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1. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
Facts:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically
as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,
1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for
employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10,
1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application
form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial,
sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter
handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company policies.

Issue:
Whether the alleged concealment of married civil status can be a ground to terminate the services
of an employee.

Law Applicable:
Art. 136(now 134). Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as
a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Case History:
Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained
the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. The labor arbiter being of
the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private
respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated
against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter. It ruled that private
respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer,
PT & T.

Ruling:
No.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company
is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion
and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by
law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor
laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were
dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the
labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to

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stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of
her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of
the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively
required.

Opinion:
There has been a reneged advocacy in the empowerment and mandate of equal opportunities and
protection for the women in the the workforce especially with the enactment of R.A. 9710 or the
Magna Carta of Women. Thus not only are they under the protection of the labor code but also
under the mantle of a special law recognized by the UN Human Rights Council.

2. STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, vs.


RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, G.R. No. 164774,
April 12, 2006
Facts:
Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an
employee of the company, whom he married. Before marriage, Josephine Ongsitco the manager
advised the couple that one of them must resign if they decided to get married pursuant to a
company policy to which Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997 Comia was hired by the company.
She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them the company policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella was also hired on
July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married

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man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to
immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states that the company policy was decreed pursuant
to what the respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. On appeal to the
NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated
August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned policy violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution
and the Labor Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled on the side of the respondents. Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage. It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were found
fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to
show how the marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be detrimental to its business operations.
It must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management
prerogative. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.

Opinion:
A Management Policy must be adhering first to the fundamental law.

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3. DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. LOLITA VELASCO, G.R. NO. 153477, March 6, 2007

Facts:
Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte Philippines (petitioner) on
October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest
assignment was as Field Laborer.
On June 16, 1987, respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. On May 4, 1991,
respondent, thru a letter, was again warned in writing by petitioner about her absences without
permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was
imposed against her.

On September 14, 1992, another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding her absences
without permission during the year 1991-1992. Her vacation entitlement for the said
employment year affected was consequently forfeited.

In view of the said alleged absences without permission, on September 17, 1994, a notice of
hearing was sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for violating the
Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for excessive absence without permission on August
15-18, 29-31 and September 1-10, 1994. The hearing was set on September 23, 1994.
Respondent having failed to appear on September 23, 1994 hearing, another notice of hearing
was sent to her resetting the investigation on September 30, 1994. It was again reset to October
5, 1994.

On January 10, 1995, after hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of respondent effective
January 16, 1994 due to excessive absences without permission.
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner asserting that
her dismissal was illegal because she was on the family way suffering from urinary tract infection,
a pregnancy-borne, at the time she committed the alleged absences.

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Issue:
Whether private respondents dismissal was in violation of Article 137(2) of the the Labor Code

Law Applicable:
Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 137. Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any employer:
(1) To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any
woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits
provided under this Code;
(2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement
due to her pregnancy; or
(3) To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear that
she may again be pregnant.

Case History:
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that the
respondent was an incorrigible absentee; that she failed to file leaves of absence; that her
absences in 1986 and 1987 were without permission; that the petitioner gave the respondent
several chances to reform herself; and that the respondent did not justify her failure to appear
during the scheduled hearings and failed to explain her absences.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, finding private respondents dismissal as
Illegal. The NLRC held that, under the company rules, the employee may make a subsequent
justification of her absenteeism, which she was able to do in the instant case; that while it is not
disputed that the respondent incurred absences exceeding six (6) days within one employment
year a ground for dismissal under the company rules the petitioner actually admitted the fact
that the respondent had been pregnant, hence, negating petitioners assertion that the
respondent failed to give any explanation of her absences.

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In affirming the NLRC, the CA held that absences due to a justified cause cannot be a ground for
dismissal; that it is undisputed that the respondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the
absences in question; that the certification issued by a private doctor duly established this fact;
that it was no less than petitioners company doctor who advised the respondent to have rest-
in-quarters for four days on account of a pregnancy- related sickness; that it had been duly
established that respondent filed leaves of absence though the last had been refused by the
company supervisor;

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners contention that the cause for the dismissal was gross and habitual neglect
unrelated to her state of pregnancy is unpersuasive.

The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondents sickness was pregnancy-related
and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondents services because in doing so,
petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an
employee on account of the latters pregnancy.

Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 137. Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any employer:

(2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement
due to her pregnancy; or

The petitioner stresses that many women go through pregnancy and yet manage to submit prior
notices to their employer, especially if there is no evidence on record indicating a condition of
such gravity as to preclude efforts at notifying petitioner of her absence from work in series. [12]
But it must be emphasized that under petitioners company rules, absences may be subsequently
justified.[13] The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that
the respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules
and policy; that the respondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that this
fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had been duly proven through substantial evidence;

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that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the petitioners supervisor refused
to receive them; that she could not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing condition; and
that the petitioner, in the last analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a
prohibited act.

Opinion:
The law recognizes and is emphatic with women undergoing the pangs of pregnancy as it is part
of a womans life. Therefore, it is unduly prejudicial and unethical to terminate ones services on
account of pregnancy.

4. General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
(General Santos City), G.R. No. 178647, February 13, 2009
Facts:

In 1990, the Company experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic
crisis. To curve the negative effect, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement
Program (ERP). Meanwhile, there was a memorandum issued mandating to put on hold all
requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions. Because several
availed of the ERP, vacancies were created. This prompted the Union to negotiate with the Labor
Management Committee (LMC) for filing up of the vacancies. No resolution was reached on the
matter. Faced with the freeze hiring, the company engaged the services of JLBP Services
Corporation that provides manpower services.

Union filed in 2002 with the Natl Conciliation and Mediation Board (MCMB) a Notice of Strike on
the ground of ULP for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. Parties
failed to file an amicable settlement. The Company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction
with DOLE. On 2003, the NLRC ruled that the Company is not guilty of ULP. On appeal, CA
affirmed the decision and found that contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management
prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this petition.

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Issue:

Whether contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to ULP.

Law Applicable:
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS

Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any
of the following unfair labor practice:

a. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;

b. To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a


labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

c. To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization;

d. To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration


of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its
organizers or supporters;

e. To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership
in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those
employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are
not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable
fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective

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bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article
242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent;

f. To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for


having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;

g. To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

h. To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or

i. To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

Case History:
The Company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with DOLE. On 2003, the NLRC ruled
that the Company is not guilty of ULP. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision and found that
contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances.

Ruling:
No. Unfair Labor Practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The
prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a
CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practice.

Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor
practices. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its
allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge.

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Opinion:
The Labor Code has sufficiently defined what constitutes unfair labor practices, the court can only
apply what has already been settled.

5. Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa SAMMA-LAKAS sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng


Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) v. SAMMA Corporation, G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner, SAMMA-LIKHA, filed a petition for certification election in DOLE. Respondent moved
for the dismissal of the petition. In an Order of Med-Arbiter, the petition was dismissed on the
ground of (i) lack of legal personality; (ii) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees; and (iii) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Issue:

Whether the respondent has a legal right to assail the certification election.

Law Applicable:
The pronouncement of this Court concerning management interference in certification elections
is wen worth repeating:

On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective
bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say
the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. (Trade
Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano)

Case History:
Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for
cancellation of petitioner registration. The Secretary of Labor, treating petitioners MR as an
appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter.

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Meanwhile, the DOLE revoked the charter certificate of petitioners local chapter. Respondent
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed the decision of Secretary of Labor.
Hence, this petition was filed by petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election
among its rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that,
in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail
the certification election.

The petition is granted. The record of the case is remanded to the office of origin for
determination of the status of petitioners legal personality.

Opinion:
The employer cannot interfere with union matters as it is beyond their management prerogative.

6. Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-


National Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries, G.R. No.
165756, June 5, 2009

Facts:

The respondent union is a certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
the Hyatt Regency Manila (HRM), a hotel owned by petitioner (Company). In 2001, the company
suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown aggravated by the 9/11
incident in the USA. The company decided to cost-cut by implementing among others reducing
work weeks in some hotel departments.

In August 2001, the union filed a notice of strike due to a bargaining deadlock before the Natl
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). In the course of the proceedings, the union accepted the
economic proposal. Hence, a new CBA was signed. Subsequently, the company decided to
implement a downsizing scheme which the union opposed. Despite the opposition, a list of the

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position declared redundant and to be contracted out was given to the union. A notice of
termination was also committed by the company to the DOLE. Thereafter, the company engaged
the services of independent job contractors.

The union filed a notice of strike. A conciliation proceeding was again conducted but to no avail.
The union went on strike.

Issue:

Whether the CAs decision declaring the strike legal is accordance with law and established facts.

