals on the constitutionality of the law in question.
6.
7. No. The legislature has the inherent power not only to select the subjects
of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never been deemed
violative of the equal protection clause. Herein, the 5% franchise tax rate
provided in Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have universal
application. Section 259 expressly allows the payment of taxes at rates lower than
5% when the charter granting the franchise precludes the imposition of a higher
tax. RA 3843, the law granting the franchise, did not only fix and specify a
franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts but made it in lieu of any and all taxes, all
laws to the contrary notwithstanding. The company, hence, is not liable for
deficiency taxes.
EXCLUSIVE EDUCATIONAL USE
Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning
duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of
Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below,
was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial
court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding
that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential
purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational
purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is
derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes
(leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of
the director).
Commissioner v. Court of Appeals 298 SCRA 83 YMCA)
Rule: Tax Exemption if claimed must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a
language TOO CLEAR TO BE MISTAKEN.
Private respondent YMCA, a non-stock, non-profit institution which conducts
various programs beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious, educational,
and charitable objectives LEASES OUT a portion of its premises to small shop
owners, like restaurants and canteen operators deriving substantial income from
such.
So seeing this, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment to private respondent (YMCA) for Deficiencies on the following: 1.
Income tax, 2. Expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and
3. Withholding tax on wages.
YMCA opposed arguing that its rental income is not subject to tax mainly because
of the provisions of Section 27 of the NIRC (National Internal Revenue Code)
which provides that civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but
operate exclusively for promotion of social welfare and those organized exclusively
for pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable businesses SHALL NOT BE
TAXED.
ISSUE: Is the contention of YMCA tenable?
HELD: NO. Tax Exemptions are:
Test of Exemption: the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
ConstitutionCited jurisprudence:YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue:
YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for
its members, which do not constitute business, but an institution used
exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is
entitled to be exempted from taxation.
No. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the
doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions. Furthermore, a
claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable
from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption
"must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be
mistaken."
1. STRICTLY CONSTRUED:
Because taxes are the LIFEBLOOD of the nation. The court has always applied the
Doctrine of Strict Interpretation in construing tax exemptions stated in the
language of the law.
2. MANIFEST & UNMISTAKABLE:
Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be Manifest
and Unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based.
3. BASED ON LANGUAGE TOO CLEAR TO BE MISTAKEN:
Thus the claimed exemption must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a
language TOO CLEAR TO BE MISTAKEN.
YMCA loses this case.
Lung Center v. Q. C.
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in
Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the
Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen,
medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to
other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial
purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts
paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients,
both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the
petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about
Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor
denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same
was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds
are used exclusively for charity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes
notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of
its property for commercial purposes.
HELD:
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its
charter and articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable
institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes
simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or
confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as
the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it
is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to
private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimi juris)
Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:
income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and
equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by
the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and
benefit of the Lung Center; and
taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases
(expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).