Law Applicable:
Procedurally, a strike to be valid must comply with Article 263 of the Labor Code, which
pertinently reads:
Article 263. x x x

xxxx

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized


bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of
lockout with the [Department] at least 30 days before the intended date thereof.
In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the
absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may
be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However,
in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance
with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting
where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall
not apply and the union may take action immediately.

(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and

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regulations as the [Secretary] of Labor and Employment may promulgate.

(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the [Department]
to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement.
Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of
days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the
employer may declare a lockout.

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the


total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a
lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the
corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be valid for the
duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when
the strike or lockout vote was taken. The [Department] may at its own initiative or
upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the [Department]
the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout,
subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Case History:

The Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The NLRC
orders the suspension of the conciliation proceedings. However, the LA already issued decision
declaring the strike legal. On appeal by the company, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and
declared the strike to be illegal. On petition, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and
declared the strike legal. Hence, this petition.

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Ruling:
Yes. A valid and legal strike must be based on strikeable grounds, because if it is based on a
non-strikeable ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded
on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts
are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists,
then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a
union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted
such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently,
such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless.

Here, the union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the
latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by
both parties under a CBA. Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel
committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on
ULP, since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioners
retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the union, the strike,
by exception, may be considered legal.

Opinion:
The union cannot be punished for engaging in an illegal strike whom they believe to be in good
faith to be valid even though proven to be groundless.

7. National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries Manila Pavilion
Hotel Chapter vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009

Facts:
A certification election was conducted on June 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of
Holiday Inn. Petitioner and another union (HIMPHLU) refer the case back to Med Arbiter to
decide which among those votes be opened and tallied. 22 votes were segregated because; (1)

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eleven were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal is still pending
before CA, (2) six were cast by those already occupying supervisory positions; and (3) five were
cast by probationary employees, and pursuant to the CBA, such employees cannot vote.

Issue:
Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification election should be
allowed to vote.

Law Applicable:
Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate


bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This
principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees
in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining covers all
aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the
certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file
employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the
selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to
their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election. The law refers to all the employees in the bargaining unit.
All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the bargaining
unit.

Case History:
The Med Arbiter ruled to open the votes cast by dismissed and by those holding supervisory
employees. The union appealed to SOLE, arguing that the vote of probationary employees should

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likewise be opened and tallied. The SOLE affirmed the decision of Med Arbiter. On appeal, CA
affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition

Ruling:
Yes. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because
probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six
other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc.
v. Ferrer-Colleja, 180 SCRA 749, holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote.

Petition is granted. The decision of CA is annulled and set aside.

Opinion:
The law did not make any distinction as to who can join or vote in the union as long as they are
employees not exempted by Labor Code.

8. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation Cooperative


G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009

Facts:
On May 1997, petitioner and respondent entered into a CBA effective until December 1999. The
CBA included No-Strke, No-Lock-out clause. On several dates, which were legal holidays and
peak season, some of the members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner
treated the refusal as a concerted action which is a violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause.
Thus, it meted the workers 30-day suspension and filed an illegal strike against them. The
attempted settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike

Issue:
Whether the strike staged by respondent is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts
and violation of the No-Strike, No-Lockout clause of the CBA.

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Law Applicable:
Apropos is the following ruling in Sukhothai Cuisine v. Court of Appeals:

Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or
purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly
paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:

a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or


b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.

The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted
slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of the vessels; where the strikers used
unnecessary and obscene language or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work, and
circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice; where the
protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons of a place of business or
against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade customers to withdraw their
patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and approaches
to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and
coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists and
threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the
workplace. Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of
customers. (emphasis supplied)

In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited Activities ' (a) x x x

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xxx

x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during an illegal
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

Case History:
Despite the conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on
strike. The company filed a motion to re-open the case which was granted by LA. In its decision,
LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed it in per curiam decision.

In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike on
the ground of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declare the second strike illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and
set aside the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position.

Ruling:
Yes. Of the participants in the illegal strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal
strike in the case of union officers or knowingly participated in the commission of violent acts
during the illegal strike in the case of union members, the records do not indicate. While
respondent Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no indication if he
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The Court not being a trier of facts, the remand of the
case to the NLRC is in order only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of
individual respondents and their respective liability, if any.

While the strike is the most preeminent weapon of workers to force management to agree to an
equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not
only the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and
progress of society and economic well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it

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must be used sparingly and within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public
welfare.

The petition is granted.

Opinion:

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